Battle of Hanging Rock 9

Part 9: Battle for the Center Camp

Previous: An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

Next: The British Flank Attack

At the same time that elements of the Americans center and left divisions were battling McCulloch for possession of the Loyalist camp, other American militia were pursuing Samuel Bryan’s Loyalists to the west and south. These panicked men threw the camps of the Provincials into disorder [1]. Amid the chaos, the Provincials mistook some of Bryan's men for Sumter's militia and shot them [2]. The Americans added to the confusion by closing pursuing Bryan's men. According to one remarkable tale told after the war:

"As the tories fled towards the British camp, many of the whigs [i.e., Sumter’s men] rushed pell-mell with them. One named Walker, hurrying along in their midst, was about to fire on those before him, when a tory close to him caught his arm, crying, ‘Those are on our side!’ and then, as if struck with a sudden suspicion, asked ‘What is that green leaf in your hat for?’ The whigs had taken the precaution to put each a leaf in their hats that morning before going into battle. The soldier pulled out the token, but the discovery was already made; one of the tories seized his gun, the other ran a bayonet through his hunting shirt. Letting the weapon go, he turned and fled back. ‘It appeared to me,’ he said, ‘that they fired fifty guns after me; every leap I gave, I heard something fall on the leaves which I took for blood, and thought I must be badly wounded, and would soon fall exhausted. I thought of the intolerable thirst I had witnessed in those bleeding to death, and my mouth began to feel parched. I had now reached the branch [Hanging Rock Creek or a tributary], and stooped to drink. On examination I found I was not hurt, but my powder horn was severely wounded, being pierced through with a rifle ball, and having lost the greater part of its contents’" [3].

Bryan's Volunteers in Flight (click to enlarge). A portion of Bryan's men flee through the camp of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

The American right division followed those of Bryan's men fleeing westward. For Richard Winn, the purpose of this movement was to attack the British center camp, his original target [4]. Here, the British "were well posted" [5]. When the Americans came into view, "the British immediately commenced firing from behind some bush tents," [6] and "behind a fence" [7]. Many of the men with Winn were simply moving "in pursuit of the Tories," and were surprised "by this unexpected discharge" from the Provincials [8]. But the Americans were quick to recover. Seeing that the Provincials were without loaded muskets, Winn "set up the Indian hollo," and his men "rushed and fire[d] on their enemy as they went with bullets in their mouths and powder in their pockets." They loaded their rifles on the run, not stopping "to take a tree even where trees was" [9]. "The British… finding such a charge made on them," [10] "broke and joined in the flight of the Loyalists" [11].

Elements of the center and left divisions soon began arriving after having pursued the survivors of McCulloch’s company to the center camp [12]. Among these, two companies of North Carolinians began taking fire from "A party of fifteen or twenty of the enemy," who had taken "shelter in a cabin with a clapboard door," and were "firing through the cracks." In response, "Captain [James] Knox, with half the men, charged the front door, Lieutenant [George] Graham with the rest charged the rear door. Captain Knox ran against and broke down the door, the enemy fled out of the rear door, and Graham's party shot down several of them" [13].

The British Flee the Center Camp (click to enlarge). Loyalist militia, the Royal North Carolina Regiment (red coats), and British Legion infantry (green jackets) abandon the center camp to American riflemen and dragoons. The British manage to retain their cannon.

All-in-all, the Provincials had delivered only "a few discharges," before giving up the center camp. They retreated "for about 300 yards." Here, Joseph Graham thought, was the opportunity to launch the knockout blow against the British garrison. The British infantry "turned their backs for 300 yards," and "a charge of 70 cavalry would have made them surrender, but at that period but few of the cavalry had returned from pursuit of the tories and they were yet unformed." That Davie’s dragoons had charged and scattered so early in the action was a "great blunder" for the Americans [14].

Battle for the Center Camp. The Americans pursue a portion of Bryan's Volunteers to the center camp and attack the British Provincials stationed there. Meanwhile, a portion of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment (PoWAR) advances towards Bryan's former encampment.

Notes:

1. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

2. The pension application of Samuel Saxon, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. Elizabeth Fries Ellet. (1850). Domestic history of the American Revolution.

4. Suggested by the accounts of William Davie and Richard Winn; both describe early attack on center camp, and neither mentioned the battle with McCulloch described in my previous post. Winn's account notes, "as soon as Brian gave way [Winn] marched with his party for the British camp which he found in an open old field about [one] half mile from where Brian was posted." For Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. For Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).

5. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

6. Winn, ibid.

7. Davie, ibid.

8. Davie, ibid.

9. Winn, ibid.

10. Winn, ibid.

11. Davie, ibid.

12. Implicit in the account of Joseph Graham, and explicit in the account of Joseph McJunkin. For Graham's account, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. For McJunkin's account, see Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

13. Graham, ibid. According to this source, Knox commanded one company, Graham the other. Graham took over Captain David Reid’s company after Reid was killed in the assault on Bryan’s camp.

14. Graham, ibid.

Battle of Hanging Rock 8

Part 8: An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

Previous: Bryan's Defeat

Next: Battle for the Center Camp

The Provincial regiments were not idle while Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers were being assailed. In the camp of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment, a detachment of men was sent north towards the Loyalist militia and other Provincials [1]. In the center camp, the British Legion infantry and Royal North Carolina regiment were formed into a line of battle [2]. Also, Captain Kenneth McCulloch's company of British Legion infantry left the center camp to go to Bryan’s aid.

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment Responds (click to enlarge). A detachment is sent north towards the sound of battle.

McCulloch’s company was dispatched “on the first alarm,” and “they arrived on the eminence [where Bryan was encamped] just after the tories had left it” [3]. Here, the Provincials found the Americans in a state of complete disarray. Half of the men, including all of Davie’s dragoons, had scattered in pursuit of the Loyalists [4], while the remainder were taking guns and ammunition from the abandoned Loyalist camp [5].

McCulloch’s men struck the American center and left divisions [6], and “advanced firing in platoons” [7]. However, the attack was ineffective. The Americans “took to trees and rocks,” [8] and the British “overshot their opponents” [9]. The Americans formed “a half circle around the eminence,” and “by taking steady aim” “in a short time caused one third of them to fall” [10]. The Provincials “fell so fast by their unseen enemy that their officers were obliged to push them forward by their sabers” [11].

McCulloch Under Fire. Having gained Bryan's encampment, McCulloch's company confronts an arc of gunfire.

At last, McCulloch’s company broke. More of his men fell when the American left division “began to cut off their flank” [12]. The survivors “retreated to the main body,” all the while “briskly pursued by Sumpter’s men” [13]. Among the fallen, Joseph McJunkin recalled finding Captain McCulloch “near the Tory camp… begging for water” [14]. He would soon be dead [15]. Casualties in McCulloch’s company were so extensive that the company was subsequently removed from the rolls of the British Legion [16].

McCulloch's Defeat. While Bryan's Volunteers flee, McCulloch's lone company is destroyed by Sumter's militia. Some of the unit actions shown on this map will be described in subsequent posts. Bryan's men fled south and west; their flight, and the American pursuit, was less organized and more scattered than the arrows indicate. PoWAR = Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

Notes:

1. William Davie's account of the battle refers to "a part of Colonel Brown's Regiment." Likewise, Banastre Tarleton referred to the actions of "a detachment of Colonel Brown's regiment" [This is the Prince of Wales' American Regiment; emphasis mine]. The activities ascribed to the "part" or "detachment" are so distinct in the two accounts as to suggest that the regiment was divided into two parts early in the battle and that the two parts fought in different parts of the battlefield. One part, as will be seen, became engaged near Bryan's camp and was destroyed. The other part ended up fighting alongside the Legion infantry near the center camp and suffered only light casualties. Why would a division in the regiment have occurred? The most likely reason is that one part of the regiment was sent in the direction of the fighting when the battle began, while the remainder defended the regiment's encampment. More about the activities of this regiment will appear in upcoming posts.

For Davie's account of the battle, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. For Tarleton's account of the battle, see Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.

2. Inference based on comments made by Davie. Davie found these regiments in a defensive posture shortly after the events described in this post.

3. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

4. William Hill claimed half of the men had pursued Bryan’s men “a considerable distance,” and could not “be brought off from the pursuit of the Tories,” before McCulloch arrived. See Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution. Graham, ibid., claimed that the dragoons were so scattered that they could not be collected again until late in the battle.

5. Joseph Johnson (1851). Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South.

6. The main commentators identified with these commands (Joseph Graham, Joseph McJunkin, and William Hill), described this attack in some detail. The main commentators with the right division (William Davie, Richard Winn) did not mention it.

7. Hill, ibid. Graham, ibid. also mentioned the firing by platoons.

8. Hill, ibid.

9. Graham, ibid.

10. Graham, ibid.

11. Hill, ibid.

12. Joseph McJunkin's account, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

13. Graham, ibid.

14. McJunkin, ibid. McJunkin also claimed that he “got a canteen out of the Tory camp… and gave him a drink.”

15. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.

16. Don Gara. Service summary of officers of the British Legion Infantry, sorted by troop. The only other officer of the Legion infantry to be killed during the battle was Lieutenant Ralph Cunningham of McCulloch’s company. See Don Gara. Biographical sketches of the infantry officers of the British Legion. (Retrieved February 19, 2010).

Battle of Hanging Rock 7

Part 7: Bryan's Defeat

Previous: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Next: An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

Battle plan in place, the Americans remounted their horses and filed off towards the British camps. For a brief moment, everything went as planned. According to Richard Winn, "the main body [i.e., the center and left divisions] wheeled to the left," while Winn and Davie’s men moved "to the right." The American commanders knew their targets, but they did not know the terrain. Therefore, they were forced to rely on the services of local guides to lead them to their destinations. Unfortunately, the guides leading the right division knew only that they were to lead this column towards the center camp on the Camden Road; they had not been briefed on the placement of Samuel Bryan’s Volunteers [1]. As a consequence, they led the right division into the Hanging Rock Creek bottom and past the front of Samuel Bryan’s men.

At this moment, Bryan’s men were having breakfast [2], but they could hardly fail to notice the Americans. Indeed, Richard Winn claimed that "his party was within 30 steps" of some of Bryan’s men when they began to receive fire. Sumter’s intended plan of attack was quickly abandoned. There was no choice now but for all three American divisions to assail Bryan’s camp.

Davie’s dragoons were in the lead when the right division came under attack. Winn claimed that Davie’s men were "ordered to move on to make room for the [infantry]" [3]. Winn’s men hurriedly began to dismount. At this moment, he recalled, "we received a most tremendous fire from Brian," but "The enemy being on the top of a big hill over shot us." Davie, however, complained that his men "suffered much while tying their horses, and forming under a heavy fire from the Tories" [4].

The Americans Advance Up the Hill (click to enlarge). Leaving their horses near the creek bottom, the Americans advance under fire towards Bryan's Volunteers at upper left.

Bryan’s men, for their part, formed up so as to face all three American divisions, their lines following the contours of the hill. Opposite the American left division, the hill looked "something like a half moon or a workman’s square," [5] and here, their "lines were extended from a point at right angles" [6]. The left division had not yet reached its assigned ground when the firing began. As a consequence, the center and left divisions were forced into an almost head-on assault of the Loyalist camp. William Hill recalled that "This action commenced under many very unfavorable circumstances to the Americans, as they had to march across a water course and climb a steep cliff, being all this time under the enemy's fire" [7].

Bryan's Line of Defense (click to enlarge). In the foreground, a camp follower awaits the outcome of the fighting. Brush huts and barrels mark the site of Bryan's camp.

The first Americans to be attacked were the first to ascend the hill. On the right, "Winn's party was ordered to put up the Indian hollow and rush up the hill before they discharged their pieces. This took place in an instance at this same time [Davie’s troop] was ordered to charge" [8].

Davie's Dragoons Charge Bryan's Left

Bryan’s line was soon rolled up from left to right. On the left, his Volunteers were only able to get off a single volley, and American losses were relatively light: just one killed and two wounded [9]. In the center, the Loyalists got off two volleys before their line collapsed [10]. The most severe losses were inflicted by Bryan’s right. Here, John McClure led his men against the angle in the Loyalist lines. They ran forward in two ranks with a terrific fire began pouring down on them. In a few moments, McClure, Joseph Gaston, and two of his brothers "fell in the front of the action." Gaston "received a ball on the bridge of his nose" that "went under the left eye and out by the ear." One of Gaston’s brothers lay "dead on the ground," while McClure and another brother lay mortally wounded [11]. Much lore developed around the mortal wounding of John McClure. According to one tradition,

"Colonel McClure was shot through the thigh, early in the action, but stuffing the wound with wadding, he rushed ahead of his command, and his clear voice was still heard, urging on his men to the continued charge. Just as the tories fled, he fell, pierced by several wounds. Those near him ran up to his relief, but he ordered them back to the fight, and his voice continued to be heard, urging and encouraging them in the pursuit" [12].

Battle Amid the Trees. The southern end of the Loyalist (left) and American (right) lines during the assault on Bryan's camp.

As Bryan's line was rolled up, many of his men began fleeing toward the south. Just then, a part of the American left "got around the side of their camp" [13], "and as Brian's men went by," the Americans gave them "a severe fire" [14].

Bryan’s men were in full rout, "attacked in front and flank, and routed with great slaughter," [15] they "fled with the utmost precipitation, and spread confusion through every quarter of the post" [16]. Even flight was precarious, for Davie’s dragoons "could not be restrained, but pursued them" across the woodland [17]. Further, some of those Loyalists that fled towards the center camp were mistaken for Sumter's men and shot by Provincials [18]. Winn boasted that "many of these men was so frightened they never stopped [running] until they got into Georgia" [19].

Bryan's Volunteers in Flight

Assault on Bryan's Camp. Some of the unit actions occurring at this time will be described in subsequent posts. PoWAR = Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

Notes:

1. The error of the guides is described by William Davie, Joseph Graham, and Richard Winn. For William Davie's account, see John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. For Graham's account, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. For Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. The pension application of Samuel Saxon, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. Winn, ibid.

4. Davie, ibid.

5. Joseph McJunkin's account, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

6. Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Queries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.

7. Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.

8. Winn, ibid.

9. Winn, ibid. However, as already noted, his description of American losses is at odds with Davie’s.

10. Graham, ibid., who was with Robert Irwin and the center division.

11. The pension application of Joseph Gaston, transcribed by Will Graves.

12. Joseph Johnson (1851). Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South. See Elizabeth Fries Ellet. (1850). Domestic history of the American Revolution for another version of this story. McClure’s death was mentioned by many participants.

13. Hill, ibid.

14. Winn, ibid.

15. Davie, ibid.

16. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

17. Graham, ibid.

18. Saxon, ibid.

19. Winn, ibid. This is an exaggeration of course, but some of the Loyalists continued their retreat at least as far as Rawdon’s force on Lynche’s Creek, 12 miles away. They reached this point in the evening and were joined there by soldiers from the Royal North Carolina Regiment and the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment who fled during a later stage in the fighting. See Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

Battle of Hanging Rock 6

Part 6: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Previous: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Next: Bryan's Defeat

Thomas Sumter did not command enough men to simply overpower the British in the South Carolina Backcountry, and what men he had were deficient in arms and ammunition. Therefore, he chose to rely on surprise to give him an advantage over his opponents. The battle plan he developed for the attack on Hanging Rock was a repeat of that used at Rocky Mount. On both occasions, he sought to achieve surprise by making a night march to suddenly close with his target. Then, he planned to launch his attack at daybreak from multiple directions. Sumter's subordinates had also adopted this stratagem several weeks earlier at Williamson's Plantation.

The American plans at Williamson's Plantation and Rocky Mount were spoiled by an unexpected obstacle on the eve of the attack [1]. Hanging Rock would be no different. In this case, Sumter's men found the Catawba River to be unexpectedly difficult to cross. Sumter noted:

“I… began to pass the river on Saturday evening [i.e., August 5, 1780]. The rapidity of the current was so great I was not only much delayed, but met with considerable loss; however, [I] proceeded on.” [2].

Once across, Sumter proceeded with some caution. Scouts were dispatched in advance of Sumter’s column [3], and “two spies” had been placed in the British camp before Sumter made his march. During the night, these men stole their way north and reported their findings. They “claimed that “the British camp… did not exceed 300 and that their reinforcement sent to Rocky Mount had not returned” [4].

