A Miniature History of the American Revolution

New Directions

2011-11-13T00:51:00.001-06:00

At the beginning of this month, I wrapped up a series of daily posts on the battle of White Plains, and the events leading up to it. As much as I enjoyed working on that project, I'm glad to be back to a slower pace of blogging. In the upcoming weeks there were be scattered posts on the historyof the Revolutionary War interwoven with posts on military miniatures.

Several of the history posts will be concerned once again with the White Plains campaign. Among other things, I plan on arguing that George Washington deserves more credit for his decision making during the White Plains campaign than he has received and that the battle of Pell's Point was an important event of the Revolutionary War -- but not for the reasons that authors say it was important.

As far as miniatures are concerned, my plan is to paint up some additional units that served in the southern campaign of the American Revolution. The first ones I’ll be painting are the Volunteers of Ireland (background, below) and the 63rd Regiment of Foot (foreground, below). The figures are primed andready to go (click to enlarge).

To the best of my knowledge, no one makes 15mm-high Volunteers of Ireland soldiers. The ones shown here are modified American light infantry figures sold by Stone Mountain Miniatures. Hopefully, when painted, they'll come out looking something like John D's 25mm-high version of the regiment.

Having these two units painted will help give me some additional options for modeling battles in miniature. The Volunteers of Ireland fought at Camden and Hobkirk’s Hill. The 63rd Foot fought at Hobkirk’s Hill and Blackstock’s Plantation.

Mapping Pell's Point

2011-11-06T01:34:00.001-05:00

Several weeks ago, one of the folks on RevList, expressed an interest to me in seeing Revolutionary War-era maps of the New York campaign combined with modern satellite imagery. I recently came up with a way to do this using nothing more sophisticated than Microsoft Excel and MS Paint. The results appear below.

The Revolutionary War map used for this comparison is from a circa 1776 Charles Blaskowitz map that shows the movements of the British army from Throg’s Neck, to the roads leading to White Plains. Below is a segment of his map showing the place where the battle of Pell’s Point was fought.

Below are a series of images that show the area today either alone or in combination with part of the Blaskowitz map. The modern maps and the Blaskowitz map don’t align perfectly, but on the whole the comparison shows that the Blaskowitz map was executed skillfully and that it does providea good guide as to the appearance of the area in 1776.

In the part of the Blaskowitz map shown below, the British can be seen landing at Pell's Point on the bottom of the map and marching inland along a road leading north (towards the top). The skirmish site is at upper right.

A note to readers: Most of the people who visit this blog use Microsoft Explorer as their web browser. My recommendation is to use Google Chrome – when you click on one image, it will bring up a slideshow of full-sized versions of all of the images in a given post. It’s a pretty cool effect. Please note, however, that if you have a slow connection, the images in the slideshow may not instantly load.

Below is a copy of the map I used in my first blog post on Pell's Point. This roughly shows where the British and American units were in relation to the modern terrain during the main phase of the fighting. The red lines correspond with roads present at the time of the battle.

Three American units are represented by blue circles. They are: 1 = Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment, 2 = William Shepard’s 3rd Continental Regiment, and 3 = Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. These units were commanded by Colonel John Glover.

Two British units are represented by white circles with red letters. They are 1 = the British light infantry, and 2 = the British grenadiers. Some British and Hessian units that were in the vicinity at the time are not marked on the map for lack of clear guidance from the source material. For example, the 1st Jager Company and possibly Colonel Carl von Donop’s brigade of Hessian grenadiers were somewhere in the wooded area between #1 and #2 (cf. the accounts by Archibald Robertson and Carl Leopold Baurmeister [list]).

November 1, 1776

2011-11-01T00:00:00.003-05:00

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for November 1st: The Americans pulled back from White Plains; the British abandoned the pursuit of Washington’s army.

Previous entry: October 31st.

In the early morning hours, the last of the Americans in the entrenchments pulled back. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion) noted in his journal:

“This morning our guards come off and leave the lines in the centre of the town called White Plains, and to distress the enemy [they] burn all the barns of hay and grain and houses, where the inhabitants had stores of wheat and corn and also stacks and barracks of hay and grain.”

The British officers looked with surprise on the burning buildings and empty defensive works. When they rode forward they could see American forces encamped on a line of hills to the north, but the American army had been so reduced by sickness and other causes, that they thought this force was no more than a rear guard. Major Stephen Kemble wrote of this force, “[we] suppose them to be about 7,000 strong”.

The British concluded that the rest of Washington’s men had fled even deeper into the hills, which meant that their attack plans had gone to naught. However, as the British were not particularly eager to attack the American lines in the first place, there was undoubtedly some sense of relief.

Lieutenant-General William Howe opted not to attack this “rearguard”. He later explained that the Americans’ actions “plainly” indicated a “desire to avoid coming to action,” and added “I did not think the driving their rearguard further back an object of the least consequence.”

Instead, the British advanced and occupied the Americans’ former entrenchments. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) wrote: “At half after 9 o’clock we got under arms, and pushed into the village of the White Plains, which the enemy had just abandoned, and the army advanced at the same time”.

This advance brought the armies within range of each others’ cannons. Major-General William Heath, on the left of the American army, wrote:

“In the morning, the British advanced, with a number of field-pieces, to the north of the road near late headquarters… and commenced a furious cannonade on General Heath’s division, which was nobly returned by Captain-Lieutenant Bryant and Lieutenant Jackson, of the artillery.”

During this cannonade, according to Heath, George Washington rode up to him and expressed concern over one of Heath’s regiments that was separated by a hollow from the rest of the division. “Take care that you do not lose them”, he warned. But the British did not attack this force. Instead, Heath wrote, the British guns withdrew from his front, “made a circuitous movement, and came down toward the American right.” As these guns moved into position, they were fired upon by some American heavy guns. Heath noted that “upon the discharge” from the American guns, the British crews “made off with their field-pieces as fast as their horses could draw them. A shot from the American cannon, at this place, took off the head of a Hessian artilleryman. They also left one of the artillery horses dead on the field.”

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Lee’s division) witnessed the British movement towards the American right. He wrote:

“we saw the enemy advance down the hill towards us in three parties[,] one party coming towards the road the other [two] through a swamp[.] We sent some 25-pound shot to them that stopped some before they could get over the bridge to us and the others passed through the swamp to a hill opposite to us… we sent over some shot… that knocked down a light horse”. [see footnote]

British Major Stephen Kemble summarized the day’s action by writing: “[they] cannonaded us… the greatest part of the day; we lost 9 men [killed] by this business. Six of them Hessians.”

Isolated fatalities were noted by several British officers.

Ensign Henry Stirke wrote:

“We received a few straggling shot, which did no execution. The 15th regiment had one man killed, and another wounded, by the rebel cannon”.

Captain Francis Rawdon observed:

“We had some cannonading with their rear guard, by which my brother John (who is an excellent soldier in every respect) was very near killed. Two men who stood close to him were killed by a twelve-pounder, and a splinter of one of their skulls stuck in his thigh, but did not hurt him much.”

American losses were even fewer. Apparently one man in Levi Paulding’s New York militia regiment was killed, and two other New Yorkers were wounded. Their brigade commander (George Clinton) commented, “I have heard of no other injury done [to] us.”

Brigade-Major Benjamin Tallmadge characterized the American withdrawal from White Plains as something of a victory: He claimed that Howe was “baffled” by this maneuver, and as a result gave up the pursuit of Washington’s army. Thus, Washington’s army, brought perilously close in this campaign to capture or collapse, had survived to fight another day.

William Howe had a rather different perspective. Howe did not wish to place his own army at risk by chasing the Americans into the wild hills on the New York-New England border. He was sure, too, that if Washington did make a firm stand, it would only be on some set of steep and heavily fortified hills. Howe had had enough of this business. He felt he could now turn his back on Washington without losing face and proceed once again to wage war on his own terms. Howe’s preference was to capture Fort Washington and consolidate his hold on the New York City area. His developing plan also came to include sending expeditions into New Jersey, Rhode Island, and, if all went well, the American capitol at Philadelphia.

Heath noted that during the rest of this day, November 1st:

“The two armies lay looking at each other, and within long cannon-shot [range]. In the night time the British lighted up a vast number of fires, the weather growing pretty cold. These fires, some on the level ground, some at the foot of the hills, and at all distances to their brows… seemed to the eye to mix with the stars, and to be of different magnitudes. The American side, doubtless, exhibited to them a similar appearance.”

The bright orange flames licked the cold November sky, and another chapter of the Revolutionary War came to a close.

Footnote: Smith indicated that this event took place on Friday the 31st. Friday was November 1st. A comparison of Smith’s description of other events occurring at the time with the journals of other Americans suggests that he was right about it being Friday and wrong about it being the 31st.

Concluding Comment: The standoff at White Plains did not end on November 1st. For a few days the two armies glowered at each other, and during that time more men were killed in little brushes or perished from illness. The British left White Plains on November 5-6 and soon joined Knyphausen’s division near Manhattan. On November 16th, Howe captured Fort Washington and completed the conquest of Manhattan.

October 31, 1776

2011-10-31T00:10:00.009-05:00

Synopsis for October 31st: The British assaults on White Plains and Fort Washington were postponed by rain; Washington was alarmed by the state of his army; Washington ordered the troops to a stronger post.

Previous entry: October 30th; next: November 1st.

A downpour struck White Plains in the early morning hours. The rain increased Lieutenant-General William Howe’s unease, but he did not alter his plans to attack the American army at dawn.

George Washington was expecting an attack, and he had the Americans lie on their arms in the fortifications at White Plains. Brigadier-General George Clinton (Heath’s division) wrote:

“Our lines were manned all night… and a most horrid night it was to lie in cold trenches. Uncovered as we are, drawn on fatigue, making redoubts, fleches, abatis and lines… I fear [these things] will ultimately destroy our army without fighting. This I am sure of, that I am likely to lose more in my brigade by sickness occasioned by extra fatigue and want of covering, than in the course of an active campaign is ordinarily lost in the most severe actions”.

At 5 AM, the British army was in motion. A powerful blow was to be made on the left, where Mirbach’s and Lossberg’s Hessian brigades, the 4th British brigade, the Brigade of Guards, the 2nd and 3rd light infantry battalions, and the 5th and 49th regiments of foot assembled for battle. These forces were entrusted to Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister who apparently had replaced Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton as Howe’s favored subordinate.

Clinton commanded the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right. The forces in this sector included the 1st Light Infantry Battalion, the 1st British brigade, the Hessian grenadiers, the British Reserve, and the 28th, 35th, 44th, 64th, and 71st regiments of foot.

As the troops formed up and moved into place, they looked upon the forbidding American lines. The British redcoats and Hessian bluecoats were cold, wet, and no doubt fearful of what was to follow.

Then, around 7 AM, the men were told that the attack was cancelled, and they marched back to camp.

Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister later wrote: “a heavy rain, fortunately perhaps for the army, frustrated all our plans. The enemy, well advised of everything[,] were prepared and ready to repulse us, sleeping on their arms that night.” Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton noted that the rain “much swelled the river,” and Charles Stedman claimed that the rain “made the ground so slippery that it was thought it could not be possible to mount the face of the hill”.

The cancellation was only temporary. Headquarters ordered that “the army [is] to be in readiness to move upon the shortest notice.” Commissary Charles Stedman claimed that “the weather proved fine about noon, but the commander in chief did not think proper to put his former intentions in execution.” Instead, Howe seemingly preferred to wait until early the next morning when poor visibility would partially mask the attack.

Baurmeister wondered why Howe did not take other steps to hide his intentions:

“Much might have been done on our left wing to mislead them [i.e., the Americans]. For example, we might have built some bridges [over the Bronx] and constructed roads to them—but nothing was done.”

Although the British did not make a major feint, Washington was anxious for their flanks. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Harrison (Washington’s secretary) wrote:

“The enemy are throwing up some lines and redoubts in our front, with a view of cannonading as soon as they are ready, and at the same time [they] are extending their wings further by our right and left. It is supposed that one of their objects is to advance a part of their troops, and seize… the bridge over Croton River, that the communication may be cut off with the upper country” [i.e., upstate New York].

Washington dispatched Brigadier-General Rezin Beall to secure this crossing with several regiments of Maryland militia.

Washington was unable to detach many men because his army was rapidly losing strength. Harrison noted:

“Our army is decreasing fast: several gentlemen who have come to camp within a few days have observed large numbers of militia returning home on the different roads”.

General orders from American headquarters on this date admonished the troops for being away from the fortifications:

“The General, in a ride he took yesterday, to reconnoitre the grounds about this [place], was surprised and shocked to find both officers and soldiers straggling all over the country, under one idle pretence or other, when they cannot tell the hour or minute the camp may be attacked, and their services indispensably necessary. He once more positively orders that neither officer [n]or soldier shall stir out of camp without leave… The provost marshal is to take up all stragglers; and it is enjoined upon all officers to seize every man who fires his gun without leave, and to have him tied up immediately and receive twenty lashes.”

Once again, there were small clashes between the armies.

Lieutenant Colonel William Henshaw (Moses Little’s 12th Continental Regiment, Nixon’s brigade) was stationed on the American right where the armies lay especially close together. He wrote:

“The enemy are now encamped within gunshot of us, so that there is a continual firing of small arms…. We daily expect an engagement with the enemy.”

Brigadier-General George Clinton noted that on this date one Captain Van Wyck was killed while commanding a company of rangers.

“He went out in the morning, with about thirty men, fell in with about one hundred of the enemy, and at once, not far distant from their lines, charged them with spirit, gave them a brisk fire, but unfortunately when loading his piece the second time, was shot in the head and fell dead. His lieutenant shot down the man who killed his captain. The enemy fled. Our party brought off their captain [i.e., Van Wyck]… He was a good man and valiant officer.”

During the day, a British deserter provided Washington with a detailed description of the planned British attack. Washington decided that the new position his men had begun to occupy on the night of October 28-29 was a better place to meet this attack. He ordered the troops to withdraw to the new position during the night.

This image uses a White Plains map of 1891 to illustrate the positions held by Washington and Howe at White Plains. The road network is substantially more developed at this time than it was in 1776; nevertheless, the area was still predominately rural (unlike today). The American positions were chiefly within the blue lines, and the British positions were chiefly within the red lines.

Washington’s initial position was on high ground north just north of the village of White Plains, with his flanks bounded by the Bronx River and St. Mary’s Lake. Part of the British army crossed the Bronx River on October 28, and remained on the high ground west of the river in the days that followed. These forces were opposite the American right, but to attack this flank they had to re-cross the Bronx River.

Washington’s initial position was a good one, but his army was more secure in the position they occupied on the night of October 31-November 1 (the area at the top of the map).

October 30, 1776

2011-10-30T00:00:00.002-05:00

Synopsis for October 30th: The American medical service cannot cope with the sick; William Howe prepared to attack upper Manhattan and White Plains; Henry Clinton balked at Howe’s plans.

Previous entry: October 29th; next: October 31st.

The American army at White Plains grimly held on to their redoubts and trenches. The men continued to suffer from a lack of food, medicine, proper clothing, and all other materials necessary for an army’s survival.

The Americans had established a general hospital in a church in the town of North Castle, 9 miles to the northeast, but it was poorly staffed due to a shortage of physicians.

The head of the American medical service (Doctor John Morgan) later wrote:

“I cannot but feel for the hospital surgeons [at North Castle], who… were suddenly overwhelmed with numbers of sick sent to them, as well as the wounded … at a time when an engagement was considered as inevitable, there were few at hand to give aid… the wounded, who were conveyed to the hospitals, naturally demanded the attention of the whole body of surgeons, to administer aid to them.”

The sick, it seems, were largely left to the informal care of their comrades.

Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote, “Today it being rainy[,] Luke was taking not well[, and] I still being not well… we both set out for North Castle hospital… and we got within 4 miles of the hospital and put up for this night.” They slept in the woods and then completed the arduous journey, unaided, in the morning.

Doctor John Pine, who had recently joined Washington’s army, found that it was impossible to take care of the sick men from his native Maryland. He wrote that on the 29th:

“I waited on Doctor Morgan, Director-General of the hospitals here, for medicines, etc. He told me he had nothing to say to the Maryland troops, and that it was not his business to supply the regimental surgeons with medicines, and that it must have been a mistake [for Maryland]… to send their surgeons here without them and think they were to be supplied here.”

Dr. Pine then sought out Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion, who was 15 miles away and recuperating from two wounds (one in the arm, one in the hip) he received during the fighting on Chatterton’s Hill. Smallwood wrote a letter for the doctor which gave Pine a little leverage.

When Dr. Pine sought out Dr. Morgan again, he was told that “I might have some few things, if I could go to New-York for them”.

Pine was aghast:

“I told him by the time I went there and got back, that… most of the [sick] Maryland troops would be expired. He told me he could not help it, and that medicines were very hard to be got.”

After the battle of White Plains, Lieutenant-General William Howe deferred attacking the American army again partially because he did not like the strength of the American position and partially because he decided to wait for reinforcements. Once those reinforcements arrived, he planned on attacking Washington’s army. At the same time, he wanted Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen to attack the American forces in upper Manhattan.

According to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Knyphausen’s preparations went smoothly:

“[The Americans had] demolished the bridge at Kings Bridge and those called Dyckman’s bridge and Williams’ bridge. Lieutenant General von Knyphausen had them repaired and sent the Grenadier Battalion Köhler and Wutginau’s and Stern’s [i.e., von Stein’s] regiments across the river to encamp at places where they would be safe from the fire of the rebels’ batteries. The rest of his corps encamped behind Fort Independence”.

The Kingsbridge area, circa 1776 (click to enlarge). On October 30th, Knyphausen occupied Fort Independence and crossed some men into upper Manhattan.

Howe’s reinforcements reached him late in the day. Among these troops was the 46th Regiment of Foot. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham, later wrote:

“On the 30th of October we embarked at Hellgate, and after a passage of about thirty miles by water in flat-bottomed boats, we landed at New Rochelle, and immediately marched to join General Howe’s army at the White Plains.” [see footnote]

After the reinforcements arrived, Howe could see no cause for further delay. He had, it seems, accepted that a full-scale attack on the American works was necessary and inevitable. That night (10pm) he issued orders for the troops to be under arms at 5 am. In the ensuing attack, Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister would command the left division of the army, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right.

In the past, Howe typically consulted with Clinton about any major moves, but the campaign severely strained their relationship. Howe made his plans without Clinton’s input, and Clinton took the omission badly. Clinton later complained that “I received [the] orders late at night”, and protested that he was not ready to attack. In fact, Clinton had convinced himself there would be no further attacks on the American army, because he had previously argued against it. He then reminded Howe of his objections:

“I took the liberty of intimating to the Commander in Chief that it might prove rather hazardous to make any attack from center or right until we saw what would be the effect of one from the left… and that even then they [i.e., the attacks] ought to be pressed with caution, as the enemy had a very strong position in the gorges of the mountains behind them.”

Howe was already aware of these concerns and he ignored Clinton’s protests.

Footnote: Captain William Bamford (40th Foot) recorded in his journal that these reinforcements embarked on the 29th.

October 29, 1776

2011-10-29T00:11:00.006-05:00

Synopsis for October 29th: The Americans strengthened their position at White Plains while the armies skirmished; Knyphausen advanced to Kingsbridge, and Howe vacillated.

Previous entry: Evening of October 28; next: October 30th.

During the night, the American army at White Plains began moving their camps to a line of hills to the north. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Spencer’s division) wrote, “at 2 o’clock [AM] the troops in General Spencer’s division had orders to strike their tents and carry them out about one mile and an half by hand and then return to the lines [i.e., the fortifications at White Plains].” The troops then made the roundtrip again, this time carrying their camp kettles and other cooking utensils. It was hard work for the exhausted men. Trumbull wrote that many “had no sleep at all” “though they had been engaged almost all day [yesterday] with the enemy and had been obliged to wade through a river [the Bronx] and were very wet”. “I was afraid I should be sick for I had been in the river almost all over, and could not change [clothes]… [and] was much fatigued with the action… but I am today well and vigorous”. Trumbull praised God for seeing him safely through the battle, and wrote that this protection “lay me under new obligations to live wholly to God and to seek his honor and glory in the little time I have to live in the world”.

Joseph Plumb Martin, who was also in the 5th Connecticut, was not so fortunate. He recalled:

“During the night we remained in our new made trenches, the ground of which was in many parts springy; in that part where I happened to be stationed, the water, before morning, was nearly over [our] shoes, which caused many of us to take violent colds… I was one who felt the effects of it, and was… sent back to the baggage to get well again, if I could, for it was left to my own exertions to do it, and no other assistance was afforded me. I was not alone in my misery; there were a number in the same circumstances. When I arrived at the baggage, which was not more than a mile or two, I had the canopy of heaven for my hospital, and the ground for my hammock. I found a spot where the dry leaves had collected between the knolls; I made up a bed of these, and nestled in it, having no other friend present but the sun to smile upon me. I had nothing to eat or drink, not even water, and was unable to go after any myself, for I was sick indeed. In the evening, one of my messmates found me out, and soon after brought me some boiled hog’s flesh (it was not pork) and turnips, without either bread or salt. I could not eat it, but I felt obliged to him notwithstanding; he did all he could do—he gave me the best he had to give, and had to steal that, poor fellow;--necessity drove him to do it to satisfy the cravings of his own hunger, as well as to assist a fellow sufferer.”

Beginning in the morning and continuing throughout the day, the two armies skirmished.

