Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (15)

This is the final entry in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12, Part 13, Part 14.

In the “separate battle” at Guilford Courthouse, British forces attacking Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s flank corps found their flank and rear imperiled by the “Rockbridge Rifles” of Edward Stevens’ brigade of Virginia militia [Part 14].

The British drew men away from their primary attack to counter the Virginians, but they found the riflemen difficult to dislodge. Rifleman Andrew Wiley later remembered, “the British forces… were swept off [a ridge] by the Virginia Riflemen, but formed again and again”. [1]

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The model battlefield as the battle winds down (click to enlarge). The Americans first line was behind the fields near the bottom of the image, the second line was in the woods in the center, and the third line was at the top (where miniature redcoats can be seen driving back the American Continentals). The green-coated British Legion cavalry are massed behind the infantry. The “separate battle” is occurring along the right edge of the image.

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Meanwhile, Lee attempted to break off the action and join the Continentals on the third line. In his words:

Lee dispensed with his cavalry, heretofore held in the rear to cover retreat in case of disaster, ordering it to close with the left of the continental line, and there to act until it should receive further orders. Upon [Regiment von] Bose... [his troops] now turned with increased animation and with confidence of success. [2]

Lee’s men drove the Guardsmen and Hessians back a little ways. At that point:

Every obstacle now removed, Lee pressed forward... and joined his horse close by Guilford court-house.

However, by the time Lee’s troops reached the courthouse area, the battle for the third line was over. Lee then followed the rest of the army on its retreat.

After Lee retreated, the Rockbridge Rifles were the only sizable group of Americans left on the battlefield (Lee, perhaps, had been unaware of their presence). The Rifles soon were imperiled. At about the same time that Lee left the fight, British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton was dispatched to aid the Hessians and Guardsmen with part of his British Legion cavalry. Tarleton recalled that en route:

[they] found officers and men of both corps wounded, and in possession of the enemy: The prisoners were quickly rescued from the hands of their captors, and the dragoons… [continued on] without delay. As soon as the cavalry arrived, the guards and the Hessians were directed to fire a volley upon the largest party of the militia, and, under the cover of the smoke, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton doubled round the right flank of the guards, and charged the Americans with considerable effect. The enemy gave way on all sides, and were routed with confusion and loss. [2]

Samuel Houston of the Rockbridge Rifles recalled running for his life from the charging horsemen: “we were obliged to run, and many were sore chased, and some cut down.” [3]

Houston and a number of other riflemen eventually found each other and made their way towards the American encampment.

Darkness and rainfall halted the movement of both armies. Houston’s party, which had several wounded men in it, spent a miserable night in the woods:

all being almost wearied out, we… encamped, where, through darkness and rain, and want of provisions we were in distress. Some parched a little corn. We stretched blankets to shelter some of us from the rain.

The British army encamped on the battlefield. Commissary General Charles Stedman recalled that:

The night… was remarkable for its darkness, accompanied with rain, which fell in torrents…. The cries of the wounded and dying who remained on the field of action during the night exceed all description. Such a complicated scene of horror and distress, it is hoped, for the sake of humanity, rarely occurs, even in a military life. [4]

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British Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis had been victorious at the battle of Guilford Courthouse as a victory, but only in a very narrow sense. He had driven the Americans from field, but more than 1 in 4 of his men were killed or wounded in the process. He also failed to achieve his primary objective – restoration of a favorable strategic situation in the southern theater through the destruction of the American army.

American Major-General Nathanael Greene’s army, however, had been greatly damaged. Many of his Continentals had been killed or wounded, and much of his militia was scattered. Some of the North Carolina militia simply went home after the battle; some left out of disgust with what they felt was poor leadership by their commanders.

Greene’s situation was in a sense the opposite of that of Cornwallis. He had been unsuccessful on the tactical level (his defense-in-depth had not stopped the British attack), but he was closer than before to achieving his strategic objectives. Cornwallis gave up his pursuit of Greene’s army and moved eastward where he could be supplied. That move gave Greene an open road into South Carolina, and he soon undertook the reconquest of that state.

When Greene moved south, he expected Cornwallis would abandon North Carolina and try to defend British holdings in South Carolina. Instead, Cornwallis, after being resupplied, moved north into Virginia.

Cornwallis later explained that a retreat into South Carolina would have been difficult to undertake and would further weaken his army. Moreover, he suspected that the fight for control of the South Carolina backcountry would be over before his troops arrived. Cornwallis knew that Virginia was Greene’s main source of men and supplies. He reasoned that no action could better preserve British holdings in the south than taking Virginia out of the war. Furthermore, Virginia was vulnerable: its fine ports and rich plantations were defended by little more than militia.

Neither commander got exactly what he wanted from these moves. Greene had considerable trouble driving the British from the South Carolina backcountry; the campaign in this quarter dragged on for months. Cornwallis had an easy and successful campaign when he first arrived in Virginia, but he was unable to stop Greene’s activity in South Carolina. Furthermore, American resistance in Virginia grew stronger with time. By late summer, 1781, Cornwallis’ operations were largely confined to the coast, and in October his army was besieged and forced to surrender at Yorktown.

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Notes:

1. Pension application of Andrew Wiley.

2. Lee's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

3. Houston's account appears in William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia....

4. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (13)

This is Part 13 in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12.

At the battle of Guilford Courthouse, British units reached the Americans’ third and final defensive line at different times and attacked in a piecemeal fashion. First Lieutenant-Colonel James Webster led an attack against the American right that was bloodily repulsed (Part 9). Then, the 2nd Battalion of Guards attacked the American left and defeated the troops opposed to them (Part 10). The Guards’ success, however, was short-lived; they were soon mauled made by counterattacking American infantry and cavalry (the 1st Maryland Regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s dragoons; Part 12).

Although these attacks were unsuccessful, the threat they posed was sufficiently great that the American commander, Major-General Nathanael Greene, ordered his army to retreat (Part 11).

The setbacks also did not deter the British from continuing their attacks. The 71st Regiment reached the Guilford Courthouse building more or less opposed, where they threatened the flank and rear of the 1st Maryland Regiment. Webster’s group advanced again and attacked the 2nd Virginia Regiment. Finally, the 23rd Regiment of Foot and the remnants of the Guards began to advance once more.

