Battle of Port Royal Island (3)

This is the third of three posts on the February 3, 1779, battle of Port Royal Island. For the first two parts, see here and here.

On Port Royal Island, British light infantry under Major Valentine Gardiner and South Carolina forces under Brigadier-General William Moultrie deployed for battle.

Major Gardiner galloped up to the Americans with a white handkerchief hanging from the tip of his drawn sword and demanded that they surrender. Allegedly, Lieutenant Francis Kinloch, Moultrie’s aide-de-camp, responded by saying that ‘they had too much British blood in their veins to yield their post without dispute,’ and the American militia cheered.

When Gardiner returned to his lines, the British howitzer fired, and the bursting shell mortally wounded Lieutenant Benjamin Wilkins of the Charleston Artillery.

The American 6-pounders responded, and the second shot struck the British gun carriage. At that moment, the sailor carrying the matchstick fled, leaving the howitzer out of action for the rest of the battle.

Moultrie then advanced his two wings and a general engagement ensued.

Battle of Port Royal Island in Miniature. British light infantry of the 16th (yellow facings) and 60th regiments (blue facings) face off against South Carolina militia, including the Charleston Artillery.

The British tried to turn the flanks of the American line, but those on the left (troops of the 4/60th under Lieutenant Breitenbach) could not negotiate the felled trees, and those on the right (troops of the 16th under Lieutenant Calderwood) found that the Charleston militia presented too extensive a line.

Meanwhile, the American guns raked the British line with both solid shot and grape shot. Ensign Plumer was struck down by the wind of a cannon ball that passed under Major Gardiner’s horse. Major Graham was struck twice by grapeshot, and Ensign Finlay was mortally wounded.

The American infantry then launched their own attack. Captain Murray refused the left flank, and as he dressed the line, he was struck in the right buttocks by a piece of grape shot.

On the other end of the line, Lieutenant Skinner repelled an attack against the British right. Skinner took command of this end of the line after Lieutenant Calderwood was mortally wounded.

The American guns drove the British to seek cover behind brush on either side of the road. Captains Murray and Bruère rallied the troops on the left (eastern) side of the road, and Major Gardiner and Lieutenant Skinner rallied the troops on the right.

Gardiner then decided to retreat and he sent one Corporal Craig of the 16th across the roadway to deliver the orders to Murray and Bruère. Murray, however, claimed he could not safely retreat, and besides, his men were at last pushing back the Americans. The brush provided his men with an opportunity. In the words of Moultrie, “this action was reversed from the usual way of fighting, between the British and Americans; they taking to the bushes and we remaining upon the open ground…” Murray sent Corporal Craig back, and Gardiner rescinded his order.

As the militia fell back, Bruère's men worked their way into range of the American cannon, and appeared to silence the guns. (According to Moultrie, the American guns were running low on ammunition). But then Bruère was struck in the ribs and he made his way to a log house in the rear of the line that had become a makeshift hospital.

During the fight, Captain John Barnwell, who commanded a troop of 15 light horse, remained on the edges of the fight, sending messages back to the American line on the British movements. At about this time, Barnwell saw an opportunity, and his troop swept down on the British line, sending Gardiner fleeing before them, and cutting him off from the British line. Barnwell’s troop then reached the log house where they captured Bruère and 14 other men.

The battlefield at this point must have been a smoke-drenched and confused place, for both sides would be convinced that they had decisively beaten their foe.

Below is historian Peter Young’s description of the conclusion of the battle, which was based primarily on Captain Murray’s written recollection.

“For as the Americans fell back, Murray was advancing: the 16th on the right; the 60th on the left; the centre open. The flank platoons, those of Calderwood and Baron Breitenbach had orders to charge in as soon as they should gain the enemy’s flanks. A solitary American rifleman, doubtless one of the Virginians [sic], stayed behind when the rest gave way and shot Murray through the left arm, just as he was waving it to signal Breitenbach to charge from the flank, while he himself attacked frontally. Murray fainted, and his men paused, giving the Americans time to bring up their horses and draw off the gun.

“The final British charge was made in open order, but the American riflemen did not wait for the bayonet: throwing away their arms, they made off.

“On the British right things followed much the same course. Lieutenant Skinner, now the senior unwounded officer, made a spirited attack and drove the Americans back to the ground from which they had advanced. They retired in confusion, threatened on both flanks.”

By contrast, below is an excerpt from General Moultrie’s after-action report to Major-General Benjamin Lincoln, dated February 4, 1779:

“after some little time finding our men too much exposed to the enemy's fire, I ordered them to take trees; about three quarters of an hour after the action began, I heard a general cry through the line, of ‘no more cartridges ;’ and was also informed by Captains Heyward and Rutledge, that the ammunition for the field-pieces was almost expended, after firing about forty rounds from each piece: upon this I ordered the field-pieces to be drawn off very slowly; and their right and left wings to keep pace with the artillery to cover their flanks, which was done in tolerable order for undisciplined troops: the enemy had beat their retreat before we began to move, but we had little or no ammunition, and could not of consequence pursue: they retreated so hastily as to leave an officer, one sergeant, and three privates, wounded, in a house near the action, and their dead lying on the field. It is impossible as yet to be particular with respect, to the latter. Two officers we have found and seven men they fought from behind the bushes.”

At this point it was late in the day, the British had taken considerable losses (perhaps 1 in 4 had been killed or wounded), and they had used up most of their ammunition. The British decided to withdraw to their boats, leaving behind their killed and some of their wounded.

One small solace was that as the British withdrew, they had a brush with Barnwell’s mounted men, which led to the recovery of most of the men Barnwell had taken. (Barnwell retained only 1 sergeant and 6 rank and file as prisoners).

The action at Port Royal Island brought the British raid into South Carolina to a close. The raid failed to significantly distract the American high command in the south, who continued to focus on preventing the British conquest of the Georgian backcountry (discussed in Part 1).

British Losses:

Several estimates of British losses appear below.

Young stated that the British held together only 70 rank and file by the end of the battle and that about half of the force (total strength was close to 160 men) was made casualties.

General Bull shared the following information in a letter to Moultrie dated February 12, 1779:

“Yesterday seven sailors, deserters from the Lord George Germain ship of war, were brought in by a party from one of our picquets; they say that the fleet is on their way to Savannah; that their land troops lost, in the action with us on Port-Royal, forty killed and wounded, and that the night after the action, an express was sent by a boat to Savannah, for a reinforcement, but the answer was, none could be spared, and that the fleet must return…”

The Royal Georgia Gazette (as cited by The History of Beaufort County, South Carolina: 1514-1861), stated that British casualties were only 30.

American Losses:

Moultrie, in an after action report to Major-General Benjamin Lincoln, stated that there was 1 officer mortally wounded, 3 other officers wounded, “with six or seven privates killed in the field, and fifteen wounded.”

Moultrie identified the officers by name and he later compiled a return of losses for those of other ranks in the two Charleston militia companies (published in Volume 1 of his 1802 memoirs). These add up to 14 named men:

• Charleston Artillery. Mortally wounded: Lieutenant Benjamin Wilkins, S. Wilkins, John Fraser. Wounded: Captain Thomas Heyward (in arm), John Anthony, John Calvert, Anthony Watts, John Green, and John Laurence.
• Charleston Light Infantry. Wounded: Lieutenant Archibald Brown, Lieutenant Sawyer, John Collins, John Righton, and John D. Miller.

The Charleston militia was not the only body of American troops at the battle. According to Boatner's Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, total American losses were 8 killed, 22 wounded.

Sources:

This account of the battle of Port Royal Island is based primarily on Peter Young’s (1967) The British Army, William Moultrie's (Volume 1, 1802) memoirs, and Lawrence Rowland, Alexander Moore, and George Rogers' (Volume 1, 1996) The History of Beaufort County, South Carolina.

Battle of Port Royal Island (2)

In late January, 1779, Major Valentine Gardiner led a British expedition north from Savannah, Georgia, along the South Carolina coast. The British landed on coastal islands, where they burned a number of plantations and captured several hundred slaves. Their excuse for burning plantations was that they “received very abusive language from the people on shore,” “or had found some illiberal words written with chalk on the walls, against them.” [1]

American forces on Port Royal Island consisted of a small detachment of the 4th South Carolina regiment (Captain John de Tréville commanding) and some militia. These men defended Fort Lyttleton, which protected the town of Beaufort, but which could not stop the British from landing and raiding elsewhere. On January 31, the militia abandoned the fort. Captain de Tréville then hastily spiked the guns and blew up the fort [2].

That night, Brigadier-General William Moultrie reached the ferry crossing to Port Royal Island and learned that the fort had been destroyed. A sizeable force of South Carolina militia encamped near the ferry, including men from the relatively well trained and equipped Charleston regiment. [3]

On February 2, Moultrie crossed over to Port Royal Island with close to 300 men, and the next morning he marched into Beaufort. There, Moultrie found that some arms and supplies could be salvaged from Fort Lyttleton, but before any action could be taken, word was received that the British were about 5 miles away. Moultrie then assembled the men and marched after them. [4]

The two forces met about halfway between Beaufort and the island ferry. At this point, the British were between the Americans and the ferry. At the same time, the Americans threatened to separate the British from their boats.

Captain Patrick Murray, who commanded a British light infantry company, claimed that the battle was fought “along the road to the entry of Rhodes’ Swamp, where—on the crest of the Pina Barren beyond the swamp where the trees were felled but not cleared off.” [5]

Schematic Diagram (not to scale) of British and American Forces at the Battle of Port Royal Island.

The Americans halted about 200 yards from the British. The Charleston Artillery deployed in the road, and the infantry were deployed in two wings that extended into the woods on either side. Captain de Tréville took with him a 2-pounder when he abandoned Fort Lyttleton; this gun was positioned in support of the right wing.

The British troops consisted of three light infantry companies supported by a small howitzer (manned by 2 gunners and 6 sailors). The infantry deployed in nine platoons, which from left to right (when facing the Americans), were commanded by Lieutenant Joseph Breitenbach (4th battalion, 60th regiment) Captain Patrick Murray (4/60th), Lieutenant Rowland Hosleton (4/60th), Ensign James Finlay (3rd battalion, 60th regiment), Captain George Bruère (3/60th), Ensign Enoch Plumer (3/60th), Lieutenant John Skinner (16th regiment), Major Colin Graham (16th), Lieutenant William Calderwood (16th). Each platoon contained around 16 men. [6]

Notes:

1. The number of captured slaves is stated in a letter from Stephen Bull to William Moultrie, dated February 12, 1779. The quoted passage appears in a letter from Lieutenant Benjamin Smith to Moultrie. Moultrie’s correspondence appears in his memoirs (published 1802).

2. Moultrie noted that “Although the fort was blown up, yet it was not so totally demolished but that a great many of the stores were left unhurt, and the guns so lightly spiked, that you might draw out the spikes with a pair of pincers.”

3. Two companies of the Charleston regiment served in this battle: the 2nd company (Charleston Artillery, commanded by Captain Thomas Heyward) and the 3rd company (Charleston Light Infantry, commanded by Captain John Baddeley). Also present were other local militia, although I have not been able to divine their numbers or organization. Of these other men, Moultrie singled out a troop of light horse commanded by Captain John Barnwell. Brigadier-General Stephen Bull commanded the militia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard Beekman commanded the artillery. Moultrie had overall command.

According to Moultrie, the only Continentals in this action were in Captain de Tréville’s detachment, which consisted of de Tréville, 2 junior officers, and 6 enlisted men.

Serving with the Charleston Artillery were two signers of the Declaration of Independence: Captains Thomas Heyward and Edward Rutledge.

Some relevant pension applications (links are to. pdf files):

• John Anthony of the Charleston Artillery. He was wounded during the battle and is named in Moultrie’s correspondence.
• Lieutenant Archibald Brown of the Charleston light infantry. He was wounded during the battle and is mentioned in Moultrie’s account.
• Lieutenant George Frederick Dener. He served in the Charleston light infantry.
• Jonathan Johnson. He served in the Charleston light infantry.
• Lieutenant Edward Barnwell. He was Captain John Barnwell’s brother and served in his troop.
• William Elliott. He served in Barnwell’s troop.

4. The number of men that fought in the battle may have been considerably less. Moultrie noted, “The Chehaw company was sent back before the action, about 125 men, on a report that the enemy had landed there.”

5. This quote appears in Peter Young’s (1967) The British Army, which describes the battle of Port Royal Island in considerable detail.

6. This order of battle is based on Young and this history of the 60th regiment.

Battle of Port Royal Island (1)

By 1778, the war in the northern theater had effectively reached a stalemate, and the British began to place increasing importance on the recovery of the southern colonies. In December, 1778, British troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell captured Savannah, Georgia. The following January, Brigadier-General Augustine Prévost arrived in Savannah and took command of British forces in the south.

Prévost laid out his plans to George Germain, Secretary of State for America, in a letter dated January 18, 1779:

“...I shall immediately proceed up the river to see what advantages can be expected from the frontier inhabitants of Carolina who give the strongest hopes of joining heartily whenever they find that they are to be supported. Should it appear that they do not mean to take the active part which they have promised, I shall confine my plan of operations to harassing the enemy by excursions and effectually securing this province, to which all the loyal subjects who have fled to Florida for shelter will soon return if they can be assured of being protected. If, on the contrary, the frontier inhabitants should evince the zeal which they profess, I cannot doubt but great advantages may be delivered from a diversion on their side supported by an attack at Beaufort or any of the settlements on the coast of South Carolina…”

In other words, Prévost intended to drive into the Georgian backcountry in order to galvanize American Loyalists, while at the same time launching a diversionary attack on the South Carolina post.

To effect this plan, Prévost made his headquarters at Ebenezer, Georgia, a town 25 miles northwest of Savannah, and roughly opposite Purrysburg, South Carolina, where Major-General Benjamin Lincoln was assembling a large American army.

Strategic Situation in the South (click to enlarge). This map shows places referred to in this blog post that were occupied by British and American forces in January, 1779. The British held Savannah and Ebenezer in Georgia [red dots], while the Americans held Augusta, Georgia, and Purrysburg, Beaufort (on Port Royal Island), and Charleston, South Carolina [blue dots]. Based on a 1776 map in the David Rumsey collection.

On January 24, Prévost sent Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell with a large force [1] to take Augusta, and sent a diversion against the South Carolina coast. In his words:

“In order to facilitate further the success of Colonel Campbell’s operations... I sent three companies of light infantry that came from Florida to go up Beaufort River under the escort of the Vigilant, and to draw the enemy’s spies about us to conceive that more troops were sent by sending a regiment of Hessians to the place of embarkation two miles from Savannah and marching them in the night back to their barracks.”

The three companies of light infantry belonged to the 16th regiment, and the 3rd and 4th battalions of the 60th regiment. This small force, no more than 160 men, was commanded by Major Valentine Gardiner. Nevertheless, their arrival on the South Carolina coast put the Americans in a state of alarm.

Colonel Charles Cotesworth Pinckney described the popular feeling in Charleston, South Carolina, in a letter to Brigadier-General William Moultrie:

“...many people think, this movement of the enemy is to post themselves at Port-Royal, and there wait reinforcements from the northward; others, that it was done only to cause a division and to weaken your little army, that they might more easily pass the river [i.e., so that Prévost could cross the Savannah River and invade South Carolina]; others, that it was to destroy the town and fort, plunder and return to Tybee [an island near Savannah]; but some with more penetrating looks and significant nods; that the vessels appearing in scull creek, as if intended, (Port-Royal was, or is, only a feint,) to cover a real design of landing suddenly on the Euhaws, march to a pass of consequence near Elliott's hill, on the southern road, and there throw up some field works, which with a few cannon will entirely cut off the communication from town to Gen. Lincoln's army, and put him between two fires; this last manoevre, is thought of so much consequence to the public safety, as to raise the public anxiety...”

Lincoln was not deceived, and he remained at Purrysburg with his army. However, Lincoln also did not want to see a key fort on Port-Royal Island fall to the British. He therefore ordered General Moultrie to take control of South Carolina militia on and near Port-Royal Island and defend that threatened post.

Note:

1. Campbell described the composition of this force in a March 4, 1779, letter to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton:

“A proper supply of provisions having been collected at Ebenezer, I marched on the 24th January with Sir James Baird’s light infantry [a light company of the 71st regiment, with, perhaps, a corps of Provincial light infantry attached], the 1st battalion of the 71st regiment, the New York Volunteers, one troop of light dragoons [commanded by Captain Tawes], Colonel [Alexander] Innes’s Carolina Loyalists [i.e., the South Carolina Royalists], and the Florida Rangers, making in all one thousand effectives, rank and file, with 4 field-pieces, one howitzer and two royal mortars.”

Battle of Fishing Creek 4

Part 4: Sumter's Defeat

Previous: To Fishing Creek

Next: A Scene of Horror

Across Fishing Creek

The Americans slaughtered cattle and feasted on beef, roasted ears of corn, and freshly picked peaches. Some men napped, while others shaved or washed their clothes. Men and women living in the neighborhood came out to greet and encourage the soldiers. The American guards detected no danger. The situation in the American camp was idyllic. Yet at that moment, Tarleton’s 160 men were quickly bearing down on the Americans along the byway [1].

The first Americans to see Tarleton’s men were two vedettes. These men stepped out of the bushes and fired, killing one of the five dragoons in the British vanguard. The remaining dragoons killed the vedettes with their sabers and headed towards the creek. Responsibility for guarding the ford by which the byway crossed Fishing Creek had been left to one Captain Thompson. Thompson, however, had left his post and the ford was now unguarded [2].

Among the Americans to see the British vanguard and live to tell of it were John Williams and John Dobbins of the North Carolina militia. These two men and others were collecting peaches in an orchard near Fishing Creek. Fortunately for them, the four remaining dragoons either did not see them, or took no notice of them. The incredulous Americans offered no resistance and swam to safety across the Catawba River [3].

Finally, the dragoons ascended a height from which the main American body was in view. The dragoons crouched upon their horses and waving for their comrades to come on. Tarleton sped ahead and when he reached the height he was amazed to see "the front of the American camp, perfectly quiet, and not the least alarmed by the fire of the vedettes" [4].

The Americans’ had been using rifles to slaughter cattle; although the vedette’s two shots had been heard in camp, they elicited no special notice [5].

Stealthily, Tarleton’s "cavalry and infantry were formed into one line," just out of the Americans’ view. Then, "giving a general shout," the British charged [6].

The Fishing Creek Battlefield. Fishing Creek is the winding stream at left; the Catawba River is at right. The large blue circle shows the approximate position of the main American body on the river road. The smaller blue circle shows the rear guard. The red arrow depicts Tarleton's charge [7]. The main road (brown line) is based on the modern-day Catawba River Road. The byway is not depicted.

Fishing Creek Area. Part of the Fishing Creek battlefield has been flooded by damming on the Catawba River. This excerpt from Mills' 1825 atlas of South Carolina was used to roughly locate the original banks of the Catawba River in the above battlefield map. Islands shown in the 1825 atlas were not included in the battlefield map. Note that Mills' map designates the "Battle of F. C."

"A Perfect Rout"

The dragoons rushed the American encampment, with sabers gleaming brightly in the sunlight. The British infantry came streaming after, charging through the dragoons’ dusty wake.

Tarleton Forms His Line. Infantry and dragoons form a single-rank line of battle. According to Tarleton, most of his infantry came from the corps of light infantry that fought at Camden. Shown are light infantrymen from the 71st Foot and 16th Foot, as well as a soldier of the British Legion infantry. As per usual, the figure to participant ratio is 1:20.

Tarleton described the battle that followed in prosaic terms: "The arms and artillery of the Continentals were secured before the men could be assembled: Universal consternation immediately ensued throughout the camp; some opposition was, however, made from behind the wagons, in front of the militia. The numbers, and extensive encampment of the enemy, occasioned several conflicts before the action was decided" [8].

Young James Collins, who had only recently joined Sumter, recalled that "Before Sumter could wake up his men and form, the enemy were among them cutting down everything in their way" [9].

According to one account, Sumter was sitting next to a wagon and was halfway through a shave when the British attacked. "When the colonel saw the state of things around, he cut a rope with which a horse was tied to a wagon, dropped his razor, mounted the horse and made his escape without saddle or bridle" [10].

At least one knot of resistance developed where the wagons were interposed between the dragoons and the militia. Here, some South Carolinians briefly rallied around Colonel William Bratton before being driven off. Then, according to Collins, the main part of Sumter’s force "retreated across the creek at the main road, leaving the remainder to the mercy of the enemy." Collins was with “the greater part of our number [who] dashed through the creek, at the fording place." These men were desperate "to secure our own safety… and pushing on with all possible speed, reached the highland." He called this "a perfect rout." The fate of those left behind was "an indiscriminate slaughter" [11].

Sumter's Defeat (click to enlarge). British dragoons and infantry overrun unarmed American Continentals at upper right, while a tenuous resistance is made by Carolina militia at lower left.

Tarleton also described the fighting as a "slaughter." According to one militiaman, the British were incensed at the deaths of a sergeant of the Legion dragoons and a captain of the light infantry. "The British officers had great spite at the militia, but ordered that the regulars [Continentals] should have quarters" [12].

The sight of so many enemy soldiers may also have been terrifying to the British, even though they had the upper hand. Relief came when the British found and released the Americans’ prisoners. These men picked up guns (which littered the ground) and joined their comrades. When this reinforcement arrived, the killing stopped [13].

Reinforcement. British prisoners, once released, picked up arms and joined their comrades. Shown here are soldiers of the 33rd and 71st regiments, who were captured on August 15.

By this time, the battleground was covered with scores of dead and grievously wounded Americans, both Continentals and militia. Tarleton claimed that 150 had been struck down, and the total American loss (including unwounded prisoners) was around 300. As for himself, he lost a mere 6 infantrymen, 9 dragoons, and 20 horses [14].

Notes:

In some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the quoted source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of David McCance, transcribed by Will Graves. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

2. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of John Henderson, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves.

4. Tarleton, ibid.

5. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

6. Tarleton, ibid.

7. Saye, ibid. has the British attacking along a relatively unguarded byway. Tarleton, ibid., claimed that the first thing he saw was "the front of the American camp" -- not the rear guard. James Collins in his (1859) Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier, claimed that the Americans "retreated across the creek at the main road," which is at the bottom of the map. This statement implies that the British were attacking from a different direction. Collins also recorded that "the rear guard consisting of militia were posted at the Creek." David McCance, ibid. claimed that "the rear guard was ordered to remain one mile behind" the main body, which is consistent with Collins' statement and Mills' placement of the battlefield. However, McCance also claimed that the rear guard "was taken," which seemingly is contradicted by Tarleton, Saye, and Collins (at least when the three are read together). Militiaman George Cunningham claimed that he was one of those "standing guard," but he was not captured. (see the pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves).

8. Tarleton, ibid.

9. Collins, ibid. A transcription appears in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

10. Saye, ibid.

11. Saye, ibid. Collins, ibid.

12. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

13. Tarleton, ibid.

14. Tarleton, ibid. British Legion killed and wounded at Catawba Fords. British Legion prisoners taken at Catawba Fords. The pension application of George Neely, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Patton, transcribed by Will Graves.

Cowpens in Miniature 2

Part 2: British Order of Battle
Previous: About the Recreation

Next: American Order of Battle

The American commander Brigadier-General Morgan indicated that the British force at Cowpens was comprised of 1,150 men (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?). I assume that this number included both the men (of all ranks) that fought at the battle and the detachment that was left behind to guard the British baggage train.

Rank and file totals for most British units can be found in a British report dated January 15, 1781. This includes the detachment of the 16th Foot (44 men), the 7th Foot (167 men), the 1st Battalion of the 71st Foot (249 men), the light infantry companies of the 71st Foot (69 men), and the British Legion (451 men).

I also reviewed the rolls for the Prince of Wales American Regiment (PoWAR) light infantry company, and determined that there were as many as 1 officer and 28 rank and file of this company present at Cowpens.

Finally, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie recorded the number of officers present in most of the units at Cowpens, including the 7th Foot (7), the 71st Foot (16 between the battalion and light companies), the PoWAR light infantry company (1), and the detachment of the 17th Light Dragoons (2).

Some assumptions had to be made fill in the gaps in the records.

Rank and File Estimates

The two 3-pounders that the British had at the battle had a crew in the neighborhood of 22 men and no officers (an estimate based primarily on John Moncure's estimate in The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour and Lawrence Babits' estimate in A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens).

Tarleton's account implies that the 17th Light Dragoons had around 50 men, but he was speaking very loosely. The other numbers he gave are demonstrably wrong, such as his statement that his total force was 1000 men, and that the 7th Foot, and 1st battalion of the 71st Foot both had 200 men. A U.S. intelligence report of Jan 6, 1781 gives 35 men for the 17th (see excerpt, below). This is also not entirely trustworthy. However a number between 35 and 50 men is probably accurate. For this reason, the 17th Light Dragoons are assumed to have had around 40 men.

The British report does not indicate how many of the rank and file in the British Legion were infantry and how many were dragoons. Tarleton's account implies that there were 250 dragoons, which would leave about 200 infantrymen. The US intelligence report, mentioned above, indicates that the infantry and cavalry components were of equal size (this is not shown in the excerpt above). An annotation on the Pigee Map (Babits, page 71) lists 280 men for Tarleton's cavalry. This number also appeared in a New Jersey newspaper account of the battle. My assumption is that the cavalry had around 240 men (280 rank and file total - 40 rank and file for the 17th light dragoons); this leaves about 210 rank and file for the infantry.

Officer Estimates

Using the number of officers listed by Mackenzie, and the rank and file numbers indicated above, it is possible to determine for some units the ratio of officers to rank and file. There were 9 officers for 167 rank and file in the 7th Foot (1:19), 16 officers for 318 rank and file in the 71st Foot (1:20) 2 officers for 40 rank and file in the 17th Light Dragoons (1:20), and 1 officer for 28 rank and file in the PoWAR light infantry (1:28). The average ratio is 1:20. By extension the number of officers in other units can be estimated.

Musician Estimates

British companies at the Cowpens were badly understrength. I'm assuming that there was not more than 1 musician per company. Following Babits, I'm further assuming that the detachment of the 16th Foot was organized as a single company, and that the 7th Foot was organized into four companies. The number of infantry and dragoon companies in the British Legion are based on records found on Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website.

Esimated Totals

British Regulars

16th Foot: ~44 men (41 rank and file, 2 officers, and 1 musician).

7th Foot: ~180 men (167 rank and file, 9 officers, and 4 musicians).

71st Foot (1st battalion): ~269 men (249 rank and file, 12 officers, and 8 musicians)

71st Foot (light infantry companies): ~75 men (69 rank and file, 4 officers and 2 musicians).

17th Light Dragoons: ~43 men (40 rank and file, 2 officers, and 1 musician).

Royal Artillery detachment: ~ 22 men (all rank and file).

Loyalists

British Legion Infantry: ~226 men (about 210 rank and file plus about 10 officers and 6 musicians).

British Legion Dragoons: ~258 men (about 241 rank and file, 12 officers and 5 musicians)

Prince of Wales American Regiment light infantry: ~29 men (28 rank and file, 1 officer, and 0 musicians).

Grand Totals

Total: 1,146 men of all ranks (1,067 rank and file, 52 officers, 27 musicians)

This total almost exactly matches the total of 1,150 men Morgan named.

Morgan said that the British claimed to have "fought" 1,037 during the battle. I'm assuming that this number was the total number of rank and file with Tarleton, minus the baggage detachment. The size of this detachment is unknown, however Mackenzie said that it was under the command of Ensign Fraser of the 71st. If the detachment was comprised of Ensign Fraser and 30 men then the total number of British present during the battle would be as follows:

Revised Total: 1,115 men of all ranks (1,037 rank and file, 51 officers, 27 musicians).

Tarleton and Mackenzie said the British force had 1,000 men. They were probably counting only rank and file that were on the battlefield.

American Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard wrote that at the climax of the battle, his 350 men were confronted by 800 Bitish. I show he was facing 814 men (1146 for the British overall - 31 men for the baggage detachment - 258 men for the British Legion dragoons - 43 men for the 17th Light Dragoons = 814) minus whatever losses the British sustained earlier in the battle).

American Major-General Nathanael Greene estimated that there were 50 Loyalist militiamen accompanying Tarleton's baggage train and presumably serving as drivers and/or guards. Tarleton probably also had a number of African Americans serving as drivers. Morgan recorded, in his after action report, the capture of "ten negroes." Tarleton mentioned having the service of Loyalist guides, but they were probably very few in number. Of these, South Carolina militaman Thomas Young encountered the Loyalists "Littlefield and Kelly" after the battle. Loyalist Captain Alexander Chesney scouted for Tarleton and participated at least during the late stages of the fighting.

The British Force in Miniature

(click to enlarge)

7th Foot (left) and 71st Foot (right)


British Legion infantry (left) and British Legion dragoons (right)


17th Light Dragoons (left) and light infantry companies (right)


Royal Artillery detachment (left) and baggage guard (right)

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of statements by Morgan, Mackenzie, Tarleton, Howard, and Greene.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has transcriptions of Tarleton's account, Mackenzie's Strictures, and other records pertaining to the British Legion.

François-Jean de Chastellux's (1787) Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782 is one place to find a copy of the British rank and file returns.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has Morgan's account of the battle as it appeared in a New Jersey newspaper.

Related: Cowpens in Miniature 1, Tarleton's Narrative, Cornwallis' Report

British Light Infantry at Cowpens - Part 2

[Minor edits 12/26/09]

Daniel Morgan, writing 2 days after the battle, described the British deployment at Cowpens as follows:

"The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks."

Banastre Tarleton, writing 6 years after the battle, said that: "The light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line."

So which view is correct? Were the British light infantry divided into two parts and deployed on the flanks of the British line (Morgan's description), or were they grouped into a single battalion and placed on the right of the British line (Tarleton's description)?

I argued that Morgan's report is more reliable, but histories of the battle that specify the position of the British units have followed Tarleton.

It's understandable that historians would assume that Tarleton is correct. After all, who should know more about the deployment of the British troops than the British commander? Furthermore, there is no reason why he should have felt compelled to misstate the facts in this case (unlike his statements about American troop totals and casualties).