Armed with this good news, Sumter’s men made their final approach march. According to William Davie, the column “turned to the left of the road to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol, with an intention to return to it under cover of a defile near the camp” [5].

Soon, the Americans could hear “the sound of horse bells” and see “the smoke settled along the valley of Hanging Rock Creek” [6]. “A whispering order came along the line that any might sit down with arms in hand to be ready” [7]. Sumter had wanted to attack at daybreak, but he claimed that “[I] was obliged to alter my mode of attack” because of the time it had taken during the night to get across the Catawba. Therefore, he “concealed” his men near the British camp, waiting for the British “to scatter” [8].

Both sides understood that early morning was an ideal time to launch a surprise attack. At Rocky Mount, George Turnbull kept his infantry under arms at daybreak, lest an attack should come. Sumter implies that by delaying the attack, the British relaxed and went about their daily routine.

While the Americans waited, they “took two Tories,” who claimed “that the reinforcement sent to Rocky Mount had returned” since the spies’ departure. This was very alarming news, and a council of war was held with Sumter and his principal commanders. Initial opinion was divided: “some for fighting others for retreating.” A consensus, however, was quickly achieved in favor of going forward because “no officer was willing to be out done by the other in bravery” [9].

What the Americans had learned, according to William Davie, was that the British were “pretty strongly posted in three divisions.” This force included “Regulars” [actually Provincials] “on the [American] right; a part of the British legion and Hamilton's Regiment were at some houses in the centre; and Bryan's Regiment, and other Loyalists some distance on the [American] left.”

Sumter downscaled the scope of the attack in view of this unwelcome news. Because the “three large encampments” were “so extensive,” “it was impossible to attack the whole at once.” Therefore, he wrote, “I proceeded against the most considerable of the Tory encampments and that of the British, which lay in the center” [10].

Sumter’s men would attack in three divisions. His left and center divisions would attack Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers. The center division would attack in front, while the left division curled around to the rear [11]. These two divisions had “orders not to fire a gun” until the left division had “passed between the British and Tory lines to the extremities [i.e., the flank and rear] [12]. The Americans might not be able to seize the entire post, but the North Carolina Loyalists, at least, were going to get thrashed. Sumter’s right division was sent against the center camp [13]. If this force was unable to capture the center camp on its own, they would at least occupy the Provincials while Bryan’s men were slaughtered.

In order to maximize surprise, Sumter wanted his men to ride up to the camps and dismount in sight of the enemy. Davie claimed that “This plan was approved by all the officers” excepting himself. Davie “insisted on leaving the horses at this place and marching to the attack on foot, urging the confusion always consequent on dismounting under a fire, and the certainty of losing the effect of a sudden and vigorous attack. This objection was, however, overruled” [14].

Notes:

1. At Williamson's Plantation, the Americans were led to believe that the British were encamped at a neighboring plantation, which threw off somewhat the planned timing of the attack, and possibly cost them the services of some of their best men (See Richard Winn's account, in General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves). At Rocky Mount, the Americans unexpectedly ran into a detachment of the British Legion before they were in position to attack.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. The difficulty in crossing the river might be connected to the rain showers on July 30.

3. The pension application of Edward Rogers, transcribed by Will Graves. He recalled that “The night before the battle he got wounded while spying out the enemy's camp.”

4. Winn, ibid.

5. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. There are some basic disagreements between the accounts of Thomas Sumter, Richard Winn, and William Davie on events during this time. Sumter’s and Winn’s accounts are fairly compatible, and as Sumter’s account is especially trustworthy, I side with them over Davie where there are disagreements.

6. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

7. Joseph McJunkin's account of the battle, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

8. Sumter, ibid. McJunkin, ibid., recalled how he spent the time: “I and a fellow soldier sat down by a pine and both slept a little.”

9. Winn, ibid.

10. Sumter, ibid.

11. Inference based on statements by Winn and McJunkin

12. McJunkin, ibid.

13. Winn and Davie have the right division attacking the Provincials.

14. Davie, ibid. His apprehension may stem, in part, from the particularly dangerous undertaking assigned to his men (the right division).

Battle of Hanging Rock 5

Part 5: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Previous: British Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Next: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Thomas Sumter claimed that he had “Six hundred brave men,” [1] and other participant statements point to a similar total [2]. Not everyone in his command was armed or fought during the battle (among these was Andrew Jackson, future 7th president of the United States) [3]. The number of men who were engaged may have been closer to 540 [4]. Those who were armed were badly supplied with ammunition. It was thought that Sumter's men had no more than 5 [5] or 10 [6] bullets apiece.

Sumter divided his force into three parts, and each contained around 200 men. These divisions are henceforth referred to as the left, center, and right divisions, after their relative positions at the beginning of the battle. Possibly the left division was commanded by William Hill, the center by Robert Irwin, and the right by Richard Winn [7].

Left Division: Several small South Carolina militia regiments, including William Bratton’s regiment, Andrew Neal’s regiment (commanded by either Samuel Watson or William Hill [8]), Edward Lacey’s regiment (possibly commanded by John McClure [9]), and Joseph Brandon’s regiment (commanded by James Steen) [10]. Most of the men in these regiments had seen action before, including at Williamson’s Plantation and Rocky Mount. Of the men that fought in this division, Joseph McJunkin of Brandon’s regiment left a detailed description of the battle.

Center Division: A battalion of 200 North Carolina militiamen under the command of Robert Irwin [11]. These men hailed from Mecklenburg County. Of the men that fought in this division, Joseph Graham left a detailed description of the battle.