The American forces still on the field could not hope to repel all of these threats.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard was with the 1st Maryland Regiment, and recalled:

I found myself in the cleared ground, and saw the seventy-first regiment near the courthouse, and other columns of the enemy appearing in different directions. Washington's horse having gone off, I found it necessary to retire, which I did leisurely; but many of the guards who were lying on the ground, and who we supposed were wounded, got up and fired at us as we retired. [1]

Then, Webster’s men advanced again and attacked the 2nd Virginia Regiment.

Lewis Griffin of the 2nd Virginia saw his brigade commander get wounded in this clash:

General [Isaac] Huger was wounded in the right hand in my view. I saw him with his Sword in his hand raised above his head encouraging his men when a shot penetrated his hand and his Sword fell in his lap, which he caught up with his left, drew from his pocket a handkerchief, tied up his hand, and moved on, not long after this occurrence we were ordered to retreat. [2]

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At top, the 33rd Regiment of Foot advances against the 2nd Virginia Regiment (click to enlarge). At lower left, the 1st Maryland Regiment holds the open ground; at lower right, the 71st Foot has reached the courthouse building (not shown).

Another view of the above. At bottom and lower left: The 23rd Foot and remnants of the Guards assemble on the edge of the open ground near three-pounders of the Royal Artillery. The 2nd Virginia Regiment is represented by the troops around the red and white flag; the 1st Maryland by the troops around the blue flag.

Another view of the above. In the foreground, the last of the North Carolina militia retreat along the Reedy Fork Road. In the background, the 23rd Foot prepares to advance.

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Finally, the 23rd Regiment of Foot and the remnants of the Guards advanced once more.

According to Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, “the two 6-pounders [of Singleton’s battery] once more fell into our hands; two ammunition-wagons and two other 6-pounders [Finley’s battery], being all the artillery they had in the field, were likewise taken… The 23rd and 71st regiments, with part of the cavalry, were ordered to pursue”. [3]

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At right, the 1st Maryland Regiment retreats along the Reedy Fork Road, while the British Guards, the 23rd, 33rd, and 71st Regiments seize the American artillery.

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The exhausted 23rd and 71st regiments did not advance very far, but the British cavalry thundered down the road after the retreating Continentals. They soon received a check from some troops of the 1st Virginia Regiment, who were acting as rearguard. According to Henry Ingle:

on our retreat we went about 3 quarters of a mile… got into a thicket we had not been there but a little while until we spied the British Light Horse coming through the lane full speed when they got within about 40 yards we stepped out in an open place and fired upon them and there was a dreadful slaughter again of Light horse men &c. [4]

Greene wrote, in concluding his report:

General Huger was the last that was engaged, and gave the enemy a check. We retreated in good order to the Reedy Fork river; and crossed at the ford, about three miles from the field of action, and then halted, and drew up the troops, until we collected most of the stragglers. We lost our artillery, and two ammunition wagons, the greater part of the horses being killed before the retreat began, and it being impossible to move the pieces but along the great road. After collecting our stragglers, we retired… ten miles distant from Guilford. [3]

But the battle was not quite over yet. South of the American third line, a separate battle continued between American riflemen and light infantry and Hessian infantry and British guardsmen.

Notes:

1. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

2. Pension application of Lewis Griffin, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. Cornwallis' and Greene's accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

4. Pension application of Henry Ingle, transcribed by Will Graves.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (12)

This is Part 12 in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11.

The 2nd Battalion of Guards was one of the first British units to reach the American third line. They attacked and quickly defeated the 2nd Maryland Regiment. In their pursuit of this regiment, the Guards then captured a battery of guns and gained the American flank and rear (Part 10). This success on their part was short-lived. Moments later they were suddenly counterattacked by the 1st Maryland Regiment and charged by Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s light dragoons.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard of the 1st Maryland Regiment recalled:

Our men gave them some well directed fires, and we then advanced and continued firing. At this time [Colonel John] Gunby's horse was shot… his horse fell upon him, and it was with difficulty he extricated himself. Major [Archibald] Anderson was killed about this time. As we advanced I observed Washington's horse, and as their movements were quicker than ours, they first charged and broke the enemy. My men followed very quickly, and we passed through the guards, many of whom had been knocked down by the horse without being much hurt. We took some prisoners, and the whole were in our power. [1]

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee, in his history of the southern campaign, wrote that “Gunby… wheeled to his left upon [the Guards]… Here the action was well fought; each corps manfully struggling for victory; when lieutenant colonel Washington… pressed forward with his cavalry… This combined operation was irresistible… the two field pieces were recovered” and the Guards were “driven back with slaughter”.

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From the third line, looking west (here and below, click to enlarge). In the foreground, the 2nd Battalion of Guards melees with the 1st Maryland and William Washington's light dragoons. In the middle ground, British infantry, artillery, and cavalry approach the third line. In the extreme distance lie casualties from the fighting on the first and second lines.

A view of the third line fighting looking south. The 2nd Guards are being mauled at upper left, while other British units approach from the right. At center, the 2nd Virginia Regiment occupies a hillside opposite the 33rd Regiment of Foot.

The 1st Maryland Regiment drives the 2nd Battalion of Guards into the open field.

Washington's light dragoons pursue the remnants of the 2nd Guards.

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Most of the Guards were left prostrate on the field of battle, but a number reached the western edge of the field. Lee believed these men were “saved by the British artillery". He wrote that these guns:

“to stop the ardent pursuit of Washington and Howard, opened upon friends as well as foes; for [Lieutenant-General Charles] Cornwallis, seeing the vigorous advance of these two officers, determined to arrest their progress, though every ball, leveled at them, must pass through the flying guards.” [2]

Neither Howard nor Cornwallis mentioned the British firing on their own men. However, Cornwallis did report that “The enemy's cavalry was soon repulsed by a well-directed fire from two 3-pounders”. [2]

Hundreds of American militia were in the vicinity of this bloody clash, and it seems some were willing to continue the contest. John Wadkins stated that “some of the militia who had stopped at the Court House followed in the rear of the Horse” when they charged the Guards [3]. James Martin claimed that he helped rally “about 500 [men] & was marching them to the Battle Ground” [3].

