Cowpens in Miniature 23

Part 23: Surrender

Previous: Flight

Next: The Last Gambit

The flight of the British Legion dragoon reserve meant that the American counterattack would not be checked. François-Jean de Chastellux noted that the British Legion "fled full gallop, without ever thinking of the infantry, or taking the least precaution to cover their retreat."

The infantry struggled to fend for themselves as all order broke down. Daniel Morgan reported that "The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight." Sergeant-Major William Seymour happily observed that the British "retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field." From writing from a British perspective, David Stewart gloomily concurred, "the rout Was general; few of the infantry escaped; and of the cavalry, who put their horses to full speed, not a man was taken."

Not all of the British troops attempted to flee, however. The remnant of the 17th Light Dragoons stayed on the field, although they had been, in Cornet James Simons words, "deserted by Colo. Tarleton's Legeonary Cavalry." Tarleton also remained behind. When the Legion dragoons could not be rallied, he remained with the 17th Light Dragoons and a handful of others on horseback, near the Green River Road. George Hanger claimed that "He stood almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy, with hopes either of rallying his own men, or not surviving their disgrace." This small force offered at least some protection for his retreating infantry, which had, in American Thomas Young’s words, thrown "down their guns and cartouch boxes, made for the wagon road, and did the prettiest sort of running!"

The presence of the American cavalry in the rear of the British infantry severely limited their options to escape.

Cornet James Simons stated in a letter to William Washington long after the battle that "In pursuit of their Cavalry [i.e., the 17th Light Dragoons] you overtook their Artillery, whom you immediately made prisoners." Howard convincingly claimed that the guns were taken by his own infantry [see Note 1], but it’s possible that the cavalry encountered at least the horse-drawn limbers. Simon went on to relate that "the Drivers of the Horses who were Galloping off with 2-3 pounders, you could not make Surrender until after Repeated Commands from you, you were obliged to order to be Shot; after securing these fieldpieces."

Letting the 17th go, the American then turned on the British infantry. According to Simons "your third Charge was made on the right wing of their Army… who, under the Operation of a Universal panic, (having been successfully charged on the left of their Army by our friend Col. Howard) instantly surrendered" [see Note 2]. Major Joseph McJunkin remembered also the key role played by the American cavalry, "Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms [see Note 3].

The British infantry was certainly not going to outrun the American cavalry; frequently they could not outrun the American infantry.

Mackenzie wrote that "the infantry were easily overtaken, as the cause which had retarded the pursuit [i.e., exhaustion], had now an equal effect in impeding the retreat: dispirited on many accounts, they surrendered at discretion." De Chastellux agreed, "Fatigued by a very long march, they were soon overtaken."

Even the militia that had survived Nettles’ attack was able to contribute to this final assault on the British right. According to Private James Collins, "We… advanced briskly, and gained the right flank of the enemy, and they being hard pressed in front, by Howard, and falling very fast, could not stand it long.

Surrender (click to enlarge). Closely pressed by American Continentals and militia, and their retreat cut off by the American cavalry, most of the British infantry throw down their arms (not shown). Meanwhile, Tarleton stands "almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy."

American Cavalryman Thomas Young, seeing the British line collapse so utterly noted that at this time, "Major Jolly and seven or eight of us, resolved upon an excursion to capture some of the baggage" [see Note 4]. Tarleton may have seen these men, but he evidently did not interfere with them. He retained his toehold on the battlefield.

Around the same time, that the Americans were mopping up the right side of the British line, the British left was also in complete collapse. Lieutenant-Colonel Howard recalled that "In the pursuit, I was led towards the [American] right, in among the 71st, who were broken into squads. They no longer offered serious resistance. William Moultrie claimed that "So great was the consternation in which the British infantry were, at seeing their cavalry gallop off, that, either from pique or panic, numbers of them never fired a gun."

Howard recalled that "I called to them [the 71st Foot] to surrender, they laid down their arms, and the officers delivered up their swords." Major McJunkin was also immediately present and remembered that "some begin to call for quarters," when "the voice of Howard is heard amid the rush of men and clangor of steel: ‘Throw down your arms and you shall have good quarters.’ When they were finally "convinced that quarters would be given, they as it were rent the very air with thanks that their lives would be spared. These were called the Scots regiment" [see Note 5].

All-in-all, according to William Moultrie, "upwards of five hundred laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners. The first battalion of the seventy-first, and two companies of light infantry, laid down their arms." The 71st surrendered on the British left; the two companies of light infantry (perhaps Moultrie meant the light infantry of the 16th and 71st regiments) were perhaps the last organized resistance on the British right.

Several anecdotes concerning the surrender of the 71st Foot have been preserved in participant accounts. McJunkin stated that "In the conclusion of this foray you might have seen Major [James] Jackson of Georgia rush among the broken ranks of the 71st Regiment and attempting to seize their standard, while they are vainly trying to form by it; you might have seen Col. Howard interposing for the relief of his friend when entangled among his foes" [see Note 6].

Howard related that one "Captain Duncanson, of the 71st grenadiers [see Note 7], gave me his sword, and stood by me. Upon getting on my horse, I found him pulling at my saddle, and he nearly unhorsed me. I expressed my displeasure, and asked him what he was about. The explanation was, that they had orders to give no'quarter, and they did not expect any; and as my men were coming up, he was afraid they would use him ill. I admitted his excuse, and put him into the care of a sergeant. I had messages from him for some years afterwards, expressing his obligation for my having saved his life."

Major Arthur McArthur, who commanded the first battalion of the 71st attempted to escape on horseback, but he was overridden by one or more mounted Americans. Who captured him is unclear. Colonel Andrew Pickens claimed that, "Major McCarthur surrendered to me, some distance from the battlefield & delivered his sword to me," while Major Jackson wrote that McArthur was "a prisoner on that occasion taken by myself" [emphasis in original].

Notes:

1. Morgan also implicitly credited Howard with capturing the guns in his official report of the battle. Howard, Morgan reported, "gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address that they [the British] fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces in our possession."

2. The excised text includes that "the right wing of their Army Composed of their Legeonary Infantry, intermixed with the Battallion of the Brave 71st (under the Command of Major McArthur,)" The 71st Foot was neither a part of the right wing of their army nor next to the British Legion infantry. Perhaps he was thinking of the light infantry companies of the 71st Foot, who were on hand.

3. The full text reads "One battalion throws down their arms and the men fall to the earth. Another commences flight, but Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms." McJunkin recognized that the British line had broken into two parts. The battalion that "throws down their arms" is the 71st, the other "battalion" is the British right. McJunkin was personally involved at this time in the fight against the 71st; he did not seem to realize or remember that the British right included several commands.

4. Howard mentions Morgan’s aide, Baron de Glaubeck leading "five or six militia men well mounted," on this excursion. McJunkin related that "After the surrender of the British infantry a company of fourteen dashed off to take possession of the British baggage wagons ten miles distant. Major Benjamin Jolly and a Frenchman called De Barron headed this party. It happened to pass Col. Tarleton while he was collecting his men after the retreat. Unconscious of this fact, they pressed on in comparative security."

Other individuals may have also made a mounted pursuit. Militiaman Hugh McNary claimed that he joined in the pursuit "when the Enemy first gave way." Whether the rest of his company was mounted or on foot, he "got far enough ahead of his company to stop a British officer, the officer surrendered, deponent [i.e., McNary] dismounted and took from the officer his Holsters and pistols, and after getting them, he discovered, that his company had stopped pursuit and were retreating back, he mounted his horse and returned leaving the British officer, but took the Holsters and pistols which he afterwards sold."

5. Several American sources seemed impressed by the restraint they showed on this occasion (implicitly in contrast with what happened on other battlefields). Morgan reported that "It, perhaps, would be well to remark, for the honor of the American arms, that although the progress of this [Tarleton’s] corps was marked with burning and devastation, and although they waged the most cruel warfare, not a man was killed, wounded, or even insulted, after he surrendered."

6. Major James Jackson confirmed this episode: "[I ran] the utmost risk of my life, in an attempt to seize the colors of the 71st regiment in the midst of it, on their attempt to form after they were broken, being saved by an exertion of Col. Howard’s." The 71st Foot did not carry its colors into the battle. The 7th Foot did have its colors, one of which was captured by an American militiaman (see 7th Regiment of Foot). This account may describe that capture.

7. The two battalions of the 71st Foot had, between them, two companies of light infantry, and two companies of grenadiers. The former were at the battle of Cowpens, the latter were not. The 71st's grenadiers were captured at the battle of Stony Point in 1779. That Captain Duncanson would have been at Cowpens indicates that he was 1) absent during the battle of Stony Point, 2) at that battle, but subsequently exchanged, or 3) captured at Stony Point, but released on parole. If Duncanson had violated his parole, he was liable to be hanged.

Sources:

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report, and a copy of Jackson's letters.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Hanger's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Young, McJunkin, Collins, Howard, and Pickens, among others.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes a review by Will Graves of McJunkin's statements. McJunkin's description of the raid on the baggage train can be found here.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh McNary (.pdf file).

Related: 71st Foot, The American Cavalry - Part 1, The American Cavalry - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 20

Part 20: Washington and Howard Charge

Previous: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Next: Collapse

Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington was stationed, with his dragoons, in rear of the American main line during the battle. His cavalry was the Americans’ last line of defense, and like his counterpart, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, he used his cavalry sparingly [see Note 1]. Washington sent mounted militia forward at the beginning of the battle to cover the retreat of the militia, but then had them return to a position in reserve [see Note 2]. When Ogilvie charged, he sent forward a portion of his dragoons to prevent the American right from being wholly swept away, but still he did not commit his entire force. However, when the Continental infantry began to retreat, he was left with no alternative than to bring his remaining dragoons forward and use them to guard against a rout of the American center. With his last dragoons deployed, no force was left to counter the charge of the 17th light dragoons. Mounted militiaman Jeremiah Dial saw "the British broke through the leftwing of the Malitia" (i.e., Triplett’s Virginians) and charge into the American rear. There was, however, no immediate relief for those that were attacked.

William Moultrie stated in his postwar history that "Colonel Washington… [was] close to the rear of the second line [i.e., the Continentals] with his cavalry, and spoke to Colonel Howard, 'that if he would rally his men, and charge the enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry that were got among our militia in the rear' [see Note 3]."

Washington at this moment may also have ordered the recall of the detachment of dragoons that had driven off Ogilvie’s company [see Note 4].

Moments later, Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard ordered the retreating Continentals to halt, about face, and deliver a fatal volley into the astonished British.

Both Howard and Washington then ordered charges, respectively, against the British infantry and cavalry.

The volleys Howard’s Continentals delivered at close range brought down many of the British infantry and left the rest reeling. According to Howard, "While [the British were] in this confusion, I ordered a charge with the bayonet, which order was obeyed with great alacrity."

This was also the experience of Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals. He recorded in his journal that we "Charged them home. They not expecting any Such thing put them in Such Confusion that We Were in amongst them With the Bayonets Which Caused them to give ground."

Similarly, Henry Lee stated that "Howard seized the happy moment, and followed his advantage with the bayonet. This decisive step gave us the day. The reserve [i.e., the 71st Foot] having been brought near the line, shared in the destruction of our fire, and presented no rallying point to the fugitives.

Meanwhile, according to Howard, "Washington observing... [the British cavalry] charged them. As well as I can recollect this charge was made at the same moment that I charged the infantry." Anderson made the same observation in his journal "At the Same time that We Charged, Col. Washington Charged the horse Which Soon gave Way" [see Note 5].

In making this charge, according to Howard, Washington "moved to the left from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse" [see Note 6].

Within moments they passed by elements of the shattered right wing of the main line [see Note 7] and into the ranks of the 17th Light Dragoons.

Washington and Howard Charge. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Cornet James Simons, one of Washington’s cavalrymen, wrote in a letter to William Washington that "your first charge was made on the enemy's Cavalry, (who were cutting down our Militia) and when, after a smart Action, you instantly defeated, leaving in the course of ten minutes 18 of their brave 17th Dragoons dead on the spot."

Ten minutes was probably too long of a duration for this action. Private James Collins remembered that "in a few moments, Col. Washington's cavalry was among them, like a whirlwind, and the poor fellows began to kneel from their horses, without being able to remount. The shock was so sudden and violent, they could not stand it, and immediately betook themselves to flight." Howard wrote that Colonel Washington charged the enemy's cavalry, who were cutting down our militia, and soon drove them off."

The American Counterattack. (two views; click to enlarge). The Continental infantry (under Howard) charge into the heart of the British line. Meanwhile, the American cavalry (under Washington) relieve the militia from the assault of the 17th Light Dragoons.

As the British dragoons retreated, the American cavalry stormed after them in close pursuit. For the British dragoons, according to Collins, "there was no time to rally, and they appeared to be as hard to stop as a drove of wild Choctaw steers, going to a Pennsylvania market. In a few moments the clashing of swords was out of hearing and quickly out of sight." Less colorfully, Howard commented that Washington "never lost sight of them until they abandoned the ground" [see Note 8].

Notes:

1. In eighteenth century Western-style warfare, the commander that committed his reserves last was often the one that emerged victorious. Tarleton used a part of his mounted force in a limited capacity during the middle phase of the battle, while holding back a large reserve. Washington deployed a large portion of his force on both occassions, but this seems chiefly to reflect the extremity of the circumstances. That the Americans had to fully commit their cavalry before the British might have been disastrous to them. Major George Hanger commented years later that the defeat of Ogilvie (and by extension, Nettles too) was inconsequential compared to Tarleton’s inability to make good use of his reserve late in the battle.

2. Private Thomas Young described the mounted militiamen being used in this capacity. See The American Cavalry - Part 2 for details on the initial deployment of the American cavalry. Whether Washington took the initiative in ordering the mounted militia forward or whether the order originated with Morgan is unknown.

3. It is difficult to discern exactly who did what at this critical point in the battle. Moultrie’s statement indicates Washington was the key actor in rallying the Continentals, while the accounts by Morgan and Howard each chiefly credit themselves.

4. Thomas Young recalled that "At this moment the bugle sounded. We about half formed and making a sort of circuit at full speed, came up in the rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen. At this moment Col. Howard gave the word "charge bayonets!" and the day was ours."

One reading of this statement is that the group of American dragoons that had driven off Ogilvie charged around the vulnerable left flank of the British line and passed into the ground behind the 71st Foot. I regard Young as a trustworthy source and have put a great deal of reliance on his account elsewhere, but this part of his statement is difficult to reconcile. Young’s account suggests that his small group of dragoons were the first to counterattack when other sources give that honor to Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard’s Continentals. He also seemingly places his small group of dragoons in an unlikely position between the British infantry and the British cavalry reserve before either had been beaten. The experience of the 71st Foot was described in detail by David Stewart and Roderick Mackenzie, but neither mention such a charge; nor too did other American cavalrymen.

An alternative interpretation is that Washington recalled the dragoons on his right ("the bugle sounded"), these cavalry then followed in the wake of Washington’s own charge, moving behind the Continentals from the right side of the battlefield to the left ("making a sort of circuit at full speed") and then joined with Washington in the charge that helped shatter the British left and broke into the British rear (we "came up in the rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen"). This reading is not problematic so long as "this moment" when "Col. Howard gave the word "charge bayonets!"" preceded the moment when the dragoons "came up in the rear of the British line."

5. Respected histories of the battle, such as those by Edwin Bearss and Lawrence Babits, place Washington’s charge against the British cavalry soon after the militia retreated and well before the Continentals counterattacked. That the charges occurred at the same time is strongly indicated by Howard and Anderson. Another participant, Robert Long, recalled that "Col. Washington charged them with his cavalry; at the same time our infantry charged the British with the bayonet." Henry Lee’s history of the battle stated that "part of the enemy's cavalry, having gained our rear, fell on that portion of the militia who had retired to their horses. Washington struck at them with his dragoons, and drove them before him. Thus, by simultaneous efforts, the infantry and cavalry of the enemy routed."

6. That Washington was charging a British cavalry force to his left (and not Ogilvie’s dragoons, which had been to his right) is indicated in several accounts. Daniel Morgan’s report of the battle stated that "Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that the Tarleton was cutting down our riflemen on the left, pushed forward, and charged them." Private Jeremiah Dial stated in his pension application that "Washington's Cavalry with whom this applicant fought during the engagement were stationed in the rear of Morgan's forces and when the British broke through the leftwing of the Malitia Washington’s cavalry made an attack upon them and defeated them with considerable loss."

Howard also emphasized that the charge was made toward the American rear, rather than towards the British infantry: "Washington's charge had no connexion with mine as his movement was to the rear in a quite different direction."

7. These men, according to the present account of the battle, first broke when Ogilvie charged, and, in retreating for their horses, fell in the path of Nettles’ charge. William Neel of Captain Patrick Buchanan’s company recalled seeing that, "the South Carolina mounted militia," who he had earlier denigrated (see Cowpens in Miniature 14) had "rallied and assisted to complete the victory." Captain Henry Connelly remarked that "we was fortunately relieved by Washingtons legion that hastened to our assistance."

8. François-Jean de Chastellux asked Morgan "how Tarleton's cavalry were employed during the engagement." He learned that "whilst the infantry were engaged, they endeavoured to turn the flanks of General Morgan's army, but were kept in awe by some riflemen, and by the American horse detached by Colonel Washington, to support them, in two little squadrons." The manner in which I have depicted the charges by Ogilvie and Nettles as well as their defeat by the American militia and cavalry is consistent with this description.

Sources:

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Dial (.pdf file).

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, Anderson, Collins, and Young, among others.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Hanger's and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf file).

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

Related: The Fatal Moment, The American Cavalry - Part 1, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 16

Part 16: The First Crisis

Previous: Attack on the Main Line

Next: The Second Crisis

Thomas Young and the American mounted militiamen had adhered closely to the front line militia during the fighting on the skirmish line and militia line. After the British assailed the militia line, these militia “retreated again-and then formed a second line” behind the main line. The mounted militia covered the second retreat and then took post even further in the rear, near Washington’s dragoons.

Young commented that “After the second forming [of the militia], the fight became general and unintermitting.” The American cavalry could plainly see the British front line bearing down on the Continentals to their front. Smoke billowed from the infantry lines and there was a continuous flash and roar from the hundreds of discharging muskets.

Oblivious to the disaster that was unfolding to their right, the Continentals continued the desperate and unequal contest with the British front line. By all accounts, both British and Americans fought well. Tarleton stated in his memoir that “The fire on both sides was well supported and produced much slaughter.” Lee wrote in his postwar history that when “Tarleton pushed forward… [he] was received… with unshaken firmness. The contest became obstinate, and each party, animated by the example of its leader, nobly contended for victory” [see Note 1]. In the case of the Americans, two leaders stood out. Seymour recalled that “The courage and conduct of the brave General Morgan in this action is highly commendable, as likewise Colonel Howard, who at all times of the action rode from right to left of the line encouraging the men.”

As the British front line became engaged with the Continentals, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton looked to his left. There he had the greatest advantage. The 71st Foot was relatively fresh and well positioned to attack the American right flank, and the ground was more elevated than on his right.

To begin the attack on the American right, he ordered Captain David Ogilvie’s troop of British Legion dragoons to assault the American militia to their front: the right wing of the main line [see Note 2]. Tarleton recalled that the dragoons “executed the order with much gallantry.”

The right wing of the main line outnumbered Ogilvie’s dragoons by a margin of 2 or 3 to 1. Nevertheless, they were at a severe disadvantage. The men of the right wing were not deployed in a compact mass and they lacked bayonets to protect themselves. They also were without support as the American mounted militia had retired to the rear after the front-line militia had reached safety. As Ogilvie’s men thundered down the slope towards them, the American militia quickly sized up the situation, turned, and fled through the trees [see Note 3].

Loyalist Alexander Chesney recorded this event in his journal: “[the] Regiment of Cavalry called the British Legion [i.e., Ogilvie’s company]… supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur [i.e., the first battalion of the 71st Foot] broke the Riflemen without difficulty” [see Note 4].

Hayes’ regiment was closest to the oncoming dragoons and perhaps the first in the right wing to break. Robert Long, who was with this regiment, implied that his regiment had intended to rally alongside Captain Patrick Buchanan’s company of Virginians, however, “the Virginians broke before we got to them” [see Note 5].

Ogilvie's Attack. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken by Ogilvie's charge), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The Right Wing Breaks (two views; click to enlarge). As the Continentals begin to fire on the advancing British, Ogilvie's British Legion dragoons charge the American right, sending the right wing of the main line into flight. Meanwhile, other militia units are reforming.

According to Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie: “Captain Ogilvie, with his troop… cut his way through their line.” Pension applications do not strongly indicate that the men in this line were cut down by the British dragoons. Most, it would seem, got out of the way in time. However, upon driving off the right wing of the main line, the dragoons soon encountered an even larger quarry – the right wing of the militia line. These men had reached the rear, and were preparing to reform. They were, however, still disorganized and utterly unready to defend against a cavalry attack. Ogilvie’s men plunged in.

Some of the injuries reported by these militiamen were horrific. Joseph Rogers James, who was with McDowell’s North Carolinians, stated that he “was then charged on by a British Dragoon and struck on the head with his sword and left on the ground for dead… his ribs were broken loose from his back as he supposes by the horse of the Dragoon.” John Whelchel, who was with Brandon’s South Carolinians, stated that he “was attacked by Tarleton's horse.” He “was severely wounded receiving four cuts on the head and three or four stabs.” He “was left on the ground it being supposed that he would die of his wounds – that the wounds in the head opened the skull to the brains.”

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina vividly recalled seeing “Two dragoons assault a large rifleman, Joseph Hughes by name. His gun was empty, but with it he parries their blows and dodges round a tree, but they still persist. At the moment the assault on Hughes began John Savage was priming his rifle, Just as they pass the tree to strike Hughes he levels his gun and one of the dragoons tumbles from his horse pierced with a bullet, The next moment the rifle carried by Hughes, now literally backed over, slips out of his hands and inflicts such a blow upon the other dragoon that he quits the contest and retires hanging by the mane of his horse.”

Ogilvie Assaults McDowell and Brandon (click to enlarge). After sending the right wing of the main line into flight, Ogilvie's dragoons collide with the reforming front-line militia. Meanwhile, the British and American front lines have become fully engaged.

The militia were on their own at this moment, but help was soon on the way. Young recalled that “In the hottest of it [the main-line fighting], I saw Col. Brandon coming at full speed to the rear, and waving his sword to Col. Washington.” Here was one of the principal commanders of the right wing of the militia line desperately trying to get Washington’s attention. Ogilvie’s charge had gone unnoticed. “In a moment the command to charge was given, and I soon found that the British cavalry had charged the American right. We made a most furious charge, and cutting through the British cavalry, wheeled and charged them in the rear. In this charge, I exchanged my tackey for the finest horse I ever rode; it was the quickest swap I ever made in my life!”

Major Joseph McJunkin was close at hand and remembered seeing “the militia… relieved from the British dragoons by a charge of the American light horse.” Moments later, “The British cavalry… [were] borne from the field.”

Other accounts indicated that it was not only the charge of Washington’s dragoons that drove back Ogilvie, but also the fire of the militia. Tarleton observed that the British cavalry “were drove back by the fire of the reserve, and by a charge of Colonel Washington's cavalry.”

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie provided more detail. He claimed that the “legion dragoons were… broke by galling fire of rifle shot;” “exposed to a heavy fire and charged at the same time by the whole of Washington's dragoons,” Ogilvie’s troop “was compelled to retreat in confusion [see Note 6]”

Ogilvie Defeated. The militia rally and, aided by the American cavalry, succeed in driving off Ogilvie's dragoons.

Notes:

1. Comparable observations were made by Morgan (“When the enemy advanced on our line, they received a well-directed and incessant fire”), Moultrie, (“The British immediately advanced upon the second line, who received them very warmly, and a heavy fire commenced between them”), and Mackenzie (“the second line, now attacked, made a stout resistance“).

2. Tarleton’s memoir indicates that at this time, “The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy's left.” However, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie corrected him on this point and stated that “Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy.” See British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1 .

3. Historians of the battle have relied chiefly on Morgan’s description of events for an American viewpoint. Morgan’s account is very good, but a limitation is that it emphasizes the key actions that positively contributed to the American victory and largely ignores the setbacks and disappointments the Americans experienced en route to that victory. Early histories of the battle have adopted the same tone. For this phase of the battle, emphasis is placed on the brave stand of the Continentals; the existence of a right wing of the main line is not always recognized and its flight has not been hitherto discussed. However, American participants who described only their personal experiences during the battle (and did not craft an account intended for public consumption) provide critical clues indicating that such a collapse occurred. Statements by British observers support this view as well. See The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses.

4. Chesney’s full statement was that “Col Tarleton charged at the head of his Regiment of Cavalry called the British Legion which was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden; the Cavalry supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty.” Tarleton did not lead this charge, nor did it involve his entire regiment. It’s possible Chesney had not yet reached the battlefield and was not a direct eyewitness to this event, or possibly he was in a different part of the battlefield at the time. See Alexander Chesney's Rivulet.

5. See The Main Line: Composition for more on the deployment of American forces on the main line.

6. Mackenzie claimed that charge was made “by the whole of Washington's dragoons;” this would appear to be elaboration on Tarleton’s statement that the cavalry was repelled “by a charge of Colonel Washington's cavalry.” The elaboration is in error. Only a portion of the American cavalry participated in this charge. Young is the only dragoon that unambiguously places himself in this attack; Cornet James Simons provided a very detailed account of his movements on the battlefield, and says nothing about this action. It would seem then that Washington committed only some men to this charge. Noteworthy is that Simons "commanded the left division" of Washington’s dragoons and would’ve been furthest from Ogilvie’s attack.

Sources:

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Young's account of the battle, and includes a description of Simon's service.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

The Journal of Alexander Chesney

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Joseph Rogers James (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Whelchel (.pdf file).

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Related: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, Flight of the Militia - Part 4

Cowpens in Miniature 15

Part 15: Attack on the Main Line

Previous: The Militia Line

Next: The First Crisis

When the British attacked the American militia, they were, in the words of William Moultrie, “soon obliged to give way and retreat behind the second line.” In retreating, Private John Thomas of Virginia saw that the militia “flanked the right and left of the musquetry”[see Note 1].

The Militia Retreat. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (in retreat), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (in retreat), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The Retreat in Miniature (two views; click to enlarge). Covered by the American cavalry, the front-line militia safely gain the main line. Meanwhile, the ragged British front line is beginning to reform.

The British infantry did not immediately pursue [see Note 2]. To their front was Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard’s Continentals, an enemy that had to be approached with some caution. Besides, as far as the British were concerned, the militia had “quitted the Field,” they could afford caution [see Note 3].

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson with the Delaware Continentals, recorded in his journal that “the Enemy Seeing us Standing in Such good Order Halted for Some time to dress their line.” So effective was this deterrent that the front-line militia, in the words of fellow-Delawarean Sergeant-Major Seymour, were able to retreat “in very good order, not seeming to be the least bit confused” [see Note 4].

The orderly retreat of the militia was a singular accomplishment considering that the British attack had been launched by the exceptionally aggressive Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton and relentless pursuit was a part of his modus operandi. Morgan’s plan was, for the moment, working perfectly. The American militia had delivered their lethal volley and were escaping retaliation.

The British infantry stopped to “dress their line,” in Anderson’s words, because of losses inflicted by the militia. Also likely is that the British line became further disordered during the subsequent bayonet charge. As the British reformed and the two opponents sized each other up, Anderson could see that the British line “Outflanked ours Considerably.” Despite heavy losses [see Note 5], The British front line nevertheless still outnumbered the Continentals; their line was also longer because they were deployed in open order whereas the Continentals were in close order. Another threat also loomed. The 71st Foot had moved up to a position behind the left end of the British line, where it was well positioned to crush the right flank of the Americans.

The British infantry then resumed the advance and shortly drew near the Americans. In response, the Continentals let loose a terrific volley, with each platoon firing in rapid succession. Militiaman Thomas Young, now in rear of the main line, remembered that “when the regulars fired, it seemed like one sheet of flame from right to left. Oh! it was beautiful!”

The commander of the Continentals, Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, stated that “The british advanced until my regiment commenced firing.” Receiving this fire, the British stopped and fired a volley of their own. According to Seymour, “the enemy… attacked our light infantry with both cannon and small arms.”

Notes:

1. This is a topic to which I’ve given special consideration. See Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4.

2. Based on Anderson’s journal; the key passage is quoted elsewhere in this post. Anderson’s journal is one of the most trustworthy accounts of the battle. According to Moultrie, “The British immediately advanced upon the second line.”

3. Quotation derived from Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' report of the battle.

4. The militia were not panic struck during their retreat. This does not imply, however, that they retired casually to the rear. In all likelihood, the militia were moving very quickly. Lee commented that the militia “gained with haste the second line.”

5. The miniature recreation shows accumulated losses of 15% among the front-line infantry and artillery, but this is very approximate.

Sources:

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Thomas, Anderson, Young, and Howard, among others.

A transcription of Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' report of the battle can be found here.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Related: Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Flight of the Militia - Part 4, The Main Line: Location

Cowpens in Miniature 14

Part 14: The Militia Line

Previous: Fighting on the Skirmish Line

Next: Attack on the Main Line

The American skirmishers fell back as the British advanced and took up new positions with the militia line. British historian David Stewart thought that the British were “running;” probably they advanced at the quick step.

Now the men on the militia line steeled themselves for their assigned mission, one massive, lethal blast, delivered at close range. A single shot, fired too soon, had the possibility of triggering a premature volley. Thomas Young on horseback behind these men remembered that “Every officer was crying don't fire! for it was a hard matter for us to keep from it.”

The British Attack the Militia Line. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

"Make Ready!"

"Fire!"

At last, the order was given. Henry Lee wrote that “The enemy, shouting, rushed forward upon the front line, which retained its station, and poured in a close fire.” Fellow American historian William Moultrie thought that the Americans waited “till the enemy came within fifty yards.” Stewart gave the distance as “thirty or forty paces.”

Daniel Morgan wrote that “The whole of Col. Pickens' command then kept up a fire by regiments.” Hammond’s South Carolinians, Cunningham’s Georgians, McDowell’s North Carolinians, and the several small battalions under Brandon, Thomas, and Roebuck all let loose within moments of each other. Thomas Young remembered this as “a whole volley.”

At some point the British fired at the militia as well. William Moultrie noted that the British “threw in a heavy fire upon the militia” before the front-line militia fired. In Stewart’s history, however, they fired second and did so without “vivacity or impression.”

British casualties in this exchange were in all likelihood heavy [see Note 1]. Some losses also occurred among the militia [see Note 2].

In the immediate aftermath, the British had the advantage: they were armed with bayonets while the Americans were not. Private James Collins remembered that “We gave the enemy one fire, when they charged us with their bayonets; we gave way and retreated for our horses” [see Note 3]. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, watching the fighting from the main line saw that the British “rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen to fire a second time.” This is exactly what Morgan had expected. “The whole of Col. Pickens' command then… [began] retreating agreeably to their orders.”

The statements by Collins, Howard, Morgan, and others all imply that the militia quickly retreated, keeping ahead of British bayonets. However, the fighting on the front line may not have been of a single character, and there was perhaps at least one place where the British and Americans entered into close combat. On the left wing of the front line, Captain John Irby recalled that militiaman “Richard Griffin was wounded… by a bayonet in his left thigh by the Enemy and he [the British soldier] would have killed him [Griffin] had he not been shot down by… the Ensign of the Company” [see Note 4].

Thomas Young noted that the militia had “fought for some time, and retreated again.” Once again, the mounted militia interposed between the advancing British and the retreating Americans. Young stated, “I recollect well that the cavalry was twice, during the action, between our army and the enemy.” They did not, however, come to blows with the British infantry. Private William Neel of Virginia was disappointed, observing that “At this battle the South Carolina mounted militia under Colo Brannon proved very defective in the commencement of the action” [see Note 5].

Notes:

1. American participants, somewhat surprisingly, did not comment on the effects of this volley. Statements indicating heavy British casualties at this point in the battle appeared only in postwar histories.

David Stewart asserted that the British front line was “exhausted by running… it received the fire of the enemy at the distance of thirty or forty paces. The effect of the fire was considerable: it produced something like a recoil, but not to any extent. The fire was returned, but not with vivacity or impression; and it continued ten or twelve minutes in a state of balance, both parties keeping their ground. The light infantry made two attempts to charge, but were repulsed with loss- The action making no progress, the Highlanders were ordered up; and, rapidly advancing in charge, the enemy's front line moved off precipitately.”

William Johnson claimed that “At the assigned distance they [the militia] delivered their fire with unerring aim, and it was the magnanimous confession of a gallant officer of the Maryland line who fought on this day, ‘that here the battle was gained.’ The killed and wounded of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers who lay on the field of battle where the fire of the riflemen Was delivered, and the high proportion which the killed and wounded of this description bore to the whole number, sufficiently justified the assertion.”

Neither of these histories is terribly reliable (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1 for my treatment of Johnson). Stewart claimed that the fighting on the militia line was prolonged. However, participant accounts, both British and American, indicate that the militia retreated quickly. Stewart has the 71st Foot breaking the deadlock on the militia line. Others generally indicate that the 71st entered the fighting at a later point in the battle. The quotation that Johnson supplies from an anonymous Maryland officer is believable, but it is not clear what it indicates. The statement surely means that for once the militia did their assigned duty and this was instrumental in the American victory (no doubt the officer had the battle of Camden in mind for comparison). Whether or not Johnson’s description also indicates that the front-line militia inflicted heavy casualties is less clear.

The British casualties I’ve indicated for this moment in the battle (3 miniatures; these will be more clearly visible in future images) are modest compared with the losses suggested by Stewart's and Johnson's histories. I arrived at this number first by making an estimate of total British casualties and second by dividing those casualties across the various phases of the battle in a manner that is primarily consistent with participant statements (and, to a lesser extent, later histories). There are other points in the battle at which the British received a greater volume of fire and for which heavy British casualties are more strongly indicated. Even if this one volley was particularly well aimed, it is difficult to see how it could have inflicted many more casualties, for example, than the British received in advancing on the Continentals. About as many men fired at the British on the main line as did on the militia line. However, the militia were only able to deliver a single volley, while the main line fired repeatedly.

2. It is quite likely that the militia suffered considerably fewer casualties than the British, despite being outnumbered. From Lexington and Concord until the final battles of the war, American sources spoke disparagingly about the accuracy of British musket fire. Many militiamen also likely stooped low to the ground or stood behind trees as a means of protecting themselves. Casualties, however, did occur. Lawrence Babits reviewed and cited pension applications from former militiamen that strongly imply they were shot on the militia line.

3. Collins' statement was given special consideration in a previous post. See Flight of the Militia - Part 3.

4. Babits placed Irby in Hayes’ regiment. However, in reviewing the composition of Hayes’ regiment, I noted that participant accounts do not appear to link Irby’s company with Hayes’ regiment (see Little River Regiment). Rather, Irby appears to have commanded a company of Georgia Refugees and as such likely served with Captain Samuel Hammond and Major John Cunningham on the left wing of the militia line. Griffin was from Georgia. It’s not clear that this passage refers to an incident that took place at this time during the battle. Also possible (but in my view less likely) is that Griffin was wounded during the American counterattack late in the battle.

5. Colonel Thomas Brandon did not command the mounted militia. However, Young links Brandon with the mounted militia at a later point in the battle, and Captain Benjamin Jolly, who commanded one of the two companies of mounted militia, was in Brandon’s regiment.

Sources:

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Young, Collins, and Howard, among other sources.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Richard Griffin (which contains the statement by Irby) (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, The Cowpens Battlefield, Mounted Militia

Cowpens in Miniature 13

Part 13: Fighting on the Skirmish Line

Previous: "Bring on the Battle"

Next: The Militia Line

Private John Savage’s shot rang across the battlefield. The other skirmishers Morgan had sent forward were also in range of the British line and, according to Major Joseph McJunkin, “In a few moments the fire is general.” The American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, stated that the skirmishers “gave them [the British] a heavy and galling fire.”

The British commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, responded to the American gunfire by hurrying up the remainder of this deployment and ordering his forces to advance. Tarleton, however, didn’t mention that his men were under fire. He gave as the reason why “he hurried the formation of his troops” was that he was “gratified with the certainty of battle” and “prone to presume on victory.”

Under rifle fire, the 7th Foot and remaining British light infantry formed into line. Major George Hanger learned that “While Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was reconnoitering the enemy on his right, a scattering fire commenced by some recruits of the 7th, who had but newly joined their regiment, and seen no service.” These men couldn’t help but fire back at their tormentors, even though the Americans were still out of range. Hanger asserted that “This unsteady behaviour he [Tarleton] silenced to the utmost of his power, and then led the line to action” [see Note 1].

Fighting on the Skirmish Line (two views; click to enlarge). Shots are fired by the American skirmishers as the British complete their deployment. Some men of the 7th Foot fire in response.

Because the British left and right deployed at different times and with different degrees of difficulty, a range of opinions formed about the propriety of Tarleton’s decision to advance at this moment. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie of the 71st Foot light infantry complained that, “Without the delay of a single moment, and in despite of extreme fatigue, the light-legion infantry and fusiliers were ordered to form in line.” However, Major Hanger, who knew many of those in the battle, learned that “Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton did halt the troops for near half an hour, and made them throw of their knapsacks and blankets to render them lighter for action.”

American sources likewise offer varying descriptions of when the British advance began. As has already been noted, Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals remembered a prolonged wait before the British advance began. However, Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled that the British “halted for a short time, and then advanced rapidly, as if certain victory.” Cavalryman James Kelly echoed Mackenzie when he stated that the British “hardly got formed before Tarlton made his charge.”

The beginning of the British attack was an auspicious moment remembered by a number of participants. Lieutenant Anderson wrote in his journal that the British “about Sunrise… began the attack by the Discharge of two pieces of cannon and three Huzzas advancing briskly On our rifle men that Was posted in front.”

Morgan, who had remained with the militia after sending the skirmishers forward observed that “their whole line moved on with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced.” Thomas Young, who was nearby with the mounted militia, also watched the advance. “About sun-rise, the British line advanced at a sort of trot, with a loud halloo. It was the most beautiful line I ever saw. When they shouted, I heard Morgan say, "They gave us the British halloo, boys, give them the Indian halloo, by G_"; and he galloped along the lines, cheering the men, and telling them [the men on the militia line] not to fire until we could see the whites of their eyes.”

The two British cannon were lined up with the gap between the wings of front-line American militia. Their fire was directed not at the thin line of militia, but rather at the large block of Continentals further down field. Their fire does not seem to have been particularly accurate, for there is little evidence that the Continentals suffered from cannon fire. Instead, the British round shot flew over or past the Continentals, affecting the Continental light dragoons posted in reserve.

Thomas Young noted “the British line advanced under cover of their artillery… it opened so fiercely upon the centre, that Col. Washington moved his cavalry from the centre towards the right wing” [see Note 2]. This move placed the American cavalry on lower ground and placed the crest of the foremost ridge between the dragoons and the British guns.