Right Division: Major William Davie’s troop of dragoons (70-80 men) [12], supported by a mixture of North and South Carolina militia units [13]. Of the men that fought in this division, William Davie and Richard Winn left detailed descriptions of the battle.

American Losses:

Thomas Sumter claimed that he lost 20 killed, 40 wounded, and 10 missing [14]. Other American participants gave lower figures, but their claims are less reliable. The 10 missing men were likely killed or wounded, but as the fighting took place over a wide area, they were not found by their comrades before the end of the battle. Among these was Matthew McClurkin, who "was severely wounded on the head... taken prisoner by the British troops... confined in jail and... sent to Charleston to be put aboard a prison ship." Fortunately, before arriving in Charleston, "he and the other prisoners overpowered the guard and made their escape" [15]

The British estimated American losses at about 100 [16].

Notes:

1. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

2. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot; Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.

3. Augustus C. Buell. (1907). History of Andrew Jackson: Pioneer, Patriot, Soldier, Politician, President.

4. According to Joseph McJunkin. Richard Winn claimed that Sumter had 500 men with arms and another 200 without. The men without arms were left to take care of the horses, but later these men took up the arms of the killed and wounded and joined their comrades in the action.

Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

5. Hill, ibid.

6. William Gordon. (1801). The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the United States of America, Vol 3.

7. This description is based primarily on the account of William Davie. See The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. Davie identified Hill and Irwin with the left and center, respectively. Davie claimed he had command of the right division, but Richard Winn also claimed that role. Winn's claim seems more credible as he outranked Davie and had served with Sumter longer.

8. Andrew Neal was killed 7 days earlier at Rocky Mount. One Samuel Gordon of this regiment claimed that Samuel Watson took over after Neal was killed, whereas Thomas Lofton remembered Hill becoming his commander. See the pension application of Samuel Gordon, and the pension application of Thomas Lofton, both transcribed by Will Graves.

9. Joseph Gaston claimed that before Sumter's men crossed the Catawba River to attack Hanging Rock, "General Sumter ordered an election for general officers in the Chester Regiment." He claimed that John McClure was elected colonel, "Colonel E. Lacy having, at that time, become unpopular among the Chester Whigs." However, several accounts placed Lacey at the battle, suggesting either that Gaston was in error or that he was serving in some other capacity. See Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Querries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.

10. Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. Brandon's absence on this occasion is not explained in the available sources. Steen was his second in command.

11. William Davie, ibid. Letter from Allen J. Davie to Archibald D. Murphey, August 9, 1826.

12. Graham said 70; Hill, ibid., said 80. William Davie, ibid., placed his troop on the American right. For Graham, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

13. William Davie, ibid. Winn, ibid., identified his regiment as one of the specific units.

14. Sumter, ibid.

15. The pension application of Matthew McClurkin, transcribed by Will Graves.

16. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

Battle of Hanging Rock 4

Part 4: British Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Previous: Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina

Next: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Statements about the British forces at Hanging Rock were made by British and American participants and their contemporaries. Most reliable is Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon's statement that Hanging Rock was defended by "400 provincials and 800 militia" [1].

Provincials:

The Provincials included men from three different regiments: The British Legion infantry, The Prince of Wales’ American Regiment, and the Royal North Carolina Regiment [2]. Total losses for the Provincials were 38 men killed, 69 wounded, 71 missing [3]. The strength and losses of each unit are as follows:

Prince of Wales’ American Regiment: Lost 93 of 181 men (51%) [4]

Royal North Carolina Regiment: Lost 50 of approximately 100 men (~50%) [5]

British Legion Infantry: Lost 35 of 161 men (22%) [6]

In regards to the number of missing, 43 men were captured by the Americans [7]. Half of these men were privates and noncommissioned officers of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment that surrendered to the Americans during the fighting [8]. The other half had been both wounded and captured (most, if not all of these, were also of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment).

Loyalist Militia:

Two forces of Loyalist militia were at Hanging Rock: Colonel Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers (called in some sources the North Carolina Refugees, because they had been forced to flee their native state), and Colonel Henry Rugeley’s South Carolina regiment [9]. Bryan organized between 600-700 men in North Carolina, however, he brought only 250 men with him to Camden after Hanging Rock [10]. Bryan surely had a fair number of his men killed, wounded, or missing as a result of the battle, but there is no reason to believe that his losses ran into the hundreds. Rather, his original force had likely been greatly reduced by August 6 by desertion, sickness, and combat [11].

Rugeley’s regiment, like other South Carolina Loyalist militia regiments, likely numbered around several dozen men [12].

Some sources claimed Bryan lost many men [13], while others thought his losses were negligible [14]. One clue to Bryan's actual loss is Thomas Sumter's account of the battle, which implies that around 30 of the Loyalists were captured [15]. As these men were likely wounded before being captured, and as a common ratio of killed to wounded during the war was 1:3, Bryan's losses were likely in the neighborhood of 40 men.

It is not possible to make any estimate of losses in Rugeley's regiment.

Based on this rather imperfect information, I estimate the total force of Loyalist militia at the battle of Hanging Rock as near 400 men. The numbers listed above suggest a lower total (250 for Bryan's survivors + ~40 for Bryan's losses + several dozen for Rugeley = ~325), but this does not include men that would have remained missing, or would have left Bryan's command altogether, after his defeat at Hanging Rock.

Division of Forces:

The British were divided into three camps. The center camp included the British Legion infantry and the Royal North Carolina Regiment [16]. The right camp included Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers [17]. The left camp included the Prince of Wales' American Regiment [18]. It is not possible to place Rugeley's regiment at any one of these camps with confidence, but the center camp seems most probable [19].