For Captain Peter Kimball (Stickney’s New Hampshire militia regiment), it was a tense day:

“we lay on our arms. The enemy appeared all round on every hill[,] the riflemen [were] firing on their guards. One of the riflemen [was] killed this day and at night our guard was alarmed. Another fired and killed Captain Buntin.”

Matters were no easier for the British light infantry across the way. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) noted:

“I had a very troublesome picket, at the entrance of the village[;] at daylight my sentries were fired on which continued by popping shots all day. I had one man wounded”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General William Howe had an enormously difficult decision to make. He had at last caught up with Washington’s army, but he loathed sending his troops against the Americans’ entrenchments. Although he was sure he could carry these works, he believed the assault would lead to the death of many of his men and produce little strategic gain.

The obvious alternative was to force the Americans from their trenches by threatening their flank. He later stated that this was his preference:

“I do not hesitate to confess, that if I could by any manoeuvre remove an enemy from a very advantageous position, without hazarding the consequences of an attack, where the point to be carried was not adequate to the loss of men to be expected… I should certainly adopt that cautionary conduct, in the hopes of meeting my adversary upon more equal terms.”

But on this occasion, Howe was unable to find a low-risk way of turning the Americans’ flank. Thus Howe was left with the unpalatable choices of either making a bloody frontal assault, or retreating.

Howe vacillated. His official excuse for not attacking was that the situation at White Plains had changed and that he now needed more men. He later explained:

“The enemy drew back their encampment on the night of the 28th, and observing their lines next morning much strengthened by additional works, the designed attack upon them was deferred, and the 4th brigade, left with Lord Percy, with two battalions of the 6th brigade were ordered to join the army.” [see footnote]

Curiously, when pressed by Parliament several years later to explain his conduct at White Plains, Howe mysteriously claimed that “I have political reasons, and no other, for declining to explain why that assault was not made”.

To the west, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen continued his operation against upper Manhattan. First he detached Major General Martin Conrad Schmidt with regiments von Wissenbach and von Huyne to hold Valentine’s Hill. Then he proceeded with grenadiere battalion Köhler and regiments Wutginau, von Stein, and Buenau to Kingsbridge.

Footnote: The 4th brigade consisted of the 17th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot. The two regiments drawn from the 6th brigade were the 44th and 64th regiments of foot. The 6th brigade had been encamped near Mamaroneck since October 25th.

October 28, 1776 (Part 4)

2011-10-28T00:42:00.010-05:00

This is the fourth of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the evening of October 28th: The battle of White Plains came to an end; Washington prepared for the next British move; Knyphausen occupied Mile Square.

Previous entry: Afternoon of October 28; next: October 29th.

The battle of White Plains gradually petered out after the British and Hessian infantry broke the American line on Chatterton’s Hill.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled that after his regiment was driven from Chatterton’s Hill, “We fell back a little distance and made a stand” and at the same time “detached parties [were] engaging [the enemy] in almost every direction. We did not come in contact with the enemy again that day, and just at night we fell back to our encampment.”

The “detached parties” probably included some groups of Continentals on the northern end of Chatterton’s Hill. Colonel John Haslet of the Delaware Regiment recalled:

“The left of the regiment took post behind a fence on the top of the hill with most of the officers, and twice repulsed the light troops and [light] horse of the enemy; but seeing ourselves deserted on all hands, and the continued column of the enemy advancing, we also retired.”

Captain William Hull of the Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment stated that his command also held out for awhile:

“Colonel Webb’s regiment maintained the conflict for a time, after the other part of the brigade had abandoned the field, and it had the honour to receive the particular thanks of Washington for its bravery and orderly retreat.”

One observer (Sergeant John Smith of Lippitt’s Regiment) wrote, “this battle lasted from 9 in the morning till night tho the hottest of the battle… was but about 20 or 30 minutes”.

During this prolonged phase of the fighting, Washington sent some reinforcements towards Chatterton’s Hill, including Brigadier-General Rezin Beall’s brigade of Maryland militia (the Maryland “flying camp”) and Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. However, as Jacob Francis of Sargent’s Regiment noted, before these troops could cross the Bronx, “the British got possession of the hill, and we retreated back to the camp.”

Afterwards, the British made no further attacks. According to Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jäger), “Since the soldiers had climbed over nothing but hills, cliffs, and stone walls the whole day, constantly dragging their guns over all obstacles, it was impossible to ask anything more from them.”

The British lost around 230 men during the battle: Most of these losses occurred in the 28th Foot (67 men), 35th Foot (about 60 men), 49th Foot (28 men), and Regiment von Lossberg (about 46 men). The Americans lost more than 200 men [see Footnote 1], but the exact total is not known. Among the regiments that had considerable losses were the Maryland Battalion (44 men), the 3rd New York Regiment (34 men) and the Delaware Regiment (32 men).

During the evening, the British discovered that Chatterton’s Hill was of dubious value. Charles Stedman noted: “The possession of that hill… [did] not enable the royalists to annoy their camp, for it rose so gradually from the Bronx that its crest was not within random cannon shot”. In other words, the British could hit the main American defensive works with their cannon, but the range was too great for the fire to be accurate or destructive.

Stedman couldn’t understand why the Americans had detached a part of their army to defend Chatterton’s Hill. He wrote: “The reason of their occupying” the hill “is inexplicable… It seems to have been a blunder of General Washington’s to have placed so considerable a corps entirely out of the capacity of supporting the rest of the army”.

Stedman believed that if the British had attacked the center of the American line instead (as he wanted), the men on Chatterton’s Hill would have had a hard time aiding in the defense. [see Footnote 2]

The Americans kept close watch on the British, not knowing when another attack might come.

Jacob Francis (Sargent’s Regiment) recalled, “I stood sentinel that night in a thicket between the American camp and the hill, so near… that I could hear the Hessians”.

Joseph Plumb Martin observed that:

“The enemy had several pieces of field artillery upon this hill [Chatterton’s], and, as might be expected, entertained us with their music all the evening. We entrenched ourselves where we now lay, expecting another attack. But the British were very civil, and indeed they generally were, after they had received a check from Brother Jonathan, for any of their rude actions”.

Meanwhile, Washington decided that the American army would be in a stronger position if it occupied the hills further north (agreeing with the assessment Major-General Charles Lee made that morning). Therefore, some of the troops were ordered to begin moving their camps to the new position.

Washington expected that the British would either launch a major assault against his defensive works or move to threaten his flank. To shore up his right flank, he sent William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) to occupy high ground between White Plains and the Hudson River.

Alexander’s brigade moved quickly, and without their baggage. It was a hard night for men already exhausted by the day’s fighting. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford of the Delaware Regiment had been shot in the arm on Chatterton’s Hill (it was a flesh wound). He wrote that he and his men spent the night “without a tent or anything but the ground to lay on, and not a blanket to cover us”. Similarly, Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered that “This night we lay in the woods without tents or blankets. It was cold and we made a fire in the woods,--turned our feet to the fire and slept comfortably, although it snowed in the night.”

Situation of the armies on October 28th (click to enlarge). While Howe fought Washington at White Plains (11), Knyphausen advanced on the Mile Square (9) / Valentine's Hill area.

Off to the west, Colonel John Lasher had a detachment of men guarding the landward approaches to Manhattan. After the British raided Mile Square he was ordered to abandon his position and join the American army at White Plains. On this date he burned the American barracks at Kingsbridge and set out on a wide arch that would take his men north and east towards White Plains, and around the British army.

The same day, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, occupied Valentine’s Hill with his division of Hessians. These troops missed cutting off Lasher’s command by a matter of hours. However, by seizing Valentine’s Hill they did cut off the landward retreat of the American forces garrisoning upper Manhattan.

Footnote 1: I’ve estimated a greater American number of casualties than are stated by most authors. If one simply totals up all the numbers available in Peter Force’s American Archives, the total is 53 killed, 96 wounded, and 24 missing (or 175 in total). The relatively high proportion of killed to wounded is at least partially due to the fact that two regiments reported only the former total, not the latter. After estimating, through extrapolation, the number wounded in these regiments, the total American loss becomes about 197.

Doctor John Pine of Maryland wrote after the battle, “the number of killed and wounded, as the report is in the camp, amounts only to about 90, but from the wounded I saw myself in the hospital, and adjacent houses, there must at least be an hundred and twenty or thirty wounded[,] the number of killed I don’t know.”

Documents show that there were several casualties between the Pennsylvania State troops and New Hampshire militia not listed in Force. Brooks’ and Moseley’s Massachusetts militia regiments likely suffered a fair number of casualties on Chatterton’s Hill, but no return exists of their losses. A conservative estimate of losses in these units, added to the losses in the other units, raises the American total to close to the reported British total.

Footnote 2: To the best of my knowledge, Washington did not describe why he chose to defend Chatterton’s Hill. Tallmadge claimed he alerted Washington to the presence of American militia on Chatterton’s Hill and the advance of British troops in their direction. Afterwards, Washington directed several units to the hill, and ordered a trusted officer (John Haslet) to take command of the militia. Perhaps Washington intended simply to support troops (militia) that were well-positioned to impede the British attack. In other words, the defense of Chatterton’s Hill may have been another manifestation of Washington’s general strategy of harassing the British at every opportunity (consider how Washington used his forces on the 21st, the 26th, and the morning of the 28th). The Staten Island raid, the American defense of Pell’s Point and the engagement near East Chester can be understood in these terms as well.

October 28, 1776 (Part 3)

2011-10-28T00:15:00.012-05:00

This is the third of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the afternoon of October 28th: British and Hessian regiments attacked and seized Chatterton’s Hill.

Previous entry: Midday on October 28; next: Evening of October 28.

The first British troops to attack the Americans on Chatterton’s Hill were Regiment von Lossberg and the 28th and 35th Regiments of Foot. They crossed the Bronx River under cover of a cannonade

The Americans had two or three of their own field pieces on the hill. Colonel John Haslet (Delaware Regiment) tried to gall the approaching British infantry with one piece. However:

“[the gun was] so poorly appointed, that myself was forced to assist in dragging it along [in] the rear of the regiment. While so employed, a cannon-ball struck the carriage, and scattered the shot about, a wad of tow blazing in the middle. The artillerymen fled. One alone was prevailed upon to tread out the blaze and collect the shot. The few that returned made not more than two discharges, when they retreated with the field-piece.”

The two British foot regiments crossed at a ford, and made it across the river quickly. Then, according to Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige, they “turned to their left and came up to storm the entrenchment” occupied by the Massachusetts militia regiments of John Moseley and Eleazer Brooks.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall sent the Maryland battalion to the support of the militia. According to a Maryland officer, “Colonel [William] Smallwood… was ordered to march down the hill and attack the enemy... and a smart contest ensued, in which the enemy gave way”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton attributed this setback to the officer leading this advance. He observed that when the British “suddenly found themselves exposed to a very heavy fire… The officer who led them… marched forward about twenty paces… halted, fired his fuzee, and began to reload (his column remaining during the time under the enemy’s fire)”. Watching this, he predicted “that they would break. It happened as I said [it would]”.

To the south, Regiment von Lossberg also experienced difficulty. According to Johann Caspar Ries, “[we] found a little river [the Bronx] before us, though which we had to wade, the water going into the cartouche pouches of most of the men. Scarcely were we through the water, than a rain of shot fell upon us, by which many were wounded.”

Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister claimed that the regiment was exposed because “On the far side [of the river there] is a steep slope, where the right wing had to halt while the left maneuvered to the front”. Ries added that “the left wing had to march through a wood that had been set alight, so that many men burnt the shoes on their feet.”

The Hessians advanced towards the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions, which were jointly led by Colonel William Douglas. The Connecticutians claimed that they drove back the Hessians just as the Massachusetts militia and Marylanders had with the British regulars.

One of the Connecticutians wrote that:

“[the Hessians] came up in the front of Colonel Douglas' s regiment, and we fired a general volley upon them, at about twenty rods distance, and scattered them like leaves in a whirlwind; and they ran off so far, that some… ran out to the ground where they were… and brought off their arms and accoutrements, and rum, that the men who fell had with them, which we had time to drink round… before they came on again.” [see Footnote 1]

More succinctly, Colonel Gold Silliman of the 1st Connecticut wrote, “We gave them a heavy fire which made them retreat but they soon returned”.

The British, it seems, intensified their cannonade after this initial check; possibly some field pieces were wheeled closer to the hill. Haslet described this as a “cannonade from twelve or fifteen pieces, well served, [which] kept up a continual peal of reiterated thunder.” A Connecticutian recalled, “the air and hills smoked and echoed terribly with the bursting of shells: the fences and walls were knocked down, and torn to pieces, and men' s legs, arms, and bodies, mingled with cannon and grape-shot all round us.” [see Footnote 1]

The British formed a line of battle on the lower part of Chatterton’s Hill. The troops crowded together, as there was little room for them to form. According to Thomas Sullivan (49th Regiment of Foot):

“Lieutenant Colonel [Robert] Carr, who commanded the 35th Regiment, behaved with great courage, being obliged to force the left of his battalion through the right wing of the 28th… The 49th Battalion formed as well as the ground would admit, [and] every company engaged as they came up… The hill was so narrow that the right-hand company of our battalion had scarcely room to form”.

The 49th Foot found itself opposite the Delaware Regiment. According to Thomas Sullivan:

“Captain[-Lieutenant William] Gore, who commanded the right wing of our battalion, seeing the rebels which we engaged on the right wing were dressed in blue, took them to be Colonel Rall’s brigade of Hessians, and immediately ordered us to cease firing; for, says he, ‘you are firing at your own men.’ We ceased for about two minutes. The rebels, hearing him, made answer that they were no Hessians, and that we should soon know the difference”.

Other British units moved to threaten the flanks of the American position.

Regiment von Rall advanced against the American right flank, with Regiment von Knyphausen and the Lieb Regiment in support.

According to Major John Brooks of Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment, the American left flank was threatened by “a body of light infantry and jaegers”.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall spotted the threat to the left, and he ordered Webb’s Regiment, (and perhaps also the 3rd New York Regiment), partially down the hill to meet them.

This movement greatly exposed the men to British cannon fire. According to Second Lieutenant Elisha Bostwick of Webb’s Regiment:

“a cannon ball cut down Lieutenant Young’s platoon which was next to that of mine[;] the ball first took the head of [Nathaniel] Smith, a stout heavy man and dashed it open, then it took off Chilson’s arm… it then took [Joel] Taylor across the bowels, it then struck Sergeant [Amasa] Garret of our company on the hip [and] took off the point of the hip bone[.] Smith and Taylor were left on the spot. Sergeant Garret was carried [away] but died the same day[.] Now to think, oh! What a sight that was to see within a distance of six rods those men with their legs and arms and guns and packs all in a heap[.] There was not a better sergeant in the army than Sergeant Garret when the soldiers were murmuring, weary, without shelter cold and hungry[;] he would stir about among them build fires and get them all in good humour and cheerful.”

For this cost, Webb’s Regiment succeeded in turning back the threat to the left. According to Captain William Hull, “After a sharp conflict, the object was completely attained.”

Meanwhile, the British began a major push against the right and center of the American position. Their line now included, from left to right, Regiment von Lossberg, the 28th, 35th, and 49th regiments of Foot. Behind these troops crowded up two battalions of Hessians grenadiers (von Linsing and Block) and the 5th Regiment of Foot.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled:

“There was in our front, about ten rods distant, an orchard of apple trees. The ground on which the orchard stood was lower than the ground that we occupied, but was level from our post to the verge of the orchard, when it fell off so abruptly that we could see the lower parts of the trees. A party of Hessian troops [Regiment von Lossberg], and some English [the 28th Regiment of Foot], soon took possession of this ground: they would advance so far as just to show themselves above the rising ground, fire, and fall back and reload their muskets. Our chance upon them was, as soon as they showed themselves above the level ground, or when they fired, to aim at the flashes of their guns—their position was as advantageous to them as a breastwork.”

Lieutenant Enoch Anderson (Delaware Regiment) remembered:

“Now began our firing with small arms on the hill and a hot fire was kept up for some time. Many lives were lost on both sides and many were wounded.”

He remembered in particular seeing a mortally wounded soldier of his regiment who “fell to the ground” and “in falling, his gun fell from him.” Then “He picked it up,--turned on his face,--took aim at the British, who were advancing,--fired,--the gun fell from him,--he turned over on his back and expired.”

This map (click to enlarge) illustrates the position of British (red numbers) and American units (blue circles) during the British assault on Chatterton’s Hill.

I relied on Thomas Sullivan's account for the placement of the British foot regiments on Chatterton's Hill. Other details about the construction of this map can be found in the post for Midday on October 28.

Although the Connecticut battalions and Delaware Regiment offered stiff resistance, the units in between soon began to collapse. First, according to Haslet, “The [Massachusetts] militia regiment behind the fence fled in confusion, without more than a random, scattering fire” [see Footnote 2].

The Maryland battalion gave way next. According to Lieutenant William Harrison:

“We were badly disposed to receive the attack of the enemy’s small arms, and unfortunately much exposed to their artillery, which flanked us so heavily as to render the post tenable but a short time. The matter was ended by a confused and precipitate retreat on our part”.

The remaining American units were soon hard pressed. Haslet wrote that “the first three Delaware companies [those closest to the retreating troops] also retreated in disorder, but not till after several were wounded and killed.”

The Connecticut state troops found themselves almost surrounded. The collapse of the center of the American line allowed British and Hessian troops to threaten the left flank of the Connecticut men, while at the same time Regiment von Rall drove against their right flank.

One of the Connecticut men wrote:

“they advanced in solid columns upon us, and were gathering all round us ten to our one. Colonel Douglas's and Silliman's regiments fired four or five times on them as they were advancing, and then retreated; but not till the enemy began to fire on their flanks. Colonels Silliman, Douglas and Arnold behaved nobly, and the men [afterwards] gained much applause.” [see Footnote 1]

Most of the Connecticutians who were killed or wounded were struck down when they fled. According to Colonel Silliman, “we were obliged to retreat which we did through a most furious fire from the enemy for half a mile for so far there was nothing to cover us from it…”

Joseph Plumb Martin recalled:

“finding ourselves flanked and in danger of being surrounded, we were compelled to make a hasty retreat from the stone wall. We lost comparatively speaking, very few at the fence: but when forced to retreat, we lost, in killed and wounded, a considerable number. One man who belonged to our company… said, “Now I am going out to the field to be killed;”… and he was—he was shot dead on the field.”

Footnote 1: This passage is from an anonymous letter published in newspapers after the battle. Ezra Stiles believed the author was Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull of the 5th Connecticut State Battalion.

Footnote 2: Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige of Moseley’s Regiment offered this curious recollection:

“While they [the British] were rallying [after the first unsuccessful attack], the Highlanders came down, stacked their arms, drew their broadswords, and formed in rear of the [British] infantry. Then they all came up. Our men opened fire as before, and soon the enemy’s infantry opened, and the Highlanders marched into our entrenchments, and the Americans retreated down the hill westwardly.”

None of the British or Hessian accounts make mention of a Highlander regiment participating in this attack (though there were two with the army – the 42nd and 71st regiments). This description would make considerably more sense if Hessian grenadiers were substituted for highlanders. The Hessian grenadiers were placed in the second line, and although they were not armed with broadswords, they did carry short swords called hangers.

October 28, 1776 (Part 2)

2011-10-28T00:03:00.009-05:00

This is the second of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for midday on October 28th: American infantry assembled on Chatterton’s Hill; Charles Stedman spotted an opportunity to destroy Washington’s army; the armies exchanged cannon fire; William Howe moved to seize Chatterton’s Hill.

Previous entry: Morning of October 28; next: Afternoon of October 28.

Washington decided to support the American troops on Chatterton’s Hill. It seems he first approached the elite Delaware Regiment (Alexander’s brigade, Spencer’s division) and ordered their commanding officer, Colonel John Haslet, to lead his regiment to the hill and take command of the militia there.

He then ordered Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall’s brigade (Lee’s division) to advance to the hill as well.

Among the men setting out with McDougall’s brigade was Second Lieutenant Elisha Bostwick of Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment. Bostwick recently had a “sickness called bilious fever” which, he said, “took all the hair off my head”. He rejoined his regiment yesterday, but he was “still unable to do duty or guard”. As the troops marched off to battle, “some thought [I was] unable to go with them,” but, he said, “I chose to be with the company”.

Meanwhile, the head of the British army reached high ground south of the village of White Plains. For the first time, the British could clearly see how the American army was deployed. Commissary Charles Stedman wrote:

“They were encamped on a long ridge of hill, the brow of which was covered with lines hastily thrown up… The weakest part was the centre. The slope of the hill was very gradual in the direction of the road by the Court House. The lines were by no means formidable, not being fraized; and the rockiness of the soil prevented the ditch from being made of any troublesome depth.”

Stedman was convinced that “an assault… on the centre of the enemy’s works… would have been destruction to the Americans.” He noted that “When our army came in sight their tents were standing.” He could see the Americans were beginning to move their tents and baggage and this “together with the movement of troops backward and forward, in evident uncertainty of purpose, gave an extraordinary picture of alarm.” Thus, “victory was to be reasonably expected, not only from the valor of our troops, but from the confusion of the enemy.”

Unknown to Stedman, the British also had another advantage: the center of the American position was chiefly manned by inexperienced state troops and militia. With very few exceptions (e.g., Hand’s 1st Continental Regiment, Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment), the Continentals were deployed on the left and right flanks of the army.

