Cowpens in Miniature 16

Part 16: The First Crisis

Previous: Attack on the Main Line

Next: The Second Crisis

Thomas Young and the American mounted militiamen had adhered closely to the front line militia during the fighting on the skirmish line and militia line. After the British assailed the militia line, these militia “retreated again-and then formed a second line” behind the main line. The mounted militia covered the second retreat and then took post even further in the rear, near Washington’s dragoons.

Young commented that “After the second forming [of the militia], the fight became general and unintermitting.” The American cavalry could plainly see the British front line bearing down on the Continentals to their front. Smoke billowed from the infantry lines and there was a continuous flash and roar from the hundreds of discharging muskets.

Oblivious to the disaster that was unfolding to their right, the Continentals continued the desperate and unequal contest with the British front line. By all accounts, both British and Americans fought well. Tarleton stated in his memoir that “The fire on both sides was well supported and produced much slaughter.” Lee wrote in his postwar history that when “Tarleton pushed forward… [he] was received… with unshaken firmness. The contest became obstinate, and each party, animated by the example of its leader, nobly contended for victory” [see Note 1]. In the case of the Americans, two leaders stood out. Seymour recalled that “The courage and conduct of the brave General Morgan in this action is highly commendable, as likewise Colonel Howard, who at all times of the action rode from right to left of the line encouraging the men.”

As the British front line became engaged with the Continentals, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton looked to his left. There he had the greatest advantage. The 71st Foot was relatively fresh and well positioned to attack the American right flank, and the ground was more elevated than on his right.

To begin the attack on the American right, he ordered Captain David Ogilvie’s troop of British Legion dragoons to assault the American militia to their front: the right wing of the main line [see Note 2]. Tarleton recalled that the dragoons “executed the order with much gallantry.”

The right wing of the main line outnumbered Ogilvie’s dragoons by a margin of 2 or 3 to 1. Nevertheless, they were at a severe disadvantage. The men of the right wing were not deployed in a compact mass and they lacked bayonets to protect themselves. They also were without support as the American mounted militia had retired to the rear after the front-line militia had reached safety. As Ogilvie’s men thundered down the slope towards them, the American militia quickly sized up the situation, turned, and fled through the trees [see Note 3].

Loyalist Alexander Chesney recorded this event in his journal: “[the] Regiment of Cavalry called the British Legion [i.e., Ogilvie’s company]… supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur [i.e., the first battalion of the 71st Foot] broke the Riflemen without difficulty” [see Note 4].

Hayes’ regiment was closest to the oncoming dragoons and perhaps the first in the right wing to break. Robert Long, who was with this regiment, implied that his regiment had intended to rally alongside Captain Patrick Buchanan’s company of Virginians, however, “the Virginians broke before we got to them” [see Note 5].

Ogilvie's Attack. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken by Ogilvie's charge), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The Right Wing Breaks (two views; click to enlarge). As the Continentals begin to fire on the advancing British, Ogilvie's British Legion dragoons charge the American right, sending the right wing of the main line into flight. Meanwhile, other militia units are reforming.

According to Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie: “Captain Ogilvie, with his troop… cut his way through their line.” Pension applications do not strongly indicate that the men in this line were cut down by the British dragoons. Most, it would seem, got out of the way in time. However, upon driving off the right wing of the main line, the dragoons soon encountered an even larger quarry – the right wing of the militia line. These men had reached the rear, and were preparing to reform. They were, however, still disorganized and utterly unready to defend against a cavalry attack. Ogilvie’s men plunged in.

Some of the injuries reported by these militiamen were horrific. Joseph Rogers James, who was with McDowell’s North Carolinians, stated that he “was then charged on by a British Dragoon and struck on the head with his sword and left on the ground for dead… his ribs were broken loose from his back as he supposes by the horse of the Dragoon.” John Whelchel, who was with Brandon’s South Carolinians, stated that he “was attacked by Tarleton's horse.” He “was severely wounded receiving four cuts on the head and three or four stabs.” He “was left on the ground it being supposed that he would die of his wounds – that the wounds in the head opened the skull to the brains.”

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina vividly recalled seeing “Two dragoons assault a large rifleman, Joseph Hughes by name. His gun was empty, but with it he parries their blows and dodges round a tree, but they still persist. At the moment the assault on Hughes began John Savage was priming his rifle, Just as they pass the tree to strike Hughes he levels his gun and one of the dragoons tumbles from his horse pierced with a bullet, The next moment the rifle carried by Hughes, now literally backed over, slips out of his hands and inflicts such a blow upon the other dragoon that he quits the contest and retires hanging by the mane of his horse.”

Ogilvie Assaults McDowell and Brandon (click to enlarge). After sending the right wing of the main line into flight, Ogilvie's dragoons collide with the reforming front-line militia. Meanwhile, the British and American front lines have become fully engaged.

The militia were on their own at this moment, but help was soon on the way. Young recalled that “In the hottest of it [the main-line fighting], I saw Col. Brandon coming at full speed to the rear, and waving his sword to Col. Washington.” Here was one of the principal commanders of the right wing of the militia line desperately trying to get Washington’s attention. Ogilvie’s charge had gone unnoticed. “In a moment the command to charge was given, and I soon found that the British cavalry had charged the American right. We made a most furious charge, and cutting through the British cavalry, wheeled and charged them in the rear. In this charge, I exchanged my tackey for the finest horse I ever rode; it was the quickest swap I ever made in my life!”

Major Joseph McJunkin was close at hand and remembered seeing “the militia… relieved from the British dragoons by a charge of the American light horse.” Moments later, “The British cavalry… [were] borne from the field.”

Other accounts indicated that it was not only the charge of Washington’s dragoons that drove back Ogilvie, but also the fire of the militia. Tarleton observed that the British cavalry “were drove back by the fire of the reserve, and by a charge of Colonel Washington's cavalry.”

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie provided more detail. He claimed that the “legion dragoons were… broke by galling fire of rifle shot;” “exposed to a heavy fire and charged at the same time by the whole of Washington's dragoons,” Ogilvie’s troop “was compelled to retreat in confusion [see Note 6]”

Ogilvie Defeated. The militia rally and, aided by the American cavalry, succeed in driving off Ogilvie's dragoons.

Notes:

1. Comparable observations were made by Morgan (“When the enemy advanced on our line, they received a well-directed and incessant fire”), Moultrie, (“The British immediately advanced upon the second line, who received them very warmly, and a heavy fire commenced between them”), and Mackenzie (“the second line, now attacked, made a stout resistance“).

2. Tarleton’s memoir indicates that at this time, “The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy's left.” However, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie corrected him on this point and stated that “Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy.” See British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1 .

3. Historians of the battle have relied chiefly on Morgan’s description of events for an American viewpoint. Morgan’s account is very good, but a limitation is that it emphasizes the key actions that positively contributed to the American victory and largely ignores the setbacks and disappointments the Americans experienced en route to that victory. Early histories of the battle have adopted the same tone. For this phase of the battle, emphasis is placed on the brave stand of the Continentals; the existence of a right wing of the main line is not always recognized and its flight has not been hitherto discussed. However, American participants who described only their personal experiences during the battle (and did not craft an account intended for public consumption) provide critical clues indicating that such a collapse occurred. Statements by British observers support this view as well. See The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses.

4. Chesney’s full statement was that “Col Tarleton charged at the head of his Regiment of Cavalry called the British Legion which was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden; the Cavalry supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty.” Tarleton did not lead this charge, nor did it involve his entire regiment. It’s possible Chesney had not yet reached the battlefield and was not a direct eyewitness to this event, or possibly he was in a different part of the battlefield at the time. See Alexander Chesney's Rivulet.

