Cowpens in Miniature 25

Part 25: The Battle Ends

Previous: The Last Gambit

At the time that Tarleton and the remnants of the British cavalry fled the battlefield, it was still morning. For many of the Americans, the remainder of the day would be spent in pursuit of the British. The Continentals would not return to the battlefield until the evening.

The main body of British Legion dragoons were in the foremost of the retreat. When they reached the British baggage train, according to Lieutenant Mackenzie, the British guards soon mounted the wagon horses and retreated after them. After their departure, some Americans began arriving on the scene and began raiding the baggage train. Tarleton noted that his group, the last of the British to flee the battlefield, came up behind and attacked "a party of the Americans, who had seized upon the baggage of the British troops on the road." In the official British report, Tarleton "retook the Baggage of the Corps, & cut to pieces the detachment of the Enemy who had taken possession of it."

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie disputed Tarleton’s characterization of it describe this event. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard believed that "Baron Glaubeck… with some five or six militia men… had taken the baggage," but when Tarleton’s band arrived, "he was obliged to leave." Howard did not refer to British losses; however, one of the raiders, militiaman Thomas Young, described running into Tarleton’s group while returning to camp and being severely injured by them [see Note 1].

Meanwhile, on the battlefield, according to Major Joseph McJunkin, "You might have seen some five or six hundred tall, brawny, well clad soldiers, the flower of the British Army, guarded by a set of militia clad in hunting shirts ‘blacked, smoked and greasy.’"

McJunkin also recalled that "The plain was strewn with the dead and dying." But at least "The number of the slain on the side of the Americans was inconsiderable compared with that of the Enemy." Private James Collins remembered that "After the fight was over, the sight was truly melancholy." Remembrance of the scene was also persevered in local lore. Obadiah Haggis, a mid-19th Century visitor to the battlefield, learned of "A woman who lived 2 miles away… [that] When the firin’ stopped and she knowed which side had whipt, she ventured to the place, with the rest of the neighborhood, and found the place all covered with dead people."

Those men that had pursued the British slept on the battlefield that night, and in Lieutenant Thomas Anderson’s words, "lay amongst the Dead & Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work."

Losses:

One of the more difficult questions to address in connection with the battle of Cowpens concerns how many British and American soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured. Quite a few participants commented on losses, but their claims are not particularly trustworthy for the reason that they are typically reporting on what they heard others claim rather than on what they personally witnessed.

The numbers of Americans killed or wounded are stated in most histories to be quite few, about 72 in number, and they refer to a seemingly unimpeachable source: Morgan’s official report of the battle. Lawrence Babits, writing in A Devil of a Whipping, claimed to have a list of 128 Americans known to have been killed or wounded based on a number of different sources, including pension applications [see Note 2].

I’m inclined to believe that the number was higher, but for a different reason. Consider carefully Morgan’s language (see Morgan's Report). He said first, "Our loss is inconsiderable, which the enclosed return will evince. I have not been able to ascertain Col. Pickens loss, but know it to be very small" [see Note 3].

Then in a postscript he added, "Our loss was very inconsiderable, not having more than twelve killed and about sixty wounded." Notice, however, that he previously defined "our loss" as something different than Pickens’ loss. Therefore, the 72 casualties is arguably limited to the force he took with him from North Carolina: Howard’s battalion of Continentals, Washington’s regiment of dragoons, and Triplett’s battalion of Virginia militia.

If 72 is an "inconsiderable" number, then Pickens’ "very small" loss would likely be something a bit less, say around 50. This produces a total loss in the neighborhood of 120, or near Babits’ number.

Sergeant Major William Seymour recorded in his journal that "Our loss in the action were one Lieutenant wounded, and one Sergeant, and thirty-five killed and wounded, of which fourteen were of Captain Kirkwood's Company of the Delaware Regiment." In this case, "our loss" would seem to mean something different than it did in Morgan’s report. It’s possible that he is describing only the losses sustained by Howard’s Continentals (which included Kirkwood’s company). When Morgan’s and Seymour’s statements are combined, American losses would have included 37 men in Howard’s Continentals (about 13% of the battalion), of which 14 men were lost in Kirkwood’s company (23% of the company; see Note 4). This leaves about 35 men lost between Washington’s dragoons and Triplett’s Virginians (about 14% of those commands). These numbers are not unreasonable, and they are reflected in the four miniature casualties on the battlefield (again, the representation is 1:20).

I also placed on the battlefield three miniature casualties representing around 50 killed and wounded between the various detachments of Georgia and Carolina militia attached to Morgan’s army (about 12% of those forces, not including the baggage guard and other detachments). One casualty was placed on the militia line, another with the militia charged by Ogilvie, and the last with the militia charged by Nettles.

For the American army, exclusive of detachments, losses are estimated to have been in the neighborhood of 13% (~120 out of ~950 participants).

Quite a few sources provide an estimate of British casualties. All agree that British losses were considerable. The exact number given, however, differs widely from one source to another. An exact count of the British killed and wounded was not performed, and most sources report their impression of British losses or what had been related to them by others.

The Americans did not linger long on the battlefield. Morgan was concerned that the British army under Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis would soon advance on him in an effort to free the British prisoners. Morgan, did, however, have an officer ride over the battlefield and do a rough count of British losses. Subsequently, Morgan stated in his report of the battle that the British had 10 officers and 100 or so rank and file killed, and 200 or so wounded. A total in the low 300s is also suggested by subtracting from total British strength the number of unwounded prisoners captured by the time Morgan filed his report, a number of infantry and cavalry that were captured after the report was filed, a small contingent of infantry that escaped capture, and the British Legion dragoons and 17th Light Dragoons that escaped wounding or capture. Therefore, I have placed 16 miniature British casualties on the battlefield. A number of American sources pegged British losses higher than Morgan, but those claims are generally less trustworthy.

For the British army, exclusive of the baggage train detachment, losses are estimated to have been around 29% (~320 out of ~1,115 participants).

In addition to the killed and wounded, the British lost large numbers of prisoners to the Americans. Morgan indicated that 531 were captured soon after the battle (some others were captured after Morgan wrote his report). For reasons that I will not wholly recount, it appears that a certain portion of Tarleton’s infantry escaped capture during the battle, but some of these men were captured later. It also appears that while almost all of Tarleton’s cavalry escaped capture during the battle, some of these men were also captured afterwards (notably, the British Legion lost 277 rank and file around the time of the battle; far too many to be accounted for by infantry losses alone). Samuel Otterson recalled how some of the Legion dragoons were captured by the American militia. Others were likely taken by William Washington’s dragoons during the pursuit. Some of the Americans must have been mounted on faster horses than some of the British, especially as the latter had made an all-night march to reach the battlefield.

Notes:

1. Howard’s acknowledgement that the Americans were forced to withdraw is the only acknowledgement on the American side that such an encounter took place. However, American participants were more likely to recall triumphs rather than setbacks, and it’s possible that there were some American casualties (aside from Young). That’s not to suggest, however, that Tarleton’s description is without exaggeration. Young’s vivid description of his wounding and capture is worth reading, but it is not recounted here.

2. Babits also suggested that the actual number may have been even higher, because these records did not cover all participants and because of an ambiguous document in the archives of the state of North Carolina [a transcription of which can be found here].

Conversely, counting the losses mentioned in pension applications may overstate the number of American killed or wounded as the information in the pension applications may in some cases be inaccurate. It’s possible, even likely that some of the claims about having been present at the battle and even wounded there were in error.

3. I have not seen a transcription of this return, but I suspect it is extant. Babits alluded to it in recounting American losses.

4. There are quite a few reasons for why Kirkwood’s losses exceeded those of the other companies. I show in the maps (although not in the miniature representation) one of the two three-pounders lined up with Kirkwood’s company during the British advance against the American main line. One or more salvos of grapeshot could have led to significantly higher casualties. William Seymour’s journal gives Kirkwood’s company a leading role in the American counterattack. It’s possible they sustained greater losses in the subsequent melee than did other companies. Henry Wells’ account suggests that Kirkwood’s company was also attacked during the final British cavalry charge; perhaps other companies were not.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Mackenzie's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, McJunkin, Collins, Anderson among others.

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South has Young's account of the battle.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes a review by Will Graves of McJunkin's statements.

Edwin Bearss' 1974 Historic Grounds and Resource Study (.pdf file) has a transcription of Obadiah Haggis' description of an 1857 visit to the Cowpens battlefield, in which Haggis related some local lore about the battle.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782 has a comparison of British rank and file returns before and after the battle of Cowpens.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson (.pdf).

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

Related: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Morgan and Seymour, The British Legion

Cowpens in Miniature 24

Part 24: The Last Gambit

Previous: Surrender

Next: The Battle Ends

Tarleton remained on the battlefield with a small group of stalwarts, even after the British had surrendered. He surely knew that the British right had fled or surrendered. Less clear is if he knew what had befallen the 71st Foot. In any case, the Americans soon assembled a force consisting of the bulk of their cavalry [see Note 1] and at least a portion of the Continentals to drive off of this last vestige of resistance and pursue those forces that had fled.

Upon the surrender of the 71st Foot, Colonel Andrew Pickens remembered that he "sent back to Genl Morgan, by Major Jackson, Major McCarthur, with the sword" [see Note 2]. He then "met Coln Washington with his cavalry in pursuit of Tarleton" [see Note 3]. He therefore "ordered Jackson who was brave & active, to return as quickly as possible with as many mounted militia as he could get."

Meanwhile, Tarleton watched as the Americans approached. With him were "Fourteen officers and forty horse-men… not unmindful of their own reputation, or the situation of their commanding officer." The American cavalry had somewhat fewer than 100 men. The prudent decision, perhaps, would have been to turn around and retreat down the Green River Road, but he felt compelled to put up a fight [see Note 4].

Final Confrontation. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11, 14 = British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons. The blue-ringed circles show where the British front line (9) and 71st Foot (13) surrendered.

Final Confrontation (click to enlarge). As American cavalry and infantry set off in pursuit of the fleeing British, they must first confront Tarleton.

Lieutenant Mackenzie, although by now a prisoner, was perhaps witness to this event. He recalled, with a mixture of awe and disdain, that "Even at this late stage of the defeat, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, with no more than fifty horse, hesitated not to charge the whole of Washington's cavalry, though supported by the continentals; it was a small body of officers, and a detachment of the seventeenth regiment of dragoons, who presented themselves on this desperate occasion" [see Note 5].

The official British report of the battle claimed that these cavalry, "having had time to recollect themselves, & being animated by the Bravery of the Officer who had so often led them to victory, charged & repulsed Colonel Washington's Horse." Tarleton’s memoir went further, claiming that "Colonel Washington's cavalry were… driven back into the continental infantry by this handful of brave men" [see Note 6].

Tarleton's Charge. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11 = British Cavalry.

Tarleton's Charge (click to enlarge).

This description seems basically accurate. Cornet Simons recalled that "It was at this period after the Action that we sustained the greatest loss of Men." Delaware Continental Henry Wells stated that "In this fight I was struck across the left shoulder by one of Tarleton's Troopers, With his Sword with Such Violence, that the colar of my coat, my vest and my Shirt, were each cut through, and the flesh & skin Sleightly scratched and bruised so much so that there was a considerable not or welt on my Sholder for a number of days" [see Note 7].

Success, however, was fleeting. The American cavalry quickly recovered and they sent the British fleeing. Alexander Chesney wrote that we "the remainder [of the British Legion] charged but were repulsed… I was with Tarleton in the charge" [see Note 8]. Mackenzie stated that "the loss sustained was in proportion to the danger of the enterprise, and the whole body was repulsed."

Simons noted that "their Cavalry, who finding they could no longer Keep Everhart a Prisoner, Shot him with a Pistol, in the head, over one of his eyes, (I cannot remember particularly which) being then intermixed with the enemy, Everhart pointed out to me the man who shot him, and on whom a just Retaliation was exercised, and who by my order, was instantly Shot, and his horse as well as I can recollect, was given to Everhart, whom I ordered in the rear to the Surgeons" [see again Note 5].

Once again, Tarleton escaped capture [see Note 9]. Henry Wells recalled that "Col. Tarleton was hard run by a small detachment of American horse and barely escaped being taken prisoner. It was generally agreed in the Camp that Tarleton could easily have been shot by those in pursuit of him, but their object was to take him alive."

The immediate American pursuit was determined, but disorganized. This led to one more confrontation between the British and American cavalry.

Howard learned that "In the pursuit he [William Washington] had got a head of his men, perhaps 30 yards. Three of the british officers observing this wheeled about and made a charge at him. The officer on his right was raising his arm to cut at him when a sargent came up and made a stroke at this officer which disabled his arm.--The officer on the left at the same moment was preparing to make a stroke at him when a boy, a waiter, who had not the strength to wield a sword, drew his pistol and shot and wounded this officer, which disabled him. The third person, who Washington thinks was Tarleton, made a thrust at him which he parryed. This person then retreated 10 or 12 steps and wheeled about and fired a pistol which wounded Washington's horse [see Note 10].

Pursuit. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11 = British Cavalry.

Pursuit (click to enlarge).

Notes:

1. But not all. As noted previously (Cowpens in Miniature 23), a part of the mounted militia was attempting to capture the British baggage train. Cornet Simons believed that some of the Continental dragoons were still mopping up the scattered British infantry. He wrote to Washington that "Lt Bell" had "taken off with him in pursuit of the Enemy, on our left nearly a fourth part of your Regt."

At least part (and maybe most) of the mounted militia was with Washington at this time. Manual McConnell stated in his pension application that he was a member of "Capt. McCall's company… attached to the command of Col. Washington." He claimed that "he was with or not far behind Col. Washington when he chased Col. Tarlton so close after the battle."

2. Although Pickens and Jackson differed as to who captured McArthur, they agreed on this point. Jackson wrote to Morgan that I had "the honor of introducing Maj. McArthur [to you]."

3. Pickens’ statement is important in establishing the timing of this last encounter of the British and American cavalry. That Washington was still on the battlefield strongly suggests that this fight occurred after the 71st had surrendered. Indications that the Delaware Continentals were also a part of Washington’s pursuit force, places the surrender of the 71st (in which the Delawareans participated), before this fight with Tarleton. In Simons account, Washington began "pursuit of their Cavalry," "immediately after Securing the Prisoners."

4. Benson Lossing, a mid-19th Century visitor of the battlefield, wrote that the British infantry "retreated along the Mill gap road [i.e., the Green River Road] to the place near Scruggs's... then covered with an open wood like the ground where the conflict commenced. There the battle ended and the pursuit was relinquished. It was near the northern border of that present open field that Washington and Tarleton had a personal conflict." He also wrote that "The battle ended within a quarter of a mile of Scruggs's." Scrugg's farm was not present at the time of the battle. It's future location was near the road, close to the right edge of the battlefield map. I show Tarleton's charge occurring close to 1/2 mile from Scrugg's farm. Although not shown (because of the small numbers involve), I envision the final brush between Washington and (allegedly) Tarleton to have occurred at a location about midway between the site of Tarleton's charge and the eastern edge of the battlefield.

5. Tarleton said there were 14 officers. Mackenzie indicated that the 17th Light Dragoons had two officers; my system for estimating British strength at the battle (see Cowpens in Miniature 2) yielded 12 officers for the British Legion dragoons. Therefore, it’s possible that all of the British Legion dragoon and 17th Light Dragoon officers were present. Although seemingly excluded, it’s possible that some mounted infantry officers were also present.

Tarleton generally gave round numbers for his strength, so it’s unlikely that exactly 40 troopers were with him, as he claimed. Mackenzie said that the number was something less than 50 and identified them as the 17th Light Dragoons. In view of their heavy losses earlier in the battle (see Cowpens in Miniature 20), they could not have mustered close to 40 or 50 men. Some rank and file of the British Legion must have been present. Their identity is unknown, although Simons’ account implicates that the men holding Sergeant Everhart a prisoner were present (see Cowpens in Miniature 7 regarding his capture). This suggests either the British vanguard or a provost guard had been left in the rear when the British Legion reserve was ordered up. This group is repeatedly depicted on the battlefield maps I’ve prepared.

6. Howard’s account was written in order to correct mischaracterizations of the battle present in William Johnson’s account (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1). Howard seems to have regarded Tarleton’s description as basically accurate (as do I), although Howard wrote that on this point, Tarleton was in error. "Tarleton says that 14 officers & 40 men charged Washington's horse and drove them back to the [Continentals] ... This is not correct. This affair checked Washington's pursuit, but he did not fall back." If Howard meant only that Washington did not fall back to where Howard, the militia, and the remainder of the Continentals were guarding the prisoners, then this statement is not problematic. Tarleton’s version seems to be confirmed by Delaware Continental Henry Wells.

7. He’s referring to the battle in general and not specifically this exchange, but this is the most likely timing. Other Delaware Continentals indicated they joined with Washington in the pursuit. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson wrote "We followed them ten miles but not being able to Come up With them Returned back to the field of Battle that night and lay amongst the Dead & Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work." Sergeant-Major William Seymour wrote "our men pursuing them for the distance of twelve miles." Neither of these statements, however, mentions the cavalry action at the beginning of the pursuit.

8. This is the most logical event that Chesney is referring to. However, when the passage is read in context, Chesney seems to be referring to some charge that occurred at the beginning of the American counterattack (See Alexander Chesney's Rivulet for the full text of his statement). While Chesney should be regarded as an excellent source, I did not make the most direct interpretation of his account because such a claim would be in contrast with a number of other participant accounts.

It should be noted Tarleton, and the band with him, might not have witnessed the surrender of the 71st Foot because of the intervening ridge. Chesney may have learned about their surrender later and wrongly concluded that the 71st surrendered after the unsuccessful final cavalry fight. The official British report of the battle claimed that "The Loss of our Cavalry is inconsiderable, but I fear, about 400 of the Infantry are either killed or wounded, or taken." This claim was disingenuous. The "400 of the Infantry" just about covers the killed, wounded, and captured that Tarleton could likely see from his final position of the battlefield. The loss sustained by the 71st (which was total) could at least have been surmised.

9. This is in reference to his escaping being captured with Major McArthur and the 71st Foot (see Cowpens in Miniature 22).

10. David Stewart related a muddled version of this same episode. In his telling, Cornet Patterson of the 17th Light Dragoons was the officer wounded by Washington’s "waiter." Continental dragoon James Kelly described a second-hand version of this episode in his pension application.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Pickens, Howard, and Anderson, among others.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

The Journal of Alexander Chesney.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Manual McConnell (.pdf file).

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Jackson's letters.

Benson John Lossing's 1860 Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of James Kelly (.pdf file).

Related: The British Legion, The American Cavalry - Part 1, 17th Light Dragoons

Cowpens in Miniature 23

Part 23: Surrender

Previous: Flight

Next: The Last Gambit

The flight of the British Legion dragoon reserve meant that the American counterattack would not be checked. François-Jean de Chastellux noted that the British Legion "fled full gallop, without ever thinking of the infantry, or taking the least precaution to cover their retreat."

The infantry struggled to fend for themselves as all order broke down. Daniel Morgan reported that "The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight." Sergeant-Major William Seymour happily observed that the British "retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field." From writing from a British perspective, David Stewart gloomily concurred, "the rout Was general; few of the infantry escaped; and of the cavalry, who put their horses to full speed, not a man was taken."

Not all of the British troops attempted to flee, however. The remnant of the 17th Light Dragoons stayed on the field, although they had been, in Cornet James Simons words, "deserted by Colo. Tarleton's Legeonary Cavalry." Tarleton also remained behind. When the Legion dragoons could not be rallied, he remained with the 17th Light Dragoons and a handful of others on horseback, near the Green River Road. George Hanger claimed that "He stood almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy, with hopes either of rallying his own men, or not surviving their disgrace." This small force offered at least some protection for his retreating infantry, which had, in American Thomas Young’s words, thrown "down their guns and cartouch boxes, made for the wagon road, and did the prettiest sort of running!"

The presence of the American cavalry in the rear of the British infantry severely limited their options to escape.

Cornet James Simons stated in a letter to William Washington long after the battle that "In pursuit of their Cavalry [i.e., the 17th Light Dragoons] you overtook their Artillery, whom you immediately made prisoners." Howard convincingly claimed that the guns were taken by his own infantry [see Note 1], but it’s possible that the cavalry encountered at least the horse-drawn limbers. Simon went on to relate that "the Drivers of the Horses who were Galloping off with 2-3 pounders, you could not make Surrender until after Repeated Commands from you, you were obliged to order to be Shot; after securing these fieldpieces."

Letting the 17th go, the American then turned on the British infantry. According to Simons "your third Charge was made on the right wing of their Army… who, under the Operation of a Universal panic, (having been successfully charged on the left of their Army by our friend Col. Howard) instantly surrendered" [see Note 2]. Major Joseph McJunkin remembered also the key role played by the American cavalry, "Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms [see Note 3].

The British infantry was certainly not going to outrun the American cavalry; frequently they could not outrun the American infantry.

Mackenzie wrote that "the infantry were easily overtaken, as the cause which had retarded the pursuit [i.e., exhaustion], had now an equal effect in impeding the retreat: dispirited on many accounts, they surrendered at discretion." De Chastellux agreed, "Fatigued by a very long march, they were soon overtaken."

Even the militia that had survived Nettles’ attack was able to contribute to this final assault on the British right. According to Private James Collins, "We… advanced briskly, and gained the right flank of the enemy, and they being hard pressed in front, by Howard, and falling very fast, could not stand it long.

Surrender (click to enlarge). Closely pressed by American Continentals and militia, and their retreat cut off by the American cavalry, most of the British infantry throw down their arms (not shown). Meanwhile, Tarleton stands "almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy."

American Cavalryman Thomas Young, seeing the British line collapse so utterly noted that at this time, "Major Jolly and seven or eight of us, resolved upon an excursion to capture some of the baggage" [see Note 4]. Tarleton may have seen these men, but he evidently did not interfere with them. He retained his toehold on the battlefield.

Around the same time, that the Americans were mopping up the right side of the British line, the British left was also in complete collapse. Lieutenant-Colonel Howard recalled that "In the pursuit, I was led towards the [American] right, in among the 71st, who were broken into squads. They no longer offered serious resistance. William Moultrie claimed that "So great was the consternation in which the British infantry were, at seeing their cavalry gallop off, that, either from pique or panic, numbers of them never fired a gun."

Howard recalled that "I called to them [the 71st Foot] to surrender, they laid down their arms, and the officers delivered up their swords." Major McJunkin was also immediately present and remembered that "some begin to call for quarters," when "the voice of Howard is heard amid the rush of men and clangor of steel: ‘Throw down your arms and you shall have good quarters.’ When they were finally "convinced that quarters would be given, they as it were rent the very air with thanks that their lives would be spared. These were called the Scots regiment" [see Note 5].

All-in-all, according to William Moultrie, "upwards of five hundred laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners. The first battalion of the seventy-first, and two companies of light infantry, laid down their arms." The 71st surrendered on the British left; the two companies of light infantry (perhaps Moultrie meant the light infantry of the 16th and 71st regiments) were perhaps the last organized resistance on the British right.

Several anecdotes concerning the surrender of the 71st Foot have been preserved in participant accounts. McJunkin stated that "In the conclusion of this foray you might have seen Major [James] Jackson of Georgia rush among the broken ranks of the 71st Regiment and attempting to seize their standard, while they are vainly trying to form by it; you might have seen Col. Howard interposing for the relief of his friend when entangled among his foes" [see Note 6].

Howard related that one "Captain Duncanson, of the 71st grenadiers [see Note 7], gave me his sword, and stood by me. Upon getting on my horse, I found him pulling at my saddle, and he nearly unhorsed me. I expressed my displeasure, and asked him what he was about. The explanation was, that they had orders to give no'quarter, and they did not expect any; and as my men were coming up, he was afraid they would use him ill. I admitted his excuse, and put him into the care of a sergeant. I had messages from him for some years afterwards, expressing his obligation for my having saved his life."

Major Arthur McArthur, who commanded the first battalion of the 71st attempted to escape on horseback, but he was overridden by one or more mounted Americans. Who captured him is unclear. Colonel Andrew Pickens claimed that, "Major McCarthur surrendered to me, some distance from the battlefield & delivered his sword to me," while Major Jackson wrote that McArthur was "a prisoner on that occasion taken by myself" [emphasis in original].

Notes:

1. Morgan also implicitly credited Howard with capturing the guns in his official report of the battle. Howard, Morgan reported, "gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address that they [the British] fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces in our possession."

2. The excised text includes that "the right wing of their Army Composed of their Legeonary Infantry, intermixed with the Battallion of the Brave 71st (under the Command of Major McArthur,)" The 71st Foot was neither a part of the right wing of their army nor next to the British Legion infantry. Perhaps he was thinking of the light infantry companies of the 71st Foot, who were on hand.

3. The full text reads "One battalion throws down their arms and the men fall to the earth. Another commences flight, but Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms." McJunkin recognized that the British line had broken into two parts. The battalion that "throws down their arms" is the 71st, the other "battalion" is the British right. McJunkin was personally involved at this time in the fight against the 71st; he did not seem to realize or remember that the British right included several commands.

4. Howard mentions Morgan’s aide, Baron de Glaubeck leading "five or six militia men well mounted," on this excursion. McJunkin related that "After the surrender of the British infantry a company of fourteen dashed off to take possession of the British baggage wagons ten miles distant. Major Benjamin Jolly and a Frenchman called De Barron headed this party. It happened to pass Col. Tarleton while he was collecting his men after the retreat. Unconscious of this fact, they pressed on in comparative security."

Other individuals may have also made a mounted pursuit. Militiaman Hugh McNary claimed that he joined in the pursuit "when the Enemy first gave way." Whether the rest of his company was mounted or on foot, he "got far enough ahead of his company to stop a British officer, the officer surrendered, deponent [i.e., McNary] dismounted and took from the officer his Holsters and pistols, and after getting them, he discovered, that his company had stopped pursuit and were retreating back, he mounted his horse and returned leaving the British officer, but took the Holsters and pistols which he afterwards sold."

5. Several American sources seemed impressed by the restraint they showed on this occasion (implicitly in contrast with what happened on other battlefields). Morgan reported that "It, perhaps, would be well to remark, for the honor of the American arms, that although the progress of this [Tarleton’s] corps was marked with burning and devastation, and although they waged the most cruel warfare, not a man was killed, wounded, or even insulted, after he surrendered."

6. Major James Jackson confirmed this episode: "[I ran] the utmost risk of my life, in an attempt to seize the colors of the 71st regiment in the midst of it, on their attempt to form after they were broken, being saved by an exertion of Col. Howard’s." The 71st Foot did not carry its colors into the battle. The 7th Foot did have its colors, one of which was captured by an American militiaman (see 7th Regiment of Foot). This account may describe that capture.

7. The two battalions of the 71st Foot had, between them, two companies of light infantry, and two companies of grenadiers. The former were at the battle of Cowpens, the latter were not. The 71st's grenadiers were captured at the battle of Stony Point in 1779. That Captain Duncanson would have been at Cowpens indicates that he was 1) absent during the battle of Stony Point, 2) at that battle, but subsequently exchanged, or 3) captured at Stony Point, but released on parole. If Duncanson had violated his parole, he was liable to be hanged.

Sources:

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report, and a copy of Jackson's letters.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Hanger's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Young, McJunkin, Collins, Howard, and Pickens, among others.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes a review by Will Graves of McJunkin's statements. McJunkin's description of the raid on the baggage train can be found here.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh McNary (.pdf file).

Related: 71st Foot, The American Cavalry - Part 1, The American Cavalry - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 19

Part 19: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Previous: The Third Crisis

Next: Washington and Howard Charge

As the Continentals about-faced and moved off in retreat, the British infantry surged towards them, cheering and wielding their bayonets. According to Henry Lee, "Considering this retrograde movement the precursor of flight, the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder." It was fortunate for the Americans that their commanders kept a cool head at this interval and marked out a spot where their men would halt and renew the fight. It was fortunate too that the American rank and file did not realize that the retreat was in error. Morgan and Howard acted "as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted" [see Note 1].

The British infantry were near the Continentals, and perhaps closing the distance with the Continentals, but the British could not overtake them. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie complained that "The infantry were not in condition to overtake the fugitives" [see Note 2]. The British, more so than the Americans "had been in motion day and night" in the days leading up to the battle. "A number [of the British]… had already fallen… fatigue, however, enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss of blood… the infantry, though well disposed, were unable to come up with his [Howard’s] corps [see Note 3].

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, in command of this battalion commented that "This retreat was accidental but was very fortunate as we thereby were extricated from the enemy."

They had fallen back approximately 100 yards [see Note 4], wheeling to their right during the retreat [see Note 5].

The Continentals Halt (click to enlarge).

At this point, according to Howard, "The enemy were now very near us." The distance may have been less than 30 yards [see Note 6].

Howard gave the command "to halt and face about." And with that "the line was perfectly formed in a moment."

For the pursuing British, here was a great shock. One moment they were on the verge of vanquishing their enemy, the next they were eye-to-eye with a wall of infantry.

There was a moment’s pause, and then the next command was given.

According to Anderson, we "then give them a full Volley."

This volley can be regarded as the climatic moment of the battle, an instant that both sides recognized as a turning point. The American after action report stated that we "gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder." The British after action report echoed this remark "General Morgan's Corps faced about & gave them [the British troops] a heavy fire. This unexpected event, occasioned the utmost confusion" [see Note 7].

A Fatal Volley (click to enlarge).

Henry Lee observed that the British were "Stunned by this unexpected shock," and "the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." The Americans, for their part, did not relent. The Continentals, in Howard’s words, gave the British "a few rounds" of "a very destructive fire."

Meanwhile, the British were also inflicting heavy losses, but on the American militia.

Major Joseph McJunkin stated that during the battle, "Tarleton… made a charge on the right & left wings, treading & cutting till he got in the rear of Howard's command." The first attack, by Ogilvie, had already been repulsed. The second one, by Lieutenant Henry Nettles and the 17th Light Dragoons, had cut through Triplett’s Virginians. Beyond Triplett’s men, and in the rear of the American position, was a host of targets for the 17th Light Dragoons. The dragoons attacked them all.

Nettles' Attack. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line (Triplett's former company has been broken, but the rest of the line is intact), 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Captain Connelly, who was fleeing with his company from the right wing of the main line towards the militia horses recalled that the British cavalry attacked "our company when just about to catch up [to] our horses which was tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle." They "fell upon us with great fury."

Some men from the right wing of the militia line were also in this area [see Note 8]. These men had already reached their horses when the dragoons attacked. One of these men Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled, "Tarleton's cavalry pursued us; ("now," thought I, "my hide is in the loft;") just as we got to our horses, they overtook us and began to make a few hacks at some, however, without doing much injury. They, in their haste, had pretty much scattered, perhaps, thinking they would have another Fishing creek frolic."

The heaviest blow fell upon the men of Colonel Andrew Pickens’ regiment of South Carolina militia. After serving on the militia line, they had reformed behind Triplett’s Virginians….

Jeremiah Files claimed he "was wounded by Tarleton's Dragoons on the head--on the left Arm and on the right Hand each wound was made with a sword… the wounds Greatly Disabled [him] & stuned him for some time." Private James Pettigrew saw that his, James Caldwell, "was cut almost to death by Tarlton's horsemen so much so that he had to be borne from the field." Michael Cain was wounded "on the head by a sword." His Captain, Andrew Miller, was killed [see Note 9]. Charles Holland "was wounded by a sword thrust through the body."

Private Robert Long, who was on the other side of the battlefield, heard that "At that time Tarleton brought 200 or 300 cavalry round in the rear of our left wing of militia." Nettles in fact had nowhere near this many men. This statement conveys something of the shocking power of this attack, coming upon the militia when and where it was least expected.

Notes:

1. From Francois-Jean de Chastellux’s 1781 interview with Daniel Morgan. During the retreat, Morgan saw that "the English, with more confidence than order, advanced to the attack." His own troops, meanwhile, were able to "keep their ranks." Therefore, Morgan "suffered them [the Continentals] to retreat a hundred paces, and then commanded them to halt and face the enemy, as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted."

2. Mackenzie’s thoughts here and elsewhere are expressed in such a way as to defame Tarleton. The retreating Continentals were not "fugitives," but rather maintained order. Mackenzie is insinuating that Tarleton could not even defeat an already-beaten foe.

3. Mackenzie claimed that "not less than two-thirds of the British infantry officers," "and nearly the same proportion of privates," had been shot. The British had amassed serious casualties by this point, but this is an exaggeration. The casualties Mackenzie alleges to have occurred by this time are greater than those suffered by the British during the entirety of the battle. This is another example in which Mackenzie’s wording implies Tarleton’s mishandling of the battle.

4. According to Howard; others stated different distances. Morgan claimed that "We retired in good order about fifty paces." Francois-Jean de Chastellux claimed that Morgan told him that he let the Continentals "retreat a hundred paces." Private John Thomas of Virginia claimed that the Continentals "retreated from aboutt 80 yards."

5. The postwar histories by Francois-Jean de Chastellux and David Stewart both describe the whole Continental line wheeling. Howard stated that the retreat began on his right flank; the wheeling movement may have resulted from the Continental line breaking off the engagement from right to left (Lawrence Babits, in a Devil of a Whipping, describes in considerable detail how this could have occurred). Whether ordered or accidental, this wheeling motion was particularly fortunate to the Americans because it prevented the 71st Foot from gaining their right flank. The wheeling movement also helps explain why different sources differently estimated the distance of the Continentals’ retreat; in such a maneuver, some parts of the line would have fallen back further than others. A distance of 100 yards for at least part of the line seems likely as this was the distance between the Continentals and Triplett’s Virginians (see The Main Line: Organization). If the Continentals had retreated further, Triplett would have been exposed to a British bayonet charge.

6. How close the two lines were has been variously stated (and perhaps was various at different points on the line). Stewart thought that the 71st Foot had come "within forty yards of the hostile force." Howard claimed the British were "within 30 yards of us with two field pieces." Virginia militiaman John Thomas thought that the British were "within aboutt 30 steps of them."

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals thought that "We let them Come Within ten Or fifteen yards of us." Anderson’s phrase that "we let them come" close, is striking. It is unclear whether Howard intended to have the pursuing British get close to the Continentals. Judging from Anderson’s journal, he was one that evidently believed that "the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted," and perhaps this is his supposition for why his superiors would order such a movement. Chastellux believed something similar before he interviewed Morgan.

7. A number of participants made similar remarks. Howard wrote in one place: "The enemy were now very near us. Our men commenced a very destructive fire, which they little expected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder in their ranks." In another he said, "The enemy pressed upon us in rather disorder, expecting the fate of the day was decided. They were by this time within 30 yards of us with two field pieces; my men with uncommon coolness gave them an unexpected and deadly fire." Banastre Tarleton claimed in his memoir that "An unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans, who came about as they were retreating, stopped the British, and threw them into confusion." Private John Thomas of Virgina recalled that the Continentals "were ordered to wheele and fire. They did so, the British being within aboutt 30 steps of them." Private John Baldwin of North Carolina recalled that "Morgan defeated the British with his regulars, after they concluded the Americans were all running."

Similar comments also appeared in postwar histories of the battle. For example, Henry Lee wrote that "the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder; but, as it drew near, Howard faced about, and gave it a close and murderous fire. Stunned by this unexpected shock, the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." David Stewart wrote that "Colonel Howard, commanding the reserve, threw in a fire upon the 71st when within forty yards of the hostile force. The fire was destructive: nearly one-half of their number fell." This is an exaggeration (see Note 4, above). The British line was so much longer than that of the Continentals that it seems likely a part of the 71st was not struck at all by this volley. More accurately, Stewart also claimed that "The fate of the action was decided by the destructive fire of the Americans' second line."

8. Henry Lee thought they had been detached by Colonel Andrew Pickens to help secure the miltia’s horses. See Flight of the Militia - Part 3.

9. These claims were made by Cain’s widow. She also identified him with Captain Robert Anderson of this regiment.

Sources:

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Mackenzie's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, Anderson, Collins, and Thomas, among others.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's after action report.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Files (.pdf file).

Nan Overton West transcribed the pension application of James Pettigew (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of Michael Cain (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Charles Holland (.pdf file).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Baldwin (.pdf file).

Related: The Fatal Moment, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

Cowpens in Miniature 14

Part 14: The Militia Line

Previous: Fighting on the Skirmish Line

Next: Attack on the Main Line

The American skirmishers fell back as the British advanced and took up new positions with the militia line. British historian David Stewart thought that the British were “running;” probably they advanced at the quick step.

Now the men on the militia line steeled themselves for their assigned mission, one massive, lethal blast, delivered at close range. A single shot, fired too soon, had the possibility of triggering a premature volley. Thomas Young on horseback behind these men remembered that “Every officer was crying don't fire! for it was a hard matter for us to keep from it.”

The British Attack the Militia Line. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

"Make Ready!"

"Fire!"

At last, the order was given. Henry Lee wrote that “The enemy, shouting, rushed forward upon the front line, which retained its station, and poured in a close fire.” Fellow American historian William Moultrie thought that the Americans waited “till the enemy came within fifty yards.” Stewart gave the distance as “thirty or forty paces.”

Daniel Morgan wrote that “The whole of Col. Pickens' command then kept up a fire by regiments.” Hammond’s South Carolinians, Cunningham’s Georgians, McDowell’s North Carolinians, and the several small battalions under Brandon, Thomas, and Roebuck all let loose within moments of each other. Thomas Young remembered this as “a whole volley.”

At some point the British fired at the militia as well. William Moultrie noted that the British “threw in a heavy fire upon the militia” before the front-line militia fired. In Stewart’s history, however, they fired second and did so without “vivacity or impression.”

British casualties in this exchange were in all likelihood heavy [see Note 1]. Some losses also occurred among the militia [see Note 2].

In the immediate aftermath, the British had the advantage: they were armed with bayonets while the Americans were not. Private James Collins remembered that “We gave the enemy one fire, when they charged us with their bayonets; we gave way and retreated for our horses” [see Note 3]. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, watching the fighting from the main line saw that the British “rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen to fire a second time.” This is exactly what Morgan had expected. “The whole of Col. Pickens' command then… [began] retreating agreeably to their orders.”

The statements by Collins, Howard, Morgan, and others all imply that the militia quickly retreated, keeping ahead of British bayonets. However, the fighting on the front line may not have been of a single character, and there was perhaps at least one place where the British and Americans entered into close combat. On the left wing of the front line, Captain John Irby recalled that militiaman “Richard Griffin was wounded… by a bayonet in his left thigh by the Enemy and he [the British soldier] would have killed him [Griffin] had he not been shot down by… the Ensign of the Company” [see Note 4].

Thomas Young noted that the militia had “fought for some time, and retreated again.” Once again, the mounted militia interposed between the advancing British and the retreating Americans. Young stated, “I recollect well that the cavalry was twice, during the action, between our army and the enemy.” They did not, however, come to blows with the British infantry. Private William Neel of Virginia was disappointed, observing that “At this battle the South Carolina mounted militia under Colo Brannon proved very defective in the commencement of the action” [see Note 5].

Notes:

1. American participants, somewhat surprisingly, did not comment on the effects of this volley. Statements indicating heavy British casualties at this point in the battle appeared only in postwar histories.

David Stewart asserted that the British front line was “exhausted by running… it received the fire of the enemy at the distance of thirty or forty paces. The effect of the fire was considerable: it produced something like a recoil, but not to any extent. The fire was returned, but not with vivacity or impression; and it continued ten or twelve minutes in a state of balance, both parties keeping their ground. The light infantry made two attempts to charge, but were repulsed with loss- The action making no progress, the Highlanders were ordered up; and, rapidly advancing in charge, the enemy's front line moved off precipitately.”

William Johnson claimed that “At the assigned distance they [the militia] delivered their fire with unerring aim, and it was the magnanimous confession of a gallant officer of the Maryland line who fought on this day, ‘that here the battle was gained.’ The killed and wounded of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers who lay on the field of battle where the fire of the riflemen Was delivered, and the high proportion which the killed and wounded of this description bore to the whole number, sufficiently justified the assertion.”

Neither of these histories is terribly reliable (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1 for my treatment of Johnson). Stewart claimed that the fighting on the militia line was prolonged. However, participant accounts, both British and American, indicate that the militia retreated quickly. Stewart has the 71st Foot breaking the deadlock on the militia line. Others generally indicate that the 71st entered the fighting at a later point in the battle. The quotation that Johnson supplies from an anonymous Maryland officer is believable, but it is not clear what it indicates. The statement surely means that for once the militia did their assigned duty and this was instrumental in the American victory (no doubt the officer had the battle of Camden in mind for comparison). Whether or not Johnson’s description also indicates that the front-line militia inflicted heavy casualties is less clear.

The British casualties I’ve indicated for this moment in the battle (3 miniatures; these will be more clearly visible in future images) are modest compared with the losses suggested by Stewart's and Johnson's histories. I arrived at this number first by making an estimate of total British casualties and second by dividing those casualties across the various phases of the battle in a manner that is primarily consistent with participant statements (and, to a lesser extent, later histories). There are other points in the battle at which the British received a greater volume of fire and for which heavy British casualties are more strongly indicated. Even if this one volley was particularly well aimed, it is difficult to see how it could have inflicted many more casualties, for example, than the British received in advancing on the Continentals. About as many men fired at the British on the main line as did on the militia line. However, the militia were only able to deliver a single volley, while the main line fired repeatedly.

2. It is quite likely that the militia suffered considerably fewer casualties than the British, despite being outnumbered. From Lexington and Concord until the final battles of the war, American sources spoke disparagingly about the accuracy of British musket fire. Many militiamen also likely stooped low to the ground or stood behind trees as a means of protecting themselves. Casualties, however, did occur. Lawrence Babits reviewed and cited pension applications from former militiamen that strongly imply they were shot on the militia line.

3. Collins' statement was given special consideration in a previous post. See Flight of the Militia - Part 3.

4. Babits placed Irby in Hayes’ regiment. However, in reviewing the composition of Hayes’ regiment, I noted that participant accounts do not appear to link Irby’s company with Hayes’ regiment (see Little River Regiment). Rather, Irby appears to have commanded a company of Georgia Refugees and as such likely served with Captain Samuel Hammond and Major John Cunningham on the left wing of the militia line. Griffin was from Georgia. It’s not clear that this passage refers to an incident that took place at this time during the battle. Also possible (but in my view less likely) is that Griffin was wounded during the American counterattack late in the battle.

5. Colonel Thomas Brandon did not command the mounted militia. However, Young links Brandon with the mounted militia at a later point in the battle, and Captain Benjamin Jolly, who commanded one of the two companies of mounted militia, was in Brandon’s regiment.

Sources:

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Young, Collins, and Howard, among other sources.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Richard Griffin (which contains the statement by Irby) (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, The Cowpens Battlefield, Mounted Militia

Morgan and Seymour

This is the fourth in a series of posts defending the view that a relatively small number of Americans fought at Cowpens.

There are only a few participant accounts of the battle of Cowpens that were written around the time that the battle was fought. Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan's after action report was written two days after the battle. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson and Sergeant William Seymour of the Delaware company serving at the battle maintained journals, so too did the Loyalist Alexander Chesney. Of these, Morgan and Seymour mentioned the number of Americans serving at the battle. Both stated that the American force was around 800 men. One of the challenges that Lawrence Babits faced in arguing in A Devil of a Whipping that the American force was much larger than has been usually claimed was addressing Morgan's and Seymour's relatively small estimates.

Morgan

Babits pointed out that Morgan may have had cause to be deceptive in his public description of American strength at Cowpens. By suggesting that the number of militia was relatively small, the continentals would be seen as having played an especially important role in the victory. Leaving aside Morgan's intentions, which of course are difficult to explore, it at least can be pointed out that what Morgan said in his public report did not differ from what he said in his private correspondence. Two days before the battle, Morgan wrote to Major-General Nathanael Greene asking that his detachment be recalled from western South Carolina because it was too small to fight off whatever detachment the British might send against it:

“Upon a full and mature deliberation, I am confirmed in the opinion that nothing can be effected by my detachment in this country which will balance the risks I will be subjected to by remaining here. The enemy's great superiority of numbers and our distance from the main army, will enable Lord Cornwallis to detach so superior a force against me, as to render it essential to our safety to avoid coming to action; nor will this always be in my power. No attempt to surprise me will be left untried by them, and situated as we must be, every possible precaution may hot be sufficient to secure us. The scarcity of forage makes it impossible for us to be always in a compact body; and were this not the case, it is beyond the art of man to keep the militia from straggling. These reasons, induce me to request that I may be recalled with my detachment; and that General Davidson and Colonel Pickens may be left with the militia of North and South Carolina and Georgia. They will not be so much the object of the enemy's attention, and will be capable of being a check on the disaffected, which is all I can effect.”

Alternatively, it could be argued that Morgan might not have fully understand how many militiamen were with him. This argument cannot be taken too far, however, considering how effectively he used his forces in defeating the British. Furthermore, if Morgan was in error, then it stands to reason that his statement would have been corrected during or after the war by the commanders of the Southern militia. Instead, Governor John Rutledge, the commander-in-chief of the South Carolina militia wrote to Morgan of, "This total defeat of chosen Veteran British Troops by a number far inferior to theirs." Colonel Andrew Pickens, the commander of the militia line at Cowpens, corresponded after the war with Colonel Henry Lee. Lee published two histories of the Southern Campaign; in the first of these he mentioned Morgan's "inferiority in numbers." Pickens corresponded with him during this period, but rather than correct a misunderstanding, he wrote to Lee, "You know the particulars of the battle of the Cowpens."

Seymour

I previously provided the text of Morgan's report. Below is the text from Seymour's journal relating to the battle of Cowpens. (You can find this online here and here).

"We lay on this ground [Morgan's camp on the Pacolet River] from the twenty-fifth December, 1780, till the fourteenth January, 1781, and then proceeded on our march farther up the river towards the iron works in order to frustrate the designs of the enemy who were coming round us, Colonel Tarleton on one side and Lord Cornwallis on the other. We encamped on the Cowpen plains on the evening of the sixteenth January, forty-two miles, being joined by some Georgia volunteers and South [Carolina] militia, to the number of between two and three hundred.

"Next day being the seventeenth January, we received intelligence a while before day, that Colonel Tarleton was advancing in our rear in order to give us battle, upon which we were drawn up in order of battle, the men seeming to be all in good spirits and very willing to fight. The militia were dismounted and were drawn up in front of the standing troops on the right and left banks, being advanced about two hundred yards. By this time the enemy advanced and attacked the militia in front, which they stood very well for some time till being overpowered by the superior number of enemy they retreated, but in very good order, not seeming to be the least bit confused. By this time the enemy advanced and attacked our light infantry with both cannon and small arms, where meeting with a very warm reception they then thought to surround our right flank, to prevent which Captain Kirkwood with his company wheeled to the right and attacked their left flank so vigorously that they were soon repulsed, our men advancing on them so very rapidly that they soon gave way. Our left flank advanced at the same time and repulsed their right flank, upon which they retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field, our men pursuing them for the distance of twelve miles, insomuch that all their infantry was killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. This action commenced about seven o'clock in the morning and continued till late in the afternoon.

"In the action were killed of the enemy one hundred and ninty men, wounded one hundred and eighty, and taken prisoners one Major, thirteen Captains, fourteen Lieutenants, and nine Ensigns, and five hundred and fifty private men, with two field pieces and four standards of colours. Their heavy baggage would have shared the same fate, if Tarleton, who retreated with his cavalry, had not set fire to it, burning up twenty-six waggons. This victory on our side can be attributed to nothing else but Divine Providence, they having thirteen hundred in the field of their best troops, and we not eight hundred of standing troops and militia.

"The troops against us were the 7th or Royal English Fuzileers, First Battalion of the 71st, and the British Legion, horse and foot.

"The courage and conduct of the brave General Morgan in this action is highly commendable, as likewise Colonel Howard, who at all times of the action rode from right to left of the line encouraging the men; and indeed all the officers and men behaved with uncommon and undaunted bravery, but more especially the brave captain Kirkwood and his company, who did that day wonders, rushing on the enemy without either dread or fear, and being instrumental in taking a great number of prisoners.

"Our loss in the action were one Lieutenant wounded, and one Sergeant, and thirty-five killed and wounded, of which fourteen were of Captain Kirkwood's Company of the Delaware Regiment."

Seymour twice referred to the number of American combatants. The first statement is "on the evening of the sixteenth January... [we were] joined by some Georgia volunteers and South [Carolina] militia, to the number of between two and three hundred."

On the morning of January 16th, the regulars and the militia minus a few detachments were encamped together. That day they marched for the Cowpens. The regulars and militia, however, began their march at different times. Josiah Martin of McDowell's battalion wrote (see this .pdf) that "Early in the morning the regulars commenced march, the militia being on horseback started about 12 O'clock & overtook the regulars the evening before the battle of the Cowpens." No doubt what Seymour is describing is these horse-riding militiamen catching up with the regulars in the evening. The 200-300 militiamen he mentions as joining them that evening is therefore basically the entirety of the militia serving on the front line, plus some of those that were on the main line (at least in my version of events: see here, here, and here), and probably the greater part of the mounted militia. This estimate can be disputed (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?). It should be remembered that given his relative position with the army he may have had no better information than the estimate provided by his eyes and the camp rumors that reached his ears. Perhaps he had heard that the militia with them were from South Carolina and Georgia and he did not realize that some were also from North Carolina. Nevertheless, Babits ascribed to Seymour's statement a very specific meaning. According to Babits (p 177-178, n 28), these 200-300 men were "McCall's South Carolina Regiment... three Georgia companies under Major James Jackson... [and those of] Hayes' Little River Battalion not on rear guard." Claiming that Seymour's 200-300 men referred to a small portion of Morgan's total force is convenient to Babits' argument that Morgan's total force was large. However, this is one of the more implausible readings of Seymour's statement. Seymour's account was very concise; he mentioned only the major facts. Why would he pick out one small part of the American force, a part that he was not in, nor served near him during the battle, nor played a crucial role in the victory? Why would he describe only its strength and not that of other militia units?

The other statement by Seymour is that, "This victory on our side can be attributed to nothing else but Divine Providence, they having thirteen hundred in the field of their best troops, and we not eight hundred of standing troops and militia." Seymour mentions 800 men in the American force, just like Morgan did in his report.

Here is Babits on the meaning of Morgan's and Seymour's 800 (p 151), "Morgan claimed 800 men won against 'chosen' British troops... Morgan's 'regulars,' Continentals, and long-service Virginia militia, numbered about 600 men; 300 Continental infantry, 82 Continental dragoons, 160 Virginia militia under Triplett, and about 50 Virginia State Troops. This total does not include Carolina and Georgia militia, nor does it include state troops. On paper, at least, Morgan counted his 'regulars," and perhaps threw in another 200 men to allow for the militia."

In an upcoming post I will present my version of the American order of battle. When I do so I will argue that the continentals, long-service militia, dragoons, and Virginia state troops totaled about 535 men. If there were 800 men in total, this would leave 265 men unaccounted for -- about the midpoint of the 200-300 Georgian and Carolina militia that Seymour witnessed. If Morgan was in fact mistaken about militia totals, his error, like Seymour's, would seem to be on the order of an honest mistake rather than deliberate subterfuge.

Babits continued by saying, "Sergeant Major William Seymour of the Delaware Company validates this interpretation by stating explicitly that "we [had] not eight hundred of standing troops and militia." If Seymour meant 800 regulars ("standing troops") augmented by militia, then Morgan, Seymour, and Tarleton agree. Eliminating the militia made the victory seem more important because American regulars won the battle."

Read in context, Seymour's statement does not validate this interpretation but indicates quite the opposite. He is comparing one total force to another, and he emphasizes the weakness of the American force by indicating not only that was it smaller in size but also that it was partially comprised of militia. It cannot be credibly argued that Seymour used his journal (which was first published long after his death) to mislead the public about the contribution of the Continentals to the victory at Cowpens. Rather, Seymour surely believed the same thing that Morgan, Greene, Pickens, Rutledge, Colonel Otho Williams, and the United States Congress believed (see the passages described in this post as well as the statements quoted above) -- that Morgan's army was substantially outnumbered by Tarleton's command.

Related: Introduction, Problems with Pensions, Veteran Survival, Little River Regiment

The Militia Line at Cowpens

[Revised 12/26/09]

General:

An 1822 history, Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland, which tells the story of the battle of Cowpens from the perspective of the Scottish soldiers in the 71st Foot, provided one of the clearest descriptions of where the American militia line stood during the battle.

"On the morning of the 17th January 1781, intelligence was received that General Morgan was in front, with his force drawn up on a rising ground, thinly covered with pine trees; the front line being on the crown of the rising ground, and the second 400 paces in rear of the first line."

In other words, there were militia positioned near the number 1 on the map below.

Not all of the militia were deployed in this one spot. Rather, the militia line was divided into two wings, with one wing located near the crest of Elevation #1 (#6 on the map below), and the other wing located near the Green River Road (#7 on the map below).

1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = Skirmishers

Clear evidence for this deployment can be found in the after action report of the American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan. Morgan stated:

"An hour before daylight [on the morning of the battle] one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them... The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of the brave and valuable Col. Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the line, one hundred and fifty yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front, Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolinans, were posted on the right of Maj. McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Maj. Cunningham."

Other participant accounts also indicated that the militia were divided into two parts.

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina recalled that, "the regulars [were] in the center, commanded by Col. Howard, the militia on the right and left—the right commanded by Gen. Pickens, the left by _________ [blank in the original]. Col. Washington in the rear with his troop of cavalry."

Sergeant-Major William Seymour of the Delaware Continentals recorded in his journal that, "The militia were... drawn up in front of the standing troops [i.e., the Continentals] on the right and left banks, being advanced about two hundred yards.”

Private Robert Long of South Carolina described the two militia wings to the front of his regiment. Directly in front of him on the right wing was "Major McDowell, of North Carolina... Cols. Thomas and Roebuck [were] in the extreme right. The left wing was similarly formed of militia." See The Statements of Private Robert Long.

Private Adam Files of South Carolina recalled in his pension application that, "The right of the Army was commanded by General Pickens. The left by Colonel McCall and these Center by General Morgan."

Private John Harris of South Carolina claimed in his pension application that, "I was in the left wing for the militia under Col. McCall."

Composition of the Right Wing:

The right wing of the militia line consisted of North and South Carolinians. The North Carolinans were organized into a single battalion under the command of Major Joseph McDowell. Following, in part, the analysis of Lawrence Babits described in A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Camden, the South Carolinians were organized into three small battalions. These South Carolinians included the 1st Spartan Regiment, under the command of Colonel John Thomas, and two battalions of the 2nd Spartan Regiment, under the command of Colonel Thomas Brandon, and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck. According to South Carolinian Aaron Guyton, these battalions were well linked with each other and Colonel Joseph Hayes' Little River regiment:

"I was under Colonel Brandon who had a few Brave men – who stood true for the cause of liberty in the back part of the State who composed our little Army I was out the most of this time sometimes we had 75 sometimes 150 men, and sometimes we had four or five Colonels with from 50 to 150 men. Each of them had command of a Regiment at home & sometimes not more than 5 of his men with him. The colonels were Brandon, Hase, Roebuck, White." Following Babits, these officers were Colonel Thomas Brandon, Colonel Joseph Hayes, Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck, and Major Henry White (second-in-command to John Thomas).

Morgan placed McDowell's battalion to the left side of the South Carolinians. Robert Long's account further adds that Thomas and Roebuck were on the extreme right. By extension, Brandon's battalion must have been deployed next to McDowell's men.

Composition of the Left Wing:

The left wing of the militia line consisted of Georgians and South Carolinians.

Major John Cunningham commanded a small battalion of Georgia militia. According to Major James Jackson of Georgia, Cunningham's command was comprised of three companies under the commands of Captains Samuel Hammond, Joshua Inman, and George Walton. Babits named a Captain Richard Heard in place of Hammond. One David Thurmond claimed, in his pension application, to have been a captain in this battalion at the battle.

Major (soon to be Colonel) James McCall commanded a regiment of South Carolina State Troops. McCall's regiment was recruited from Georgia and South Carolina "refugees." This regiment was supposed to be equipped as dragoons, but the regiment was still being organized at the time of the battle, and only a relatively small number were prepared to fight in that capacity. McCall took personal command of those troops equipped as dragoons and fought alongside Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington and the remainder of the American cavalry during the battle. The rest of the troops served under McCall's second-in-command, Captain (soon to be Major) Samuel Hammond. (Hammond's pension application is the source of many of these details).

Morgan's account indicates that the Georgians served on the right end of the left wing, while South Carolinians served on the left. Morgan placed Colonel Joseph Hayes' regiment of South Carolinians on the left wing, but Long convincingly placed it on the main line.

There are some other bodies of troops that were likely a part of the left wing that are generally not described in accounts of the battle. These may have included Captain John Irby's company of Georgia refugees (see Little River Regiment), and other, miscellaneous volunteers (see pension application of George Harbinson).

More significantly, Colonel Andrew Pickens' Upper Ninety-Six District Regiment of South Carolina militia was likely on the left wing. The few references to Pickens' regiment in accounts of the battle may reflect the absence of the regiment's senior leadership. Pickens was given overall command of the front-line militia and so was away from his regiment. Major Alexander Noble possibly had command of the American baggage (at least this was his assignment after the battle). Private Patrick Norris mentioned that Noble was "officer of the guard" and after the battle "conducted the forge wagon with a considerable number of arms, that were taken from Tarleton at his defeat to Gilbertstown in North Carolina."

McCall was well known to the men of Pickens' regiment having come from the same part of the state and having been, at one time, a captain in the regiment. It can be difficult to distinguish in some pension applications whether the applicant was a South Carolina refugee attached to McCall or whether the individual was in Pickens' regiment.

John Harris is one individual whose account is somewhat ambiguous.

Early in the war he was clearly in what would become Pickens' regiment: "In the summer of 1778–I was again called out and went in Captain Noble’s Company under Col. Andrew Williamson and Maj. Andrew Pickens." This was before Noble and Pickens had been promoted.

Sometime in 1780, however, he "joined Col. (then Capt McCall) in an enterprise which he under took to surprize the British at Augusta... [later] McCall retreated up the Saluda River spent two weeks in the mountains on the border of North Carolina, almost without food, and joined Gen’l. Morgans army in North Carolina a short time after the Battle of Kings Mountain. With this army I remained until the battle of the Cowpens Jan’y. 1781, in which I was in the left wing for the militia under Col. McCall."

A number of pension applications, however, clearly establish Pickens' regiment as one present at the battle.

Charles Holland was a private in Joseph Pickens' company of Colonel Andrew Pickens' regiment:

"he volunteered, some time in the month of September (as well as he can recollect) 1776, in a company of militia under the command of Captain James McCall, in the District then called Ninety-Six, now Abbeville, in the State of South Carolina, that said company was attached to a Regiment, or corps of men, under the command of Major Andrew Williamson or Winson, the Colonel, if any, not recollected; that he continued with Captain McCall until about a month July 1777, when the Captain was taken prisoner by the Indians & this relator was transferred to a militia company commanded by Captain Andrew Pickens, in the same Regiment; that soon after this, Williamson was promoted to the command of the Regiment & Captain Pickens was made the Major... [later,] one Joseph Pickens was promoted to the captaincy of said Company... and Major Andrew Pickens became the Commandant of this Regiment; and one Alexander Noble became Major."

Holland was also at the battle of Cowpens, where a British cavalryman wounded him "by a sword thrust through the body, which disabled him for active service for two or three months." Others in his regiment experienced the same fate.

James Pettigrew was a private in James Caldwell's company:

"The next battle he was in of any note was at the Cowpens under General Morgan. General Pickens, Col. Anderson, Colonel McCall, Major Noble, Lieut. Carlile [Francis Carlisle] were in that engagement and most of them, if not all, were under the command of General Pickens and from Abbeville District. He recollects that Colonel Washington with his cavalry was there and saved the militia from inevitable destruction. James Caldwell commanded this applicant's company and was cut almost to death by Tarlton's horsemen so much so that he had to be borne from the field."

Jeremiah Files was a private in John Files' company:

Jeremiah "enrolled himself as a volunteer under Colonel Andrew Pickens and at the time of his enrollment resided in Abbeville District in the State of South Carolina and marched from thence as a volunteer with Col.Pickens to Granvile Shoals on Packlet River and there joined General Morgan about the first of January in the year 1781 and then placed under the command of Captain McKall [James McCall] in the Battalion of Major Noble in the Regiment of Colonel Andrew Pickens of the South Carolina Militia... we marched under General Morgan to the Cowpens and was at the Battle fought there against Tarltons Legion on the Wednesday Morning on the 17th day of January 1781... This Deponent was wounded by Tarleton's Dragoons on the head – on the left arm and on the right hand each wound was made with a sword & the wounds are now visible the wounds Greatly Disabled this Deponent -- & Stunned him for some time & one Captain Alexander of Rowan County North Carolina was the first man to come to his relief & informed him of our victory."

Samuel Hammond's dubious sketch of the battle shows Pickens' regiment on the left wing of the main line (see The Hammond Map). However, Pettigrew's statement (see above) links McCall with Pickens' regiment, suggesting that their regiments served together during the battle.

Sources:

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland is available through Google Books.

Morgan's report of the battle can be found in James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan.

For a transcription of Long's accounts of the battle see The Statements of Private Robert Long.

John Moncure's The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage has a transcription of the statements by Hammond, Seymour, and Howard.

This issue of the online magazine, Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution has complete transcriptions and commentary on McJunkin's statements.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of David Thurmond (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Adam Files, which can be read here (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of John Harris, which can be read here (.pdf file).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Aaron Guyton (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Hammond (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of George Harbinson (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Patrick Norris (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Charles Holland (.pdf file).

Nan Overton West transcribed the pension application of James Pettigew (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Files (.pdf file).