Notes:

1. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

2. Todd Braisted (2001). A History of the Prince Of Wales' American Regiment; The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

Some secondary accounts claim that the King’s Rangers, commanded by Colonel Thomas Brown, were at the battle. This stems from a misreading of Tarleton’s description of the battle, which refers to Brown’s regiment, but means Colonel Montfort Browne, commander of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment. Browne was not present on this occasion, and command of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment was left to Major John Carden. Because of absences in the field officers for the other regiments, Carden also commanded the entire post.

3. Enclosure in a letter dated August 20, 1780 from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain. In K. G. Davies (Ed.), Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series), Vol. XVI. Irish University Press.

4. Braisted, ibid., Donald E. Graves. Guide to Canadian Sources Related to Southern Revolutionary War National Parks. (Retrieved February 6, 2010).

5. See this return of losses; Braisted, ibid. The Royal North Carolina Regiment appears to have been a detachment only; its strength was estimated from subtracting the strength of the Legion infantry and the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment from Rawdon’s stated 400.

6. Braisted, ibid. The strength of the regiment is estimated by adding these losses to their strength on August 15, 1780. Approximately forty of the Legion infantry were in the companies of Patrick Stewart and Charles McDonald, according to Banastre Tarleton’s A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. These companies arrived at the close of the battle, and William Davie claimed they lost 1 man. Of the Legion infantry who were present at the beginning of the battle, 34 men were lost of approximately 121 (or 28%).

7. Pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves. Sumter claimed that the number was 40 or so; see Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

8. National Archives of Canada: List of the Killed Wounded & Prisoners of ye P.W.A.Regt [posted on a geocities website that is no longer available].

9. Braisted, ibid.

10. Judicary report on Samuel Bryant, John Hampton and Nicholas White, April 5, 1782.

11. Desertion, as noted previously, was a natural occurrence when militia units were not regularly employed. Sickness was likely a factor given that Bryan's men were encamped briefly at Cheraws, South Carolina, where the 71st Foot became debilitated. Losses in combat occurred primarily at Colson's Ferry, North Carolina, on July 21 (see letter from Thomas Blount to Abner Nash, July 23, 1780), and at Hanging Rock on July 30 (see Davie, ibid.).

12. By way of comparison, Mathew Floyd's Loyalist militia regiment, which fought at Hill's Ironworks, Williamson's Plantation, and (probably) Rocky Mount had only 30 men in mid June. See Michael C. Scoggins, More on the Battle of Hill's Ironworks, Volume 2, Number 7 of Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution. This unsourced website gives Rugeley's regiment 40 men at the battle.

13. For example, Davie, ibid., claimed that during the battle, Bryan's men were "routed with great slaughter."

14. Tarleton, ibid., stated that "Colonel Bryan's North-Carolina refugees were greatly dispersed, but did not suffer considerably by the fire of the enemy."

15. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

16. Davie, ibid.

17. The rationale behind this placement was described in this post.

18. The site of their encampment was determined by process of elimination in the absence of clear statements among the available sources.

19. Davie said Bryan's camp included "Bryan's Regiment, and other Loyalists." This can be interpreted to include Rugeley's regiment, but it is not a necessary conclusion. Given how small American and Loyalist militia regiments typically were in this campaign, Davie may simply be indicating that a Loyalist force consisting of hundreds of men must have included more than a single regiment. Sumter said that Bryan's was "the most considerable of the Tory encampments," clearly implying that some of the Loyalist militia were encamped elsewhere. Oddly, he indicated that the left British camp belonged to Joseph Robinson, an officer in the South Carolina Royalists, who was stationed at the British post at Ninety-Six, South Carolina. Sumter's statement could be read, though not very convincingly, to mean that the South Carolina militia were encamped there. Braisted, ibid., has Rugeley's militia defending one of the British guns after the Legion infantry was driven from the center camp. As the British forces were in considerable disarray at the time, it is more believable that both the Legion infantry and Rugeley's militia had been in the center camp than that Rugeley's militia came to their assistance from some other quarter. The Legion infantry and Rugeley's militia also appear to be the units stationed longest at this post. It's plausible that when they were first stationed at Hanging Rock, they chose to encamp near each other on the site of the center camp.

Battle of Hanging Rock 3

Part 3: Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina

Previous: Sumter's Second Target

Next: British Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

British Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon had been given the important task of defending the South Carolina Backcountry. His primary opponents were Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter's brigade of militia, and Major-General Horatio Gates' large army of Continentals and militia. Rawdon had his headquarters in Camden, a town in central South Carolina that was a conduit for men and supplies directed to the British posts defending the state’s borders. Rawdon's description of the strategic situation deserves to be quoted at length:

"Having been left in the command of the back country when Lord Cornwallis [i.e., Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis] went to Charlestown, I had (by my spies) kept a vigilant eye over the force which was collecting in North Carolina for the invasion of our newly acquired territory. Though Lord Cornwallis had not thought it probable that the attack would be made upon south Carolina till the violent heat of the summer should be passed, I had suspected that Gates might count on our inability to stand the climate (especially as it was known that we were very sickly) and might then make a speedier effort. I had on that account minutely examined the country and formed my eventual plans. Camden had from the first day appeared to me an objectionable station for the army. It was a false position relative to the country, and in itself indefensible beyond any ground that I ever saw. On learning that a body of the enemy's militia had advanced to the Pedee [i.e., the Peedee River in the northeastern part of the state], I considered it a sure indication that Gates would move immediately. I therefore detached [Lieutenant-Colonel James] Webster, a good and gallant officer, to the east branch of Lynche's Creek and I reinforced a post which I had at Hanging Rock. As soon as I had made the necessary arrangements at Camden, I followed Webster. Of distances, I must speak loosely. I suppose the point where the road crosses the east branch of Lynche's Creek to be thirty miles from Camden; the post at Hanging Rock, thirty-five. There was a ready communication between the two by a road of about twelve miles. My object in taking this forward position was to retard the progress of Gates' till Lord Cornwallis should collect force from other parts of the Province, or to reduce the enemy to hazard an action where my peculiar advantages of situation would compensate for my disparity in numbers. I had 1100 men with me, all regulars or provincials; the detachment at Hanging Rock consisted of 400 provincials and 800 militia. The latter was a requisite post, because Sumpter menaced that road to Camden with a corps of militia. Gates came opposite to me.” [1]

The map below shows the arrangement of Rawdon’s forces along the northern frontier the day Hanging Rock was attacked (August 6, 1780). Rawdon had concentrated his forces into a defensive arc north of Camden.

Position of British Forces Defending Camden, South Carolina, August 6, 1780 (click to enlarge). (See key below).

It is not possible to locate the placement of every detachment in Rawdon's command, so for some locations only the principle units are described.

#1. The post at Rocky Mount, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull, and defended by the New York Volunteers, a detachment of the British Legion, and a force of Loyalist militia [2].

#2. The post at Hanging Rock, commanded by Major John Carden, and defended by the British Legion infantry, the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment, a detachment of the Royal North Carolina Regiment, Colonel Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers, and some South Carolina Loyalist militia [3].

#3. The post at Lynche’s Creek, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonels Francis Rawdon and James Webster, and defended by the 33rd Foot, the two battalions of the 71st Foot, and the Volunteers of Ireland [4].

#4 The post at Camden, defended by the 23rd Foot. Who commanded the post in Rawdon's absence is unclear. Major Thomas Mecan was the commander of the 23rd, but he was severely ill at about this time [5]. The British Legion dragoons, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, had either recently reached Camden, or would do so shortly [6].

The blue shaded area at upper left is the Catawba Nation (where Sumter was stationed). The blue arrow at the upper right is the direction from which the Americans under Horatio Gates approached Rawdon's defenses.

Notes:

1. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

2. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Charles Cornwallis, July 31, 1780. (In William T. Sherman, 2009, Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed).

3. Todd Braisted (2001). A History of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment; The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

4. Letter from Josiah Martin to George Germain, August 18-20, 1780.

5. Martin, ibid., and Mark Urban (2007). Fusiliers: Eight Years with the Redcoats in America.

6. Martin, ibid.

Battle of Hanging Rock 2

Part 2: Sumter's Second Target

Previous: Introduction

Next: Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina

Retreat from Rocky Mount

Thomas Sumter had tried, without success, to capture the British post of Rocky Mount, South Carolina, on July 30, 1780. That battle ended after a rain shower put an end to the Americans' efforts to burn down the British-occupied buildings. The Americans subsequently withdrew, but only for a short distance. The rain raised the level of Rocky Creek, which crossed their path of retreat [1]. Sumter might have directed his men towards a shallow ford upstream, but remaining close to the British post was good for morale, or at least his pride. He claimed that he spent this period "relieving and covering the country" from excursions by Provincials and Loyalist militia [2].

Sumter's decision to remain close to Rocky Mount was a dangerous one, for the British soon learned of the attack on Rocky Mount [3] and organized a retaliatory expedition against Sumter’s men. This force reached Rocky Mount on August 1 [4]. Late the following morning, the Americans found that the waters in the creek had receded somewhat, and a crossing was effected. Once on the other side, “the men turned out their horses and they themselves scattered about in search of roasting ears and green peaches” [5]. Sumter’s men did not realize their danger until “the enemy to the number [of] 8 or 900 men and 2 pieces of artillery was in a mile in our rear” [6]. According to one soldier, the British force reached the creek crossing “before our vittles were cooked,” and the Americans promptly fled, “leaving our provisions and some baggage” [7].

Colonel Richard Winn assembled an ad hoc rear guard, but the British could not close with the Americans before the latter made their escape. Winn then followed Sumter and detailed one “Captain Coleman from Midway in Georgia,” and a South Carolinian “by the name of Stroud” “to watch and give notice of the Enemy's motions.” Unfortunately, “these two men ventured too near the British. Both was made prisoner stripped naked and immediately hung up by the side of the road” [8].

Sumter’s Next Target

Sumter’s brigade returned to the Catawba Nation, its former base of operations. The brigade had grown steadily in size since its initial formation in late June, and new arrivals once again began to appear [9]. Sumter immediately began considering how to strike another blow at the British, even though he had by this time used up most of his ammunition.

Some authors, in considering Sumter’s actions during this period, have determined that he was at best imprudent, and at worse foolish. Others regarded him as a kind of genius. Banastre Tarleton claimed that, “This active partizan was thoroughly sensible, that the minds of men are influenced by enterprize, and that to keep undisciplined people together, it is necessary to employ them” [10]. Joseph Graham held the same opinion:

“[Sumter] had discovered that his men, while marching and fighting and fighting and marching would keep with him, but to encamp and remain stationary he might calculate with certainty his force might diminish; therefore if he failed in his enterprise the loss to the Country would only be those who were killed and wounded, the remainder might be organized in a short time as formidable as before. If he succeeded it would considerably weaken the Enemy’s effective force and have considerable weight in the operations which he expected shortly would take place” [11].

Having determined it was most prudent to remain on the offensive, he began to consider his options. Rocky Mount, now reinforced, was clearly unassailable, but the nearby post of Hanging Rock was defended by only 250 men [12]. The post at Hanging Rock was "very weak," because "the principle part of their troops" had been sent to reinforce Rocky Mount [13]. Moreover, Hanging Rock, he realized, was “of very great consequence” to the British. If Hanging Rock fell, Rocky Mount would have to be abandoned, and the central part of the state would be accessible to the Americans [14]. The British realized this, too, and they ensured that Hanging Rock was not vulnerable [15]. Before Sumter could strike, the post would receive a large reinforcement.

Notes:

1. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

3. For the circumstances in which the British learned of this attack, and their initial reaction to it, see the letter from Francis Rawdon to Charles Cornwallis, July 31, 1780. (In William T. Sherman, 2009, Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed).

4. Winn, ibid. Winn claims that this event occurred on Tuesday, August 2nd, but Tuesday was the 1st. Similarly, his account has the correct day of the week, but the wrong date, for the battles of Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. The pension application of John Whelchel, transcribed by Will Graves. Whelchel served in Thomas Brandon’s regiment.

8. Winn's notes. Whelchel also referred to the capture and hanging of the two men.

9. This is claimed by several sources. See Winn’s memoir, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, Joseph Graham's papers, and the pension application of John Whelchel.

10. Tarleton, ibid.

11. Graham, ibid.

12. See this intelligence report.

13. Letter from Thomas Polk to Thomas Pinckney, August 6, 1780.

14. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. William Davie claimed that the loss of Hanging Rock would cause the abandonment of Rocky Mount. See The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

15. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 20, 1780.

Battle of Hanging Rock 1

The Battle of Hanging Rock
Part 1: Introduction
Next: Sumter Plans a Second Attack

General

The description of this battle is a continuation of my current interest in Thomas Sumter's campaign in the South Carolina Backcountry in the summer of 1780. The description is noteworthy because of the level of detail in which the action is described. This detail is possible because quite a few accounts of the battle were left by participants. The approach that I've taken is to treat participant statements about the battle as puzzle pieces, and to identify ways in which they seem to fit together. I'm pleased to say that these "pieces" can be joined to create a coherent, believable narrative, and that they can be made to "fit" together without selectively omitting certain passages. (There are, however, a few places where accounts are contradictory; these are addressed in footnotes). The source material is subject to varying interpretations. Links are available to most of the sources I site, and the reader is encouraged to examine these sources for himself/herself. I hope at the very least this exercise will stimulate thought, interest, and research on an important, but largely overlooked, battle of the American Revolution.

Use of Source Material

To improve the readability of the text (and bring it into line with modern standards), I have changed the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the source material I quote. Likewise, I have written out words abbreviated in the original.

Maps of the Battle

The battle is illustrated using a series of map that are fairly specific as to the placement of military units at different points in the fighting. The reader should note that the maps are more specific than is warranted from a reading of the source material. The maps are intended primarily to help bring clarity to the source material, not to make a definitive statement about the ground on which the action took place.

Identification of the Hanging Rock Battlefield

Once I decided to use digital maps to help illustrate the fighting, a decision had to be made about the landforms in the Hanging Rock area that best match participant accounts of the battle. I determined that one set of landforms is a better match with the source material than others. I recognize that my position on this count may be controversial (if it’s appropriate to use such a term in connection with an obscure battle of the American Revolution). Therefore, I devoted a number of posts to laying out the case for the interpretation I make. A brief guide to these posts appears below.

In this post, I list a number of statements made about the Hanging Rock battlefield between 1780 and 1860. I later used agreement with this list as an “objective” means of determining the likelihood that a given location was the scene of the battle.

In this post, I consider the possibility that the Hanging Rock Battlefield Property, and I give a number of reasons both for and against this view.

In this post, I consider the possibility that much of the fighting took place near a modern-day fish hatchery on Hanging Rock Creek, and I give a number of reasons both for and against this view.

In this post, I describe the area on which I think the fighting actually took place, and I argue that it is a particularly good match with descriptions of the battlefield and other, military considerations.

In this post, I address and deflect potential objections to the interpretation I favor. (This doesn’t mean that I can’t be persuaded, but only that I’m presently unaware of convincing counterarguments).

Finally, in this post, I show images of the area I’ve identified as the battlefield and comment further on the strengths of this interpretation.

Illustration of the Battle with Military Miniatures

I collect and paint 15mm-high figurines that depict soldiers of the American Revolution. To help illustrate the fighting, I created a miniature version of the Hanging Rock battlefield, and peopled it with hand-painted soldiers. The scale is 1:20, that is, 1 figure represents approximately 20 combatants (distances likewise are 1:20). Some effort was made to paint the miniatures in a manner appropriate to this battle. However, limitations in the available metal figures and my ability as a painter means that the figures fall short of a perfect representation of their historical counterparts. Likewise, the miniature battlefield is also inexact. The two cannon that the British possessed cannot be reduced by a factor of 20; therefore, 1 gun is used to depict the two pieces.

The Assault on Samuel Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers

Index to the Posts in this Series

1. Introduction

2. Sumter Plans a Second Attack

3. Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina

4. British Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

5. American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

6. Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

7. Bryan's Defeat

8. An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

9. Battle for the Center Camp

10. The British Flank Attack

11. Rousselet’s Gallant Stand

12. Stalemate

13. Reinforcement and Retreat