5. See The Main Line: Composition for more on the deployment of American forces on the main line.

6. Mackenzie claimed that charge was made “by the whole of Washington's dragoons;” this would appear to be elaboration on Tarleton’s statement that the cavalry was repelled “by a charge of Colonel Washington's cavalry.” The elaboration is in error. Only a portion of the American cavalry participated in this charge. Young is the only dragoon that unambiguously places himself in this attack; Cornet James Simons provided a very detailed account of his movements on the battlefield, and says nothing about this action. It would seem then that Washington committed only some men to this charge. Noteworthy is that Simons "commanded the left division" of Washington’s dragoons and would’ve been furthest from Ogilvie’s attack.

Sources:

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Young's account of the battle, and includes a description of Simon's service.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

The Journal of Alexander Chesney

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Joseph Rogers James (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Whelchel (.pdf file).

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Related: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, Flight of the Militia - Part 4

Cowpens in Miniature 15

Part 15: Attack on the Main Line

Previous: The Militia Line

Next: The First Crisis

When the British attacked the American militia, they were, in the words of William Moultrie, “soon obliged to give way and retreat behind the second line.” In retreating, Private John Thomas of Virginia saw that the militia “flanked the right and left of the musquetry”[see Note 1].

The Militia Retreat. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (in retreat), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (in retreat), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The Retreat in Miniature (two views; click to enlarge). Covered by the American cavalry, the front-line militia safely gain the main line. Meanwhile, the ragged British front line is beginning to reform.

The British infantry did not immediately pursue [see Note 2]. To their front was Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard’s Continentals, an enemy that had to be approached with some caution. Besides, as far as the British were concerned, the militia had “quitted the Field,” they could afford caution [see Note 3].

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson with the Delaware Continentals, recorded in his journal that “the Enemy Seeing us Standing in Such good Order Halted for Some time to dress their line.” So effective was this deterrent that the front-line militia, in the words of fellow-Delawarean Sergeant-Major Seymour, were able to retreat “in very good order, not seeming to be the least bit confused” [see Note 4].

The orderly retreat of the militia was a singular accomplishment considering that the British attack had been launched by the exceptionally aggressive Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton and relentless pursuit was a part of his modus operandi. Morgan’s plan was, for the moment, working perfectly. The American militia had delivered their lethal volley and were escaping retaliation.

The British infantry stopped to “dress their line,” in Anderson’s words, because of losses inflicted by the militia. Also likely is that the British line became further disordered during the subsequent bayonet charge. As the British reformed and the two opponents sized each other up, Anderson could see that the British line “Outflanked ours Considerably.” Despite heavy losses [see Note 5], The British front line nevertheless still outnumbered the Continentals; their line was also longer because they were deployed in open order whereas the Continentals were in close order. Another threat also loomed. The 71st Foot had moved up to a position behind the left end of the British line, where it was well positioned to crush the right flank of the Americans.

The British infantry then resumed the advance and shortly drew near the Americans. In response, the Continentals let loose a terrific volley, with each platoon firing in rapid succession. Militiaman Thomas Young, now in rear of the main line, remembered that “when the regulars fired, it seemed like one sheet of flame from right to left. Oh! it was beautiful!”

The commander of the Continentals, Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, stated that “The british advanced until my regiment commenced firing.” Receiving this fire, the British stopped and fired a volley of their own. According to Seymour, “the enemy… attacked our light infantry with both cannon and small arms.”

Notes:

1. This is a topic to which I’ve given special consideration. See Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4.

2. Based on Anderson’s journal; the key passage is quoted elsewhere in this post. Anderson’s journal is one of the most trustworthy accounts of the battle. According to Moultrie, “The British immediately advanced upon the second line.”

3. Quotation derived from Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' report of the battle.

4. The militia were not panic struck during their retreat. This does not imply, however, that they retired casually to the rear. In all likelihood, the militia were moving very quickly. Lee commented that the militia “gained with haste the second line.”

5. The miniature recreation shows accumulated losses of 15% among the front-line infantry and artillery, but this is very approximate.

Sources:

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Thomas, Anderson, Young, and Howard, among others.

A transcription of Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' report of the battle can be found here.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Related: Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Flight of the Militia - Part 4, The Main Line: Location

Cowpens in Miniature 14

Part 14: The Militia Line

Previous: Fighting on the Skirmish Line

Next: Attack on the Main Line

The American skirmishers fell back as the British advanced and took up new positions with the militia line. British historian David Stewart thought that the British were “running;” probably they advanced at the quick step.

Now the men on the militia line steeled themselves for their assigned mission, one massive, lethal blast, delivered at close range. A single shot, fired too soon, had the possibility of triggering a premature volley. Thomas Young on horseback behind these men remembered that “Every officer was crying don't fire! for it was a hard matter for us to keep from it.”

The British Attack the Militia Line. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

"Make Ready!"

"Fire!"

At last, the order was given. Henry Lee wrote that “The enemy, shouting, rushed forward upon the front line, which retained its station, and poured in a close fire.” Fellow American historian William Moultrie thought that the Americans waited “till the enemy came within fifty yards.” Stewart gave the distance as “thirty or forty paces.”

Daniel Morgan wrote that “The whole of Col. Pickens' command then kept up a fire by regiments.” Hammond’s South Carolinians, Cunningham’s Georgians, McDowell’s North Carolinians, and the several small battalions under Brandon, Thomas, and Roebuck all let loose within moments of each other. Thomas Young remembered this as “a whole volley.”

At some point the British fired at the militia as well. William Moultrie noted that the British “threw in a heavy fire upon the militia” before the front-line militia fired. In Stewart’s history, however, they fired second and did so without “vivacity or impression.”

British casualties in this exchange were in all likelihood heavy [see Note 1]. Some losses also occurred among the militia [see Note 2].

In the immediate aftermath, the British had the advantage: they were armed with bayonets while the Americans were not. Private James Collins remembered that “We gave the enemy one fire, when they charged us with their bayonets; we gave way and retreated for our horses” [see Note 3]. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, watching the fighting from the main line saw that the British “rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen to fire a second time.” This is exactly what Morgan had expected. “The whole of Col. Pickens' command then… [began] retreating agreeably to their orders.”

The statements by Collins, Howard, Morgan, and others all imply that the militia quickly retreated, keeping ahead of British bayonets. However, the fighting on the front line may not have been of a single character, and there was perhaps at least one place where the British and Americans entered into close combat. On the left wing of the front line, Captain John Irby recalled that militiaman “Richard Griffin was wounded… by a bayonet in his left thigh by the Enemy and he [the British soldier] would have killed him [Griffin] had he not been shot down by… the Ensign of the Company” [see Note 4].

Thomas Young noted that the militia had “fought for some time, and retreated again.” Once again, the mounted militia interposed between the advancing British and the retreating Americans. Young stated, “I recollect well that the cavalry was twice, during the action, between our army and the enemy.” They did not, however, come to blows with the British infantry. Private William Neel of Virginia was disappointed, observing that “At this battle the South Carolina mounted militia under Colo Brannon proved very defective in the commencement of the action” [see Note 5].

Notes:

1. American participants, somewhat surprisingly, did not comment on the effects of this volley. Statements indicating heavy British casualties at this point in the battle appeared only in postwar histories.

David Stewart asserted that the British front line was “exhausted by running… it received the fire of the enemy at the distance of thirty or forty paces. The effect of the fire was considerable: it produced something like a recoil, but not to any extent. The fire was returned, but not with vivacity or impression; and it continued ten or twelve minutes in a state of balance, both parties keeping their ground. The light infantry made two attempts to charge, but were repulsed with loss- The action making no progress, the Highlanders were ordered up; and, rapidly advancing in charge, the enemy's front line moved off precipitately.”

William Johnson claimed that “At the assigned distance they [the militia] delivered their fire with unerring aim, and it was the magnanimous confession of a gallant officer of the Maryland line who fought on this day, ‘that here the battle was gained.’ The killed and wounded of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers who lay on the field of battle where the fire of the riflemen Was delivered, and the high proportion which the killed and wounded of this description bore to the whole number, sufficiently justified the assertion.”

