October 26, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 26th: The British raided Mile Square.

Previous entry: October 25th; next: October 27th.

The Americans felt that they had bested the British by reaching White Plains before the British and fortifying the village, but apprehension remained over the looming showdown with the British army.

Colonel Joseph Reed (Washington’s adjutant general) wrote:

“We have taken post here in such a manner, that we hope they will not be able to execute their plan of surrounding us, and cutting off our communication. I can only conjecture that finding themselves baffled in this, they are now advancing to engage us. The business of this campaign, and possibly the next[,] may probably be determined this week.”

Adjutant Samuel Shaw (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote:

“We shall remain at this place till we have a brush with the enemy. They are within three miles of us. Their movements have been such as to occasion us a great deal of trouble, and it is happy for us that they did not effect our ruin... In several skirmishes with the enemy, we have had constantly the better; so that our troops are in good spirits, and impatiently desire an action. Something decisive must soon be done, as cold weather approaches and we want winter-quarters.”

According to Lieutenant Tench Tilghman (aide to George Washington), When Major-General Charles Lee pulled out of Mile Square on the 25th, “he was obliged to leave [behind] eighty or ninety barrels of provisions… for want of wagons.”

A Loyalist informed Hessian Captain Johann von Ewald that the Americans' supplies “could be approached without discovery.”

Ewald was willing to raid this post with his jaegers, but Brigadier-General William Erskine decided a larger force was needed for this operation, and Erskine placed himself at its head. According to Ewald:

“General Erskine arrived at my post with a hundred dragoons from the 17th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry. He ordered me to march with sixty jägers and form the advanced guard, which was to be reinforced with one officer and twenty dragoons.” [see Footnote 1]

At this time, Westchester County, between Kingsbridge and White Plains, was defended by few American troops. Close to Kingsbridge, Colonel John Lasher of New York had 400 men detached from Major-General William Heath’s division (specifically, from two brigades of New York militia and from William Prescott’s 7th Continental Regiment). Lasher’s chief responsibility was to defend Fort Independence near Kingsbridge, but he also had men patrolling the roads to the north and east. It was a weak force, and Lasher lamented that “many of the detachments have not ten rounds a man”.

At Mile Square, Lee had left behind some troops to guard over the supplies that could not be moved. According to Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment), this included “a guard of about 30 men… under the command of Lieutenant [Abraham] Turtelow”.

When the British advanced on Mile Square, they first encountered one of Lasher’s detachments. Ewald described it as “an enemy patrol of riflemen which gave fire and ran back.” He noted that “Several dragoons gave chase, but could not overtake any of them.”

The British expedition continued on until they came to the American depot. The British then swiftly attacked.

Ewald recalled:

“The jägers deployed, supported by the light infantry, with the dragoons following. The enemy guard drew up behind the stone walls which surrounded the plantation and received us with a lively fire. I quickly separated the jägers into four to five parts to surround the enemy and advanced under steady fire from wall to wall. The light infantry likewise divided into three to four parts and attacked the guard with the bayonet. Nearly everyone was struck down and only a few officers and men were taken prisoner.”

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers), who was also present, wrote that “the rebels had a guard of 1 captain and 25 men who ran… The dragoons pursued, killed the officer and 2 others and took 16 or 18 prisoners.”

Lieutenant Turtelow of Lippitt’s Regiment escaped “from the light horse” but he reported (in the words of John Smith) that the British “took the stores… and killed the doctor and some of the men belonging to the hospital”. [see Footnote 2]

Afterwards, according to Hessian Major Carl-Leopold Baurmeister, “We dispensed the wine and rum we could not take with us in bottles and destroyed the flour magazine… We also found the two jagers who had been missing since the attack of the 23rd.”

Ewald summarized how the successful raid concluded:

“Several enemy patrols which ran into our outpost withdrew quickly after a few shots. After midnight we withdrew, the light infantry covering the rear, and at daybreak of the 27th we arrived back at the army. I had the honor to receive a compliment from the commanding general.”

Footnote 1. In addition to the above, Baurmesiter stated that Regiment von Rall was also sent on this expedition. Archibald Robertson wrote that “1 Battalion of Hessians” was present, but didn’t name the unit.

Footnote 2. A return for Daniel Hitchcock’s 11th Continental Regiment (Nixon’s brigade, Lee’s division) stated that 8 men were captured at Mile Square on this date. My guess is that these men were either left behind to help guard the baggage, or had been left at the hospital.

Cowpens in Miniature 24

Part 24: The Last Gambit

Previous: Surrender

Next: The Battle Ends

Tarleton remained on the battlefield with a small group of stalwarts, even after the British had surrendered. He surely knew that the British right had fled or surrendered. Less clear is if he knew what had befallen the 71st Foot. In any case, the Americans soon assembled a force consisting of the bulk of their cavalry [see Note 1] and at least a portion of the Continentals to drive off of this last vestige of resistance and pursue those forces that had fled.

Upon the surrender of the 71st Foot, Colonel Andrew Pickens remembered that he "sent back to Genl Morgan, by Major Jackson, Major McCarthur, with the sword" [see Note 2]. He then "met Coln Washington with his cavalry in pursuit of Tarleton" [see Note 3]. He therefore "ordered Jackson who was brave & active, to return as quickly as possible with as many mounted militia as he could get."

Meanwhile, Tarleton watched as the Americans approached. With him were "Fourteen officers and forty horse-men… not unmindful of their own reputation, or the situation of their commanding officer." The American cavalry had somewhat fewer than 100 men. The prudent decision, perhaps, would have been to turn around and retreat down the Green River Road, but he felt compelled to put up a fight [see Note 4].

Final Confrontation. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11, 14 = British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons. The blue-ringed circles show where the British front line (9) and 71st Foot (13) surrendered.

Final Confrontation (click to enlarge). As American cavalry and infantry set off in pursuit of the fleeing British, they must first confront Tarleton.

Lieutenant Mackenzie, although by now a prisoner, was perhaps witness to this event. He recalled, with a mixture of awe and disdain, that "Even at this late stage of the defeat, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, with no more than fifty horse, hesitated not to charge the whole of Washington's cavalry, though supported by the continentals; it was a small body of officers, and a detachment of the seventeenth regiment of dragoons, who presented themselves on this desperate occasion" [see Note 5].

The official British report of the battle claimed that these cavalry, "having had time to recollect themselves, & being animated by the Bravery of the Officer who had so often led them to victory, charged & repulsed Colonel Washington's Horse." Tarleton’s memoir went further, claiming that "Colonel Washington's cavalry were… driven back into the continental infantry by this handful of brave men" [see Note 6].

Tarleton's Charge. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11 = British Cavalry.

Tarleton's Charge (click to enlarge).

This description seems basically accurate. Cornet Simons recalled that "It was at this period after the Action that we sustained the greatest loss of Men." Delaware Continental Henry Wells stated that "In this fight I was struck across the left shoulder by one of Tarleton's Troopers, With his Sword with Such Violence, that the colar of my coat, my vest and my Shirt, were each cut through, and the flesh & skin Sleightly scratched and bruised so much so that there was a considerable not or welt on my Sholder for a number of days" [see Note 7].

Success, however, was fleeting. The American cavalry quickly recovered and they sent the British fleeing. Alexander Chesney wrote that we "the remainder [of the British Legion] charged but were repulsed… I was with Tarleton in the charge" [see Note 8]. Mackenzie stated that "the loss sustained was in proportion to the danger of the enterprise, and the whole body was repulsed."

Simons noted that "their Cavalry, who finding they could no longer Keep Everhart a Prisoner, Shot him with a Pistol, in the head, over one of his eyes, (I cannot remember particularly which) being then intermixed with the enemy, Everhart pointed out to me the man who shot him, and on whom a just Retaliation was exercised, and who by my order, was instantly Shot, and his horse as well as I can recollect, was given to Everhart, whom I ordered in the rear to the Surgeons" [see again Note 5].

Once again, Tarleton escaped capture [see Note 9]. Henry Wells recalled that "Col. Tarleton was hard run by a small detachment of American horse and barely escaped being taken prisoner. It was generally agreed in the Camp that Tarleton could easily have been shot by those in pursuit of him, but their object was to take him alive."

The immediate American pursuit was determined, but disorganized. This led to one more confrontation between the British and American cavalry.

Howard learned that "In the pursuit he [William Washington] had got a head of his men, perhaps 30 yards. Three of the british officers observing this wheeled about and made a charge at him. The officer on his right was raising his arm to cut at him when a sargent came up and made a stroke at this officer which disabled his arm.--The officer on the left at the same moment was preparing to make a stroke at him when a boy, a waiter, who had not the strength to wield a sword, drew his pistol and shot and wounded this officer, which disabled him. The third person, who Washington thinks was Tarleton, made a thrust at him which he parryed. This person then retreated 10 or 12 steps and wheeled about and fired a pistol which wounded Washington's horse [see Note 10].

Pursuit. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11 = British Cavalry.

Pursuit (click to enlarge).

Notes:

1. But not all. As noted previously (Cowpens in Miniature 23), a part of the mounted militia was attempting to capture the British baggage train. Cornet Simons believed that some of the Continental dragoons were still mopping up the scattered British infantry. He wrote to Washington that "Lt Bell" had "taken off with him in pursuit of the Enemy, on our left nearly a fourth part of your Regt."

At least part (and maybe most) of the mounted militia was with Washington at this time. Manual McConnell stated in his pension application that he was a member of "Capt. McCall's company… attached to the command of Col. Washington." He claimed that "he was with or not far behind Col. Washington when he chased Col. Tarlton so close after the battle."

2. Although Pickens and Jackson differed as to who captured McArthur, they agreed on this point. Jackson wrote to Morgan that I had "the honor of introducing Maj. McArthur [to you]."

3. Pickens’ statement is important in establishing the timing of this last encounter of the British and American cavalry. That Washington was still on the battlefield strongly suggests that this fight occurred after the 71st had surrendered. Indications that the Delaware Continentals were also a part of Washington’s pursuit force, places the surrender of the 71st (in which the Delawareans participated), before this fight with Tarleton. In Simons account, Washington began "pursuit of their Cavalry," "immediately after Securing the Prisoners."

4. Benson Lossing, a mid-19th Century visitor of the battlefield, wrote that the British infantry "retreated along the Mill gap road [i.e., the Green River Road] to the place near Scruggs's... then covered with an open wood like the ground where the conflict commenced. There the battle ended and the pursuit was relinquished. It was near the northern border of that present open field that Washington and Tarleton had a personal conflict." He also wrote that "The battle ended within a quarter of a mile of Scruggs's." Scrugg's farm was not present at the time of the battle. It's future location was near the road, close to the right edge of the battlefield map. I show Tarleton's charge occurring close to 1/2 mile from Scrugg's farm. Although not shown (because of the small numbers involve), I envision the final brush between Washington and (allegedly) Tarleton to have occurred at a location about midway between the site of Tarleton's charge and the eastern edge of the battlefield.

5. Tarleton said there were 14 officers. Mackenzie indicated that the 17th Light Dragoons had two officers; my system for estimating British strength at the battle (see Cowpens in Miniature 2) yielded 12 officers for the British Legion dragoons. Therefore, it’s possible that all of the British Legion dragoon and 17th Light Dragoon officers were present. Although seemingly excluded, it’s possible that some mounted infantry officers were also present.

Tarleton generally gave round numbers for his strength, so it’s unlikely that exactly 40 troopers were with him, as he claimed. Mackenzie said that the number was something less than 50 and identified them as the 17th Light Dragoons. In view of their heavy losses earlier in the battle (see Cowpens in Miniature 20), they could not have mustered close to 40 or 50 men. Some rank and file of the British Legion must have been present. Their identity is unknown, although Simons’ account implicates that the men holding Sergeant Everhart a prisoner were present (see Cowpens in Miniature 7 regarding his capture). This suggests either the British vanguard or a provost guard had been left in the rear when the British Legion reserve was ordered up. This group is repeatedly depicted on the battlefield maps I’ve prepared.

6. Howard’s account was written in order to correct mischaracterizations of the battle present in William Johnson’s account (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1). Howard seems to have regarded Tarleton’s description as basically accurate (as do I), although Howard wrote that on this point, Tarleton was in error. "Tarleton says that 14 officers & 40 men charged Washington's horse and drove them back to the [Continentals] ... This is not correct. This affair checked Washington's pursuit, but he did not fall back." If Howard meant only that Washington did not fall back to where Howard, the militia, and the remainder of the Continentals were guarding the prisoners, then this statement is not problematic. Tarleton’s version seems to be confirmed by Delaware Continental Henry Wells.

7. He’s referring to the battle in general and not specifically this exchange, but this is the most likely timing. Other Delaware Continentals indicated they joined with Washington in the pursuit. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson wrote "We followed them ten miles but not being able to Come up With them Returned back to the field of Battle that night and lay amongst the Dead & Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work." Sergeant-Major William Seymour wrote "our men pursuing them for the distance of twelve miles." Neither of these statements, however, mentions the cavalry action at the beginning of the pursuit.

8. This is the most logical event that Chesney is referring to. However, when the passage is read in context, Chesney seems to be referring to some charge that occurred at the beginning of the American counterattack (See Alexander Chesney's Rivulet for the full text of his statement). While Chesney should be regarded as an excellent source, I did not make the most direct interpretation of his account because such a claim would be in contrast with a number of other participant accounts.

It should be noted Tarleton, and the band with him, might not have witnessed the surrender of the 71st Foot because of the intervening ridge. Chesney may have learned about their surrender later and wrongly concluded that the 71st surrendered after the unsuccessful final cavalry fight. The official British report of the battle claimed that "The Loss of our Cavalry is inconsiderable, but I fear, about 400 of the Infantry are either killed or wounded, or taken." This claim was disingenuous. The "400 of the Infantry" just about covers the killed, wounded, and captured that Tarleton could likely see from his final position of the battlefield. The loss sustained by the 71st (which was total) could at least have been surmised.

9. This is in reference to his escaping being captured with Major McArthur and the 71st Foot (see Cowpens in Miniature 22).

10. David Stewart related a muddled version of this same episode. In his telling, Cornet Patterson of the 17th Light Dragoons was the officer wounded by Washington’s "waiter." Continental dragoon James Kelly described a second-hand version of this episode in his pension application.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Pickens, Howard, and Anderson, among others.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

The Journal of Alexander Chesney.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Manual McConnell (.pdf file).

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Jackson's letters.

Benson John Lossing's 1860 Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of James Kelly (.pdf file).

Related: The British Legion, The American Cavalry - Part 1, 17th Light Dragoons

Cowpens in Miniature 23

Part 23: Surrender

Previous: Flight

Next: The Last Gambit

The flight of the British Legion dragoon reserve meant that the American counterattack would not be checked. François-Jean de Chastellux noted that the British Legion "fled full gallop, without ever thinking of the infantry, or taking the least precaution to cover their retreat."

The infantry struggled to fend for themselves as all order broke down. Daniel Morgan reported that "The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight." Sergeant-Major William Seymour happily observed that the British "retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field." From writing from a British perspective, David Stewart gloomily concurred, "the rout Was general; few of the infantry escaped; and of the cavalry, who put their horses to full speed, not a man was taken."

Not all of the British troops attempted to flee, however. The remnant of the 17th Light Dragoons stayed on the field, although they had been, in Cornet James Simons words, "deserted by Colo. Tarleton's Legeonary Cavalry." Tarleton also remained behind. When the Legion dragoons could not be rallied, he remained with the 17th Light Dragoons and a handful of others on horseback, near the Green River Road. George Hanger claimed that "He stood almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy, with hopes either of rallying his own men, or not surviving their disgrace." This small force offered at least some protection for his retreating infantry, which had, in American Thomas Young’s words, thrown "down their guns and cartouch boxes, made for the wagon road, and did the prettiest sort of running!"

The presence of the American cavalry in the rear of the British infantry severely limited their options to escape.

Cornet James Simons stated in a letter to William Washington long after the battle that "In pursuit of their Cavalry [i.e., the 17th Light Dragoons] you overtook their Artillery, whom you immediately made prisoners." Howard convincingly claimed that the guns were taken by his own infantry [see Note 1], but it’s possible that the cavalry encountered at least the horse-drawn limbers. Simon went on to relate that "the Drivers of the Horses who were Galloping off with 2-3 pounders, you could not make Surrender until after Repeated Commands from you, you were obliged to order to be Shot; after securing these fieldpieces."

Letting the 17th go, the American then turned on the British infantry. According to Simons "your third Charge was made on the right wing of their Army… who, under the Operation of a Universal panic, (having been successfully charged on the left of their Army by our friend Col. Howard) instantly surrendered" [see Note 2]. Major Joseph McJunkin remembered also the key role played by the American cavalry, "Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms [see Note 3].

The British infantry was certainly not going to outrun the American cavalry; frequently they could not outrun the American infantry.

Mackenzie wrote that "the infantry were easily overtaken, as the cause which had retarded the pursuit [i.e., exhaustion], had now an equal effect in impeding the retreat: dispirited on many accounts, they surrendered at discretion." De Chastellux agreed, "Fatigued by a very long march, they were soon overtaken."

Even the militia that had survived Nettles’ attack was able to contribute to this final assault on the British right. According to Private James Collins, "We… advanced briskly, and gained the right flank of the enemy, and they being hard pressed in front, by Howard, and falling very fast, could not stand it long.

Surrender (click to enlarge). Closely pressed by American Continentals and militia, and their retreat cut off by the American cavalry, most of the British infantry throw down their arms (not shown). Meanwhile, Tarleton stands "almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy."

American Cavalryman Thomas Young, seeing the British line collapse so utterly noted that at this time, "Major Jolly and seven or eight of us, resolved upon an excursion to capture some of the baggage" [see Note 4]. Tarleton may have seen these men, but he evidently did not interfere with them. He retained his toehold on the battlefield.

Around the same time, that the Americans were mopping up the right side of the British line, the British left was also in complete collapse. Lieutenant-Colonel Howard recalled that "In the pursuit, I was led towards the [American] right, in among the 71st, who were broken into squads. They no longer offered serious resistance. William Moultrie claimed that "So great was the consternation in which the British infantry were, at seeing their cavalry gallop off, that, either from pique or panic, numbers of them never fired a gun."

Howard recalled that "I called to them [the 71st Foot] to surrender, they laid down their arms, and the officers delivered up their swords." Major McJunkin was also immediately present and remembered that "some begin to call for quarters," when "the voice of Howard is heard amid the rush of men and clangor of steel: ‘Throw down your arms and you shall have good quarters.’ When they were finally "convinced that quarters would be given, they as it were rent the very air with thanks that their lives would be spared. These were called the Scots regiment" [see Note 5].

All-in-all, according to William Moultrie, "upwards of five hundred laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners. The first battalion of the seventy-first, and two companies of light infantry, laid down their arms." The 71st surrendered on the British left; the two companies of light infantry (perhaps Moultrie meant the light infantry of the 16th and 71st regiments) were perhaps the last organized resistance on the British right.

Several anecdotes concerning the surrender of the 71st Foot have been preserved in participant accounts. McJunkin stated that "In the conclusion of this foray you might have seen Major [James] Jackson of Georgia rush among the broken ranks of the 71st Regiment and attempting to seize their standard, while they are vainly trying to form by it; you might have seen Col. Howard interposing for the relief of his friend when entangled among his foes" [see Note 6].

Howard related that one "Captain Duncanson, of the 71st grenadiers [see Note 7], gave me his sword, and stood by me. Upon getting on my horse, I found him pulling at my saddle, and he nearly unhorsed me. I expressed my displeasure, and asked him what he was about. The explanation was, that they had orders to give no'quarter, and they did not expect any; and as my men were coming up, he was afraid they would use him ill. I admitted his excuse, and put him into the care of a sergeant. I had messages from him for some years afterwards, expressing his obligation for my having saved his life."

Major Arthur McArthur, who commanded the first battalion of the 71st attempted to escape on horseback, but he was overridden by one or more mounted Americans. Who captured him is unclear. Colonel Andrew Pickens claimed that, "Major McCarthur surrendered to me, some distance from the battlefield & delivered his sword to me," while Major Jackson wrote that McArthur was "a prisoner on that occasion taken by myself" [emphasis in original].

Notes:

1. Morgan also implicitly credited Howard with capturing the guns in his official report of the battle. Howard, Morgan reported, "gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address that they [the British] fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces in our possession."

2. The excised text includes that "the right wing of their Army Composed of their Legeonary Infantry, intermixed with the Battallion of the Brave 71st (under the Command of Major McArthur,)" The 71st Foot was neither a part of the right wing of their army nor next to the British Legion infantry. Perhaps he was thinking of the light infantry companies of the 71st Foot, who were on hand.

3. The full text reads "One battalion throws down their arms and the men fall to the earth. Another commences flight, but Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms." McJunkin recognized that the British line had broken into two parts. The battalion that "throws down their arms" is the 71st, the other "battalion" is the British right. McJunkin was personally involved at this time in the fight against the 71st; he did not seem to realize or remember that the British right included several commands.

4. Howard mentions Morgan’s aide, Baron de Glaubeck leading "five or six militia men well mounted," on this excursion. McJunkin related that "After the surrender of the British infantry a company of fourteen dashed off to take possession of the British baggage wagons ten miles distant. Major Benjamin Jolly and a Frenchman called De Barron headed this party. It happened to pass Col. Tarleton while he was collecting his men after the retreat. Unconscious of this fact, they pressed on in comparative security."

Other individuals may have also made a mounted pursuit. Militiaman Hugh McNary claimed that he joined in the pursuit "when the Enemy first gave way." Whether the rest of his company was mounted or on foot, he "got far enough ahead of his company to stop a British officer, the officer surrendered, deponent [i.e., McNary] dismounted and took from the officer his Holsters and pistols, and after getting them, he discovered, that his company had stopped pursuit and were retreating back, he mounted his horse and returned leaving the British officer, but took the Holsters and pistols which he afterwards sold."

5. Several American sources seemed impressed by the restraint they showed on this occasion (implicitly in contrast with what happened on other battlefields). Morgan reported that "It, perhaps, would be well to remark, for the honor of the American arms, that although the progress of this [Tarleton’s] corps was marked with burning and devastation, and although they waged the most cruel warfare, not a man was killed, wounded, or even insulted, after he surrendered."

6. Major James Jackson confirmed this episode: "[I ran] the utmost risk of my life, in an attempt to seize the colors of the 71st regiment in the midst of it, on their attempt to form after they were broken, being saved by an exertion of Col. Howard’s." The 71st Foot did not carry its colors into the battle. The 7th Foot did have its colors, one of which was captured by an American militiaman (see 7th Regiment of Foot). This account may describe that capture.

7. The two battalions of the 71st Foot had, between them, two companies of light infantry, and two companies of grenadiers. The former were at the battle of Cowpens, the latter were not. The 71st's grenadiers were captured at the battle of Stony Point in 1779. That Captain Duncanson would have been at Cowpens indicates that he was 1) absent during the battle of Stony Point, 2) at that battle, but subsequently exchanged, or 3) captured at Stony Point, but released on parole. If Duncanson had violated his parole, he was liable to be hanged.

Sources:

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report, and a copy of Jackson's letters.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Hanger's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Young, McJunkin, Collins, Howard, and Pickens, among others.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes a review by Will Graves of McJunkin's statements. McJunkin's description of the raid on the baggage train can be found here.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh McNary (.pdf file).

Related: 71st Foot, The American Cavalry - Part 1, The American Cavalry - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 21

Part 21: Collapse

Previous: Washington and Howard Charge

Next: Flight

After Howard charged, several specific things happened at this time so close together that it is difficult to sort out the exact timing of each.

On the British left, the 71st Foot was disorganized, but still dangerous. David Stewart wrote that "They were checked; but they did not fall back immediately, probably expecting that the first line and cavalry would push forward to their support" [see Note 1].

It is likely that the 71st Foot still extended beyond the right flank of the Continentals. There was, on at least one part of the line, enough separation with the Continentals to permit, in Stewart’s words, "some irregular firing between them [the 71st Foot] and Colonel Howard's reserve [the Continentals]" [see Note 2].

This portion of the 71st may also have continued to advance, even as other parts of the British line were falling back. Sergeant Major William Seymour recorded in journal that the British "thought to surround our right flank," but they were foiled in this effort because "Captain Kirkwood with his company wheeled to the right and attacked their left flank [i.e., the 71st Foot] so vigorously that they were soon repulsed, our men advancing on them so very rapidly that they soon gave way" [see Note 3].

In the British center, the Americans pitched into the ranks of the British infantry with their bayonets, making prisoners of some, striking down others, and driving back the rest. This created a clean break in the British line with the British infantry there either scattering or falling back towards the flanks and rear [see Note 4]. Just as a part of the Continentals had wheeled to the right to attack the 71st Foot, others wheeled to the left and fell upon the other end of the broken British line. According to Sergeant-Major William Seymour, "Our left flank [i.e., the left side of the Continentals] advanced… and repulsed their right flank [i.e., the right half of the British line]."

In this moment of crisis, Tarleton ordered his last reserve, the British Legion dragoons, to advance. He "sent directions to his cavalry to form about four hundred yards to the right of the enemy, in order to check them." With the British infantry beginning to retreat, Tarleton perhaps thought that by placing this massive cavalry force on the flank of the American line he could compel them to fall back and adopt a defensive posture. However, "The cavalry did not comply with the order" [see Note 5]. Meanwhile, Tarleton personally attempt to turn around the British infantry, but he was stymied: "Exertions to make them advance were useless" [see Note 6].

As the 7th Foot and British Legion infantry fell back, they left exposed the two cannon belonging to the Royal Artillery.

Howard recalled that "As the [Continental] line approached [the British], I observed their artillery a short distance in front, and called to Captain Ewing, who was near me, to take it. Captain Anderson… hearing the order, also pushed for the same object, and both being emulous for the prize, kept pace until near the first piece, when Anderson, by placing the end of his espontoon forward into the ground, made a long leap which brought him upon the gun, and gave him the honour of the prize" [see Note 7].

Tarleton was on hand and "endeavoured to rally the infantry to protect the guns… [but] the effort to collect the infantry was ineffectual: Neither promises nor threats could gain their attention; they surrendered or dispersed, and abandoned the guns to the artillery men, who defended them for some time with exemplary resolution" [see Note 8].

On the British right, Washington burst onto the scene as he pursued the fleeing 17th Light Dragoons. Howard wrote that "as soon as we got among the enemy & were making prisoners I observed the enemy's cavalry retreating the way they had advanced, by our left flank, and Washington in pursuit of them and he followed them some distance."

Howard recalled that "My attention was now drawn to an altercation of some of the men with an artillery man, who appeared to make it a point of honour not to surrender his match. The men, provoked by his obstinacy, would have bayonetted him on the spot, had I not interfered, and desired them to spare the life of so brave a man. He then surrendered his match" [see Note 9].

The British Line Collapses. 1 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (reforming), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The British Line Collapses (two views; click to enlarge). The British infantry began to retreat in the face of a bayonet charge by the Continental infantry in front. Meanwhile, the American cavalry and militia begin to threaten the British flanks.

Notes:

1. The first line was not behind them at this point, as he alleged, but off to the right. It was in a similar situation at this moment and in no condition to offer assistance.

2. One of the distinctive features of Lawrence Babits’ account of the battle (A Devil of a Whipping) is that he maintained that Major Joseph McDowell’s battalion of North Carolinians did not retreat behind the main line when the militia line broke, but rather maintained contact with the British infantry and were driven back only by a charge of Ogilvie’s dragoons and a detachment of the 71st Foot. In support of this account, Babits cited the pension application of William Meade, who claimed that "He had a rib broken by the point of a Bayonet, had his skull badly fractured by a Sword, and had a leg badly wounded by the stroke of a Cutlass of a British Light horseman."

Meade's statement indicates that some of the American militia on the right were assailed by both infantry and cavalry. In my account, Ogilvie charged the American militia on the right, but without the participation of British infantry. However, I do show that the 71st Foot later crossed into the area through which Ogilvie had charged in attempting to turn the right flank of the Continentals. My explanation for Meade’s injuries is as follows: in the wake of Ogilvie’s charge, a number of militiamen (including, but not limited to, the men of McDowell’s battalion) were left wounded on the ground, and as the 71st Foot swept over the area, some of these hapless Americans were bayoneted by the Highlanders).

3. Captain Robert Kirkwood commanded the company of Delaware Continentals. Seymour’s description is ambiguous as to whether he was referring to the larger British effort to turn the Americans’ right flank or a specific proximal event that triggered this movement by Kirkwood’s company.

4. Several American accounts distinguish between a British left and right for this and later points in the battle. Robert Long, for example, recalled that late in the battle the British "on the right and left surrendered or retreated." Seymour’s account provides the strongest indication that the Continentals’ counterattack forced this severance.

5. This failure of the British Legion cavalry to advance has been interpreted as a primary cause of the British defeat. The cavalry, it has been argued by others, were lacking in fighting spirit. I don’t find this argument to be particularly compelling. Captain David Ogilvie’s company charged the Americans and appears to have fought bravely, and I know of no reason why this company should be viewed as exceptional within the regiment.

Worth considering is an alternative possibility: that the Legion dragoons didn’t execute the order because it didn’t make sense.

The order would have carried the dragoons into a creek bottom and wood swarming with militiamen. That’s not to say that Tarleton should have realized that the order was nonsensical. Tarleton was, after all, in the center trying to rally the British regulars, and things were so chaotic at this moment that there was no opportunity for him to converse with the officers commanding his dragoons.

But why would Tarleton have thought this order to be appropriate?

Tarleton had already ordered the Legion dragoons to occupy a position on the American right (see Cowpens in Miniature 17), but they failed to fully execute this order. I suggested one of three possible reasons for that failure (see Cowpens in Miniature 18, Note 1): that they may have misunderstood Tarleton’s intentions, that they may have found the ground in front of them to be unsuitable, or that they may have found the timing of the movement to be spoiled. Tarleton can be excused on this count unless the problem was with the terrain and he had been informed of that problem.

Also curious is that at this moment the Americans were a short distance to the front. Why then would Tarleton then order the dragoons to a position on the flank? Perhaps Tarleton saw that the dragoons could not make a direct charge (in any order at least) through the swarm of Continentals and British regulars, and he ordered the dragoons to the flank where they would have a relatively clear shot at the Americans.

6. There are some noteworthy differences between the Tarleton-inspired British official report of the battle and Tarleton’s later memoir. The report notes that "The 1st Battalion of the 71st & the cavalry were successively ordered up; but neither the exertions, entreaties, or Example of Lieut. Colonel Tarleton could prevent the panic from becoming general." In the memoir, it is clear that the 71st had already been committed and was in no condition to rescue anyone. David Stewart, in fact, claimed that the rest of the British line failed to come up in support of the 71st. Such gross differences suggest that neither half of the broken British line knew where the other half was or what it was doing.

7. Captain James Ewing commanded the left-hand company in Howard’s battalion (see pension application of Sergeant Benjamin Martin). The placement of Anderson’s company is unknown, but he may have been next to Ewing.

8. The language in Cornwallis’ report of the battle is even stronger, "the two three pounders were taken… In justice to the Detachment of the Royal Artillery, I must here observe that no terrors could induce them to abandon their Guns, & they were all either killed or wounded in defense of them."

9. Elsewhere he gave another version of this event: "When I came up to the two pieces of artillery which we took, I saw some of my men going to bayonet the man who had the match. He refused to surrender it, and I believe he would have suffered himself to have been bayoneted, if I had not rescued him rather than give up his match."

Sources:

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's account of the battle.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Meade (.pdf file).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf).

Related: 7th Regiment of Foot, 71st Foot, The British Legion

Cowpens in Miniature 20

Part 20: Washington and Howard Charge

Previous: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Next: Collapse

Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington was stationed, with his dragoons, in rear of the American main line during the battle. His cavalry was the Americans’ last line of defense, and like his counterpart, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, he used his cavalry sparingly [see Note 1]. Washington sent mounted militia forward at the beginning of the battle to cover the retreat of the militia, but then had them return to a position in reserve [see Note 2]. When Ogilvie charged, he sent forward a portion of his dragoons to prevent the American right from being wholly swept away, but still he did not commit his entire force. However, when the Continental infantry began to retreat, he was left with no alternative than to bring his remaining dragoons forward and use them to guard against a rout of the American center. With his last dragoons deployed, no force was left to counter the charge of the 17th light dragoons. Mounted militiaman Jeremiah Dial saw "the British broke through the leftwing of the Malitia" (i.e., Triplett’s Virginians) and charge into the American rear. There was, however, no immediate relief for those that were attacked.

William Moultrie stated in his postwar history that "Colonel Washington… [was] close to the rear of the second line [i.e., the Continentals] with his cavalry, and spoke to Colonel Howard, 'that if he would rally his men, and charge the enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry that were got among our militia in the rear' [see Note 3]."

Washington at this moment may also have ordered the recall of the detachment of dragoons that had driven off Ogilvie’s company [see Note 4].

Moments later, Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard ordered the retreating Continentals to halt, about face, and deliver a fatal volley into the astonished British.

Both Howard and Washington then ordered charges, respectively, against the British infantry and cavalry.

The volleys Howard’s Continentals delivered at close range brought down many of the British infantry and left the rest reeling. According to Howard, "While [the British were] in this confusion, I ordered a charge with the bayonet, which order was obeyed with great alacrity."

This was also the experience of Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals. He recorded in his journal that we "Charged them home. They not expecting any Such thing put them in Such Confusion that We Were in amongst them With the Bayonets Which Caused them to give ground."

Similarly, Henry Lee stated that "Howard seized the happy moment, and followed his advantage with the bayonet. This decisive step gave us the day. The reserve [i.e., the 71st Foot] having been brought near the line, shared in the destruction of our fire, and presented no rallying point to the fugitives.

Meanwhile, according to Howard, "Washington observing... [the British cavalry] charged them. As well as I can recollect this charge was made at the same moment that I charged the infantry." Anderson made the same observation in his journal "At the Same time that We Charged, Col. Washington Charged the horse Which Soon gave Way" [see Note 5].

In making this charge, according to Howard, Washington "moved to the left from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse" [see Note 6].

Within moments they passed by elements of the shattered right wing of the main line [see Note 7] and into the ranks of the 17th Light Dragoons.

Washington and Howard Charge. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Cornet James Simons, one of Washington’s cavalrymen, wrote in a letter to William Washington that "your first charge was made on the enemy's Cavalry, (who were cutting down our Militia) and when, after a smart Action, you instantly defeated, leaving in the course of ten minutes 18 of their brave 17th Dragoons dead on the spot."

Ten minutes was probably too long of a duration for this action. Private James Collins remembered that "in a few moments, Col. Washington's cavalry was among them, like a whirlwind, and the poor fellows began to kneel from their horses, without being able to remount. The shock was so sudden and violent, they could not stand it, and immediately betook themselves to flight." Howard wrote that Colonel Washington charged the enemy's cavalry, who were cutting down our militia, and soon drove them off."

The American Counterattack. (two views; click to enlarge). The Continental infantry (under Howard) charge into the heart of the British line. Meanwhile, the American cavalry (under Washington) relieve the militia from the assault of the 17th Light Dragoons.

As the British dragoons retreated, the American cavalry stormed after them in close pursuit. For the British dragoons, according to Collins, "there was no time to rally, and they appeared to be as hard to stop as a drove of wild Choctaw steers, going to a Pennsylvania market. In a few moments the clashing of swords was out of hearing and quickly out of sight." Less colorfully, Howard commented that Washington "never lost sight of them until they abandoned the ground" [see Note 8].

Notes:

1. In eighteenth century Western-style warfare, the commander that committed his reserves last was often the one that emerged victorious. Tarleton used a part of his mounted force in a limited capacity during the middle phase of the battle, while holding back a large reserve. Washington deployed a large portion of his force on both occassions, but this seems chiefly to reflect the extremity of the circumstances. That the Americans had to fully commit their cavalry before the British might have been disastrous to them. Major George Hanger commented years later that the defeat of Ogilvie (and by extension, Nettles too) was inconsequential compared to Tarleton’s inability to make good use of his reserve late in the battle.

2. Private Thomas Young described the mounted militiamen being used in this capacity. See The American Cavalry - Part 2 for details on the initial deployment of the American cavalry. Whether Washington took the initiative in ordering the mounted militia forward or whether the order originated with Morgan is unknown.

3. It is difficult to discern exactly who did what at this critical point in the battle. Moultrie’s statement indicates Washington was the key actor in rallying the Continentals, while the accounts by Morgan and Howard each chiefly credit themselves.

4. Thomas Young recalled that "At this moment the bugle sounded. We about half formed and making a sort of circuit at full speed, came up in the rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen. At this moment Col. Howard gave the word "charge bayonets!" and the day was ours."

One reading of this statement is that the group of American dragoons that had driven off Ogilvie charged around the vulnerable left flank of the British line and passed into the ground behind the 71st Foot. I regard Young as a trustworthy source and have put a great deal of reliance on his account elsewhere, but this part of his statement is difficult to reconcile. Young’s account suggests that his small group of dragoons were the first to counterattack when other sources give that honor to Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard’s Continentals. He also seemingly places his small group of dragoons in an unlikely position between the British infantry and the British cavalry reserve before either had been beaten. The experience of the 71st Foot was described in detail by David Stewart and Roderick Mackenzie, but neither mention such a charge; nor too did other American cavalrymen.

An alternative interpretation is that Washington recalled the dragoons on his right ("the bugle sounded"), these cavalry then followed in the wake of Washington’s own charge, moving behind the Continentals from the right side of the battlefield to the left ("making a sort of circuit at full speed") and then joined with Washington in the charge that helped shatter the British left and broke into the British rear (we "came up in the rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen"). This reading is not problematic so long as "this moment" when "Col. Howard gave the word "charge bayonets!"" preceded the moment when the dragoons "came up in the rear of the British line."

5. Respected histories of the battle, such as those by Edwin Bearss and Lawrence Babits, place Washington’s charge against the British cavalry soon after the militia retreated and well before the Continentals counterattacked. That the charges occurred at the same time is strongly indicated by Howard and Anderson. Another participant, Robert Long, recalled that "Col. Washington charged them with his cavalry; at the same time our infantry charged the British with the bayonet." Henry Lee’s history of the battle stated that "part of the enemy's cavalry, having gained our rear, fell on that portion of the militia who had retired to their horses. Washington struck at them with his dragoons, and drove them before him. Thus, by simultaneous efforts, the infantry and cavalry of the enemy routed."

6. That Washington was charging a British cavalry force to his left (and not Ogilvie’s dragoons, which had been to his right) is indicated in several accounts. Daniel Morgan’s report of the battle stated that "Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that the Tarleton was cutting down our riflemen on the left, pushed forward, and charged them." Private Jeremiah Dial stated in his pension application that "Washington's Cavalry with whom this applicant fought during the engagement were stationed in the rear of Morgan's forces and when the British broke through the leftwing of the Malitia Washington’s cavalry made an attack upon them and defeated them with considerable loss."

Howard also emphasized that the charge was made toward the American rear, rather than towards the British infantry: "Washington's charge had no connexion with mine as his movement was to the rear in a quite different direction."

7. These men, according to the present account of the battle, first broke when Ogilvie charged, and, in retreating for their horses, fell in the path of Nettles’ charge. William Neel of Captain Patrick Buchanan’s company recalled seeing that, "the South Carolina mounted militia," who he had earlier denigrated (see Cowpens in Miniature 14) had "rallied and assisted to complete the victory." Captain Henry Connelly remarked that "we was fortunately relieved by Washingtons legion that hastened to our assistance."

8. François-Jean de Chastellux asked Morgan "how Tarleton's cavalry were employed during the engagement." He learned that "whilst the infantry were engaged, they endeavoured to turn the flanks of General Morgan's army, but were kept in awe by some riflemen, and by the American horse detached by Colonel Washington, to support them, in two little squadrons." The manner in which I have depicted the charges by Ogilvie and Nettles as well as their defeat by the American militia and cavalry is consistent with this description.

Sources:

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Dial (.pdf file).

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, Anderson, Collins, and Young, among others.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Hanger's and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf file).

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

Related: The Fatal Moment, The American Cavalry - Part 1, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 19

Part 19: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Previous: The Third Crisis

Next: Washington and Howard Charge

As the Continentals about-faced and moved off in retreat, the British infantry surged towards them, cheering and wielding their bayonets. According to Henry Lee, "Considering this retrograde movement the precursor of flight, the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder." It was fortunate for the Americans that their commanders kept a cool head at this interval and marked out a spot where their men would halt and renew the fight. It was fortunate too that the American rank and file did not realize that the retreat was in error. Morgan and Howard acted "as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted" [see Note 1].

The British infantry were near the Continentals, and perhaps closing the distance with the Continentals, but the British could not overtake them. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie complained that "The infantry were not in condition to overtake the fugitives" [see Note 2]. The British, more so than the Americans "had been in motion day and night" in the days leading up to the battle. "A number [of the British]… had already fallen… fatigue, however, enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss of blood… the infantry, though well disposed, were unable to come up with his [Howard’s] corps [see Note 3].

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, in command of this battalion commented that "This retreat was accidental but was very fortunate as we thereby were extricated from the enemy."

They had fallen back approximately 100 yards [see Note 4], wheeling to their right during the retreat [see Note 5].

The Continentals Halt (click to enlarge).

At this point, according to Howard, "The enemy were now very near us." The distance may have been less than 30 yards [see Note 6].

Howard gave the command "to halt and face about." And with that "the line was perfectly formed in a moment."

For the pursuing British, here was a great shock. One moment they were on the verge of vanquishing their enemy, the next they were eye-to-eye with a wall of infantry.

There was a moment’s pause, and then the next command was given.

According to Anderson, we "then give them a full Volley."

This volley can be regarded as the climatic moment of the battle, an instant that both sides recognized as a turning point. The American after action report stated that we "gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder." The British after action report echoed this remark "General Morgan's Corps faced about & gave them [the British troops] a heavy fire. This unexpected event, occasioned the utmost confusion" [see Note 7].

A Fatal Volley (click to enlarge).

Henry Lee observed that the British were "Stunned by this unexpected shock," and "the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." The Americans, for their part, did not relent. The Continentals, in Howard’s words, gave the British "a few rounds" of "a very destructive fire."

Meanwhile, the British were also inflicting heavy losses, but on the American militia.

Major Joseph McJunkin stated that during the battle, "Tarleton… made a charge on the right & left wings, treading & cutting till he got in the rear of Howard's command." The first attack, by Ogilvie, had already been repulsed. The second one, by Lieutenant Henry Nettles and the 17th Light Dragoons, had cut through Triplett’s Virginians. Beyond Triplett’s men, and in the rear of the American position, was a host of targets for the 17th Light Dragoons. The dragoons attacked them all.

Nettles' Attack. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line (Triplett's former company has been broken, but the rest of the line is intact), 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Captain Connelly, who was fleeing with his company from the right wing of the main line towards the militia horses recalled that the British cavalry attacked "our company when just about to catch up [to] our horses which was tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle." They "fell upon us with great fury."

Some men from the right wing of the militia line were also in this area [see Note 8]. These men had already reached their horses when the dragoons attacked. One of these men Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled, "Tarleton's cavalry pursued us; ("now," thought I, "my hide is in the loft;") just as we got to our horses, they overtook us and began to make a few hacks at some, however, without doing much injury. They, in their haste, had pretty much scattered, perhaps, thinking they would have another Fishing creek frolic."

The heaviest blow fell upon the men of Colonel Andrew Pickens’ regiment of South Carolina militia. After serving on the militia line, they had reformed behind Triplett’s Virginians….

Jeremiah Files claimed he "was wounded by Tarleton's Dragoons on the head--on the left Arm and on the right Hand each wound was made with a sword… the wounds Greatly Disabled [him] & stuned him for some time." Private James Pettigrew saw that his, James Caldwell, "was cut almost to death by Tarlton's horsemen so much so that he had to be borne from the field." Michael Cain was wounded "on the head by a sword." His Captain, Andrew Miller, was killed [see Note 9]. Charles Holland "was wounded by a sword thrust through the body."

Private Robert Long, who was on the other side of the battlefield, heard that "At that time Tarleton brought 200 or 300 cavalry round in the rear of our left wing of militia." Nettles in fact had nowhere near this many men. This statement conveys something of the shocking power of this attack, coming upon the militia when and where it was least expected.

Notes:

1. From Francois-Jean de Chastellux’s 1781 interview with Daniel Morgan. During the retreat, Morgan saw that "the English, with more confidence than order, advanced to the attack." His own troops, meanwhile, were able to "keep their ranks." Therefore, Morgan "suffered them [the Continentals] to retreat a hundred paces, and then commanded them to halt and face the enemy, as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted."

2. Mackenzie’s thoughts here and elsewhere are expressed in such a way as to defame Tarleton. The retreating Continentals were not "fugitives," but rather maintained order. Mackenzie is insinuating that Tarleton could not even defeat an already-beaten foe.

3. Mackenzie claimed that "not less than two-thirds of the British infantry officers," "and nearly the same proportion of privates," had been shot. The British had amassed serious casualties by this point, but this is an exaggeration. The casualties Mackenzie alleges to have occurred by this time are greater than those suffered by the British during the entirety of the battle. This is another example in which Mackenzie’s wording implies Tarleton’s mishandling of the battle.

4. According to Howard; others stated different distances. Morgan claimed that "We retired in good order about fifty paces." Francois-Jean de Chastellux claimed that Morgan told him that he let the Continentals "retreat a hundred paces." Private John Thomas of Virginia claimed that the Continentals "retreated from aboutt 80 yards."

5. The postwar histories by Francois-Jean de Chastellux and David Stewart both describe the whole Continental line wheeling. Howard stated that the retreat began on his right flank; the wheeling movement may have resulted from the Continental line breaking off the engagement from right to left (Lawrence Babits, in a Devil of a Whipping, describes in considerable detail how this could have occurred). Whether ordered or accidental, this wheeling motion was particularly fortunate to the Americans because it prevented the 71st Foot from gaining their right flank. The wheeling movement also helps explain why different sources differently estimated the distance of the Continentals’ retreat; in such a maneuver, some parts of the line would have fallen back further than others. A distance of 100 yards for at least part of the line seems likely as this was the distance between the Continentals and Triplett’s Virginians (see The Main Line: Organization). If the Continentals had retreated further, Triplett would have been exposed to a British bayonet charge.

6. How close the two lines were has been variously stated (and perhaps was various at different points on the line). Stewart thought that the 71st Foot had come "within forty yards of the hostile force." Howard claimed the British were "within 30 yards of us with two field pieces." Virginia militiaman John Thomas thought that the British were "within aboutt 30 steps of them."

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals thought that "We let them Come Within ten Or fifteen yards of us." Anderson’s phrase that "we let them come" close, is striking. It is unclear whether Howard intended to have the pursuing British get close to the Continentals. Judging from Anderson’s journal, he was one that evidently believed that "the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted," and perhaps this is his supposition for why his superiors would order such a movement. Chastellux believed something similar before he interviewed Morgan.

7. A number of participants made similar remarks. Howard wrote in one place: "The enemy were now very near us. Our men commenced a very destructive fire, which they little expected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder in their ranks." In another he said, "The enemy pressed upon us in rather disorder, expecting the fate of the day was decided. They were by this time within 30 yards of us with two field pieces; my men with uncommon coolness gave them an unexpected and deadly fire." Banastre Tarleton claimed in his memoir that "An unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans, who came about as they were retreating, stopped the British, and threw them into confusion." Private John Thomas of Virgina recalled that the Continentals "were ordered to wheele and fire. They did so, the British being within aboutt 30 steps of them." Private John Baldwin of North Carolina recalled that "Morgan defeated the British with his regulars, after they concluded the Americans were all running."

Similar comments also appeared in postwar histories of the battle. For example, Henry Lee wrote that "the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder; but, as it drew near, Howard faced about, and gave it a close and murderous fire. Stunned by this unexpected shock, the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." David Stewart wrote that "Colonel Howard, commanding the reserve, threw in a fire upon the 71st when within forty yards of the hostile force. The fire was destructive: nearly one-half of their number fell." This is an exaggeration (see Note 4, above). The British line was so much longer than that of the Continentals that it seems likely a part of the 71st was not struck at all by this volley. More accurately, Stewart also claimed that "The fate of the action was decided by the destructive fire of the Americans' second line."

8. Henry Lee thought they had been detached by Colonel Andrew Pickens to help secure the miltia’s horses. See Flight of the Militia - Part 3.

9. These claims were made by Cain’s widow. She also identified him with Captain Robert Anderson of this regiment.

Sources:

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Mackenzie's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, Anderson, Collins, and Thomas, among others.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's after action report.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Files (.pdf file).

Nan Overton West transcribed the pension application of James Pettigew (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of Michael Cain (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Charles Holland (.pdf file).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Baldwin (.pdf file).

Related: The Fatal Moment, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

Cowpens in Miniature 18

Part 18: The Third Crisis

Previous: The Second Crisis

Next: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Daniel Morgan had put into place a well-thought out plan for defeating the British. At the opening of the battle, that plan was executed perfectly, and significant losses had been inflicted on the British. The improvisation of sending skirmishers forward to gall the British before they reached the militia line had also worked well. After the British advanced on the main line, however, his became completely unraveled. Morgan was now galloping across the battlefield addressing a series of crises.

The first crisis was the charge of Ogilvie’s dragoons, which shattered his right flank. That crisis had been contained when Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington sent forward a detachment of light dragoons to counter Ogilvie’s charge. Morgan also assisted in rallying the broken militia. According to Robert Long of Joseph Hayes’ regiment, "We were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person."

The second crisis was when the 71st Foot advanced towards the right of the Continentals, which triggered an accidental retreat of the Continental infantry. To address this crisis, Morgan ordered a stopgap measure: the Continentals were to halt and form a new line near Washington’s dragoons. His right flank, however, remained vulnerable.

Meanwhile, a new crisis erupted on the American left. As the Continentals retreated towards the rear, Tarleton ordered forward his last unengaged unit on the front line. In Tarleton’s words, "The British rushed forwards: An order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge" [see Note 1].

Lieutenant Henry Nettles’ company of 17th Light Dragoons rounded the right flank of the British line and stormed up the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard could only watch as the dragoons rushed past his infantrymen and into the rear of the American position: "about the time of our retreat, a large body of british cavalry passes round my left flank and pursued the flying militia to their horses" [see Note 2].

The dragoons first encountered Major Francis Triplett’s company of Virginia militia, which were posted, in part, on the road. Within moments, the dragoons inflicted devastating losses on the Virginians with their sabers and pistols [see Note 3].

Charge of the 17th Light Dragoons. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (retreating / reforming), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The Third Crisis (two views; click to enlarge). The Continentals retreat, pursued by the British infantry, while the British Legion dragoons take up a new position in reserve. On the American right, the remnants of Captain David Ogilvie's company retreat in confusion. On the American left, the 17th Light Dragoons collide with Major Francis Triplett's Virginians.

Private Isaac Way remembered that he "was severely wounded on the side, back, arms, head and in the face by the cut of the sword of a British dragoon." Both of the company’s officers were also struck down. John Thomas remembered that "Lieutenant Dearing… was wounded through his hand on this occasion and bled to death. He died the next day." Private George Rogers remembered that "the Captain of the Company to which he belonged at this time was John Combs who was killed." Sergeant Benjamin Martin also remembered Combs’ death: "I was in the road all the time of the action I was covering Capt. Combs he was killed." Martin presumably took over what was left of the company.

Notes:

1. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie assumed that Tarleton was referring to the British Legion dragoons and said that "This order, however, if such was then thought of, being either not delivered or disobeyed, they stood aloof, without availing themselves of the fairest opportunity of reaping the laurels which lay before them." It seems unlikely that this is what Tarleton meant. He had previously ordered "a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy's right flank," but they had not gained that flank.

In the images accompanying this post, the British Legion is shown forming a line on the British left, behind the 71st Foot, rather than advancing around the American flank. The movements of the British Legion dragoon reserve during the battle are not well documented, but this is a likely occurrence. Two plausible reasons for why the dragoons took this action are as follows:

First, the officers commanding the dragoon reserve may have thought this is what Tarleton wanted. By forming a line behind the 71st, they were more-or-less threatening "the enemy’s right flank." Moving beyond or around the 71st may have seemed ill advised because this would have taken them into low ground that included the headwaters of Island Creek.

Second, it’s worth reconsidering the comments by Colonel Richard Winn to Daniel Morgan (originally described in Cowpens in Miniature 6). Winn said that Tarleton’s "mode of Fighting is to Surprise, by doing this he sends up two or three Troops of Horse and if he can throw the party into Confusion with his reserve he falls on and will cut them to pieces." Perhaps this movement of the reserve "to threaten the enemy's right flank" was intended to exploit the damage inflicted by Ogilvie’s charge. However, by the time that the Legion dragoon reserve reached the area, Ogilvie’s men were retreating in confusion and the opportunity was lost. Therefore, the dragoon reserve may have chosen to halt and wait for new orders.

2. The left wing of the militia line had retreated through this same gap a short while earlier. They had meanwhile reformed in rear of Triplett’s Virginians, near the horses of the militia. It’s unclear whether Howard was referring to these men or the militia "flying" past his retreating Continentals from the broken right wing of the main line.

3. This company is particularly well represented in participant accounts of the battle. Perhaps this traumatizing moment helped compel the survivors to leave a record of their experience.

Sources:

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's memoirs, and Mackenzie's critique of them.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard and Thomas, among others.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Isaac Way (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of George Rogers (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the statement by Colonel Richard Winn (.pdf file).

Related: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, 17th Light Dragoons, Flight of the Militia - Part 4