However, Greene had previously issued orders for the army to retreat (see Part 11), and soon these militia began to move off. Martin noted that when he was approaching the fighting “I met General Stephens [i.e., Brigadier-General Edward Stevens] of [the] Virginia [militia] Corps retreating[.] I asked if the Retreat was by General Greene's Orders[;] he told me it was[.] I then retreated with him” [4].

At the same time that Howard and Washington lost their potential support, the Guards were aided by British troops coming through the woods.

Cornwallis wrote:

the 71st regiment, which, having been impeded by some deep ravine, were now coming out of the wood on the right of the Guards, opposite to the Court-house. By the spirited exertions of Brigadier-General [Charles] O'Hara, though wounded, the second battalion of Guards was soon rallied, and, supported by the grenadiers [of the Guards], returned to the charge with the greatest alacrity. The 23rd regiment arriving at that instant from our left, and Lieut.-Colonel [Banastre] Tarleton having advanced with a part of the cavalry, the enemy were soon put to flight. [2]

Notes:

A challenging aspect of depicting the battle in miniature has involved issues of timing. The sequence of events involving each unit is generally clear, but it’s rather difficult to determine how the events involving one unit corresponded in time with the events involving other units on the battlefield. A source of particular consternation for me has been the retreat of Stevens’ brigade to the third line. In recent posts, Stevens’ men were depicted as reaching the third line only after major combat had begun on the third line (in the second picture, above, they are the block of retreating militia at the top of the image). There are a couple of reasons for this. One is that the 71st Foot is known to have been delayed by rough terrain on its march to the third line (see Cornwallis' quote, above); Stevens’ brigade had to traverse the same ground, and it’s reasonable to think they would have been delayed as well. The other is Martin's pension application (also quoted above), which implies that Stevens’ brigade was still moving towards the courthouse when the Guards were defeated. However, the depiction has ended up looking a bit peculiar – this huge brigade of Virginia militia is shown essentially behind the Guards during the third line fighting. Of course, the alternative would also look a bit odd – having Stevens' brigade reach the third line quickly only to stand idly about while the Guards attacked and routed the 2nd Maryland. (As is, there are already quite a few militia figures shown hovering near the third line, based on Martin’s comment above, and comments by St. George Tucker concerning Lawson’s Virginia brigade [5]). There is, to say the least, room for varying interpretations.

1. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

4. Lee's and Cornwallis' accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium

3. Pension application of John Wadkins.

4. Pension application of James Martin.

5. Letters of St. George Tucker to his wife (from the Magazine of American History).

Is a Hessian Major’s Journal a Key Source on Cowpens?

Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister was in New York when the battle of Cowpens was fought in South Carolina (January 17, 1781). Nevertheless, his journal provides one of the earliest, detailed descriptions of the battle. Baurmeister received his information third-hand; nevertheless his account aligns well in many respects with most first-hand accounts of the battle. For this reason, Baurmeister’s account may help resolve the question of how the British deployed for battle at Cowpens [cf. New Research on Cowpens], and, as described below, how the British force met with defeat.

A traditional view of Cowpens is that the Americans defeated the British by launching a double envelopment: a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the British line. However, as I noted in previous posts, there is considerable evidence that both either British flank was attacked, the British line was first broken in front. Specifically, the American Continentals first overran the center of the British line, and then turned left and right to attack the troops that remained.

How I represented this sequence originally (Spring, 2009):

The American Continentals are attacked in front by three British regiments.

The 71st Foot threatens the right flank of the Continentals; the Continentals make an unintended retreat.

The Continentals then make a surprise counterattack, inflicting devastating casualties on much of the British line.

The ensuing counterattack shatters the British center. The Continentals then divide left and right and attack the remaining regulars (with assistance from American militia and cavalry).

Now let’s take a fresh look at the evidence, beginning with Baurmeister’s treatment of this critical point in the battle:

“The British attack was too furious for the enemy's right wing—nothing withstood the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment. General Morgan withdrew and took another position. Since the Legion did not pursue, Lieutenant Colonel Washington with 240 horse and the Virginia militia under Major Triplett experienced no difficulty in falling between the dispirited Legion and the two British regiments, thus putting the Georgia volunteers in a position to capture the two fieldpieces and charge the rear of the 7th Regiment. Those not killed were captured.”

Some explanation is in order:

• Baurmeister claimed that the British were deployed, from left-to-right, as the 71st Foot (Highlanders), the British Legion infantry, and the 7th Foot.
• Baurmeister’s description of the American units involved in this action is in error, but that is of little consequence to the point under consideration. It was American regulars (chiefly from Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia) that made the counterattack.
• According to Baurmeister, the Americans did not, in fact, overrun the British center before turning left and right: The British Legion failed to attack, leaving the 71st unsupported.
  A comparison of this description with two other sources suggests that Baurmeister’s version may be essentially correct.

A comparison of this description with two other sources suggests that Baurmeister’s version may be essentially correct.

First, here is an excerpt from the journal of Sergeant-Major William Seymour of the 1st Delaware Regiment (who was with the Continentals):

“By this time the enemy advanced and attacked our light infantry [i.e., the Continentals] with both cannon and small arms, where meeting with a very warm reception they then thought to surround our right flank, to prevent which Captain Kirkwood with his company [i.e., the Delaware Continentals] wheeled to the right and attacked their left flank so vigorously that they were soon repulsed, our men advancing on them so very rapidly that they soon gave way. Our left flank advanced at the same time and repulsed their right flank, upon which they retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field, our men pursuing them for the distance of twelve miles, insomuch that all their infantry was killed, wounded, and taken prisoners.”

• Seymour’s account jumps from what is happening in the first image in the sequence above, to what is happening in the fourth and final image. He did not mention the intervening accidental retreat described by a number of others.
• Seymour notably didn’t refer to the Americans attacking and defeating British troops to their immediate front [as is shown in the third image]. Instead, as in Baurmeister’s account, the primary threat is stemming only from the right.
• In Seymour’s account the Continentals were free to divide into two parts and attack either flank of the British line. Seymour explicitly described one part of the Continentals wheeling to their right and attacking the British “left flank” [i.e., the 71st]. In this respect, Seymour’s account matches Baurmeister’s.

Second, here is an excerpt from David Stewart’s (1825) Sketches… of the Highlanders of Scotland.

“…the Highlanders, "who ran in, with characteristic eagerness, desirous to take advantage of the confusion which appeared among the enemy."… [But then the Continentals] threw in a fire upon the 71st when within forty yards of the hostile force. The fire was destructive; nearly one-half of their number fell; and those who remained were so scattered, having run over a space of five hundred yards at full speed, that they could not be united to form a charge with the bayonet, "the mode of attack in which their superiority lay." They were checked; but they did not fall back immediately, probably expecting that the first line and cavalry would push forward to their support. This did not happen; and, after some irregular firing between them and Colonel Howard’s Reserve, the front line of the latter rallied, returned to the field, and pushed forward to the right flank of the Highlanders, who now saw no prospect of support, while their own numbers were diminishing, and the enemy increasing. They began to retire, and at length to run, the first instance of a Highland regiment running from an enemy!!! This retreat struck a panic into those whom they left in the rear, who fled in the greatest confusion: order and command were lost; the rout became general; few of the infantry escaped; and of the cavalry, who put their horses to full speed, not a man was taken.”

• As described by Baurmeister and implied by Seymour, the critical British attack was made solely by the 71st. According to Stewart, it was precisely because this regiment was not supported by the others that the British met with defeat.

A Reinterpretation:

Baurmeister’s account, taken in combination with that of others, suggests that the sequence by which the British met with defeat was different than how I originally described it. A more likely sequence was that when the Americans made their unintended retreat, only the 71st Foot made a serious pursuit. The British Legion infantry advanced either not at all, or only in the most halting manner. Therefore, when the Continentals made their counterattack, the field of action would have looked something like this:

The 71st Foot would have taken the full brunt of the Continentals’ close-range volley, and the Americans would have been free to pivot both to their right (taking the 71st in the flank) and to their left (taking the British artillery and 7th Foot in the flank). According to Stewart, once the 71st fell back, the Legion retreated also. This would have ceded the center of the battlefield to the Americans. (Note that in this image, unlike those above, I don’t show casualties or smoke bursts, and there are changes to the British figurines).

New Research on Cowpens

Recently, I’ve come across new evidence about how the British force was deployed at the onset of the fateful battle of Cowpens. This evidence has convinced me that the deployment that I described last year (and which is the same as appears in histories of the battle) is likely in error.

To the best of my knowledge, every published description of the British deployment at Cowpens has followed Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s account. None have suggested there is reason to doubt the accuracy of his description. Consider the weight of evidence described below and ask yourself a) whether the question of how the British deployed should be regarded as settled, and b) whether Tarleton’s description is most likely the correct one.

Below is a listing of the earliest descriptions of the British deployment at Cowpens, followed by two different representations of the deployment in miniature.

Lieutenant Harry Calvert, on or shortly after January 17, 1781:

Comments: Calvert was not present at the battle but he evidently spoke with men that had been present, and he summarized their discussion in his journal. Mark Urban summarized Calvert's take on Cowpens in Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution. According to Urban:

"As one fugitive after another wandered into the British camp, Calvert pierced together the story of what had gone wrong. Tarleton, as was his custom, had hurled his troops into action before they were all up, and the 71st had advanced towards their enemy, taking significant losses from enemy sharpshooters as they went" (p 226).

Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, January 18, 1781:

Comments: Cornwallis was not present at the battle but he spoke with Tarleton shortly afterward. Cornwallis briefly summarized the British deployment in a letter to his superior, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton. He did not describe the relative positioning of the various units aside from identifying them with a front line or with a reserve.

“The attack was begun by the first Line of Infantry, consisting of the 7th Regiment, the Infantry of the Legion & Corps of Light Infantry annexed to it; & Troop of Cavalry was placed on each Flank: the 1st Battalion of the 71st, and the Remainder of the Cavalry, formed the reserve.”

Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, January 19, 1781:

Comments: Morgan was an eyewitness writing about the event shortly afterwards. He reportedly rode up to the front line before the battle began where (presumably) he could clearly observe how the British were deploying. Because a number of British officers were later made prisoners, he also had the opportunity to question them at length about their numbers, battle plan, etc. The following passage is from his official report of the battle.

“The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front moved two pieces of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line.”

Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, February 21, 1781:

Comments: Baurmeister was not present at Cowpens, but he recorded a description of the battle in his journal. Apparently, one or more paroled British officers that had returned to Charleston, South Carolina, described the battle to James Wemyss, a major in the 63rd Foot. Wemyss, who was recuperating from a wound, soon after departed for New York where he described his second-hand information to officers there. In this way, Baurmeister learned of the battle. Baurmeister’s description of the British deployment is strikingly similar to that in Morgan’s report. However, Wemyss’ description, rather than Morgan’s report, seems to have been the source of Baurmeister’s description. Baurmeister’s account shows a poor understanding of the American side of the battle. For example, Baurmeister wrote that it was the "the Georgia volunteers" that broke the British line and captured the cannon; he made no mention of the Maryland and Delaware Continentals. This is the kind of error that might be expected if Baurmeister got his information from Wemyss, who in turn got it from an officer in the battle -- not the kind of error that would occur if Baurmeister was restating Morgan’s published report. Baurmeister's description of the British deployment also differs from Morgan's in several minor respects.

“Believing that he had forced General Morgan to retreat and that his force was superior to the rebels', he [Tarleton] went in search of General Morgan on the 17th of January. He found him in battle formation at the Cowpens, close to the Pacolet River. Colonel Tarleton had to defend himself as well as he could in a space of four hundred yards. He posted the 7th Regiment on his right, the 1st Battalion of the 71st on his left, and the dismounted Legion in the center. His dragoons covered the flanks… in front of the left wing of the 7th Regiment he had two light fieldpieces.

“The British attack was too furious for the enemy's right wing—nothing withstood the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment….”

Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, 1787:

Comments: Tarleton issued the orders for the British deployment and observed their execution. He wrote about the event approximately 6 years later in his history of the southern campaign of the American Revolution.

“Tarleton desired the British infantry to disencumber themselves of every thing, except their arms and ammunition: The light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line: The legion infantry were added to their left; and, under the fire of a three-pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to advance within three hundred yards of the enemy. This situation. being acquired, the 7th regiment was commanded to form upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th: A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps, who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and threaten the flanks of the enemy: The 1st battalion of the 71st was desired to extend a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near two hundred cavalry, composed the reserve.”

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Two different conceptions of the British deployment at Cowpens appear below. (For information on the deployment of American forces in the background, see The Militia Line at Cowpens, The Main Line at Cowpens: Organization, The Americans Deploy). Each miniature represents approximately 20 combatants. The two British guns are represented by a single piece. Per Tarleton's account (and what was likely standard practice), the infantry are in open order [cf. Modeling Notes]. The flags are carried by the 7th Foot; the British Legion infantry is clothed in green [cf. British Legion Redux]. Not all of the British Legion dragoons can be seen in these images.

Banastre Tarleton's Description of the British Deployment at Cowpens. The front line consists of (from left to right), a troop of dragoons, the 7th Foot, a contingent of Royal Artillery, the British Legion infantry, a contingent of light infantry, and a troop of dragoons. The 71st Foot and the greater part of the British Legion dragoons are in reserve.

Alternative Conception of the British Deployment at Cowpens. The British line is anchored on either end by a troops of dragoons (Baurmeister, Tarleton). The 71st Foot is on the left of the British line where it is close enough to the front to participate in the attack on the American militia (Calvert, Morgan, Baurmeister), but far enough from the front where it can be called accurately a reserve (Cornwallis, Tarleton). With the 71st is part of the light infantry (Morgan). The center of the line consists of the British Legion infantry (Morgan, Baurmeister), and the right consists of the 7th Foot (Morgan, Baurmeister), supported by the remainder of the light infantry (Morgan). A contingent of Royal Artillery is in advance of the infantry (Morgan, Baurmeister). The greater part of the British Legion dragoons are in reserve (Cornwallis, Morgan, Baurmeister, Tarleton).

Battle of Fishing Creek 4

Part 4: Sumter's Defeat

Previous: To Fishing Creek

Next: A Scene of Horror

Across Fishing Creek

The Americans slaughtered cattle and feasted on beef, roasted ears of corn, and freshly picked peaches. Some men napped, while others shaved or washed their clothes. Men and women living in the neighborhood came out to greet and encourage the soldiers. The American guards detected no danger. The situation in the American camp was idyllic. Yet at that moment, Tarleton’s 160 men were quickly bearing down on the Americans along the byway [1].

The first Americans to see Tarleton’s men were two vedettes. These men stepped out of the bushes and fired, killing one of the five dragoons in the British vanguard. The remaining dragoons killed the vedettes with their sabers and headed towards the creek. Responsibility for guarding the ford by which the byway crossed Fishing Creek had been left to one Captain Thompson. Thompson, however, had left his post and the ford was now unguarded [2].

Among the Americans to see the British vanguard and live to tell of it were John Williams and John Dobbins of the North Carolina militia. These two men and others were collecting peaches in an orchard near Fishing Creek. Fortunately for them, the four remaining dragoons either did not see them, or took no notice of them. The incredulous Americans offered no resistance and swam to safety across the Catawba River [3].

Finally, the dragoons ascended a height from which the main American body was in view. The dragoons crouched upon their horses and waving for their comrades to come on. Tarleton sped ahead and when he reached the height he was amazed to see "the front of the American camp, perfectly quiet, and not the least alarmed by the fire of the vedettes" [4].

The Americans’ had been using rifles to slaughter cattle; although the vedette’s two shots had been heard in camp, they elicited no special notice [5].

Stealthily, Tarleton’s "cavalry and infantry were formed into one line," just out of the Americans’ view. Then, "giving a general shout," the British charged [6].

The Fishing Creek Battlefield. Fishing Creek is the winding stream at left; the Catawba River is at right. The large blue circle shows the approximate position of the main American body on the river road. The smaller blue circle shows the rear guard. The red arrow depicts Tarleton's charge [7]. The main road (brown line) is based on the modern-day Catawba River Road. The byway is not depicted.

Fishing Creek Area. Part of the Fishing Creek battlefield has been flooded by damming on the Catawba River. This excerpt from Mills' 1825 atlas of South Carolina was used to roughly locate the original banks of the Catawba River in the above battlefield map. Islands shown in the 1825 atlas were not included in the battlefield map. Note that Mills' map designates the "Battle of F. C."

"A Perfect Rout"

The dragoons rushed the American encampment, with sabers gleaming brightly in the sunlight. The British infantry came streaming after, charging through the dragoons’ dusty wake.

Tarleton Forms His Line. Infantry and dragoons form a single-rank line of battle. According to Tarleton, most of his infantry came from the corps of light infantry that fought at Camden. Shown are light infantrymen from the 71st Foot and 16th Foot, as well as a soldier of the British Legion infantry. As per usual, the figure to participant ratio is 1:20.

Tarleton described the battle that followed in prosaic terms: "The arms and artillery of the Continentals were secured before the men could be assembled: Universal consternation immediately ensued throughout the camp; some opposition was, however, made from behind the wagons, in front of the militia. The numbers, and extensive encampment of the enemy, occasioned several conflicts before the action was decided" [8].

Young James Collins, who had only recently joined Sumter, recalled that "Before Sumter could wake up his men and form, the enemy were among them cutting down everything in their way" [9].

According to one account, Sumter was sitting next to a wagon and was halfway through a shave when the British attacked. "When the colonel saw the state of things around, he cut a rope with which a horse was tied to a wagon, dropped his razor, mounted the horse and made his escape without saddle or bridle" [10].

At least one knot of resistance developed where the wagons were interposed between the dragoons and the militia. Here, some South Carolinians briefly rallied around Colonel William Bratton before being driven off. Then, according to Collins, the main part of Sumter’s force "retreated across the creek at the main road, leaving the remainder to the mercy of the enemy." Collins was with “the greater part of our number [who] dashed through the creek, at the fording place." These men were desperate "to secure our own safety… and pushing on with all possible speed, reached the highland." He called this "a perfect rout." The fate of those left behind was "an indiscriminate slaughter" [11].

Sumter's Defeat (click to enlarge). British dragoons and infantry overrun unarmed American Continentals at upper right, while a tenuous resistance is made by Carolina militia at lower left.

