Surrender at Lavaltrie

This is the most recent entry in a series of posts on the American invasion of Canada. The previous post can be found here. For an index of all posts, see here.

British Governor Guy Carleton abandoned Montreal on November 11, 1775, and headed for Quebec. Carleton sailed with an 11-vessel flotilla that included the British regulars that had garrisoned Montreal. The flotilla reached Sorel on the 15th, where they found their passage blocked by American forces under Colonel James Easton. Easton had placed a 12-pounder gun was placed in a gondola that was rowed out into the shipping channel. He also had on shore one battery of two 6-pounders, and another of one 9-pounder and three 12-pounders. Overseeing the guns was Lieutenant Martin Johnston of Lamb’s artillery company.

When the British vessels neared these guns, the Americans fired seven cannon balls into the lead vessel (probably the Gaspee), causing havoc on board [1]. According to Benjamin Trumbull, the British then attempted to land some of “their men and Effects,” but they were thwarted by Canadian volunteers allied with the Americans. The flotilla then turned about and anchored upstream.

Easton sent a message to Carleton, in which he gloatingly wrote, “You are very sensible I am in Possession at this Place, and from the Strength of the United Colonies on both sides, your own situation is Rendered very disagreeable.” He warned that if Carleton did not surrender, “you will cherefully take the Consequences which will Follow.”

Soon thereafter, Easton advanced some guns close to the British anchorage, and forced them to retreat still further upstream. This time they anchored near Lavaltrie.

From Sorel to Lavaltrie. The routes taken by the American forces are conjectural.

When American Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery learned that Carleton had been trapped, he asked Colonel Timothy Bedel to take his regiment (Bedel’s Rangers) and the Green Mountain Boys to Easton’s assistance. As an incentive to the troops, he offered them “All public stores, except ammunition and provisions.” Bedel’s men chose to march; the Green Mountain Boys did not.

At Lavaltrie, Governor Carleton weighed his options. The wind was still not in his favor, and the Americans were closing in. He accepted the offer of one of his Canadian ship captains (Bouchette) to lead him past the Americans in a small boat. Carleton then ordered Brigadier-General Richard Prescott to make his way as best he could with the flotilla. As a last resort, Prescott was to throw his guns and gunpowder overboard and surrender.

On the night of November 16-17, Captain Bouchette, Governor Carleton, and two of Carleton’s aides (de Lanaudière and de Niverville) rowed quietly downstream (the oars were wrapped in cloth to dampen the noise). When their boat neared the Americans, the men silently paddled with their hands. By morning, they were well out into Lac Saint Pierre. Carleton reached Quebec on the 20th.

Prescott did not attempt a breakout, and on the 19th he agreed to surrender. The Americans thus captured 11 officers, 9 sergeants, 5 drummers and fifers, 113 rank and file, a large number of sailors, some prominent French and English Canadians, and a few artillerymen. Also on board was a large supply of provisions, including 760 barrels of pork and 675 barrels of flour. Prescott had most of the gunpowder thrown overboard, but the Americans still captured much-needed ordinance and ammunition [2].

In this manner, the Americans finished off the 26th Regiment of Foot, and Montgomery obtained the means to convey his army from Montreal to Quebec. Montgomery was astonished by the ease of this victory, writing “I blush for His Majesty's troops! Such an instance of base poltroonery I never met with!”

Notes:

1. As was the case with the attack on the Fell, I’m unsure how many casualties were inflicted. At least one soldier was killed -- a sergeant in the 26th Regiment (see here).

2. Most of the infantry were from the 26th Regiment; the rest were odds and ends of the 7th Regiment and the Royal Highland Emigrants. Click on the following links for a tally of the loss in officers, enlisted men, ordinance, and provisions.

The Siege of Fort Saint-Jean

Fort Saint-Jean in southern Quebec was the place at which the British hoped to turn back the American invasion of Canada. The Americans were not strong enough to take the fort by assault, and so intended to capture the fort by siege. However, the Americans’ initial attempts to approach the fort were easily turned back.

Some events described in previous posts:

• September 4: The invasion begins
• September 6: First attempt to approach Fort Saint-Jean
• September 10: Second attempt to approach Fort Saint-Jean
• ~September 11: Canadian volunteers prevent supplies from reaching Fort Saint-Jean by water.
• September 17: Major John Brown cuts the land route to Fort Saint-Jean. The fort is now in a state of siege.
• September 18: Colonel Timothy Bedel turns back a British sortie northwest of the fort.

Over the next week, the Americans expanded their main camp, and constructed a road leading towards Fort Saint-Jean. At the edge of the woods south of the fort, the Americans constructed two gun emplacements. These guns opened fire at 3pm on September 25th, 1775 (the same day that Ethan Allen met with defeat near Montreal).

On November 1st, the British garrison, worn down by the bombardment, low on rations, and without hope of relief, decided to enter into surrender negotiations. The garrison formally surrendered on November 3rd.

I don’t plan on providing an exhaustive review of the month-and-a-half long siege. Instead, this post is intended to provide a broad overview of the siege. An upcoming post will describe, in detail, the dramatic, final bombardment of the fort on November 1st.

The Americans had four camps in the vicinity of Fort Saint-Jean during the siege. Their approximate location is identified by the following letters on the map below:

A. Main camp, commanded by Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery. In use from September 17 to October 28, 1775. On the 28th, Montgomery relocated all of the forces in the main camp to the lower camp.

B. Lower camp, commanded by Colonel Timothy Bedel (superseded by Brigadier-General David Wooster on October 27, and Montgomery on October 28). In use from September 18 to November 3, 1775.

C. Camp near Hazen’s house, commanded by James Livingston. First occupied by September 22 and probably in use for the remainder of the siege. In mid-October, Livingston and most of his men departed to attack Fort Chambly.

D. East camp, commanded by Colonel James Clinton. In use from around October 11 to November 3, 1775.

The Americans also established four gun emplacements during the siege. For the most part, these pieces were manned by Lamb’s artillery company with support from various infantry detachments. The location of the emplacements is identified by the following numbers on the map below:

1. 2-gun battery of 12-pounders. Intended to fire on the British shipyard and the British vessels. Operational September 25-October 27.

2. Mortar battery, including a 13-in. mortar nicknamed the “old sow”. Intended to shell the fort. Operational September 25-October 27.

3. East battery, consisting of 2 4-pounders (the Canadian artillery) and 2 12-pounders. Intended to fire on the British vessels and the fort. Operational October 11-November 1 (the 4-pounders first opened fire on the 11th, the 12-pounders on the 14th).

4. Northwest battery, consisting of four 12-pounders and 6 mortars. Intended to fire on the fort. Operational November 1.

The Siege of Fort Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). For details on construction, see here. The site of the gun emplacements indicated on the map is fairly exact; however, the map should not be used for guidance as to the shape and size of the emplacements. A number of the roads shown on this map were constructed after the siege began. While the existence of these roads is clearly indicated in primary sources, their exact course is not, and the manner in which I’ve represented these roads is based on interpretation. The British fort consisted of two redoubts connected by a trench and picket fence. The trench and fence were constructed after the siege began and do not appear on earlier maps I've made of the area. Bedel constructed at least one breastwork to defend his camp at Grosse Pointe. His men also felled trees (not shown) at several places across the road leading north from the fort, and they controlled the shore opposite Hazen's estate.

Comments on Research

I do not document here the various sources used to support each of the above statements. However, interested readers are welcome to contact me with specific questions regarding sources and interpretations.

One subject that I've wrestled with in composing this post concerns the location of the Canadians' guns.

Foucher, a Canadian officer serving with the British garrison, recorded in his journal "On the fourth [of October] several Bostonians [actually, they were primarily Livingston's men] were noticed on the south side of the river near Moses Hazen's house. Several cannon shots were fired at them, to which the enemy replied in the same way."

From this statement, I concluded that the Canadians' had built, or were building, a gun emplacement for their 4 pounders by Hazen's house, and I indicated as much in an earlier post.

This view seemed confirmed by an October 6 letter from General Montgomery to Major-General Philip Schuyler, in which Montgomery noted, "Mr. Livingston, some days ago, took post at Mr. Hazen' s house, with near two hundred of the Canadians; they are erecting a battery there, which seems to make the garrison very uneasy." [Emphasis in original]

However, only Foucher's account suggests the Canadians fired their cannon on this occasion; other accounts indicate only that the Canadians responded to British fire with their muskets.

A British officer's journal (thought to have been written by Lieutenant John André), noted in the entry for October 5th that "Some imagin'd they saw men at work opposite the north redoubt on the east side of the River." His account makes it clear that this is a new enemy position: on October 7th, a British row galley is sent out both "towards Hazens House and along the side of the River opposite the N. Redoubt." No account mentions the Canadians' guns in action on this occasion, strongly suggesting that such a battery had not yet been erected. The British officer's journal indicates that a battery across from the north redoubt was completed on October 11th and opened fire on the fort the same day.

On considering these and other sources again, I've concluded that Foucher was probably mistaken in his characterization of the October 4th incident, and that Montgomery's description probably applies to the battery that began to be constructed on October 5th and that the garrison discovered on the 11th.

All of this is a very minor point, of course, but it is illustrative of the difficulty that arises when one attempts to reconcile participant accounts.

The Battle of Longue-Pointe

After dark, on September 24, 1775, Ethan Allen, with 80 Canadians and 30 American provincials, crossed the St. Lawrence River in order to attack Montreal. [1] The Americans “…expected all in the Suburbs, some in the Town, & many from the neighbouring Parishes wou'd have joyned them, & that they were to march in [to Montreal] without opposition…” [2] However, Allen’s plans were not widely known and he was too far removed to receive much help from friendly Canadians. Allen claimed that Major John Brown had promised to cross the river, too, but in any event his force failed to appear. [3] Instead, at about 9am on September 25, a local farmer rushed into Montreal and alerted the garrison of the impending threat. [4]

According to the Quebec Gazette, the drums beat the alarm, and “The faithful Citizens of Montreal, both English and French, wanted little persuation; in a moment the whole Town appear’d under arms…” [5] In Carleton’s words, those that turned out were primarily “all the old Gentlemen & better sort of Citizens English & Canadian” but also “some of the lower Classes followed their Example.” Carleton spoke to the assembled mass about the rebel threat, and ordered the citizens to join the British troops at the city barracks. [6]

Carleton did not know how many men he was facing and feared the worse. While ammunition was distributed to the citizens, the British leadership prepared to evacuate the city. The force that was entrusted to do battle with the Americans would be commanded by Major John Campbell, superintendent of Indian affairs in Quebec, and Major John Carden, a half-pay officer who had served with the 60th Foot. Governor Carleton and Brigadier-General Richard Prescott would remain behind with most of the city’s garrison. These stood ready to march to the city’s docks in case Campbell was defeated. Meanwhile, some other prominent officials (including Guy Johnson and Daniel Claus of the Indian Department) and the wives and children of the officers and soldiers embarked on boats in the city harbor. [7]

In the early afternoon, the British force filed out the eastern end of the city. A detachment of the 26th Foot led the advance, and the citizenry followed. Carleton noted sardonically that as the men marched forth, some of the English citizens (many of whom had ties to New England) “turned off the contrary way” while the rest “followed the Troops very gallantly, & hurried them forward without further command & without much Order.” [8]

The British force consisted of:

• 34 British regulars of the 26th Regiment, commanded by Captain John Crawford. [9]
• Between 20 and 32 officers and men attached to the Indian Department. [10]
• 6 or 8 Native Americans. [11]
• Between 30 and 80 English citizens of Montreal. [12]
• Between 120 and 300 Canadians citizens of Montreal. [13]

Allen’s men were deployed behind houses and trees near the St. Lawrence. Watching the British column advance, he dispatched one Richard Young with 9 men to protect his left flank and to annoy the right flank of the enemy. These men took post behind a creek embankment between the road and the St. Lawrence. Allen’s men were so well hidden that the British discovered them only when the British regulars came under fire. [14]

According to an account in the Quebec Gazette, Major Carden “was one of the first in the field” “tho’ extremely corpulent” “and unfortunately received a wound of which he expired in 8 hours after.” While Carden lay bleeding, the citizens began to come up. Alexander Paterson, a prominent merchant, had a ball pass through his body “as he boldly advanced towards the rebels.” “Then the general fire began on both sides and continued about fifteen minute.” The regulars delivered “a constant and steady platoon fire” “who were within sixty yards of [the rebels], covered by the gable end of a house.” Allen recalled that the British and Canadians “began to attack from wood-piles, ditches, buildings, and such like places, at a considerable distance, and I returned the fire from a situation more than equally advantageous.” Allen’s men blasted away, but they “were not the best of marksmen,” and he would later lament that “it is rare, that so much ammunition was expended, and so little execution done by it.” Fortunately, the opposing fire was little more effective as they could not see more than 2 or 3 of Allen’s men at a time. [15]

While this firefight erupted in front of Allen’s position, a flank attack was made by Indian department officers, Indians, and Canadian volunteers. Allen ordered Jeremiah Dugan to take 50 of the Canadians and take post in a ditch on his right. However, Dugan’s men quickly fled in the face of overwhelming numbers. At about the same time, Young’s party on Allen’s left flank gave way for the same reason.

The Longue-Pointe Battlefield. For information on the possible site of the battlefield (and the construction of this map), click here.

According to Allen:

“At this time I had but about forty five men with me; some of whom were wounded; the enemy kept closing round me, nor was it in my power to prevent it; by which means, my situation, which was advantageous in the first part of the attack, ceased to be so in the last; and being almost entirely surrounded with such vast, unequal numbers, I ordered a retreat, but found that those of the enemy, who were of the country, and their Indians, could run as fast as my men, though the regulars could not. Thus I retreated near a mile, and some of the enemy, with the savages, kept flanking me, and others crowded hard in the rear. In fine, I expected, in a very short time, to try the world of spirits; for I was apprehensive that no quarter would be given to me, and therefore had determined to sell my life as dear as I could. One of the enemy's officers [one Johnson, an officer in the Indian Department], boldly pressing in the rear, discharged his fusee at me; the ball whistled near me, as did many others that day. I returned the salute, and missed him, as running had put us both out of breath; for I conclude we were not frightened: I then saluted him with my tongue in a harsh manner, and told him that, inasmuch as his numbers were so far superior to mine, I would surrender provided I could be treated with honor, and be assured of good quarter for myself and the men who were with me; and he answered I should; another officer [possibly Walter Butler], coming up directly after, confirmed the treaty; upon which I agreed to surrender with my party… I ordered them to ground their arms, which they did.” [16]

Allen recalled that one of his wounded, William Stewart, was struck by an Indian with a tomahawk after he had surrendered.

An Indian tried to kill Allen as well. Allen grabbed onto Johnson and, he claimed, “I twitched the officer, to whom I gave my sword, between me and the savage; but he flew round with great fury, trying to single me out to shoot me without killing the officer; but by this time I was nearly as nimble as he, keeping the officer in such a position that his danger was my defence; but, in less than half a minute, I was attacked by just such another imp of hell: Then I made the officer fly around with incredible velocity, for a few seconds of time, when I perceived a Canadian, who had lost one eye, as appeared afterwards, taking my part against the savages; and in an instant an Irishman came to my assistance with a fixed bayonet, and drove away the fiends, swearing by Jasus he would kill them.”

Allen was then brought before the British officers, who said they were happy to see him. “I answered them, that I should rather choose to have seen them at General Montgomery's camp.” [17]

The British captured Ethan Allen, 17 other Americans, and 16 Canadians. Ten of the prisoners were wounded (2 mortally, 8 slightly). Allen also lost 5 men killed. The rest escaped. [18]
On the British side, three were mortally wounded (Major Carden, Alexander Patterson, and a soldier in the 26th). One Sieur Beaubassin “had his eyebrow carried away by a glancing shot,” and it was said that one volunteer was shot in the thigh and another lost an eye. [19]

Allen was escorted back to town by a British officer, and Sieur Beaubassin, who was “very merry and facetious” despite his brush with death. The British officers were considerably less amused and Brigadier-General Richard Prescott threatened to bayonet Allen and the other prisoners. Instead, Allen was put in irons on a British vessel, and his men were placed in prison. Carleton ordered Allen to be brought to England for trial as a traitor. [20]

The Battle of Longue-Pointe. This is a crude, and not-to-scale, representation of the battlefield. Allen's men are in the building or behind trees on the left; the British force is on the right. The British force, consisting of regulars, Indian Department officers, Native Americans, and English and Canadian civilians (shown here at a 1:20 figure:combatant ratio), also had the protection of some buildings (not shown).

Notes:

1. These numbers are from Allen’s memoir. British sources tended to credit him with somewhat more men; American sources with somewhat fewer men.

2. Carleton to Legge. Carleton’s description of the battle, as well as that of some others, can be found in this previous post.

3. Allen’s meeting with Brown was described in an earlier post. It is unclear of what to make of Allen’s statement: Did Brown encounter some unexpected difficulty in crossing the St. Lawrence? Was there a miscommunication between the two men? Did Allen willfully misconstrue events? One thing that is clear is that Allen was not alone in contemplating an attack on Montreal. Consider the following intriguing snippet appearing in a letter from Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery to Colonel Timothy Bedel, written on the day of the battle (but before news of Allen’s attack and defeat were received):

“I have just received yours by Mr. [James] Livingston. I approve exceedingly of your plan, if it can be done without risk of weakening your present post [he was encamped northwest of Fort Saint-Jean; see here], which might facilitate the escape of the garrison. If you go to Montreal, pay the utmost attention to good order.”

4. See Allen’s memoir. Sanguinet gave his name as Deshotel.

5. October 5, 1775, issue.

6. Carleton to Legge.

7. Sanguinet is the sole source on these details, but in light of the telling omissions in the British side of the story, his description of events seems correct. Carleton and Johnson both wrote about the battle afterwards, but neither they, nor other British sources, indicated why a number of senior officers did not participate in the battle. Sanguinet claimed that 80 British regulars remained in the city, while only 30 fought in the battle. His claim is supported by evidence that the British garrison consisted of about 110 rank and file (see here and here). Carleton’s intention was to abandon Montreal if necessary (as evidenced by his actions in November, 1775) and preserve the town of Quebec at all costs. It was believed that if the town of Quebec fell to the Americans, all of upper Canada (including Montreal) would inevitably fall, too.

8. Carleton to Legge

9. Carleton to Legge; “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter of September 28, 1775; Sanguinet

10. “Nauticus”; Johnson to Legge

11. “Nauticus”; Johnson to Legge; Carleton to Legge

12. Sanguinet provided the low estimate; the high estimate was reported by “Nauticus” and the author of the anonymous letter dated September 28, 1775

13. “Nauticus” and the anonymous letter of September 28, 1775 provided the low estimate, Sanguinet the high estimate.

14. Allen’s memoir; “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter of September 28, 1775; Sanguinet

15. Allen’s memoir; “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter of September 28, 1775

16. Allen’s memoir; that a Johnson was the first officer is indicated by Johnson to Legge and “Nauticus”. That Walter Butler was the second officer is suggested by “Nauticus” and this biography of Walter Butler.

17. Allen’s memoir

18. “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter dated September 28, 1775; Livingston to Montgomery; Carleton to Legge; Sanguinet

Allen’s memoir and the account by “Nauticus” imply that the Americans surrendered as one group, and the Canadians were captured either singly, or in one or more groups, elsewhere in the area.

19. “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter dated September 28, 1775; Carleton to Legge; Allen’s memoir

20. See Allen’s memoir for a vivid description of his capture, near killing, and imprisonment.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (3)

This is the third and final post devoted to a skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean in southern Canada that took place on September 18, 1775. For the events immediately preceding this skirmish, click here. For transcriptions of journal entries recorded by the participants, click here.

On September 17, 1775, the Americans advanced on Fort Saint-Jean, in southern Canada, for the third time. Unlike the earlier attempts (September 6 and September 10), this time the British offered no outward resistance. The Americans took up positions to the south and northwest of the fort, which placed the garrison in a state of siege. Early on September 18th, the British garrison learned of its predicament. Lieutenant William Duff of the 7th Foot was dispatched with about 30 Canadian volunteers to round up cattle from farms north of the fort and to scout out the American position to the northwest. Also, Guillaume de Lorimier, with a few Indians, was sent to scout out the American position to the south.

When Duff returned to the fort, he reported that the American force to the northwest was small, and the fortification it had erected was crude. Major Preston then dispatched Captain John Stronge with around 100 men of the 7th and 26th regiments, with nearly as many Canadian volunteers, and a field piece to drive away the Americans. The force they attacked was much smaller: about 50 Americans and 34 Canadians under the command of Major John Brown.

Brown’s men fired as the British approached, killing Sieur Beaubien dit Desauniers of the Canadians and wounding Corporal Knowles and Private Kelly of the 7th. The British, for their part, fired and charged. This fire possibly wounded several of Brown’s men, who quickly fled into the woods. [1]

British infantry and Canadian volunteers capture a breastwork near Fort Saint-Jean.

Canadian Antoine Dupré was the first man to climb into the breastwork; there he captured a couple of men, including Moses Hazen, a retired British officer and a prominent local landowner.

Hazen had been Brown's prisoner; he was captured the day before while traveling to his fields. However, the British suspected the worst of him and kept him as their own prisoner. The suspicion was deserved. Hazen had secretly contacted the Americans on September 6. On September 11, the British gave him a captain’s commission and orders to raise a company of militia. He did neither.

The British sortie against Brown’s command surprised the American leadership. Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery had intended Brown’s position to remain secret until he could move 500 men into position to support him. However, Brown was defeated before the American movement began. As soon as the sound of musket fire boomed across the flat woodland, Montgomery raced to get his forces into motion.

On the river, the Schuyler and Hancock rowed towards the fort and opened fire with their 12-pounders. This fire reportedly struck a bateau and the British schooner, the Royal Savage, but apparently did no other harm. The British responded with shell fire, but they, too, were unable to inflict casualties.

On land, Colonel Timothy Bedel led around 500 men from Bedel’s Rangers (his regiment), the 4th Connecticut, and the Green Mountain Boys, on a circuitous march through the wet woodland north and west of Saint-Jean. En route, Bedel received conflicting advice: a Canadian guide wanted to take Bedel directly to the site of the earlier skirmish, while a Huron guide wanted to take Bedel further to the east, so as to cut off the British detachment from the fort. Bedel, not understanding the Indian’s intention, and fearing treachery, took the Canadian’s advice.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). The British attack is shown in red. The advance of the American relief force is shown in blue.

The Americans advanced noisily through the woods, and the British opened fire the moment they came into view. According to Lieutenant John Fassett of Vermont, “They gave us a hot fire. The grape shot and Musket balls flew very thick…”

Bedel's Column Forms for Battle.

Benjamin Trumbull (who at the time was in the main American camp), claimed that the British fire wounded two Americans (including a Captain John Watson of the 4th Connecticut), and that a piece of grape shot accidentally killed one Briton (that would be, based on other evidence, Private Alexander Ross of the 26th). Before the Americans could deploy, the British scrambled for the safety of their fort. Bedel then occupied the breastwork Brown had built.

Once again, Fort Saint-Jean was in a state of siege.

Note:

1. See this letter from Major Israel Morey to the New-Hampshire Committee of Safety.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (1)

The first two American movements against Fort Saint-Jean ended in disappointment (cf. here and here. On the third attempt, however, the Americans were able to cut the roads leading to the fort, placing the garrison in a state of siege. This attempt, like those that preceded it, produced a sharp skirmish between the two opponents.

The Americans advanced close to the Fort Saint-Jean on September 17, 1775. That same day, a small force of Canadians and Americans, led by Major John Brown of Massachusetts, skirted Fort Saint-Jean, and cut the roads to the fort. These men first took down the bridge over Rivière Saint-Jean, and then built a crude fortification from the bridge pieces. Brown's men also captured a supply train that was headed to the fort.

On September 18, the British in Fort Saint-Jean learned of Brown’s presence, and drove him from his post. However, a second American force then appeared, led by Colonel Timothy Bedel. This force compelled the British to retreat and reestablished the siege of Saint-Jean. A map of these movements appears below.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). The British attack is shown in red. The advance of the American relief force is shown in blue.

In this post I share how the events of this day were described in the journals of 7 different men that were present at Fort Saint-Jean (5 Americans, 1 Briton, and 1 Canadian). A more detailed description of the skirmish will appear in a future post.

Journal Entries

John André was a lieutenant in the 7th Regiment of Foot. He is thought to have been the author of a journal kept by a British officer during the siege of Fort Saint-Jean. The following extract from that journal describes the events of September 18.

“18th—This morning we were inform’d that the rebels intended to take Post about 2 miles lower than St John’s, at a Rivulet near which we had had a redoubt ‘till within a fortnight, when the Enemy made their first Appearance at the Isle aux Noix. Lieutt Duff with 30 Men was sent for intelligence, with order to bring in the cattle belonging to the neighbouring farms. At his return he reported that there appear’d to him to be about 200 Men on the other Side of the rivulet entrench’d with the logs of a Bridge which they had broken. Captn Strong was then sent with a detachment of 100 Men, an Officer of Artillery with a field piece and the Volunteers. The Rebels on their Appearing fir’d a few Shot and ran off into the wood.

“Our people took two wounded prisoners, and lost one man. (Monsr Beaubien a Volunteer.) We had two or three wounded.

“After this little Skirmish whilst the breastwork was destroying more Ammunition was sent for from the Fort which an Officer and 20 Men brought up. The Bridge was scarce repair’d when some noise was heard an Indian who appear’d at the Edge of the wood was seiz’d by two or three who were with us. A good many Shot were fir’d from behind the Trees and Bushes upon our returning the fire very briskly nothing more was heard of the Enemy. A Soldier of the 26th Regiment was kill’d in this last fray.

“Captn Dundee, on the second firing being heard at the Fort, was order’d out with a reinforcement of 40 Men and met the first detachmt on their return to the Fort.

“During this time, the Enemys Gondola’s had been insulting the redouts with a few Shot which had no Effect.

“The Indian who was taken was buffeted by our Indians and sent back. Mr Hazen and Mr Tucker who were found with the Rebels (tho’ indeed without Arms) were kept prisoners in the Forts. In this Affair, as there have since been throughout the Campaign in Canada There were Englishmen fighting Englishmen, French against French, and Indians of the same Tribe against each other.

“Both the last night and this the Rebels were heard at work entrenchg themselves.—”

Aaron Barlow was a sergeant in the 5th Connecticut Regiment. He was south of the fort (in the American main camp) at the time of the skirmish. The "Shambalee" (or Chambly) party refers to John Brown's men.

“They cut a road toward the Fort in order to draw their cannon. The Shambalee party took this day 12 waggon loads of Provision, Rum, Wine, & Ammunition, from the Regulars and received no damage from them. Towards night the Regulars came out upon the Shambalee party. They wounded 3 of our men and took 2 prisoners. Our men took some provisions and drove them to the Fort.”

John Fassett was a lieutenant in the Green Mountain Boys. The Green Mountain Boys was one of three regiments in Bedel's relief force.

“18 Sept. In the morning our army fired their cannon and they fired from the fort. There was a hot fire from both sides sometime, but in the midst of it Col. Warner’s Regiment was ordered to march about three miles thro’ the wood around St. Johns. We had to travel knee deep in water expecting every minute to meet with the enemy. We at length came very near to Major Brown’s encampment, where the Regulars were. They gave us a hot fire. The grape shot and Musket balls flew very thick, but our pilots, not knowing the ground, we had not an equal chance for they all fled to St. Johns. They wounded Capt. Watson, but killed none of our men. We took the ground and staid there all night and had a very tedious night with our feet wet and cold, no houses nor tents to lie in.”

Foucher was an officer serving with the pro-British Canadian Volunteers. Although the Canadian volunteers participated in this engagement, Foucher, who was ill, did not. The following extract is a translation of the original French.

“Sept. 18th.—The Bostonians arrived at St. Johns in two sloops and barges, numbering about one thousand men. Major Preston, who commanded this fort, sent on the same day about thirty men of the Canadian troops to bring in the cattle which was in the bush near St. Johns. Soon after he was informed by a Canadian that there were two or three hundred Bostonians on the other side of a bridge about half a league from St. Johns, who were raising fortifications and who had taken four cart loads of provisions which were on their way to St. Johns, and also the cattle he had sent for; and that the bridge was already demolished, so that communication between St. Johns and La Prairie de la Magdeleine was cut off by the enemy. Immediately Major Preston ordered out one hundred men under command of Captain Strong, together with one hundred Canadian volunteers and a piece of artillery to feel the enemy. This detachment advanced and the Bostonians fired upon them. The fire was brisk on both sides and lasted about half an hour. The enemy left the battle field and was pursued for some distance. The Srs. Moses Hazen and Toker, and also Hazen's servant, who were within the enemy's line, were made prisoners and brought to the fort. Beaubien Desauniers, a Canadian volunteer, and a soldier of the 26th regiment were shot; another soldier was dangerously wounded. During this action the artillery of the fort and of the gun boat, continued to fire for three hours; the enemy kept up the fire in return; but the above mentioned were the only casualties on our side.”

Rudolphus Ritzema was lieutenant-colonel of the 1st New York Regiment. He was south of the fort (in the American main camp) at the time of the skirmish. The following journal entry spans the events of September 17th and 18th.

“The whole Army amounting to about 1500 Men under General Montgomery [General Schuyler from his ill state of Health being gone to Ticonderoga] embarked again for St Johns—About Noon we landed at the Breast Work nearest the Enemy. The General detached Col Bedel with his Corps to occupy the Road, leading from St Johns to Chamblee, in order to cut off the Enemy’s Communication with the Country, which they effectually accomplished.”

Benjamin Trumbull was a chaplain in the 5th Connecticut Regiment. He was south of the fort (in the American main camp) at the time of the skirmish.

“Monday Morning September, 18th Major Brown who had been previously sent of from the Isle Aux Noix into Canada, and on the 17 had taken 4 Hogsheads of Rum and several Carriages and some clothing from the Enemy was attacked by them above the forts. The Fire was heard in the Camp South of the Forts. On this 500 men under the Command of Colonel Bedel who had orders to Pass the Forts and cut of the Communication between them and the adjacent Country were hastened off immediately to assist major Brown and his Party w[h]o at the Time of the Action did not exceed 50, men of the Provincials, joined with 30 or 40 Canadians. His Party consisted originally of towards 100 men, but one half of them were placed as Guards at Chambly and the adjacent Country. The General marched at the Head of the Detachment of 500 men and passed the Forts. The Regulars who came out with several Field Pieces and 3 or 400 men drove Major Browns Party from their Breast Work and took the Ground on the Appearance of Colonel Beadles Party the Regulars Fire their Field Pieces and discharged a few vollies of small Arms and retreated, almost before our men had marched into open view so as to fire on them with any Advantage.

“No man was lost on the Side of the Provincials. Capt. Watson was badly wounded and afterwards taken up by our men another was wounded and taken. This was all the loss we sustained. The Regulars lost one or two. One was killed with a Cannon ball Shot from their own Canon. Our People took and ever after maintained their Ground.

“The Rest of the Army Advanced to the lower Breast Work and began to clear a Place for an Encampment. Encamped and cast up a Breastwork.”

Bayze Wells was a sergeant in the 4th Connecticut Regiment. The 4th Connecticut was one of three regiments in Bedel's relief force. Wells, (like many of the men in the Connecticut regiments) was sick at the time of the engagement. He did not participate in the action.

“18th three Regiments Col Hinmans With the Rest about 300 of them Ware ordred to march Round St Jo we travild Round St Johns we ware beset by A Party which Give us A warm fire but I was unwell I Did not Get So Near as to See any Enemy I was Abligd to Get my Pack Carried to A house that Day St Johns was Besedged I being So unwell that I Got to mr minneeres with Cpt Watson that was badly wounded...”