No immediate assault, however, could be made, as a number of units were still coming up.

As the British moved up and deployed, some of their artillery began to cannonade the mishmash of American troops on Chatterton’s Hill. Haslet recalled:

“We had not been many minutes on the ground, when the cannonade began, and the second shot wounded a militia-man in the thigh, upon which the whole regiment [of militia] broke and fled immediately, and were not rallied without much difficulty.”

In the center of the line, the Americans had a small stroke of success. Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) noted, “about 12 o’clock the [British] light horse came near us[;] we fired and killed three men and 3 horses and took one of the enemy after a smart engagement.”

Major-General William Heath gave a different account of this incident:

“about twenty light-horse [of the 16th Light Dragoons], in full gallop, and brandishing their swords, appeared on the road leading to the courthouse, and now directly in front of General Heath's division. The light-horse leaped the fence of a wheat-field at the foot of the hill, on which Colonel Malcolm's [New York militia] regiment was posted, of which the light-horse were not aware, until a shot from Lieutenant Fenno's field-piece gave them notice, by striking in the midst of them, and [sending] a horseman pitching from his horse. They then wheeled short about, galloped out of the field as fast as they came in, rode behind a little hill in the road, and faced about, the tops of their caps only being visible to General Heath where he stood.”

Back on Chatterton’s Hill, Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall’s brigade came up and deployed for battle. Lieutenant Bostwick described “the place of action” as “a large field of fenced lots”. The British had a clear of these men, and Bostwick complained that they “were wholly exposed to the fire of their artillery”.

McDougall’s men were situated behind the Delaware Regiment, and Haslet noted that “Some of our officers expressed much apprehension from the fire of our friends so posted.” In other words, they didn’t want to be accidentally shot in the back if the British attacked. “On my application to the General [McDougall], he ordered us to the right, formed his own brigade on the left, and ordered [Colonel Eleazer] Brooks' Massachusetts Militia still farther to the right, behind a stone fence.”

This “stone fence” was part of a primitive fortification defended by Colonel John Moseley’s Massachusetts Militia Regiment. Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige remembered that “Brook’s regiment, with some other troops, went into it. Brook’s regiment was next to us.”

All of this activity caught the eye of the British general staff.

Lieutenant-General William Howe later reported that “Colonel [Johann Gottlieb] Rall, who commanded a brigade of Hessians on the left, observing this position of the enemy and seeing a height on the other side of the Bronx unoccupied by them from whence their flank might be galled… took possession of it with great alacrity to the approbation of Lieutenant-General [Leopold Philip von] Heister who was acquainted with this movement by Sir William Erskine.”

Stedman thought that because the Americans were pushing men onto the hill, Howe was led “to imagine this hill to be of more importance than it… appeared to be”. Probably too, the British concluded that if the hill was worth taking, now was the time to take it. Major Stephen Kemble observed that the hill “might have cost us dear had we attempted it the next day”, that is, after the Americans had properly fortified it.

Howe wrote:

“Upon viewing the situation orders were given for a battalion of Hessians to pass the Bronx and attack this detached corps [of Americans on Chatterton’s Hill], supported by the 2nd brigade of British under the command of Brigadier-General [Alexander] Leslie, and the Hessian grenadiers sent from the right commanded by Colonel [Carl von] Donop, giving directions at the same time for Colonel Rall to charge the enemy’s flank”.

The Americans watched these developments with awe.

Captain William Hull (Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment, McDougall’s brigade) remembered:

“we discovered at a distance the approach of the British army. Its appearance was truly magnificent. A bright autumnal sun shed its full luster on their polished arms; and the rich array of dress and military equipage, gave an imposing grandeur to the scene, as they advanced, in all the pomp and circumstance of war, to give us battle.”

This map (click to enlarge) illustrates the position of British (red numbers) and American units (blue circles) prior to the assault on Chatterton’s Hill.

There is some uncertainty as to exactly which American units were on the hill. The units represented are ones for which the source material clearly places on Chatterton’s Hill (as opposed to some other area of combat, such as the Mamaroneck Road). The location of these units on the map is somewhat approximate; particularly important to this reconstruction were the accounts by Joseph Plumb Martin, Benjamin Trumbull, Thomas Craige, John Haslet, John Brooks, and William Hull.

The British units represent the whole of von Heister’s column, minus several small commands (two battalions of the 71st Foot and some Provincials). This reconstruction of their deployment is based chiefly on the Charles Blaskowitz map of the battle, and, to a lesser extent, the accounts by Carl Leopold Baurmeister and Johann von Ewald. There are several discrepancies among these sources, which makes this representation more approximate than that for the Americans. For example, Blaskowitz did not show the 1st British brigade on his map; the location I’ve assigned to it follows from Ewald’s account, but it cannot be considered definite.

The village of White Plains and the Americans’ main defensive works are off-map to the upper right. Heister’s column advanced from the bottom of the map along the York (or East Chester) Road. Donop’s Hessian grenadiers marched into this area from the right edge of the map, probably near the units marked #6 and #7.

I commented on the development of this map in a couple of previous posts (here and here).

October 28, 1776 (Part 1)

2011-10-28T00:00:00.004-05:00

This is the first of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the morning of October 28th: The British marched to White Plains; Washington dispatched men to meet their advance; the armies skirmished south of White Plains.

Previous entry: October 27th; next: Midday of October 28.

The British army struck their tents at 5am. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) thought the troops began to march at 7:30am. Once again, the British advanced in two columns, with Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister commanding the left column and Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton the right.

That morning, George Washington and some of his general officers began to reconnoiter the hills surrounding the American position at White Plains. According to Heath, “to the southwest there appeared to be a very commanding height, worthy of attention.” This was Chatterton’s Hill. Heath noted, “When [we] arrived at the ground, although very commanding, it did not appear so much so as other grounds to the north… ‘Yonder,’ says Major-General [Charles] Lee, pointing to the grounds [to the north]… ‘is the ground we ought to occupy.’”

Washington agreed to inspect it, but at that moment “a light-horseman came up in full gallop, his horse almost out of breath, and addressed General Washington, ‘The British are on the camp, sir.’ The General observed, ‘Gentlemen, we have now other business than reconnoitring,’ putting his horse in full gallop for the camp, and followed by the other officers.”

At headquarters, Washington was informed by Colonel Joseph Reed that the American pickets had been driven in, and that the army was prepared for action. Then, according to Heath, “The Commander-in-Chief turned round to the officers, and only said, ‘Gentlemen, you will repair to your respective posts, and do the best you can.’”

This late 19th Century map shows White Plains at a time when the area was still predominately rural. The blue lines roughly correspond with the site of the American entrenchments in 1776. The red arrows show the direction from which von Heister (left) and Clinton (right) approached White Plains.

Benjamin Tallmadge (brigade major for Wadsworth’s brigade, Spencer’s division) noted that:

“[Washington had taken] possession of the high ground north and east of the town. Here he seemed determined to take his stand, his lines extending from a mountain on the right, called Chatterton’s Hill, to a lake or large pond of water on his left. An entrenchment was thrown up from right to left, behind which our army formed. Long poles with iron pikes upon them, supplied the want of bayonets.”

At right: a drawing of several types of spears used by the American army (click to enlarge).

Major-General Joseph Spencer was dispatched with a number of regiments to meet the advancing British army and harass them on their approach.

Part of Spencer’s force went down the Mamaroneck Road to confront Clinton, while the other part went down the York Road (towards East Chester) to confront von Heister. Each British column was preceded by a battalion or two of light infantry, a company of jaegers, and a detachment of light dragoons.

Sergeant James McMichael (Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment) was with the troops sent down the Mamaroneck Road. He wrote:

“My regiment was sent to the front to bring on the action, but not endanger ourselves enough to be taken prisoners. We had not marched two miles before we saw them coming. We were attacked by their right wing (all Hessians) and after keeping up an incessant fire for an hour, we were informed by our flanking party, that their light horse was surrounding us… [and then] we retreated to the lines.”

These forces probably consisted of the 1st Jäger Company, and a detachment of the 16th Light Dragoons.

Ensign Stirke of the British light infantry also described the skirmishing on the Mamaroneck Road:

“The army… dislodged several large parties of rebels, that threw themselves into the woods, in our front[,] in order to impede our march; but on our field pieces being fired into the woods, they immediately ran.”

The skirmishing on the York Road attracted more attention. Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige of Moseley’s Massachusetts Militia Regiment was on Chatterton’s Hill, which loomed above the York Road. These militiamen could see the British advance guard approaching Spencer’s men on the far side of the Bronx River, and they promptly took measures to protect themselves:

“[The] regiment… went into entrenchments already to some extent prepared [on Chatterton’s Hill] and immediately began to extend them... There was an orchard in front… which the men… cut down and made into pickets for entrenchments.”

Colonel Gold Silliman of the 1st Connecticut State Battalion described the action on the York Road:

“I with my regiment and 3 others were ordered out about 1 ½ miles below our lines to take post on a hill to gall them [i.e., the British] in their march as they advanced. We accordingly took our post and mine and one other regiment had the advantage of a stone wall… the enemy came up within 6 or 8 rods… [then] our men rose from behind the wall, [and] poured in a most furious fire.”

As was the case at Pell’s Point on the 19th, the Americans’ fire appeared “most furious” but mostly was innocent. Perhaps, as often occurred during the war, inexperienced soldiers aimed too high.

Captain Johann von Ewald’s 2nd Jäger Company led the opposing British column, but he scarcely took notice of the Connecticut troops:

“The army had marched scarcely two hours when the left column encountered an advanced corps of the enemy, which I had to engage supported by the [3rd battalion of] light infantry. The area was intersected by hills, woods, and marshes, and every field was enclosed with a stone wall. This enemy corps had taken a stand behind the stone walls on the steep hills between two plantations. Several guns were set up on the main road at some distance, which were covered by cavalry. General Heister immediately mounted a battery on the main road and cannonaded the enemy, who withdrew…”

At least two of the Connecticut State Battalions (the 1st and 5th) fled towards Chatterton’s Hill. To get there, they had to cross the Bronx River.

According to Brigade-Major Benjamin Tallmadge:

“The troops immediately entered the river and ascended the Hill, while I[,] being in the rear, and mounted on horseback, endeavored to hasten the last of our troops, the Hessians then being within musket shot. When I reached the bank of the river, and was about to enter it, our chaplain, the Rev. Dr. [Benjamin] Trumbull, sprang up behind me on my horse, and came with such force as to carry me with my accoutrements, together with himself, headlong into the river. This so entirely disconcerted me, that by the time I reached the opposite bank of the river, the Hessian troops were about to enter it, and considered me as their prisoner.” [see footnote]

Tallmadge, however, was able to scramble out of the way, just as some militia on the western bank gave the Hessians a check.

Then, Tallmadge wrote:

“I rode to headquarters, near the courthouse, and informed General Washington of the situation of the troops on Chatterton's Hill.”

Footnote: Benjamin Trumbull kept a journal during the campaign. He did not mention in it his embarrassing mishap with Tallmadge, but he did write that “I had been in the river almost all over”.

October 27, 1776

2011-10-27T00:06:00.004-05:00

Synopsis for October 27th: Synopsis for October 27: Hugh Percy made a feint at Fort Washington; Waldeckers were ambushed near Mamaroneck; the British planned a move to White Plains.

Previous entry: October 26th; next: Morning of October 28.

On October 18, Lieutenant-General William Howe cut one of the main supply lines of the American forces in Manhattan (the Boston Post Road). Not long after, George Washington pulled his army away from Manhattan, and took a strong post at the town of White Plains, New York. Howe, meanwhile, established a base for his army at New Rochelle, brought up reinforcements, examined the countryside, and made plans to battle the American army.

Howe’s battle plan came to consist of two main parts. First, his army would attack Washington’s men at White Plains. Second, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knypahusen’s recently arrived Hessian division would advance on upper Manhattan from the north. Although Washington had pulled out of Manhattan, some men were left behind to garrison Fort Washington and the other defensive works in upper Manhattan.

The twin advance was scheduled to begin on the 28th. To draw attention away from Knyphausen’s advance, Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy had orders to make a feint at Fort Washington from the south on the 27th. It was hoped he might also seize some of the Americans’ defensive works in the process.

Percy took with him six British regiments (the 10th, 17th, 37th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot), and two Hessian regiments from Stirn’s brigade. The troops advanced in line of battle with the Hessians on the left, and the British regulars on the right. Percy later wrote:

“I approached… with caution, for I had not force enough to attack them. By the time I had advanced within random musket shot [range], their [defensive] lines (three in number) were all completely manned… As our moving forward did not make them evacuate their works, I tried what a few shots from six-pounders and shells from two howitzers would do”.

The shot and shell had little effect: “they were too well secured by their parapets.”

American defenses in upper Manhattan (click to enlarge). Upper Manhattan is bounded on the left by Hudson's River and on the right by the Harlem River. Fort Washington appears at the top of the image; below the fort are three defensive lines spanning the width of the island. On October 27th, Percy's men skirmished with American forces defending the first (lowermost) line. The troop movements shown on this map pertain to a later engagement (the assault on Fort Washington on November 16, 1776).

Charles Lefferts illustration of drummers and infantrymen of the 10th Regiment of Foot.

Percy observed that the Americans brought cannon down to their lines, and he “retired with the main body about halfway between their works and ours.” Soon, he added, “The rebels… began to cannonade us”. This fire, however, was not very dangerous: “Their cannon were so ill pointed, that tho' they fired annoyingly at us, they hit nobody.” Nevertheless, he noted, “I retired a little out of reach.” Percy’s men then encamped for the evening.

While these movements took place on land, the frigates Repulse and Pearl advanced up Hudson’s River. Soon the vessels began to be bombarded by the guns from Fort Washington and Fort Lee (the renamed Fort Constitution).

Major-General Nathanael Greene boasted about the battering the Repulse received:

“Colonel [Robert] Magaw got down an eighteen-pounder and fired sixty shot at her, twenty-six of which went into her. She slipped her cable and left her anchor, and was towed off by four boats. I think we must have killed a considerable number of their men, as the confusion and distress exceeded all description.”

Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, acknowledged that “Many shots were thrown into the Repulse, and some into the Pearl”. However, he heard that “no men [were] killed in either, and only one man's leg broke on board the Repulse.”

Percy’s losses were also modest: five were killed or wounded in the 37th Foot; two in the 10th Foot, and three among the Hessians.

Greene stated that one man “was killed by a shell that fell upon his head” and that Major Andrew Colburn (Knowlton’s Rangers) was wounded.

The British made light of the whole affair. Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham of the 46th Foot wrote that “Lord Percy very properly called it ‘the little excursion.’”

Closer to White Plains, the British sent out parties to reconnoiter. Archibald Robertson noted that he accompanied William Erskine on another expedition to the Mile Square area. He was surprised that “We returned [to that area] without firing a shot… as the enemy might have suspected our intention of occupying these heights.” Instead, according to Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Erskine “brought back nine prisoners and the assurance that all the rebels had left this part of the country and gone to White Plains”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton was ordered, as he later wrote, “to take out a part of the army to reconnoiter” the American position at White Plains. Clinton made a cursory effort, turned around, and gave Howe a discouraging report: “I suspected that the enemy’s lines at the White Plains shouldered to the Bronx and to the mountains, whereby their flanks were safe and their retreat practicable when[ever] they pleased.” He concluded, “[I] could not from what I saw recommend a direct attack”.

Howe could not have been pleased either with the incomplete information or the lack of support for his plans.

American scouting parties were also active. Baurmeister noted that one party attacked some men from the Waldeck Regiment:

“Eighteen men of this regiment went marauding in the region around Mamaroneck, where they were surprised and attacked by forty rebels and disarmed. One subaltern and twelve soldiers were captured and hurriedly sent away. Two men remained on the field, wounded.”

October 26, 1776

2011-10-26T00:07:00.004-05:00

Synopsis for October 26th: The British raided Mile Square.

Previous entry: October 25th; next: October 27th.

The Americans felt that they had bested the British by reaching White Plains before the British and fortifying the village, but apprehension remained over the looming showdown with the British army.

Colonel Joseph Reed (Washington’s adjutant general) wrote:

“We have taken post here in such a manner, that we hope they will not be able to execute their plan of surrounding us, and cutting off our communication. I can only conjecture that finding themselves baffled in this, they are now advancing to engage us. The business of this campaign, and possibly the next[,] may probably be determined this week.”

Adjutant Samuel Shaw (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote:

“We shall remain at this place till we have a brush with the enemy. They are within three miles of us. Their movements have been such as to occasion us a great deal of trouble, and it is happy for us that they did not effect our ruin... In several skirmishes with the enemy, we have had constantly the better; so that our troops are in good spirits, and impatiently desire an action. Something decisive must soon be done, as cold weather approaches and we want winter-quarters.”

According to Lieutenant Tench Tilghman (aide to George Washington), When Major-General Charles Lee pulled out of Mile Square on the 25th, “he was obliged to leave [behind] eighty or ninety barrels of provisions… for want of wagons.”

A Loyalist informed Hessian Captain Johann von Ewald that the Americans' supplies “could be approached without discovery.”

Ewald was willing to raid this post with his jaegers, but Brigadier-General William Erskine decided a larger force was needed for this operation, and Erskine placed himself at its head. According to Ewald:

“General Erskine arrived at my post with a hundred dragoons from the 17th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry. He ordered me to march with sixty jägers and form the advanced guard, which was to be reinforced with one officer and twenty dragoons.” [see Footnote 1]

At this time, Westchester County, between Kingsbridge and White Plains, was defended by few American troops. Close to Kingsbridge, Colonel John Lasher of New York had 400 men detached from Major-General William Heath’s division (specifically, from two brigades of New York militia and from William Prescott’s 7th Continental Regiment). Lasher’s chief responsibility was to defend Fort Independence near Kingsbridge, but he also had men patrolling the roads to the north and east. It was a weak force, and Lasher lamented that “many of the detachments have not ten rounds a man”.

At Mile Square, Lee had left behind some troops to guard over the supplies that could not be moved. According to Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment), this included “a guard of about 30 men… under the command of Lieutenant [Abraham] Turtelow”.

When the British advanced on Mile Square, they first encountered one of Lasher’s detachments. Ewald described it as “an enemy patrol of riflemen which gave fire and ran back.” He noted that “Several dragoons gave chase, but could not overtake any of them.”

The British expedition continued on until they came to the American depot. The British then swiftly attacked.

Ewald recalled:

“The jägers deployed, supported by the light infantry, with the dragoons following. The enemy guard drew up behind the stone walls which surrounded the plantation and received us with a lively fire. I quickly separated the jägers into four to five parts to surround the enemy and advanced under steady fire from wall to wall. The light infantry likewise divided into three to four parts and attacked the guard with the bayonet. Nearly everyone was struck down and only a few officers and men were taken prisoner.”

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers), who was also present, wrote that “the rebels had a guard of 1 captain and 25 men who ran… The dragoons pursued, killed the officer and 2 others and took 16 or 18 prisoners.”

Lieutenant Turtelow of Lippitt’s Regiment escaped “from the light horse” but he reported (in the words of John Smith) that the British “took the stores… and killed the doctor and some of the men belonging to the hospital”. [see Footnote 2]

Afterwards, according to Hessian Major Carl-Leopold Baurmeister, “We dispensed the wine and rum we could not take with us in bottles and destroyed the flour magazine… We also found the two jagers who had been missing since the attack of the 23rd.”

Ewald summarized how the successful raid concluded:

“Several enemy patrols which ran into our outpost withdrew quickly after a few shots. After midnight we withdrew, the light infantry covering the rear, and at daybreak of the 27th we arrived back at the army. I had the honor to receive a compliment from the commanding general.”

Footnote 1. In addition to the above, Baurmesiter stated that Regiment von Rall was also sent on this expedition. Archibald Robertson wrote that “1 Battalion of Hessians” was present, but didn’t name the unit.

Footnote 2. A return for Daniel Hitchcock’s 11th Continental Regiment (Nixon’s brigade, Lee’s division) stated that 8 men were captured at Mile Square on this date. My guess is that these men were either left behind to help guard the baggage, or had been left at the hospital.

October 25, 1776

2011-10-25T00:02:00.002-05:00

Synopsis for October 25th: The British army advanced towards White Plains; Clinton and Howe grew irresolute; the Americans prepared for battle; New Yorkers celebrated George III.

Previous entry: October 24th; next: October 26th.

In the morning, one of the British vessels on the Hudson came under fire near Dobb’s Ferry. The Americans fired on it with a 12-pounder gun they brought down to the shore under cover of darkness. An officer in New Jersey bragged, “They hulled her eleven times out of fifteen” before the British ship was towed out of range. He added, “Little skirmishes happen almost every day; but they are thought so little of that they seldom are mentioned as news.”

Since October 21st, Major-General Charles Lee’s division had been defending the crossings of the Bronx River while the rest of the American army moved to White Plains. It's mission now virtually complete, Lee's men began to move towards White Plains also.

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Nixon’s brigade) wrote:

“about one o’clock in the morning the major called to us in our tents and ordered us to strike out tents at 4 o’clock in the morning and to cook our provisions… and get in readiness to march by day[light][.] We turned out immediately and cooked our provisions… and ate our breakfasts… and got ready to march[.] About 9 or 10 o’clock we began to load our baggage[.] The officers destroyed their chests not being allowed any wagons to carry them… and about 12 o’clock we began to move forward… We marched about northwest 7 or 8 miles and then east 2 miles[.]… we halted about two miles from the White Plains and posted ourselves as a picquet[.] We were 250 in number[.] It was very cold lodging on the ground without tents and but little fire[.]”

At about 9 A.M. the British army marched towards White Plains in two columns. The right column halted “at the distance of four miles from the White Plains”, according to Howe, on the Mamaroneck Road. The left column halted on the East Chester Road, about 6 miles from White Plains.

The troops in the left column could see part of Major-General Charles Lee’s division, but the two forces remained on opposite sides of the Bronx. According to Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) “[we] took a position on the East Chester Road… facing west[,] the Bronx River in our front and the rebels on the heights [on the] other side of the river facing us.”

Situation of the armies on October 25th (click to enlarge). Howe’s forces in Westchester County were divided into three parts. One part, under Henry Clinton, approached White Plains from the direction of Mamaroneck (10). Another part, under Leopold Philip von Heister, approached White Plains from the direction of Eastchester. The third part, under Wilhelm von Knyphausen, remained near New Rochelle. Washington had four divisions at White Plains (11); Charles Lee’s division was at Mile Square (9), and Nathanael Greene’s division was positioned along the Hudson.

This map shows the location of British and American army units between New Rochelle (lower left) and White Plains (upper right). Heister's column encamped on the East Chester Road, near the Bronx River; Clinton's column encamped on the Mamaroneck Road, only 4 miles from White Plains. Lee's division is shown at Mile Square, the position he held in the morning; by nightfall, his brigades were 2 miles from White Plains. North is at upper right.

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British units on the road leading from Mamaroneck to White Plains. Text on the map states that this was the position held by the British army on October 21st, but a comparison with the accounts of the campaign by William Howe and others suggests that this was the position occupied by Clinton’s forces on the 25th. Clinton commanded the first and second battalions of light infantry (red triangles at top), the British Reserve (which included three battalions of British grenadiers), a brigade of British regulars, a brigade of Hessian grenadiers, the Brigade of Guards, part of the 16th Light Dragoons, and a company of jaegers (green triangles at right).

The British were now within easy striking distance of Washington’s army, but Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton had become irresolute. He later wrote, “not knowing the ground about White Plains or how the rebels had posted themselves on it, I could not think an immediate attack of their camp there prudent”. He felt that if Howe “had any such intention” as attacking, he should first “reconnoiter in force,” develop a plan of attack, and then engage in an elaborate ruse so as to surprise the Americans at daybreak. He recommended first marching back to New Rochelle, then making a feint towards the town of Rye (to the east of Mamaroneck, on Long Island Sound), and then finally performing a countermarch to White Plains during the night.

Whether these maneuvers would have improved the odds of a successful assault on White Plains was doubtful; whether the marching would have tired the troops was certain. Howe ignored Clinton’s suggestion, but he clearly harbored reservations of his own, for no attack plans were made.

The Americans closely monitored the British advance. Robert Harrison (Washington’s secretary) wrote: “The general officers are now reconnoitering the several passes leading from the enemy, [so] that the most important may be immediately secured.”

Before long, parties of armed men were sent out to watch the British movements and contest the roads to White Plains. Among these was Sergeant James McMichael of the Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment; he wrote: “One captain, two subalterns, three sergeants with one hundred men, were ordered on a scouting expedition. We left White Plains at 11 P. M. direct for the enemy’s advance sentries.”

At the end of the day, according to British Ensign Henry Stirke, “the pickets” of the two armies were “within musket shot of each other.”

Washington even considered making some kind of preemptive attack. Major-General William Heath recalled that “Eight American regiments were ordered to be ready to march in the approaching night. [Major] General [Israel] Putnam was to command them; and they were intended to make an attack on the enemy’s advance, if it should appear to be practicable.” One of these may have included Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment (Sargent’s brigade, Sullivan’s division). Private How wrote, “This evening we all marched to East Chester in order to attack the enemy there[,] but the General thought best not to attack them there and we returned to camp in the morning.”

Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jaeger Company) was placed in a position to guard the left flank of the British army. He felt vulnerable in this situation and he took every precaution to ensure the security of his men:

“Here I was left alone for the first time with my own theory of partisan warfare, which I had acquired through much reading. I took my post in a large apple orchard surrounded by a wall of fieldstones, behind which, since it lay on a hill, I thought I could defend myself well against an enemy attack. I placed two pickets on two knolls from which we could see far around, and dispatched constant patrols as far as Mile Square.”

In New York City, the British celebrated the anniversary of George III’s accession to the throne. According to the New York Gazette:

“the day was celebrated here with every demonstration of joy. The flag ships hoisted the royal standard; and all the ships in the harbour gave a salute of twenty-one guns each. So noble an appearance, and so grand a salute, was never known in this port before. The two admirals [i.e., Richard Howe and Molyneux Shuldham] gave entertainments, and many loyal toasts were drank upon the occasion.”

October 24, 1776

2011-10-24T00:33:00.003-05:00

Synopsis for October 24th: The British prepared for another move.

Previous entry: October 23rd; next: October 25th.

At White Plains, the Americans continued to improve their defenses. William Heath’s division was encamped on the left of their position, Joseph Spencer’s division was on the right, and the divisions of John Sullivan and Israel Putnam were in the center. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (Spencer’s division) jotted down in his journal: “A very pleasant day and nothing very special seems to be going on.”

For some days after moving his army to Pell’s Point, British Lieutenant-General William Howe was unsure of where the Americans were and what intentions they had; he also had little knowledge about the layout of the Westchester countryside. He gathered information, deliberated with his officers, and took on stores of provisions and reinforcements.

By the end of this date he had the information he needed and his preparations were complete. He was now ready to make his next move. As he later explained it:

“[the Americans had] quitted their position about King’s Bridge with some precipitation, leaving two thousand men for the defense of Fort Washington, extending their force behind the Bronx from Valentine’s Hill [near Mile Square] to White Plains in detached camps, everywhere entrenched. Their left by this means covering an upper communication with Connecticut as well as the road along the North River [i.e., the Hudson], it was judged expedient to move to White Plains and endeavour to bring them to an action.”

At 9 P.M. he ordered “Tents to be struck tomorrow morning at 6 o’clock; the baggage to be loaded, and the army to be ready to march at seven, in two columns by the right.”

The British army would divide into two parts: the right column was given to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton, and the left column was given to Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister. Clinton would advance towards White Plains from the direction of Mamaroneck, while von Heister would advance towards White Plains from the direction of East Chester. Screening the columns on their march would be the jaegers, the light dragoons, and a company of the New York Volunteers.

Part of the army remained near the coast to safeguard the provisions.

Wilhelm von Knyphausen’s division (minus Ewald’s jaegers) remained near New Rochelle for the time being, but Howe planned to use this force before long.

October 23, 1776

2011-10-23T00:02:00.005-05:00

Synopsis for October 23rd: The British sent a reconnaissance in force towards Mile Square.

Previous entry: October 22nd; next: October 24th.

The Hessians of Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen’s newly arrived division were inspected at New Rochelle. George Osborn scoffed that “they are in every respect far inferior to the first [division]”. Actually, the men of Captain Johann von Ewald’s 2nd Jäger Company were found to be excellent troops, and that morning they were called upon to participate in a reconnaissance in force towards Mile Square.

Captain Johann von Ewald recalled, “I was delighted with the message, for there was nothing I dreaded more in the world than a rest camp, and I wished for nothing more than to get to know the enemy.”

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) thought the British sent two or three thousand men on this mission. The two jäger companies were placed at the head of the advance, with Captain Carl August von Wreden’s 1st Jäger on the right of the road, and Ewald’s 2nd Jäger on the left. Ewald turned to his company and “informed each officer and corporal what they were to do during the march and exhorted the jägers to demonstrate their good conduct, since they would get their first test today.”

The jägers then began to fan out and advance, but, according to Ewald, “The area was heavily intersected by woods, hills, and fields enclosed by walls; hence it was impossible to see far around, and I lost sight of most of my company.”

Also on the move this morning was Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Nixon’s brigade). He recalled:

“I having not much business to do I went out of the camp with Sergeant Harvey and a lad to take a walk to get If I could something for myself as most of the others had done [in other words, he was looking for plunder]… we went over a hill about 2 miles from our camp and going down the hill I espied a number of Hessians in an orchard getting apples which we took for our own men but… one… on seeing us stepped behind some bushes… to wait [for] our coming [and] gave us some suspicion of their being enemies[.] We turned back and ran up the hill again for we had no arms with us and as soon as we got to the top of the hill we heard a volley of small arms beyond the orchard[.] An affray soon began”.

The affray was started by a much larger party of Americans –200 or so men – that Colonel John Glover described as “a scouting party, principally from my own regiment”.

Ewald recalled:

“We had marched only a few minutes when several shots rang out on our left. As I tried to gain a hill from which I could look around, our left wing suddenly came under fierce fire [from Glover’s men]. With the half of the platoon I had taken with me I rushed toward the sound of the firing, where I found a handful of my jägers engaged with several battalions of Americans. I could not retreat… and I could not advance with my few men, since I caught sight of a camp nearby which must have belonged to the enemy army.”

“I maneuvered as well as I could to cover both my flanks, which had formed into a circle lying an acre’s length apart under heavy fire. I discovered a house on a hill to the right toward which several jägers were crawling. Through their fire I gained some air on the right flank, but on my left I was completely hemmed in.”

Soon Colonel Carl von Donop came to his aid with a battalion of light infantry and two field pieces. Ewald wrote that their “bayonets and grapeshot provided the precious air by which I was saved. I got off with a loss of six dead and eleven wounded, including [Second] Lieutenant [Carl von] Rau, who was shot in the foot, and two taken prisoner.”

The Americans lost 1 man mortally wounded in Baldwin’s Regiment and six or eight others who were less severely wounded [see footnote].

Major-General Charles Lee wrote later with satisfaction:

“Glover, an admirable officer… fairly beat ‘em—a shooting match betwixt the riflers and Hessian chasseurs [jaegers] demonstrated our superiority at this time [when] the parties were equal in numbers, and we won the match”.

The sound of heavy firing brought the British general officers onto the field. Ewald noted that “[Lieutenant] General [Leopold Philip von] Heister, who seemed to be unfriendly, gave me a sharp reprimand. But [Lieutenant] General [William] Howe, who apparently noticed that the Hessian general must have said something unpleasant to me, expressed his satisfaction to me through one of his adjutants.”

The reconnaissance-in-force then continued forward. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) saw “small parties” of the Americans “at a great distance, but [they] always retreated as we advanced.”

The British force did not attempt to cross the Bronx, and after several hours they returned to camp, having made no great discoveries.

Sergeant Smith meanwhile had hurried back to Mile Square. He was afraid that:

“I should come under blame for leaving the camps as it was against general orders to cross over the [Bronx] River without a pass from the general[.] The regiment was at their alarm post and I got into camp without being discovered by anybody there[.] About sundown the regiments turned into quarters again[.]”

Footnote: Ewald’s company consisted of approximately 125 men. Various claims were made about Ewald’s losses, These include 2 killed, 2 wounded, 2 missing (Carl Leopold Baurmeister); 4 killed, 3 wounded, 2 missing (historian Edward Lowell, citing a Hessian source); 4 killed, 9 wounded (Archibald Robertson); 6 killed, 11 wounded, 2 captured (Ewald); 9 killed and 2 captured (John Smith); 10 killed, 2 captured (Robert Harrison); 10 killed, 3 captured (Charles Lee); 12 killed, 3 captured (John Glover); 13 killed, 2 captured (Benjamin Trumbull).

William Heath claimed that the Americans had 200 men; Robert Harrison gave the number as 240; he also stated they were some of Edward Hand’s Pennsylvania riflemen. Benjamin Trumbull wrote that one American was mortally wounded (“an Indian fellow”), and six or eight were less severely wounded. Glover also admitted to one mortally wounded man, and said that he was in Baldwin’s Regiment. John Smith heard that “we had a rifleman killed and an Indian wounded in the action”.

October 22, 1776

2011-10-20T00:20:00.008-05:00

Synopsis for October 22nd: The Americans concentrated at White Plains; the British received a large reinforcement.

Previous entry: October 21st (Part 2); next: October 23rd.

Two American divisions (those of William Heath and Joseph Spencer) marched to White Plains on the night of October 21-22 [see footnote]. They reached White Plains early in the morning in an exhausted condition. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Spencer’s division) wrote:

“The men slept on the ground in the streets [and] had nothing to cook with or to cover them, and many of them were exceeding[ly] hungry as well as sleepy and weary.”

It took some time for the new arrivals to become established. Major-General William Heath noted that his division “took post on the high strong ground… on the left of the line”. Looking around at the situation of the rest army, he saw that:

“The ground, from General Heath's left to the right, descended gradually a very considerable distance, and then gradually ascended up to the plain, and still on to the right to more commanding ground. On this was the American army formed, the line running nearly from northeast to southwest. There were some strong works thrown up on the plain, across the road, and still to the right of it… Headquarters were on the plain, near the crossroads.”

It wasn’t until the evening that a decision was made as to where to place Trumbull’s battalion. At last they were ordered from the center of the village over to the right side of the line, which meant, according to Trumbull, recrossing “with weary steps the ground we had… with so much labour travelled over [earlier].” Trumbull groused, “The men are worried in a manner to death and are treated with great hardship and severity, and in my opinion are put to much unnecessary hardship and fatigue.”

More men were on the way. On this date John Sullivan’s division marched for White Plains; probably so too did the division of Israel Putnam, which had been manning the defenses in upper Manhattan [see footnote].

Major-General Charles Lee’s men continued to occupy the Mile Square area. They had been defending the left flank of the army. However, the movement of Washington’s army to White Plains meant that their role was becoming one of defending the right flank of the army. In this position they safeguarded the slow-moving procession of provisions and other stores from upper Manhattan to White Plains.

As the British remained near the coast, Lee’s men had the opportunity to forage and look for plunder in the surrounding countryside. According to Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Lee’s division):

“Amaziah Blackmore[,] a sergeant in Captain Blackmore’s company[,] went to Eastchester amongst the deserted houses to see what he could plunder[. He] was surrounded in the house with a lieutenant and a fifer and was made prisoner by about 30 Hessians and plundered of his shoe and knee buckles and 18 dollars in paper money and carried away… he watched [for] an opportunity and sprang from between [his guards]… and kicked away his shoes that were loose on his feet and got clear of them and came into camp again… Last night Captain Bailey and Lieutenant Richmond went down and plundered some houses at East Chester of household furniture to the value of 400 dollars and one colt[,] which the general made a present of to Captain Bailey”.

The British were aware of the desperate condition of the American army. As Commissary Charles Stedman later put it:

“The American army was now in a disagreeable situation. The soldiers were very poorly clothed, and a scarcity of provisions among them had been followed by much illness. Nor, amidst these disadvantages, was their position either secure or eligible in other respects. Their sole resource was to avoid action”.

Meanwhile, the British awaited fresh provisions and welcomed the arrival of more reinforcements. A second division of Hessians had recently crossed the Atlantic and was at New York City. This force consisted of six Hessian regiments (plus jaegers and artillerists) under the command of Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, and an additional regiment from the German state of Waldeck. On this date, the division left New York City and landed near New Rochelle.

Ambrose Serle witnessed the passage of these troops northward:

“This morning the Hessians… passed in flat-boats up the Eastern River towards the grand army. They were all in high spirits, and rowed along with drums beating, trumpets and fifes sounding, and colors flying in a very gallant order. They made a fine appearance altogether.”

The New York Gazette noted:

“It being a very fine day, the scene was rendered extremely beautiful by the crowds upon the water, [and the Hessians] cheering their military brethren and other spectators on shore, and making the hills resound with trumpets, French horns, drums and fifes, accompanied by the harmony of their voices.”

Among the new arrivals was Captain Johann von Ewald, who commanded the detachment of jaegers. Ewald wrote:

“…early on the morning of the 22nd[,] the flatboats appeared and took in the troops. As soon as the boats, each containing fifty men, had assembled on the western side of the city, the journey toward land was started up the East River. It was very pleasant. On the right we observed the well-cultivated shore of Long Island, and on the left the shore of York Island [i.e., Manhattan]. Everything was new to us and we liked it all.”

“Night overtook us and we continued our journey for several more hours in utter darkness. Since no one knew when or where we would land, we were plagued with boredom and curiosity. But at last we set foot on the coast of the province of New York in the vicinity of New Rochelle…. In the darkness all we could see was that the area was wooded. Dogs were barking nearby, hence we could assume that people must reside in the area.”

“The commanding general ordered the regiments to encamp and light fires… which was carried out promptly… sooner had several fires blazed than we heard cries of chickens, geese, and pigs which our resourceful soldiers had discovered. Within the hour, several roasts hung from long sticks before each fire. The whole camp was as busy as an anthill. From this one can see how easily a good soldier knows his way about.”

Footnote: The exact position of Washington’s divisions from one day to the next is difficult to piece together from the source material. That Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) arrived in White Plains on the 21st is indicated by Rufus Putnam’s memoir, the journal of James McMichael, and the presence of men from this brigade in the action at Mamaroneck. That Heath’s division, followed by the remainder of Spencer’s division, reached White Plains on the morning of the 22nd is indicated by William Heath’s memoir, and Benjamin Trumbull’s journal. That Sullivan’s division reached White Plains on the night of the 22nd is indicated by Heath’s memoir and the journal of David How. At about the same time that Sullivan’s men moved, three companies of Knox’s Artillery marched from a point near Kingsbridge to White Plains. An artillerist in this detachment (Solomon Nash) recorded in his journal, “today about 10 o’clock we struck our tents and set out for White Plains and arrived there about 12 o’clock at night and encamped.”

I don’t have a copy of a journal by an infantryman in Israel Putnam’s division, but the overall pattern of activity in the army strongly suggests that Putnam’s men at least started the move from Manhattan to White Plains on the 22nd and that they completed the move no later than the 23rd.

October 21, 1776 (Part 2)

2011-10-20T00:12:00.009-05:00

Synopsis for October 21st (Part 2): Alexander McDougall considered the makings of an effective leader; John Haslet attacked Loyalists at Mamaroneck.

Previous entry: October 21st (Part 1); next: October 22nd.

While William Heath’s and Joseph Spencer’s divisions marched to White Plains, Major-General Charles Lee’s division defended the crossings of the Bronx River. They had a quiet day, and Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall found time to write about what he saw as the main weakness in the American army: the lack of good officers to command the men.

“All the discerning officers of the army see the necessity of having good officers in it. Without that, you never can have a regular or brave army. The contrast between those troops who are well [officered] and those who are ill officered, now in service, is so great, that it is impossible to have an adequate idea of it but by experience.”

The cause for poor leadership, in McDougall’s view, was that too many older citizens had been given important posts in the army for no reason other than their standing in society. He complained:

“Old men without experience, are utterly unfit for the army. They want [i.e., lack] ambition, which is the life and soul of a soldier; nor are they fit for it if they have seen service, unless they are men of genius, capable of improving by service; otherwise they are a burthen to it. They are useless old boys, who pride themselves in having been in service, without profiting by it.”

In McDougall’s view, the army needed officers who were active and intelligent gentlemen: “men who have a sense of honour, and whose class in life is respectable. These are necessary qualifications, among others, to make the officer. Where these meet in men of genius, those they command will be soldiers; but without it, they will only be men.”

Lieutenant-General William Howe took one relatively aggressive action on this date, and sent a detachment of men eastward along the coastal road to occupy the town of Mamaroneck.

George Washington was soon apprised of this move, and he ordered Major Zabdiel Rogers of Connecticut, who commanded the militia there, “to make the best stand you can, with the troops under your command”. He also promised to support him by sending “a party to attack them in flank”.

However, before the attack party could be organized, Washington was informed that “our people shamefully abandoned [Mamaroneck] at their approach, not for want of numbers, but [for] want of a good officer to lead on the men.”

Washington learned that there was still an opportunity to make an attack. The British placed in a vulnerable near Mamaroneck a corps of Loyalists known as the Queen’s Rangers. He organized a force to attack and destroy this unit. The attacking force was entrusted to Colonel John Haslet of the Delaware Regiment, and consisted of men drawn from William Alexander’s brigade and the militia at White Plains [see footnote].

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British army units near Mamaroneck. The Boston Post Road (modern day US Highway 1) can be seen crossing from lower left to the right edge of the map. The Queen’s Rangers are represented by triangles at several points along this road. The road extending to the north (top) went to White Plains. New Rochelle is misidentified at the bottom of the map; the town was a considerable distance to the west.

The attack party set out in the afternoon, and was near Mamaroneck at dusk. However, after night descended things did not go as planned. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford (Delaware Regiment), “instead of meeting with this main body [of the Loyalists] our guides brought us (it was eleven o’clock at night) on their picket-guard, consisting of seventy men” (In other words, one of the isolated triangles on the Blaskowitz map).

Major John Green (1st Virginia Regiment) led the troops which stumbled on this detachment. Bedford claimed that Green “made the first attack, with one hundred and fifty men” and that he “had the chief merit”. Colonel George Weedon (3rd Virginia Regiment) later heard that Green succeeded in surrounding the Loyalist detachment. However, the captain commanding the Loyalists cleverly confused the issue by shouting at the Virginians, “Surrender, you Tory dogs! Surrender!” Approximately 20 of the Loyalists were killed, and more than 30 captured. Amid the confusion, the Loyalist captain and some of his men fled to safety.