Tarleton also described the fighting as a "slaughter." According to one militiaman, the British were incensed at the deaths of a sergeant of the Legion dragoons and a captain of the light infantry. "The British officers had great spite at the militia, but ordered that the regulars [Continentals] should have quarters" [12].

The sight of so many enemy soldiers may also have been terrifying to the British, even though they had the upper hand. Relief came when the British found and released the Americans’ prisoners. These men picked up guns (which littered the ground) and joined their comrades. When this reinforcement arrived, the killing stopped [13].

Reinforcement. British prisoners, once released, picked up arms and joined their comrades. Shown here are soldiers of the 33rd and 71st regiments, who were captured on August 15.

By this time, the battleground was covered with scores of dead and grievously wounded Americans, both Continentals and militia. Tarleton claimed that 150 had been struck down, and the total American loss (including unwounded prisoners) was around 300. As for himself, he lost a mere 6 infantrymen, 9 dragoons, and 20 horses [14].

Notes:

In some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the quoted source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of David McCance, transcribed by Will Graves. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

2. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of John Henderson, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves.

4. Tarleton, ibid.

5. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

6. Tarleton, ibid.

7. Saye, ibid. has the British attacking along a relatively unguarded byway. Tarleton, ibid., claimed that the first thing he saw was "the front of the American camp" -- not the rear guard. James Collins in his (1859) Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier, claimed that the Americans "retreated across the creek at the main road," which is at the bottom of the map. This statement implies that the British were attacking from a different direction. Collins also recorded that "the rear guard consisting of militia were posted at the Creek." David McCance, ibid. claimed that "the rear guard was ordered to remain one mile behind" the main body, which is consistent with Collins' statement and Mills' placement of the battlefield. However, McCance also claimed that the rear guard "was taken," which seemingly is contradicted by Tarleton, Saye, and Collins (at least when the three are read together). Militiaman George Cunningham claimed that he was one of those "standing guard," but he was not captured. (see the pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves).

8. Tarleton, ibid.

9. Collins, ibid. A transcription appears in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

10. Saye, ibid.

11. Saye, ibid. Collins, ibid.

12. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

13. Tarleton, ibid.

14. Tarleton, ibid. British Legion killed and wounded at Catawba Fords. British Legion prisoners taken at Catawba Fords. The pension application of George Neely, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Patton, transcribed by Will Graves.

Battle of Fishing Creek 3

Part 3: To Fishing Creek

Previous: Cary's Fort and Camden

Next: Sumter's Defeat

Sumter’s Retreat

On August 16, 1780, the men of Thomas Sumter’s brigade could hear the distant sound of cannon fire from the battle of Camden, and anxiously awaited word of the result. That evening, three or four riders appeared bearing news of the American defeat; they also conveyed orders from Major-General Horatio Gates for Sumter to retreat to a place of safety [1].

Sumter had held onto a toehold of South Carolina since late June, and although his men had galled the British at Williamson’s Plantation, he had been left undisturbed because of "the intense heat of the summer," because British offensive preparations were then incomplete, and because he did not yet register as a serious threat. After the attacks on Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock, Sumter was seen as truly dangerous, but the American offensive under Gates prohibited the British from launching a sustained retaliatory campaign. Now, Gates' army was destroyed, and Sumter’s protection was gone [2].

Sumter well appreciated the new strategic situation, and wasted no time in seeking the relative safety of the North Carolina border. That night his men marched north along the western bank of the Wateree [3]. This night march was not as rapid as the one he made before the battles of Rocky Mount or Hanging Rock. On those occasions his force was mounted; now he was responsible for hundreds of men (the force lent by Gates and his British prisoners) who would travel by foot.

Sumter pushed his men again the following day (August 17), and got his force by nightfall to Rocky Mount, some 25 miles from Camden, and on the edge of his former sphere of operations. At dawn on August 18, Sumter burned the post at Rocky Mount (which had been abandoned by the British some days earlier) and headed north again [4].

By this time, Sumter had picked an unlooked-for reinforcement. A band of mounted militia led by Captain John Moffett met him on the road, which was fleeing from a different danger: a growing Loyalist militia presence in the western part of the state. On the morning of the 18th, Sumter’s men also met up with several Maryland Continentals who had journeyed from the Camden battlefield. These men included privates John Housley and Benjamin Burch of the 6th Maryland Regiment, which had been in the very center of the fighting. Housley had made the grueling journey despite a flesh wound [5].

By midday, Sumter’s force had made another 8 miles, and was on a ridge a short distance north of Fishing Creek. Both he and his men were exhausted and at least one wagon had broken down. He ordered a rest. Sumter had previously posted a lookout at the ford over the Catawba at Rocky Mount, and he now placed a patrol on the road south of Fishing Creek, and a strong guard at the ford across Fishing Creek. Vedettes kept watch over other approaches to the American position [6]. After issuing these orders, Sumter partly undressed and napped under a wagon [7].

Tarleton’s Mission

Soon after the battle of Camden ended, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis plotted the destruction of Sumter’s brigade. Cornwallis had two forces that were capable of catching Sumter. On the far side of the wide Wateree, Major Patrick Ferguson and Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull commanded a force of Provincials and Loyalist militia collected from Rocky Mount and other points in western South Carolina. This force was not as numerous as Sumter’s brigade, but they were well positioned to cut off his retreat. On the near side of the river, he had Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, a great driver of men. It was hoped that the two forces would act in concert, and orders were issued to both commands [8].

Tarleton set off early on the 17th with his British Legion dragoons, a 3-pounder cannon, and a number of infantry. By nightfall, he had reached the Catawba/Wateree near Rocky Mount. At that moment, Sumter’s men were on the other side of the river [9].

At dawn on the 18th, some of the British sentries reported that the Americans were pulling out. Fearing a ruse, Tarleton ordered Captain Charles Campbell to take a small party across the river to assess the situation. Campbell’s party captured the lookout the Americans had left at Rocky Mount, and confirmed that the Americans had departed. When Tarleton saw Campbell waving a white handkerchief from the top of the height, the British set off with the cannon and the light infantry in several boats, while the horses (with riders) first waded out into the river and then swam across the deepest part [10].

Tarleton was unable to make contact with Ferguson and Turnbull, and so would be forced to go it alone at this point. Tarleton marched his men up the river road, following the clear tracks left by Sumter’s men. Then: a remarkable stroke of fortune. Two Loyalist women met him on the road, who claimed that Sumter’s men had halted. The women described the Americans’ position and a byway that led to their flank. Losing no time, Tarleton left behind his cannon and those men unable to make a rapid march. He then pressed on with about 100 dragoons and 60 infantry. Leading the way was a vanguard of one sergeant and four privates of the British Legion dragoons [11].

Sumter's Retreat and Tarleton's Pursuit (click to enlarge). Approximate paths taken by Sumter's brigade (in blue) and Tarleton's command (in red) before the battle of Fishing Creek.

Notes:

1. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 20, 1780.

3. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

4. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of William McGarity, transcribed by Will Graves. The distance is based on a straight line from Rocky Creek to Camden town.

5. James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier. The pension application of John Housley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Benjamin Burch, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. At Camden, the 6th Maryland on the left flank of the 2nd Maryland Brigade (see Otho Holland Williams, A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780), where it was engaged with portions of at least three different regiments: The Volunteers of Ireland, the 33rd Foot, and the 71st Foot.

6. As noted previously, Thomas Sumter has been criticized for some of the military decisions that he made in the course of this campaign. The strongest criticisms have been made regarding his defenses (or lack thereof) at the battle of Fishing Creek. On this point, the present account of the battle differs substantially from others. The meme that Sumter was a careless commander received a large boost from William Davie, who wrote that Sumter “strangely neglected the necessary precautions to prevent a surprise… the whole security of the army rested upon two vedettes.” But Davie was not present, and he obtained his information largely from Tarleton’s memoir rather than from the remembrances of American participants. American accounts, in particular those recorded by James Saye and James Collins, point to a very different conclusion: that Tarleton surprised the Americans because he crossed Fishing Creek at an obscure (though still guarded) ford, and in this way suddenly gained the Americans’ flank. This interpretation of course does not completely exonerate Sumter, but it does further suggest that he was a much abler commander than some historians believe.

For Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Saye's account can be found in this extract from his Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot. For Collins' account, see the transcription appearing in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

7. Tarleton, ibid. Davie, ibid. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. According to the pension application of David McCance (transcribed by Will Graves), Sumter slept in a tent.

8. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

9. Tarleton, ibid.

10. Tarleton, ibid.

11. Tarleton, ibid. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

Battle of Fishing Creek 2

Part 2: Cary's Fort and Camden

Previous: Sumter's Third Target

Next: To Fishing Creek

Cary's Fort

On the morning of August 15, 1780, Thomas Sumter’s brigade of militia was joined by the reinforcement sent to him by Major-General Horatio Gates, bringing his total to around 700 men [1], the largest force he had commanded to date. Sumter then advanced on the Wateree river crossings south and west of Camden. As the Americans approached, they found that the British had evacuated all of their posts except for a redoubt held by Colonel James Cary of the South Carolina Loyalist militia. These men held their ground to keep open the flow of men and supplies into Camden. The Americans quickly attacked and after a brief fight in which seven Loyalists were killed, the Americans "took about thirty prisoners, among which was colonel Cary, their commander, together with thirty odd wagons loaded with corn, rum, etc., also a number of horses" [2].

The British on the other side of the river began to open fire on his men, and Sumter noted with apprehension that "the ground upon this side [is] very bad," and that "the boats are all upon the opposite side of the river" [3]. The Americans withdrew out of gunfire range, leaving a small guard to keep an eye on the British. Among these men was George Weir, a soldier in Edward Lacey’s regiment. He recalled in later years being "left alone" "as a sentinel near the ferry" "and nearly to have been captured by the enemy" [4].

Sumter also had men watching the southern and western approaches to the Wateree. Some of his men saw a party of around 60 British regulars from the 33rd and 71st regiments approaching the Wateree. These regulars had been recalled from the western post at Ninety-Six to aid in the defense of Camden. Oblivious to danger, they marched with their weapons loaded up in a wagon [5]. The Americans "secreted themselves until the British came up, when suddenly rushing upon them [they] took the whole party… without firing a gun" [6].

Meanwhile, Sumter was growing concerned about his safety. Perhaps hoping to spur Gates into action, he wrote to him saying that the British had only 1,200 regulars in Camden, and fewer than 1,000 militia, the latter of whom "are generally sickly and much dispirited." He also claimed that 500 men were en route from Charleston and were expected to arrive on the 17th. He then withdrew his force 10 miles up the river to a more easily defended position [7].

Camden

Gates received Sumter’s letter on the 15th and determined to apply further pressure to the British force in Camden. He would make a nighttime march to a strong position behind Saunders Creek, just 5 miles from Camden. From this position he could further restrict the flow of supplies into Camden and deter the British from attacking Sumter. The position was also strong enough that he could likely repel there any attack by British regulars. Gates’ army marched at 10pm [8].

Meanwhile, Charles Cornwallis had taken control of the British forces in Camden, after arriving there from Charleston the day before (August 14th). Cornwallis could see that Camden was not a strong position and that the Americans’ were likely to ultimately force them from this post. Cornwallis therefore determined to take the fight directly to Gates, reasoning that a victory would wipe out the Americans’ gains, while a defeat would be no worse than avoiding a fight altogether (in either case he would be forced to retreat). In order to maximize the probability of victory, he determined to try and catch the Americans by surprise. During the night of August 15-16, his army marched out of Camden hoping to surprise the Americans at dawn [9].

The two American armies marched along the same road, each expecting to surprise the other. Instead, both armies were surprised when their vanguards collided in the night, a little more than a mile north of Saunders Creek. After a confused flurry of fighting, the armies separated and in the morning (August 16), properly deployed for battle. Cornwallis anchored the left end of his line with the battered veterans of Hanging Rock (the British Legion Infantry, Bryan’s Volunteers, and the Royal North Carolina Regiment). He attacked primarily with several units of British regulars placed on his right. Gates adopted a similar strategy: he placed his weakest troops (North Carolina and Virginia militia) on his left and his strongest troops (Maryland and Delaware Continentals) on his right. The British regulars quickly sent the American militia into flight. The Continentals then found themselves attacked in front, flank, and rear. By the end of the day, the American army was destroyed with the loss of hundreds of men killed or captured. The American baggage train was also captured, and most of the broken militia headed home. This battle, known as Camden, was one of the greatest British victories of the war [10].

Sources:

Note that in some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Letter from Josiah Martin to George Germain, August 18-20, 1780. Both higher and lower totals can be found in later sources.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Horatio Gates, August 15, 1780. [The date was incorrectly transcribed as the 10th in this edition].

3. Sumter to Gates, ibid.

4. The pension application of George Weir, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

5. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Nathan Jaggars, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Dunlap, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves.

The day before a "corps of light infantry" passed safely the same way into Camden. See Martin to Germain, ibid.

6. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. In Hicks' account the convoy was captured by just him and two other men. Other veterans remembered this event differently.

7. Sumter to Gates, ibid. This is not to say that Sumter didn’t believe these things. Without a doubt he and his men questioned both the prisoners they took and civilians living in the area and this is likely the best intelligence he possessed. Rather, Sumter’s letter seems designed as an implicit reminder that the British might cross the river and attack him unless Gates provided a credible threat from the north.

The "500 men" was possibly misinformation given out by British officers to convince the locals and their own Loyalist militia that the Americans’ fortunes would soon be reversed. The only approaching reinforcement from that direction mentioned by Cornwallis was a mounted detachment of the 63rd Foot. See letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

8. General Gates' orders for August 15, 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Thomas Pinckney to William Johnson, July 27, 1822.

9. Martin to Germain, ibid. Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

10. Horatio Gates to President of Congress, August 30, 1780. Otho Holland Williams. A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. Martin to Germain, ibid. Cornwallis to Germain, ibid. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

Battle of Hanging Rock 13

Part 13: Reinforcement and Retreat

Previous: Stalemate

The final British bayonet charge and the withdrawal to the center of the open area effectively brought the battle of Hanging Rock to an end. Nevertheless, the British remained apprehensive about another American attack. According to Charles Stedman, the outcome remained "doubtful," until:

"the appearance of a reinforcement changed entirely the fortune of the day. This reinforcement consisted of forty mounted infantry of the Legion who were returning from Rocky Mount: But the captains [Patrick] Stewart and [Charles] MacDonald, who commanded it, by ordering the men to extend their files, gave it the appearance of a formidable detachment. The bugle horns were directed to sound a charge: And the Americans, already kept at bay, were now fearful of being overpowered" [1].

Reinforcement. While the American militia plunder the center camp, the Provincials holding the open area receive an unexpected reinforcement.

Mounted Infantry Arrive (click to enlarge). Two companies of mounted Legion infantry advance up the Camden Road towards the Americans. The Provincials are in square formation.

William Davie and was dragoons "were returning towards the centre," after driving off a number of Provincials and Loyalist militia, when they saw that Stewart's and MacDonald's companies had "advanced up in the Camden road." Davie turned his men around and charged. The British "took the woods in flight, and one only was outdone" [2].

Davie's Final Charge (click to enlarge). The American dragoons send the mounted Legion infantry into the woods.

This repulse would seem to be the end of the affair, except that these green-jacketed mounted infantry were mistaken for the vanguard of Tarleton's dreaded British Legion dragoons [3]. According to Joseph McJunkin, Sumter remarked, "Boys, it is not good to pursue a victory too far," and began pulling his troops back [4]. A number of American participants and British commentators referred to this reinforcement as the cause of the American retreat [5].

Before the retreat was effected, "about an hour" was spent "plundering the [center] camp, taking the parole of the British officers, and preparing litters for the wounded" [6]. According to William Davie, "All this was done in full view of the British army, who consoled themselves with some military music [7] and an interlude of three cheers for King George" [8]. Hearing this, Sumter called out, "'Boys, can't you raise a whoop of victory?' Then the air was rent with the cry of victory" [9].

Plundering the British Camp (click to enlarge). The Americans raid the British Commissary's stores before abandoning the Hanging Rock battlefield.

Davie concluded, "The militia at length got into the line of march, Davie and his dragoons covering the retreat, but as the troops were loaded with plunder, and encumbered with their wounded friends, and many of them intoxicated, this retreat was not performed in the best military style. However, under all these disadvantages, they filed off unmolested, along the front of the enemy" [10]. Sumter claimed that he "brought off one hundred horses, two hundred and fifty stand of arms, with other articles of considerable value" [11].

The Americans had marched about a mile when a mounted British caught up to the rear of the column with a flag of truce, ostensibly to gain permission to bury their dead [12], but probably also to verify that the Americans were in fact retreating. Joseph McJunkin was near the rear of the column at this time, escorting the prisoners. Turning to Sumter he said, "You have through the Divine hand of Providence, achieved a great victory today." Sumter agreed, but ruefully noted that "it will scarcely ever be heard of, because we are nothing but a handful of raw militia, but if we had been commanded by a Continental officer it would have sounded loud to our honor" [13].

Sumter was correct: Hanging Rock was a remarkable battle, but destined to be mostly forgotten.

Notes:

1. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

2. For William Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

3. Cf. Davie, ibid., and Joseph McJunkin's account, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

4. McJunkin, ibid.

5. For example, among the Americans, Mark Jackson stated that "it being rumored that Tarleton’s Corps were coming we retreated." James Kincaid noted, "we failed of success by a reinforcement of the British Army from Rocky Mount but we marched off in order." Zachary Kitchens observed that "after a hard and long fight we retreated, upon being informed that a reinforcement was coming to the aid of the British." As for British commentators, the connection between the arrival of this reinforcement and the American retreat is made by Charles Stedman, Banastre Tarleton, and Anthony Allaire.

• The pension application of Mark Jackson, transcribed by Will Graves.
• The pension application of James Kincaid, transcribed by Will Graves.
• The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris.
• Stedman, ibid.
• Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
• Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain. (Includes a transcription of Allaire's journal).

Other causes for the American retreat were mentioned previously.

6. Davie, ibid.

7. The British Legion had a regimental band. See the letter from Otho Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781, and summarized here.

8. Davie, ibid.

9. McJunkin, ibid. This cheer was recalled somewhat differently by others. According to Davie, ibid., "three cheers [were given] for the hero of America." Richard Winn claimed that Sumter "gathered his men and for victory three cheers was given by the true friends of America." For Richard Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

10. Davie, ibid.

11. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

12. McJunkin, ibid.

13. McJunkin, ibid.