33rd Regiment of Foot

The 33rd Regiment of Foot was one of the most distinguished regiments serving in the British army during the American Revolutionary War. An admirer, Sergeant Roger Lamb, commented that "The 33rd... set a standard of soldier like duty." Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis served as the regiment's colonel, but in the field the regiment was led by Lieutenant-Colonel James Webster.

The 33rd first served on a British expedition to the Carolinas, and it was present at battle of Sullivan's Island (June 28, 1776). After the unsuccessful conclusion of that expedition, the regiment was sent to New York, where it was active at the battles of Long Island (August 27, 1776) and Fort Washington (November 16, 1776). In 1777, the regiment participated in the invasion of Pennsylvania and the subsequent retreat through New Jersey. The battalion companies saw relatively little combat during this interval. The grenadier company, however, saw hard fighting at Brandywine (September 11, 1777) and Monmouth (June 28, 1778), and the light infantry company lost many of its men in various engagements by the end of 1777.

Also in 1777, a portion of the regiment served in the northern theater in John Burgoyne's army. These men helped serve the artillery pieces, and, like most of Burgoyne's men, were captured at Saratoga.

After Monmouth, the regiment spent time in and around British posts in New York City and Newport, Rhode Island. In 1780, the regiment fought in the southern theater, including at the siege of (April-May, 1780) Charleston. After Charleston surrendered, the battalion companies of the regiment helped garrison South Carolina. These men saw hard hard fighting at the battle of Camden (August 16, 1780), where the regiment charged Continental infantry and American cannon spewing grape shot and canister. By the end of the day, the regiment lost 100 men, or 1/3 of its strength. The next major battle in which the 33rd served was Guilford Courthouse (March 15, 1781). On this occasion, the British army was faced with three successive lines of American infantry. The 33rd was the first regiment to fight its way through the first two American lines (militia from North Carolina and Virginia), and it then played a pivotal role in forcing the final line (Continentals) to retreat. However, losses once again totaled 1/3 of the regiment's strength. The remainder of the 33rd accompanied Cornwallis into Virginia, and it fought its last battle at Yorktown (October, 1781).

Below are two images of 15mm miniatures I've painted to represent the 33rd Foot. Colors for the flag pole will be added at a future date.

Also Online

Reenactors: 33rdfoot.org

Painted miniatures by other bloggers:

• 28mm miniatures by Giles
• 40mm miniatures by Truls

1st Maryland Regiment

The 1st Maryland Regiment was one of the most distinguished American regiments serving during the American War of Independence. Originally organized as the Maryland Battalion, the regiment won acclaim in desperate actions against numerically superior British forces at the battles of Long Island (August 27, 1776) and White Plains (October 28, 1776). During the following winter, the regiment, though much reduced in size, was at the forefront of the fighting at the battles of Trenton (December 26, 1776) and Princeton (January 3, 1777). The following year, the redesignated 1st Maryland helped defend Pennsylvania and fought at Brandywine (September 11, 1777) and Germantown (October 4, 1777).

In 1780, the Maryland line was sent to the Carolinas, where they suffered horrendous losses at the battle of Camden (August 16). The remnants of the Maryland regiments were organized into two regiments. The reorganized 1st Maryland fought with great distinction at Cowpens (January 17, 1781), Guilford Courthouse (March 15, 1781), and Eutaw Springs (September 8, 1781). On each of these occasions the regiment launched a critical bayonet charge that broke well-trained British regulars. The regiment was also heavily engaged at Hobkirk's Hill (April 25, 1781) and the siege of Ninety-Six (May 22-June 19, 1781).

The Maryland Regiment of 1776 wore hunting shirts (in battle). Beginning in 1777, and continuing until the end of the war, the regiment wore blue coats with red facings. Below: An assortment of blue-coated Continentals by several manufacturers that can be used to represent the 1st Maryland or its sister regiments.

Uniforms of the Maryland Battalion of 1776. Left panel: Lefferts' representation of the battalion's field uniform (at left), and the dress uniform of the Baltimore Independent Cadets (one component of the battalion; at right). Right panel: 15mm Minifigs.

15mm Minifigs painted to represent the 1st Maryland Regiment as it appeared beginning in 1777.

15mm Marylanders by other manufacturers. From left to right: Musket Miniatures, Stone Mountain Miniatures, Essex Miniatures, Valent Miniatures.

For the 1st Maryland reenactors, see here.

For 28mm-high versions of the 1st Maryland by fellow bloggers, see here and here.

Battle of Fishing Creek 3

Part 3: To Fishing Creek

Previous: Cary's Fort and Camden

Next: Sumter's Defeat

Sumter’s Retreat

On August 16, 1780, the men of Thomas Sumter’s brigade could hear the distant sound of cannon fire from the battle of Camden, and anxiously awaited word of the result. That evening, three or four riders appeared bearing news of the American defeat; they also conveyed orders from Major-General Horatio Gates for Sumter to retreat to a place of safety [1].

