Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (11)

This is Part 11 in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10.

At the battle of Guilford Courthouse, Major-General Nathanael Greene used an elaborate defense-in-depth to wear down the advancing British infantry. He hoped they would be primed for defeat by the time they reached the Continentals posted on the the third and final line. However, a number of things had not gone as planned. The North Carolina militia retreated without orders on the first line (Part 4). So too did part of the Virginia militia on the second line (Part 6). Also, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s flank corps had become separated from rest of the army (Part 8). Finally, on the third line, the 2nd Maryland regiment gave cursory resistance to the British 2nd Battalion of Guards, then broke and fled (Part 10). Greene later wrote:

[the Guards had] turned our left flank, got into the rear of the Virginia brigade, and appearing to be gaining on our right, which would have encircled the whole of the continental troops, I thought it was most advisable to order a retreat. [1]

There is some unwitting exaggeration in this description. The Guards had gained the rear of the American line, but probably they had not yet advanced as far as the Virginia regiments. The Guards were also much too few in number to encircle “the whole of the continental troops”. Nevertheless, the sudden collapse of his left flank may have appeared to presage the total defeat of his army. Greene's orders to retreat no doubt seemed prudent.

However, the Continental units nearest the 2nd Guards had already chosen to take matters into their own hands.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard of the 1st Maryland recalled:

[M]y station being on the left of the first regiment, and next the cleared ground, Captain Gibson, deputy adjutant-general, rode to me, and informed me that a party of the enemy, inferior in number to us, were pushing through the cleared ground and into our rear, and that if we would face about and charge them, we might take them. We had been for some time engaged with a part of Webster's brigade, though not hard pressed, and at that moment their fire had slackened. I rode to [Colonel John] Gunby and gave him the information. He did not hesitate to order the regiment to face about, and we were immediately engaged with the guards. [2]

Also nearby was Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s cavalry, which consisted of the 1st and 3rd Light Dragoons, and additional troops raised recently in North Carolina and Virginia.

Lieutenant Philemon Holcombe, who served under Washington, recalled:

Colo[nel] Washington’s command was in view of the conflicting armies and were spectators of the bloody scene for several hours. The Carolina Militia had given way, and the second and third lines of the american army were hard pressed, and the British columns were passing to the rear of the american line, flushed with victory, marching rapidly and in some confusion. [3]

Coolly appraising the situation, Washington did not hesitate to act. In Holcombe’s words, “the brave and gallant William Washington ordered a charge upon their columns”.

The 2nd Battalion of Guards (at center) is simultaneously attacked by the 1st Maryland Regiment (shown here with a blue regimental flag), and Washington's cavalry (the mounted men at left). (Click to enlarge).

Another view of the above; North Carolina militiamen look on as Washington's cavalry charges.

Notes:

1. Greene's account of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

2. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

3. Pension application of Philemon Holcombe.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (6)

This is the sixth in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5.

Brigadier-General Robert Lawson commanded the right wing of Virginia militia on the American second line. Lawson’s brigade consisted of three regiments commanded by (from his left to his right), Robert Mumford, John Holcombe, and Beverley Randolph. [1]

During the opening cannonade of the battle, British round shot came bounding through the woods and into their position. According to Lawson’s brigade-major, St. George Tucker:

“Major Hubbard, of Col. Mumford’s regiment, had the skirt of his surtout shot away by a cannon ball, and his horse slightly wounded by the same. There were not, however, above ten men killed and wounded during the whole cannonade…” [2]

Lawson decided against waiting passively for the redcoats to reach his front. Instead, according to Tucker, “When the cannonade ceased, orders were given for Holcombe’s regiment and the regiment on the right of him [Randolph's] to advance and annoy the enemy’s left flank.”

This was the kind of bold gamble that potentially could win or lose a battle. The British left flank was vulnerable (see Part 5), but Lawson’s decision undermined the planned defense-in-depth.

----------------------------------------------------

John Holcombe’s and Beverley Randolph’s regiments advance through the woods and encounter North Carolinians retreating from the first line.

----------------------------------------------------

While the Virginians trudged through the woods, the British infantry broke the North Carolina line (Part 4). The rapidity of the British advance prevented Lawson’s men from acting as planned. Instead, the Virginians found their own flank imperiled when some British troops – probably from the brigade of Guards – moved into the area between Mumford’s right and Holcombe’s left. This unexpected advance unnerved the Virginians. According to Tucker:

While we were advancing to execute this order [i.e., to harass the British left], the British had advanced, and, having turned the flank of Col. Mumford’s regiment… we discovered them in our rear. This threw the militia into such confusion, that, without attending in the least to their officers who endeavored to halt them, and make them face about and engage the enemy, Holcombe’s regiment and ours instantly broke off without firing a single gun, and dispersed like a flock of sheep frightened by dogs. [2]

A chasm had suddenly opened in the Americans’ second defensive line. Fortunately for the Americans, Tucker was equal to the occasion. He wrote:

With infinite labor Beverley and myself rallied about sixty or seventy of our men, and brought them to the charge. Holcombe was not so successful. He could not rally a man… With the few men which we had collected we at several times sustained an irregular kind of skirmishing with the British, and were once successful enough to drive a party for a very small distance. [2]

----------------------------------------------------

Fighting on the Second Line. At left, the 33rd Foot, supported by Hessian Jaegers and the Guards light infantry (the latter not shown) battles William Washington’s flank corps. Meanwhile, other elements of the Guards brigade (upper right) and the 23rd Foot (lower right) battle parts of Lawson’s brigade.

Another view of the above. Mumford’s regiment is at left. Most of the remainder of Lawson’s brigade is fleeing, although St. George Tucker and others skirmish with the 23rd Foot in the woods.

----------------------------------------------------

Sergeant Roger Lamb of the 23rd Foot (Royal Welch Fusiliers) was one who got caught up in the “irregular kind of skirmishing” with Lawson’s men. He wrote, “Here the conflict became still more fierce.” When the Virginians finally gave way, he spotted a fleeing American officer. He wrote:

“I immediately darted after him, but he perceiving my intention to capture him, fled with the utmost speed. I pursued and was gaining on him, when, hearing a confused noise on my left, I observed several bodies of Americans drawn up within the distance of a few yards.” [3]

Were these more of Tucker’s men? Or had Lamb reached Mumford’s position? In any event, he was now in grave danger:

Whoever has been in an engagement well knows that, in such moments all fears of death are over. Seeing one of the guards among the slain, where I stood, I stopped and replenished my own pouch with the cartridges that remained in his; during the time I was thus employed, several shots were fired at me; but not one took effect. [3]

Lamb was relieved when a company of the guards appeared and attacked the parties of Americans. He watched with admiration as British troops “with calm intrepidity [attacked] superior numbers,” and he noted that “this instance was not peculiar; it frequently occurred in the British army, during the American war.”

In this manner, the Guards and Fusiliers dislodged the last of Lawson’s men.

----------------------------------------------------

Yet another view of the above. In the foreground is the cavalry component of William Washington’s flank corps – chiefly troopers of the 1st and 3rd Continental Light Dragoons. In the middle ground, most of Lawson’s men stream out of action. In the distance, a great blaze of smoke arises from where other Virginia militiamen battle British Guards and Fraser’s Highlanders (more on this next time).

----------------------------------------------------

Notes:

I noted at the outset of this series that I would be presenting a fairly conventional account of the battle of Guilford Courthouse. The present post is something of an exception. The advance made by part of Lawson's brigade has been omitted from virtually every account of the battle (Babits' and Howard's recent history being a notable exception). My feeling is that the major source on this advance -- a letter by St. George Tucker to his wife, written shortly after the battle --provides a clear and believable description of this movement.

1. Letters of St. George Tucker to his wife (from the Magazine of American History); Lawrence E. Babits & Joshua B. Howard (2009) Long, obstinate, and bloody: The battle of Guilford Courthouse. Henry Skipwith led Mumford's regiment on the day of the battle.

2. Tucker, ibid.

3. A copy of Lamb's account (among others) can be found in this compendium.

North Carolina: June, 1780

In June, 1780, the British completed their conquest of South Carolina and were making preparations for an eventual invasion of North Carolina. In anticipation of this invasion, large bands of Loyalist militia began to organize in North Carolina. For the moment, at least, North Carolina remained firmly in American control. Large bodies of North Carolina militia had been embodied, supported by a division of Continentals, a brigade of Virginia militia, and South Carolina refugees. The map shows the approximate distribution of these forces shortly before the battle of Ramsour's Mill (June 20). Please note that some small concentrations of troops have been omitted from this map.

British and American Forces in North Carolina in June, 1780 (click to enlarge). Red letters refer to British forces, blue letters to American forces. Placement of letters is approximate with respect to troop location.

Loyalist Militia:

A: A body of Loyalist militia at Ramsour's Mill, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Moore. This force was estimated to have 1,000 to 1,300 men.

B: A body of Loyalist militia at the forks of the Yadkin River, under the command of Colonel Samuel Bryan. This force was estimated to be as many as 800 men.

American Forces:

A: Continental forces at Hillsborough under the command of Major-General Johann de Kalb. This force included the Maryland division with 1,278 effectives, the 1st Continental artillery with 140 effectives, the Virginia state regiment of artillery with 175 effectives, 36 North Carolina Continentals, and 20 officers from South Carolina and Georgia.

B: American forces at Cross Creek under the command of Major-General Richard Caswell. This forced included approximately 1,500 North Carolina militia and the 200 infantry and cavalry of Armand's Legion.

C: North Carolina militia in the vicinity of Charlotte under the command of Brigadier-General Griffith Rutherford. Rutherford commanded approximately 1,100 men, including detachments sent to counter Moore. Nearby, South Carolina refugees were organizing under Thomas Sumter.

D: Virginia militia in Roanoke. This force included the vanguard of Brigadier-General Edward Stevens' approximately 2,500-man militia brigade.

E: American forces in Guilford County. This force included an unknown number of Guilford County militia, 80 Virginia State infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Porterfield, and 55 Virginia State cavalry under Major John Nelson.

F: American cavalry in Halifax. This force included the remnants of the 1st and 3rd Continental Light Dragoons, which had suffered serious losses during the Charleston campaign. According to one estimate, they now numbered about 200 men.

Note: The above is based on a variety of different sources, the most important of which is a letter from Johann de Kalb to George Washington dated June 29, 1780.