Neither of these histories is terribly reliable (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1 for my treatment of Johnson). Stewart claimed that the fighting on the militia line was prolonged. However, participant accounts, both British and American, indicate that the militia retreated quickly. Stewart has the 71st Foot breaking the deadlock on the militia line. Others generally indicate that the 71st entered the fighting at a later point in the battle. The quotation that Johnson supplies from an anonymous Maryland officer is believable, but it is not clear what it indicates. The statement surely means that for once the militia did their assigned duty and this was instrumental in the American victory (no doubt the officer had the battle of Camden in mind for comparison). Whether or not Johnson’s description also indicates that the front-line militia inflicted heavy casualties is less clear.

The British casualties I’ve indicated for this moment in the battle (3 miniatures; these will be more clearly visible in future images) are modest compared with the losses suggested by Stewart's and Johnson's histories. I arrived at this number first by making an estimate of total British casualties and second by dividing those casualties across the various phases of the battle in a manner that is primarily consistent with participant statements (and, to a lesser extent, later histories). There are other points in the battle at which the British received a greater volume of fire and for which heavy British casualties are more strongly indicated. Even if this one volley was particularly well aimed, it is difficult to see how it could have inflicted many more casualties, for example, than the British received in advancing on the Continentals. About as many men fired at the British on the main line as did on the militia line. However, the militia were only able to deliver a single volley, while the main line fired repeatedly.

2. It is quite likely that the militia suffered considerably fewer casualties than the British, despite being outnumbered. From Lexington and Concord until the final battles of the war, American sources spoke disparagingly about the accuracy of British musket fire. Many militiamen also likely stooped low to the ground or stood behind trees as a means of protecting themselves. Casualties, however, did occur. Lawrence Babits reviewed and cited pension applications from former militiamen that strongly imply they were shot on the militia line.

3. Collins' statement was given special consideration in a previous post. See Flight of the Militia - Part 3.

4. Babits placed Irby in Hayes’ regiment. However, in reviewing the composition of Hayes’ regiment, I noted that participant accounts do not appear to link Irby’s company with Hayes’ regiment (see Little River Regiment). Rather, Irby appears to have commanded a company of Georgia Refugees and as such likely served with Captain Samuel Hammond and Major John Cunningham on the left wing of the militia line. Griffin was from Georgia. It’s not clear that this passage refers to an incident that took place at this time during the battle. Also possible (but in my view less likely) is that Griffin was wounded during the American counterattack late in the battle.

5. Colonel Thomas Brandon did not command the mounted militia. However, Young links Brandon with the mounted militia at a later point in the battle, and Captain Benjamin Jolly, who commanded one of the two companies of mounted militia, was in Brandon’s regiment.

Sources:

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Young, Collins, and Howard, among other sources.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Richard Griffin (which contains the statement by Irby) (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, The Cowpens Battlefield, Mounted Militia

Cowpens in Miniature 13

Part 13: Fighting on the Skirmish Line

Previous: "Bring on the Battle"

Next: The Militia Line

Private John Savage’s shot rang across the battlefield. The other skirmishers Morgan had sent forward were also in range of the British line and, according to Major Joseph McJunkin, “In a few moments the fire is general.” The American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, stated that the skirmishers “gave them [the British] a heavy and galling fire.”

The British commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, responded to the American gunfire by hurrying up the remainder of this deployment and ordering his forces to advance. Tarleton, however, didn’t mention that his men were under fire. He gave as the reason why “he hurried the formation of his troops” was that he was “gratified with the certainty of battle” and “prone to presume on victory.”

Under rifle fire, the 7th Foot and remaining British light infantry formed into line. Major George Hanger learned that “While Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was reconnoitering the enemy on his right, a scattering fire commenced by some recruits of the 7th, who had but newly joined their regiment, and seen no service.” These men couldn’t help but fire back at their tormentors, even though the Americans were still out of range. Hanger asserted that “This unsteady behaviour he [Tarleton] silenced to the utmost of his power, and then led the line to action” [see Note 1].

Fighting on the Skirmish Line (two views; click to enlarge). Shots are fired by the American skirmishers as the British complete their deployment. Some men of the 7th Foot fire in response.

Because the British left and right deployed at different times and with different degrees of difficulty, a range of opinions formed about the propriety of Tarleton’s decision to advance at this moment. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie of the 71st Foot light infantry complained that, “Without the delay of a single moment, and in despite of extreme fatigue, the light-legion infantry and fusiliers were ordered to form in line.” However, Major Hanger, who knew many of those in the battle, learned that “Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton did halt the troops for near half an hour, and made them throw of their knapsacks and blankets to render them lighter for action.”

American sources likewise offer varying descriptions of when the British advance began. As has already been noted, Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals remembered a prolonged wait before the British advance began. However, Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled that the British “halted for a short time, and then advanced rapidly, as if certain victory.” Cavalryman James Kelly echoed Mackenzie when he stated that the British “hardly got formed before Tarlton made his charge.”

The beginning of the British attack was an auspicious moment remembered by a number of participants. Lieutenant Anderson wrote in his journal that the British “about Sunrise… began the attack by the Discharge of two pieces of cannon and three Huzzas advancing briskly On our rifle men that Was posted in front.”

Morgan, who had remained with the militia after sending the skirmishers forward observed that “their whole line moved on with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced.” Thomas Young, who was nearby with the mounted militia, also watched the advance. “About sun-rise, the British line advanced at a sort of trot, with a loud halloo. It was the most beautiful line I ever saw. When they shouted, I heard Morgan say, "They gave us the British halloo, boys, give them the Indian halloo, by G_"; and he galloped along the lines, cheering the men, and telling them [the men on the militia line] not to fire until we could see the whites of their eyes.”

The two British cannon were lined up with the gap between the wings of front-line American militia. Their fire was directed not at the thin line of militia, but rather at the large block of Continentals further down field. Their fire does not seem to have been particularly accurate, for there is little evidence that the Continentals suffered from cannon fire. Instead, the British round shot flew over or past the Continentals, affecting the Continental light dragoons posted in reserve.

Thomas Young noted “the British line advanced under cover of their artillery… it opened so fiercely upon the centre, that Col. Washington moved his cavalry from the centre towards the right wing” [see Note 2]. This move placed the American cavalry on lower ground and placed the crest of the foremost ridge between the dragoons and the British guns.

The British advanced “in as good a line as troops could move at open files,” according to Tarleton. As they did so, the American skirmishers fell back, preventing the British from getting into range. Thomas Young recalled that “After the first fire [i.e., the first fire after the British began their attack], the militia retreated, and the cavalry covered their retreat.” The mounted militiamen were on hand to protect the skirmishers from a sudden dash by the British cavalry, but as this did not occur, they merely escorted the skirmishers back towards the militia line.

The skirmishers meanwhile kept “up a warm fire… [while] gradually retreating,” according to Major James Jackson. Sergeant-Major William Seymour thought that the militia “stood very well for some time.” His superior, Lieutenant Thomas Anderson, was also impressed. “[The riflemen] Fought Well Disputing the ground that Was between them and us, Flying from One tree to another” [see Note 3]. Private John Thomas of Virginia thought that these militiamen fired, in total, “five rounds.”

The British Attack the Skirmishers. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = American Skirmishers, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.


The Skirmish Line Retreats (two views; click to enlarge). The American skirmishers fire their finals shots as the British advance on the militia line.

Henry Lee wrote that the skirmishers, after “preserving a desultory well-aimed fire… fell back to the front line, to range with it and renew the conflict.” There, they “arrayed with Pickens” [see Note 4]. Watching from the main line, Private William Neel of Virginia saw that the militia, “broke in the centre.” Neel did not realize that the Americans were merely following orders. According to Morgan, the skirmishers under “McDowall and Cunningham… retreated to the regiments intended for their support.” This meant that the men under McDowell and Cunningham took up positions on the right and left wing of the militia line, respectively, leaving a gap between them [see Note 5].

As for the mounted militia, Thomas Young noted that when the militia “were again formed… we retired to the rear,” meaning to a new station behind the militia line. Once again, the mounted militia were expected to cover their comrades when they retreated.

