The Hammond Map

An account by Captain Samuel Hammond of South Carolina is one of the most important statements about how the American army was deployed at the battle of Cowpens. Unfortunately, it is also contradictory and confusing.

Hammond wrote of the evening before the battle:

"Orders had been issued to the militia, to have twenty-four rounds of balls prepared and ready for use, before they retired to rest. A general order, forming the disposition of the troops, in case of coming to action, had also been prepared, and was read to Colonels Pickens and McCall, Major Jackson and the author of these notes, in the course of the evening. No copy was ever afforded to either of these authors, before the battle, and the author of these notes has never since seen them, but in the, course of the same evening he made the following notes upon them, then fresh in his memory, and which was shown to Major Jackson and Colonel McCall, and approved by them as correct as far as they went. To show those concerned what would be their stations, the author drew out a rough sketch of the position set forth in the general order, and after the action, the rough sketch of the enemy's position was added. No perfect or accurate sketch of the enemy's position was ever drawn: this was only taken by the eye, not with mathematical instruments; and yet no opportunity has been afforded of correcting it. Nevertheless, this gives you a still better idea of the affair, than could be obtained without it.

"The order commenced in substance thus:

"As the enemy seems resolved to force us into action, the numbers and spirit of this little band of patriot soldiers seems to justify the general in the belief that they may be met with confidence, defeated and driven back. To prepare for which, the following order will be observed.

"The front line will be composed of that part of Colonel McCall's regiment of South-Carolina State troops, who have not yet been equipped as dragoons, under the command of Major Hammond; the Georgia volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, and the North Carolina volunteers, under the command of Major McDowal, Colonel Cunningham will take post on the right, Major McDowal on the left of the line, southwest of the road, upon the rising ground beyond the valley in front, three hundred to three hundred and fifty yards in rear of this cantonment or camp, with the left resting upon the road. Major Hammond will take post on the left of the road, in line with Colonel Cunningham; supported on the left by Captain Donoly, of the Georgia refugees.

"The second line will be composed of the continental regiment of Maryland troops, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Howard; on the left of the second line, falling back one hundred yards in its rear, a continuation of the second line, or third line, will be formed, advancing its left wing towards the enemy, so as to bring it nearly parallel with the left of the continental troops, upon the second line. The Virginia militia, commanded by Major Triplet, with the South-Carolina militia, commanded by Captain Beaty, will form to the right of the second line; the left nearly opposite to the right of the second line, one hundred yards in its rear; the right extending towards the enemy, so as to be opposite to or parallel with the second line, The main guard will hold its present position, and be commanded as at present by Colonel Washington's cavalry, with such of Colonel McCall's regiment of new raised South-Carolina State troops, as have been equipped for dragoons, will be a reserve, and form in the rear of Colonel Pickens, beyond the ridge, one or two hundred yards, and nearly opposite the main guard, north of the road.

"This is not meant as a correct report of the general order, but as nearly so as the memory, influenced by such events, could be expected to retain. The sketch annexed will give you a further illustration of the important event.”

One problem with this statement concerns certain omissions. He named Triplett and Beaty as serving with a wing of troops to the right of Howard's Continentals, but he did not identifiy the troops serving to the left of the Continentals. He said that McCall's dragoons were to be held in reserve behind Pickens, but he didn't identify where Pickens was stationed.

There is also a contradiction in his statement about the placement of troops on the front line. First he said first that, "Colonel Cunningham will take post on the right, Major McDowal [sic] on the left of the line, southwest of the road." This would seem to indicate that both commands were to be southwest of the road, with Cunningham on the right and McDowell on the left. However, he then said that "Major Hammond will take post on the left [i.e., northeast] of the road, in line with Colonel Cunningham." If Hammond were in line with Cunningham, then Cunningham would have been on the left of McDowell, not on the right.

Confusion also arises from a comparison of Hammond's written accounts with the maps he allegedly drew. Here is the "sketch," in two parts, which was originally printed in Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South.


The first map seems to have the directional arrow pointing in the wrong direction (South rather than North). McCall's dragoons have disappeared. There is a "valley or ravine" running across the road in front of the American position that does not correspond with the actual terrain (see this post). There are also two second lines, each consisting of the same troops, but in different positions. Perhaps the intention was to show the position of these troops at two different points in time. However, in neither case do the wings on either side of Howard's continentals begin 100 yards behind the regulars as the text has them.