Cowpens in Miniature 24

Part 24: The Last Gambit

Previous: Surrender

Next: The Battle Ends

Tarleton remained on the battlefield with a small group of stalwarts, even after the British had surrendered. He surely knew that the British right had fled or surrendered. Less clear is if he knew what had befallen the 71st Foot. In any case, the Americans soon assembled a force consisting of the bulk of their cavalry [see Note 1] and at least a portion of the Continentals to drive off of this last vestige of resistance and pursue those forces that had fled.

Upon the surrender of the 71st Foot, Colonel Andrew Pickens remembered that he "sent back to Genl Morgan, by Major Jackson, Major McCarthur, with the sword" [see Note 2]. He then "met Coln Washington with his cavalry in pursuit of Tarleton" [see Note 3]. He therefore "ordered Jackson who was brave & active, to return as quickly as possible with as many mounted militia as he could get."

Meanwhile, Tarleton watched as the Americans approached. With him were "Fourteen officers and forty horse-men… not unmindful of their own reputation, or the situation of their commanding officer." The American cavalry had somewhat fewer than 100 men. The prudent decision, perhaps, would have been to turn around and retreat down the Green River Road, but he felt compelled to put up a fight [see Note 4].

Final Confrontation. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11, 14 = British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons. The blue-ringed circles show where the British front line (9) and 71st Foot (13) surrendered.

Final Confrontation (click to enlarge). As American cavalry and infantry set off in pursuit of the fleeing British, they must first confront Tarleton.

Lieutenant Mackenzie, although by now a prisoner, was perhaps witness to this event. He recalled, with a mixture of awe and disdain, that "Even at this late stage of the defeat, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, with no more than fifty horse, hesitated not to charge the whole of Washington's cavalry, though supported by the continentals; it was a small body of officers, and a detachment of the seventeenth regiment of dragoons, who presented themselves on this desperate occasion" [see Note 5].

The official British report of the battle claimed that these cavalry, "having had time to recollect themselves, & being animated by the Bravery of the Officer who had so often led them to victory, charged & repulsed Colonel Washington's Horse." Tarleton’s memoir went further, claiming that "Colonel Washington's cavalry were… driven back into the continental infantry by this handful of brave men" [see Note 6].

Tarleton's Charge. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11 = British Cavalry.

Tarleton's Charge (click to enlarge).

This description seems basically accurate. Cornet Simons recalled that "It was at this period after the Action that we sustained the greatest loss of Men." Delaware Continental Henry Wells stated that "In this fight I was struck across the left shoulder by one of Tarleton's Troopers, With his Sword with Such Violence, that the colar of my coat, my vest and my Shirt, were each cut through, and the flesh & skin Sleightly scratched and bruised so much so that there was a considerable not or welt on my Sholder for a number of days" [see Note 7].

Success, however, was fleeting. The American cavalry quickly recovered and they sent the British fleeing. Alexander Chesney wrote that we "the remainder [of the British Legion] charged but were repulsed… I was with Tarleton in the charge" [see Note 8]. Mackenzie stated that "the loss sustained was in proportion to the danger of the enterprise, and the whole body was repulsed."

Simons noted that "their Cavalry, who finding they could no longer Keep Everhart a Prisoner, Shot him with a Pistol, in the head, over one of his eyes, (I cannot remember particularly which) being then intermixed with the enemy, Everhart pointed out to me the man who shot him, and on whom a just Retaliation was exercised, and who by my order, was instantly Shot, and his horse as well as I can recollect, was given to Everhart, whom I ordered in the rear to the Surgeons" [see again Note 5].

Once again, Tarleton escaped capture [see Note 9]. Henry Wells recalled that "Col. Tarleton was hard run by a small detachment of American horse and barely escaped being taken prisoner. It was generally agreed in the Camp that Tarleton could easily have been shot by those in pursuit of him, but their object was to take him alive."

The immediate American pursuit was determined, but disorganized. This led to one more confrontation between the British and American cavalry.

Howard learned that "In the pursuit he [William Washington] had got a head of his men, perhaps 30 yards. Three of the british officers observing this wheeled about and made a charge at him. The officer on his right was raising his arm to cut at him when a sargent came up and made a stroke at this officer which disabled his arm.--The officer on the left at the same moment was preparing to make a stroke at him when a boy, a waiter, who had not the strength to wield a sword, drew his pistol and shot and wounded this officer, which disabled him. The third person, who Washington thinks was Tarleton, made a thrust at him which he parryed. This person then retreated 10 or 12 steps and wheeled about and fired a pistol which wounded Washington's horse [see Note 10].

Pursuit. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11 = British Cavalry.

Pursuit (click to enlarge).

Notes:

1. But not all. As noted previously (Cowpens in Miniature 23), a part of the mounted militia was attempting to capture the British baggage train. Cornet Simons believed that some of the Continental dragoons were still mopping up the scattered British infantry. He wrote to Washington that "Lt Bell" had "taken off with him in pursuit of the Enemy, on our left nearly a fourth part of your Regt."

At least part (and maybe most) of the mounted militia was with Washington at this time. Manual McConnell stated in his pension application that he was a member of "Capt. McCall's company… attached to the command of Col. Washington." He claimed that "he was with or not far behind Col. Washington when he chased Col. Tarlton so close after the battle."

2. Although Pickens and Jackson differed as to who captured McArthur, they agreed on this point. Jackson wrote to Morgan that I had "the honor of introducing Maj. McArthur [to you]."

3. Pickens’ statement is important in establishing the timing of this last encounter of the British and American cavalry. That Washington was still on the battlefield strongly suggests that this fight occurred after the 71st had surrendered. Indications that the Delaware Continentals were also a part of Washington’s pursuit force, places the surrender of the 71st (in which the Delawareans participated), before this fight with Tarleton. In Simons account, Washington began "pursuit of their Cavalry," "immediately after Securing the Prisoners."

4. Benson Lossing, a mid-19th Century visitor of the battlefield, wrote that the British infantry "retreated along the Mill gap road [i.e., the Green River Road] to the place near Scruggs's... then covered with an open wood like the ground where the conflict commenced. There the battle ended and the pursuit was relinquished. It was near the northern border of that present open field that Washington and Tarleton had a personal conflict." He also wrote that "The battle ended within a quarter of a mile of Scruggs's." Scrugg's farm was not present at the time of the battle. It's future location was near the road, close to the right edge of the battlefield map. I show Tarleton's charge occurring close to 1/2 mile from Scrugg's farm. Although not shown (because of the small numbers involve), I envision the final brush between Washington and (allegedly) Tarleton to have occurred at a location about midway between the site of Tarleton's charge and the eastern edge of the battlefield.

5. Tarleton said there were 14 officers. Mackenzie indicated that the 17th Light Dragoons had two officers; my system for estimating British strength at the battle (see Cowpens in Miniature 2) yielded 12 officers for the British Legion dragoons. Therefore, it’s possible that all of the British Legion dragoon and 17th Light Dragoon officers were present. Although seemingly excluded, it’s possible that some mounted infantry officers were also present.

Tarleton generally gave round numbers for his strength, so it’s unlikely that exactly 40 troopers were with him, as he claimed. Mackenzie said that the number was something less than 50 and identified them as the 17th Light Dragoons. In view of their heavy losses earlier in the battle (see Cowpens in Miniature 20), they could not have mustered close to 40 or 50 men. Some rank and file of the British Legion must have been present. Their identity is unknown, although Simons’ account implicates that the men holding Sergeant Everhart a prisoner were present (see Cowpens in Miniature 7 regarding his capture). This suggests either the British vanguard or a provost guard had been left in the rear when the British Legion reserve was ordered up. This group is repeatedly depicted on the battlefield maps I’ve prepared.

6. Howard’s account was written in order to correct mischaracterizations of the battle present in William Johnson’s account (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1). Howard seems to have regarded Tarleton’s description as basically accurate (as do I), although Howard wrote that on this point, Tarleton was in error. "Tarleton says that 14 officers & 40 men charged Washington's horse and drove them back to the [Continentals] ... This is not correct. This affair checked Washington's pursuit, but he did not fall back." If Howard meant only that Washington did not fall back to where Howard, the militia, and the remainder of the Continentals were guarding the prisoners, then this statement is not problematic. Tarleton’s version seems to be confirmed by Delaware Continental Henry Wells.

7. He’s referring to the battle in general and not specifically this exchange, but this is the most likely timing. Other Delaware Continentals indicated they joined with Washington in the pursuit. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson wrote "We followed them ten miles but not being able to Come up With them Returned back to the field of Battle that night and lay amongst the Dead & Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work." Sergeant-Major William Seymour wrote "our men pursuing them for the distance of twelve miles." Neither of these statements, however, mentions the cavalry action at the beginning of the pursuit.

8. This is the most logical event that Chesney is referring to. However, when the passage is read in context, Chesney seems to be referring to some charge that occurred at the beginning of the American counterattack (See Alexander Chesney's Rivulet for the full text of his statement). While Chesney should be regarded as an excellent source, I did not make the most direct interpretation of his account because such a claim would be in contrast with a number of other participant accounts.

It should be noted Tarleton, and the band with him, might not have witnessed the surrender of the 71st Foot because of the intervening ridge. Chesney may have learned about their surrender later and wrongly concluded that the 71st surrendered after the unsuccessful final cavalry fight. The official British report of the battle claimed that "The Loss of our Cavalry is inconsiderable, but I fear, about 400 of the Infantry are either killed or wounded, or taken." This claim was disingenuous. The "400 of the Infantry" just about covers the killed, wounded, and captured that Tarleton could likely see from his final position of the battlefield. The loss sustained by the 71st (which was total) could at least have been surmised.

9. This is in reference to his escaping being captured with Major McArthur and the 71st Foot (see Cowpens in Miniature 22).

10. David Stewart related a muddled version of this same episode. In his telling, Cornet Patterson of the 17th Light Dragoons was the officer wounded by Washington’s "waiter." Continental dragoon James Kelly described a second-hand version of this episode in his pension application.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Pickens, Howard, and Anderson, among others.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

The Journal of Alexander Chesney.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Manual McConnell (.pdf file).

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Jackson's letters.

Benson John Lossing's 1860 Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of James Kelly (.pdf file).

Related: The British Legion, The American Cavalry - Part 1, 17th Light Dragoons

Cowpens in Miniature 20

Part 20: Washington and Howard Charge

Previous: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Next: Collapse

Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington was stationed, with his dragoons, in rear of the American main line during the battle. His cavalry was the Americans’ last line of defense, and like his counterpart, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, he used his cavalry sparingly [see Note 1]. Washington sent mounted militia forward at the beginning of the battle to cover the retreat of the militia, but then had them return to a position in reserve [see Note 2]. When Ogilvie charged, he sent forward a portion of his dragoons to prevent the American right from being wholly swept away, but still he did not commit his entire force. However, when the Continental infantry began to retreat, he was left with no alternative than to bring his remaining dragoons forward and use them to guard against a rout of the American center. With his last dragoons deployed, no force was left to counter the charge of the 17th light dragoons. Mounted militiaman Jeremiah Dial saw "the British broke through the leftwing of the Malitia" (i.e., Triplett’s Virginians) and charge into the American rear. There was, however, no immediate relief for those that were attacked.