The British advanced “in as good a line as troops could move at open files,” according to Tarleton. As they did so, the American skirmishers fell back, preventing the British from getting into range. Thomas Young recalled that “After the first fire [i.e., the first fire after the British began their attack], the militia retreated, and the cavalry covered their retreat.” The mounted militiamen were on hand to protect the skirmishers from a sudden dash by the British cavalry, but as this did not occur, they merely escorted the skirmishers back towards the militia line.

The skirmishers meanwhile kept “up a warm fire… [while] gradually retreating,” according to Major James Jackson. Sergeant-Major William Seymour thought that the militia “stood very well for some time.” His superior, Lieutenant Thomas Anderson, was also impressed. “[The riflemen] Fought Well Disputing the ground that Was between them and us, Flying from One tree to another” [see Note 3]. Private John Thomas of Virginia thought that these militiamen fired, in total, “five rounds.”

The British Attack the Skirmishers. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = American Skirmishers, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.


The Skirmish Line Retreats (two views; click to enlarge). The American skirmishers fire their finals shots as the British advance on the militia line.

Henry Lee wrote that the skirmishers, after “preserving a desultory well-aimed fire… fell back to the front line, to range with it and renew the conflict.” There, they “arrayed with Pickens” [see Note 4]. Watching from the main line, Private William Neel of Virginia saw that the militia, “broke in the centre.” Neel did not realize that the Americans were merely following orders. According to Morgan, the skirmishers under “McDowall and Cunningham… retreated to the regiments intended for their support.” This meant that the men under McDowell and Cunningham took up positions on the right and left wing of the militia line, respectively, leaving a gap between them [see Note 5].

As for the mounted militia, Thomas Young noted that when the militia “were again formed… we retired to the rear,” meaning to a new station behind the militia line. Once again, the mounted militia were expected to cover their comrades when they retreated.

Notes:

1. Hanger provided most detail about this incident. There are subtle differences between Tarleton's and Hanger's versions. Tarleton's account implies that the 7th stopped to fire at the skirmishers after the British attack began. Tarleton also did not claim to have personally stopped the recruits from firing.

2. This statement serves as another indication that there was relatively thin tree cover on the battlefield.

3. With a gap between the two wings of the militia line directly in front of the Continentals, these skirmishers were in fact the only militia troops between them and the British.

4. Most participant accounts of the battle do not distinguish between the front-line militia and the skirmishers, but rather indicate that there was only one militia line. This is a very strong indication that the skirmishers served double duty. All of the British accounts (Tarleton, Hanger, Mackenzie, Cornwallis, Stewart, Chesney) are of this view. Descriptions of skirmishers that were in some sense distinct from the militia line appear principally in Morgan, and the detailed participant accounts by McJunkin and Young, and in reliable postwar histories by nonparticipants, like Lee and Moultrie.

The strongest contraindicative statement is by Major Joseph McJunkin, who wrote that “The sharpshooters fall behind Pickens.” This could mean that the skirmishers (or at least the group with McJunkin) did not participate in the militia line fighting. Alternatively, he may have meant only that the skirmishers stopped retreating only when they cleared the militia line; there they could reload their rifles in peace.

5. There is no reason why the gap built into the militia line would also have been present on the skirmish line. Indeed, a position in front of the gap between the two wings of the militia line was an ideal place for the skirmishers to fight. From there they could retreat to their comrades without obstructing their comrades’ view of the enemy.

Sources:

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report, and a copy of Jackson's letters.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, Mackenzie's, and Hanger's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Anderson, Collins, Young, Thomas, and Neel, among other sources.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of James Kelly (.pdf file).

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

A transcription of Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' statement about the battle can be found here.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

The Journal of Alexander Chesney

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Related: The American Skirmishers, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, Who Did John Savage Shoot?

Cowpens in Miniature 12

Part 12: "Bring on the Battle"

Previous: The British Deploy

Next: Fighting on the Skirmish Line

The Americans watched in awe as the light infantry and British Legion infantry deployed into line and marched forward. Behind this leading edge of the British advance they could see a large column of infantry, artillery, and cavalry.

Private James Collins who was with the front line militia, remembered when “the enemy came into full view. The sight, to me at least, seemed somewhat imposing.”

Although behind the militia, the Continentals could also see the British advance [see Note 1].

Private Henry Wells of Delaware remembered that “At the onset we were much alarmed by the Superiority of the Enemy in numbers.” However, Morgan was with them, and when he spoke, his “powerful and trumpetlike voice… drove fear from every bosom, and gave new energies to every arm.”

Meanwhile, Tarleton had determined on a plan of attack. So far he had advanced his light infantry, British Legion infantry, and one cannon. Together, these units covered a little over half the width of the American front line. He gave orders for the next regiment in column (the 7th Foot) and the cannon behind it to complete the front line. In his words, “the 7th regiment was commanded to form upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th.”

Tarleton also had on hand the two troops of dragoons he had dispatched to reinforce the advance guard on the approach to Cowpens. He ordered these troops to support the front line. “A captain, with fifty dragoons was placed on each flank of the corps, who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and threaten the flanks of the enemy.”

Other commands were issued bringing forward the 1st battalion of the 71st Foot, and his remaining mounted forces, which would constitute the British reserve.

Tarleton knew little more about the battlefield than what he was able to see from horseback, riding across the front of the American position. However, there was no need to perform a turning movement across unfamiliar terrain. The American force to his immediate front was less than formidable. Tarleton therefore deployed his front-line infantry on a line that more-or-less matched in width that of the American militia. His men were deployed in open order in two ranks; this formation facilitated movement through wooded terrain and would keep casualties relatively low. It also enabled him to keep a large part of his force in reserve.

Tarleton later complemented himself on how well the deployment proceeded. “The disposition was planned with coolness, and executed without embarrassment.”

According to Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of Delaware, the British deployment did not meet with resistance because “We had no artillery to annoy them and the Genl not thinking it prudent to advance from the ground [on which] We had form'd,” Instead, according to Lee, Morgan “waited in stern silence for the enemy.”

In fact, the British deployment was impeded, but by the terrain rather than by the Americans. To complete the British line, the 7th Foot had to advance cross relatively low, boggy ground, away from the road [see Note 2]. Tarleton also directed that his reserve infantry “The 1st battalion of the 71st… extend a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one hundred and fifty yards in the rear.” The 71st Foot marched into this even lower, boggier ground that possibly was, unlike other parts of the battlefield, covered with underbrush. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie recorded that “The seventy-first regiment… who had not as yet disentangled themselves from the brushwood with which Thickelle Creek abounds [see Note 3], were directed to form [i.e., form a line behind the 7th Foot], and wait for orders.”