The second map has Hammond on the far right of the American line when the text has him on the far left.

Of the two, the textual description seems more reliable. It is more detailed than the maps, and seems to better reflect Hammond's recollection. (I wonder if the printer, in preparing the sketch for publication, did not err in attaching labels to the sketch). The textual description also meshes well with other descriptions of the American deployment, including that in Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan's after action report. The maps are considerably less consistent with other participant accounts.

Sources:

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's account.

The Cowpens Battlefield

Below is a topographic map of the Cowpens battlefield and surrounding area. North is at the top of the map. The contour lines represent approximately 20-foot increments (6 meters to be exact). Lighter shaded areas indicate higher elevations.

Elevations on the Cowpens Battlefield.

The map shows the location of three "eminences" associated with the battle. Elevation #1 is where the majority of the fighting took place. Elevation #2 and Elevation #3 are places that have been identified by some authors as the site of the American encampment on the night before the battle and where the American cavalry were stationed during the battle.

The light blue lines represent creeks in the vicinity of the battlefield. The creek in the upper left portion of the map is a part of Buck (or Cudds) Creek. The creek exiting the northern portion of the map is a branch of Suck Creek. The creek exiting the southern portion of the map is a branch of Zekial Creek. The creek in the southwestern corner of the map is Island Creek.

The brown line represents the Green River Road along which the British advanced (marching from the right side of the map).

A comprehensive review of the battlefield, including terrain features, vegetation, roads, and land ownership can be found in The Cowpens Historic Grounds and Resource Study by National Park Service historian Edwin Bearss.

The Coulter's Ferry Road is also included in a number of maps of the battle, but is not shown on this map. Bearss' study suggests that at the time of the battle, it intersected the Green River Road at a point slightly north of this map.

A portion of Bearss' map of the battlefield is visible below. The boxed area roughly corresponds with the area I've modeled.

Excerpt of the Historic Grounds and Resource Study map of the Cowpens Battlefield (click to enlarge).

There is agreement among British and American recollections of the battle that at the time of the battle the area was covered by an "open wood," meaning chiefly that there was little or no underbrush. This would seem to have been the result of human activity. Bearss' review, however, did not uncover evidence of habitation in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield before the beginning of the 19th century.

Bearss offered this explanation for the name of the battle:

"Although at the time the battle was fought, on January 17, 1781, cattle grazed in the area of the battlefield, the pens where the cattle were kept, the habitations where the keeper and cattle hunters lived, the cornfields, the garden, and other improvements were about 'two miles distant.' But as Benjamin F. Perry, a visitor to the site in 1835, wrote, "inasmuch as there was no other or nearer known place in the neighborhood; it is called 'the battle of the Cowpens.'" "

South Carolina militiaman John Whelchel made the same observation in his postwar pension application. According to him, the battle was fought "2 miles above the Cowpens."

Sources:

Edwin Bearss' Cowpens 1974 Historic Grounds and Resource Study (.pdf file).

The pension application of John Whelchel (.pdf file) transcribed by Will Graves.

Modeling Notes

I'm modeling battles in 1:20 scale. That is, for every 20 participants in the actual battle there will be 1 15mm miniature. The battlefield, likewise undergoes a similar transformation. The formula that I've worked out is as follows.

A "true" 15mm miniature (that is, 15mm from foot to eye) is equivalent to 62 inches in height. (I'm assuming the average soldier was a bit on the short side by contemporary standards).

This means that a 15mm miniature is about 0.009525019 the height of the soldier it represents (62 inches = 1574.8 mm; 15mm/1574.8mm = 0.009525019).

The usefulness of these calculations is that they make it possible to accurately scale distances on the battlefield.

For example, let's say a 100 man battalion were to be deployed as a single rank in close order. In close order the interval between files would be about 15 inches (see this page for a discussion of open and close order). Assuming that a typical soldier was something like 18 inches across the shoulders (I'm assuming that they were on the slender side, too), then each soldier would occupy 33 inches of space, and the battalion would have a frontage of 3,300 inches, or 275 feet.

However, at 1:20 scale with 15mm miniatures this translates into 5 miniatures with a frontage of 1.57 inches (3,300 inches * .009525019 / 20). The picture below provides a visual demonstration, although this "battalion" has a frontage that is slightly too wide because the bases could not be pressed further together.

If the same 100 man battalion were to be deployed as a single rank in open order, then the interval between files would be about 24 inches. Again, assuming that a typical soldier was something like 18 inches across the shoulders, each soldier would occupy 42 inches of space. The battalion, in turn, would have a frontage of 4,200 inches, or 350 feet. At 1:20 scale with 15mm miniatures this translates into 5 miniatures with a frontage of 2.00 inches. The picture below provides a visual demonstration.

The Fatal Moment

[Minor edits 12/26/09]

The American victory at Cowpens is often credited to a double envelopment of the British forces (see this map on John Moncure's The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage).

This is not quite how the final stages of the battle are portrayed in some accounts. In addition to the pressure against their outer flanks, there was also a collapse of the middle of the British line.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, who commanded the Continental infantry, wrote that at the climax of the battle: "The enemy were now very near us. Our men commenced a very destructive fire, which they little expected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder in their ranks. While in this confusion, I ordered a charge with the bayonet, which order was obeyed with great alacrity."

Howard's Continentals charged into the center of the British infantry, breaking their line into two pieces.

Sergeant William Seymour of the Delaware Continentals wrote that when this gap was created, the Continentals advanced and fell upen the flanks of the British to their left and right: "..Captain Kirkwood with his company wheeled to the right and attacked their left flank so vigorously that they were soon repulsed, our men advancing on them so very rapidly that they soon gave way. Our left flank advanced at the same time and repulsed their right flank, upon which they retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field."

Along with Kirkwood's company, Howard participated in the attack towards the right: “In the pursuit, I was led towards the right, in among the 71 st..."

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina also described these two halves. “One battalion [actually one half of the British line] throws down their arms and the men fall to the earth. Another commences flight, but Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms."

David Stewart's (1825) Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland indicated that this break in the center of the line was the primary reason why the 71st Foot, on the left of the British line, was forced to retreat during the battle:

"They [i.e., the 71st] did not immediately fall back, but engaged in some irregular firing, when the American line pushed forward to the right flank of the Highlanders, [the 71st] now realized that there was no prospect of support, and while their number was diminishing that of their foe was increasing. They first wavered, then began to retire, and finally to run. This is said to have been the first instance of a Highland regiment running from an enemy. This repulse struck a panic into those whom they left in the rear [i.e., Tarleton's reserve of British Legion dragoons], and who fled in the greatest confusion. Order and command were lost, and the rout became general. Few of the infantry escaped, and the cavalry saved itself by putting their horses to full speed."

Loyalist Alexander Chesney did not specifically mention the collapse in the center of the British line, but he did confirm that at this point in the battle, the 71st was "unsupported."

It is unclear which British regiment took the brunt of Howard's counterattack. As previously mentioned, Morgan and Tarleton offered different descriptions of how the British units were arrayed. According to Morgan, it was the infantry of the British Legion that were most directly opposed to Howard's Continentals. According to Tarleton, it was the 7th Foot.

Sources:

Tarleton's description of the battle can be found on Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website.

David Stewart (1825). Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Morgan's report of the battle can be found in James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of statements by Morgan, Tarleton, Howard, McJunkin, Chesney, and Seymour.

For McJunkin's recollections, see James Saye's Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot. Also see this issue (.pdf file) of the online newsletter, Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

The British Legion

[Minor edits 12/25/09; 4/13/10]

The British Legion was formed at New York in 1778 from other Provincial units. The term "legion" refers to the fact that the regiment included both an infantry and a cavalry component (specifically, "dragoons"). The Legion also apparently had a band, and, according to Colonel Otho Williams, their instruments were captured at the battle of Cowpens.

The infantry of the Legion usually fought on foot, but detachments were sometimes mounted, most notably at Waxhaws and Hanging Rock. Some of the Legion infantry were apparantly mounted at Cowpens, too, for Tarleton commented that "the cavalry and mounted infantry brought up the rear" during his approach to the battlefield.

The British Legion was one of the most active units during the later years of the war. The regiment (or detachments thereof) saw action at Indian Field in 1778, the siege of Charleston, Lenud's Ferry, Monck's Corner, and Waxhaws in the Spring of 1780, Williamson's Plantation, Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, Camden, and Fishing Creek in the Summer of 1780, Fishdam Ford, and Blackstock's Plantation in the Fall of 1780, and Cowpens, Torrence's Tavern, Wetzell's Mill , Guilford Courthouse, and Yorktown in 1781.