William Moultrie stated in his postwar history that "Colonel Washington… [was] close to the rear of the second line [i.e., the Continentals] with his cavalry, and spoke to Colonel Howard, 'that if he would rally his men, and charge the enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry that were got among our militia in the rear' [see Note 3]."

Washington at this moment may also have ordered the recall of the detachment of dragoons that had driven off Ogilvie’s company [see Note 4].

Moments later, Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard ordered the retreating Continentals to halt, about face, and deliver a fatal volley into the astonished British.

Both Howard and Washington then ordered charges, respectively, against the British infantry and cavalry.

The volleys Howard’s Continentals delivered at close range brought down many of the British infantry and left the rest reeling. According to Howard, "While [the British were] in this confusion, I ordered a charge with the bayonet, which order was obeyed with great alacrity."

This was also the experience of Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals. He recorded in his journal that we "Charged them home. They not expecting any Such thing put them in Such Confusion that We Were in amongst them With the Bayonets Which Caused them to give ground."

Similarly, Henry Lee stated that "Howard seized the happy moment, and followed his advantage with the bayonet. This decisive step gave us the day. The reserve [i.e., the 71st Foot] having been brought near the line, shared in the destruction of our fire, and presented no rallying point to the fugitives.

Meanwhile, according to Howard, "Washington observing... [the British cavalry] charged them. As well as I can recollect this charge was made at the same moment that I charged the infantry." Anderson made the same observation in his journal "At the Same time that We Charged, Col. Washington Charged the horse Which Soon gave Way" [see Note 5].

In making this charge, according to Howard, Washington "moved to the left from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse" [see Note 6].

Within moments they passed by elements of the shattered right wing of the main line [see Note 7] and into the ranks of the 17th Light Dragoons.

Washington and Howard Charge. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Cornet James Simons, one of Washington’s cavalrymen, wrote in a letter to William Washington that "your first charge was made on the enemy's Cavalry, (who were cutting down our Militia) and when, after a smart Action, you instantly defeated, leaving in the course of ten minutes 18 of their brave 17th Dragoons dead on the spot."

Ten minutes was probably too long of a duration for this action. Private James Collins remembered that "in a few moments, Col. Washington's cavalry was among them, like a whirlwind, and the poor fellows began to kneel from their horses, without being able to remount. The shock was so sudden and violent, they could not stand it, and immediately betook themselves to flight." Howard wrote that Colonel Washington charged the enemy's cavalry, who were cutting down our militia, and soon drove them off."

The American Counterattack. (two views; click to enlarge). The Continental infantry (under Howard) charge into the heart of the British line. Meanwhile, the American cavalry (under Washington) relieve the militia from the assault of the 17th Light Dragoons.

As the British dragoons retreated, the American cavalry stormed after them in close pursuit. For the British dragoons, according to Collins, "there was no time to rally, and they appeared to be as hard to stop as a drove of wild Choctaw steers, going to a Pennsylvania market. In a few moments the clashing of swords was out of hearing and quickly out of sight." Less colorfully, Howard commented that Washington "never lost sight of them until they abandoned the ground" [see Note 8].

Notes:

1. In eighteenth century Western-style warfare, the commander that committed his reserves last was often the one that emerged victorious. Tarleton used a part of his mounted force in a limited capacity during the middle phase of the battle, while holding back a large reserve. Washington deployed a large portion of his force on both occassions, but this seems chiefly to reflect the extremity of the circumstances. That the Americans had to fully commit their cavalry before the British might have been disastrous to them. Major George Hanger commented years later that the defeat of Ogilvie (and by extension, Nettles too) was inconsequential compared to Tarleton’s inability to make good use of his reserve late in the battle.

2. Private Thomas Young described the mounted militiamen being used in this capacity. See The American Cavalry - Part 2 for details on the initial deployment of the American cavalry. Whether Washington took the initiative in ordering the mounted militia forward or whether the order originated with Morgan is unknown.

3. It is difficult to discern exactly who did what at this critical point in the battle. Moultrie’s statement indicates Washington was the key actor in rallying the Continentals, while the accounts by Morgan and Howard each chiefly credit themselves.

4. Thomas Young recalled that "At this moment the bugle sounded. We about half formed and making a sort of circuit at full speed, came up in the rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen. At this moment Col. Howard gave the word "charge bayonets!" and the day was ours."

One reading of this statement is that the group of American dragoons that had driven off Ogilvie charged around the vulnerable left flank of the British line and passed into the ground behind the 71st Foot. I regard Young as a trustworthy source and have put a great deal of reliance on his account elsewhere, but this part of his statement is difficult to reconcile. Young’s account suggests that his small group of dragoons were the first to counterattack when other sources give that honor to Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard’s Continentals. He also seemingly places his small group of dragoons in an unlikely position between the British infantry and the British cavalry reserve before either had been beaten. The experience of the 71st Foot was described in detail by David Stewart and Roderick Mackenzie, but neither mention such a charge; nor too did other American cavalrymen.

