October 21, 1776 (Part 2)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 21st (Part 2): Alexander McDougall considered the makings of an effective leader; John Haslet attacked Loyalists at Mamaroneck.

Previous entry: October 21st (Part 1); next: October 22nd.

While William Heath’s and Joseph Spencer’s divisions marched to White Plains, Major-General Charles Lee’s division defended the crossings of the Bronx River. They had a quiet day, and Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall found time to write about what he saw as the main weakness in the American army: the lack of good officers to command the men.

“All the discerning officers of the army see the necessity of having good officers in it. Without that, you never can have a regular or brave army. The contrast between those troops who are well [officered] and those who are ill officered, now in service, is so great, that it is impossible to have an adequate idea of it but by experience.”

The cause for poor leadership, in McDougall’s view, was that too many older citizens had been given important posts in the army for no reason other than their standing in society. He complained:

“Old men without experience, are utterly unfit for the army. They want [i.e., lack] ambition, which is the life and soul of a soldier; nor are they fit for it if they have seen service, unless they are men of genius, capable of improving by service; otherwise they are a burthen to it. They are useless old boys, who pride themselves in having been in service, without profiting by it.”

In McDougall’s view, the army needed officers who were active and intelligent gentlemen: “men who have a sense of honour, and whose class in life is respectable. These are necessary qualifications, among others, to make the officer. Where these meet in men of genius, those they command will be soldiers; but without it, they will only be men.”

Lieutenant-General William Howe took one relatively aggressive action on this date, and sent a detachment of men eastward along the coastal road to occupy the town of Mamaroneck.

George Washington was soon apprised of this move, and he ordered Major Zabdiel Rogers of Connecticut, who commanded the militia there, “to make the best stand you can, with the troops under your command”. He also promised to support him by sending “a party to attack them in flank”.

However, before the attack party could be organized, Washington was informed that “our people shamefully abandoned [Mamaroneck] at their approach, not for want of numbers, but [for] want of a good officer to lead on the men.”

Washington learned that there was still an opportunity to make an attack. The British placed in a vulnerable near Mamaroneck a corps of Loyalists known as the Queen’s Rangers. He organized a force to attack and destroy this unit. The attacking force was entrusted to Colonel John Haslet of the Delaware Regiment, and consisted of men drawn from William Alexander’s brigade and the militia at White Plains [see footnote].

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British army units near Mamaroneck. The Boston Post Road (modern day US Highway 1) can be seen crossing from lower left to the right edge of the map. The Queen’s Rangers are represented by triangles at several points along this road. The road extending to the north (top) went to White Plains. New Rochelle is misidentified at the bottom of the map; the town was a considerable distance to the west.

The attack party set out in the afternoon, and was near Mamaroneck at dusk. However, after night descended things did not go as planned. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford (Delaware Regiment), “instead of meeting with this main body [of the Loyalists] our guides brought us (it was eleven o’clock at night) on their picket-guard, consisting of seventy men” (In other words, one of the isolated triangles on the Blaskowitz map).

Major John Green (1st Virginia Regiment) led the troops which stumbled on this detachment. Bedford claimed that Green “made the first attack, with one hundred and fifty men” and that he “had the chief merit”. Colonel George Weedon (3rd Virginia Regiment) later heard that Green succeeded in surrounding the Loyalist detachment. However, the captain commanding the Loyalists cleverly confused the issue by shouting at the Virginians, “Surrender, you Tory dogs! Surrender!” Approximately 20 of the Loyalists were killed, and more than 30 captured. Amid the confusion, the Loyalist captain and some of his men fled to safety.

The Americans then groped forwards towards the main Loyalist camp, and there was another spat of combat. The British claimed that they gave the Americans a check. However, Sergeant James McMichael (Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment) heard that “we fired on each other” “unfortunately taking the Delaware Blues for the enemy… six of our riflemen and nine of the Blues were killed.”

Haslet said that “three or four were left dead, and about fifteen [were] wounded”. Having been unable to take the main Loyalist camp by surprise, he returned to White Plains.

Footnote: Alexander’s brigade on this date included the Delaware Regiment, three battalions of Pennsylvania State troops, and the 1st and 3rd Virginia Regiments. It is likely that troops from all of these units were present. For example, Sergeant James McMichael of the Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment noted in his journal that the force included “a party of 100 men, properly officered, from our riflemen”. Evidence that militia participated in this expedition is found in the journal of New Hampshire militiaman Peter Kimball. He recorded: “there was a detachment of about 600 men sent to engage the enemy at Mamaroneck[,] 8 [went] out of our company”. Other militia companies likely made a similar contribution.