The Americans then groped forwards towards the main Loyalist camp, and there was another spat of combat. The British claimed that they gave the Americans a check. However, Sergeant James McMichael (Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment) heard that “we fired on each other” “unfortunately taking the Delaware Blues for the enemy… six of our riflemen and nine of the Blues were killed.”

Haslet said that “three or four were left dead, and about fifteen [were] wounded”. Having been unable to take the main Loyalist camp by surprise, he returned to White Plains.

Footnote: Alexander’s brigade on this date included the Delaware Regiment, three battalions of Pennsylvania State troops, and the 1st and 3rd Virginia Regiments. It is likely that troops from all of these units were present. For example, Sergeant James McMichael of the Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment noted in his journal that the force included “a party of 100 men, properly officered, from our riflemen”. Evidence that militia participated in this expedition is found in the journal of New Hampshire militiaman Peter Kimball. He recorded: “there was a detachment of about 600 men sent to engage the enemy at Mamaroneck[,] 8 [went] out of our company”. Other militia companies likely made a similar contribution.

October 21, 1776 (Part 1)

2011-10-20T00:03:00.008-05:00

Synopsis for October 21st (Part 1): George Washington’s Continentals occupied White Plains; William Howe moved cautiously by the coast.

Previous entry: October 20th; next: October 21st (Part 2).

George Washington learned on the night of the 20th that he faced the potential for a catastrophic defeat if the British army reached the village of White Plains before he did. Indeed, the Americans wondered why the British had not already made such a move. Major-General William Heath wrote, “it is not a little unaccountable that they did not attempt to stretch themselves across to the Hudson, which [they] might have been done with great ease.” Colonel Rufus Putnam commented on “the stupidity of the British general in that he did not… send a detachment and take possession of… White Plains[,] for had he done this we must then have fought him on his own terms”.

Throughout the day, and into the night, the American army began streaming towards White Plains. The first troops on the road belonged to Brigadier-General William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division). They reached White Plains sometime between midmorning (Rufus Putnam’s memoir) and early afternoon (journal of Sergeant James McMichael). Rufus Putnam accompanied these men and he breathed a sigh of relief when they reached the village: “thus was the American army saved… from a probable total destruction.”

William Heath’s division followed Alexander’s brigade on the road to White Plains. Heath recalled:

“At about four o' clock, p. m., General Heath's division moved from above King’s Bridge… About eight o' clock in the evening, they passed General Lincoln's quarters, on Valentine's Hill, where the Commander-in-Chief was to spend the night…. The division reached Chatterton's Hill, to the south of White-Plains, at four o' clock in the morning… having marched all night.”

Following Heath’s division was the rest of Spencer’s division (the brigades of James Wadsworth and John Fellows). Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Wadsworth’s brigade) recorded in his journal:

“Marched about 10 o’clock at night for the White Plains, [we] carried our tents on our backs[,] packs[,] pots[,] kettles[,] and provisions[,] etc. The army marched all night excepting some small halts, [and the men] almost fainted under their burdens and were greatly fatigued.”

Joseph Plumb Martin served in the same battalion as Trumbull, and had a similar experience:

“We marched from Valentine’s Hill for the White Plains in the night… We had our cooking utensils (at that time the most useless things in the army) to carry in our hands. They were made of cast iron and consequently heavy. I was so beat out before morning with hunger and fatigue that I could hardly move one foot before the other. I told my messmates that I could not carry our kettle any further… my arms were almost dislocated; I sat down in the road, and one of the others gave it a shove with his foot, and it rolled down against the fence, and that was the last I ever saw of it. When we got through the night’s march we found our mess was not the only one that was rid of their iron bondage.”

The British commander, Lieutenant-General William Howe, was perhaps unaware of the opportunity at White Plains (just as Washington had been before the 20th). But that does not sufficiently account for his inactivity along the Westchester coastline. Howe, it seems, was extraordinarily cautious about sending men into the countryside. Perhaps this was, as Stephen Kemble (Howe’s assistant adjutant general) put it, because American deserters claimed that their generals “propose to surround us and cut off our communication with our shipping.” On this date, Howe did shift his army 2 miles further from the landing place, but, Kemble noted, “we keep the [Long Island] Sound in short views on our right”.

Howe’s army may have been slow to act, but it was quickly becoming more powerful. Recent reinforcements included Lossberg’s brigade of Hessians from Staten Island, a large detachment of light dragoons from Long Island, and the 2nd and 6th British brigades from Throg’s Neck (minus the 28th Foot, which was left to hold that post awhile longer).

Situation of the armies on October 21st (click to enlarge). Howe’s army remained near Pell’s Point (8) and New Rochelle, although a detachment was sent east to Mamaroneck (10). Most of Washington’s army was in the process of moving from the area of Kingsbridge (6) to White Plains (11). Washington himself made his headquarters on Valentine’s Hill near Mile Square (9). Major-General Nathanael Greene’s men remained in upper Manhattan and at Fort Lee in New Jersey.

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British army units on the heights of New Rochelle. Much of the army is visible, including the light infantry and jaegers (red and green triangles, respectively), the British Reserve (the British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the Brigade of Guards, the 71st Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders), and two brigades of Hessians. Other troops were encamped to the south and east.

The Hutchinson River bisects the map. To the left of the river can be seen the town of East Chester (which was plundered by both armies), and a position formerly held by John Glover’s brigade.

October 20, 1776

2011-10-20T00:00:00.002-05:00

Synopsis for October 20th: British victory appeared close at hand; Rufus Putnam made an unwelcome discovery; Washington decided to move his army to White Plains.

Previous entry: October 19th; next: October 21st (Part 1).

Lieutenant-General William Howe led the British army into the New York mainland from Pell’s Point on October 18th. However, he made no aggressive moves on the 19th or 20th. The inaction was partly due to the need to bring up provisions and other supplies. Perhaps too Howe was trying to get a sense of the lay of the land. He later explained to Parliament, “The [American] country is so covered with wood, swamps and creeks, that it is not open in the least degree to be known, but from post to post, or from accounts to be collected from the inhabitants entirely ignorant of military description. These circumstances were, therefore, the cause of some unavoidable delay in our movements.”

The British may also have felt little urgency because they believed victory was inevitable. A Loyalist in New York City wrote about what he saw as the impending end of the war:

“The Howes [i.e., General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe] do all that is possible to alleviate the sufferings of a persecuted people [i.e., the Loyalists]… we are now protected in our lives and properties; and some thousands have joined the King's troops; and every time they attack the rebels they rout them with great loss; they fly before our victorious army on every onset; and I don't doubt but in a very little time this daring rebellion will be crushed… It is resolved to attack Washington directly. Proper dispositions are making for that purpose; and I hope by the next letter to give you an account of an end being put to a government that have dared to call themselves the Independent States of America. Almost all the New Yorkers have returned to their allegiance, and there is not a doubt but the other colonies will do the same when they dare declare themselves, and be properly supported by [the British] government.
“There is a broad R [for Rebel] put upon every door in New York that is disaffected to government, and examples will be made of its inhabitants; on the other hand, every person that is well affected to government finds protection.”

A further reason for confidence was that the arrival of a large reinforcement at New York City: the second Hessian division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen. Ambrose Serle witnessed their arrival and wrote:

“The ships made a most beautiful appearance in coming up this morning, the sun shining clear, and the wind wafting only a gentle breeze. All the colors were flying; and the cheerful congratulations of the sailors as they passed along contributed to the beauty of the scene. Here are now between 4 and 500 sail—a number, which never appeared in this harbor together before.”

Whereas the British army had many thousands of professional soldiers, well equipped and supplied, the American rebellion tottered along.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) was encamped on Valentine’s Hill, near the Bronx River. There, he remembered, “[we were] keeping up the old system of starving. A sheep’s head which I begged of the butchers, who were killing some for the ‘gentleman officers,’ was all the provisions I had for two or three days.”

Washington continued to prepare for the next British move as best he could, and he dispatched his adjutant general (Colonel Joseph Reed), and his chief engineer (Colonel Rufus Putnam) to reconnoiter the position held by the British army.

According to Rufus Putnam, “when we arrived on the heights of East Chester we saw a small body of British near the church”. They dared proceed no further, although they had not yet seen the camps of the British army. Reed then departed and Putnam set out to reconnoiter the area around White Plains, a key crossroads to the north. Putnam wrote that he disguised himself “by taking out my cockade, loping my hat and secreting my sword and pistols under my loose coat”. It was a calculated risk; he reasoned that if he were captured while wearing this disguise “the probability is that I should have been hanged for a spy”.

The journey was especially hazardous because Putnam was liable to run into the British at any time. He wrote:

“I did not then know where White Plains was, nor where the road I had taken could carry me. I had gone about 1 ½ mile, when a road turned off to the right, I followed it perhaps ½ a mile and came to a house, where I learned from woman that this road led to New Rochelle that the British were there and that they had a guard at a house in sight. On this information I turned and pursued my route toward White Plains (the houses on the way all deserted) until I came with[in] 3 or 4 mile[s] of the place. Here I discovered a house a little ahead with men about it[.] [B]y my [eye]glass I found they were not British soldiers, however I approached them with caution.”

Fortunately for Putnam, the men turned out to be friendly militia.

Putnam then explored the White Plains area and found that the Bronx River could be crossed there in two places, that the British were only 9 miles away and that in between there was only “good roads and in general level open country”. In addition, “at White Plains [there] was a large quantity of stores, with only about three hundred militia to guard them”.

In other words, Putnam could see how the British could easily seize these vital stores and cut Washington’s connections with New England and upstate New York. Putnam then set out to share these disturbing findings with Washington. He wrote:

“[I]t was now after sunset…. I took some refreshment, and set off for headquarters… [along] a road I had never traveled, among Tory inhabitants and in the night. I dare[d] not enquire the way, but Providence conducted me – I arrived at headquarters near Kingsbridge (a distance of about 10 miles) about nine o’clock at night. I found the General alone. I reported to him the discoveries I had made, with a sketch of the country[. H]e complained very feelingly of the gentlemen from New York from whom he had never been able to obtain a plan of the country—that from their information he had ordered the stores to White Plains as a place of security— the General sent for [Major] General [Nathanael] Greene, and [Brigadier] General George Clinton [Greene was one of Washington’s most trusted generals, Clinton was from New York]… as soon as General Clinton came in[,] my sketch and statement were shown to him and he was asked if the situation of those places were as I had reported,– General Clinton said they were”.

Washington now knew that the safety of his army, and perhaps the future of the United States, depended on his getting to White Plains before the British. He began issuing orders for his troops to march.

October 19, 1776

2011-10-19T00:07:00.002-05:00

Synopsis for October 19th: The British consolidated their gains at Pell’s Point.

Previous entry: Afternoon of October 18th; next: October 20th.

On October 18th, the British landed at Pell’s Point and advanced into the New York mainland. This placed Washington in a delicate situation. The only important barrier separating his army from the British was the Bronx River. If the British pushed across the Bronx, the result would be catastrophic: Washington’s army would be hemmed in near Manhattan and possibly forced to surrender. Washington’s army was not strong enough to drive the British back from Pell’s Point nor mobile enough to quickly escape the potential trap (the troops could march quickly, but there was a shortage of wagons to move the provisions and other baggage). Washington therefore focused on defending the crossing points on the Bronx while the stores kept in Manhattan were moved to places of safety.

Meanwhile, the British were enthusiastic about their prospects. Ambrose Serle heard Vice Admiral Richard Howe boast “that the army had landed, and posted themselves upon the heights beyond Kingsbridge; so that now the rebels are nearly surrounded.” But how to finish the campaign was not obvious, and Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton later recalled, “Many plans for our further proceedings became now… the subject of deliberation.”

While the British commanders held their discussions, the men in the ranks discovered many temptations in the neighborhood of Pell’s Point. Almost all of the residents had fled upon the approach of the British army, and abandoned homes dotted the countryside.

According to Colonel Loammi Baldwin (Glover’s brigade), “The enemy lay pretty still this day, only plundering the Point [i.e., Pell’s Point] indiscriminately, showing no more favor to a Tory than a Whig.”

British headquarters tried to curtail this behavior by proclaiming that “The Commander in Chief is greatly disappointed that the repeated orders… for the suppression of plundering and marauding, have not been attended to by the troops,” and warning that there would be “no mercy to any person proved guilty” of these crimes.

The Americans, although hungry and poorly clothed, had largely abstained from this sort of behavior. However, Baldwin found that the men were upset to see that by being “careful of the property of the country people and farmers,” they were “only saving it for our enemies”. Therefore, “near the disputed ground” (East Chester) they began to behave in the same manner: “the fields of corn and stacks of wheat serve for fodder for our horses,” and “the pigs, poultry, etc.” provide a “change of diet for the soldiers”.

October 18, 1776 (Part 2)

2011-10-18T00:08:00.008-05:00

Synopsis for the afternoon of October 18th: The British army attacked Glover’s brigade; afterwards they cut one of Washington’s primary supply lines.

Previous entry: Morning of October 18th; next: October 19th.

On the morning of October 18th, the British landed at Pell’s Point and began streaming inland towards New Rochelle and the Boston Post Road. En route, the light infantry received a check from Colonel John Glover’s brigade of Massachusetts Continentals.

The British then halted and Glover anxiously waited for the attack to be renewed. Glover saw in his front “about four thousand [men], with seven pieces of artillery”. He later recalled:

“Oh! the anxiety of mind I was then in for the fate of the day — the lives of seven hundred and fifty men immediately at hazard, and under God their preservation entirely depended on their being well disposed of; besides this, my country, my honour, my own life, and everything that was dear, appeared at that critical moment to be at stake”.

Lieutenant-General William Howe surveyed the scene. He saw “a considerable body appearing in front behind stone walls and in woods”. He then dispatched “some companies of light infantry and a party of chasseurs [jaegers]… to dislodge them”.

Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) wrote that “The 1st Battalion of Light Infantry pushed the rebels from fence to fence”.

Glover’s Continentals were forced to withdraw, but the withdrawal was conducted slowly and skillfully. Glover was with Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment when the British advance began. He wrote:

“we kept our post under cover of the stone wall… till they came within fifty yards of us, [then we] rose up and gave them the whole charge [i.e., volley] of the battalion; they halted and returned the fire with showers of musketry and cannon balls. We exchanged seven rounds at this post, retreated, and formed in the rear of Colonel Shepard and on his left; they then shouted and pushed on till they came on Shepard, posted behind a fine double stone wall; he rose up and fired by grand divisions, by which he kept up a constant fire, and maintained his part till he exchanged seventeen rounds with them”.

When Shepard’s men were forced back, the British pressed against Colonel Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. Baldwin observed, “Our troops were as calm and steady as though expecting a shot at a flock of pigeons, and not in the least daunted or confused.” When the British came within range, he wrote, “We galled the enemy very much”.

Finally, Baldwin’s Regiment was also made to retreat.

According to Glover:

“we retreated to the bottom of the hill, and had to pass through a run of water, (the bridge I had taken up before) and then marched up a hill [on] the opposite side of the creek, where I [had] left my artillery; the ground being rough and much broken I was afraid to risk [bringing] it over. The enemy halted, and played away their artillery at us, and we at them… without any damage on our side, and but very little on theirs.”

Glover’s own 14th Continental Regiment had been left with the guns. The regiment had erected a crude fortification while the rest of the brigade was in action and this gave Glover another strong position to defend.

The cannonade drew more of the British army into the battle, including some of the British grenadiers and Hessian Regiment von Knyphausen.

Captain George Harris (grenadier company, 5th Foot) noted, “The grenadiers did not suffer, being only exposed to the fire of the American batteries, which were very ill served.”

Lieutenant Andreas Wiederholdt (Regiment von Knyphausen) wrote, “The enemy had dug in on the high ground facing us and greeted us with a number of cannon shots, but these had no effect because they flew wide. I skirmished with the enemy and they wounded one of my men, for which I sent one of them into the next world with my rifle.”

Artist Charles Lefferts painted these representations of British soldiers. At left is a light infantryman in the 10th Regiment of Foot (Stirke’s company); at right is a grenadier in the 5th Regiment of Foot (Harris’ company).

Glover’s men blocked the route westward, which led towards the Bronx River and the rear of the American army. However, Howe did not attempt to force Glover from his post. Instead, he kept some men facing the Americans while others were sent to occupy high ground to the east. That night, according to Howe, the men “laid… upon their arms with the left upon a creek opposite to East Chester [i.e., opposite Glover’s position] and the right near to [New] Rochelle.”

Glover had done everything in his power to harass and delay the British army. Now it was time to pull back to a safer position:

“At dark we came off, and marched about three miles… after fighting all day without victuals or drink, laying as a picket all night, the heavens over us and the earth under us, which was all we had, having left our baggage at the old encampment we left in the morning. The next morning [we] marched over to Mile Square. I had eight men killed and thirteen wounded, among which was Colonel Shepard, a brave officer.”

British losses were heavier, but not as heavy as the volume of American fire would suggest. Ensign Stirke claimed there were 34 killed and wounded in the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry. Accounts by others suggest that the total British loss was not much higher.

Situation of the armies on October 18th (click to enlarge). Howe’s army crossed from Throg’s Neck (7) to Pell’s Point, and fought Glover’s brigade on his march inland. By the end of the day, the leading elements of his army were near New Rochelle (8). Meanwhile, Charles Lee prepared to defend Mile Square (9) lest the British attempt to cross the Bronx River and surround the American army.

October 18, 1776 (Part 1)

2011-10-18T00:07:00.009-05:00

Synopsis for the morning of October 18th: The British army crossed to Pell’s Point, but were met by Glover’s brigade; Washington’s divisions scrambled to turn back the British advance.

Previous entry: October 17th; next: Afternoon of October 18th.

For a second straight day, the British vanguard marched at 1AM. This time the weather cooperated, and the troops boarded flatboats and crossed from Throg’s Neck to Pell’s Point. As the British ships approached shore, they were fired on by some American sentries [see footnote]. Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton, who commanded the vanguard, recalled, “They… began to fire a few shot. But, as I was certain they could not be in any great force, I ordered the debarkation to proceed”.

The sentries quickly withdrew, and the British began to assemble on the shore. According to Clinton, “The moment the whole avant garde was ashore I… detached Lord Cornwallis with the grenadiers, light infantry, and [jaegers]… to our right”.

Meanwhile, Colonel John Glover was hurrying forward with his brigade of Massachusetts Continentals to contest the British advance. Glover wrote that:

“[The British had] stole a march [of] one and a half miles on us. I marched down to oppose their landing with about seven hundred and fifty men, and three field-pieces, but had not gone more than half the distance before I met their advanced guard, about thirty men; upon which I detached a captain's guard of forty men to meet them, while I could dispose of the main body to advantage.”

Glover’s advanced troops were able to surprise the head of the British column.

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) recalled:

“I was ordered to join the light infantry and grenadiers under Lieutenant General Clinton… I was ordered by the General to the top of a rising ground in front with the advance guard of the light infantry to reconnoitre, but we were immediately fired upon from behind trees and heaps of stones where the rebels lay concealed”.

Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company of the 10th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion) was also with the leading troops. He recorded, “we received a very heavy fire, as we marched up a hill, from behind stone walls, pickets etc. by which I had 1 sergeant killed, another, with a private man wounded.”

Glover wrote that the advanced troops “kept the ground till we exchanged five rounds” with the British. Soon, however, they were forced to withdraw. The advanced troops had lost “two men killed and several wounded,” and the British aggressively pressed ahead:

“Their body being much larger than mine… [and] the enemy pushing forward not more than thirty yards distant, I ordered a retreat, which was masterly well done by the captain that commanded the party. The enemy gave a shout and advanced”.

However, as the British light infantry advanced, they ran into Colonel Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment. These men, Glover wrote, were “laying under cover of a stone wall undiscovered till they [the British] came within thirty yards, then rose up and gave them the whole charge [i.e., a volley]; the enemy broke, and retreated for the main body to come up.”

According to Archibald Robertson, “we halted until General Howe came up. The Rebels appeared drawn up in our front behind all the fences and high stone walls.”

One of the clearest indicators of the site of the battle of Pell’s Point is a map prepared by Charles Blaskowitz documenting the movements of the British army in Westchester County. Below is an excerpt of his map (click to enlarge) that shows the British landing on Pell’s Poin.

Note the road network on Pell’s Point: there is a road that goes inland, goes through a marsh, and on the far side of the marsh forms a “V” with one branch going north, and the other brance going east. Blaskowitz indicated that the battle was fought on the road leading to the north.

A comparison with later maps helps make it possible to determine the site of the main phase of the fighting (see especially Part 2). The first row in the image below (click to enlarge) shows a series of maps that illustrate how the road system at Pell’s Point changed over time.

The first map dates to the Revolutionary War. On this map the “V” pattern is quite distinct; the road connecting the V with the shore is also visible, but it is quite short in length. The second map dates to the early 19th Century and the third map dates to the late 19th Century. Both of these maps show the V present in the Blaskowitz map, with a road leading to the shore. These maps show additional roads as well, indicating that the area was becoming more developed. The fourth map is from the 20th-Century, and on this map the V is no longer visible. Instead, the northern branch, on which the battle was fought, was removed to accommodate a golf course. The eastern branch, however, remains. The fifth map is from a modern satellite image. It shows the same road network present in the fourth map. Larger versions of these maps are available are available through the Library of Congress, the David Rumsey Map Collection, Acme Mapper, and Google Maps.