An alternative interpretation is that Washington recalled the dragoons on his right ("the bugle sounded"), these cavalry then followed in the wake of Washington’s own charge, moving behind the Continentals from the right side of the battlefield to the left ("making a sort of circuit at full speed") and then joined with Washington in the charge that helped shatter the British left and broke into the British rear (we "came up in the rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen"). This reading is not problematic so long as "this moment" when "Col. Howard gave the word "charge bayonets!"" preceded the moment when the dragoons "came up in the rear of the British line."

5. Respected histories of the battle, such as those by Edwin Bearss and Lawrence Babits, place Washington’s charge against the British cavalry soon after the militia retreated and well before the Continentals counterattacked. That the charges occurred at the same time is strongly indicated by Howard and Anderson. Another participant, Robert Long, recalled that "Col. Washington charged them with his cavalry; at the same time our infantry charged the British with the bayonet." Henry Lee’s history of the battle stated that "part of the enemy's cavalry, having gained our rear, fell on that portion of the militia who had retired to their horses. Washington struck at them with his dragoons, and drove them before him. Thus, by simultaneous efforts, the infantry and cavalry of the enemy routed."

6. That Washington was charging a British cavalry force to his left (and not Ogilvie’s dragoons, which had been to his right) is indicated in several accounts. Daniel Morgan’s report of the battle stated that "Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that the Tarleton was cutting down our riflemen on the left, pushed forward, and charged them." Private Jeremiah Dial stated in his pension application that "Washington's Cavalry with whom this applicant fought during the engagement were stationed in the rear of Morgan's forces and when the British broke through the leftwing of the Malitia Washington’s cavalry made an attack upon them and defeated them with considerable loss."

Howard also emphasized that the charge was made toward the American rear, rather than towards the British infantry: "Washington's charge had no connexion with mine as his movement was to the rear in a quite different direction."

7. These men, according to the present account of the battle, first broke when Ogilvie charged, and, in retreating for their horses, fell in the path of Nettles’ charge. William Neel of Captain Patrick Buchanan’s company recalled seeing that, "the South Carolina mounted militia," who he had earlier denigrated (see Cowpens in Miniature 14) had "rallied and assisted to complete the victory." Captain Henry Connelly remarked that "we was fortunately relieved by Washingtons legion that hastened to our assistance."

8. François-Jean de Chastellux asked Morgan "how Tarleton's cavalry were employed during the engagement." He learned that "whilst the infantry were engaged, they endeavoured to turn the flanks of General Morgan's army, but were kept in awe by some riflemen, and by the American horse detached by Colonel Washington, to support them, in two little squadrons." The manner in which I have depicted the charges by Ogilvie and Nettles as well as their defeat by the American militia and cavalry is consistent with this description.

Sources:

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Dial (.pdf file).

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, Anderson, Collins, and Young, among others.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Hanger's and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf file).

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

Related: The Fatal Moment, The American Cavalry - Part 1, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 7

Part 7: Initial Contact
Previous: In the Night

Next: The Americans Deploy

According to Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, the British night march was difficult. “The ground which the Americans had passed… [was] much intersected by creeks and ravines.” Tarleton was also wary of encountering an ambush in the darkness, “the march of the British troops during the darkness was exceedingly slow [see Note 1], on account of the time employed in examining the front and flanks as they proceeded.”

At least two groups of Americans were deployed in front of the American encampment. Closest to the British was scouts, probably operating in small groups. There were at least 30 men detached for this service. Colonel Thomas Brandon and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck operated with them as well, at least for a time.

The other group was comprised of vedettes that would alert the Americans to the approach of the British. These were placed perhaps at a distance of 2 or 3 miles in front of the American camp. They were close enough that the Americans would hear their guns; yet distant enough to allow the Americans time to get up, grab their arms, and assemble before the British reached their camp.

After Tarleton began his march, Colonel Thomas Brandon and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck returned to the Americans’ encampment. The two officers perhaps first detailed the advanced scouts to harass the British during their march. After returning to camp they most likely conferred with Morgan. They were later able to rejoin the balance of their commands and get some rest [see Note 2].

After Brandon and Roebuck’s return, a fresh batch of observers was dispatched to monitor the British advance. . According to Cornet Simons, “you [Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington] selected Sergeant [Lawrence] Everhart from your Regiment and ten men, whom you sent to reconnoitre Lt. Colonel Tarletons Army" [see Note 3].

Around this time, Tarleton recalled, “Thickelle [Thicketty] creek was passed.” Tarleton then dispatched an “advanced guard of cavalry… to the front.” Like Everhart’s Continentals, this too was a select group. According to Simons, Tarleton’s “advanced guard… were mounted as we understood, and believed, on some of the fleetest race horses which he had impressed from their owners in this Country” [see Note 4].

In the grey light of early morning, the two mounted forces approached each other. Once visual contact was made, the smaller American dragoons turned and raced towards Morgan’s encampment.

Tarleton's Advance Guard Pursues the American Patrol [see Note 5].

According to Tarleton, “The enemy's patrole… was pursued and overtaken.” Simons provided more detail. He said that the British were able “to take Serjeant Everhart and one of the men-but the other, ten men returned, and gave you [Washington] information of the approach of the enemy.” Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie of the 71st Foot also confirmed that two prisoners were taken: [Around] day light… the enemy were discovered in front. Two of their vedettes were taken soon after” [see Note 6].