October 10, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 10th: Gunning Bedford described life in the American army; the Americans feared the British would seize key points on the Hudson; William Howe prepared for the move to Throg’s Point.

Previous entry: October 9th; next: October 11th.

The passage of the British ships up the Hudson on the 9th alarmed the American army. Once it became clear that no major movement was afoot, the officers and men returned to their usual routine. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford (the Delaware Regiment) described the situation of the army on this date:

“We are strengthening our [defensive] lines,--the enemy are also busy with theirs. Our duty continues hard, having the lines to man every morning before day, and they are a mile and a half from here, and [we have] a great deal of other duty… many of our men have deserted to the enemy, though none from our regiment... [British] deserters say the enemy are apprehensive of an attack from us. They all, likewise, say they are healthy, and their army strong,--above thirty thousand… Our army is very sickly yet. We have one hundred and forty of our regiment unfit for duty. We have neither hospitals nor medicines for them, which makes them suffer much… Our army seems in good spirits, and we think our lines are secure, if they should be attempted.”

Although the British vessels on the Hudson posed no immediate threat to the American army, their presence was suggestive of Britain’s longer-term plans. Writing from the town of Fishkill, the New York Committee of Safety described to George Washington their fears that British vessels, acting in conjunction with local Loyalists, would take control of key points on the river:

“Nothing can be more alarming than the present situation of our state; we are daily getting the most authentic intelligence of bodies of men [i.e., Loyalists] enlisted and armed in order to assist the enemy[.] We much fear that they[,] cooperating with the enemy may seize such passes as will cut off all communication, between the army and us and prevent your supplies.”

This map (click to enlarge) shows the lower Hudson River, which was a primary route for the flow of men and materials to and from Washington’s army. On October 9th, a handful of British vessels successfully passed Fort Washington (4) and Fort Constitution (5) and took post in a wide stretch of the Hudson’s River near Dobb’s Ferry (7) and Tarrytown (8). The Americans had previously begun construction on Fort Montgomery (10) to defend one vital chokepoint on the river, but other points seemed vulnerable, such as Stony Point (9) and West Point (11).

The painting is Dominic Serres’ depiction of the frigates Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar passing, on October 9th, between the American batteries in and around Fort Constitution (left) and Fort Washington (right).

The Americans were well aware that their supply lines extending north and east of Manhattan were also vulnerable. Although they had no forts to control the shoreline (like they did on the Hudson), the Americans were at least aided by geography: British vessels moving troops into Long Island Sound would have to pass through a treacherous passageway known as Hell Gate.

Colonel George Weedon (3rd Virginia Regiment) wrote with amazement that the British kept a vessel anchored in this passage: “at this time a 28 gun frigate lays in Hellgate, a place not much wider than the streets of Williamsburg, [Virginia]”

Lieutenant-General William Howe had in fact decided to move his entire army through this passage and land on Throg’s Point (cf. October 8, 1776). At this time he was attending to the details of this operation. In brief, the British occupied several posts in the New York City area: the lower half of Manhattan, western Long Island, Staten Island, Paulus Hook on the New Jersey shore, and a couple of islands in New York’s East River. Howe decided to largely strip these posts of troops, although on Manhattan Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy would be left with three brigades of British troops and one of Hessians.

Howe’s force would consist, at first, of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th brigades of British regulars, the British Reserve (three battalions of British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the brigade of Guards, one brigade of Hessian grenadiers, one brigade of Hessian musketeers and fusiliers, three battalions of light infantry, two battalions of the 71st Foot, some light dragoons, the Hessian jaegers, and a couple of recently formed Loyalist corps.

Howe expected to receive substantial reinforcements while the campaign was underway, including an entire division of Hessian troops that was then crossing the Atlantic. In addition, Percy would be able to release some of his men to Howe if and when Washington pulled back from Manhattan.

The exact timing of these decisions was unrecorded, but by this time the British were nearly ready for the offensive to begin. On this date the army was issued 6 days’ worth of provisions (a sure sign that a move was imminent) and they were ordered to “dress” these provisions on the 11th.