In the second row is a series of close-up views of the area where the road leading north once was. Based on clues in 18th and 19th Century maps, I sketched in the old road network in red. Based on clues in the Blaskowitz map and participant accounts of the battle, I marked the approximate site of the battle with a blue square. Note that Glover’s men were deployed just shy of the crest of a hill. As described above, the battle began when the British were ascending this hill and came under fire from the men in Glover’s advance party. The British were able to seize the high ground, and Glover’s men were deployed somewhat shy of the crest. Glover noted, “The enemy had the advantage of us, being posted on an eminence which commanded the ground we had to march over.” He also referred, in his account of the battle, to “the ground being much in their favour”.

Glover deployed three of his regiments in a staggered manner to meet the British: the lead regiment was on the left of the road, the other two were on the right. Their relative placement (but not absolute position) is indicated in the map below: Blue 1 = Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment, Blue 2 = William Shepard’s 3rd Continental Regiment, Blue 3 = Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. Red 1 = the route taken by the British light infantry, Red 2 = the route taken by the British grenadiers. The Hessian jaegers (position not marked) likely occupied the woods to the right of the light infantry.

When the British army moved to Pell’s Point, they left behind, at Throg’s Neck, the 2nd and 6th British brigades. These troops made a feint to distract the Americans, by making it appear as if the British army was going to advance overland from Throg’s Neck.

Major-General William Heath scrambled to respond. First he was informed “that the British were opening an embrasure in their work at the end of the causeway [i.e., by Westchester Creek bridge]… [which made it appear that] they intended, under [cover of] a cannonade… to attempt to pass.” Heath instantly ordered a brigade stationed near Valentine’s Hill to hurry towards the bridge. Then, “When the troops had advanced to about half the way… another express met him, informing him that the whole British army were in motion, and seemed to be moving towards the pass at the head of the creek.” Heath ordered the troops to change direction “and march briskly to reinforce the Americans at the pass at the head of the creek.”

General Washington was not deceived by these movements, and he called off Heath’s response. Washington, however, saw a large number of British vessels heading up the East River (a change in wind direction now favored the movement of British ships), and he expressed concern over the possibility that the British might land troops west of Throg’s Neck. Therefore, according to Heath, Washington “ordered him to return immediately, and have his division formed ready for action”.

The other divisions on the New York mainland similarly prepared for a fight. At Mile Square, Major-General Charles Lee positioned his forces (minus Glover’s brigade) to defend the crossings of the Bronx River.

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment; Nixon’s brigade) listened to the sound of British cannon fire at Pell’s Point, while his troops moved into position:

“we heard a heard a heavy firing of cannon after breakfast[.] We were ordered to parade ourselves under arms and marched over to General Lee’s quarters who ordered our regiment to take post on a hill… to prevent the enemy’s crossing the land from east to west”.

To further protect these key crossings, George Washington sent Major-General Joseph Spencer’s division to nearby Valentine’s Hill.

This map shows the distribution of Washington’s army units in Westchester County on October 18, 1776 (click to enlarge). The placement of the units on this map is inexact. North is up at the upper-right corner of the map. A part of the Hudson is at the top of the map, and a part of Long Island Sound is at the bottom.

While Howe’s army landed at Pell’s Point, the 2nd and 6th British brigades conducted a feint on Throg’s Neck. (The 2nd brigade is shown near the head of Westchester Creek; the 6th brigade was in an off-map location near the bridge at extreme lower left). The divisions of William Heath and John Sullivan watched over the British on Throg’s Neck and defended the shoreline between Throg’s Neck and Manhattan (off map, at left). The crossings of the Bronx River are marked by the numbers 1-4. One part of Charles Lee’s division guarded these crossings, while another (John Glover’s brigade) contested the British advance from Pell’s Point. During the day, Joseph Spencer’s division marched from Kingsbridge (upper left) to Valentine’s Hill (upper right).

Footnote: The sentries were probably a detachment of militia. Militia units from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire were placed in various locations along the shore of Long Island Sound and Hudson’s River to watch the movements of the British navy, safeguard caches of supplies, and keep key points out of the hands of the Loyalists. The detachments were not expected to stop a major drive by the British army. New York militiaman Benjamin Bogardus later wrote, “The orders came from [Major] General [Charles] Lee, for all the guard along the shore to draw back and let them [the British] land”.

October 17, 1776

2011-10-17T00:00:00.009-05:00

Synopsis for October 17th: Bad weather delayed the British move to Pell’s Point; William Smallwood commented on the sufferings of the American soldier.

Previous entry: October 16th; next: Morning of October 18th.

The British vanguard marched at 1 AM for the move to Pell’s Point. The move, however, was soon cancelled because of a storm. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company of the 10th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion) recorded in his journal that “very heavy rain, and high wind” “obliged us to return to our quarters at ½ after 3 o’clock [A.M.].”

Lieutenant-General William Howe decided to make the move on the 18th instead.

Lieutenant Tench Tilghman (one of Washington’s aides) was puzzled by the British inactivity:

“The enemy has made no move from Frog's Point. We may say the 17th October is come and nearly past without the predicted blow. The winds have not been favourable to pass Hell-Gate, where several of their transports are now laying; perhaps that may be the reason…. If we can but foil General Howe again, I think we knock him up for the campaign.”

Tilghman expected the British advance to be made overland from Throg’s Neck, not by water to the east; therefore, he was puzzled by the British inactivity. He was right, however, about the winds causing delays for the British.

Captain Frederick Mackenzie (23rd Regiment of Foot) commented on the slow movement of men and supplies from New York City to Throg’s Neck:

“The recruits lately arrived for those regiments which are with the army under General Howe, went though Hellgate this morning in flatboats. The ships with the Hessians [see footnote] cannot go through for want of a proper wind. Several ships with horses and wagons are detained for the same reason. The Senegal sloop of war got through this morning with much difficulty; she touched the shore several times but at last effected the passage with much labor and danger.”

This map illustrates the distribution of Washington’s army units in Westchester County on October 17, 1776 (click to enlarge). North is at the upper-right corner of the map. A part of the Hudson is at the top of the map, and a part of Long Island Sound is at the bottom. By the end of the day, four of Washington’s divisions were on the New York mainland (those of William Heath, John Sullivan, Charles Lee, and Joseph Spencer) as was Benjamin Lincoln's brigade of Massachusetts militia. The placement of the units on this map is inexact.

Washington’s army units were deployed with three objectives in mind:

First, units were deployed to defend the crossings of the Bronx River (marked by the numbers 1-4). Glover’s brigade of Lee’s division was positioned in advance of these crossings near the town of East Chester. As long as the British were kept from crossing the Bronx, Washington had a secure connection with upstate New York and New England.
Second, units were deployed to contain the British army on Throg’s Neck (partially visible at extreme lower left).
Third, units were deployed to guard the shoreline between Throg’s Neck and Manhattan (off the map, at left).

The divisions of Israel Putnam and Nathanael Greene (not shown) defended upper Manhattan, and nearby Fort Constitution in New Jersey. Around this time, Fort Constitution was renamed Fort Lee, after the American general.

Spencer’s division was in a reserve position at Kingsbridge, where it could quickly move to reinforce American forces in either Westchester County or upper Manhattan.

Howe had wanted to land his forces at Pell's Point on this date (bottom of the map), but the move was delayed by bad weather.

On this quiet day, Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion (McDougall’s brigade; Lee’s division), wrote about his misgivings with the army. He asserted that “Our Commander-in-Chief is an excellent man,” but he found much fault with the officers below Washington:

“Were our officers good, and our men well trained, it would be impossible [for the British] to effect their purpose…” but “there seems to be a total ignorance of and inattention to” the kind of military discipline “necessary to render an army formidable.” He argued that many of the officers essentially “train” their men “to run away” from the enemy, “and to make them believe they never can be safe unless under cover of an entrenchment… Discipline here is totally neglected, and yet after all it is the only bulwark in war. Had our troops been trained better, and worried less with the pick-axe and spade, by this time our army would have been in a condition to have sought for their enemies in turn.”

Smallwood also complained that the men were poorly fed, and that many were sick from “being often moved, and… exposed to lie on the cold ground… often lying without their tents for several nights”. He added, “We want medicine much; none can be had here. Our sick have [been] and are now suffering extremely.” “I foresee the evils arising from the shameful neglect… One good-seasoned and well-trained soldier, recovered to health, is worth a dozen new recruits, and [it] is often easier [to] get [a well-trained soldier] recovered than [it is] to get a recruit…”

But, Smallwood also saw glimmers of hope. He believed the British “are as much afraid and cautious of us, as we can be… of them”. He remarked also that all ranks in the army understood what was on the line: they must either “fight or starve and surrender at [British] discretion”.

Footnote: The Hessian reinforcement consisted of the Lieb Regiment, Regiment von Dittfurth, and Regiment Prinz Carl, which together formed a brigade under the command of Friedrich Wilhelm von Lossberg. These troops departed Staten Island on October 12th, but were still awaiting the opportunity to join Howe’s army.

October 16, 1776

2011-10-16T00:11:00.003-05:00

Synopsis for October 16th: Hugh Mercer attacked British troops on Staten Island; George Washington held a council of war; the British army began to move.

Previous entry: October 15th; next: October 17th.

Late in the day on October 15th, Brigadier-General Hugh Mercer led a force consisting of militia from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware onto British-held Staten Island. During the night they found and burned some old British camps and they attempted to capture some troops stationed at the town of Richmond. This force, Mercer later learned, consisted of 20 British regulars, 45 Hessians, and a newly-formed Loyalist outfit called the New Jersey Volunteers [see footnote].

Mercer moved one part of his force behind the British so as to cut off their retreat. The rest of his force was to attack at daybreak from three directions. The attack, however, did not go as well as planned. According to Colonel Samuel Patterson, who was with the troops behind the British:

“Colonel [Samuel] Griffin was too eager. He ordered my battalion to attack as soon as it came up. At this time the others had not a man arrived. This then was dawn of day. We began it as hard as we could blaze. The few enemy… were ready at a church and a corner of the street near there. We should not have begun so soon, but came near one of their sentries, who fired at our advanced flanking-party, [commanded by] Captain Rumford, which brought us all to work, and not being light, had liked to have shot our own people. It lasted about one hour in attacking parties of regulars that ran up the hill, and [who] made a small stand in the cedars, and then ran off. We… [had] two of ours killed, and three or four wounded… Colonel Griffin got wounded in the first fire in the heel…. About half an hour after the first attack the general [Hugh Mercer] came up, amidst the smoke, and escaped narrowly from being fired on by our own people, as it was not light [enough] to know him.”

Mercer wrote, “Well disciplined troops would have taken the whole [enemy force] without the loss of a man, but we only took… eight Hessians and nine British, one of those wounded, and besides these, two mortally wounded, left at Richmond town.”

Sometime later, Ensign Samuel Richards (Samuel Wyllys’ 22nd Continental Regiment) was given charge of the prisoners. He recalled that the Hessians “were well built young men, very athletic. As they were the first Hessians we had taken [during the war]… they attracted much attention, and procured for me many civilities and some substantial refreshment [from grateful citizens]”.

Back at American headquarters, George Washington held a council of war with his general officers (Charles Lee, Nathanael Greene, William Heath, Israel Putnam, Joseph Spencer, John Sullivan, and Benjamin Lincoln, among others). According to the minutes of that meeting:

“After much consideration and debate, the following question was stated: whether, (it having appeared that the obstructions in the North River have proved insufficient, and that the enemy's whole force is now in our rear on Frog Point,) it is now deemed possible in our situation to prevent the enemy cutting off the communication with the country and compelling us to fight them at all disadvantages, or surrender prisoners at discretion?”

In other words, could they safely hold their current position given that British vessels could ascend the Hudson and that the main British army had entered Westchester County?

The generals agreed (General Lee was particularly vocal on this point) that they could not prevent the British from cutting their supply lines and that it was necessary to move the army to defend them. However, the general officers also agreed to leave a garrison in and about upper Manhattan.

Afterwards, Major-General Nathanael Greene wrote, “The troops appear to be in good spirits, and I am in hopes, if Howe attacks us, he will meet with a defeat. A battle is daily, nay hourly, expected.” He was chagrined however, that he would have “no share of the honour or glory of the day, if victorious” because he had been ordered to remain with the American troops left guarding the Hudson.

The Americans wasted no time in undertaking the movement into Westchester County. The same day that the general officers met, Benjamin Trumbull observed that “the stores[,] baggage[,] etc.” are being “moved to places of safety with the greatest expedition.”

Meanwhile, Major-General Charles Lee began shifting his units inland to defend the left flank and rear of the army. Glover’s brigade was moved east. Private John Dewey (Shepard’s 3rd Continental Regiment) noted in his journal, “We marched about one mile… and encamped in the woods.” Nixon’s brigade was moved north to guard a key crossing on the Bronx River. Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) wrote in his journal that the troops were ordered “to draw 4 days’ provisions and cook it” lest they should have to move “at a moment’s notice”.

Lieutenant-General William Howe was at last ready for his next move: a crossing from Throg’s Neck to Pell’s Point to the east. Although this move would place his army at a greater distance from the Americans, there was no broken bridge at Pell’s Point to prevent the British from marching inland.

In the evening, orders were issued for the vanguard “to strike their tents and load their wagons at 12 tonight, and march at 1 [A.M.]”.

Footnote: The detachment of British regulars at Richmond was commanded by one Captain Stanton of the 14th Foot. Some men of the 6th Foot were also present. These two understrength regiments were weeks later drafted into the other regiments in the British army. The 6th, according to one of Mercer’s prisoners, consisted of only 150 men (see Force or Naval Documents of the American Revolution for their testimony). The Hessian prisoners were from Regiment von Trümbach.

October 15, 1776

2011-10-15T00:00:00.003-05:00

Synopsis for October 15th: The standoff at Throg’s Neck continued; the armies prepared for another movement; Hugh Mercer led a raid onto Staten Island.

Previous entry: October 14th; next: October 16th.

The uneasy standoff at Throg’s Neck (commonly called Frog’s Point) continued into a fourth day. American Major General William Heath noted, “The scattering fire across the marsh continued, and now and then a man was killed.” Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) was witness to one of these incidents:

“in the morning… I walked out to see the country and found plenty of… apples and peaches and [I] went as far as our lower lines and saw the enemy on Frog’s Point where they was at an house over a creek[,] a little beyond musket shot of our guard[.] One who appeared like an officer ventured down to the creek and was shot down by one of our men and was carried up by them to the house”.

Archibald Robertson of the Royal Engineers noted that he spent the day “raising two mock batteries… opposite the bridge… and a line opposite theirs on our right” by the head of the creek. These batteries made it look as if the British would attempt an overland push across Westchester Creek. In actuality, the British were preparing to bypass the American defenses by landing on another part of the coast.

Newly-arrived American Major General Charles Lee did not know what move the British would make next, but he felt that the Americans should not wait for it in their present position. According to Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion)*:

“General Lee… thought that the situation of the army of the States of America was much too confined and cramped, and that it could not be good policy to lie still in such a situation, or to hazard the great cause in which we were embarked in one general action, in which if we should not succeed, the army might be lost, as a retreat would be extremely difficult if not impossible.”

George Washington was also troubled by the situation of the army. He doubted that he had enough men to prevent the British from taking control of the Hudson, maintain the army’s fortifications in upper Manhattan, and counter the British advance into Westchester County. He wrote that:

“…we are obliged to divide our force, and guard every probable place of attack as well as we can; as most of our stores are here [in upper Manhattan] and about King's Bridge, and the preservation of the communication with the States on the other side of Hudson’s River [is] a matter of great importance… I have sent two regiments of the Massachusetts militia up the river to watch the motions of the [British] ships [cf.October 9th & 10th], and to oppose any landing of men that they may attempt. I am also extending every part of my force that I possibly can… to oppose the enemy [inWestchester County], and prevent their effecting their plan… but our numbers being far inferior to the demands for men, I cannot answer for what may happen: the most in my power shall be done.”

The American stance at this time was not wholly defensive.

In Connecticut, Governor Jonathan Trumbull and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Livingston (2ndNew York Regiment) had begun to wage war on British Loyalists occupying Long Island. They were in the process of rounding up men and boats so as to make a major raid.

In New Jersey, Major-General Nathanael Greene and Brigadier-General Hugh Mercer led on this date a raid onto Staten Island. Staten Island was the first base of operations for the British army in the New York City area. However, by this date the island was largely stripped of troops.

Colonel Samuel Patterson was present with a battalion of Delaware militia. He later wrote:

“in the evening, General Mercer ordered part of four battalions to… go on board boats at eight o’clock that evening. We did, in the whole about six hundred men, with two pieces of brass artillery. We crossed all about ten o’clock at night, in order to attack a small fort at the east end of that island, at the watering-place, and to be there by break of day,--seventeen miles, our battalion in front”.

While the Americans were marching across the island, a messenger caught up with the generals and informed them that Washington had called for a council of war that would convene in the morning. Greene left, but Mercer continued ahead.

According to Patterson, “At the same time” we were “informed… that the fort was reinforced the day before by the arrival of fresh troops… to about twelve hundred men.”

Mercer gave up the idea of taking the fort and sent back the artillery. However, he also learned of a target of opportunity. He afterwards reported, “I was then advanced within a few miles of Richmond town [on Staten Island], and received information… that a company of British troops, one of Hessians and one of [Cortland] Skinner’s [Loyalist] militia [the New Jersey Volunteers], lay there.” He issued orders to surround and capture these men.

According to Patterson, Mercer ordered Patterson and one Colonel Samuel Griffin to take the Delaware militia and two rifle companies to a point “about a mile below the town… and to lay about there till near break of day”. There they would cut off the retreat of the British troops. “General Mercer’s plan was—he to attack, with his party, in three places, and we to be ready at the same time in the other quarters.”

Patterson added: “[Mercer] is… as cool in his plans as a philosopher. I love him.”

*The letter was anonymous; Ezra Stiles believed Trumbull was the author.

October 14, 1776

2011-10-14T00:12:00.010-05:00

Synopsis for October 14th: Charles Lee joined the American army; Joseph Reed found cause for optimism; Loyalists were cheered by the new campaign.

Previous entry: October 13th; next: October 15th.

Major-General Charles Lee arrived at George Washington’s headquarters. Lee recently was in command of American forces in the south, and he was credited with foiling a British attempt on Charleston, South Carolina (June, 1776). He was one of the persons Congress considered placing in command of the army when it created the post of commander-in-chief. Both officers were widely respected.

It was thought that the British might soon attempt to move deeper into Westchester County and cut off the American army from New England. Washington wanted Lee to defend this crucial sector and he gave him command of the brigades of Alexander McDougall, John Nixon, and John Glover. These troops were almost wholly Continentals. Lieutenant Tench Tilghman (one of Washington’s aides) later wrote that Lee “will have the flower of the army with him, as our [defensive] lines in front are so strong that we can trust them to troops who would not stand [up to the British] in the [open] field.”

According to Major-General William Heath, Washington asked Lee “not to exercise the command for a day or two, until he could make himself acquainted with the post, its circumstances, and [the] arrangements of duty.”

Washington and Lee spent part of the day close to Throg’s Neck, inspecting the terrain and the situation of the British army. For a third straight day there was desultory firing across Westchester Creek. (According to Archibald Robertson of the Royal Engineers, “They fired several cannon shot and wounded some of our men.”)

The situation of the two armies appeared so favorable to the Americans that Colonel Joseph Reed (Washington’s adjutant general), was prompted to write:

“I had at one time concluded that the enemy would go into winter quarters, satisfied with the summer’s business, but I find I was mistaken. They have taken post above the main body of our army, keeping constantly the same object in view, that of surrounding us. We have now every advantage of ground, and if the men will fight, I cannot but hope we shall foil them in any attempt they make. My own opinion is that if we cannot fight them here, we cannot do it anywhere.”

This map of Throg's Neck (from the David Rumsey collection) was rendered many years after the Revolutionary War, but nevertheless well illustrates the disadvantages of Throg's Neck to the British army. The troops were separated from the mainland by Westchester Creek (running, at left, from nearly the top of the image to the bottom), and by a wide salt marsh that could not be easily crossed (the shaded area).

The British continued to bring up horses, wagons, provisions, and other materials of war to Throg’s Neck in preparation for their next move. This process, however, went slowly. The British transports had to pass through treacherous Hell Gate, and the wind, according to Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion), was “entirely unfavourable for the enemy.”

Elsewhere, news of the British advance into Westchester Country excited American Loyalists. Reverend Ezra Stiles wrote:

“There is considerable motion among the Tories which are said to be a quarter of the people west of Stratford River [in Connecticut]. [There is an] Appearance of conspiracy and preparation for insurrection; they express great expectations that the King’s troops will prevail. The patriots and friends of liberty don’t love to take violent courses with them, but begin to think they must.”

October 13, 1776

2011-10-13T00:04:00.004-05:00

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776.Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 13th: The Americans brought reinforcements into Westchester County; the British prepared for their next move.

Previous entry: October 12th; next: October 14th.

Major-General William Heath commanded the American troops in lower Westchester County. He observed that at Throg’s Neck “a large number of vessels, ships, brigs, schooners, sloops… etc.” were at anchor offshore. During the night of October 12-13, “[their] lanthorns were lighted and hung out at their yard arms which made a very extraordinary appearance.”

The Americans suspected the landing on Throg’s Neck was only a feint, and they thought the British might make a new landing elsewhere. Sure enough, the British showed no signs of attempting to force their way overland from Throg’s Neck. Instead, there was only scattered firing between the armies. According to Heath, “Captain Bryant [of Knox’s Artillery Regiment], now and then… saluted the British with a field-piece.”

To prepare against the various possible British moves, the Americans poured reinforcements into Westchester County. Alexander McDougall’s marched into Westchester County from Manhattan, and the brigades of John Glover and John Nixon were sent across the Hudson from New Jersey to Kingsbridge.

Screenshot of a Google Maps satellite view of Throg’s Neck (click to enlarge). The marked sites of the British landing and of Westchester Creek bridge are based on the Charles Blaskowitz map, shown partially below.

Excerpt of a Charles Blaskowitz showing the position of British and American forces on either side of Westchester Creek (click to enlarge). The American positions at the bridge (lower left) and at the head of the creek (upper left) were defended by troops from Colonel Edward Hand’s Pennsylvania brigade, Colonel William Prescott’s 7th Continental Regiment, Colonel Morris Graham’s New York militia regiment, and a couple of pieces of artillery. These troops (among others) were commanded by Major-General William Heath. Only part of the British army is visible. Blaskowitz depicted close to the bridge some companies of British light infantry (the red triangles), the 1st Jäger Company (two green triangles), and a detachment of light dragoons (the red and white square). Near the head of the creek is the 2nd British brigade (5th, 28th, 35th, 49th regiments of foot). The rest of the British army was encamped to the east or southeast.

The Throg’s Neck area is today heavily urbanized. The image below (screenshot using Google Maps) shows that the humble Westchester Creek Bridge has given way to several major traffic arteries.

British Commissary Charles Stedman later criticized Lieutenant-General William Howe for not immediately making another move. He called the landing on Throg’s Neck a “mistake” and said that it “should have been remedied instantly, by pushing along some other route”. The British landing craft were on hand, and the troops were already carrying provisions for this day and the next, but no move was made. Howe explained later that another move “would have been an imprudent measure, as it could not have been executed without much unnecessary risk.” Instead, Howe decided to wait until he was more fully prepared. During this time, he later wrote, “we were employed in getting up stores and provisions” and “the carriages and horses for transporting provisions, artillery, ammunition, and baggage.” More men were on the way as well.

October 12, 1776

2011-10-12T00:22:00.005-05:00

Synopsis for October 12th: The British army crossed to Throg’s Neck; the Americans prevented the British from advancing far inland.

Previous entry: October 11th; next: October 13th.

During the night, the British army began to cross to Throg’s Neck (also known as Frog’s Point). Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, oversaw part of the crossing. He wrote:

“About three o'clock [on] Saturday morning, the 12th, the troops were embarked in the flat boats and bateaux, to the number of between four and five thousand men; the Guards and 42nd regiment, between fourteen and fifteen hundred men, were embarked on board sloops under my direction. At daybreak in the morning the boats set off, and no sooner had they put off, with an amazing strong tide, but it came on a fog equal to pitch darkness, with now and then an interval of light for a few seconds. The boats were put off; to attempt to stop them would have been very dangerous, for the headmost boats must have anchored, and the boats that followed would in all probability run [a]foul of them, to the imminent danger of sinking each other; the admiral [i.e., Vice Admiral Richard Howe], therefore, rather chose to run the risk of passing Hell Gate with all the boats in that rapid tide and dark fog. I went astern and ordered all the boats to move forward. Soon after their putting off, a galley towing one of the artillery boats, in endeavouring to cross a vessel lying in the passage, towed her athwart hawse; the boat ran directly up her cable, and overset instantly. Many of the people were picked up; there were three field-pieces lost, and I suppose five or six people. There were very few people in the flat boats [that] had ever been through or knew anything of the passage of Hell Gate. This made the danger much the greater.”

Captain George Harris (grenadier company, 5th Regiment of Foot) also had a close call:

“the point of an island… divides the river into two rapid streams, and causes a very dangerous whirlpool…. through the ignorance of our pilot, we were on the edge of the pool… too late to avoid the suction, and found ourselves, circle after circle, attracted to the centre, in spite of all our efforts, till at last the boatmen were on the point of quitting their oars, despairing of escape, when, animated I suppose by the love of life, I began to storm at them for their cowardice, and made them stick to their oars. We at length perceived that we made progress, and emerged from the whirlpool, escaping without other accident than the dislocation of a man's wrist”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton had much praise for Vice Admiral Richard Howe and his fellow Royal Navy officers for getting the army through Hell Gate “almost miraculously” despite the heavy fog and treacherous waters. He added:

“About eight o’clock we arrived off Frog’s Point, where we found a frigate stationed to cover our embarkations. A few rebels made their appearance as we approached the shore; but some scattering shots soon dispersed them, and the landing was effected without loss.”

Two watercourses lay between Throg’s Neck and the American army: Westchester Creek and the Bronx River. Securing the passage over Westchester Creek was especially important as a single bridge over this creek provided the only good route inland. Therefore, according to Clinton, “As soon as the troops could be formed, we pushed for Westchester Bridge in hopes of securing it.”

The area nearest Throg’s Neck was defended by Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade of Pennsylvanians (this included Hand’s own 1st Continental Regiment, Colonel Henry Haller’s Berks County Regiment, and Colonel James Cunningham’s 1st Lancaster County Regiment; see footnote).

Major-General William Heath had previously stationed “25 picked men” from Hand’s brigade to watch over the Westchester Creek bridge at all times, “and, in case the enemy made a landing… to take up the planks of the bridge”.

The men quickly performed their duty, and when the head of the British column appeared, they “commenced a firing with their rifles.”

Clinton lamented: “the enemy had been too quick for us”.

The British then attempted to bypass the wrecked bridge and cross at the head of Westchester Creek. However, according to Heath, they “found here also the Americans in possession of the pass.”

Both sides called up reinforcements.

Situation of the British and American armies on October 12, 1776 (click to enlarge).

Throg's Neck area circa 1781. The map shows the solitary road leading inland from Throg's Neck, which crossed Westchester Creek. Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade had its headquarters at DeLancey's Mills on the Bronx River, but a detachment carefully guarded the Westchester Creek bridge. The town of West Chester was a short distance west of the bridge.

The site of the British landing on October 12th; from a map by Charles Blaskowitz.

Heath stated that “he immediately ordered Colonel Prescott, the hero of Bunker Hill, with his regiment, and Captain-Lieutenant Bryant of the artillery, with a 3 pounder, to reinforce the riflemen at West Chester causeway [i.e., the bridge]; and Colonel Graham of the New-York line, with his [militia] regiment, and Lieutenant Jackson of the artillery, with a 6 pounder, to reinforce at the head of the creek; all of which was promptly done, to the check and disappointment of the enemy.”

Captain-Lieutenant Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) wrote that “the [British] guns were taken forward to the bridge, 16 pieces” but no attempt was made to take either pass by force. Instead, he wrote, “we were ordered to encamp.” He noted that the remainder of the day was punctuated by “popping shots across the water.”

George Washington arrived in person to examine the situation of the British army. He later wrote that Throg’s Neck “is a kind of island” although “the water that surrounds it is fordable at low tide.” However, he was pleased to find that “The grounds from Frog's Point are strong and defensible, being full of stone fences, both along the road and across the adjacent fields, which will render it difficult for artillery, or indeed a large body of foot, to advance in any regular order, except through the main road.” He then ordered fortifications erected to guard the road and the pass at the head of the creek. He noted that “Our men, who are posted on the passes, seemed to be in good spirits”.

These fortifications, according to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, soon made “everything still more unapproachable.” At the same time, the Americans “cannonaded the camp of the 71st Regiment, which lost six killed and three wounded.” He claimed that “If the rebels had accurately aimed their guns, the balls of which flew over English headquarters, they could have annihilated the Guards and the 33rd Regiment in the reserve.”

October 11, 1776

2011-10-11T00:05:00.002-05:00

Synopsis for October 11th: Friendly fire killed men on the Hudson; Joseph Reed contemplated defeat; Ambrose Serle watched the new offensive get underway.

Previous entry: October 10th; next: October 12th.

The Americans closely watched Hudson’s River for signs of renewed British activity. A vessel was observed coming down the river. Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) noted “she hoisted an uncommon sail,” and Major-General William Heath wrote that she was thought “to be one of the British tenders”.

Henry Hallowell (Hutchinson’s 27th Continental Regiment) remembered: “I was ordered with a party to place ourselves near the shore [with muskets] all loaded to stop [the vessel]… and [we were] just about to fire” when “Knox’s Artillery threw a shot from the fort” at it. In fact, the Americans were firing on their own men – the vessel was one of the few vessels to have escaped the Royal Navy on the 9th.

According to Smith, the shot “killed three men as they was sitting aft and wounded the captain slightly”. Afterwards, the dead men were “landed at the ferry and buried in one grave”. Hallowell called it “a sorrowful sight.”

Colonel Joseph Reed was Washington’s adjutant general. He was shocked by the poor showing of American troops when the British first landed on Manhattan one month earlier (September 15, 1776), and he was convinced that the American army lacked the discipline to defeat the British in battle. Reed also didn’t think the situation was likely to improve. He complained in a letter to his wife:

“To attempt to introduce discipline and subordination into a new army must always be a work of much difficulty, but where the principles of democracy so universally prevail, where so great an equality and so thorough a leveling spirit predominate, either no discipline can be established, or he who attempts it must become odious and detestable…”

Reed previously informed the Continental Congress that he wished to resign from his post, but he was stuck in this position as they had not appointed a replacement.

He told his wife, “I never meant to make arms a profession, my duty to you and my dear children will lead me to pursue that course of life which will contribute most to their and your happiness, for though I would wish to serve my country… I have not the least desire to sacrifice you and them to fame, even if I was sure to attain it.”

He feared that “if France or some other foreign power does not interfere” in this conflict “we shall not be able to stand” against the British “next spring”. But he consoled his wife that if the war were lost, they would not suffer too much for it: “my estate is no object of confiscation, my rank is not so high as to make me an example”.

New York City was devastated by a massive fire on September 21st. Its port was closed, many of its inhabitants had fled, and it was now occupied by hundreds of British soldiers. The remaining citizens attempted to maintain a degree of normalcy. Ambrose Serle (Vice Admiral Richard Howe’s secretary) recorded that he “walked about the town, which begins to fill, and has some of its markets open for meat and vegetables.” He noted disparagingly that “The meat is sweet, but generally lean: the vegetables are mostly good: but both very inferior to those of England; at least, what I have seen.”

In the afternoon Serle saw that the invasion of Westchester County was getting underway:

“all the flat-boats, belonging to the fleet were ordered up the East River in order to effect a landing for the troops… The admiral [Howe] and the other principal officers of the navy went up to conduct the embarkation and debarkation, intended in the morning; so that tomorrow or next day, warm work may be expected.”

He exulted, “May God prosper the king’s arms, and the cause of my country!”

No spies or deserters warned the Americans of the British plans. Nevertheless, the Americans closely watched the shore, and they had an inkling of what was coming. Major-General William Heath observed, “There was a considerable movement among the British boats”.

October 10, 1776

2011-10-10T00:00:00.008-05:00

Synopsis for October 10th: Gunning Bedford described life in the American army; the Americans feared the British would seize key points on the Hudson; William Howe prepared for the move to Throg’s Point.

Previous entry: October 9th; next: October 11th.

The passage of the British ships up the Hudson on the 9th alarmed the American army. Once it became clear that no major movement was afoot, the officers and men returned to their usual routine. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford (the Delaware Regiment) described the situation of the army on this date:

“We are strengthening our [defensive] lines,--the enemy are also busy with theirs. Our duty continues hard, having the lines to man every morning before day, and they are a mile and a half from here, and [we have] a great deal of other duty… many of our men have deserted to the enemy, though none from our regiment... [British] deserters say the enemy are apprehensive of an attack from us. They all, likewise, say they are healthy, and their army strong,--above thirty thousand… Our army is very sickly yet. We have one hundred and forty of our regiment unfit for duty. We have neither hospitals nor medicines for them, which makes them suffer much… Our army seems in good spirits, and we think our lines are secure, if they should be attempted.”

Although the British vessels on the Hudson posed no immediate threat to the American army, their presence was suggestive of Britain’s longer-term plans. Writing from the town of Fishkill, the New York Committee of Safety described to George Washington their fears that British vessels, acting in conjunction with local Loyalists, would take control of key points on the river:

“Nothing can be more alarming than the present situation of our state; we are daily getting the most authentic intelligence of bodies of men [i.e., Loyalists] enlisted and armed in order to assist the enemy[.] We much fear that they[,] cooperating with the enemy may seize such passes as will cut off all communication, between the army and us and prevent your supplies.”

This map (click to enlarge) shows the lower Hudson River, which was a primary route for the flow of men and materials to and from Washington’s army. On October 9th, a handful of British vessels successfully passed Fort Washington (4) and Fort Constitution (5) and took post in a wide stretch of the Hudson’s River near Dobb’s Ferry (7) and Tarrytown (8). The Americans had previously begun construction on Fort Montgomery (10) to defend one vital chokepoint on the river, but other points seemed vulnerable, such as Stony Point (9) and West Point (11).

The painting is Dominic Serres’ depiction of the frigates Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar passing, on October 9th, between the American batteries in and around Fort Constitution (left) and Fort Washington (right).

The Americans were well aware that their supply lines extending north and east of Manhattan were also vulnerable. Although they had no forts to control the shoreline (like they did on the Hudson), the Americans were at least aided by geography: British vessels moving troops into Long Island Sound would have to pass through a treacherous passageway known as Hell Gate.

Colonel George Weedon (3rd Virginia Regiment) wrote with amazement that the British kept a vessel anchored in this passage: “at this time a 28 gun frigate lays in Hellgate, a place not much wider than the streets of Williamsburg, [Virginia]”

Lieutenant-General William Howe had in fact decided to move his entire army through this passage and land on Throg’s Point (cf. October 8, 1776). At this time he was attending to the details of this operation. In brief, the British occupied several posts in the New York City area: the lower half of Manhattan, western Long Island, Staten Island, Paulus Hook on the New Jersey shore, and a couple of islands in New York’s East River. Howe decided to largely strip these posts of troops, although on Manhattan Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy would be left with three brigades of British troops and one of Hessians.

Howe’s force would consist, at first, of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th brigades of British regulars, the British Reserve (three battalions of British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the brigade of Guards, one brigade of Hessian grenadiers, one brigade of Hessian musketeers and fusiliers, three battalions of light infantry, two battalions of the 71st Foot, some light dragoons, the Hessian jaegers, and a couple of recently formed Loyalist corps.

Howe expected to receive substantial reinforcements while the campaign was underway, including an entire division of Hessian troops that was then crossing the Atlantic. In addition, Percy would be able to release some of his men to Howe if and when Washington pulled back from Manhattan.

The exact timing of these decisions was unrecorded, but by this time the British were nearly ready for the offensive to begin. On this date the army was issued 6 days’ worth of provisions (a sure sign that a move was imminent) and they were ordered to “dress” these provisions on the 11th.

October 9, 1776

2011-10-09T00:23:00.005-05:00

Synopsis for October 9: British vessels on the Hudson River cut an important communications link to George Washington’s army.

Previous entry: October 8th; next: October 10th.

The Americans defended their position in and about upper Manhattan with an extensive series of fortifications. Particularly impressive were the forts and batteries designed to keep the British navy from ascending the Hudson River (then commonly called the North River). British vessels would have to pass between a series of batteries in and around Fort Constitution on the New Jersey side of the river and Fort Washington on the New York side. In between, the river was obstructed by hulks that had been intentionally sunk. The Americans also had a small flotilla of row galleys on the far side of the obstacles.

Captain Andrew Snape Hamond of HMS Roebuck recalled that “the rebel army was chiefly supplied by the North River, and placed great dependence upon it… they looked upon it to be perfectly secure: and it is possible, from seeing the great preparation they had made, we might also have thought so”.

But then, in early October:

“a deserter… informed the admiral [Vice Admiral Richard Howe] that there was a passage open between two of the sunken vessels… and offered himself as a pilot. This intelligence was exceedingly agreeable to both the General [Lieutenant-General William Howe] and admiral, conceiving, that if ships could be got up the North River, the rebel’s supplies would not only be cut off from Albany and that country, but even their communication with the Jerseys would become very uncertain and unsafe which could not fail of distressing them, and would very much assist in the intended operation of surrounding their army”.

On October 9th, a southerly breeze made the expedition possible. The British dispatched three frigates (Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar), a schooner (Tyral), and two tenders.

According to Captain Hammond:

“Much praise is due to Captain [Hyde] Parker on this occasion (who led, in the Phoenix) for his steadiness and good conduct – when they drew near to the danger, the pilot, in great confusion told him, that the marks which then appeared were not those that had been described to him, and he was totally at a loss[,] upon which Captain Parker, very prudently, immediately determined to take his chance where he knew the deepest water to be, which was close to the eastern shore…”

The Americans watched with incredulity as the British vessels eased past their defenses.

George Washington wrote, “to our surprise and mortification, they all ran through without the least difficulty, and without receiving the least apparent damage from our forts, which kept playing on them from both sides of the river.”

Appearances were a little deceiving: the British lost 9 killed and 18 wounded. Among these were a servant boy killed by a cannonball on the Phoenix and a Captain-Lieutenant of His Majesty’s Marines flayed by splinters on the Tartar. The ships were also considerably damaged, although none came close to sinking.

On the far side of the forts, “the enemy began to fire small arms from the woods,” according to Captain Cornthwaite Ommanney of the Tartar. Apparently, the British fired back, for Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered:

“they gave us some volleys of grape-shot… and some bombs. The grape-shot made holes in our tents, and some of the bombs broke in the air. One fell amidst our tents, but one of our boys ran and soon had pulled out the fuse. We had one man wounded.”

Heading north, the British gave chase to the American vessels on the river.

Captain Hyde Parker of the Phoenix wrote, “at Noon… [we were] in chase of four of the rebel galleys[,] etc. [and I] sent the Tartar ahead to cut them off… at 1 P.M. two of [the] galleys, a schooner, and two sloops ran onshore”. At 1:30 the Phoenix “anchored … [and] fired several broadsides to scour the shore…”

Among the men on the row galleys were two junior officers of Hutchinson’s 27th Continental Regiment. They claimed the vessels were run on shore once it became clear they could not outrun the British vessels. They recalled, “We run her [i.e., their vessel] on shore just above Dobb’s Ferry where we had not time enough to get our people and things on shore…” Instead, the fast approaching enemy “obliged us to swim on shore. But no lives [were] lost”. Then the British “fired a broad side of grape shot as we lay in the bushes…”

In the end the British captured two of the American row galleys (Independence and Crane), two sloops, and a schooner. According to Major-General William Heath of Massachusetts, one of the sloops “had on board the machine invented by… a Mr. Bushnell, intended to blow up the British ships.” This was the famous Turtle, the world’s first submarine.

The American infantry now had the awkward task of chasing the British navy. Orders went down the line from George Washington (the commander in chief), to Major-General William Heath (a division commander), to Colonel Paul Dudley Sargent (a brigade commander), to send men north and prevent the British from doing additional damage.

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General Heath’s orders to Colonel Sargent:

“Sir: The enemy, as it is reported, have landed a number of troops at or near Dobbs's Ferry; and it being thought indispensably our duty to dislodge them, you are immediately to take the command of the detachment designed for that purpose, consisting of five hundred men. You will march without the least loss of time, with the said detachment and forty light-horse, to Dobbs's Ferry, taking with you one howitzer and a detachment of the artillery, now at Philips’s Mills [i.e., two 12-pounders]… You will take particular care that the howitzer is properly covered, and defended by the battalion men.

You will, if possible, dislodge the enemy; killing or taking prisoners, as occasion may require…”

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The British expedition caused a good deal of marching and countermarching for some of the Continentals. Among these was Private Davie How of Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. Like many journalists of this era he described the events of the day in simple terms, and left out how difficult such marches were for poorly clothed and often inadequately fed troops:

“This morning three ships sailed up the North River[.] Our people kept a hot fire at them[.] We were all alarmed and marched down to Morrisania – 6 miles – then we all marched back before night [another 6 miles]. This night I went with a party of men to Dobb’s Ferry[,] about 12 miles[; we] got there at daybreak.”

October 8, 1776

2011-10-08T00:00:00.003-05:00

Synopsis for October 8th: British leaders planned to drive George Washington’s army from Manhattan.

Next entry: October 9th.

George Washington’s army was ejected from New York City in mid-September. Afterwards, the Americans established their headquarters in upper Manhattan. They also erected strong fortifications spanning the width of the island. The British wished to complete their conquest of Manhattan without having to storm these works. Therefore, the British looked to drive the Americans from Manhattan by threatening their lines of supply and communication with New England.

In the words of the British commander in chief, Lieutenant-General William Howe:

“The very strong positions the enemy had taken on this island [Manhattan] and fortified with incredible labour determined me to get upon their principal communication with Connecticut, with a view of forcing them to quit the strongholds in the neighbourhood of King’s Bridge and if possible to bring them to action.”

In early October, General Howe, along with his brother, Vice Admiral Richard Howe, examined the coastline of the New York mainland to the east of Manhattan (New York’s Westchester County). They identified several possible landing sites. Not far from the shore lay the Boston Post Road, the principle connection between New York and New England.

On this date (the 8th), the British leadership apparently debated how to make this move into the New York mainland. According to Major Stephen Kemble (deputy adjutant-general), there was “a long council of general officers with the commander in chief and admiral [that] did not break up till half past three in the afternoon.”

