Defeat from the Jaws of Victory
The Battle of Hanging Rock
August 6, 1780
In the later years of the American War of Independence, the British placed increasing emphasis on the conquest of the southern states. By the early summer of 1780, the British had overrun all of Georgia and South Carolina, and were poised to invade North Carolina as well. However, a serious threat to British plans soon emerged in the form of Colonel Thomas Sumter's brigade of Carolina militia, and Major-General Horatio Gates' army of Maryland and Delaware Continentals, supported by Virginia and North Carolina militia. These forces aimed to retake the South Carolina Backcountry [1].
To counter these twin threats, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon, formed a defensive arc around the town of Camden, South Carolina, his center of operations. This arc consisted of three defensive posts. To the northwest was a post on Rocky Mount, to the north was a post behind Hanging Rock Creek, and to the northeast was a post behind the East Branch of Lynche’s Creek. Although Sumter was closest to Rocky Mount and Gates to Lynche’s Creek, Rawdon placed many of his men at the intermediate post at Hanging Rock (specifically 400 Provincials and 800 Loyalist militia [2]). Hanging Rock was perhaps the weak link in his defensive chain. The Rocky Mount post was on a high hill, and the Lynche's Creek post was protected by a wide morass. The post at Hanging Rock was less well protected. [3]
At the beginning of August, Rawdon was fairly confident that his defensive arc would hold until reinforcements arrived. The Rocky Mount post had already withstood a daylong assault by Sumter. Rawdon was therefore stunned when, on the evening of August 6, a stream of men from Hanging Rock came into his camp at Lynche's Creek claiming that Sumter had overrun the post. His defenses had been broken. [4]
What had happened at Hanging Rock? Thomas Sumter had a mere 600 men [5], and the post had been manned by such veteran outfits as the British Legion infantry, the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment, and the Royal North Carolina Regiment [6]. How had a numerically inferior force routed his veterans?
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Thomas Sumter’s men were woefully short on ammunition before the battle of Hanging Rock [7], but he still believed he should take the offense. According to Adjutant Joseph Graham of North Carolina:
“He had discovered that his men, while marching and fighting, and fighting and marching, would keep with him, but to encamp and remain stationary, he might calculate with certainty his force would diminish; therefore, if he failed in his enterprise, the loss to the country would only be those who were killed and wounded. The remainder might be organized in a short time as formidably as before. If he succeeded it would considerably weaken the enemy's effective force, and have considerable weight in the operations [Gates’ advance into South Carolina] which he expected shortly would take place” [8].
Sumter chose to attack Hanging Rock partly because some of the garrison had been sent to assist Rocky Mount [9]. His plan was to make a night march to suddenly close with the enemy, and then to attack at first light from three directions at once [10].
After a difficult nighttime crossing of the Catawba River, Sumter’s men reached the Camden Road and headed south [11]. After his scouts reached the British pickets (occasioning some shooting [12]), his main body veered into the woods east of the road to avoid detection. They then continued moving towards the British post. The Americans knew they were close when they could hear “the sound of horses bells,” and see “the smoke of settlers along the valley of Hanging Rock Creek” [13]. At this point, the Americans rested, while Sumter waited for the most auspicious moment to attack. It was fortunate that they waited, for his men caught two Loyalists in the woods who revealed that the detachment had returned from Rocky Mount [14]. At this point, Sumter realized that he could not possibly attack the whole post at once. Instead, the plan became for one division (his left) to curl around the camp of Colonel Samuel Bryan’s Loyalist militia, which lay nearby. Once they were in position, they would attack Bryan’s flank and rear while a second division (his center) attacked in front. At the same time, the remaining division (his right) would attack the British center camp [15].
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Possible Site of the Battle of Hanging Rock
The exact site of the fighting is unknown, but a comparison of primary sources and modern terrain features suggests the portion of Hanging Rock Creek shown above. North is at top; contour lines are at 10-foot intervals. Today's Flat Rock Road (the brown line) approximates the course taken by Camden Road during the 18th Century. Hanging Rock Creek is represented by the light blue line running across the top of the map. The map shows the location of two of the three British camps, where most of the fighting took place. A) Approximate area from which the Americans advanced [16]. B) A marsh or swamp on the Americans' right flank, and between the center camp and Bryan's camp [17]. C) A creek running across the front of the “Tory” camp [18]. D) A hill, which had a 90-degree angle on the side facing the Americans [19]. E) Bryan's camp. (All three British camps were on heights [20]). F) The center camp, which was between 1/4 and 1/2 mile from the center camp [21]. G) A high plateau with old fields and cabins and where much of the fighting took place [22]. This figure is based on a United States Geographical Survey map. Some modern terrain features have been removed.
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Sumter briefed his officers on the plan of attack and had guides lead them to their assigned positions. However, shortly after the right division turned towards the center camp, it unexpectedly came under fire from some of Bryan’s men. The guides leading this division had not been briefed on the location of Bryan’s camp and they led the column directly past the Loyalists (then having breakfast). The American hurriedly began to dismount, and although losses were sustained, for the most part the Loyalists overshot their mark [23].
The other American divisions likewise joined the fighting, although the left division was not yet in position. Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill, who was with the left, recalled that “This action commenced under many very unfavorable circumstances to the Americans, as they had to march across a water course & climb a steep cliff, being all this time under the enemy's fire” [24]. Bryan’s deployment followed the contours of the hill, which created a right angle in their line. Joseph Gaston, who was likewise on the left, found his company charging against this point. In a few moments, Gaston was shot between the eyes (but survived, in part, because the ball exited near his left ear rather than pass through the brain), and one of his brothers was killed and another mortally wounded [25]. Gaston’s commander, John McClure, was hit in his thigh, but, “stuffing the wound with wadding, he rushed ahead of his command, and his clear voice was still heard, urging on his men to the continued charge” [26].
Bryan’s line was soon rolled up from left to right. On the left, his volunteers were only able to get off a single volley, and American losses were relatively light: just one killed and two wounded [27]. In the center, the Loyalists got off two volleys before fleeing[ 28], and on their right they inflicted heavy losses on McClure’s men. McClure himself was mortally wounded, “pierced by several wounds” “just as the Tories fled.” The Americans, however, had their revenge. On the American right, William Davie’s dragoons were likely the first to reach the top, where they “routed [Bryan’s men] with great slaughter” [29]. They “could not be restrained,” and pursued the Loyalists across the woodland [30]. Meanwhile, on the left, some of the Americans “got around the side of their camp” [31], and fired on the Tories as they fled past [32].
American organization severely broke down at this time, with some men chasing after the Loyalists while others raided Bryan’s camp for arms and ammunition [33]. Colonel Richard Winn and William Davie pressed on with as many men as they could gather towards the British center camp (their original assignment) [34]. At the same time, two bodies of Provincial troops, dispatched “on the first alarm” [35] were en route to reinforce Bryan.
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Assault on Bryan’s Camp
Positions of the Americans (in blue) at the time of the assault on Bryan’s men (in red), as suggested by participant accounts and Figure 1. Right division: Davie’s dragoons (A) and North and South Carolina militia under Winn (B). Center division: Irwin’s Mecklenburg militia (C). Left division: McClure’s South Carolinians (D), and other small regiments of South Carolina militia (E).
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The first reinforcement to arrive was a party of British Legion infantry commanded by Captain Kenneth McCulloch. These men “arrived on the eminence just after the Tories had left it” [36]. The Provincials “advanced firing in platoons,” but the Americans “took to trees & rocks”[37], and the British “overshot their opponents.” The Americans formed “a half circle around the eminence,” and “by taking steady aim” “in a short time caused one third of them to fall” [38]. Indeed, the Provincials “fell so fast by their unseen enemy that their officers were obliged to push them forward by their sabers” [39]. Soon McCulloch was mortally wounded [40] and the survivors “retreated to the main body, and were briskly pursued by Sumpter’s men” [41].
The flight of Bryan’s Volunteers “spread confusion through every quarter of the post” [42] and a number of Sumter’s men “rushed pell-mell with them” [43]. According to one remarkable tale told after the war:
“One [American] named Walker… was about to fire on those before him, when a Tory close to him caught his arm, crying, ‘Those are on our side!’ and then, as if struck with a sudden suspicion, asked ‘What is that green leaf in your hat for?’ The Whigs had taken the precaution to put each a leaf in their hats that morning before going into battle. The soldier pulled out the token, but the discovery was already made; one of the Tories seized his gun, the other ran a bayonet through his hunting shirt. Letting the weapon go, he turned and fled back. ‘It appeared to me,’ he said, ‘that they fired fifty guns after me; every leap I gave, I heard something fall on the leaves which I took for blood, and thought I must be badly wounded, and would soon fall exhausted. I thought of the intolerable thirst I had witnessed in those bleeding to death, and my mouth began to feel parched. I had now reached the branch [Hanging Rock Creek or a tributary], and stooped to drink. On examination I found I was not hurt, but my powder horn was severely wounded, being pierced through with a rifle ball, and having lost the greater part of its contents’” [44].