Sumter had held onto a toehold of South Carolina since late June, and although his men had galled the British at Williamson’s Plantation, he had been left undisturbed because of "the intense heat of the summer," because British offensive preparations were then incomplete, and because he did not yet register as a serious threat. After the attacks on Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock, Sumter was seen as truly dangerous, but the American offensive under Gates prohibited the British from launching a sustained retaliatory campaign. Now, Gates' army was destroyed, and Sumter’s protection was gone [2].

Sumter well appreciated the new strategic situation, and wasted no time in seeking the relative safety of the North Carolina border. That night his men marched north along the western bank of the Wateree [3]. This night march was not as rapid as the one he made before the battles of Rocky Mount or Hanging Rock. On those occasions his force was mounted; now he was responsible for hundreds of men (the force lent by Gates and his British prisoners) who would travel by foot.

Sumter pushed his men again the following day (August 17), and got his force by nightfall to Rocky Mount, some 25 miles from Camden, and on the edge of his former sphere of operations. At dawn on August 18, Sumter burned the post at Rocky Mount (which had been abandoned by the British some days earlier) and headed north again [4].

By this time, Sumter had picked an unlooked-for reinforcement. A band of mounted militia led by Captain John Moffett met him on the road, which was fleeing from a different danger: a growing Loyalist militia presence in the western part of the state. On the morning of the 18th, Sumter’s men also met up with several Maryland Continentals who had journeyed from the Camden battlefield. These men included privates John Housley and Benjamin Burch of the 6th Maryland Regiment, which had been in the very center of the fighting. Housley had made the grueling journey despite a flesh wound [5].

By midday, Sumter’s force had made another 8 miles, and was on a ridge a short distance north of Fishing Creek. Both he and his men were exhausted and at least one wagon had broken down. He ordered a rest. Sumter had previously posted a lookout at the ford over the Catawba at Rocky Mount, and he now placed a patrol on the road south of Fishing Creek, and a strong guard at the ford across Fishing Creek. Vedettes kept watch over other approaches to the American position [6]. After issuing these orders, Sumter partly undressed and napped under a wagon [7].

Tarleton’s Mission

Soon after the battle of Camden ended, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis plotted the destruction of Sumter’s brigade. Cornwallis had two forces that were capable of catching Sumter. On the far side of the wide Wateree, Major Patrick Ferguson and Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull commanded a force of Provincials and Loyalist militia collected from Rocky Mount and other points in western South Carolina. This force was not as numerous as Sumter’s brigade, but they were well positioned to cut off his retreat. On the near side of the river, he had Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, a great driver of men. It was hoped that the two forces would act in concert, and orders were issued to both commands [8].

Tarleton set off early on the 17th with his British Legion dragoons, a 3-pounder cannon, and a number of infantry. By nightfall, he had reached the Catawba/Wateree near Rocky Mount. At that moment, Sumter’s men were on the other side of the river [9].

At dawn on the 18th, some of the British sentries reported that the Americans were pulling out. Fearing a ruse, Tarleton ordered Captain Charles Campbell to take a small party across the river to assess the situation. Campbell’s party captured the lookout the Americans had left at Rocky Mount, and confirmed that the Americans had departed. When Tarleton saw Campbell waving a white handkerchief from the top of the height, the British set off with the cannon and the light infantry in several boats, while the horses (with riders) first waded out into the river and then swam across the deepest part [10].

Tarleton was unable to make contact with Ferguson and Turnbull, and so would be forced to go it alone at this point. Tarleton marched his men up the river road, following the clear tracks left by Sumter’s men. Then: a remarkable stroke of fortune. Two Loyalist women met him on the road, who claimed that Sumter’s men had halted. The women described the Americans’ position and a byway that led to their flank. Losing no time, Tarleton left behind his cannon and those men unable to make a rapid march. He then pressed on with about 100 dragoons and 60 infantry. Leading the way was a vanguard of one sergeant and four privates of the British Legion dragoons [11].

Sumter's Retreat and Tarleton's Pursuit (click to enlarge). Approximate paths taken by Sumter's brigade (in blue) and Tarleton's command (in red) before the battle of Fishing Creek.

Notes:

1. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 20, 1780.

3. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

4. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of William McGarity, transcribed by Will Graves. The distance is based on a straight line from Rocky Creek to Camden town.

5. James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier. The pension application of John Housley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Benjamin Burch, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. At Camden, the 6th Maryland on the left flank of the 2nd Maryland Brigade (see Otho Holland Williams, A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780), where it was engaged with portions of at least three different regiments: The Volunteers of Ireland, the 33rd Foot, and the 71st Foot.

6. As noted previously, Thomas Sumter has been criticized for some of the military decisions that he made in the course of this campaign. The strongest criticisms have been made regarding his defenses (or lack thereof) at the battle of Fishing Creek. On this point, the present account of the battle differs substantially from others. The meme that Sumter was a careless commander received a large boost from William Davie, who wrote that Sumter “strangely neglected the necessary precautions to prevent a surprise… the whole security of the army rested upon two vedettes.” But Davie was not present, and he obtained his information largely from Tarleton’s memoir rather than from the remembrances of American participants. American accounts, in particular those recorded by James Saye and James Collins, point to a very different conclusion: that Tarleton surprised the Americans because he crossed Fishing Creek at an obscure (though still guarded) ford, and in this way suddenly gained the Americans’ flank. This interpretation of course does not completely exonerate Sumter, but it does further suggest that he was a much abler commander than some historians believe.

For Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Saye's account can be found in this extract from his Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot. For Collins' account, see the transcription appearing in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

7. Tarleton, ibid. Davie, ibid. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. According to the pension application of David McCance (transcribed by Will Graves), Sumter slept in a tent.

8. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

9. Tarleton, ibid.

10. Tarleton, ibid.

11. Tarleton, ibid. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

Battle of Fishing Creek 2

Part 2: Cary's Fort and Camden

Previous: Sumter's Third Target

Next: To Fishing Creek

Cary's Fort

On the morning of August 15, 1780, Thomas Sumter’s brigade of militia was joined by the reinforcement sent to him by Major-General Horatio Gates, bringing his total to around 700 men [1], the largest force he had commanded to date. Sumter then advanced on the Wateree river crossings south and west of Camden. As the Americans approached, they found that the British had evacuated all of their posts except for a redoubt held by Colonel James Cary of the South Carolina Loyalist militia. These men held their ground to keep open the flow of men and supplies into Camden. The Americans quickly attacked and after a brief fight in which seven Loyalists were killed, the Americans "took about thirty prisoners, among which was colonel Cary, their commander, together with thirty odd wagons loaded with corn, rum, etc., also a number of horses" [2].

The British on the other side of the river began to open fire on his men, and Sumter noted with apprehension that "the ground upon this side [is] very bad," and that "the boats are all upon the opposite side of the river" [3]. The Americans withdrew out of gunfire range, leaving a small guard to keep an eye on the British. Among these men was George Weir, a soldier in Edward Lacey’s regiment. He recalled in later years being "left alone" "as a sentinel near the ferry" "and nearly to have been captured by the enemy" [4].

Sumter also had men watching the southern and western approaches to the Wateree. Some of his men saw a party of around 60 British regulars from the 33rd and 71st regiments approaching the Wateree. These regulars had been recalled from the western post at Ninety-Six to aid in the defense of Camden. Oblivious to danger, they marched with their weapons loaded up in a wagon [5]. The Americans "secreted themselves until the British came up, when suddenly rushing upon them [they] took the whole party… without firing a gun" [6].

Meanwhile, Sumter was growing concerned about his safety. Perhaps hoping to spur Gates into action, he wrote to him saying that the British had only 1,200 regulars in Camden, and fewer than 1,000 militia, the latter of whom "are generally sickly and much dispirited." He also claimed that 500 men were en route from Charleston and were expected to arrive on the 17th. He then withdrew his force 10 miles up the river to a more easily defended position [7].

Camden

Gates received Sumter’s letter on the 15th and determined to apply further pressure to the British force in Camden. He would make a nighttime march to a strong position behind Saunders Creek, just 5 miles from Camden. From this position he could further restrict the flow of supplies into Camden and deter the British from attacking Sumter. The position was also strong enough that he could likely repel there any attack by British regulars. Gates’ army marched at 10pm [8].

Meanwhile, Charles Cornwallis had taken control of the British forces in Camden, after arriving there from Charleston the day before (August 14th). Cornwallis could see that Camden was not a strong position and that the Americans’ were likely to ultimately force them from this post. Cornwallis therefore determined to take the fight directly to Gates, reasoning that a victory would wipe out the Americans’ gains, while a defeat would be no worse than avoiding a fight altogether (in either case he would be forced to retreat). In order to maximize the probability of victory, he determined to try and catch the Americans by surprise. During the night of August 15-16, his army marched out of Camden hoping to surprise the Americans at dawn [9].

The two American armies marched along the same road, each expecting to surprise the other. Instead, both armies were surprised when their vanguards collided in the night, a little more than a mile north of Saunders Creek. After a confused flurry of fighting, the armies separated and in the morning (August 16), properly deployed for battle. Cornwallis anchored the left end of his line with the battered veterans of Hanging Rock (the British Legion Infantry, Bryan’s Volunteers, and the Royal North Carolina Regiment). He attacked primarily with several units of British regulars placed on his right. Gates adopted a similar strategy: he placed his weakest troops (North Carolina and Virginia militia) on his left and his strongest troops (Maryland and Delaware Continentals) on his right. The British regulars quickly sent the American militia into flight. The Continentals then found themselves attacked in front, flank, and rear. By the end of the day, the American army was destroyed with the loss of hundreds of men killed or captured. The American baggage train was also captured, and most of the broken militia headed home. This battle, known as Camden, was one of the greatest British victories of the war [10].

Sources:

Note that in some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Letter from Josiah Martin to George Germain, August 18-20, 1780. Both higher and lower totals can be found in later sources.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Horatio Gates, August 15, 1780. [The date was incorrectly transcribed as the 10th in this edition].

3. Sumter to Gates, ibid.

4. The pension application of George Weir, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

5. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Nathan Jaggars, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Dunlap, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves.

The day before a "corps of light infantry" passed safely the same way into Camden. See Martin to Germain, ibid.

6. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. In Hicks' account the convoy was captured by just him and two other men. Other veterans remembered this event differently.

7. Sumter to Gates, ibid. This is not to say that Sumter didn’t believe these things. Without a doubt he and his men questioned both the prisoners they took and civilians living in the area and this is likely the best intelligence he possessed. Rather, Sumter’s letter seems designed as an implicit reminder that the British might cross the river and attack him unless Gates provided a credible threat from the north.

The "500 men" was possibly misinformation given out by British officers to convince the locals and their own Loyalist militia that the Americans’ fortunes would soon be reversed. The only approaching reinforcement from that direction mentioned by Cornwallis was a mounted detachment of the 63rd Foot. See letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

8. General Gates' orders for August 15, 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Thomas Pinckney to William Johnson, July 27, 1822.

9. Martin to Germain, ibid. Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

10. Horatio Gates to President of Congress, August 30, 1780. Otho Holland Williams. A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. Martin to Germain, ibid. Cornwallis to Germain, ibid. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

Battle of Fishing Creek 1

The Battle of Fishing Creek
Part 1: Sumter's Third Target
Next: Cary's Fort and Camden

[This account follows an earlier series of posts describing the battle of Hanging Rock. Some earlier posts provide useful background information, see especially Occupied South Carolina, Sumter's Brigade Forms, and Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina].

Rawdon's Dilemma

On the evening of August 6th, 1780 a trickle of Provincials and Loyalist militia arrived in Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon's camp at East Lynche's Creek. These men described how Thomas Sumter had routed their units and seized the British post at Hanging Rock. The news was a shock. Sumter had evidently cleared a route towards his base of operations at Camden. Worse, Sumter’s men were mounted; his were on foot.

Rawdon knew that even if Sumter could not seize Camden, he could at least get in rear of his command. This was a most unwelcome prospect because the main American army under Major-General Horatio Gates was simultaneously approaching from in front.

Deciding that no time was to be lost, Rawdon decided to abandon his strong post and make a night march towards Camden. He thought the situation might even turn in his favor if he could catch and defeat Sumter before Gates appeared. In the morning (August 7), however, he learned the truth of the battle of Hanging Rock: The British Legion infantry, aided by other detachments, had held their ground, forcing Sumter to withdraw. By now, the movements of Gates' army made it too hazardous to reestablish the post at East Lynche’s Creek. Rawdon therefore settled on a new (and weaker) defensive line closer to Camden. The troops at Hanging Rock were withdrawn to Rugeley’s Mill, and Rawdon's command encamped at West Lynche’s Creek. The post at Rocky Mount was not in imminent danger, but on August 12 Rawdon gave orders for it to withdraw as well to a more secure position [1].

Sumter Advances

Although Sumter was forced to withdraw from Hanging Rock, he took comfort in the fact that in the following days, "both British and Tories" were "pannick struck," by the Americans' gains [2]. As Gates' army closed with Rawdon's new position, Sumter wished to contribute to his operations by cutting the flow of men and supplies into Camden. To accomplish this, he proposed to march his brigade down the western side of the Catawba/Wateree River [3] and take control of key ferry crossings south of Camden [4]. On about August 13, Sumter's brigade set out on this mission. Sumter's brigade was much reduced in size by this time: in addition to the men killed and wounded at Hanging Rock, he lost the services of all of his North Carolina troops [5]. Some of his South Carolinians also left him in order to protect the western part of their native state from the Loyalist militia [6].

Rawdon's New Defensive Line: 1) British base at Camden, 2) British post at Rugeley's Mill, 3) British post at West Lynche's Creek. The arrow at upper left shows route of Sumter's advance (Sumter was in the marked area on or about August 14). The arrow at upper right shows Gates' advance (Gates' vanguard was in the marked area on August 8). (Compare with this map).

On August 14, Sumter informed Gates that a wagon train bringing men, ammunition, and clothing was approaching Camden from the south and that he was poised to capture it. By this time, Gates had maneuvered Rawdon out of his second defensive line and had become confident of his ability to take Camden. To support Sumter's small force (now only about 250 men), Gates lent him 100 Continentals, 300 North Carolina militia and 2 pieces of artillery. These men left Gates' army the night of August 14-15 and joined Sumter at daybreak [7].

Notes:

1. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801. Letter from Josiah Martin to George Germain, August 18-20, 1780. Journal of Lieutenant Anthony Allaire, in Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

3. The river is known as the Wateree in the vicinity of Camden, but as the Catawba at Rocky Mount and points further north.

4. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 12, 1780.

5. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

6. Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

7. Letter from General Gates to the President of Congress, August 20, 1780. Otho Holland Williams. A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract].

The Continental infantry was drawn mainly from the Maryland line, although there were also a few of the 1st Delaware and a company-sized detachment of Armand's Legion. The whole was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Woolford of the 5th Maryland. Two 3-pounder cannon, accompanied by a small crew, were detached from the Continental artillery. The North Carolina militia were commanded by Colonel Elijah Isaacks.