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton’s memoir provides insight into the deliberations. He noted that “many different plans were suggested”. He believed:

“our landing should be made at such a distance from the enemy’s gross [i.e., main part] that our whole army might have time to be disembarked before they could come upon us in numbers sufficient to disturb us, yet at the same time so near their three communications with the continent [that] they must be obliged to fight us on our own terms or fall back.”

This probably was not a controversial position. However, the generals disagreed about where exactly the landing should take place.

Clinton wanted the army to land near New Rochelle, where it could easily cut the “three communications” from Manhattan. Specifically, by seizing New Rochelle, the British would cut the Boston Post Road, which ran to the east. A short march later and they would seize the crossroads at White Plains and cut the northeastern route. One more march and they would seize the bridge over the Croton River and cut the northern route.

However, General Howe disapproved of landing at New Rochelle because of doubts that the British could be easily supplied there.

Instead, according to Clinton, Howe preferred to land at the mouth of Westchester Creek. There the British would have a shorter supply line of their own while also being closer to the supply lines of the Americans. However, this suggestion was dropped because a landing could be made only at high tide.

Finally, Brigadier-General William Erskine proposed a landing near Throg’s Point (also known as Frog’s Point), which lay just to the east of Westchester Creek.

Howe agreed to this proposal. Clinton did as well; he stated, “though roundabout, it led finally to the object I had in view.”

This map (click to enlarge) is based on a modern photograph of the New York City area, taken from the Space Shuttle Columbia. In 1776, New York City occupied only the lower tip of Manhattan Island (Number 7). The British intended to land behind Washington’s army on the northern shore of Long Island Sound (at the points designated by Numbers 8, 9, or 10). Washington’s army would then either have to retreat or face entrapment once the British began cutting the roads leading north and east from Manhattan.

The British had good reason to be optimistic about the success of this movement. On this date, Ambrose Serle (secretary to Vice Admiral Howe) spoke with several American deserters in New York City who told him that their army was “very sickly, ill clothed, and much dispirited.”

The American army had lost over the previous month-and-a-half the battle of Long Island and possession of New York City. The army was ill clothed – indeed, they were poorly supplied with almost every military necessity — and illness was rampant. However, morale had not reached a crisis point; the American army, as a whole, remained determined to continue the fight.

White Plains Project

2011-10-07T00:16:00.008-05:00

Overview

This month I'm going to write about the White Plains "campaign" of 1776, which was part of the broader contest between George Washington and William Howe for control of the New York City area. In brief, at the beginning of October, 1776, George Washington's army had its headquarters in upper Manhattan. William Howe wanted to force Washington to retreat or surrender by cutting his supply lines. To this end, Howe moved into New York's Westchester County and tried to circle around Washington’s army.

My plan is to have a post online for each day of the campaign; furthermore, the posts will appear on the anniversary of the historical occurrences. The first post is scheduled for tomorrow (October 8th) and will cover the events of October 8th, 1776. I will continue in this manner through November 1st, on which date the British gave up their pursuit of Washington’s army. Although some days in this campaign were not terribly eventful, I've decided to write about all of them so as to explore how a campaign gradually unfolded over time.

The posts are intended to be brisk and readable and will focus on the battles and skirmishes during this period, the plans of the commanders, and camp life in the two armies.

To improve readability, I will alter capitalization and spelling in the passages I quote to bring the text in line with modern conventions (an example appears below). I will also be omitting passages in the quoted material (leaving ellipses in their place) that bog down the reader with unnecessary detail.

The writing will be geared primarily to folks who are already familiar with the Revolutionary War. In other words, I'm not going to summarize earlier events during the war, provide background information on the major figures, or define terms like "light dragoon" or "howitzer". A set of links to wikipedia articles appears below for those that would like to learn more about the events preceding this campaign and the historical persons that figured prominently during this campaign.

For most of the days in this campaign, I will have the blog post online a little after midnight, U.S. Central Standard Time. If I'm busy certain evenings, then the posts will be online even earlier. I anticipate having four posts online for October 28th, when the battle of White Plains was fought (these will correspond with the events of the morning, mid-day, afternoon, and evening).

Sources

Below is an alphabetical listing of accounts of the White Plains campaign that I anticipate quoting or referring to in the posts in this series. I'm listing all of the sources up front because it's more convenient than having a separate listing at the end of every upcoming post.

Most of the accounts are from works in the public domain that were accessed via Google Books or archive.org. I also greatly relied on several collections of transcribed primary sources: Peter Force’s American Archives (electronic database hosted by Northern Illinois University), the George Washington Papers (Volumes 6 and 7), the Naval Documents of the Revolutionary War (Volumes 6 and 7), and Henry Phelps Johnston (1878). The campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn. Bamford’s diary and Stirke’s journal were accessed through the website of the Maryland Historical Society.

Anderson, Enoch. Henry Hobart Bellas (1896). Personal recollections of Captain Enoch Anderson, an officer of the Delaware regiments in the Revolutionary War. Papers of the Historical Society of Delaware, Issue 16.
Anonymous Loyalist. Cited in Henry Phelps Johnston (1878). The campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn.
Anonymous American officer in New Jersey. Letter in Peter Force’s American Archives.
Baldwin, Loammi. As cited in William Abbatt (1901). The Battle of Pell’s Point.
Bamford, William. Maryland Historical Society (1932-33). Bamford’s Diary: The Revolutionary diary of a British officer. Maryland Historical Magazine.
Baurmeister, Carl Leopold. Bernhard A. Uhlendorf (1957). Revolution in America: Confidential letters and journals 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian forces.
Bedford, Gunning. William Thompson Read (1870). Life and correspondence of George Read.
Bogardus, Benjamin. New York State Historical Association (1926). Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, Vol. 24.
Bostwick, Elisha. William S. Powell (1949). A Connecticut soldier under Washington: Elisha Bostwick’s memoirs of the first years of the Revolution. William and Mary Quarterly.
Brooks, John. Maria Campbell and James Freeman Clarke (1848). Revolutionary services and civil life of General William Hull.
Clinton, George. John Hastings (1899). Public Papers of George Clinton, first governor of New York, 1777-1795—1801-1804. Military—Vol. 1.
Clinton, Henry. William B. Willcox (1954). The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's narrative of his campaigns; 1775-1782.
Craige, Thomas. John C. Dann (1980). The Revolution remembered: Eyewitness accounts of the War for Independence.
Dewey, John. Journal appears in Louis M. Dewey (1898). Life of George Dewey, Rear Admiral, U. S. N., and Dewey family history.
Douglas, William. Excerpts of letters in Henry Phelps Johnston (1878). The campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn.
Duncan, Henry. John Knox Laughton (1902). Journals of Henry Duncan, Captain, Royal Navy. In The Naval Miscellany, Vol. 1; Also excerpted in Naval Documents of the American Revolution.
Ewald, Johann von. Joseph P. Tustin (1979). Diary of the American War: A Hessian journal.
Francis, Jacob. John C. Dann (1980). The Revolution remembered: Eyewitness accounts of the War for Independence.
Glover, John. William Upham (1863). A memoir of Gen. John Glover of Marblehead. Historical Collections of the Essex Institute, Vol. 5; Peter Force’s American Archives; William Gordon (1788). The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2.
Greene, Nathanael. Peter Force’s American Archives; the George Washington Papers.
Hallowell, Henry. Howard Kendall Sanderson (1909). Lynn in the Revolution.
Hamond, Andrew Snape. Naval Documents of the American Revolution.
Harris, George. Stephen Rumbold Lushington (1840). The life and services of General Lord Harris.
Harrison, Robert. Peter Force’s American Archives; George Washington Papers.
Harrison, William. William Hand Browne (1893). Journal and correspondence of the Maryland Council of Safety: July 7-December 31, 1776. Archives of Maryland, Vol. 12.
Haslet, John. Peter Force’s American Archives.
Heath, William. William Abbatt (1901). Memoirs of Major-General William Heath; Peter Forces’ American Archives; George Washington Papers.
Henshaw, William. Emory Washburn, Charles C. Smith, and Harriet E. Henshaw (1881). The orderly book of Colonel William Henshaw of the American Army.
How, David. Henry B. Dawson (1865). Diary of David How, a private in Colonel Paul Dudley Sargent’s regiment of the Massachusetts line, in the army of the American Revolution.
Howe, William. Reports in Peter Force’s American Archives and in K. G. Davies (1980). Documents of the American Revolution, Vol. 12. Transcripts, 1776; A copy of general orders issued by Howe is in New York Historical Society (1883). The Kemble Papers, Vol. 1. 1773-1789; Howe’s interview by Parliament is in The Parliamentary Register (1779). Vol. 12.
Hull, William. Maria Campbell and James Freeman Clarke (1848). Revolutionary services and civil life of General William Hull.
Kemble, Stephen. New York Historical Society (1883). The Kemble Papers, Vol. 1. 1773-1789.
Kimball, Peter. Charles Carleton Coffin (1881). Diary of Capt. Peter Kimball in 1776. The Granite Monthly, Vol. 4.
Lasher, John. Peter Force’s American Archives.
Leggett, Abraham. Charles I. Bushnell (1865). The narrative of Major Abraham Leggett, of the army of the Revolution.
Lee, Charles. New York Historical Society (1872). The Lee Papers, Vol. 2. 1776-1778.
Mackenzie, Frederick. Journal excerpts are in Naval Documents of the American Revolution.
Markham, Enoch. Clements Robert Markham (1883). A naval career during the old war: Being a narrative of the life of Admiral John Markham.
Martin, Joseph Plumb. George F. Scheer (1962). Private Yankee Doodle: Being a narrative of some of the adventures, dangers, and sufferings of a Revolutionary soldier.
Mercer, Hugh. Peter Force’s American Archives; George Washington Papers; Naval Documents of the American Revolution.
McDougall, Alexander. Peter Force’s American Archives.
McMichael, James. William Henry Engle (1893). Journals and diaries of the War of the Revolution.
Morgan, John. Francis Randolph Packard (1901). The history of medicine in the United States. [Appendix B]
Nash, Solomon. Charles Bushnell (1861). Journal of Solomon Nash.
New York Committee of Safety. Peter Force’s American Archives.
New York Gazette. Frank Moore (1860). Diary of the American Revolution from Newspapers and original documents, Vol. 1.
Ommanney, Cornthwaite. Naval Documents of the American Revolution.
Osborn, George. K. G. Davies (1980). Documents of the American Revolution, Vol. 12. Transcripts, 1776.
Parker, Hyde. Naval Documents of the American Revolution.
Patterson, Samuel. William Thompson Read (1870). Life and correspondence of George Read.
Percy, Hugh. Charles Knowles Bolton (1902). Letters of Hugh Earl Percy from Boston and New York 1774-1776.
Pine, John. William Hand Browne (1893). Journal and correspondence of the Maryland Council of Safety: July 7-December 31, 1776. Archives of Maryland, Vol. 12.
Putnam, Rufus. Rowena Buell (1903). The memoirs of Rufus Putnam.
Rawdon, Francis. Paul David Nelson (2005). Francis Rawdon-Hastings, Marquess of Hastings: Soldier, Peer of the Realm, Governor-General of India.
Reed, Joseph. William B. Reed (1847). Life and correspondence of Joseph Reed, Vol. 1; also in Peter Force’s American Archives.
Richards, Samuel. Samuel Richards (1909). Diary of Samuel Richards: Captain of Connecticut Line War of the Revolution.
Ries, Johann Caspar. As cited in Rodney Atwood (2002). The Hessians.
Robertson, Archibald. Harry Miller Lydenberg (1930). Archibald Robertson: His diaries and sketches in America, 1762-1780.
Serle, Ambrose. Edward H. Tatum (1969). The American journal of Ambrose Serle, secretary to Lord Howe 1776-1778.
Shaw, Samuel. Josiah Quincy (1847). The journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the first American Consul at Canton.
Silliman, Gold. Excerpts of his letters are in Henry Phelps Johnston (1878). The campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn.
Smallwood, William. Peter Force’s American Archives.
Smith, John. Louise Rau (1933). Sergeant John Smith’s diary of 1776. Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 20.
Stedman, Charles. Charles Stedman (1794). The history of the origin, progress, and termination of the American War, Vol. 1.
Stiles, Ezra. Franklin Bowditch Dexter (1901). The literary diary of Ezra Stiles, Vol. 2.
Stirke, Henry. S. Sydney Bradford (1961). A British officer’s Revolutionary War journal, 1776-1778. Maryland Historical Magazine, Vol. 56.
Sullivan, Thomas. As cited in Matthew H. Spring (2008). With zeal and with bayonets only: The British army on campaign in North America, 1775-1783.
Tallmadge, Benjamin. Benjamin Tallmadge (1858). Memoir of Colonel Benjamin Tallmadge.
Tilghman, Tench. Peter Force’s American Archives.
Trumbull, Benjamin. Connecticut Historical Society (1899). Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society, Vol. 7. Journal of the Campaign at New York 1776-7. Ezra Stiles believed that Trumbull authored an anonymous account of the campaign that was published in newspapers of the time and that appears in his journal (see above) and in Peter Force’s American Archives.
Van Cortlandt, Philip. Jacob Judd. (1976). The Revolutionary War memoir and selected correspondence of Philip van Cortlandt.
Washington, George. Peter Force’s American Archives; George Washington Papers.
Weedon, George. Letter summarized in John R. Sellers (1968). The Virginia Continental Line, 1775-1780; letters also excerpted in Naval Documents of the American Revolution.
Wiederholdt, Andreas. As cited in Rodney Atwood (2002). The Hessians.
Wood, Sylvanus. John C. Dann (1980). The Revolution remembered: Eyewitness accounts of the War for Independence.

Use of Sources

As mentioned above, the text is altered to bring spelling and capitalization in line with modern standards. As an example, here is an excerpt from the journal of Private David How:

"This morning the Enimy Landed at Frogg’s point We ware all a larmed and Marchd Down Almost there And Staid all Day the Enimy Did not offer to March any Distance from there Ships."

This becomes:

"This morning the enemy landed at Frog's Point[.] We were all alarmed and marched down almost [to] there and stayed all day[.] The enemy did not offer to march any distance from their ships."

Background Reading (Wikipedia Articles)

Major events:

Some American officers who feature prominently in this series:

Some British and Hessian officers who feature prominently in this series:

Guilford Courthouse Project (Index)

2011-10-06T23:21:00.002-05:00

Index to Posts in the Guilford Courthouse in Miniature Series

Overview

Battle of Guilford Courthouse Project

Research Posts

The Americans at Guilford Courthouse [Reconstruction of the American order of battle based on an obscure troop return]
The 71st at Guilford Courthouse [Surprising statements made about this British regiment in the pension applications of American veterans]
The Third Line at Guilford Courthouse [Reconstruction of the American third line based on participant statements]
Fighting Formations at Guilford Courthouse [An old map provides evidence that the British used an open-order formation]
The “Separate Battle” at Guilford Courthouse [The sequence of events in one part of the battle can be interpreted in two different ways]
On the Origins of the Defense in Depth [Comment on how Greene’s tactics can be traced at least as far back as the New York campaign of 1776]

Preparing the Miniatures

Painting Minifigs Riflemen [Step-by-step process of painting some Rockbridge Riflemen]
Almost There [Painting Lee's Legion]
Battle Flags for the Continentals [Creatively designing flags for the Continentals]
Painting Update: Regiment von Bose [Pictures of my first Hessian Regiment]

Preparing the Model Battlefield

The Battle in Miniature

Part 1: Background information

Action on the First Line

Part 2: Exchange of artillery fire
Part 3: British infantry advance
Part 4: Infantry fight on the first line
Part 5: Webster’s fight on the British left flank

Action on the Second Line

Part 6: Actions involving Lawson’s brigade of Virginia militia
Part 7: Actions involving Stevens’ brigade of Virginia militia
Part 8: Start of the “separate battle” at Guilford Courthouse on the British right flank

Action on the Third Line

Part 9: Webster’s attack
Part 10: The British Guards attack
Part 11: The Americans counterattack
Part 12: The Guards are defeated, but the British renew the attack
Part 13: The Americans are driven from the third line
Part 14: The separate battle continues
Part 15: Conclusion of the battle of Guilford Courthouse

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (15)

2011-10-05T19:02:00.002-05:00

This is the final entry in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12, Part 13, Part 14.

In the “separate battle” at Guilford Courthouse, British forces attacking Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s flank corps found their flank and rear imperiled by the “Rockbridge Rifles” of Edward Stevens’ brigade of Virginia militia [Part 14].

The British drew men away from their primary attack to counter the Virginians, but they found the riflemen difficult to dislodge. Rifleman Andrew Wiley later remembered, “the British forces… were swept off [a ridge] by the Virginia Riflemen, but formed again and again”. [1]

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The model battlefield as the battle winds down (click to enlarge). The Americans first line was behind the fields near the bottom of the image, the second line was in the woods in the center, and the third line was at the top (where miniature redcoats can be seen driving back the American Continentals). The green-coated British Legion cavalry are massed behind the infantry. The “separate battle” is occurring along the right edge of the image.

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Meanwhile, Lee attempted to break off the action and join the Continentals on the third line. In his words:

Lee dispensed with his cavalry, heretofore held in the rear to cover retreat in case of disaster, ordering it to close with the left of the continental line, and there to act until it should receive further orders. Upon [Regiment von] Bose... [his troops] now turned with increased animation and with confidence of success. [2]

Lee’s men drove the Guardsmen and Hessians back a little ways. At that point:

Every obstacle now removed, Lee pressed forward... and joined his horse close by Guilford court-house.

However, by the time Lee’s troops reached the courthouse area, the battle for the third line was over. Lee then followed the rest of the army on its retreat.

After Lee retreated, the Rockbridge Rifles were the only sizable group of Americans left on the battlefield (Lee, perhaps, had been unaware of their presence). The Rifles soon were imperiled. At about the same time that Lee left the fight, British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton was dispatched to aid the Hessians and Guardsmen with part of his British Legion cavalry. Tarleton recalled that en route:

[they] found officers and men of both corps wounded, and in possession of the enemy: The prisoners were quickly rescued from the hands of their captors, and the dragoons… [continued on] without delay. As soon as the cavalry arrived, the guards and the Hessians were directed to fire a volley upon the largest party of the militia, and, under the cover of the smoke, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton doubled round the right flank of the guards, and charged the Americans with considerable effect. The enemy gave way on all sides, and were routed with confusion and loss. [2]

Samuel Houston of the Rockbridge Rifles recalled running for his life from the charging horsemen: “we were obliged to run, and many were sore chased, and some cut down.” [3]

Houston and a number of other riflemen eventually found each other and made their way towards the American encampment.

Darkness and rainfall halted the movement of both armies. Houston’s party, which had several wounded men in it, spent a miserable night in the woods:

all being almost wearied out, we… encamped, where, through darkness and rain, and want of provisions we were in distress. Some parched a little corn. We stretched blankets to shelter some of us from the rain.

The British army encamped on the battlefield. Commissary General Charles Stedman recalled that:

The night… was remarkable for its darkness, accompanied with rain, which fell in torrents…. The cries of the wounded and dying who remained on the field of action during the night exceed all description. Such a complicated scene of horror and distress, it is hoped, for the sake of humanity, rarely occurs, even in a military life. [4]

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British Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis had been victorious at the battle of Guilford Courthouse as a victory, but only in a very narrow sense. He had driven the Americans from field, but more than 1 in 4 of his men were killed or wounded in the process. He also failed to achieve his primary objective – restoration of a favorable strategic situation in the southern theater through the destruction of the American army.

American Major-General Nathanael Greene’s army, however, had been greatly damaged. Many of his Continentals had been killed or wounded, and much of his militia was scattered. Some of the North Carolina militia simply went home after the battle; some left out of disgust with what they felt was poor leadership by their commanders.

Greene’s situation was in a sense the opposite of that of Cornwallis. He had been unsuccessful on the tactical level (his defense-in-depth had not stopped the British attack), but he was closer than before to achieving his strategic objectives. Cornwallis gave up his pursuit of Greene’s army and moved eastward where he could be supplied. That move gave Greene an open road into South Carolina, and he soon undertook the reconquest of that state.

When Greene moved south, he expected Cornwallis would abandon North Carolina and try to defend British holdings in South Carolina. Instead, Cornwallis, after being resupplied, moved north into Virginia.

Cornwallis later explained that a retreat into South Carolina would have been difficult to undertake and would further weaken his army. Moreover, he suspected that the fight for control of the South Carolina backcountry would be over before his troops arrived. Cornwallis knew that Virginia was Greene’s main source of men and supplies. He reasoned that no action could better preserve British holdings in the south than taking Virginia out of the war. Furthermore, Virginia was vulnerable: its fine ports and rich plantations were defended by little more than militia.

Neither commander got exactly what he wanted from these moves. Greene had considerable trouble driving the British from the South Carolina backcountry; the campaign in this quarter dragged on for months. Cornwallis had an easy and successful campaign when he first arrived in Virginia, but he was unable to stop Greene’s activity in South Carolina. Furthermore, American resistance in Virginia grew stronger with time. By late summer, 1781, Cornwallis’ operations were largely confined to the coast, and in October his army was besieged and forced to surrender at Yorktown.

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Notes:

1. Pension application of Andrew Wiley.

2. Lee's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

3. Houston's account appears in William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia....

4. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.