The many battles in which this regiment participated took a severe toll on the rank and file. Loyalist Alexander Chesney wrote that at the time of Cowpens, the dragoon companies were "filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden."

The uniform of the dragoons is well documented as short green jackets with black cuffs and collars (see especially this famous painting and Don Troiaini's modern one). The recollections of Cornet James Simons of the American 3rd light dragoons confirmed that this uniform was worn at Cowpens, “Colo. Tarleton's Legeonary Cavalry... wore a Uniform of Green with black facings.” The infantry of the Legion probably wore green jackets as well, although the "Barron Map" of the Battle of Camden shows them in red coats with black facings.

Sources:

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

Johann Ewald (1979). Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal. Translated by Joseph P Tustin. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lawrence Babits. (1998). A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (amazon.com link).

The Journal of Alexander Chesney is available here through Google Books.

A summary of the Otho Williams papers can be found here. The item in question is a letter from Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website is a fantastic resource for Banastre Tarleton and British Legion aficionados.

Mounted Militia

[Minor edits 12/25/09]

My miniatures are "true" 15mm in height, that is, 15mm from foot to eye. There are a number of manufacturers of such miniatures for the American Revolution. None of these manufacturers makes a mounted militiaman figure, which is unfortunate because mounted militia played an important role at a number of battles during the Revolution (e.g., James McCall's and Banjamin Jolly's mounted militia at the battle of Cowpens). Pictured are five versions of a mounted militiaman that I've painted. The figure on the left is an American dragoon by Musket Miniatures riding an Essex horse. Next to him is a Prussian Seven Years War dragoon by Essex. In the middle is a Freikorps mounted infantryman. Next to him on the right is an American cavalryman by Essex. Finally on the right is a Prussian Seven Years War cuirassier by Essex (I filed down the cuirass).

British Light Infantry at Cowpens - Part 2

[Minor edits 12/26/09]

Daniel Morgan, writing 2 days after the battle, described the British deployment at Cowpens as follows:

"The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks."

Banastre Tarleton, writing 6 years after the battle, said that: "The light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line."

So which view is correct? Were the British light infantry divided into two parts and deployed on the flanks of the British line (Morgan's description), or were they grouped into a single battalion and placed on the right of the British line (Tarleton's description)?

I argued that Morgan's report is more reliable, but histories of the battle that specify the position of the British units have followed Tarleton.

It's understandable that historians would assume that Tarleton is correct. After all, who should know more about the deployment of the British troops than the British commander? Furthermore, there is no reason why he should have felt compelled to misstate the facts in this case (unlike his statements about American troop totals and casualties).

Corroboration or refutation of Tarleton's description might be sought in the Strictures of his critic, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie, who served with the 71st lights at the battle. Mackenzie does not correct Tarleton on this count, which may be taken as tacit acceptance of his version. However, this does not necessarily settle the metter. Mackenzie sought to destroy Tarleton's reputation chiefly through logical argument, rather than by offering a different remembrance of events.

David Ramsay's early history of the battle states that at the end of the fighting, "The first battalion of the 71st, and two British light infantry companies, laid down their arms to the American militia." Lawrence Babits' modern history suggests (p 197, n. 102) that the two light infantry companies were the light infantry of the 16th Foot and the Prince of Wales' American Regiment; the 71st lights might not have surrendered with them if they had fled from the right flank to join in an attempted rally of the 71st battalion companies on the left flank.

An alternative possibility is that two of the four companies of light infantry were already on the left flank (as per Morgan's after action report, quoted above) and that these two companies surrendered with the battalion companies of the 71st Foot.

Cornet James Simons of the American cavalry recalled participating in a charge late in the battle "on the right wing of their Army Composed of their Legeonary Infantry, intermixed with the Battallion of the Brave 71st." Because other accounts make clear that the 71st Foot was on the British left, not right, Simons seemingly placed the light infantry of the 71st Foot, at least, on the British right flank.

Sources:

Copies of Tarleton's and Mackenzie's description of the battle can be found on Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website.

A transcription of Morgan's report and Simons' statement can be found on John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour.

David Ramsay (1811). The History of the American Revolution (Vol. 2).