Morgan and Anderson watched the stationary British front line, perhaps not realizing the difficulties that were occurring with the final stage of their deployment (the British left flank was screened from their view by the crest of the ridge in front). Anderson recalled only that “We [the British and Americans] look'd at each other for a Considerable time.” Morgan may not have had artillery to harass the British, but he did have an abundance of long-ranged riflemen. Taking advantage of the failure of the British to mount an immediate attack, he seized the initiative. Morgan reported that, “The [British] disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy.” Private John Thomas of Virginia noted that, “Gel. Morgan then rode down to the rifle men and gave them orders to fire.”

Major Joseph McJunkin and the South Carolinians on the right wing of the militia line anxiously watched as “Tarleton [was] marching up and filing [his troops] to the right and left, [until they were] formed in battle assay” [see Note 4]. General Morgan then rode up to them and asked “‘Boys, who will bring on the battle?’” According to McJunkin, “Col. Farr [Lieutenant-Colonel William Farr] & Major McJunkin stepped out.” These two commanders then turned to their men and asked, “‘Boys, who will go with us’.” Then “others stepped out until Morgan said there were enough, & said ‘Go & bring on the action & if you are pressed, retreat, & come in on our flank.’”

Morgan also visited McDowell’s North Carolinians and Cunningham’s Georgians and made a similar request [see Note 5].

In the rear of the American position, Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington, observing the skirmishers advance, sent his mounted militia forward to cover them [see Note 6].

The Americans strode forward. Soon there was, according to McJunkin, “a corps of picked riflemen [see Note 7]… scattered in loose order along the whole front” “at a distance of 150 yards” in front of the militia line. At that distance they could fire on the British with impunity [see Note 8].

The British Deploy for Battle. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = American Skirmishers, 9 = British Front Line (including two three-pounders), 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

In moving forward, the group of South Carolinians with Farr and McJunkin headed directly toward the still-deploying left-flank of the British line. This group was not well remembered after the battle [see Note 9]. However, they soon would play an important role. These men watched, according to McJunkin, as “the red coats stream before the eyes of the militia. A column marches up in front of Brandon's men [i.e., the South Carolinians] led by a gayly dressed officer on horseback.” This column was either the 7th Foot or the two companies of light infantry assigned to cover the left flank (see Who Did John Savage Shoot?).

According to Thomas Young: This “British Officer rode up towards the advance guard of Morgan's Army [i.e,. the skirmishers] & calling them in a loud voice "dam’d Rebels," ordered them to disperse.”

McJunkin stated that then, “The word passes along the line, "Who can bring him down?" John Savage looked Col. Farr [Lieutenant-Colonel William Farr] full in the face and read yes in his eye. He darted a few paces in front, laid his rifle against a sapling, a blue gas streamed above his head, the sharp crack of a rifle broke the solemn stillness of the occasion and a horse without a rider wheeled from the front of the advancing column” [see Note 10].

Young believed the same thing [see Note 11]. “John Savage instantly raised his rifle & fired & the British Officer fell from his horse mortally wounded.” Thus, “John Savage fired the first gun in this battle.” Or at least, the first gunshot after the two armies had deployed.

Notes:

1. This point confirms that the tree cover on the battlefield was thin. See Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature.

2. See Alexander Chesney's Rivulet.

3. Mackenzie was mistaken that the men of the 71st were near Thicketty Creek (which was some miles distant), but there still may have been some kind of watercourse in this area. Perhaps he mentioned Thicketty Creek because it was the one local watercourse whose name he heard.

4. In my recreation of the American deployment I placed these South Carolinians a short distance behind the crown of the ridge on which they were placed. I am uncertain whether they would have been able to see, from this position, the British deployment. Some officers, perhaps including McJunkin, were on horseback, which would have helped. However, privates like James Collins also recalled seeing the British deployment. Perhaps the angle of the American militia line should be one that better conforms to the crown of this ridge.

5. Several participant accounts indicate that a portion of McDowell’s battalion was in this force. For example, Richard Crabtree of McDowell’s battalion remembered that “Captain McDowell & his company of which applicant was one was ordered out to meet General Tarleton & bring on the action, this action commenced early in the morning.” Likewise, Richard Swearingen of McDowell’s battalion stated “he was one of the Company who first fired.”

The clearest statement of Cunningham’s involvement is found in Morgan’s report of the battle. Speaking of the entire battalion of Georgians, Major James Jackson wrote in a letter to Morgan that, “The detachment was small; but… you placed them in front of the whole.” This language suggests that all of Cunningham’s men were deployed as skirmishers.

6. This deployment proved to be of minor consequence, and only two participant accounts mention it (those of Thomas Young and William Neel). The key passages from their statements will be quoted in upcoming posts. Young did not specify which American cavalry units were involved; Neel referred only to mounted militia.

7. The skirmishers were not exactly individually handpicked. McJunkin’s account indicates that the skirmishers from his regiment were volunteers. Statements relating to the Georgian and North Carolina skirmishers suggest at least company-sized detachments were sent forward.

8. The skirmishers were in range of the British but the British were not in range of the skirmishers. The skirmishers’ rifles had a much longer range than did the British regulars’ muskets. Lawrence Babits’ A Devil of a Whipping provides an insightful examination of the weapon abilities of contemporary rifles and muskets.

9. Colonel Henry Lee wrote in his history that these skirmishers were only, “Two light parties of militia, under Major M'Dowel, of North Carolina, and Major Cunningham, of Georgia.” Lee thought they had “orders to feel the enemy as he approached.” This would seem to have been the role fulfilled earlier by Inman’s vedettes. McJunkin’s statement suggests that the role of the skirmishers was to provoke, disrupt, and injure the British.

10. According to Young, Lieutenant-Colonel Farr did not directly indicate that Savage should fire. Rather when Farr “was riding to and fro, along the lines… he saw Savage fix his eye upon a British officer; he [Savage] stepped out of the ranks, raised his gun-fired, and he [Farr] saw the officer fall.

11. Young was nearby, but not immediately present. He specifically said “I have heard old Col. Fair [Farr] say often, that he believed John Savage fired the first gun in this battle,” and that “John Savage, in my opinion fired the first gun at the Battle of the Cowpens.”

Sources:

John Moncure's The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage has a transcription of the statement by Collins, Anderson, Thomas, and others.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's memoir, and Mackenzie's Strictures.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

One of Young's statements appears in the pension application of John Jolly (.pdf file), transcribed by Will Graves.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Richard Crabtree (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Richard Swearingen (.pdf file).

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has a copy of Jackson's letters.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The American Skirmishers, Who Did John Savage Shoot?, Morgan's Report