Sergeant Everhart was one of the two captured dragoons. He explained that his “horse being shot he was captured early in the morning… our army at this point of time being perhaps three miles in the rear.”

Everhart and the other prisoner were sent back to the British column (about 2 miles away) where Tarleton preceded to interview them. Everhart noted that his captor was “Quarter Master Wade of the British Army with whom he had some previous acquaintance & by him [he was] taken to Col Tarlton.” According to Mackenzie, “these [two men] gave information that General Morgan had halted, and prepared for action.”

Everhart recalled the specifics of his interview. “Dismounting from his horse, that officer [Tarleton] asked the petitioner [Everhart]… if he expected Mr. Washington & Mr. Morgan would fight him that day. Yes if they can keep together only two hundred men was the reply. Then he said it would be another Gates' defeat [see Note 7]. I hope to God it will be another Tarlton's defeat said this petitioner. I am Col. Tarlton, Sir. And I am Sergeant Everhart. My wounds were bleeding at this time [see Note 8] but soon afterwards were dressed by the surgeon. I received from the enemy great kindness.”

Although Everhart’s statement was more-or-less truthful, Tarleton persisted in believing that the Americans were retreating through the night to avoid battle. However, he felt sure at least that his quarry was near. Therefore, Tarleton ordered, “Two troops of dragoons [see Note 9], under Captain Ogilvie, of the legion… to reinforce the advanced guard, and to harass the rear of the enemy.” He hoped Ogilvie’s detachment would delay the American retreat and force them to stand and fight.

Notes:

1. Mackenzie claimed that “The pursuit… was rapidly continued through marshes and broken ground.” The difference in Mackenzie’s wording was intended to emphasize the heroism of the British soldiery (and implicitly to demonstrate that Tarleton alone was responsible for the British defeat).

2. Lawrence Babits, in A Devil of a Whipping, described how small parties of militiamen seem to have harassed the British during their march. According to Captain Samuel Otterson, many of the scouts missed the battle; South Carolina militiaman Thomas Young's account places Brandon at the battle.

3. Morgan may have feared that he would either not get accurate information from the militia scouts or no information at all if Tarleton’s dragoons swept down on them and made them prisoners. Morgan knew Tarleton was approaching. His greatest fear at this point was most likely whether or not Tarleton would turn away from the direct approach towards his camp and approach from an unexpected direction.

The transcription of Simon's leter in Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution indicates that the patrol consisted of "Sergeant Everheart" and "thirteen men."

4. Given that the horses were handpicked for this important duty it may be that the men were, too. Babits, however, speculated that this was Captain Hovenden’s company of British Legion dragoons. Babits identified (page 179, n. 50) this “Quarter Master Wade” with Hovenden's company, but cited Tarleton's memoir, which does not contain this information. I have not inspected the muster rolls. Balch claimed that Wade was killed during the battle.

5. At a 1:20 ratio, a single miniature can represent between 10 and 29 men. The American patrol, according to Simons, consisted of 11 men. The strength of the British advance guard is unknown.

6. South Carolina Thomas Young described a different version of what was apparently the same episode. “Three of Washington's dragoons were out on a scout, when they came almost in contact with the advanced guard of the British army; they wheeled, and were pursued almost into camp. Two got in safely; one poor fellow, whose horse fell down, was taken prisoner.”

7. A reference to the American defeat at the battle of Camden.

8. According to Balch, Everhart's left hand was repeatedly cut by a dragoon's sabre. Balch described the initial contact between the British and Americans as "a severe and bloody contest."

9. Although not specifically identified, the two troops were likely Captain David Ogilvie’s own troop of British Legion dragoons and Lieutenant Henry Nettles’ troop of 17th Light Dragoons.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has transcriptions of Tarleton's account and Mackenzie's Strictures.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Tarleton, Mackenzie, Simons, Everhart, and Young.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson (.pdf).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington, and extensive information on Sergeant Everhart. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Related: The British Legion, The American Cavalry - Part 1, The American Cavalry - Part 2

British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2

Last time, I noted that the British commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, deployed a troop of cavalry on either end of his line of infantry at the beginning of the battle. I also argued that both of these troops were used to assail the two flanks of the American line. I described, in particular, the attack of Captain David Ogilvie's British Legion dragoons against the right wing of the American main line.

The other British cavalry charge was made by Lieutenant Henry Nettles and the 17th Light Dragoons.

Whereas Ogilvie's charge was made at an early point in the British attack on the American main line, Nettles' attack occurred after the American Continentals had begun to retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, who commanded the Continentals, wrote that, “…about the time of our retreat, a large body of british cavalry passes round my left flank and pursued the flying militia to their horses."

This force would have been Nettles' 17th Light Dragoons, which had been stationed on the British right.

Howard, like Major McJunkin, whom I quoted in my last post, believed that the retreating front-line militia was the target of Nettles' attack. However, this may be another case in which the encounter between the British dragoons and the reforming front-line infantry was accidental. South Carolina militiaman Jeremiah Dial stated that the British cavalry "broke through the leftwing of the Malitia," which echoes the statements made about the attack that broke the right wing (see: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses). Private Isaac Way, who was on the left wing of the main line (Triplett's Virginians), evidently was in the line of this charge. He claimed that he “was severely wounded on the side, back, arms, head and in the face by the cut of the sword of a British dragoon.”

There is evidence that around the time of Nettles' charge, at least some of the American cavalry was employed to assist Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard in halting the Continentals during their accidental retreat.

Brigadier-General William Moultrie, who obtained his information second-hand, wrote, “…the second [main] line began to give way. Colonel Washington [i.e., Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington of the American 3rd light dragoons] perceiving this, immediately rode up close to the rear of the second line with his cavalry, and spoke to Colonel Howard, ‘that if he would rally his men, and charge the enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry that were got among our militia in the rear.' Colonel Washington, riding up so close to the rear of our second line stopped the British for a moment, which gave time to Colonel Howard to rally his men, and charge with fixed bayonets… [then] Colonel Washington charged the enemy's cavalry, who were cutting down our militia, and soon drove them off.” (book link)

Howard's account reinforces this point: "Washington observing this [i.e., the British cavalry attack] charged them. As well as I can recollect this charge was made at the same moment that I charged the [British] infantry, for as soon as we got among the enemy & were making prisoners I observed the enemy's cavalry retreating the way the[y] had advanced, by our left flank, and Washington in pursuit of them and he followed them some distance--You will observe by this statement that Washington's charge had no connexion with mine as his movement was to the rear in a quite different direction.”

Washington’s charge “to the rear” was from immediately behind the Continentals to the area in the left rear of the main line where the militia were under attack. Howard repeated this idea in another place in the same letter: “He [Washington] moved to the left from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse.”

Nettles' Attack. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line (Triplett's former company has been broken, but the rest of the line is intact), 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (and parts of the right wing, see: Flight of the Militia - Part 3; both groups are reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Howard.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Dial (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Isaac Way (.pdf file).

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Related: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, 17th Light Dragoons, The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses

The American Cavalry at Cowpens - Part 1

[Minor edits 12/28/09]

Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan commanded a mixed force of Continentals and militia at the battle of Cowpens. The majority of these men fought on foot. However, a number of his men fought on horseback, and these men played a critical role in the American victory. In this post I concentrate on the American cavalry.

Varying estimates have been provided as to the number of Continental dragoons present during the battle. The number stated by different sources includes:

• 50 - Brigadier-General Edward Stevens (in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in the Jefferson Papers; source not online).
• 60 - Major-General François-Jean de Chastellux.
• 70 - Private Benjamin Copeland of the American 3rd light dragoons; mounted militiaman Thomas Young
• 75 - Brigadier-General William Moultrie.
• 80 - Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, U.S. Congressional Resolution of March 8, 1781.

Perhaps the most definite statement appeared in the pension application of North Carolina rifleman Josiah Martin, who stated that “Col. Washington was there with his company of Cavalry which amounted to 72 as counted by the applicant the day before the battle.”

The men in Washington's command appears to have been derived from several sources. Washington himself was an officer in the 3rd Light Dragoons, and most of the Continental cavalry at the Cowpens were from this regiment as well. However, the Americans had few properly equipped dragoons in the south at this period. Lawrence Babits, in A Devil of a Whipping, pointed out that pension applications place some men of the 1st Light Dragoons and Virginia State Dragoons were attached to Washington's regiment as well. The pension application of James Busby indicates that Washington may also have had some veterans of Pulaski's and Armand's legions.

Presumably, Josiah Martin's 72 men includes all of 1st and 3rd Light Dragoons, and perhaps also whatever number of uniformed Virginia State Dragoons were present. It's possible that the reason why some sources stated that there were fewer than 70 men with Washington is that they were counting only the number of men from the 3rd Light Dragoons present at the battle.

General Morgan understood that this small mounted force was insufficient to cope with the approximately 300 mounted men available to his British counterpart. Therefore, at the end of December he wrote General Greene to say that, "I have sent for one hundred swords, which I intend to put into the hands of expert riflemen, to be mounted and incorporated with Lieut. Col. Washington's corps.” Whether he actually received 100 swords is unknown. The number of militia dragoons employed at the Cowpens appears to have been a considerably smaller number. According to Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina, “On the night before the battle forty-five militia soldiers were enrolled as dragoons and placed under the command of Col. McCall and annexed to Washington's cavalry." McJunkin's statement confirmed that these were the "expert riflemen" that Morgan was looking for. "These officers and men, in the respective commands, were far from being tyros in the art of war. They were marksmen and had generally been in the war from the commencement.”

American Cavalry at Cowpens. Washington's regulars are on the left; the mounted militia are on the right. The 3rd Light Dragoons are believed to have worn a white uniform with blue facings. The blue-coated dragoon represents other Continental dragoons and/or state troops attached to Washington's command.

Sources:

François-Jean de Chastellux. (1787). Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of James Busby (.pdf).

For Joseph McJunkin's accounts of the battle, see:

• James Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.
• Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. (.pdf file).

John Moncure's The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage has a transcription of the statements by Copeland, Young, Martin, and McJunkin.

William Moultrie. (1802). Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Theodorus Bailey Myers. (1881). Cowpens Papers (Has the number by Morgan and a copy of the U.S. Congressional Resolution).

Susan K. Zimmerman and R. Neil Vance transcribed the pension application of Josiah Martin (.pdf).

The re-created 3rd Light Dragoons depicts the regiment as it appeared during the Southern Campaign.