See: Prisoners Taken at Catawba Fords. Pension application of Peter Scrum, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. Letter from General Gates to the President of Congress, August 20, 1780. Pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

Sumter's Continentals

Thomas Sumter's militia brigade was composed primarily of BackCountry South Carolina militia regiments, but it also contained North Carolina militia units, Catawba Indians, and even a few odd Continentals. The main American army in the South was captured at Charleston in May, 1780, but that does not mean that every Continental was captured or remained in captivity. Francis Marion famously missed the siege of Charleston due to an injury, and so could take the field after the American surrender and lead resistance in eastern South Carolina. Some of the rank and file also claimed, in pension applications filed after the war, to have subsequently taken up arms against the British.

As argued in a recent post, some skepticism is in order when assessing pension applications. The pension application of Absalom Baker is a case in point: He claimed to have been, in 1780, captured at Charleston, exchanged 30 days later, and than served at the battles of Waxhaws, Ramsour's Mill, Hanging Rock, Camden (where he was allegedly wounded), and King's Mountain. (Waxhaws, notably, was fought 2-and-a-half weeks after Charleston fell). However, friends vouched for Baker's presence at Charleston, Hanging Rock, Camden, and King's Mountain).

William McMurry, of the 6th South Carolina Regiment, claimed to have been a Continental from about 1779 to 1782, yet stated he fought at Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and Camden. No explanation was given for why he was not in captivity after Charleston fell.

Jesse Harrison, of the 10th (and later 1st) North Carolina Regiment, was one to provide some account of how he escaped captivity. He claimed to have served as a North Carolina Continental "untill the fall of Charleston, at which place he escaped, being taken out with the waggons." Subsequently he served at Hanging Rock and Camden.

James Courson, of the 6th South Carolina Regiment, stated that he “was at the siege of Charleston & was taken prisoner then. Most of my comrades were put on board prison ships but there were a great many of the prisoners inoculated on account of the small pox I having had the small pox in my childhood was removed for the purpose of nursing the sick from which place I escaped after about a month. I joined Sumpter the day after the battle of Rocky mount & the next Sunday after we fought the battle of the Hanging rock.”

Robert Wilson, of the 3rd South Carolina Regiment, claimed that he served "until the capture of Charleston in May 1780 when he was surrendered a prisoner of war with General Lincoln's Army – was under a limited parole, on Haddrell's Point near Charleston, a few days before his parole was out, he made his escape, and came home.” However, he didn't remain free for very long: “a few days after his Return was taken prisoner by a party of Tories." After escaping a second time, he "immediately joined General Sumpter upon Clem's Branch in the State of North Carolina, and served until the British left Charleston, That during his Service under General Sumter he was in the Battle at Rocky Mountain, & Hanging Rock.”

A statement by Captain James Jamieson in Wilson's application vouches for this history: “although this deponent never belonged to the Continental establishment himself, yet he has no doubt from many circumstances, that Robert Wilson was captured at Charleston, South Carolina, and made his escape from the British at Haddrell's point, where he was confined on parole, not to go beyond a certain limit: that this was in the month of June, a sickly season of the year, when his life would have been lost by remaining in so unhealthy a place: that said Wilson escaped by breaking his parole, and returning home to Chester District where he was taken prisoner by a gang of Tories from whom he again made his escape, and fled to general Sumter, whose Army said Wilson joined at Haggler's branch, where said Wilson and this deponent served together under Sumter, until this deponent was disabled from further service, by wounds received at the battle of 'Hanging Rock.'"


Sources:

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Absalom Baker. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William McMurry. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Wilson. (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed and annotated the pension application of James Courson. (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed and annotated the pension application of Jesse Harrison. (.pdf file).

Seeds of Defeat (More)

At beginning of June, 1780, the British were confident that they would soon complete the subjugation of South Carolina. By the end of the month, however, that goal was proving elusive. The Backcountry militia were driven into neighboring North Carolina following the battle of Hill's Ironworks, but the destruction of private property and the hanging of some rebels pushed the populace more towards becoming angry and dangerous than frightened and submissive. The British, in other words, had enough numbers and used enough force to provoke many inhabitants of the Backcountry, but they were not so numerous as to deter or suppress armed resistance. The Backcountry militia were stronger at the end of June than they were at the end of May, and the British had inadvertently started on the road to defeat.

There are multiple explanations that can be invoked to explain the failure of the British occupation of South Carolina. Some authors have praised the indomitable spirit of resistance among the South Carolina Scotch Irish, or the guerrilla-style tactics employed by the American militia (see the works by Sam Thomas and Michael Scoggins). In a previous post, I described errors in strategy and policy as root causes of the British defeat. Recently I read an article by Malcolm Gladwell that prompted me to consider overconfidence on the part of the British leadership as a critical factor.

Gladwell often shows connections between seemingly unrelated events, and in this article he identified overconfidence as the root cause of last year's financial meltdown on Wall Street, and the infamous British defeat at Gallipoli in World War I. In describing Gallipoli, he repeatedly referred to Eliot Cohen's and John Gooch's analysis of this defeat. Gladwell wrote:

"Cohen and Gooch ascribe the disaster at Gallipoli to a failure to adapt--a failure to take into account how reality did not conform to their expectations. And behind that failure to adapt was a deeply psychological problem: the British simply couldn't wrap their heads around the fact that they might have to adapt. "Let me bring my lads face to face with Turks in the open field," [Sir Ian] Hamilton wrote in his diary before the attack. "We must beat them every time because British volunteer soldiers are superior individuals to Anatolians, Syrians or Arabs and are animated with a superior ideal and an equal joy in battle."

What struck me while reading this article is the several parallels between the British invasion of Gallipoli in 1915 and South Carolina in 1780. In both cases, a second front was opened in order to bring a stalemated war to a successful conclusion. In both cases, the invaders had a low opinion of the opponent they faced, and in both occasion the invaders would be slow to adapt to unanticipated difficulties (such as the asymmetrical warfare adopted by the Americans in the South).

"'The attack was based on two assumptions,' Cohen and Gooch write, 'both of which turned out to be unwise: that the only really difficult part of the operation would be getting ashore, after which the Turks could easily be pushed off the peninsula; and that the main obstacles to a happy landing would be provided by the enemy.'"

The British planning for the invasion of South Carolina was likewise concerned primarily with getting the army safely ashore, and dealing with the threat posed by the Continentals. In fact, defeating the Continental army at Charleston proved to be a much less formidable task than subduing the rural parts of the state.

I'm not going to be do justice to the article in this post, but I'll share one tidbit that I found to be especially interesting. Regarding the origins of overconfidence, Gladwell wrote:

"As novices, we don't trust our judgment. Then we have some success, and begin to feel a little surer of ourselves. Finally, we get to the top of our game and succumb to the trap of thinking that there's nothing we can't master. As we get older and more experienced, we overestimate the accuracy of our judgments, especially when the task before us is difficult and when we're involved with something of great personal importance. The British were overconfident at Gallipoli not because Gallipoli didn't matter but, paradoxically, because it did; it was a highstakes contest, of daunting complexity, and it is often in those circumstances that overconfidence takes root."

Is this what happened in South Carolina? Arguably, the British commanders, Lieutenant-Generals Henry Clinton and Charles Cornwallis had much the same background and were in much the same situation. Cornwallis in particular seemed to take increasingly large and ill-advised risks during the Southern Campaign. He wisely refrained from invading North Carolina in June of 1780 because he felt insufficiently strong and because South Carolina had not been wholly subdued. In August, he took a big gamble at the battle of Camden (attacking a force he believed to be several times larger than his own) that paid off spectacularly well. In the spring of 1781, he invaded North Carolina with a little over 2,000 men, even though this entailed advancing into a wilderness where he could not be supplied and where few supplies could be found. That too paid off, or so he may have convinced himself because of the "victory" won at Guilford Courthouse. And so on it continued until his final courting of disaster at Yorktown.

Sources:

Sam Thomas. The 1780 Presbyterian Rebellion and the Battle of Huck's Defeat.

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (link to amazon.com).

Malcolm Gladwell. Cocksure: Banks, battles, and the psychology of overconfidence. The New Yorker. July 27, 2009.

New York Volunteers

The New York Volunteers were one of several regiments of Provincials (Loyalists that were essentially trained and equipped in the manner of British regulars) that served in the Southern campaign of the American Revolution.

Loyalist refugees in New York began fleeing in 1775 to the British authorities, and these were formed in early 1776 at Halifax into two companies of Volunteers. The companies were first deployed at the battles of Long Island (1776) and White Plains (1776). The Volunteers were subsequently expanded and in 1779 were placed on the American Establishment and designated the 3rd American Regiment (although they continued to be referred to as the New York Volunteers). The Volunteers participated in the storming of Fort Montgomery, New York (1777), the capture of Savannah, Georgia (1778), the siege of Savannah (1779), and the siege of Charleston, South Carolina (1780). Following the capture of the American army at Charleston, the regiment was assigned to garrison the post at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, one of a string of posts across the northern portion of the state. The regiment was engaged at the battle of Rocky Mount (1780), and, after that post was abandoned, Hobkirk's Hill (1781), and Eutaw Springs (1781). Detachments were also present at Williamson's Plantation (1780), Camden (1780), and King's Mountain (1780).

The regiment appears to have worn red coats, faced blue, while in South Carolina.

Bibliography:

René Chartrand (2008). American Loyalist Troops 1775-84. Osprey.

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

The On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies. New York Volunteers Officers' Memorial.

Alexander Chesney's Rivulet

[Minor edits 12/28/09]

One of the few British accounts of the battle of Cowpens was provided by the Loyalist Alexander Chesney. In his Journal, he wrote:

"I rode to my father's who said Morgan was gone to the Old-fields about an hour before; my wife said the same and that they had used or destroyed my crop & took away almost every thing. I immediately returned to Col Tarleton and found he had marched towards the Old fields. I overtook them before 10 oclock near the Cowpens on Thickety Creek where we suffered a total defeat by some dreadful bad management. The Americans were posted behind a rivulet with Rifle-men as a front line and Cavarly in the rear so as to make a third line; Col Tarleton charged at the head of his Regiment of Cavalry called the British Legion which was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden; the Cavalry supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty, but the prisoners on seeing their own Regt opposed to them in the rear would not proceed against it and broke: the remainder charged but were repulsed this gave time to the front line to rally and form in the rear of their Cavalry which immediately charged and broke the 71st (then unsupported) making many prisoners: the rout was almost total. I was with Tarleton in the charge who behaved bravely but imprudently the consequence was his force disperced in all directions the guns and many prisoners fell into the hands of the Americans."

A curious feature of this account is the statement that, "The Americans were posted behind a rivulet," that is a small stream. An examination of the battlefield shows that there is no such stream interposing between the American and British initial positions. Chesney's account suggests that during the battle he was on the left side of the British line, and more specifically, with Tarleton's dragoon reserve. Lawrence Babits in A Devil of a Whipping pointed out that there is an area of low ground near the Green River Road on the left side of the battlefield, and he suggested that "After winter rains, this low ground was probably a near bog at the time of the battle" (p 63). Boggy ground and a small stream would not seem to be the same thing, but Babits' suggestion is nevertheless appealing. Chesney is considered to be a reliable source, and an explanation along these lines seems preferable to ignoring his statement. Given all the tumult, the large numbers of men about him, and perhaps also that his group was moving with some speed, it's not unreasonable that Chesney's remembrance would be less than perfect. Also possible is that the terrain has changed somewhat since the time of the battlefield.

The American Deployment at Cowpens. "Rivulets" exist on the flanks of the American army, but not in front. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = Skirmishers.

Possible Location of Alexander's Chesney's Rivulet. The medium blue line in the bottom half of the map shows the approximate path of Chesney's rivulet, as based on Babits' maps and erosion patterns visible in the topography. (Contour lines are at 20-foot intervals; a more detailed topographic map may suggest a different path).

Chesney indicated that the Americans were posted behind this rivulet. Technically, the map shows this, but Chesney's account implies that the Americans would have been closer to this terrain feature than the map indicates. However, it is again plausible that Chesney was in error and his statement about the Americans being formed behind this barrier may have been no more than supposition on his part. Chesney's statement that he met up with the British "before 10 oclock" may mean that he may have missed the beginning of the battle, as other accounts place the start of the battle considerably earlier (e.g., "about sunrise," according to Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, and "before one hour of daylight had passed," according to Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie). In any case, no American account mentions this rivulet and from this it can be inferred that it did not play a role in the Americans' defensive plans.

Babits took Chesney's statement fairly literally. Specifically, he placed the American skirmish line a little more than 100 yards behind the rivulet. This too may seem to be stretching the definition of "behind," but at least the advancing British would have been well within the range of the Americans' rifles at that juncture.

In my view, this interpretation causes two problems.

First, this interpretation does not wholly jibe with Chesney's statement. Chesney did not describe the existence of a separate American skirmish line. His "riflemen" is the American militia line (the regulars, which are not mentioned, are the second line and the "Cavarly in the rear" are explicitly called "a third line"). All writers agree that the militia line was not posted in the supposed vicinity of Chesney's rivulet.

Second, participant accounts indicate that the main line, the militia line, and the skirmishers were spaced at 150 yard intervals (some put the distance at 200 yards). If the skirmishers were near the rivulet, then the militia and main lines must be placed in advance of the positions usually ascribed to them.

Sources:

The Journal of Alexander Chesney.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Morgan, and Mackenzie.

71st Regiment of Foot

[Minor edits 12/28/09]

The 71st Regiment of Foot was raised in 1775 among the Highlanders of Scotland; it was the first British regiment to be raised after the start of the war. At its peak, the regiment had 2,340 men. The regiment was sent to New York in 1776 and participated in the battle of Long Island, and served in a minor capacity at White Plains and Fort Washington. The following spring (1777), the regiment was active in New Jersey and fought at Short Hills; that summer, the 71st accompanied William Howe to Pennsylvania, where it fought at Brandywine. Afterwards, the regiment was used to guard the British baggage and to help secure the Delaware River. The regiment returned to New York in December, 1777. While in New York, the 71st participated in the raid on Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey (1778), and the grenadiers of the regiment were captured at Stony Point (1779). The 71st participated in the capture of Savannah (1778), and Augusta (1779) in Georgia. In that same campaign it served with distinction at Briar Creek, Stono Ferry, and the siege of Savannah (1779). The following year (1780), the 71st participated in the siege of Charleston and was garrisoned at Cheraws, South Carolina, when the British established a system of outposts in that state.

The 71st suffered significant losses in 1779-1780 due to illness. Captain Johann Ewald of the Hessian Jaegers recorded in his diary (February 2, 1780) that "The remainder of the 71st Scottish Regiment, which had arrived from Savannah, joined us here [near Charleston]. The regiment had melted away during this war from three thousand to four hundred men, due partly to the sword and partly to the climate."

The 71st was placed in reserve at Camden (1780), and helped repel the Continentals when the British left began to gave way. Subsequently, the regiment participated in Cornwallis' abortive invasion of North Carolina, and was present at the capture of Charlotte (1780). The 1st battalion of the 71st and the light infantry of both battalions were destroyed at Cowpens. The 2nd battalion fought at Wetzell's Mill and Guilford Courthouse (1781), and was captured at Yorktown (1781).

The images below show my 1st battalion of the 71st advancing into action. The uniform is based on the Troiani painting of an infantryman of the 71st in the South. Among the miniatures is a bagpiper (wearing a enlisted man's coat with some lace added to the shoulders rather than a proper musician's uniform). Colonel Otho Williams mentioned in a letter that the bagpipes of the 71st were captured at Cowpens.

Feud with Tarleton

Immediately after Cowpens, a long-running feud began between Tarleton and the officers of the 71st. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard of the Maryland continentals recalled that the captured, "Major M'Arthur [of the 71st] very freely entered. into conversation, and said that he was an officer before Tarleton was born; that the best troops in the service were put under 'that boy' to be sacrificed." Brigadier-General William Moultrie of South Carolina heard the paroled British officers echoing these sentiments after their arrival in Charleston, where they awaited to be exchanged for American prisoners of war. He recalled, "Some of the old British officers who were made prisoners, and paroled to Charlestown, when they came down, were exceedingly angry indeed, at their defeat, and were heard to say, 'that was the consequence of trusting such a command to a boy like Tarleton.'" David Stewart's 1822 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland related that, "if they [the 71st] had been properly led on and supported, they would have shown themselves at Cowpens the same as in all other actions... The troops were hurried into action, without any previous examination of the ground, or of the disposition of the enemy; and so strong was the impression on the minds of the officers of the Highland regiment that the fault did not lie with their men, that they made a representation to Lord Cornwallis, not to be employed again under the same officer. His Lordship complied with their request." The feud reached its climax with the attacks of Lieutenant Roderick's Mackenzie on Tarleton. The first of these appeared in a London newspaper while the war was still in progress. In this, Mackenzie complained to Tarleton that, "You got yourself and your party completely ambuscaded, completely surrounded, upon all sides, by Mr. Morgan's rifle men. What was the consequence? The two detachments of British were made prisoners after a great slaughter was made among them, your legion dragoons were so broke by galling fire of rifle shot that your charging was in vain, till prudence, on your side, with about twenty men who were well mounted, made your retreat good, by leaving the remains of the poor blended legion in the hands of Mr. Morgan."

Sources:

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

Johann Ewald (1979). Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal. Translated by Joseph P Tustin. New Haven: Yale University Press.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of statements by Tarleton, Cornwallis, Howard, and Mackenzie's August 9, 1782, letter in the London Morning Chronicle.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

A summary of the Otho Williams papers can be found here. The item in question is a letter from Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781.

The British Legion

[Minor edits 12/25/09; 4/13/10]

The British Legion was formed at New York in 1778 from other Provincial units. The term "legion" refers to the fact that the regiment included both an infantry and a cavalry component (specifically, "dragoons"). The Legion also apparently had a band, and, according to Colonel Otho Williams, their instruments were captured at the battle of Cowpens.

The infantry of the Legion usually fought on foot, but detachments were sometimes mounted, most notably at Waxhaws and Hanging Rock. Some of the Legion infantry were apparantly mounted at Cowpens, too, for Tarleton commented that "the cavalry and mounted infantry brought up the rear" during his approach to the battlefield.

The British Legion was one of the most active units during the later years of the war. The regiment (or detachments thereof) saw action at Indian Field in 1778, the siege of Charleston, Lenud's Ferry, Monck's Corner, and Waxhaws in the Spring of 1780, Williamson's Plantation, Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, Camden, and Fishing Creek in the Summer of 1780, Fishdam Ford, and Blackstock's Plantation in the Fall of 1780, and Cowpens, Torrence's Tavern, Wetzell's Mill , Guilford Courthouse, and Yorktown in 1781.

The many battles in which this regiment participated took a severe toll on the rank and file. Loyalist Alexander Chesney wrote that at the time of Cowpens, the dragoon companies were "filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden."

The uniform of the dragoons is well documented as short green jackets with black cuffs and collars (see especially this famous painting and Don Troiaini's modern one). The recollections of Cornet James Simons of the American 3rd light dragoons confirmed that this uniform was worn at Cowpens, “Colo. Tarleton's Legeonary Cavalry... wore a Uniform of Green with black facings.” The infantry of the Legion probably wore green jackets as well, although the "Barron Map" of the Battle of Camden shows them in red coats with black facings.

Sources:

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

Johann Ewald (1979). Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal. Translated by Joseph P Tustin. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lawrence Babits. (1998). A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (amazon.com link).

The Journal of Alexander Chesney is available here through Google Books.

A summary of the Otho Williams papers can be found here. The item in question is a letter from Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website is a fantastic resource for Banastre Tarleton and British Legion aficionados.