Notes:

1. Hanger provided most detail about this incident. There are subtle differences between Tarleton's and Hanger's versions. Tarleton's account implies that the 7th stopped to fire at the skirmishers after the British attack began. Tarleton also did not claim to have personally stopped the recruits from firing.

2. This statement serves as another indication that there was relatively thin tree cover on the battlefield.

3. With a gap between the two wings of the militia line directly in front of the Continentals, these skirmishers were in fact the only militia troops between them and the British.

4. Most participant accounts of the battle do not distinguish between the front-line militia and the skirmishers, but rather indicate that there was only one militia line. This is a very strong indication that the skirmishers served double duty. All of the British accounts (Tarleton, Hanger, Mackenzie, Cornwallis, Stewart, Chesney) are of this view. Descriptions of skirmishers that were in some sense distinct from the militia line appear principally in Morgan, and the detailed participant accounts by McJunkin and Young, and in reliable postwar histories by nonparticipants, like Lee and Moultrie.

The strongest contraindicative statement is by Major Joseph McJunkin, who wrote that “The sharpshooters fall behind Pickens.” This could mean that the skirmishers (or at least the group with McJunkin) did not participate in the militia line fighting. Alternatively, he may have meant only that the skirmishers stopped retreating only when they cleared the militia line; there they could reload their rifles in peace.

5. There is no reason why the gap built into the militia line would also have been present on the skirmish line. Indeed, a position in front of the gap between the two wings of the militia line was an ideal place for the skirmishers to fight. From there they could retreat to their comrades without obstructing their comrades’ view of the enemy.

Sources:

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report, and a copy of Jackson's letters.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, Mackenzie's, and Hanger's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Anderson, Collins, Young, Thomas, and Neel, among other sources.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of James Kelly (.pdf file).

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

A transcription of Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' statement about the battle can be found here.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

The Journal of Alexander Chesney

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Related: The American Skirmishers, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, Who Did John Savage Shoot?

Cowpens in Miniature 12

Part 12: "Bring on the Battle"

Previous: The British Deploy

Next: Fighting on the Skirmish Line

The Americans watched in awe as the light infantry and British Legion infantry deployed into line and marched forward. Behind this leading edge of the British advance they could see a large column of infantry, artillery, and cavalry.

Private James Collins who was with the front line militia, remembered when “the enemy came into full view. The sight, to me at least, seemed somewhat imposing.”

Although behind the militia, the Continentals could also see the British advance [see Note 1].

Private Henry Wells of Delaware remembered that “At the onset we were much alarmed by the Superiority of the Enemy in numbers.” However, Morgan was with them, and when he spoke, his “powerful and trumpetlike voice… drove fear from every bosom, and gave new energies to every arm.”

Meanwhile, Tarleton had determined on a plan of attack. So far he had advanced his light infantry, British Legion infantry, and one cannon. Together, these units covered a little over half the width of the American front line. He gave orders for the next regiment in column (the 7th Foot) and the cannon behind it to complete the front line. In his words, “the 7th regiment was commanded to form upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th.”

Tarleton also had on hand the two troops of dragoons he had dispatched to reinforce the advance guard on the approach to Cowpens. He ordered these troops to support the front line. “A captain, with fifty dragoons was placed on each flank of the corps, who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and threaten the flanks of the enemy.”

Other commands were issued bringing forward the 1st battalion of the 71st Foot, and his remaining mounted forces, which would constitute the British reserve.

Tarleton knew little more about the battlefield than what he was able to see from horseback, riding across the front of the American position. However, there was no need to perform a turning movement across unfamiliar terrain. The American force to his immediate front was less than formidable. Tarleton therefore deployed his front-line infantry on a line that more-or-less matched in width that of the American militia. His men were deployed in open order in two ranks; this formation facilitated movement through wooded terrain and would keep casualties relatively low. It also enabled him to keep a large part of his force in reserve.

Tarleton later complemented himself on how well the deployment proceeded. “The disposition was planned with coolness, and executed without embarrassment.”

According to Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of Delaware, the British deployment did not meet with resistance because “We had no artillery to annoy them and the Genl not thinking it prudent to advance from the ground [on which] We had form'd,” Instead, according to Lee, Morgan “waited in stern silence for the enemy.”

In fact, the British deployment was impeded, but by the terrain rather than by the Americans. To complete the British line, the 7th Foot had to advance cross relatively low, boggy ground, away from the road [see Note 2]. Tarleton also directed that his reserve infantry “The 1st battalion of the 71st… extend a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one hundred and fifty yards in the rear.” The 71st Foot marched into this even lower, boggier ground that possibly was, unlike other parts of the battlefield, covered with underbrush. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie recorded that “The seventy-first regiment… who had not as yet disentangled themselves from the brushwood with which Thickelle Creek abounds [see Note 3], were directed to form [i.e., form a line behind the 7th Foot], and wait for orders.”

Morgan and Anderson watched the stationary British front line, perhaps not realizing the difficulties that were occurring with the final stage of their deployment (the British left flank was screened from their view by the crest of the ridge in front). Anderson recalled only that “We [the British and Americans] look'd at each other for a Considerable time.” Morgan may not have had artillery to harass the British, but he did have an abundance of long-ranged riflemen. Taking advantage of the failure of the British to mount an immediate attack, he seized the initiative. Morgan reported that, “The [British] disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy.” Private John Thomas of Virginia noted that, “Gel. Morgan then rode down to the rifle men and gave them orders to fire.”

Major Joseph McJunkin and the South Carolinians on the right wing of the militia line anxiously watched as “Tarleton [was] marching up and filing [his troops] to the right and left, [until they were] formed in battle assay” [see Note 4]. General Morgan then rode up to them and asked “‘Boys, who will bring on the battle?’” According to McJunkin, “Col. Farr [Lieutenant-Colonel William Farr] & Major McJunkin stepped out.” These two commanders then turned to their men and asked, “‘Boys, who will go with us’.” Then “others stepped out until Morgan said there were enough, & said ‘Go & bring on the action & if you are pressed, retreat, & come in on our flank.’”

Morgan also visited McDowell’s North Carolinians and Cunningham’s Georgians and made a similar request [see Note 5].

In the rear of the American position, Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington, observing the skirmishers advance, sent his mounted militia forward to cover them [see Note 6].

The Americans strode forward. Soon there was, according to McJunkin, “a corps of picked riflemen [see Note 7]… scattered in loose order along the whole front” “at a distance of 150 yards” in front of the militia line. At that distance they could fire on the British with impunity [see Note 8].

The British Deploy for Battle. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = American Skirmishers, 9 = British Front Line (including two three-pounders), 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

In moving forward, the group of South Carolinians with Farr and McJunkin headed directly toward the still-deploying left-flank of the British line. This group was not well remembered after the battle [see Note 9]. However, they soon would play an important role. These men watched, according to McJunkin, as “the red coats stream before the eyes of the militia. A column marches up in front of Brandon's men [i.e., the South Carolinians] led by a gayly dressed officer on horseback.” This column was either the 7th Foot or the two companies of light infantry assigned to cover the left flank (see Who Did John Savage Shoot?).

According to Thomas Young: This “British Officer rode up towards the advance guard of Morgan's Army [i.e,. the skirmishers] & calling them in a loud voice "dam’d Rebels," ordered them to disperse.”

McJunkin stated that then, “The word passes along the line, "Who can bring him down?" John Savage looked Col. Farr [Lieutenant-Colonel William Farr] full in the face and read yes in his eye. He darted a few paces in front, laid his rifle against a sapling, a blue gas streamed above his head, the sharp crack of a rifle broke the solemn stillness of the occasion and a horse without a rider wheeled from the front of the advancing column” [see Note 10].

Young believed the same thing [see Note 11]. “John Savage instantly raised his rifle & fired & the British Officer fell from his horse mortally wounded.” Thus, “John Savage fired the first gun in this battle.” Or at least, the first gunshot after the two armies had deployed.

