October 28, 1776 (Part 4)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the fourth of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the evening of October 28th: The battle of White Plains came to an end; Washington prepared for the next British move; Knyphausen occupied Mile Square.

Previous entry: Afternoon of October 28; next: October 29th.

The battle of White Plains gradually petered out after the British and Hessian infantry broke the American line on Chatterton’s Hill.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled that after his regiment was driven from Chatterton’s Hill, “We fell back a little distance and made a stand” and at the same time “detached parties [were] engaging [the enemy] in almost every direction. We did not come in contact with the enemy again that day, and just at night we fell back to our encampment.”

The “detached parties” probably included some groups of Continentals on the northern end of Chatterton’s Hill. Colonel John Haslet of the Delaware Regiment recalled:

“The left of the regiment took post behind a fence on the top of the hill with most of the officers, and twice repulsed the light troops and [light] horse of the enemy; but seeing ourselves deserted on all hands, and the continued column of the enemy advancing, we also retired.”

Captain William Hull of the Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment stated that his command also held out for awhile:

“Colonel Webb’s regiment maintained the conflict for a time, after the other part of the brigade had abandoned the field, and it had the honour to receive the particular thanks of Washington for its bravery and orderly retreat.”

One observer (Sergeant John Smith of Lippitt’s Regiment) wrote, “this battle lasted from 9 in the morning till night tho the hottest of the battle… was but about 20 or 30 minutes”.

During this prolonged phase of the fighting, Washington sent some reinforcements towards Chatterton’s Hill, including Brigadier-General Rezin Beall’s brigade of Maryland militia (the Maryland “flying camp”) and Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. However, as Jacob Francis of Sargent’s Regiment noted, before these troops could cross the Bronx, “the British got possession of the hill, and we retreated back to the camp.”

Afterwards, the British made no further attacks. According to Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jäger), “Since the soldiers had climbed over nothing but hills, cliffs, and stone walls the whole day, constantly dragging their guns over all obstacles, it was impossible to ask anything more from them.”

The British lost around 230 men during the battle: Most of these losses occurred in the 28th Foot (67 men), 35th Foot (about 60 men), 49th Foot (28 men), and Regiment von Lossberg (about 46 men). The Americans lost more than 200 men [see Footnote 1], but the exact total is not known. Among the regiments that had considerable losses were the Maryland Battalion (44 men), the 3rd New York Regiment (34 men) and the Delaware Regiment (32 men).

During the evening, the British discovered that Chatterton’s Hill was of dubious value. Charles Stedman noted: “The possession of that hill… [did] not enable the royalists to annoy their camp, for it rose so gradually from the Bronx that its crest was not within random cannon shot”. In other words, the British could hit the main American defensive works with their cannon, but the range was too great for the fire to be accurate or destructive.

Stedman couldn’t understand why the Americans had detached a part of their army to defend Chatterton’s Hill. He wrote: “The reason of their occupying” the hill “is inexplicable… It seems to have been a blunder of General Washington’s to have placed so considerable a corps entirely out of the capacity of supporting the rest of the army”.

Stedman believed that if the British had attacked the center of the American line instead (as he wanted), the men on Chatterton’s Hill would have had a hard time aiding in the defense. [see Footnote 2]

The Americans kept close watch on the British, not knowing when another attack might come.

Jacob Francis (Sargent’s Regiment) recalled, “I stood sentinel that night in a thicket between the American camp and the hill, so near… that I could hear the Hessians”.

Joseph Plumb Martin observed that:

“The enemy had several pieces of field artillery upon this hill [Chatterton’s], and, as might be expected, entertained us with their music all the evening. We entrenched ourselves where we now lay, expecting another attack. But the British were very civil, and indeed they generally were, after they had received a check from Brother Jonathan, for any of their rude actions”.

Meanwhile, Washington decided that the American army would be in a stronger position if it occupied the hills further north (agreeing with the assessment Major-General Charles Lee made that morning). Therefore, some of the troops were ordered to begin moving their camps to the new position.

Washington expected that the British would either launch a major assault against his defensive works or move to threaten his flank. To shore up his right flank, he sent William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) to occupy high ground between White Plains and the Hudson River.

Alexander’s brigade moved quickly, and without their baggage. It was a hard night for men already exhausted by the day’s fighting. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford of the Delaware Regiment had been shot in the arm on Chatterton’s Hill (it was a flesh wound). He wrote that he and his men spent the night “without a tent or anything but the ground to lay on, and not a blanket to cover us”. Similarly, Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered that “This night we lay in the woods without tents or blankets. It was cold and we made a fire in the woods,--turned our feet to the fire and slept comfortably, although it snowed in the night.”

Situation of the armies on October 28th (click to enlarge). While Howe fought Washington at White Plains (11), Knyphausen advanced on the Mile Square (9) / Valentine's Hill area.

Off to the west, Colonel John Lasher had a detachment of men guarding the landward approaches to Manhattan. After the British raided Mile Square he was ordered to abandon his position and join the American army at White Plains. On this date he burned the American barracks at Kingsbridge and set out on a wide arch that would take his men north and east towards White Plains, and around the British army.

The same day, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, occupied Valentine’s Hill with his division of Hessians. These troops missed cutting off Lasher’s command by a matter of hours. However, by seizing Valentine’s Hill they did cut off the landward retreat of the American forces garrisoning upper Manhattan.

Footnote 1: I’ve estimated a greater American number of casualties than are stated by most authors. If one simply totals up all the numbers available in Peter Force’s American Archives, the total is 53 killed, 96 wounded, and 24 missing (or 175 in total). The relatively high proportion of killed to wounded is at least partially due to the fact that two regiments reported only the former total, not the latter. After estimating, through extrapolation, the number wounded in these regiments, the total American loss becomes about 197.

Doctor John Pine of Maryland wrote after the battle, “the number of killed and wounded, as the report is in the camp, amounts only to about 90, but from the wounded I saw myself in the hospital, and adjacent houses, there must at least be an hundred and twenty or thirty wounded[,] the number of killed I don’t know.”

Documents show that there were several casualties between the Pennsylvania State troops and New Hampshire militia not listed in Force. Brooks’ and Moseley’s Massachusetts militia regiments likely suffered a fair number of casualties on Chatterton’s Hill, but no return exists of their losses. A conservative estimate of losses in these units, added to the losses in the other units, raises the American total to close to the reported British total.

Footnote 2: To the best of my knowledge, Washington did not describe why he chose to defend Chatterton’s Hill. Tallmadge claimed he alerted Washington to the presence of American militia on Chatterton’s Hill and the advance of British troops in their direction. Afterwards, Washington directed several units to the hill, and ordered a trusted officer (John Haslet) to take command of the militia. Perhaps Washington intended simply to support troops (militia) that were well-positioned to impede the British attack. In other words, the defense of Chatterton’s Hill may have been another manifestation of Washington’s general strategy of harassing the British at every opportunity (consider how Washington used his forces on the 21st, the 26th, and the morning of the 28th). The Staten Island raid, the American defense of Pell’s Point and the engagement near East Chester can be understood in these terms as well.

Battle of Longueuil (3)

This is the third of three posts on the October 30, 1775, battle of Longueuil. For the first two parts, see here and here.

On the morning of October 30, 1775, British forces in Montreal boarded boats in the harbor and set out to do battle with American forces on the other side of the St. Lawrence River. A larger vessel (probably the schooner Gaspé and probably with Governor Guy Carleton himself on board) led the way. There were around 34 boats in total, most of them small craft. Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume de Lorimier, commanded the Canadian militia from one small boat, which contained “two rudders, eight rowers and others ready to fire.”

The Battle of Longueuil (click to enlarge). The numbers on the map correspond with the numbers below describing key events during the battle. The arrows indicate the approximate location of troop movements during the battle.

1. A little before noon, the small boats passed Île Ronde and became visible to the Americans. A crowd of civilians followed the boats and watched events from the northern shore.

2. The American forces were garrisoned at Longueuil on the southern shore. When the boats came into view, the troops marched down to the riverfront. They brought with them a recently arrived 4-pounder cannon. This functioned as a kind of secret weapon, which the soldiers hid by standing close around it.

3. The British boats did not make a direct descent on Longueuil. Instead, the schooner turned back upstream. The Americans dispatched a company-sized detachment to follow it. When the schooner neared the southern shore, the Americans began firing at it. The schooner then appeared to veer away, and the rest of the boats followed and “promenaded” past Longueuil.

When the British boats reached Île Ste Hélène, some of the Canadians and Native Americans disembarked. This group, under the command of de Lorimier’s brother (Jean-Claude-Chamilly) went down to the shallow water separating Île Ste Hélène from the southern shore. Meanwhile de Lorimier arranged the boats in a line of battle.

American Continentals of the 2nd New York Regiment follow the British boats.

4. More and more American infantry were sent upstream until only the 4-pounder gun and its crew were left in the village.

5. Carleton, however, did not immediately give the signal to attack (he was to fire two cannons). While de Lorimier waited, Chaptes La Corne Saint-Luc came alongside him in a canoe paddled by Algonquians. They were singing a war song. La Corne Saint-Luc was an experienced officer and part of Carleton’s inner circle. When de Lorimier asked him what was to be done, La Corne Saint-Luc pointed ahead and said “Voilà l'endroit où il faut se distinguer.” De Lorimier took this to be the general order, and at that moment, he recalled:

“I made the cry of attack - My brother, on the cry, rushed with all his Indians on the shoals to get to the mainland, from sandbar to sandbar and rock to rock…”

The boats then advanced “in line, all in the same order, all my boats on my left and to the right those Indians who might listen to my orders. We proceeded in that order.”

The Americans were now taking position on the southern shore opposite Île Ste Hélène. Many lay down behind the river bank, which formed in places a natural breastwork. Others crouched behind pine trees. Two Indians got to the shore as the Americans were deploying. One David Mallary of the Green Mountain Boys ran down and captured one. The other got away and hid in a barn (he was captured that night).

The Green Mountain Boys take position before British forces can get to shore.

Then the Americans opened fire as a number of Indians and Canadians neared shore. These men were horribly exposed, and they either ducked down behind rocks or took shelter on the small islands. They returned fire against an enemy they could barely see.

The Green Mountain Boys, prone behind the river bank, fire on British forces in the river.

Carleton was not pleased, and he soon gave the signal for the troops to withdraw. Some immediately fell back, but others found themselves pinned down close to shore. The boats did not uniformly respond either. De Lorimier was so focused on what lay ahead of him, that he initially missed the signal to retreat. When his boat did withdraw, he observed a boat containing some men of the 26th regiment that had gotten caught on the rocks. The men on board could not extricate themselves, and they lay down waiting for night to fall.

From out in the river, the British fired shot and shell on the Americans. None struck the well-protected Americans, although there were close calls. Lieutenant John Fassett of the Green Mountain Boys recalled, “There was one shell broke within a few feet of my head right over me. The pieces flew all around me and there were men lying very thick around me, but none received any harm.”

6. Carleton then ordered some of the boats to descend on the village, but when these boats neared shore, they were repulsed by the Americans’ cannon.

Sporadic musket fire continued along the shore. There, Fassett had another close call: “I had got my gun charged and was lying flat on my belly as all the rest were and was going to get up to see if I could see anybody to shoot at when one spoke and said: “There is a man running, shoot him!” I put my head a little higher when all at once our men fired very brisk and one that was behind me fired his gun over my head so that it seemed to shake my head, and Capt’n Stanton that was close behind me said that he expected I was killed. He said it did not go more than one inch from my head the whole charge, but it did not hurt me.”

The American infantry received some small reinforcements. Captain John Nicholson's company of the 3rd New York arrived from La Prairie. More importantly, the gun crew in Longueuil brought their cannon up river, and fired on some more boats and raked the small islands in the river.

By this time, Carleton had had enough, and he and his flotilla returned to Montreal. His last order was for “fires on the island [to be lit] to warm the Indians who might withdraw.”

According to Fassett:

“By this time it had begun to be dark. Then we hailed the Enemy (for there were some within 30 rods) and told them that if they would come ashore to us they could have good quarter, there were 3 behind one rock that said they would. We waited for them sometime. Then we called again. They said they had a wounded man they could not bring. Col. Warner [i.e., Lieutenant-Colonel Seth Warner] told them to leave him and come ashore and if they offered to run back, or if they fired a gun, Death was their portion. Then we see one stepping off the other way Col. Warner ordered us to fire. The gun cracked merrily at him. He fell down and crawled off, but whether we hit him I don’t know.”

The Vermonters then brought off the wounded man, a Mohawk that de Lorimier called, “my great chief Hotgouentagehte.” He was bleeding profusely from a leg wound, and he died soon after being brought on shore. The other man was Jean-Baptiste Lemoine dit Despins, who, according to Fassett, “was a gentleman… [whose] father is one of the richest men in Montreal.” Other men venturing out into the water took prisoner a militiaman named Lacoste.

The battle of Longueuil was a one-sided victory for the Americans. Captain Wait Hopkins of the Green Mountain Boys was slightly wounded. There were no other American casualties.

British casualties are uncertain. The Americans found two dead Native Americans after the battle (in addition to the Mohawk chief), and they captured two Native Americans and two Canadians. De Lorimier knew about the losses reported by the Americans, but he did not mention any other Canadian or Native American casualties. He did, however, state that there were two killed and three wounded in the stranded boat containing troops of the 26th regiment.

The Americans believed they inflicted heavy losses. According to Fassett, the Americans learned from a Canadian prisoner that “we killed 12 men in the first Boat that tried to land. They said they believed we killed 9 others and wounded about 50 men.” But where were the bodies? Either their deaths were imagined or the dead were carried away by the river. Their fire had certainly seemed devastating. During the battle, Fassett noted, “We saw numbers fall down and some never got up again.”

Fassett slept little that night, and the next day he witnessed the burial of the Native Americans:

“The 3 Indians were buried when we got there. Canadians were digging a grave for them. They dug it about 2 ft. and a half deep, then put them in stark naked with their faces downward, two at the bottom with their heads both one way, the other on top with his head at the others feet. Then they flung on dirt and then stones. ‘Twas such a funeral as I never saw before. Nothing extra, it is very cold.”

Note:

This account of the battle of Longueuil is constructed chiefly from the journal of John Fassett, and the memoirs of Guillaume de Lorimier and Simon Sanguinet (both published in Verreau's 1873 Invasion du Canada). Attention was also paid to brief descriptions of the battle appearing in a number of other places, such as this letter from Richard Montgomery to Philip Schuyler, and this letter from one of the men besieging Fort Saint-Jean.

Also helpful were the entries in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography on Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume de Lorimier, and Chaptes La Corne Saint-Luc.

Battle of Longueuil (1)

The American Invasion of Canada has been a recurring theme of this blog. Last month I wrote about two events that took place during this campaign. On September 25, 1775, the Americans began to bombard Fort Saint-Jean. Most of the British regulars defending Canada were trapped in this fort. On the same day, the British defeated Ethan Allen’s men in the battle of Longue-Pointe. Afterwards, hundreds of Canadian militia rallied to the support of the British governor Guy Carleton.

By the beginning of October, Carleton had amassed a small army at Montreal which he hoped to use to raise the siege of Fort Saint-Jean. This army consisted of 900 or so militia, 100 Native Americans (Algonquians and Mohawk), and more than 100 British regulars [1].

However, Carleton took no immediate action.

• He lacked reliable information on American numbers and deployment.
• He doubted that his militia would overpower Montgomery’s Continentals.
• He was hopeful of obtaining additional militia from the rural parishes.
• He wanted Lieutenant-Colonel Allan Maclean to come to his assistance with British troops garrisoning the city of Quebec.

During mid-to-late October, the Americans built up a small force to defend the southern shore of the St. Lawrence river. This force consisted of the Green Mountain Boys, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Seth Warner, the 2nd New York regiment, and two companies of the 3rd New York regiment (those of Captains John Nicholson and Lewis Dubois).

British and American Positions in Mid-October (click to enlarge). Warner occupied Longueuil on October 15. Brown and Livingston attacked Fort Chambly on October 17. Around this time, Maclean arrived at Sorel.

While the Americans grew stronger, Carleton’s army grew weaker. Carleton’s efforts to force additional militia to join his army were unsuccessful. In addition, as the weeks went by without action, Carleton’s militia began to grow restless and started returning to their homes [2].

In mid-October, the British began sending armed boats along the southern shore of the St. Lawrence in what seem to have been efforts to probe the American defenses. Exchanges of fire took place on October 15, between Boucherville and Longueuil, and October 18 and October 26 at Longueuil.

Carleton finally launched a major attack at Longueuil on October 30. Details concerning this battle will be described in two upcoming posts.

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Example of a probing attack (that of October 18), as described by Lieutenant John Fassett of the Green Mountain Boys:

“Seven Boats came down the river and made as if they were going to land on a point of an island or come across the river to us. A number of our officers went out towards the boats, and the Regulars from the boats fired their field pieces at us. The Balls and Grape Shot flew over our heads, but did us no harm. They shot two or three cannon balls thro' the roofs of some of the houses. Our men fired several small arms at them. Their Balls scooted along by their boats, some of them” [3].

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Notes:

1. Estimates of Carleton’s force varied widely. Carleton claimed 900; Simon Sanguinet, resident of Montreal, stated there twice as many men. Others, less credibly, claimed that Carleton had almost no assistance from the Canadian militia.

2. Carleton complained in a letter dated October 25 that the militia “disappear thirty or forty of a night.” However, it seems that he still had at least 500 Canadians available for the October 30 attack on Longueuil (see journals of John Fassett and Henry Livingston, and these letters by Henry Livingston and Timothy Bedel).

3. Fassett’s journal provides essential reading on the American invasion of Canada. A .pdf copy can be found here.

New York Regiments of 1775

In 1775, the colony of New York raised four regiments of infantry and one company of artillery. These troops were assigned to the army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, and they participated in the siege of Fort Saint-Jean and the assault on Quebec.

New York had considerable difficulty getting its men into the field, with the result that when the American invasion of Canada was launched, only 5 companies of the 1st New York Regiment were on hand. Many of the troops were awaiting either arms and equipment, or transportation north.

The problems then facing the colony are well-illustrated in a letter by the lieutenant-colonel of the 4th New York, written just 1 week before the invasion got under way.

"I arrived [in Albany] the 26th [of August], finding Captain Henry B. Livingston, with his Company, in a small house in Town. He wants many things, such as shoes, stockings, shirts, underclothes, haversacks, and cash, having advanced all himself that has been paid his men as yet. The day I arrived, came up the following Captains, with their Companies: Captain Herrick, Captain Palmer, Captain Horton, and Captain Mills, all without blankets, excepting Captain David Palmer; many of the men wanting shirts, shoes, stockings, underclothes, and, in short, without any thing fit for a soldier, except a uniform coat; and not more than thirty guns [i.e., muskets], with four Companies, fit for service. They are now on board of the small boats that brought them up, having no place for them to go into, as there is not one tent that I can find for our Battalion, and three Companies without blankets, and none to be had at this place. I do not know how to act or what to do with them; they begin to ask for cash and better lodgings, being much crowded in the small boats in which I am obliged to keep them."

Uniform coats seems to be one of the few items the colony was able to reliably supply to its troops. On June 28, 1775, the New York Provincial Congress ordered the purchase of 712 of each of the following types of short coats: blue broadcloth with crimson facings, light brown coarse broadcloth with blue facings, grey broadcloth with green facings, and dark brown coarse broadcloth with scarlet facings. [see here].

A number of writers have indicated that the above description refers to, in order, the uniforms worn by the four New York regiments. However, in a relatively recent uniform book, Marko Zlatich (1994) wrote that in practice the regiments were clothed as follows: blue faced scarlet (1st New York), blue faced crimson (2nd New York), a variety of coat colors faced green (3rd New York), a variety of coat colors faced blue (4th New York).

Lamb's New York artillery company wore blue coats with buff facings. [see here].

Uniforms of Lamb's Artillery Company (Left) and the 3rd New York (Right) According to Charles Lefferts.

3rd New York Regiment in Miniature. Following Zlatich, I've painted the regiment in a variety of coat colors (blue, brown, and grey) faced green. The miniatures are by Stone Mountain.

Reenactor Units:

• 2nd New York Regiment
• 3rd New York Regiment
• Lamb's Artillery Company