At the moment the right division bore down on the center camp, the Provincials posted there opened fire, mistakenly shooting at first some of Bryan’s fleeing men [45]. The Americans were surprised “by this unexpected discharge,” but quickly recovered [46]. Making an Indian war cry, Winn’s men made a mad dash at the Provincials, whose only cover was a fence and some bush tents [47]. According to William Davie, “the Legion Infantry broke and joined in the flight of the Loyalists, yielding their camp, without a second effort, to the militia” [48].
Now the second British reinforcement made its presence felt. A part of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment [49], evidently en route to Bryan’s camp [50], saw some Americans “forming from the disorder of the pursuit.” In response they “"passed into a wood between the Tory and centre encampments,” and “drew up unperceived” into a line of battle, “and poured in a heavy fire on the militia” [51]. Thirty Americans finding their escape cut off turned and charged through the Provincials, losing half their men in the process. The Provincials followed but soon encountered another, much larger body of Americans in an open area near Bryan’s camp [52].
When the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment attacked this second body of men, they “nearly changed the fate of the day” [53]. However, the Americans fell back and took shelter amid the undergrowth [54], and Richard Winn rushed his men toward the sound of the firing, and fell upon the rear of the British [55]. The Redcoats likewise “took instinctively to the trees and bush heaps” to defend themselves, but although they “returned the fire with deadly effect,” they were at a severe disadvantage. Soon “there was not a British officer standing, and many of the regiment had fallen.” At last, the remaining rank and file “threw down their arms.” Colonel Robert Irwin, who “had his clothes perforated with four separate balls” [56] personally disarmed an obstinate sergeant major who commanded the survivors [57].
While the battle raged with the detachment of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment, continued fighting took place in the area of the center camp. Here, two companies of North Carolinians began taking fire from “a party of fifteen or twenty of the enemy,” who had taken “shelter in a cabin with a clapboard door,” and were “firing through the cracks.” In response, “Captain [James] Knox, with half the men, charged the front door, [and] Lieutenant [George] Graham with the rest charged the rear door. Captain Knox ran against and broke down the door, the enemy fled out of the rear door, and Graham's party shot down several of them” [58].
The Provincials in the center camp retreated “for about three hundred yards.” Joseph Graham felt this was the moment to launch the knockout blow. The British infantry “turned their backs for three hundred yards,” and “a charge of seventy cavalry would have made them surrender, but at that period but few of the cavalry had returned from pursuit of the Tories and they were yet unformed” [59].
The Provincials had one or two three-pounder cannon in camp [60], and “they kept firing” one “on the right of their line” “after being forced from their camp.” This gun was vulnerable and could be used to drive the British wholly off the field. According to Joseph Graham, “Captain James Knox… gave order to his men to load their guns, and when that piece fired the next time they would take it; on the discharge of the gun they started in full run, and before the artillerists could load got within forty steps and began to fire, the British retreated and Knox and party took the gun and turned her on their adversaries” [61].
Fortunately for the British, Knox’s men did not know “how to manage or load” the cannon, although it was “in their possession several minutes” [62]. At this moment of crisis, Captain John Rousselet of the British Legion, formed the remnants of his regiment in an old field, and drew to him elements of the other Provincial regiments, who had by now “recover[ed] from the consternation into which they had been thrown by the flight of Colonel Bryan” [63]. The new arrivals were added to the line [64]. Then the British then “came on with fixed bayonets and retook the gun” [65].
The Americans continued to press the British, although they had only about 200 infantrymen left in action. (Other unwounded Americans were attending to those that had been shot, guarding prisoners, suffering from fatigue, or getting drunk after raiding the British Commissary’s stores in the center camp). The Americans had the advantage of long-range rifles, but the British minimized their effectiveness through sudden bayonet charges. At last, the British fell back another 200 yards until they were out of rifle range and in the center of the open space [66].
William Davie launched one more attack when he noticed “a large body of the enemy, consisting of the legion infantry, Hamilton's regiment, and Tories... rallying, and formed on the opposite side of the British camp, near the wood.” He worried that they “they might be induced to take the Americans in flank.” His dragoons had been collected by this time, and to avoid the deadly open space, he “passed round the camp under cover of the trees, and charged them.” The British “were routed and dispersed by a handful of men” [67].
Perhaps because of this charge, the remaining Provincials “formed a hollow square” [68]. Sumter intentionally “had his men withdrawn a small distance” so that the men could be properly “formed” and “stragglers collected.” Sumter intended “to renew the action,” but as “he rode along the line, personally inquiring of each man his stock of ammunition,” he “found that they had not on an average three rounds per man” [69]. (The disappearance of the Americans during this interval led the British to conclude the former had been routed by the latter’s final bayonet charge) [70].
The mutual, limited withdrawal brought major combat at Hanging Rock to a close. Nevertheless, the British remained apprehensive about another American attack. According to British sources, the outcome remained “doubtful,” until:
“the appearance of a reinforcement changed entirely the fortune of the day. This reinforcement consisted of forty mounted infantry of the Legion who were returning from Rocky Mount: But the captains [Patrick] Stewart and [Charles] MacDonald, who commanded it, by ordering the men to extend their files, gave it the appearance of a formidable detachment. The bugle horns were directed to sound a charge: And the Americans, already kept at bay, were now fearful of being overpowered” [71].
Davie and was dragoons “were returning towards the centre,” when they saw the mounted infantry had "advanced up in the Camden road.” Davie turned his men around and charged. The British “took the woods in flight, and one only was outdone” [72].
The Americans drew no comfort from this repulse. The green-jacketed mounted infantry were mistaken for Tarleton's dreaded British Legion dragoons, and the vanguard of a larger reinforcement. Their appearance and the scarcity of ammunition compelled Sumter to retreat. First, according to Davie, time was spent “plundering the [center] camp, taking the parole of the British officers, and preparing litters for the wounded. All this was done in full view of the British army, who consoled themselves with some military music and an interlude of three cheers for King George.” The Americans responded with their own cheers [73].
Davie concluded, “The militia at length got into the line of march, Davie and his dragoons covering the retreat, but as the troops were loaded with plunder, and encumbered with their wounded friends, and many of them intoxicated, this retreat was not performed in the best military style. However, under all these disadvantages, they filed off unmolested, along the front of the enemy” [74].
American losses at Hanging Rock were about 20 killed, 40 wounded, and 10 missing (at least some of the missing were men that were shot during the battle and later captured by the British) [75]. British losses, by comparison, were devastating. The Provincials lost 38 killed, 69 wounded, and 71 missing [76]. The most severe losses were borne by the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment, which ceased to be an effective combat unit [77]. Losses for the Loyalist militia, although not tallied, probably were considerable [78].
Meanwhile, at Lynche’s Creek, Francis Rawdon heard of the rout of his troops at Hanging Rock before he learned of the American retreat. At that moment, he believed Sumter had cleared a path to his base at Camden. Much worse: the Americans were mounted, whereas his men were on foot. Fearing that Sumter would cut him off, he abandoned his strong post and began to retreat [79]. The (partial) defeat of the British at Hanging Rock and the retreat from Lynche’s Creek made the British seem quite weak to the Americans. (The Americans, it seems, did not realize the events were related). As a consequence, Major-General Horatio Gates became convinced that he could take Camden without undue difficulty. Misappraising British strength and intentions, Gates first detached part of his force to accompany Sumter on a raid, and then advanced incautiously towards the British base. Ten days after the battle of Hanging Rock, his army was destroyed at the battle of Camden [80]. Despite the defeat at Camden, the Carolina militia did not despair. According to Joseph Graham, the Americans had proven that British soldiers “were by no means invincible.” At Hanging Rock, they “had seen the British soldiers run like sheep and many of them bite the dust” [81]. In the months ahead these men would retake the field and recover rural South Carolina.
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On the Use of Source Material
There are a few places where primary sources disagree. Sumter’s account, written 3 days after the battle, is deemed especially reliable. A manuscript likely composed by Richard Winn and that broadly agrees with Sumter’s description is likewise favored. Primary accounts written long after the battle are used insofar as they are not contradicted by more reliable sources. These include the recollections of Joseph Graham, Joseph Gaston, William Hill, Joseph McJunkin, and a number of veterans filing pension applications. Cited Revolutionary War pension applications (RWPA) refer to documents transcribed by Will Graves and made available for public viewing at the website http://southerncampaign.org/pen. The above accounts are by American participants in the battle. As a number of these participants dropped out of the fighting over time (e.g., Gaston, Hill, and Winn were wounded), it is necessarily the case that the timing and nature of events at the beginning of the battle are clearer than those near the end. British participants did not leave a comparable written record. However, several contemporaries left written descriptions of the battle; these and two secondary works by American authors are used to fill in gaps left by the primary sources. Quoted passages are from published works out of copyright; spelling and capitalization have been altered in places to make the language consistent with modern standards.
Endnotes
2. Josiah Martin to George Sackville Germain, August 18-20, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, Volume 15, pages 49-56 (retrieved from http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/, December 9, 2009). Earl of Moira [Rawdon] to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801; transcription in Arthur Aspinall (1963). The Correspondence of George, Prince of Wales, 1770-1812, Vol. IV. Cassell. p. 194. British sources stated that Colonel Samuel Bryan commanded a force of 700-800 North Carolina militia (e.g., Charles Stedman [1794]. The History of the Origin, Progress and Termination of the American War, Vol II. p 197). Because of desertions, sickness, and losses in prior engagements, the true number was likely only half of the British estimate, see Orders from Thomas Burke. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, Volume 16, pages 263-269 (retrieved from http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/, December 9, 2009).
3. Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, Volume 14, pages 540-543 (retrieved from http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/, December 9, 2009).
4. Rawdon to McMahon, ibid. 194.
5. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid.
6. Account of William Davie, in John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. Lippincott, Grambo, and Co. p. 193. Todd Braisted (2001). A History of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment (retrieved from the On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies [http://www.royalprovincial.com ]; retrieved December 9, 2009).
7. Account of William Hill, in A. S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill’s Memoirs of the Revolution. The Historical Commission of South Carolina. p. 12. William Gordon. (1801). The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the United States of America, Vol 3. p. 95.
8. Account of Joseph Graham, in William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. Edwards & Broughton. p. 237.
9. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. Davie, ibid. 192. Account of Richard Winn, transcribed by Will Graves and retrieved from the website http://southerncampaign.org/pen/scx2.pdf on December 9, 2009.
10. Supporting statements appear below. Notably this was also Sumter’s plan of attack in a July attack on Rocky Mount, see Graham, ibid. 236. RWPA W8610 (William Clark). RWPA S2437 (James Clinton). RWPA S1262 (Arthur Travis).
11. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. Sumter’s brigade was encamped northwest of the battlefield. This is the likely route, judging from 18th Century maps, although there were of course byways in the area. An advance from the west seems unlikely, as the Americans did not encounter during the night British forces returning to Hanging Rock from Rocky Mount.
12. RWPA S31944 (Edward Rogers).
13. Graham, ibid. 238.
14. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. Account of Joseph McJunkin, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 11, pp. 29-47. Winn, ibid.
15. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid., on the general plan. The exact order of battle is uncertain because of contradictions among sources. Following primarily William Davie (ibid. 193), the Americans were divided into three major divisions, with additional subunits within each one. The left division consisted of a number of small regiments of South Carolina militia, the center division consisted of a battalion of North Carolina militia from Mecklenburg County, and the right division consisted of a mixed force of North and South Carolina militia, including Davie’s troop of dragoons. Of the participants whose accounts are prominently cited below, William Hill and Joseph McJunkin would have been with the left division, Joseph Graham with the center division, and Richard Winn and William Davie with the right division. Sumter’s whole force appears to have been mounted, but only Davie’s dragoons fought on horseback. The Mecklenburg battalion had 200 men (Allen Davie to Archibald Murphey, August 9, 1826. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, Volume 19, pages 995-997 [retrieved from http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/, December 9, 2009]). The infantry units comprising the left and right divisions were quite small in size (cf. Graham, ibid. 209). The dragoons numbered between 70 (Graham, ibid. 240) and 80 (Hill, ibid. 12).
16. Davie’s account suggests that the Americans were advancing towards the British camp to the left (east) of the Camden Road. In this area they encountered Bryan’s Loyalist militia. In describing the British post, he wrote that “a part of the British legion and Hamilton's Regiment were at some houses in the centre and Bryan's Regiment and other Loyalists some distance on the left.” If Davie meant that Bryan was opposite the American left, then there is no contradiction.
17. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. RWPA R9400 (Samuel Saxon). Davie, ibid. 193.
18. Davie (ibid. 192) wrote that “a deep ravine and creek covered the whole point of the Tory camp.” “Tory” was used by Davie and others to designate Bryan’s volunteers. American participants typically referred to the Provincials as “regulars.”
19. McJunkin, ibid. 39. Also see account of Joseph Gaston, in Dr. Howe (1873). A Reminiscence of the War of the Revolution, in South Carolina. The Historical Magazine, Vol. II, No. 2. p. 92.
20. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid.
21. Winn, ibid. Graham, ibid. 239. Hill, ibid. 13. RWPA S32403 (Matthew McClurkin)
22. Map of Kershaw District, in Mills' (1825) Atlas of the State of South Carolina. Benson J. Lossing (1860). The Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution, Vol 2. Harper & Bro. p. 456. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. Winn, ibid. Graham, ibid. 28.
23. Winn, ibid. Davie, ibid. 192-193, 194. RWPA R9400 (Samuel Saxon) Davie, unlike Winn, suggested that losses were heavy.
24. Hill, ibid. 13.
25. Gaston, ibid. 92. RWPA W23089 (Joseph Gaston)
26. Joseph Johnson (1851). Traditions and Reminiscences, Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South. Walker and James. p. 345.
27. Winn, ibid.
28. Graham, ibid. 239.
29. Davie, ibid. 193.
30. Graham, ibid. 239.
31. Hill, ibid. 13.
32. Winn, ibid.
33. Hill, ibid. 13. Johnson, ibid. 345.
34. Winn, ibid. Davie, ibid. 193. Notably their accounts do not describe the fight with McCulloch’s men.
35. Graham, ibid. 239.
36. Graham, ibid. 239.
37. Hill, ibid. 13.
38. Graham, ibid. 239.
39. Hill, ibid. 13.
40. McJunkin, ibid. 39. Banastre Tarleton (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America. p. 98.
41. Graham, ibid. 239.
42. Stedman, ibid. 202.
43. Elizabeth Fries Ellet. (1850). Domestic History of the American Revolution. Baker and Scribner. p. 197.
44. Ellet, ibid. 197-198.
45. RWPA R9400 (Samuel Saxon)
46. Davie, ibid. 193.
47. Winn, ibid. Davie, ibid. 193.
48. Davie, ibid. 193.
49. Referred to in some sources as Colonel Brown’s regiment, after Colonel Montfort Browne. That this was a detachment of the regiment, and not the whole, is suggested by a comparison of the accounts by Davie and Tarleton. Each described the actions of a “part” of the regiment, but their accounts are so dissimilar that they must have been describing different parts of the whole.
50. Or so this was claimed by American sources. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. RWPA S2437 (James Clinton).
51. Davie, ibid. 193.
52. RWPA R9400 (Samuel Saxon). Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. RWPA S2496 (John L. Davies).
53. Davie, ibid. 193.
54. RWPA S2496 (John L. Davies).
55. Winn, ibid.
56. Graham, ibid. 240.
57. RWPA S2496 (John L. Davies).
58. Graham, ibid. 28.
59. Graham, ibid. 239-240.
60. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid., in the earliest account of the battle, claimed one, but other sources claimed two.
61. Graham, ibid. 240.
62. Graham, ibid. 240.
63. Tarleton, ibid. 97.
64. Braisted, ibid.
65. Graham, ibid. 240.
66. Davie, ibid. 193. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. McJunkin, ibid. 39. Stedman, ibid. 202 Tarleton, ibid. 98. Graham, ibid. 239.
67. Davie, ibid. 193.
68. Davie, ibid. 193.
69. Graham, ibid. 240.
70. Rawdon to McMahon, ibid. 194.
71. Stedman, ibid. 202. See also Tarleton, ibid. 97-98, for a similar account.
72. Davie, ibid. 193.
73. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. Graham, ibid. 240. Davie, ibid. 193. McJunkin, ibid. 39. Winn, ibid.
74. Davie, ibid. 193-194.
75. Sumter to Pinckney, ibid. For an example of a wounded American turned prisoner, see RWPA S32403 (Matthew McClurkin).
76. Enclosure in a letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, dated August 20, 1780. In K. G. Davies (Ed.), Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series), Vol. XVI. Irish University Press.
77. Braisted, ibid.
78. Davie, ibid. 194 stated losses were high. However, British accounts (e.g., Stedman, ibid. 203), believed they were low.
79. Rawdon to McMahon, ibid. 194.
80. Thomas Addis Emmett. (1880). The Southern Campaign: 1780. Letters of Major General Gates from 21st June to 31st August. Magazine of American History. Vol 5, No. 4. p. 302.
81. Graham, ibid., 245.