Notes:

1. This point confirms that the tree cover on the battlefield was thin. See Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature.

2. See Alexander Chesney's Rivulet.

3. Mackenzie was mistaken that the men of the 71st were near Thicketty Creek (which was some miles distant), but there still may have been some kind of watercourse in this area. Perhaps he mentioned Thicketty Creek because it was the one local watercourse whose name he heard.

4. In my recreation of the American deployment I placed these South Carolinians a short distance behind the crown of the ridge on which they were placed. I am uncertain whether they would have been able to see, from this position, the British deployment. Some officers, perhaps including McJunkin, were on horseback, which would have helped. However, privates like James Collins also recalled seeing the British deployment. Perhaps the angle of the American militia line should be one that better conforms to the crown of this ridge.

5. Several participant accounts indicate that a portion of McDowell’s battalion was in this force. For example, Richard Crabtree of McDowell’s battalion remembered that “Captain McDowell & his company of which applicant was one was ordered out to meet General Tarleton & bring on the action, this action commenced early in the morning.” Likewise, Richard Swearingen of McDowell’s battalion stated “he was one of the Company who first fired.”

The clearest statement of Cunningham’s involvement is found in Morgan’s report of the battle. Speaking of the entire battalion of Georgians, Major James Jackson wrote in a letter to Morgan that, “The detachment was small; but… you placed them in front of the whole.” This language suggests that all of Cunningham’s men were deployed as skirmishers.

6. This deployment proved to be of minor consequence, and only two participant accounts mention it (those of Thomas Young and William Neel). The key passages from their statements will be quoted in upcoming posts. Young did not specify which American cavalry units were involved; Neel referred only to mounted militia.

7. The skirmishers were not exactly individually handpicked. McJunkin’s account indicates that the skirmishers from his regiment were volunteers. Statements relating to the Georgian and North Carolina skirmishers suggest at least company-sized detachments were sent forward.

8. The skirmishers were in range of the British but the British were not in range of the skirmishers. The skirmishers’ rifles had a much longer range than did the British regulars’ muskets. Lawrence Babits’ A Devil of a Whipping provides an insightful examination of the weapon abilities of contemporary rifles and muskets.

9. Colonel Henry Lee wrote in his history that these skirmishers were only, “Two light parties of militia, under Major M'Dowel, of North Carolina, and Major Cunningham, of Georgia.” Lee thought they had “orders to feel the enemy as he approached.” This would seem to have been the role fulfilled earlier by Inman’s vedettes. McJunkin’s statement suggests that the role of the skirmishers was to provoke, disrupt, and injure the British.

10. According to Young, Lieutenant-Colonel Farr did not directly indicate that Savage should fire. Rather when Farr “was riding to and fro, along the lines… he saw Savage fix his eye upon a British officer; he [Savage] stepped out of the ranks, raised his gun-fired, and he [Farr] saw the officer fall.

11. Young was nearby, but not immediately present. He specifically said “I have heard old Col. Fair [Farr] say often, that he believed John Savage fired the first gun in this battle,” and that “John Savage, in my opinion fired the first gun at the Battle of the Cowpens.”

Sources:

John Moncure's The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage has a transcription of the statement by Collins, Anderson, Thomas, and others.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's memoir, and Mackenzie's Strictures.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

One of Young's statements appears in the pension application of John Jolly (.pdf file), transcribed by Will Graves.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Richard Crabtree (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Richard Swearingen (.pdf file).

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has a copy of Jackson's letters.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The American Skirmishers, Who Did John Savage Shoot?, Morgan's Report

Cowpens in Miniature 11

Part 11: The British Deploy

Previous: The British Reach Cowpens

Next: "Bring on the Battle"

The British column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, halted on the edge of the Cowpens battlefield. In front was the British advanced guard, supported by two companies of light dragoons. Tarleton had earlier consulted with his guides as to this position; he now found that it was as the scouts had related to him.

“The ground where General Morgan had chosen for the engagement, in order to cover his retreat to Broad river, was disadvantageous for the Americans, and convenient for the British: An open wood was certainly as proper a place for action as Lieutenant- colonel Tarleton could desire; America does not produce many more suitable to the nature of the troops under his command. The situation of the enemy was desperate in case of misfortune; an open country, and a river in their rear, must have thrown them entirely into the power of a superior cavalry” [see Note 1].

Other British sources agreed with this assessment. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie stated that Morgan “had formed his troops… in an open wood, secured neither in front, flank, nor rear.” The British after action report stated, “Everything now bore the most promising Aspect. The Enemy were drawn up in an open wood and, having been lately joined by some Militia, were more numerous; but the different Quality of the Corps under Lieut. Col. Tarleton's Command, and his great superiority in cavalry, left him no room of doubt of the most brilliant Success.”

Tarleton would attack, but he had first to inspect the American position and develop a battle plan. Therefore, he “ordered the legion dragoons to drive in the militia parties who covered the front, that General Morgan's disposition might be conveniently and distinctly inspected.”

It is supposed, in some histories of the battle, that these “militia parties” comprised the skirmish line that first offered resistance to the British attack. In fact this was not so; Morgan indicated in his report that the skirmish line was advanced only after the British deployed for battle. Instead, these “parties” were the stalwarts commanded by Captain Joshua Inman of Georgia, who had resisted the advance of the British vanguard, and who had been driven to the edge of the American position [see Note 2].

The British Vanguard Reaches Cowpens. The British mounted vanguard has halted on the edge of the Cowpens battlefield. Several hundred yards to their front, Captain Joshua Inman's vedettes continue to screen the front of the American position.

As the dragoons advanced, Inman yielded and his men took up their assigned places on the militia line.

Tarleton likely rode with these dragoons, for he claimed to have “discovered that the American commander had formed a front line of about one thousand militia, and had composed his second line and reserve of five hundred continental light infantry, one hundred and twenty of Washington's cavalry, and three hundred back woodsmen” [see Note 3].

Tarleton continued, “This accurate knowledge being obtained, Tarleton desired the British infantry to disencumber themselves of every thing, except their arms and ammunition: The light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line: The legion infantry were added to their left; and, under the fire of a three-pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to advance within three hundred yards of the enemy” [see Note 4].

The British Deploy for Battle. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line (including one three-pounder), 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 14 = British Column of Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry.

The British Front Line. The British light infantry are posted on the right, the British Legion infantry are posted on the left [see Note 5]. This line was supported by one three-pounder (not shown). The infantry are deployed in open order.

The British Approach. Behind the British front line and advance guard of cavalry, the remainder of the British column waits in the road (from front to back: the 7th Foot, the remaining three-pounder, the 1st battalion of the 71st Foot, and additional British Legion dragoons).

Notes:

1. Tarleton’s comments in this regard echo those of Winn and Lee.

2. The misunderstanding about these skirmishers, like the misunderstanding about the retreat of the militia, has its origins with William Johnson.

Johnson wrote that Tarleton “ordered the cavalry to advance and drive them [the parties of skirmishers] in. On the advance of the cavalry, the American parties retreated and fell into the first line, and were thus precluded from performing the service for which they were most probably assigned to this advanced position. But they performed another which in the sequel answered nearly as beneficial a purpose. They gave the cavalry a few discharges which made them tremble, for at least that day, at the deadly aim of an American rifleman.”

The misunderstanding is reasonable. Tarleton used the term “small parties” to refer to Inman’s group, while Morgan used the same term to describe the later line of skirmishers.

The argument against Johnson’s interpretation is that neither Tarleton nor Morgan mentioned armed conflict at this interval. An inspection of other participant accounts likewise reveals almost no basis for Johnson’s assertion. The best supporting statement that I could find was a comment in William Knight’s pension application that “the attack was brought on by an attack from Tarleton's Regiment.” This is quite ambiguous; “Tarleton’s Regiment” could refer to either the British infantry or cavalry.

Instead, participant accounts indicate that the line of skirmishers were deployed later. Morgan wrote, “The [British] disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy.” Morgan’s account also indicates that it was the British infantry, not the cavalry, that drove in the line of skirmishers.

Lawrence Babits, in A Devil of a Whipping, performed an unparalleled examination of accounts of the battle. Through this examination he seemingly did not find (or at least cite) participant accounts supporting Johnson’s description of the militia retreat or actions on the skirmish line, but he did attempt to reconcile Johnson’s version of events (what has largely become the conventional understanding of the battle) with his own findings.

Babits noted (p. 187, n. 9) that Captain Richard Hovenden’s company lost 17 k between the end of December, 1780 and February 23, 1781. Discounting Morgan, his account has the line of skirmishers in place before the British deployed, and, based chiefly on Hovenden’s losses (tentatively at least) concluded that Hovenden did perform a charge on the skirmishers that resulted in losses.

There is some kind of error with the number that Babits gives for Hovenden’s loss, but I am unable to explain it. The 17 k seems too high. If Hovenden’s company suffered the usual proportion of wounded then his company would have been annihilated – an inauspicious beginning for the British attack, and one that surely would have garnered notice. Ignoring the wounded, Hovenden’s company lost a greater proportion in killed than the British infantry units that assailed the militia and main lines. This also is implausible.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website includes a listing of British Legion dragoon losses at Cowpens, prepared by Don Gara and based on at least one set of muster records. On this website, Hovenden’s company is shown as having lost a mere four captured, and none killed. Gara notes that a problem with these numbers is that they do not add up to the known total losses for the Legion at the battle.

Not having inspected the muster rolls for myself, I can only speculate as to the reasons why Babits’ and Gara’s numbers are so different.

3. It is doubtful that Tarleton was able to make such a perfect reconnaissance of the American position. The numbers he gave are not accurate with the exception of his total for the American cavalry. This may be because he held mounted militiaman Thomas Young as a prisoner after the battle and Tarleton received from him an honest answer about American cavalry numbers.

4. Morgan gave the distance between the British and the American front lines as 400 yards. I defer to Tarleton on this count, who was arguably in a better position to judge distance (Morgan was probably with the main line at this point). Tarleton’s distance places the British front line on the more elevated ground in front of Chesney’s rivulet.

5. I defer to Tarleton on questions of the British deployment, but with considerable reservation. Tarleton's description differs in important respects from Morgan’s reliable account.

In regards to the placement of the light infantry, Tarleton stated that “The light infantry were… ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line;” this statement implicitly places all of the light infantry on the right flank of the British line.

Morgan indicated that the British light infantry were divided equally between the two flanks. A newspaper account of the battle based on Morgan's report specified that there were 100 men in each flanking party of light infantry, or 200 in total. In my order of battle for the British, the light infantry totaled 148 men. There is enough agreement in these numbers to lend credence to the view that the British light infantry were divided into two parts. This impression is reinforced by an account of the battle implying that the 71st Foot surrendered on the left of the British line along with two companies of light infantry (see British Light Infantry at Cowpens - Part 2).

However, I found through attempting to recreate the battle in miniature that it is difficult to have one group of light infantry sidle repeatedly to the left (first to gain the left of the 7th Foot, then again to gain the left of the 71st). Tarleton's account is followed less because it is well supported by source materials than because it is much simpler to execute.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's memoir, Mackenzie's Strictures, and documents pertaining to the British Legion.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Knight (.pdf file).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has the New Jersey newspaper account of the battle.

Related: Modeling Notes, Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature, British Light Infantry at Cowpens - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 10

Part 10: The British Reach Cowpens

Previous: Morgan's Plan

Next: The British Deploy

While the Americans were deploying for battle, the British were on the last leg of their march to Cowpens. In front, the British vanguard swept down the Green River Road, seeking out the Americans. After engaging Sergeant Lawrence Everhart’s patrol, they next encountered Morgan’s vedettes. Major Joseph McJunkin recalled that, “The guns of the vedettes, led by Capt. [Joshua] Inman, announce the approach of the foe.” Major James Jackson of George confirmed that Inman was in command. In a letter to Morgan he wrote, “[Inman] was particularly serviceable to you in advertising you of the enemy’s approach and skirmishing with their advance.”

Little is known about these vedettes, but they appear to have included both Georgians and South Carolinians and to have been sufficiently numerous to pose some armed resistance to the advancing British. A “vedette” is, by definition, a mounted sentry, although it's not clear that all were in fact on horseback [see Note 1]. The British vanguard charged at the vedettes with slashing sabres. Some were cut down, others nearly so. South Carolina militiaman Thomas Young recalled “Our pickets were stationed three miles in advance…. Samuel Clowney was one of the picket guards, and I often heard him afterwards laugh at his narrow escape. It was about day that the pickets were driven in.”

As the vedettes were driven back, the British vanguard was soon able to come within sight of the American army. The horsemen halted and sent word to Tarleton, who was with the main body.

Tarleton soon learned from “the commanding officer in front… that the American troops were halted and forming.” Tarleton knew nothing about this location, only that he had caught up with the Americans before they could retreat across the Broad River (or so he supposed; see Note 2).

Tarleton wrote, “The guides were immediately consulted relative to the ground which General Morgan the occupied, and the country in his rear. These people described both with great perspicuity: They said that the woods were open and free from swamps; that the part of Broad river, just above the place where King's creek joined the stream, was about six miles distant from the enemy's left flank, and that the river, by making a curve to the westward, ran parallel to the rear.”

Now, the British column marched the last couple of miles to the Cowpens. Perhaps at this interval word began to filter through the ranks that the Americans had stopped and would fight.

The Americans, who had completed their deployment, stood in ranks quietly awaiting their enemy.

Thomas Young, who was serving with the mounted militia, recalled, “The morning of the 17th of January, 1781, was bitterly cold. We were formed in order of battle, and the men were slapping their hands together to keep warm-an exertion not long necessary.”

Captain Benjamin Brooks of Maryland, Brigade Major to the Continental infantry was on horseback in front of the main line. He peered down the Green River Road, past the British dragoons and into the shadows beyond. At last, the British infantry column strode into view. According to Private John Thomas of Virginia, Brooks then “rode up to Gel. Morgan and informed him that the British were in Sight.”

Colonel Henry Lee stated that, “On the verge of battle, Morgan availed himself of the short and awful interim to exhort his troops.” He spoke to the militia and “extolled the zeal and bravery so often displayed by them, when unsupported with the bayonet or sword; and declared his confidence that they could not fail in maintaining their reputation, when supported by chosen bodies of horse and foot, and conducted by himself. Nor did he forget to glance at his unvarying fortune, and superior experience; or to mention how often, with his corps of riflemen, he had brought British troops, equal to those before him, to submission. He described the deep regret he had already experienced in being obliged, from prudential considerations, to retire before an enemy always in his power; exhorted the line to be firm and steady; to fire with good 'aim; and, if they would pour in but two volleys at killing distance, he would take upon himself to secure victory.”

Major Joseph McJunkin, who was with the South Carolinians on the right of the militia line, remembered Morgan appealing to Providence. With “the Enemy in sight between day light and sun-up, Gen. Morgan addressed the Sovereign of the Universe in the following words, saying—‘O thou Great Disposer of all Events, the battle is not to the strong, nor the race to the swift: Our domineering Enemy now being in sight, Oh, leave us not nor forsake us!’”

Morgan then rode over to the Continentals, and with them, according to Lee, “he was very brief. He reminded them of the confidence he had always reposed in their skill and courage; assured them that victory was certain, if they acted well their part; and desired them not to be discouraged by the sudden retreat of the militia, that being part of his plan and orders.”

Notes:

1. Lawrence Babits, in A Devil of a Whipping, quotes the account of South Carolinia militiaman James Caldwell (p 59) that clearly served as one of these vedettes. Caldwell was cut down by the British vanguard; the quoted passage implies he was on foot at the time.

2. The British after action report credits Tarleton with having, “conducted his march so well & got so near to General Morgan, who was retreating before him, as to make it dangerous for him to pass the Broad River, and came up with him at 8:00 AM on the l7th instant.” The British did not realize that the Americans had chosen to fight at this location despite the disadvantageous circumstances.

Sources:

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has a copy of Jackson's letters.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Young and Thomas, among other sources.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's memoir.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

A transcription of the British after action report (letter from Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton) can be found here.

Related: The Cowpens Battlefield, Cornwallis' Report, Tarleton's Narrative

Cowpens in Miniature 9

Part 9: Morgan's Plan
Previous: The Americans Deploy

Next: The British Reach Cowpens

Major Joseph McJunkin stated that after “The [Americans] lines formed… the plan of battle [was] disclosed.” On the night before the battle, Morgan shared the details of his battle plans with the senior leadership. Now that the infantry were on the battlefield, they too were informed of his plan.

Morgan placed many of his militiamen in front of his Continentals, forming what is known as a defense-in-depth. His hope wasn’t that the militiamen would hold off the British, rendering the main line superfluous. He expected the British to drive off the militia. Instead, his hope was that the front line militia would inflict significant damage to the British before their onslaught could reach the main line.

The American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

There were two threats facing the front line militia. The British, under Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, might choose to assail the militia with either their massive force of cavalry or their several regiments of bayonet-wielding infantry.

Because the British attacked with infantry, Morgan’s planned defense against a cavalry charge has been largely forgotten. William Johnson [see Note 1] claimed that Morgan’s orders were for “every third man to fire and two to remain in reserve, lest the cavalry should continue to advance after the first fire; or to be used if they wheeled to retire.” Under this scheme, one part of the militia would have had loaded guns at all times and provided protection for others to reload. In this manner, the militia would have been able to keep up a more-or-less continuous fire. If anything would have prevented a massacre, something of this kind would have succeeded. There may have been additional features to Morgan’s plan for this contingency, such as a countercharge by the American cavalry, but they have not been recorded.

Against an infantry attack, the militia were to deliver a single lethal volley at close range before retreating. The two wings of the militia line were roughly centered on the two gaps in the main line. When the militia retreated, they were to fall straight back through these gaps. Their initial withdrawal would be covered by the fire of the Continentals. As they moved to their final destinations and began to reform, they would be covered by the left and right militia wings of the main line. The gaps in the main line between the militia wings and the Continentals served another purpose as well, and helped ensure that the Continentals would not be struck by “friendly fire” from the riflemen behind them.

The Planned American Retreat. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = Skirmishers

This plan was remembered by several participants in the battle.

Private John Thomas, who was on the left wing of the main line provided the clearest description. He learned that “not a gun was to be fired without orders.” Then, the militia in front “were to fire and… [pass] breaks in the Centre [i.e., the main line] and fall off to the right and flank of the Musquet Line [i.e., the Continentals].”

Private Richard Swearingen who was in Major Joseph McDowell’s battalion of front-line North Carolinians recalled that: “The commander General Morganton [Morgan] gave orders for the militia to fire on the enemy & then retreat & give room for the regulars.” Private John Baldwin, who was also in this battalion, remembered receiving the orders through McDowell. “McDowell told his men to take aim when they fired, and as they retreated to divide to the right & left & form in the rear.” Private Robert Long, who was on the right wing of the main line learned his regiment’s mission was to “cover” “the North Carolinians… [when they] were retreating” [see Note 2].

Thomas Young remembered hearing Morgan say on the night before the battle that the militia only needed to deliver “three fires” to fulfill their duty. At the time, this may have made the task of the militia seem easy. However, in the exposed position assigned to them, it would have been difficult for the militia to fulfill this role. Perhaps Morgan’s statement reveals that he was mentally preparing the militia to reenter the fight after their initial retreat (they would feel obligated to fire the additional shots Morgan had asked for).

Morgan had more than one way to bring the militia back into the fight after they had reformed in the rear of the main line. If the British attempted to turn the flanks of the main line, he could use the militia to counter this maneuver. If the British advanced on a wide front but did not attempt to turn the American flanks, he could bring the front-line militia forward to augment the firepower of the main-line militia. If the British advanced on a narrow front, he could bring the militia forward around the main-line militia to assail the British flanks.

Notes:

1. I deem Johnson an unreliable source (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1). It’s impossible to say whether Johnson’s information on this point is accurate, but it is at least a reasonable plan.

2. In my interpretation, the entirety of McDowell’s battalion was to retreat to the right rear of the main line, therefore Baldwin’s statement must describe the plan for the entire militia line and not just McDowell’s battalion. This view of McDowell’s planned retreat is supported by Long’s statement.

Sources:

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Thomas and Young.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Richard Swearingen (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Baldwin (.pdf file).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

Related: The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Flight of the Militia - Part 4

Cowpens in Miniature 8

Part 8: The Americans Deploy
Previous: Initial Contact

Next: Morgan's Plan

Now certain that battle was eminent, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan began his final preparations. He reported:

“An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp [see Note 1]. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them.”

Other writers made a similar remark. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the 1st Delaware would record in his journal, “Before day Reced Information that Col Tarlton Was Within Five Miles of us With a Strong Body of Horse and Infantry Whereon We got up and put Ourselves in Order of Battle.”

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina remembered that Morgan and Colonel Andrew Pickens walked through the American encampment waking up the men and exhorting them to fight.

“Gen. Morgan being apprised of the approach of Tarleton by faithful spies, began before day to go from mess to mess with Gen. Pickens, saying ‘Boys, get up, Benny's coming; & you that have sweethearts or wives or children or parents, must fight for them and above all you must fight for liberty and for your country,’ which appeared to have the ears of Every true friend of this country, & were alive to action, but a few ‘pet Tories’ whom it seemed like poison to.”

As for the Continentals, as soon as the drums started beating, they rose and hastened into formation. According to McJunkin, “the tattoo being sounded, the line was formed commanded by Col. Howard [Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard].” Morgan then spoke to them collectively, saying “My friends in arms, my dear boys, I request you to remember Saratoga, Monmouth, Paoli & Brandywine, & this day you must play your parts for your honor & liberty's cause.”

The troops then began moving onto the battlefield. It was an unpleasant morning. Private William Neel, who was in Captain Buchanan’s company of Virginians, remembered that, “the Army paraded before day a cold morning.” Captain Henry Connelly recalled, “it was cold weather but inclined to be rainey.”

According to McJunkin, “First the regulars and some companies of Virginia militia are posted to where the final issue is expected.” However, Colonel Joseph Hayes’ small regiment may have been the first onto the battlefield. Perhaps they were directed to mark the spot where the Continentals were to deploy or they were designated to cover the Continentals’ deployment with their long-ranged rifles. Robert Long of Hayes’ regiment watched as the Continentals “marched out in sections, and divided two and two as they got [within] ten paces of Hayes' regiment already formed across the road.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 1. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's infantry march down the road behind them, followed by Major Francis Triplett's Virginians.

The Continentals deployed to the southwest of the Green River Road, that is, to the right of Hayes’ regiment [see Note 2]. Thomas Young remembered that, “The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 2. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Howard's Continentals have completed their deployment. Major Francis Triplett's Virginians are beginning to deploy as well. Other units can be seen preparing to deploy.

The Virginia militia deployed behind and to the sides of the Continentals, leaving a gap between the Continentals and either wing of militia [see Note 3]. According to Neel, his company of Virginia militia “formed in single file with the Militia on the right of the Regulars, stood in ranks till Sun rise, at which time the battle commenced” [see Note 4].

Sergeant Major William Seymour of the Delaware Continentals recorded in his journal that “we were drawn up in order of battle, the men seeming to be all in good spirits and very willing to fight.”

Next came the more complicated deployment of the balance of the American militia. According to McJunkin, “the main body of militia under Gen. Pickens are drawn up at the distance of 150 yards” in front of the main line [see Note 5]. They were deployed in two wings, which were aligned with the gaps between the Continentals and militia wings on the main line [see Note 6]. The American cavalry, meanwhile, took up position on the elevation behind the Continentals [see Note 7].

The American deployment was now complete. Brigadier-General William Moultrie, an early historian of the battle, wrote that, “General Morgan drew up his men on an open pine barren in the following order… the militia of about four hundred men formed the first line under General Pickens; the continentals of about five hundred (two hundred of whom were six months men, very raw troops) formed the second line [see Note 8], commanded by Colonel Howard, about two hundred yards in the rear of the first. Colonel Washington, with about seventy-five continental cavalry, and- forty-five mounted militia, with swords, under Colonel M'Call, in the rear of the whole: in this disposition did they wait to receive the enemy.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Colonel Henry Lee made similar observations in his early history [see Note 9]. He concluded, “Erroneous as was the decision to fight in this position, when a better might have been easily gained, the disposition for battle was masterly.”

Morgan indicated in his report of the battle that Hayes’ regiment was deployed on the left wing of the militia wing. However, Robert Long stated that his regiment was deployed on the right wing of the main line (see The Statements of Private Robert Long). Either Morgan or Long was mistaken in their recollection, or Hayes' regiment was ordered to the militia line, but then moved to the main line due to some last-minute adjustment in the deployment.

Why would men have been drawn from the left wing of the militia line to reinforce the right wing of the main line? It is noteworthy that the left wing of the militia line bordered a branch of Suck Creek, while the right wing of the militia line was posted on a high point on the battlefield. Perhaps it was determined that while the left wing could have fewer men without endangering the American position, but the right wing could not be reduced.

No participant account directly says that some men were shifted off of the front line to supplement the main line. However, Robert Long, of Hayes’ regiment did describe his regiment performing some peculiar pre-battle maneuvers. He stated that after the Continentals deployed,

“Hayes regiment then moved to the right of the infantry [the Continentals],” or onto the other side of the battlefield. Once they were there, there seems to have been some confusion over exactly where Hayes’ regiment was to deploy. At first Hayes’ regiment was “70 or 80 yards in advance” of the Continentals, and “70 or 80 yards” behind “Major McDowell, of North Carolina.” In other words, they were midway between the militia line and the main line. The rest of the main line militia were deployed behind the Continentals.

The Americans Deploy, Part 3. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is on the right of the Continentals, midway between the Continentals' right and Major Joseph McDowell's North Carolinians. At this stage, the American deployment is largely complete.

Eventually, the deployment was sorted out. Long noted that “Hayes' regiment having advanced too far were to retreat.” They then fell back to a more appropriate position, perhaps next to Connelly’s company. At that point, Long stood “in the center line on the right wing in Captain Ewing's company commanded by Colonel Joseph Hayes, next to Colonel Howard's Infantry.”

The right wing of the main line was described by few participants. For example, Thomas Young wrote that, “The battle field was almost a plain with a ravine on both hands, and very little under growth in front or near us. The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks, their right flank resting upon the head of the ravine on the right. The militia [of the main line] were formed on the left of the regulars… their left flank resting near the head of the ravine on the left.”

Howard remembered that he had “two companies of Virginia Militia or volunteers, one commanded by Capt Tripolet [Major Francis Triplett] from Fauguhar [Fauquier County], the other by a capt Tate from Rockbridge or one of the western Counties.” He wrote, “I am positive that Triplett and Tate were on my left,” but said nothing about militia units on his right.

The right wing of the main line was on lower ground than the Continentals and the other militia units; perhaps Howard and others didn’t see them there. Alternatively, as the right wing failed to distinguish itself during the battle, their presence, while known at the time, was later forgotten.

Final American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Notes:

1. The scout could be either a militiaman or one of Washington’s dragoons. As noted in my previous post, Sergeant Lawrence Everhart claimed that he was captured when 3 miles away from Morgan’s camp; this suggests that the main British column was 2 miles distant from the site of the initial conflict.

2. This is indicated in the pension application of Sergeant Benjamin Martin of the Virginia militia. Martin stated that "I was in the road all the time of the action... Lieutenant Ewen [James Ewing] was on the left of the Maryland Troops near me." This places Martin on the left of the Continentals, and the Continentals to the southwest of the Green River Road. A number of illustrations of the battle of Cowpens show the Americans deployed equally to either side of the Green River Road. However, the ground was more elevated to the southwest of the road than to the northeast (see The Cowpens Battlefield). Martin’s statement suggests that the American deployment was governed more by the topography of the battlefield than by the location of the road.

3. The description of the American deployment provided here is unlike that in many histories of the battle, but it is not wholly unique. A similar arrangement can be found in Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Two Interpretations of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, Bearss' on the right. The positioning of the units per Bearss' account is approximate. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

In both cases, heavy emphasis has been placed on Morgan's after action report and Hammond's description of Morgan's plan (see Morgan's Report, The Hammond Map). I interpreted Hammond somewhat differently than did Bearss. Other differences arose because I drew upon pension applications as a source of information.

One recent history that indicates a very different American deployment than that shown here is Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens.

Comparison of Two Versions of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, and is as described above. Babits' interpretation appears on the right; the positioning of the units per his account is approximate. On the right, 1 = American Cavalry; 2 = Main Line; 3 = Militia Line; 4 = Skirmish Line. The two accounts also differ in terms of the location of the Green River Road. The road in my version follows Bearss and is shown in brown. Babits showed the Green River Road following a different course, which I have partially sketched out in black on the right panel.

There are a number of reasons for the differences in the present account with that by Babits. Chief among these is that Babits concluded (while I did not) that Morgan's and Hammond's descriptions of the American deployment referred to a temporary battle plan that was developed the night before the battle and then greatly modified before the actual fighting began. (see Morgan's Report and The Hammond Map for a transcription of their accounts).

I have devoted a number of previous posts to arguing for the version of the American deployment shown here. In regards to the main line deployment, see in particular The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Composition, and The Main Line: Location.

4. Aside from Neel, the only participant to comment on the number of ranks was Thomas Young, who said that “the regulars… were formed in two ranks.” He did not indicate this deployment for the militia. Indeed, that he should have mentioned this fact at all suggests that he found such a deployment to be exceptional. A single rank for the militia line leads to their covering well the high ground between Suck Creek and Island Creek. Perhaps all of the militia were formed in a single rank, although it's not unreasonable to believe that the men also would have doubled up behind large trees where they were near the line.

5. Some sources say that distance was 150 yards, others that it was 200 yards. In the images the distance between the first and second lines is a little greater than 150 (scale) yards.

6. This is indicated in participant accounts. As noted above, Martin’s statement indicated that gap between the Continentals and the left wing of the main line would have been near the Green River Road. Hammond’s description of the militia line deployment places his regiment on the northeast of the Green River Road and Major John Cunningham’s men on the southwest of the road. In other words, the left wing of the militia line was roughly aligned with the left gap in the main line. I assume, by extension, that the same was true of the right wing of the militia line. See The Hammond Map.

7. For details about where the American cavalry were deployed, see The American Cavalry - Part 2.

8. Moultrie mistakenly referred to 200 of the troops as Continentals that were in fact Virginia militia with long terms of service. They were, in any case, “raw troops.”

9. Lee said that “The main body of the militia composed… [the front] line, with General Pickens at its head. At a suitable distance in the rear of the first line a second was stationed, composed of the continental infantry and two companies of Virginia militia, under Captains Triplett and Taite, commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel Howard. Washington's cavalry, reinforced with a company of mounted militia armed with sabres, was held in reserve; convenient to support the infantry, and protect the horses of the rifle militia, which were tied, agreeably to usage, in the rear.”

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Morgan, Anderson, McJunkin, Neel, Connelly, Young, Seymour, Howard, and Hammond.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan also has a copy of Morgan's report.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Long (.pdf file). See also The Statements of Private Robert Long.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's statement.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf).

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Location, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization