Ramsour’s Mill: Joseph Graham Clarifies

Early histories of the southern campaign of the American Revolution said little about the battle of Ramsour’s Mill. In 1820, Joseph Graham, then an aged veteran, sought to set straight the historical record.

Joseph Graham first saw military service during the American Revolution with the 4th North Carolina regiment. He began active duty late in 1778, and was discharged 9 months later. During that time he served primarily as quartermaster sergeant and he was present at the battle of Stono Ferry (June 20, 1779). The North Carolina Continentals were captured en masse with the surrender of Charleston, South Carolina (May 12, 1780), and so when Graham returned to the field it was with the Mecklenburg, North Carolina, militia regiment. Graham was appointed regimental adjutant. The Mecklenburg militia (including Graham) largely missed participating in the battle of Ramsour’s Mill (June 20, 1780); however, they were engaged at Rocky Mount (July 30, 1780) and Hanging Rock (August 6, 1780). When the British invaded North Carolina in September, 1780, Graham commanded a volunteer force at Charlotte (September 26), where he fought with distinction and was badly wounded. At the end of the year he was appointed captain of a company of militia dragoons, and Graham led these men at Cowan’s Ford (February 1, 1781), Hart’s Mill (February 17, 1781), Pyle’s Defeat (February 17, 1781), Clapp’s Mill (March 4, 1781), and Weitzel’s Mill (March 6, 1781). In the Fall, he was promoted to major and led detachments at Raft Swamp (October 15, 1781), and More’s Plantation (November 14, 1781). Graham also served during the War of 1812, as brigadier-general commanding a force of North and South Carolina militia.

Joseph Graham, late in life.

Joseph Graham did not attempt to write his own history of the southern campaign, but rather wished to furnish material for those who would. In a letter to Colonel Charles Conner (dated November 27, 1820), he noted:

“I have a great number of loose sheets in continuation if properly connected and corrected, in my opinion would be interesting and voluminous, not a regular History of the war in this section of Country but rather a Supplement to the Histories of [John] Marshall, Ramsey [David Ramsay] and [Henry] Lee; some things omitted by them entirely, others inaccurately described and others where well described incidents are omitted which are worthy of being preserved, especially where the men of what was then Mecklenburg [County] and Rowan [County] were concerned… I will be responsible and furnish the facts; if you and a partner will furnish the arrangement and language…” [1]

Connor soon shared Graham’s written material with Judge Archibald Murphey, who was then working on a history of North Carolina. Murphey gushed to Graham (letter dated January 10, 1821), “Col. Connor delivered to me in Raleigh, your account of the battle at Ramsour’s, which I have read with much interest, for it was the first time I had any correct idea of that affair. I have the account in my possession, and will shortly give it to the public.”

Murphey soon submitted the account to the Hillsborough Register.

Later that year, Graham wrote to Murphey (letter dated October 8, 1821) about the reception this account received:

“Since the printers furnished me with an account of the Battles of Ramsour’s it has been examined by 8 or 10 persons who were in that affair, they all admit of the correctness and being circumstances to their recollection which they had forgotten.”

That same year, Graham sent Murphey accounts of Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and other engagements that had received little attention from the early historians. [2]

Coming soon: Graham's account of the battle of Ramsour's Mill.

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Note 1: Graham echoed this complaint in a later letter to Archibald Murphey, writing:

“In the Histories of the Revolutionary War by Marshall, Ramsey & Lee the details given of transactions in this Section of Country [i.e., the Carolinas] are frequently inaccurate and several things which had a bearing on the general result entirely omitted. They had not the means of correct information, except Lee who did not join the Southern Army with his Legion until the month of February, 1781, after which his narrative may be generally relied on.

“It may be remarked that… of all the battles fought in the South, there were not more than three or four official reports ever published. The Historians had to collect some of their information from common fame and other precarious sources. The truth is that many of the officers of that time were better at fighting than writing and could make better marks with their swords than with their pens. Their object did not appear so much to have their names puff’d in the columns of a news paper as to destroy their Enemy or drive him from their Country and Establish its Independence…”

Note 2: Graham’s letters do not make clear how he obtained his information. His comments in the note above suggest that he relied neither on written accounts by others, nor on common knowledge. He visited the battlefield not long after the fighting ended, and his memory for what he saw and heard was likely one source.

Graham wrote to Murphey, “For the truth of the facts he states he appeals to those who were present on the several occasions related, of whom it is believed more than 100 are yet living.” This comment implies that Graham had also discussed the battle with some number of surviving participants in later years and that he had reason to believe that his understanding of Ramsour’s Mill was consistent with the recollections of others.

Ramsour’s Mill in Early Histories of the War

As described previously, the battle of Ramsour’s Mill was seldom mentioned in surviving correspondence from the summer of 1780. Nevertheless, the battle did not escape the notice of early chroniclers of the war.

Below is a selection of passages referring to the battle in some of the earliest works on the war. Common themes in these works is that a force of Loyalists organized in North Carolina in June, 1780, and that this force was soon attacked and dispersed by the Americans (Whigs). Few details about where or how the Loyalists were defeated were available to the authors of these accounts.

Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

Comments: Charles Stedman was a British officer who served in the southern theater (but not at Ramsour's Mill). In his account, the North Carolina Loyalists under John Moore rose up in anticipation of a British invasion of their colony. However, the "insurrection" was premature and Moore's force was dispersed by Griffith Rutherford.

“A correspondence had been kept up with the loyalists in North Carolina: And, as the expedition into that province was necessarily delayed, his lordship [Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis] sent emissaries amongst them to request the well affectect to attend to their harvest, collect provisions, and remain quiet till the king's troops were ready to enter the province, which would not be till the end of August, or beginning of September. But, unfortunately, this prudent and necessary admonition was not attended to. A number of loyalists in Tryon County having prematurely assembled in arms under a colonel More [Lieutenant-Colonel John Moore], towards the end of June, were quickly routed and dispersed by a provincial force under general Rutherford [i.e., Brigadier-General Griffith Rutherford]. This unsuccessful insurrection furnished a pretence for persecuting the loyalists in other parts of the province their gaols were filled with loyalists, and every day added a victim to their gibbets.”

William Gordon. (1801). The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the United States of America, Vol 3.

Comments: Reverend William Gordon of Roxbury, Massachusetts, was an avid chronicler of the war. His account provided additional detail as to how Moore's Loyalists were dispersed by the American Whigs. He noted that it was Francis Locke, not Griffith Rutherford, that commanded the American force that fought Moore, that Locke's men were greatly outnumbered, that a charge by a party of mounted Americans threw the Loyalists into confusion, and that the battle ended when the Loyalists fled during a temporary cease-fire.

“A large body of them [i.e., Loyalists] collected under the command of col. Moore, in North-Carolina, on the 22d of June. The greatest part had taken the oath of allegiance to that state, and many had done militia duty in the American service. Their premature insurrection... subjected them to an immediate dispersion. Gen. Rutherford instantly marched against these insurgents, but was so short of lead that he could arm only 300 men. Col. Lock [i.e., Colonel Francis Locke] advanced with this detachment twenty-five miles a-head to observe them, while the main body halted for a supply of ammunition. The colonel, though greatly inferior in force, was reduced to the necessity of attacking or being attacked. He chose the former; and capt. Falls [Captain Gilbraith Falls], with a party of horse, rushed into the middle of the royalists, and threw them into confusion. Twenty-two of the whig militia were killed or wounded; among the former were six of their officers, who were singled out by riflemen among the insurgents. The captain was one of the slain. Col. Moore proposed to col. Lock a cessation of all hostilities for an hour, which being agreed to, the former ran off with his whole party.”

David Ramsay (1811). The History of the American Revolution, Vol. 2.

Comments: David Ramsay was a South Carolina doctor turned delegate to the Continental Congress, and later, historian of the war. Ramsay was captured when the British took Charleston in May, 1780. He was imprisoned at the time of Ramsour's Mill.

“The precautions taken to prevent the rising of the royalists in North-Carolina, did not answer the end. Several of the inhabitants of Tryon county, under the direction of Col. Moore took up arms, and were in a few days defeated by the whig militia, commanded by Gen. Rutherford.”

Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Comments: Henry Lee fought in the southern theater of the war as a lieutenant-colonel commanding an American partisan corps. He and his corps arrived in the southern theater months after the battle of Ramsour's Mill. His account appears to have been based on that of William Gordon, described above. Lee, however, named the site of the battle (although it is misspelled).

“A large body of loyalists collected under colonel Moore at Armsaour's [sic] mill on the 22d of June; among whom were many who had not only taken the oath of allegiance to the state, but had served in arms against the British army. Rutherford lost no time in taking his measures to bring Moore to submission. But so destitute was he of ammunition that only three hundred men could be prepared for the field. This detachment was intrusted to colonel Locke, who was ordered to approach the enemy and watch his motions, while Rutherford continued to exert himself in procuring arms for the main body to follow under his own direction.

“Moore, finding an inferior force near to him, determined to attack it, in which decision he was gallantly anticipated by Locke, who, perceiving the enemy's purpose, and knowing the hazard of retreat, fell upon Moore in his camp. Captain Falls with the horse, led, and rushing suddenly, sword in hand, into the midst of the insurgents, threw them into confusion which advantage Locke pressed forward to improve, when he suspended the falling blow in consequence of colonel Moore proposing a truce for an hour with the view of amicable adjustment. During the negotiation, Moore and his associates dispersed, which appears to have been their sole object in proposing the suspension of hostilities.”

Cowpens Historiography

Last year when I wrote about the battle of Cowpens, the approach I took was to track down and read (virtually) every primary source on the battle, identify how the accounts appear best to fit together, and then write a revisionitic account of the battle based on that analysis of the source material. Repeatedly, during this process, I was struck by the disconnect I found between participants' reminiscences and what is stated in published histories. Indeed, I developed the nagging feeling that Cowpens must be one of the most misdescribed battles in American history.

Recently I took a comparative look at what authors have had to say about Cowpens over the past 200 years. One might expect that within that time, accounts of Cowpens, while problematic in some respects, would at least have improved. Errors appearing in early accounts would be detected and omitted from later histories.

To examine this question, I compared 20 relatively detailed accounts of the battle of Cowpens on certain fine points of the battle. (The 20 accounts are far fewer than the total number that has been published, but the selection, listed at the bottom of this post, is representative). Below I summarize my findings in respect to one aspect of the battle: the deployment of the American militia line and skirmishers.

The most trustworthy description of the battle is the detailed report of the American commander, Daniel Morgan, written just 2 days after the event. In regards to the American deployement, he wrote:

“An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton [the British commander] had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them... The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of the brave and valuable Col. Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the line [i.e., the Continentals], one hundred and fifty yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front, Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolinans, were posted on the right of Maj. McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Maj. Cunningham. Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta [Virginia] riflemen, to support the right of the line.

“The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps… [a detailed description of the British deployment then follows].

“The [British] disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy…” [for the full account, see here].

Note the following assertions in this excerpt:

1. The militia was deployed so as “to guard the flanks” of the Continentals posted behind them.

2. The left flank was guarded by Cunningham, Hay, and McCall. The right flank was guarded by McDowell, Brannon, and Thomas.

3. “Small parties of riflemen,” or skirmishers, were detached from the militia line after the British had deployed (or at least after they had begun to deploy).

There is little reason to doubt these assertions. Surely Morgan, a man whose military genius has been widely praised, was able to accurately describe how the battle had been fought 2 days afterwards. Moreover, comparison with descriptions of the battle by other participants shows a high degree of agreement with Morgan's account (see The Militia Line at Cowpens, "Bring on the Battle", Fighting on the Skirmish Line).

Below I describe how well these three facts are represented in the 20 accounts.

1. The militia was deployed so as “to guard the flanks” of the Continentals posted behind them.

• States this: Bearss (see references below).
• Doesn’t state this: Everyone else.
• Trend: Published histories of the battle have almost always neglected this important point. Babits is the one author in this review to give a reason for contradicting Morgan. He claimed that Morgan was describing a temporarily formation adopted at 8pm on the evening before the battle. However, Morgan's report very plainly states that this formation was adopted on the morning of the battle and offers no suggestion that a change in formation occurred before the first shot was fired.

2. The left flank was guarded by Cunningham, Hay, and McCall. The right flank was guarded by McDowell, Brannon, and Thomas.

• States this: Bearss. Graham, Scharf, Davis, and Babits had these units on the sides of the battlefield indicated by Morgan, although they didn't state that the units were being used to provide flank protection.
• States something different: Johnson reversed the relative position of Cunningham and McDowell. McCrady evidently copied Johnson's mistake.
• Trend: Johnson's error seemingly was caught and corrected. Most accounts do not name these units or identify their relative position.

3. “Small parties of riflemen,” or skirmishers, were detached from the militia line after the British had deployed (or at least begun to deploy).

• States this: Davis.
• Doesn’t state this: Everyone else.
• Trend: Published histories of the battle have almost always failed to describe this facet of the battle. Early accounts were at least somewhat ambiguous as to when the skirmishers were deployed. Recent accounts tend to baldly state that Morgan deployed his militia in two distinct lines in front of his Continentals and that they were in this position before the British arrived.

Summary: Most accounts of the battle either get the same details right or they get the same details wrong. The errors that appeared in earlier accounts are eventually corrected (I'm thinking in particular of the histories by Bearss and Davis), but fascinatingly, later authors either do not notice or choose to ignore these corrections.

Based on this finding, it would appear that authors writing about Cowpens rely more on secondary accounts than primary sources. In some individual cases, this is quite obvious:

Christopher Ward (1952): "About one hundred and fifty yards in front, 300 North and South Carolina militia under Pickens were posted in open order in a thin line three hundred yards long. In front of them, at a similar interval, 150 picked riflemen, Georgians and North Carolinians under Major John Cunningham of Georgia and Major Charles McDowell of North Carolina were thrown out in line as sharpshooters."

Lee Patrick Anderson (2002): "About one hundred and fifty yards in front of the main line, 300 North and South Carolina militia under Pickens were posted in open order in a thin line three hundred yards long. In front of them, at a similar interval, 150 hand picked riflemen; Georgians and North Carolinians under Major John Cunningham of Georgia and Major Charles McDowell of North Carolina were literally thrown out in a line as sharpshooters."

Christopher Ward (1952): "After two volleys they were to retire slowly, firing at will, and fall into the spaces in the second line of militia."

Lee Patrick Anderson (2002): "After three volleys they were to retire, slowly, firing at will as they retreated, and fall into spaces in the second line of militia."

(How pathetic).

However, it would be misleading to suggest that most new authors are simply borrowing the ideas of others because there is a host of contradictory statements to be found across secondary accounts. These histories differ, for example, as to how many volleys the militia was to fire before retreating, whether the militia was primarily made up of good soldiers or bad, whether the skirmishers were given detailed instructions or none at all, and whether the skirmishers fought alongside the main body of militia or whether they kept apart. Leaving aside the question of which statements are accurate, the lack of agreement in these cases further shows that inaccuracies are commonplace (only one side can be accurate).

All-in-all, this strikes me as a very bad state of affairs.

So here is a thought question, and if you've made it this far through a very long post, I encourage you to leave a response in comments. Which of the following positions seems to you to be more true?

History writing is getting worse:

• History is of broad interest but most of the consumers of historical writing are, in some respects, poor judges of the quality of a written work (they lack the expertise to detect errors in fact or reasoning). This is problematic because history writing is increasingly done not by scholars but by pop-historians. The contingencies that govern this type of writing are unfavorable to spending a significant amount of time in research. Authors make the most money when they churn out books relatively quickly. This combination of factors leads authors to borrow heavily from other authors rather than consult the source material at every turn. Over time, historical works grow further and further removed from the source material, and the public is given an increasingly distorted view of the past.

History writing is getter better:

• One does not have to look very hard to find errors in history books written for a mass audience, but this is irrelevant so long as the essential facts are correct. People read these books primarily for entertainment purposes, and if they are sufficiently entertained, they may be encouraged to delve into the field more deeply to learn about "what really happened." Meanwhile, a community of people exists that makes a serious study of history and that is working towards a more accurate understanding of the past. Progress may not be smooth or linear, but in time it does occur.

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The 20 accounts I compared are:

William Gordon. (1801). The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the Independence of...

David Ramsay. (1811). The History of the American Revolution. Vol 2.

Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department...

William Johnson. (1822). Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene...

William Gilmore Simms. (1840). The History of South Carolina…

James Graham. (1856). The Life of General Daniel Morgan…

Henry B. Dawson. (1858). Battles of the United States… Vol. 1.

Henry Beebee Carrington. (1876). Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781.

John Thomas Scharf. (1879). History of Maryland...

Edward McCrady. (1902). The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783.

Christopher Ward. (1952). The War of the Revolution. Vol. 2.

Burke Davis. (1962). The Cowpens-Guilford Courthouse Campaign.

Edwin Bearss. (1967). Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Craig L. Symonds. (1986). A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution.

Lawrence Babits. (1998). A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens.

Ian Barnes & Charles Royster. (2000). The Historical Atlas of the American Revolution.

David Lee Russell. (2000). The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies.

Lee Patrick Anderson. (2002). Forgotten Patriot: The Life & Times of Major-General Nathanael Greene.

John W. Gordon. (2003). South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History.

Terry Golway. (2005). Washington’s General: Nathanael Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution.