Mapping Pell's Point

Several weeks ago, one of the folks on RevList, expressed an interest to me in seeing Revolutionary War-era maps of the New York campaign combined with modern satellite imagery. I recently came up with a way to do this using nothing more sophisticated than Microsoft Excel and MS Paint. The results appear below.

The Revolutionary War map used for this comparison is from a circa 1776 Charles Blaskowitz map that shows the movements of the British army from Throg’s Neck, to the roads leading to White Plains. Below is a segment of his map showing the place where the battle of Pell’s Point was fought.

Below are a series of images that show the area today either alone or in combination with part of the Blaskowitz map. The modern maps and the Blaskowitz map don’t align perfectly, but on the whole the comparison shows that the Blaskowitz map was executed skillfully and that it does providea good guide as to the appearance of the area in 1776.

In the part of the Blaskowitz map shown below, the British can be seen landing at Pell's Point on the bottom of the map and marching inland along a road leading north (towards the top). The skirmish site is at upper right.

A note to readers: Most of the people who visit this blog use Microsoft Explorer as their web browser. My recommendation is to use Google Chrome – when you click on one image, it will bring up a slideshow of full-sized versions of all of the images in a given post. It’s a pretty cool effect. Please note, however, that if you have a slow connection, the images in the slideshow may not instantly load.

Below is a copy of the map I used in my first blog post on Pell's Point. This roughly shows where the British and American units were in relation to the modern terrain during the main phase of the fighting. The red lines correspond with roads present at the time of the battle.

Three American units are represented by blue circles. They are: 1 = Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment, 2 = William Shepard’s 3rd Continental Regiment, and 3 = Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. These units were commanded by Colonel John Glover.

Two British units are represented by white circles with red letters. They are 1 = the British light infantry, and 2 = the British grenadiers. Some British and Hessian units that were in the vicinity at the time are not marked on the map for lack of clear guidance from the source material. For example, the 1st Jager Company and possibly Colonel Carl von Donop’s brigade of Hessian grenadiers were somewhere in the wooded area between #1 and #2 (cf. the accounts by Archibald Robertson and Carl Leopold Baurmeister [list]).

October 18, 1776 (Part 1)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for the morning of October 18th: The British army crossed to Pell’s Point, but were met by Glover’s brigade; Washington’s divisions scrambled to turn back the British advance.

Previous entry: October 17th; next: Afternoon of October 18th.

For a second straight day, the British vanguard marched at 1AM. This time the weather cooperated, and the troops boarded flatboats and crossed from Throg’s Neck to Pell’s Point. As the British ships approached shore, they were fired on by some American sentries [see footnote]. Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton, who commanded the vanguard, recalled, “They… began to fire a few shot. But, as I was certain they could not be in any great force, I ordered the debarkation to proceed”.

The sentries quickly withdrew, and the British began to assemble on the shore. According to Clinton, “The moment the whole avant garde was ashore I… detached Lord Cornwallis with the grenadiers, light infantry, and [jaegers]… to our right”.

Meanwhile, Colonel John Glover was hurrying forward with his brigade of Massachusetts Continentals to contest the British advance. Glover wrote that:

“[The British had] stole a march [of] one and a half miles on us. I marched down to oppose their landing with about seven hundred and fifty men, and three field-pieces, but had not gone more than half the distance before I met their advanced guard, about thirty men; upon which I detached a captain's guard of forty men to meet them, while I could dispose of the main body to advantage.”

Glover’s advanced troops were able to surprise the head of the British column.

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) recalled:

“I was ordered to join the light infantry and grenadiers under Lieutenant General Clinton… I was ordered by the General to the top of a rising ground in front with the advance guard of the light infantry to reconnoitre, but we were immediately fired upon from behind trees and heaps of stones where the rebels lay concealed”.

Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company of the 10th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion) was also with the leading troops. He recorded, “we received a very heavy fire, as we marched up a hill, from behind stone walls, pickets etc. by which I had 1 sergeant killed, another, with a private man wounded.”

Glover wrote that the advanced troops “kept the ground till we exchanged five rounds” with the British. Soon, however, they were forced to withdraw. The advanced troops had lost “two men killed and several wounded,” and the British aggressively pressed ahead:

“Their body being much larger than mine… [and] the enemy pushing forward not more than thirty yards distant, I ordered a retreat, which was masterly well done by the captain that commanded the party. The enemy gave a shout and advanced”.

However, as the British light infantry advanced, they ran into Colonel Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment. These men, Glover wrote, were “laying under cover of a stone wall undiscovered till they [the British] came within thirty yards, then rose up and gave them the whole charge [i.e., a volley]; the enemy broke, and retreated for the main body to come up.”

According to Archibald Robertson, “we halted until General Howe came up. The Rebels appeared drawn up in our front behind all the fences and high stone walls.”

One of the clearest indicators of the site of the battle of Pell’s Point is a map prepared by Charles Blaskowitz documenting the movements of the British army in Westchester County. Below is an excerpt of his map (click to enlarge) that shows the British landing on Pell’s Poin.

Note the road network on Pell’s Point: there is a road that goes inland, goes through a marsh, and on the far side of the marsh forms a “V” with one branch going north, and the other brance going east. Blaskowitz indicated that the battle was fought on the road leading to the north.

A comparison with later maps helps make it possible to determine the site of the main phase of the fighting (see especially Part 2). The first row in the image below (click to enlarge) shows a series of maps that illustrate how the road system at Pell’s Point changed over time.

The first map dates to the Revolutionary War. On this map the “V” pattern is quite distinct; the road connecting the V with the shore is also visible, but it is quite short in length. The second map dates to the early 19th Century and the third map dates to the late 19th Century. Both of these maps show the V present in the Blaskowitz map, with a road leading to the shore. These maps show additional roads as well, indicating that the area was becoming more developed. The fourth map is from the 20th-Century, and on this map the V is no longer visible. Instead, the northern branch, on which the battle was fought, was removed to accommodate a golf course. The eastern branch, however, remains. The fifth map is from a modern satellite image. It shows the same road network present in the fourth map. Larger versions of these maps are available are available through the Library of Congress, the David Rumsey Map Collection, Acme Mapper, and Google Maps.

In the second row is a series of close-up views of the area where the road leading north once was. Based on clues in 18th and 19th Century maps, I sketched in the old road network in red. Based on clues in the Blaskowitz map and participant accounts of the battle, I marked the approximate site of the battle with a blue square. Note that Glover’s men were deployed just shy of the crest of a hill. As described above, the battle began when the British were ascending this hill and came under fire from the men in Glover’s advance party. The British were able to seize the high ground, and Glover’s men were deployed somewhat shy of the crest. Glover noted, “The enemy had the advantage of us, being posted on an eminence which commanded the ground we had to march over.” He also referred, in his account of the battle, to “the ground being much in their favour”.

Glover deployed three of his regiments in a staggered manner to meet the British: the lead regiment was on the left of the road, the other two were on the right. Their relative placement (but not absolute position) is indicated in the map below: Blue 1 = Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment, Blue 2 = William Shepard’s 3rd Continental Regiment, Blue 3 = Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. Red 1 = the route taken by the British light infantry, Red 2 = the route taken by the British grenadiers. The Hessian jaegers (position not marked) likely occupied the woods to the right of the light infantry.

When the British army moved to Pell’s Point, they left behind, at Throg’s Neck, the 2nd and 6th British brigades. These troops made a feint to distract the Americans, by making it appear as if the British army was going to advance overland from Throg’s Neck.

Major-General William Heath scrambled to respond. First he was informed “that the British were opening an embrasure in their work at the end of the causeway [i.e., by Westchester Creek bridge]… [which made it appear that] they intended, under [cover of] a cannonade… to attempt to pass.” Heath instantly ordered a brigade stationed near Valentine’s Hill to hurry towards the bridge. Then, “When the troops had advanced to about half the way… another express met him, informing him that the whole British army were in motion, and seemed to be moving towards the pass at the head of the creek.” Heath ordered the troops to change direction “and march briskly to reinforce the Americans at the pass at the head of the creek.”

General Washington was not deceived by these movements, and he called off Heath’s response. Washington, however, saw a large number of British vessels heading up the East River (a change in wind direction now favored the movement of British ships), and he expressed concern over the possibility that the British might land troops west of Throg’s Neck. Therefore, according to Heath, Washington “ordered him to return immediately, and have his division formed ready for action”.

The other divisions on the New York mainland similarly prepared for a fight. At Mile Square, Major-General Charles Lee positioned his forces (minus Glover’s brigade) to defend the crossings of the Bronx River.

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment; Nixon’s brigade) listened to the sound of British cannon fire at Pell’s Point, while his troops moved into position:

“we heard a heard a heavy firing of cannon after breakfast[.] We were ordered to parade ourselves under arms and marched over to General Lee’s quarters who ordered our regiment to take post on a hill… to prevent the enemy’s crossing the land from east to west”.

To further protect these key crossings, George Washington sent Major-General Joseph Spencer’s division to nearby Valentine’s Hill.

This map shows the distribution of Washington’s army units in Westchester County on October 18, 1776 (click to enlarge). The placement of the units on this map is inexact. North is up at the upper-right corner of the map. A part of the Hudson is at the top of the map, and a part of Long Island Sound is at the bottom.

While Howe’s army landed at Pell’s Point, the 2nd and 6th British brigades conducted a feint on Throg’s Neck. (The 2nd brigade is shown near the head of Westchester Creek; the 6th brigade was in an off-map location near the bridge at extreme lower left). The divisions of William Heath and John Sullivan watched over the British on Throg’s Neck and defended the shoreline between Throg’s Neck and Manhattan (off map, at left). The crossings of the Bronx River are marked by the numbers 1-4. One part of Charles Lee’s division guarded these crossings, while another (John Glover’s brigade) contested the British advance from Pell’s Point. During the day, Joseph Spencer’s division marched from Kingsbridge (upper left) to Valentine’s Hill (upper right).

Footnote: The sentries were probably a detachment of militia. Militia units from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire were placed in various locations along the shore of Long Island Sound and Hudson’s River to watch the movements of the British navy, safeguard caches of supplies, and keep key points out of the hands of the Loyalists. The detachments were not expected to stop a major drive by the British army. New York militiaman Benjamin Bogardus later wrote, “The orders came from [Major] General [Charles] Lee, for all the guard along the shore to draw back and let them [the British] land”.

Hanging Rock (and other) Maps

One of the topics I've enjoyed reading and writing about is Thomas Sumter's 1780 campaign against British forces occupying South Carolina.

When I started researching Sumter's August 6, 1780, battle at Hanging Rock, South Carolina, I quickly noticed that the place that has been officially designated as the Hanging Rock battlefield (some hills on the western bank of Hanging Rock Creek, opposite the eponymous rock formation) was unlikely to have been the actual site of the battle to judge from statements in the source material (as explained here and here). I took this as carte blanche to determine where, in this area, the actual fighting took place. Eventually, I concluded that the battle most likely took place over a stretch of ground ranging from a plateau south of Hanging Rock Creek to a hill the northeast (as explained here).

I didn't regard this attribution as definitive because I didn't have access to all sources of information (noted here). And indeed, this year I've come across electronic copies of three old maps of the Hanging Rock battlefield that I wish I had earlier.

One map is attributed to Richard Winn, who was a participant in the battle of Hanging Rock. It can be found here.

The other two appear are in the Draper map collection, and were rendered in the late 19th Century (based, I believe, on local lore). They can be found here and here. (On the first link, north is at right; on the second, north is at top;

The maps partially confirm, and partially disconfirm, my interpretation of the Hanging Rock battlefield site.

All three maps appear to show that I was right about the placement of the main British camp on a plateau south of the creek.

All three maps appear to show that I was wrong about the hill on which British Loyalists were encamped. I concluded the hill was northeast of the main camp; these maps show the Loyalists on a hill northwest of the main camp.

I use the term "appear" because it's unclear how much confidence should be placed in these maps. The Draper maps are of a very late date, and the Winn map is wrong in at least one respect: it appears to show Hanging Rock Creek flowing west into the Catawba River, when it actually flows east into the Lynche's Creek.

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This map is from one of last year's posts on Hanging Rock. The three red squares show places that I suspected to be part of the British encampment. #1 is Hanging Rock, #2 approximately corresponds with the Loyalist camp according to the Winn and Draper maps, #3 and #4 is a flat plateau bisected by the Camden Road; the Draper maps show the main British camp in this area.

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The online Winn and Draper maps also provide insight into two of Sumter's later engagements. See the links listed below.

Battle of Fishdam Ford (November 9, 1780)

• Winn
• Draper

Battle of Blackstock's Plantation (November 20, 1780)

• Winn
• Draper (1)
• Draper (2)

For more on the Draper Manuscripts, see here and here

The “Separate Battle” at Guilford Courthouse

The British army at Guilford Courthouse deployed for battle in a well-ordered formation. However, this order did not last very long. As the British routed the first American line, and drove into a forest to attack the second, the British regiments became scattered and disorganized. Two British units drifted so far to the right of the others that they fought what has been called a “separate battle” at Guilford Courthouse.

The two British units in the separate battle were Regiment von Bose and the 1st battalion of Guards. These two unit fought two American formations: Henry Lee’s flank corps and the “Rockbridge Rifles” [1].

The source material does not allow one to trace the exact movements of the units in this fight, but some generalities can be stated with confidence.

One of the most helpful accounts for understanding the course of the separate battle was composed by Charles Stedman, a British staff officer who wrote one of the first military histories of the Revolutionary War [2].

According to Stedman, the advancing 1st Guards found themselves facing, alone, a withering fire from a hilltop. The Guards eventually seized this position, but only to find that “another line of the Americans presented itself to view, extending far beyond the right of the guards, and inclining towards their flank, so as almost to encompass them.” The fire from in front and from the right “completed its confusion and disorder” until the battalion “was at last entirely broken.”

Stedman went on to relate that the Guards were saved by “the fortunate arrival of the regiment of Bose” which “was advancing in firm and compact order on the left of the guards...” The Hessians then wheeled to their right and attacked the Americans while the Guards rallied. The two units then made a unified drive against the Americans.

The "separate battle" at Guilford Courthouse according to Stedman (click to enlarge). The image has been cropped and red arrows drawn onto the map to clearly show the path taken by the 1st Guards and Regiment von Bose (these are indicated by faint dashed lines on the original map).

The Stedman map shows the separate battle to have been centered on a prominent hill south and west of the American third line. This hill will also be included in the Guilford Courthouse diorama I am preparing. The figure below depicts the area I am modeling (at left: the roads, fields, and topographic features that will be modeled; at right: a modern topographic map of the same area).

Below I show how the movements depicted on the Stedman map correspond with my project map. The four panels in this map represent, from left to right, four successive stages in the separate battle (note that the final phases of the separate battle are not shown). The following units are represented by numbers: 1) 1st Guards, 2) Regiment von Bose, 3) Lee’s flank corps. In the first panel, Regiment von Bose attacks the American first line, and the 1st Guards is brought up from reserve to extend the British line. In the second panel, the 1st Guards approaches a hill defended by Lee’s men. In the third panel, the 1st Guards takes the hilltop, but is driven back in disorder. In the fourth panel, Regiment von Bose wheels to the right and attacks the Americans while the 1st Guards rally.

(click to enlarge)

Although the 1st Guards and Regiment von Bose had taken a key position, the separate battle was far from over. According to Stedman:

No sooner had the guards and Hessians defeated the enemy in front, than they found it necessary to return and attack another body of them [Americans] that appeared in the rear; and in this manner were they obliged to traverse the same ground in various directions, before the enemy were completely put to the rout.

The separate battle finally ended when Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton arrived with part of the British cavalry. These troops scattered “a few hardy rifle-men” who had remained behind to harry the British.

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Another valuable source on the separate battle is the journal of Samuel Houston of the Rockbridge Rifles. The Rockbridge Rifles was positioned on the extreme left of the American second line (in Brigadier-General Edward Stevens' brigade). Houston wrote that:

...the enemy appeared to us; we fired on their flank, and that brought down many of them; at which time Capt. Tedford was killed. We pursued them about forty poles [i.e., 660 feet], to the top of a hill, where they stood, and we retreated from them back to where we formed. Here we repulsed them again; and they a second time made us retreat back to our first ground, where we were deceived by a reinforcement of Hessians, whom we took for our own, and cried to them to see if they were our friends, and shouted Liberty! Liberty! and advanced up till they let off some guns; then we fired sharply on them, and made them retreat a little. [3]

Presumably, the “the enemy [who] appeared to us” were men of the 1st Guards, and the “Hessians” were men of Regiment von Bose.

There are two basic ways of reconciling Houston’s account with Stedman’s. One way is to assume that the events described by Houston correspond with the first set of events described by Stedman (the attack of the 1st Guards up a hill, their retreat, and subsequent relief by Regiment von Bose). The other way is to assume that the events described by Houston correspond with the second set of events described by Stedman (the appearance of an American force in the rear of the British and the subsequent round of back-and-forth combat in the woods).

As described below, neither method of reconciling the accounts is wholly satisfactory, leaving as an open question what exactly took place during the separate battle.

First, consider the possibility that the combat described by Houston took place earlier rather than later. In this case, the initial sequence of events in the separate battle might look something like this (click to enlarge):

The four panels in this map represent, from left to right, four successive stages in the separate battle (note that the final phases of the separate battle are not shown). The following units are represented by numbers: 1) 1st Guards, 2) Regiment von Bose, 3) Lee’s flank corps, 4) Rockbridge Rifles. In the first panel, Regiment von Bose attacks the American first line, and the 1st Guards is brought up from reserve to extend the British line. In the second panel, the 1st Guards attacks a hill defended by Lee’s men. The Rockbridge Rifles spy the flank of the Guards and attack it. In the third panel, fighting rages back and forth between the 1st Guards and the Rockbridge Rifles. At last, the 1st Guards is saved by the advance of Regiment von Bose. In the fourth panel, Regiment von Bose wheels to the right and attacks the Americans and the 1st Guards rally and renew the attack.

A difficulty in combining the accounts in this way is that some statements by Stedman and Houston appear to contradict.

• Stedman’s account indicates that the Guards were attacked on their right flank; Houston’s account suggests that the Guards were attacked on their left flank.
• Stedman’s account suggests that the Guards advanced on a relatively straight line, interrupted by one brief retreat. Houston’s account indicates that the fighting raged back and forth over a wide area.
• Stedman’s account suggests that the Guards were forced to retreat from a hill; Houston’s account indicates that the Guards were forced to retreat to a hill.

I tried to finesse these differences in the above figure, but the interpretation is not without problems. For example, the above figure makes it appear that Regiment von Bose was very slow in reaching the separate battle. This seems implausible in light of comments made by the British army commander, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, in his after action report:

the Hessian regiment of Bose deserves my widest praises for its discipline, alacrity, and courage, and does honor to Major Du Buy, who commands it, and who is an officer of superior merit. [4]

Why would Cornwallis have praised the regiment’s “alacrity” if it was slow to advance?

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An alternative way of combining the accounts by Stedman and Houston is to assume that the combat described by Houston occurred relatively late in the battle (when the British discovered an American force to their rear). In this case, the initial sequence of events in the separate battle might look something like the figure below (click to enlarge).

The eight panels in this map represent, from upper left to lower right, eight successive stages in the separate battle (note that the final phases of the separate battle are not shown). The following units are represented by numbers: 1) 1st Guards, 2) Regiment von Bose, 3) Lee’s flank corps, 4) Rockbridge Rifles. In the first panel, Regiment von Bose attacks the American first line, and the 1st Guards is brought up from reserve to extend the British line. In the second panel, the 1st Guards approaches a hill defended by Lee’s men. In the third panel, the 1st Guards reach the top of the hill, only to be forced to retreat when the Americans attack their right flank. The Guards are given time to rally by the arrival of Regiment von Bose. In the fourth panel, Regiment von Bose wheels to the right and attacks the Americans. In the fifth panel, the 1st Guards renews the attack. In the sixth panel, the 1st Guards and Regiment von Bose are forced to fight off party of Americans in their rear. In the seventh panel, the 1st Guards run into a deadly fire from the Rockbridge Rifles while pursuing one group of Americans. Meanwhile, Regiment von Bose continues to fight off small parties of Americans. In the eighth panel, back and forth fighting has begun between the 1st Guards and the Rockbridge Rifles. Panels 7 and 8 correspond with the beginning of the quoted passage in Houston’s journal.

A ninth panel, were it included, would show part of Regiment von Bose advancing on the Rockbridge Rifles, as per Houston’s account. Note that in the first interpretation, the Hessians advanced on the Rifles from the west, while in this case the Hessians advanced on the Rifles from the east. I think the change in direction is a strong point of the second interpretation. It’s more plausible that the Rockbridge Rifles would have been deceived by a body of men advancing from the east – the direction from which reinforcements might be expected – than from the west – the direction from which the British originally attacked.

One cause for skepticism about this interpretation is that it is terribly complicated. Also problematic is that there is not a lot of evidence to support the fine points depicted in the figure above.

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I'm not sure how I will handle the details of the separate battle when I begin representing the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature later this month. Feel free to leave a comment as to how you would interpret the source material.

Notes:

1. Lee’s flank corps consisted of Lee’s Legion, some militia dragoons, and a corps riflemen. After the battle started, they were joined by some diehards among the North Carolina militia. The Rockbridge Rifles was a regiment of Virginia militia on the extreme left of the American second line. (See The Americans at Guilford Courthouse).

2. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2. Note that Stedman is believed to have been at the battle of Guilford Courthouse, but it has not been established that he was an eyewitness to the separate battle. In any event, his account was probably composed years after the battle.

3. William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia...

4. A copy of Cornwallis' report can be found in this useful compendium of primary sources.

More on White Plains

The battle of White Plains marked Britain’s last opportunity to destroy George Washington’s American army during the New York campaign of 1776. The battle was a British victory, but not a crushing blow to the fledgling American republic.

White Plains is also one of the least discussed of Washington’s battles and a subject that has attracted my particular interest. Earlier this month I posted a draft map of the battlefield. Since then I’ve been able to make some improvements to the map. Below I present the revised map, and describe how it was constructed.

Here is the revised version of the map (click to enlarge). Once again, British and American positions are not shown. To envision where they were, imagine a diagonal line running from the lower left corner to the upper right. During the main phase of the fighting, the Americans would have been on the upper left side of the line (especially on Chatterton’s Hill), and the British would have been on the lower right side of the line.

One important change from the previous map is that I expanded the map to the west. Three Hessian regiments – Regiments Lieb, Knyphausen, and Rall – deployed in the lower left corner of the map early in the battle in the area between the Dobb’s Ferry Road and the Bronx River (cf. Baurmeister’s and Ewald’s accounts of the battle [1]), and I wanted to make sure that I included this area.

Another change is that I added a minor road and a creek to the upper right corner of the map. Details about the road appear below. The creek generally does not show up on early maps of the battlefield, but it is clearly shown on several 19th-Century maps of White Plains, and surely it was also present at the time of the battle. I suspect this low-lying ground is what Hessian Captain Johann Ewald was referring to when he wrote the following:

“The two jäger companies had to work their way, under the heaviest enemy cannon fire, through the ravines and marshes which lay between the two [British] wings. Here we came upon a number of riflemen who were hiding in these ravines, and who withdrew when they caught sight of us after sharp firing.”

The British left wing was centered on Wolf Pit Hill; the British right wing was centered on high ground east of this map. There is little sign of “ravines” in the area of the creek, but possibly that is because of changes that have been made in the terrain. This area has been urbanized for more than a century.

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The map was constructed first by removing the buildings and roads from a 1930s-era topographic map, and then by adding roads and woods that appear to have been present at the time of the battle.

The oldest maps I’ve been able to identify appear below (I’ve cropped the images so that the area shown roughly corresponds with the area I mapped). Three of these were made during the Revolutionary War, and electronic copies of them are hosted by the Library of Congress. The 1807 map is part of the David Rumsey Historical Map Collection.

Early maps of the White Plains Battlefield (click to enlarge).

The three Revolutionary War-era maps are somewhat crude and they differ from each other in some important respects. All three maps, however, show both the Dobb’s Ferry Road, the York Road, and the Bronx River. In all three cases, the Bronx is shown making a nearly 90-degree angle as it skirts the flanks of Chatterton’s Hill. The Dobb’s Ferry Road and the York Road are shown taking different courses on these maps, but it is possible to divine the correct path through comparisons with more skillfully-executed 19th Century maps.

Some roads show up on some maps but not others. The three Revolutionary War maps show a road running across Chatterton’s Hill thank links the Dobb’s Ferry Road and the York Road. The 1776 map shows a large American force deployed astride this road. The 1778 map similar designates this area (through text) as the site of the battle of White Plains. This road, however, does not show up on the 1807 map, and hints of it only appear on later maps. Therefore I drew this road in based on clues present in the early maps, especially the relatively detailed 1776 battlefield map.

I added another road linking the Dobb’s Ferry and York Roads to the revised map. This road is east of the Bronx River. This road shows up in the 1778 and 1781 maps, but not the 1776 or 1807 maps. From this I inferred it was a secondary route (and hence marked it with a thinner brown line). The path I assigned to this road is based on an 1868 map of White Plains, which shows a similar road. I suspect the 18th Century route did not follow the neat straight line of the 19th Century road, but this is what I’ve elected to show for lack of better information.

The 1776 and 1778 maps show another minor road extending northwest from the crest of Chatterton’s Hill. No corresponding path appears on later maps, and I opted to omit this road for lack of good information on its historic route.

Wooded areas are shown in the 1781 map and an 1891 map in the David Rumsey collection. I decided to mark as wooded on my map any area that was shown as wooded on either of these maps.

What’s Next

I’m not sure whether I’ll make any additional changes to this map yet or regard it as final. There’s a few things I’m uncertain about – like the original route of the Dobb’s Ferry Road in the Hartsdale area (lower left part of the map). The main X factor is whether I will find any other historic maps of the battlefield.

The next major step will be to locate exactly where the fighting took place during the battle of White Plains. In this regard, the 1776 map is invaluable. This map, by one Captain Charles Blaskowitz, shows the position of a number of specific regiments (a zoomable version of the map is available through the Library of Congress website; the regiment names can be read there quite clearly). Although the map is somewhat crude, the hills and ravines he drew generally have clear counterparts in the modern topography of the area. Thus, it would seem possible to use the Blaskowitz map to precisely locate where the fighting took place. However, in respect to certain details, the Blaskowitz map is contradicted by the accounts of Baurmeister and other participants. No obvious method of reconciling these differences has occurred to me.

The problem of identifying the exact location of the American units is even greater. Participant accounts make it possible to fairly precisely locate where certain regiments were located (e.g., the Delaware Regiment). But I have significant questions about a number of others (John Moseley’s regiment of Massachusetts militia, Jonathan Holman's regiment of Massachusetts militia, and David Forman’s regiment of New Jersey levies, to name a few). Maybe it’s not possible to show exactly where every regiment was located. In any case, I will describe the battle in as much detail as my research permits.

Note:

1. Bernhard A. Uhlendorf. (1957). Revolution in America: Confidential letters and journals 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian forces. Joseph P. Tustin (1979). Diary of the American War: A Hessian journal. Captain Johann Ewald.

Looking for More Information on Hanging Rock

Last year I spent a considerable amount of time reading and writing about the battle of Hanging Rock, South Carolina, and turned that into an original, and rather detailed, account posted to this blog.

Recently, however, I came across a new piece of information that has led me to rethink some of my conclusions -- a map that is believed to have been made by Colonel Richard Winn, one of the American commanders at that battle.

The direct link to the map is here. It is one of several Winn maps hosted on John Robertson's Online Library of the Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War website.

On the map, Hanging Rock is at center right. The map identifies the "Tory encampment under Col Brian," the "old field British encampment," and a "Steep Hill"

A map like this should make it easier to understand where and how the battle was fought, but unfortunately I find this map difficult to reconcile with some of the other statements in the source material and with the modern landscape. For example, the map makes it appear that the battle was not fought along Hanging Rock Creek (as has been supposed by myself and others) but along another creek that flowed south and west into the Catawba River. I'm willing to revise my conclusions (including a draft article I prepared), but it seems to me that other information is needed to help make sense of this map. Folks that are familiar with the area -- especially archaeological work that has been performed -- are encouraged to contact me about what they know, or to point me towards persons or sources that may be helpful. Emails can be addressed to me (Adam) at mini_awi "at" yahoo "dot" com.

Life and Death in the Metropolitan Army

The French metropolitan army was the backbone of the French army – the “white coat” counterpart to the British “redcoat.” Americans familiar with the French role during the Revolutionary War are probably most familiar with the army commanded by Comte de Rochambeau that helped win a pivotal victory at Yorktown. However, a much larger proportion of the French army served further to the south, in the West Indies [1]. There, regiments were used to garrison important islands, to serve as shipboard marines [2], and to mount attacks on British-held islands. A few regiments (e.g., Auxerrois, Armagnac, and Dillon) were repeatedly used when the French took the offense. But for even those regiments that mainly spent the war in garrison, the West Indies was an extraordinarily dangerous place. The chief danger, it seems, was disease. Epidemics – which were not uncommon – could kill hundreds of men within a few months, and no army was spared.

Recently I spent some time examining transcribed records to get a better sense of the dangers faced by metropolitan army units serving in the West Indies. The records appear in Les combattants francais de la guerre americaine, 1778-1783 (1905), and include such information as when a soldier enlisted, when and where he died, and (if he survived) when he was discharged from the service [3].

Sample of the records for the grenadiers of Régiment Foix

I then charted the results from a small sample of four infantry companies in order to track life and death in these units over time. I expected to find a significant incidence of mortality in each unit, but I didn’t know how that mortality would be patterned. Would there be a sudden spike in mortality once the unit arrived in the West Indies? Would disease instead be a constant companion, leading to a steady loss of men over time? Or would mortality from disease be relatively unpredictable?

I found, in this small sample, no evidence that regiments began to suffer appalling casualties from disease upon arrival in the West Indies. Instead, disease outbreaks seem unpredictable, beyond perhaps an association with major troop movements (such as the return of d’Estaing’s force to the West Indies from Georgia in late 1779, and the assembly of a large army on Haiti in the Spring of 1782). For each company, the analysis spans the period from May, 1778, to January, 1784. The charts shows the number of enlisted men with each company on a month-by-month basis.

Fusilier Compagnie de Manoel, Régiment Hainault

• A -- August 16, 1778: The company is in combat for the first time in an engagement between the British Isis and the French César in waters off Rhode Island. Four men are killed in action, and the company is at 94% of its original strength by the end of the month.
• B -- December, 1778: The company arrives in the West Indies aboard the fleet of Charles-Henri d'Estaing. The company is present at the December 18, 1778, battle of La Vigie, but they are only lightly engaged (1 killed in action). In the following months, enlisted men begin dying at a rate of about 1 per month.
• C -- October, 1779: The company participates in the siege of Savannah, including the bloody assault on the Spring Hill redoubt. Nine enlisted men die this month (including 5 on the day of the assault). The company is at 76% of its original strength by the end of the month.
• D -- December, 1779: This month there appears to be an outbreak of sickness while the company is on Grenada. Five men die in December, 8 in January, 4 in February. By the end of February, the company is at 61% of peak strength. The 17 men who perish during this period represent 14% of the company's original complement.
• E -- January, 1784: A number of men are struck from the company list this month. (Not clear to me is if these men were discharged or if their deaths during the war was belatedly acknowledged). This reduction brings the company down to 40% of its original strength.

Grenadier Compagnie de Pecomme, Régiment Gatinois

• A -- August, 1779: The company occasionally gains new recruits during this period. Four enroll in August, 1779, bringing the company to a peak strength of 103 enlisted men.
• B -- October, 1779: The company is spared from the horrific assault on Savannah’s Spring Hill redoubt. (The chasseur company, however, does take severe losses). One death is recorded this month.
• C -- February, 1780: The disease outbreak that took a heavy toll on Régiment Hainault appears to have affected Gatinois as well. Four enlisted men's deaths are recorded this month.
• D -- October, 1781: The company is present at the siege of Yorktown, and the grenadiers lose 4 men killed outright during the assault on Redoubt #9, and an additional 3 men at other points during the siege. Several deaths are also reported in Virginia in November -- probably from men that fell ill or that succumbed to their wounds. The losses reduce the company to 79% of its peak strength.
• E -- August, 1782: Three enlisted men die during what is perhaps another period of illness. The company falls to 73% of peak strength.
• F -- April, 1783: A number of enlisted men transfer to the French colonial Régiment du Cap (Probably it is their intention to remain in the West Indies beyond the conclusion of the war).
• G -- August, 1783: The war is effectively over, and many of the enlisted men are discharged. The discharges occur in waves, with the largest number (13) occurring in August, 1783.

Chasseur Compagnie d'Artel de Veinsberg, Régiment Touraine

• A -- July, 1781: The company reaches a peak strength of 125 enlisted men.
• B -- October, 1781: The company is present at the siege of Yorktown, but no deaths are recorded among the enlisted men.
• C -- January, 1782: Five deaths are reported this month; three occur on Martinique and are likely due to illness, the other two are combat fatalities on St. Kitts
• D -- June, 1782: The company is transferred to Cap François (Haiti). En route the company is present at the battle of The Saintes (April 9 & 12), but the vessel carrying them is not heavily engaged and only 1 death is recorded. Severe illness strikes the company at the Cap starting in June.
• E -- October, 1782: The main period of illness at Cap François ends. From May to November, the company suffered 28 deaths, reducing it to 68% of peak strength. Nearly 1/3 of the company died in a little more than 1 year, and only three or four of those deaths appear to be combat related.
• F -- January, 1783: Five more deaths are recorded at Cap François in the first part of 1783. Other reductions in strength after this time are due to men being discharged.

Compagnie de Sigoyer Grenadiers, Régiment Foix

• A -- March, 1779: The company reaches a peak strength of 98 enlisted men.
• B -- October, 1779: Seven enlisted men die during the month of October. The company participates in the siege of Savannah (including the assault on the Spring Hill redoubt), but most of the deaths appear to be due to illness, including several among ill men that were left behind on the island of Martinique.
• C -- December, 1779: Seven enlisted men die during the month of December. The deaths occur on the islands of Martinique, St. Vincent, and Grenada, and also at sea. Either the company has been divided among several posts, or the company has left sick men at each of several places it has been stationed. At the end of the month, the company is down to 81% of peak strength.
• D -- April, 1782: Two enlisted die aboard the Magnanime during naval operations
• E -- July, 1783: A handful of men are struck from the rolls or are discharged; discharges continue as the war winds down.

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Notes:

1. For an excellent history, see René Chartrand (1992). The French army in the American War of Independence.

2. Such troops were used to board enemy vessels, repel boarders from enemy vessels, and to fire on the gunners serving enemy vessels.

3. I was of course working under the assumption that these records are accurate and complete for these companies (a difficult point to gauge).

The Third Line at Guilford Courthouse

Earlier this month I began writing about the March 15, 1781, battle of Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina. Most of the posts I have planned will involve the recreation of the battle with military miniatures, but a few are concerned with areas of research.

In this post I discuss the American "third line" at Guilford Courthouse -- the part of the battlefield where the American Continentals were deployed and where the Americans hoped to stop the British attack.

Visitors to Guilford Courthouse National Military Park (website) are probably aware that there has been a certain amount of controversy concerning where the third line was stationed. Some years ago, the National Park Service concluded that the area in which several monuments had been placed was not in fact the correct location. The "old" and "new" third line sites are roughly indicated below.

The map at left is from the one that I prepared for this project; the fields were drawn in such a way as to be consistent with the new interpretation.

Participant accounts strongly support the new interpretation. Here is Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s description of third line area:

“Guilford court house, erected near the great state road, is situated on the brow of a declivity, which descends gradually with an undulating slope for about a half mile. It terminates in a small vale, intersected by a rivulet” [1]

The courthouse is near the junction of the two roads on the map. The "rivulet" presumably what is today called Hunting Creek, the stream that crosses the width of the map. His description goes on to place the open ground on which much of the third line fighting took place as between the courthouse and the rivulet, on either side of the road.

The new third line position is on a hill that is much higher and broader than the old third line position. It more clearly can accommodate the two brigades of Continentals that fought at Guilford Courthouse.

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At the beginning of the battle, the third line consisted of two Virginia regiments that averaged about 385 men each (both officers and enlisted men), two Maryland regiments that averaged about 340 men each, and a two-gun battery commanded by Captain Ebenezer Finley. The Virginia regiments formed a brigade on the right of the line, the Maryland regiments formed a brigade on the left of the line, and Finley’s battery was located roughly between them [2].

Maps of the third line at Guilford Courthouse usually present the American deployment in a simplified manner: either a simple straight line or four closely aligned rectangles (one for each Maryland and Virginia regiment). However, the source material allows for a more precise understanding of how each regiment was positioned. Some key passages are quoted below. [3]

• Major-General Nathanael Greene: the Continentals presented “a double front, as the hill drew to a point where they were posted, and on the right and left were two old fields.”
• Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton: “The flanks [of the two Continental brigades] did not dress up to the center, but were drawn back, so that each brigade presented a different front…”
• Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard: "the first [Maryland] regiment... was formed in a hollow, in the wood, and to the right [west] of the cleared ground about the Court house." "...my station [was] on the left of the first regiment, and next the cleared ground..."
• Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard: "The second [Maryland] regiment was at some distance to the left of the first, in the cleared ground, with its left flank thrown back, so as to form a line almost at right angles with the first regiment."

The exact spacing of the troops on the third line is not known, but a “close order” formation seems likely. As three of the four regiments were in a wooded area, it does not seem likely that the troops were packed closely together (which anyway does not seem to have been the norm by the late war; see this website for a lengthy discussion). A reasonable guess, I think, is that 12 inches separated each man. If correct, than the Virginia regiments had a front of around 480 feet each, and the Maryland regiments had a front of around 425 feet each. [4]

Taking all these points together, I believe the regiments were deployed on or near the spots indicated on the map below. The blue lines represent, from left to right, the 1st Virginia, and 2nd Virginia, the 1st Maryland, and the 2nd Maryland. The two blue “t”s represent the two cannon in Finley’s battery. The orange lines represent watercourses or ravines. Note that the left and right flanks may have been anchored on ravines. The historical New Garden Road roughly corresponds with the road marked in red-and-white that runs from the top of the map to the bottom. Notably, there may have been a gap at this point in the American line – perhaps to accommodate the retreat of the first and second American lines. [5]

Here is what the regiments look like on the battlefield map I created.

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Notes:

1. Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the war in the Southern Department of the United States

2. I discussed the American order of battle here. To the best of my knowledge, the source material does not directly indicate where Finley’s battery was located, although there are certain clues. Based on these, Lawrence E. Babits & Joshua B. Howard (2009) in Long, obstinate, and bloody: The battle of Guilford Courthouse concluded that "Finley's two six-pounders were situated on the terrace's southwest corner" where they covered the most probable British routes of attack (p. 144). I believe this interpretation is probably correct, but there are minor differences in our maps.

3. A useful compendium of sources for the battle of Guilford Courthouse can be found here. Howard’s account is quoted in Babits & Howard, ibid. and in James Herring and James Barton Longacre’s (1835) The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2

4. Here is the very crude math: 18 inches (presumed width of a typical 18th Century soldier) + 12 inches (as described above, the assumed spacing between soldiers) * 385 (estimated men in 1st Virginia) / 2 (usual number of ranks) = 5775 inches, or 481.25 feet.

5. Worth noting is that the interpretation presented here is similar to that described by Babits & Howard, ibid. The only real difference in interpretation, as best I can tell, concerns how much of the 2nd Maryland should be placed south of the New Garden Road (they suggest most, I suggest all). As is so often the case, the source material lends itself to more than one interpretation. To imagine what the line would look like according to their account, one should mentally move the 2nd Maryland regiment north until the right flank of the regiment crosses the New Garden Road.

Finding the Longue-Pointe Battlefield

In December, I discussed the location of Ethan's Allen defeat near Montreal (what is known as the battle of Longue-Pointe). I suggested in that post that the battle was fought at a stream known as Ruisseau Migeon in the 18th and 19th Centuries. I suggested several reasons why this spot appeared to be the site of the battle. They included that 1) the site was near the place Ethan Allen was thought to have landed, 2) the site was at the right distance from Montreal (judging from contemporary accounts of the battle), 3) physical features of the site are compatible with Ethan Allen's description of the battle, and 4) the site is at the right direction and distance from a house associated with Ethan Allen's capture.

Of course, none of these points is definitive. Allen's landing site was determined by supposition, not by statements present in the source material, statements about distance are subject to error, the physical features of the site were imperfectly described by participants, and different meanings can be ascribed to the house associated with Allen's capture.

I thought, however, that the convergent evidence was good enough to risk suggesting the Ruisseau Migeon site, even though I admitted there were other statements about the battle site that I could not evaluate. These additional statements included that the stream was known by some as Ruisseau Truteau and that the battle was fought near Christie's farm.

This map shows several places referred to in this post. A - Montreal (where the British troops assembled before the battle), B - Ruisseau Migeon (English: Migeon Creek), C - Original site of a house linked with Ethan Allen's capture, D - Ruisseau des Soeurs (English: Nun's Creek), later called Molson’s Creek.

Since posting this information, a reader alerted me to two sources of information that greatly reduces the likelihood that Ruisseau Migeon was the site of the battle.

The first source of information is a letter dated October 23, 1775 from Grand-Vicar Montgolfier to Bishop Briand that states, in part (per his translation):

"Our city troop met them on the road to Longue Pointe, at a place named the Soeurs Creek, which forms the precise boundary between the two parishes,..."

If Montgolfier's information was accurate, then the battle was fought at a stream that was known as Ruisseau des Soeurs during the 18th Century and that in the 19th Century became known as Molson's Creek.

The second source of information is a couple of maps that show how land was divided among residents living near Ruisseau des Soeurs (Molson's Creek) during the first part of the 18th Century. (These were retrieved from an online photo album; the original place of publication is unknown). I cropped and combined these maps to create the image below (click to enlarge). The left panel map shows the stream in question. The right panel shows this site was associated with a Truteau family -- probably the family of Pierre Truteau and Marie-Charlotte Ménard, to judge from family history websites. Members of the Truteau (or Trutteau or Trudeau) family evidently continued to be a part of the Longue-Pointe community throughout the remainder of the 18th Century. Thus, there is good reason to believe that Ruisseau Truteau was another name for Ruisseau des Soeurs.

Below is an early 19th Century painting of this stream. If this is where the battle of Longue-Pointe was fought (as seems likely), then the British would have been advancing towards Allen along the road in the right foreground.

Louise-Amelie Panet-Berczy's (1839) depiction of the Longue-Pointe battlefield (click to enlarge).

In Search of a Lost Battlefield

On the night of September 24, 1775, Ethan Allen crossed the St. Lawrence near the city of Montreal with a force consisting of around 80 Canadian volunteers and 30 Americans. Allen hoped that his advance would inspire an uprising among the Canadians, and he would capture Canada’s largest city, and the British governor, in one fell swoop. Instead, Governor Carleton assembled an ad hoc force and put Allen’s force to rout. Rather than speed up the American conquest of Canada, Allen’s foray put that conquest into grave doubt. Hundreds of Canadians who had been sitting on the sidelines were inspired to join the British cause.

The defeat of Allen’s forces has been termed the battle of Longue-Pointe, but there is some uncertainty as to exactly where that battle took place. In this post I discuss where I believe the battle occurred. The battlefield area is shown in the map below. Montreal is at left (southwest) and the modern city of Longue-Pointe is at right (northeast). Both communities are on the Island of Montreal, and on the north shore of the St. Lawrence river.

The map shows several places referred to in this post. A - Where the citizens of Montreal assembled before the battle, B - Ruisseau Migeon (English: Migeon Creek), about 2 1/3 miles from Montreal (in 1775), C - Original site of the “Pierre-Joseph-Picard” house or “Maison Allen," which, according to tradition, is where Ethan Allen was captured, D - Ruisseau des Soeurs (English: Nun's Creek), later called Molson’s Creek, about 3 1/2 miles from Montreal.

Extinct watercourses northeast of Montreal (click to enlarge). [1]

The site of the battle was more-or-less forgotten during the 19th Century. Benson John Lossing went looking for the battlefield in the mid-19th Century. He met in Montreal, “An intelligent gentleman, who was one of the leaders in the rebellion there in 1837, assured me that the spot was unknown to the inhabitants, for tradition has but little interest in keeping its finger upon the locality, and not a man was living who had personal knowledge of the event. It is probable that the northern suburbs of the city now cover the locality, and that the place is not far from the present Longueuil ferry-landing.” [2]

In 1875, the Numismatic and Antiquarian Society of Montreal arrived at a similar conclusion:

“The locality of Allen’s landing and the battle ground is unknown, but it is probable that the suburbs of the city now covers it, and that the place is not far from the present ferry-landing at Hochelaga, on the road to Longue Pointe.” [3]

Since then, Gustave Lanctôt (1967) asserted that the battle was fought at Ruisseau des Soeurs (see D, on the above map), a creek that fed into the St. Lawrence near what is today the western edge of the city of Longue-Pointe. [4] Lanctôt did not cite a source for this information, which leaves the basis for the attribution unclear (at least to me). However, this stream stood near the “Pierre-Joseph-Picard” house, also known as “Maison Allen” that stood near this creek (see C, on the above map). Allegedly, it was here that Allen was captured. [5] Louise-Amelie Panet-Berczy painted the nearby stream in 1839 and termed it the site of the “Combat de la Grange” of 25 Septembre 1775. [6]

Google street view of “Maison Allen” in Longue-Pointe.

Section of Panet-Berczy's painting of the Longue-Pointe battlefield. Ruisseau des Soeurs (at left) flows towards the St. Lawrence (which can be glimpsed in the background).

However, there are other sources of evidence about the site of the battle, and these provide reason to believe that the Hochelaga location suggested by Lossing and the Montreal Antiquarians (see B, on the above map) may in fact have been the true site of the battle.

The other sources of evidence can be found in 18th Century correspondence and memoirs. These sources indicate:

• The battle was fought between 2 and 3 miles of Montreal. [7]

The mean distance among the various estimates seems to be a point between Ruisseau Migeon and Ruisseau des Soeurs. The former, however, falls within the range of estimated distances, while the latter does not.

• The battle was fought “near Colonel Christie' s farm.” [8]

Christie was an unusual name for this area. Finding 18th Century land ownership records for this area would go a long way towards definitely establishing the site of the battle. However, I have not conducted such a search.

• The battle was fought at “the little river Truteau.” [9]

Some streams in this area were known by more than one name. To the best of my knowledge, none of these streams is known to have been called Ruisseau Truteau. This statement indicates that the battle was fought by a stream, but it does not indicate which one.

• A prominent ditch was perpendicular to Allen’s position. [10]

Allen indicated that his force was arrayed behind trees and buildings. When the British started to turn his right flank, Allen dispatched nearly half his force to a ditch that protected that flank. Ruisseau Migeon makes a 90-degree bend and then flows in an almost straight line parallel to St. Lawrence. It is impossible to say what conditions were like on the ground in 1775, but plausibly this stretch of stream was both ditch-like in appearance and suitable for the defense. Small streams on the island are known to have sometimes run dry [11], and September, 1775, appears to have been a time when some small streams ran dry. [12]

1869 map showing part of Ruisseau Migeon and the St. Lawrence River. [13]

• Allen ran 1 mile away from the battlefield before he was captured. [14]

The “Maison Allen” (see C on the map above), which is associated with Allen’s capture was 1 mile from Ruisseau Migeon, and in the direction Allen was likely to have fled.

Other considerations:

Ruisseau Migeon is located at about the spot Allen likely landed when crossing the St. Lawrence from Longueuil. Thus, Allen, who in some respects was unfamiliar with the area, should at least have known about this stream. Allen allegedly advanced towards the Quebec suburb of Montreal in the hopes of sparking a mass uprising, but then fell back. [15] Ruisseau Migeon would have been the first good defensive site he would have come across and it (presumably) had the advantage of being near where his boats were moored.

Conclusions:

There are strong indications that Ruisseau Migeon was the site of Ethan Allen’s defeat on September 25, 1775. A definite attribution cannot be made, however, without land ownership records and/or better information about the other names for “river Truteau.”

The Site Today:

Combining 19th Century maps of Ruisseau Migeon with the details in Allen’s memoir suggests that the British and American forces might have been arrayed during the battle of Longue-Pointe as follows.

Street maps of Montreal dating from the late 19th Century to the early 20th Century show the course of Ruisseau Migeon before it was obliterated by urban development. Using the Google Maps Street View feature, one can take a virtual tour of the area today. See images below.

1897 (left) and 1907 (right) maps showing Ruisseau Migeon.

Google Maps’ street view that may show a part of the battlefield (click to enlarge). The British advanced from Montreal (note skyscrapers in distance) along a road that has since become the busy highway pictured. The St. Lawrence is behind the buildings at left. Ruisseau Migeon flowed from right to left and crossed the road at a point roughly between the two approaching cars closest to the viewer. If this was the site of the battle, then Young’s 10-man detachment was perhaps arrayed in the parking lot shown at left (in 1775 this was behind the creek). Allen’s force would have been arrayed behind trees and buildings that stood to the right (including beyond the right margin of this image). Young’s force was defeated with little difficulty; Allen was forced to flee after his right flank was turned (this area is not shown).

Notes:

1. Map source can be found here, from the remarkable site Under Montreal. A blog devoted to the extinct streams that once ran through Montreal can be found here.

2. Benson John Lossing (1851). The pictoral field-book of the Revolution...

3. Book link.

4. Gustave Lanctôt (1967). Canada & the American Revolution, 1774-1783.

5. See this March 16, 2008 article in the Montreal Gazette.

6. See this 2008 issue of the Bulletin de l'Altier d'histoire de la Longue-Pointe.

7. A number of primary sources appeared in a previous post. Estimates were: 1 league or less (a league was about 2.5 miles; Livingston to Montgomery), about 1 league (Sanguinet memoir), within 3 miles or less (Quebec Gazette, September 28, 1775; Johnson to Legge), about 3 miles (Carleton to Legge).

8. See this letter dated October 1, 1775.

9. Letters to Quebec Gazette of September 28 and October 19, 1775.

10. From Ethan Allen’s memoir.

11. A point of discussion on the website Under Montreal.

12. See this letter from James Livingston to Philip Schuyler, written in September, 1775.

13. For links to 18th, 19th, and 20th Century maps of Montreal, see here.

14. From Ethan Allen’s memoir.

15. From Simon Sanguinet's memoir.