October 21, 1776 (Part 1)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 21st (Part 1): George Washington’s Continentals occupied White Plains; William Howe moved cautiously by the coast.

Previous entry: October 20th; next: October 21st (Part 2).

George Washington learned on the night of the 20th that he faced the potential for a catastrophic defeat if the British army reached the village of White Plains before he did. Indeed, the Americans wondered why the British had not already made such a move. Major-General William Heath wrote, “it is not a little unaccountable that they did not attempt to stretch themselves across to the Hudson, which [they] might have been done with great ease.” Colonel Rufus Putnam commented on “the stupidity of the British general in that he did not… send a detachment and take possession of… White Plains[,] for had he done this we must then have fought him on his own terms”.

Throughout the day, and into the night, the American army began streaming towards White Plains. The first troops on the road belonged to Brigadier-General William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division). They reached White Plains sometime between midmorning (Rufus Putnam’s memoir) and early afternoon (journal of Sergeant James McMichael). Rufus Putnam accompanied these men and he breathed a sigh of relief when they reached the village: “thus was the American army saved… from a probable total destruction.”

William Heath’s division followed Alexander’s brigade on the road to White Plains. Heath recalled:

“At about four o' clock, p. m., General Heath's division moved from above King’s Bridge… About eight o' clock in the evening, they passed General Lincoln's quarters, on Valentine's Hill, where the Commander-in-Chief was to spend the night…. The division reached Chatterton's Hill, to the south of White-Plains, at four o' clock in the morning… having marched all night.”

Following Heath’s division was the rest of Spencer’s division (the brigades of James Wadsworth and John Fellows). Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Wadsworth’s brigade) recorded in his journal:

“Marched about 10 o’clock at night for the White Plains, [we] carried our tents on our backs[,] packs[,] pots[,] kettles[,] and provisions[,] etc. The army marched all night excepting some small halts, [and the men] almost fainted under their burdens and were greatly fatigued.”

Joseph Plumb Martin served in the same battalion as Trumbull, and had a similar experience:

“We marched from Valentine’s Hill for the White Plains in the night… We had our cooking utensils (at that time the most useless things in the army) to carry in our hands. They were made of cast iron and consequently heavy. I was so beat out before morning with hunger and fatigue that I could hardly move one foot before the other. I told my messmates that I could not carry our kettle any further… my arms were almost dislocated; I sat down in the road, and one of the others gave it a shove with his foot, and it rolled down against the fence, and that was the last I ever saw of it. When we got through the night’s march we found our mess was not the only one that was rid of their iron bondage.”

The British commander, Lieutenant-General William Howe, was perhaps unaware of the opportunity at White Plains (just as Washington had been before the 20th). But that does not sufficiently account for his inactivity along the Westchester coastline. Howe, it seems, was extraordinarily cautious about sending men into the countryside. Perhaps this was, as Stephen Kemble (Howe’s assistant adjutant general) put it, because American deserters claimed that their generals “propose to surround us and cut off our communication with our shipping.” On this date, Howe did shift his army 2 miles further from the landing place, but, Kemble noted, “we keep the [Long Island] Sound in short views on our right”.

Howe’s army may have been slow to act, but it was quickly becoming more powerful. Recent reinforcements included Lossberg’s brigade of Hessians from Staten Island, a large detachment of light dragoons from Long Island, and the 2nd and 6th British brigades from Throg’s Neck (minus the 28th Foot, which was left to hold that post awhile longer).

Situation of the armies on October 21st (click to enlarge). Howe’s army remained near Pell’s Point (8) and New Rochelle, although a detachment was sent east to Mamaroneck (10). Most of Washington’s army was in the process of moving from the area of Kingsbridge (6) to White Plains (11). Washington himself made his headquarters on Valentine’s Hill near Mile Square (9). Major-General Nathanael Greene’s men remained in upper Manhattan and at Fort Lee in New Jersey.

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British army units on the heights of New Rochelle. Much of the army is visible, including the light infantry and jaegers (red and green triangles, respectively), the British Reserve (the British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the Brigade of Guards, the 71st Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders), and two brigades of Hessians. Other troops were encamped to the south and east.

The Hutchinson River bisects the map. To the left of the river can be seen the town of East Chester (which was plundered by both armies), and a position formerly held by John Glover’s brigade.

October 17, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 17th: Bad weather delayed the British move to Pell’s Point; William Smallwood commented on the sufferings of the American soldier.

Previous entry: October 16th; next: Morning of October 18th.

The British vanguard marched at 1 AM for the move to Pell’s Point. The move, however, was soon cancelled because of a storm. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company of the 10th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion) recorded in his journal that “very heavy rain, and high wind” “obliged us to return to our quarters at ½ after 3 o’clock [A.M.].”

Lieutenant-General William Howe decided to make the move on the 18th instead.

Lieutenant Tench Tilghman (one of Washington’s aides) was puzzled by the British inactivity:

“The enemy has made no move from Frog's Point. We may say the 17th October is come and nearly past without the predicted blow. The winds have not been favourable to pass Hell-Gate, where several of their transports are now laying; perhaps that may be the reason…. If we can but foil General Howe again, I think we knock him up for the campaign.”

Tilghman expected the British advance to be made overland from Throg’s Neck, not by water to the east; therefore, he was puzzled by the British inactivity. He was right, however, about the winds causing delays for the British.

Captain Frederick Mackenzie (23rd Regiment of Foot) commented on the slow movement of men and supplies from New York City to Throg’s Neck:

“The recruits lately arrived for those regiments which are with the army under General Howe, went though Hellgate this morning in flatboats. The ships with the Hessians [see footnote] cannot go through for want of a proper wind. Several ships with horses and wagons are detained for the same reason. The Senegal sloop of war got through this morning with much difficulty; she touched the shore several times but at last effected the passage with much labor and danger.”

This map illustrates the distribution of Washington’s army units in Westchester County on October 17, 1776 (click to enlarge). North is at the upper-right corner of the map. A part of the Hudson is at the top of the map, and a part of Long Island Sound is at the bottom. By the end of the day, four of Washington’s divisions were on the New York mainland (those of William Heath, John Sullivan, Charles Lee, and Joseph Spencer) as was Benjamin Lincoln's brigade of Massachusetts militia. The placement of the units on this map is inexact.

Washington’s army units were deployed with three objectives in mind:

• First, units were deployed to defend the crossings of the Bronx River (marked by the numbers 1-4). Glover’s brigade of Lee’s division was positioned in advance of these crossings near the town of East Chester. As long as the British were kept from crossing the Bronx, Washington had a secure connection with upstate New York and New England.
• Second, units were deployed to contain the British army on Throg’s Neck (partially visible at extreme lower left).
• Third, units were deployed to guard the shoreline between Throg’s Neck and Manhattan (off the map, at left).

The divisions of Israel Putnam and Nathanael Greene (not shown) defended upper Manhattan, and nearby Fort Constitution in New Jersey. Around this time, Fort Constitution was renamed Fort Lee, after the American general.

Spencer’s division was in a reserve position at Kingsbridge, where it could quickly move to reinforce American forces in either Westchester County or upper Manhattan.

Howe had wanted to land his forces at Pell's Point on this date (bottom of the map), but the move was delayed by bad weather.

On this quiet day, Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion (McDougall’s brigade; Lee’s division), wrote about his misgivings with the army. He asserted that “Our Commander-in-Chief is an excellent man,” but he found much fault with the officers below Washington:

“Were our officers good, and our men well trained, it would be impossible [for the British] to effect their purpose…” but “there seems to be a total ignorance of and inattention to” the kind of military discipline “necessary to render an army formidable.” He argued that many of the officers essentially “train” their men “to run away” from the enemy, “and to make them believe they never can be safe unless under cover of an entrenchment… Discipline here is totally neglected, and yet after all it is the only bulwark in war. Had our troops been trained better, and worried less with the pick-axe and spade, by this time our army would have been in a condition to have sought for their enemies in turn.”

Smallwood also complained that the men were poorly fed, and that many were sick from “being often moved, and… exposed to lie on the cold ground… often lying without their tents for several nights”. He added, “We want medicine much; none can be had here. Our sick have [been] and are now suffering extremely.” “I foresee the evils arising from the shameful neglect… One good-seasoned and well-trained soldier, recovered to health, is worth a dozen new recruits, and [it] is often easier [to] get [a well-trained soldier] recovered than [it is] to get a recruit…”

But, Smallwood also saw glimmers of hope. He believed the British “are as much afraid and cautious of us, as we can be… of them”. He remarked also that all ranks in the army understood what was on the line: they must either “fight or starve and surrender at [British] discretion”.

Footnote: The Hessian reinforcement consisted of the Lieb Regiment, Regiment von Dittfurth, and Regiment Prinz Carl, which together formed a brigade under the command of Friedrich Wilhelm von Lossberg. These troops departed Staten Island on October 12th, but were still awaiting the opportunity to join Howe’s army.

Battle of Port Royal Island (1)

By 1778, the war in the northern theater had effectively reached a stalemate, and the British began to place increasing importance on the recovery of the southern colonies. In December, 1778, British troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell captured Savannah, Georgia. The following January, Brigadier-General Augustine Prévost arrived in Savannah and took command of British forces in the south.

Prévost laid out his plans to George Germain, Secretary of State for America, in a letter dated January 18, 1779:

“...I shall immediately proceed up the river to see what advantages can be expected from the frontier inhabitants of Carolina who give the strongest hopes of joining heartily whenever they find that they are to be supported. Should it appear that they do not mean to take the active part which they have promised, I shall confine my plan of operations to harassing the enemy by excursions and effectually securing this province, to which all the loyal subjects who have fled to Florida for shelter will soon return if they can be assured of being protected. If, on the contrary, the frontier inhabitants should evince the zeal which they profess, I cannot doubt but great advantages may be delivered from a diversion on their side supported by an attack at Beaufort or any of the settlements on the coast of South Carolina…”

In other words, Prévost intended to drive into the Georgian backcountry in order to galvanize American Loyalists, while at the same time launching a diversionary attack on the South Carolina post.

To effect this plan, Prévost made his headquarters at Ebenezer, Georgia, a town 25 miles northwest of Savannah, and roughly opposite Purrysburg, South Carolina, where Major-General Benjamin Lincoln was assembling a large American army.

Strategic Situation in the South (click to enlarge). This map shows places referred to in this blog post that were occupied by British and American forces in January, 1779. The British held Savannah and Ebenezer in Georgia [red dots], while the Americans held Augusta, Georgia, and Purrysburg, Beaufort (on Port Royal Island), and Charleston, South Carolina [blue dots]. Based on a 1776 map in the David Rumsey collection.

On January 24, Prévost sent Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell with a large force [1] to take Augusta, and sent a diversion against the South Carolina coast. In his words:

“In order to facilitate further the success of Colonel Campbell’s operations... I sent three companies of light infantry that came from Florida to go up Beaufort River under the escort of the Vigilant, and to draw the enemy’s spies about us to conceive that more troops were sent by sending a regiment of Hessians to the place of embarkation two miles from Savannah and marching them in the night back to their barracks.”

The three companies of light infantry belonged to the 16th regiment, and the 3rd and 4th battalions of the 60th regiment. This small force, no more than 160 men, was commanded by Major Valentine Gardiner. Nevertheless, their arrival on the South Carolina coast put the Americans in a state of alarm.

Colonel Charles Cotesworth Pinckney described the popular feeling in Charleston, South Carolina, in a letter to Brigadier-General William Moultrie:

“...many people think, this movement of the enemy is to post themselves at Port-Royal, and there wait reinforcements from the northward; others, that it was done only to cause a division and to weaken your little army, that they might more easily pass the river [i.e., so that Prévost could cross the Savannah River and invade South Carolina]; others, that it was to destroy the town and fort, plunder and return to Tybee [an island near Savannah]; but some with more penetrating looks and significant nods; that the vessels appearing in scull creek, as if intended, (Port-Royal was, or is, only a feint,) to cover a real design of landing suddenly on the Euhaws, march to a pass of consequence near Elliott's hill, on the southern road, and there throw up some field works, which with a few cannon will entirely cut off the communication from town to Gen. Lincoln's army, and put him between two fires; this last manoevre, is thought of so much consequence to the public safety, as to raise the public anxiety...”

Lincoln was not deceived, and he remained at Purrysburg with his army. However, Lincoln also did not want to see a key fort on Port-Royal Island fall to the British. He therefore ordered General Moultrie to take control of South Carolina militia on and near Port-Royal Island and defend that threatened post.

Note:

1. Campbell described the composition of this force in a March 4, 1779, letter to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton:

“A proper supply of provisions having been collected at Ebenezer, I marched on the 24th January with Sir James Baird’s light infantry [a light company of the 71st regiment, with, perhaps, a corps of Provincial light infantry attached], the 1st battalion of the 71st regiment, the New York Volunteers, one troop of light dragoons [commanded by Captain Tawes], Colonel [Alexander] Innes’s Carolina Loyalists [i.e., the South Carolina Royalists], and the Florida Rangers, making in all one thousand effectives, rank and file, with 4 field-pieces, one howitzer and two royal mortars.”