Corroboration or refutation of Tarleton's description might be sought in the Strictures of his critic, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie, who served with the 71st lights at the battle. Mackenzie does not correct Tarleton on this count, which may be taken as tacit acceptance of his version. However, this does not necessarily settle the metter. Mackenzie sought to destroy Tarleton's reputation chiefly through logical argument, rather than by offering a different remembrance of events.

David Ramsay's early history of the battle states that at the end of the fighting, "The first battalion of the 71st, and two British light infantry companies, laid down their arms to the American militia." Lawrence Babits' modern history suggests (p 197, n. 102) that the two light infantry companies were the light infantry of the 16th Foot and the Prince of Wales' American Regiment; the 71st lights might not have surrendered with them if they had fled from the right flank to join in an attempted rally of the 71st battalion companies on the left flank.

An alternative possibility is that two of the four companies of light infantry were already on the left flank (as per Morgan's after action report, quoted above) and that these two companies surrendered with the battalion companies of the 71st Foot.

Cornet James Simons of the American cavalry recalled participating in a charge late in the battle "on the right wing of their Army Composed of their Legeonary Infantry, intermixed with the Battallion of the Brave 71st." Because other accounts make clear that the 71st Foot was on the British left, not right, Simons seemingly placed the light infantry of the 71st Foot, at least, on the British right flank.

Sources:

Copies of Tarleton's and Mackenzie's description of the battle can be found on Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website.

A transcription of Morgan's report and Simons' statement can be found on John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour.

David Ramsay (1811). The History of the American Revolution (Vol. 2).

British Light Infantry at Cowpens - Part 1

[Minor edits 12/25/09]

Among the British participants at the Battle of Cowpens was a contingent of light infantry made up of men from three different regiments. These included 41 rank and file of the 16th Foot, 69 rank and file of the 71st Foot (representing both battalions), and around 30 men of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. The first two numbers come from Cornwallis’ monthly return dated January 15, 1781. This website [link no longer works] on the Prince of Wales American Regiment includes summaries of the service record for each soldier in the regiment, broken down by companies. The records are incomplete, with only one roster available for the period of time near the battle of Cowpens (April, 1781). Based on this information there appears to have been, by my count, two members of the company gravely wounded at the battle and paroled, including the sole officer of the company present at the battle, Ensign Thomas Lindsay. Two sergeants and 17 privates were captured. An additional corporal and 4 privates were attached to Cornwallis' army at the time, and they presumably escaped capture. Three privates disappeared from the roster while the company was in South Carolina; these plausibly could have been killed at the battle. This totals up to a small company of 1 ensign, 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, and 25 privates. Again, though, this is a rough estimation based on a transcription rather than original records. A sizeable number of men from the company are listed as being "on command" in April, 1781. In many cases these assignments appear to have begun long before Cowpens.

Don Troiani’s painting of the men of the 16th Foot at Cowpens shows them in a typical light infantry uniform. The men actually came from three different companies; I don’t know if one of those was the regiment’s light company. In any case, at least some of these men had previously belonged to the regiment’s “hat” companies.

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie praised the British light infantry at Cowpens in the following terms:

"The company of the 16th regiment was well known by its services in the army commanded by Major General Prevost; those of the seventy-first regiment were distinguished under Sir James Baird at the surprise of General Wayne in Pennsylvania, of Baylor's dragoons in New Jersey, at Briar Creek in Georgia, at the capture and subsequent defence of Savannah, at the battle near Camden under Earl Cornwallis; and even Lieutenant Colonel did them justice at the [battle of Fishing Creek]. The light infantry company of the Prince of Wales's American regiment, when but newly raised and indifferently disciplined, acquired reputation under General Tryon at Danbury.”

Pictured are miniatures representing the British light infantry at Cowpens. From left to right they are from the 16th Foot, Prince of Wales's American Regiment, and the 71st Foot. The uniform of the 16th lights is based on the Troiani painting mentioned above. The uniform of the PoWAR lights is based on the uniform worn by the member of the light infantry company of the recreated Royal Welsh Fusileers. The uniform of the 71st lights is based on a Troiani painting.

Sources:

Copies of Tarleton's and Mackenzie's descriptions of the battle can be found on John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, and Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website.

Michael S. Mallery's Prince of Wales American Regiment webpage contains a wealth of information about that unit. [Link no longer works]