Battle of Fishing Creek 3

Part 3: To Fishing Creek

Previous: Cary's Fort and Camden

Next: Sumter's Defeat

Sumter’s Retreat

On August 16, 1780, the men of Thomas Sumter’s brigade could hear the distant sound of cannon fire from the battle of Camden, and anxiously awaited word of the result. That evening, three or four riders appeared bearing news of the American defeat; they also conveyed orders from Major-General Horatio Gates for Sumter to retreat to a place of safety [1].

Sumter had held onto a toehold of South Carolina since late June, and although his men had galled the British at Williamson’s Plantation, he had been left undisturbed because of "the intense heat of the summer," because British offensive preparations were then incomplete, and because he did not yet register as a serious threat. After the attacks on Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock, Sumter was seen as truly dangerous, but the American offensive under Gates prohibited the British from launching a sustained retaliatory campaign. Now, Gates' army was destroyed, and Sumter’s protection was gone [2].

Sumter well appreciated the new strategic situation, and wasted no time in seeking the relative safety of the North Carolina border. That night his men marched north along the western bank of the Wateree [3]. This night march was not as rapid as the one he made before the battles of Rocky Mount or Hanging Rock. On those occasions his force was mounted; now he was responsible for hundreds of men (the force lent by Gates and his British prisoners) who would travel by foot.

Sumter pushed his men again the following day (August 17), and got his force by nightfall to Rocky Mount, some 25 miles from Camden, and on the edge of his former sphere of operations. At dawn on August 18, Sumter burned the post at Rocky Mount (which had been abandoned by the British some days earlier) and headed north again [4].

By this time, Sumter had picked an unlooked-for reinforcement. A band of mounted militia led by Captain John Moffett met him on the road, which was fleeing from a different danger: a growing Loyalist militia presence in the western part of the state. On the morning of the 18th, Sumter’s men also met up with several Maryland Continentals who had journeyed from the Camden battlefield. These men included privates John Housley and Benjamin Burch of the 6th Maryland Regiment, which had been in the very center of the fighting. Housley had made the grueling journey despite a flesh wound [5].

By midday, Sumter’s force had made another 8 miles, and was on a ridge a short distance north of Fishing Creek. Both he and his men were exhausted and at least one wagon had broken down. He ordered a rest. Sumter had previously posted a lookout at the ford over the Catawba at Rocky Mount, and he now placed a patrol on the road south of Fishing Creek, and a strong guard at the ford across Fishing Creek. Vedettes kept watch over other approaches to the American position [6]. After issuing these orders, Sumter partly undressed and napped under a wagon [7].

Tarleton’s Mission

Soon after the battle of Camden ended, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis plotted the destruction of Sumter’s brigade. Cornwallis had two forces that were capable of catching Sumter. On the far side of the wide Wateree, Major Patrick Ferguson and Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull commanded a force of Provincials and Loyalist militia collected from Rocky Mount and other points in western South Carolina. This force was not as numerous as Sumter’s brigade, but they were well positioned to cut off his retreat. On the near side of the river, he had Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, a great driver of men. It was hoped that the two forces would act in concert, and orders were issued to both commands [8].

Tarleton set off early on the 17th with his British Legion dragoons, a 3-pounder cannon, and a number of infantry. By nightfall, he had reached the Catawba/Wateree near Rocky Mount. At that moment, Sumter’s men were on the other side of the river [9].

At dawn on the 18th, some of the British sentries reported that the Americans were pulling out. Fearing a ruse, Tarleton ordered Captain Charles Campbell to take a small party across the river to assess the situation. Campbell’s party captured the lookout the Americans had left at Rocky Mount, and confirmed that the Americans had departed. When Tarleton saw Campbell waving a white handkerchief from the top of the height, the British set off with the cannon and the light infantry in several boats, while the horses (with riders) first waded out into the river and then swam across the deepest part [10].

Tarleton was unable to make contact with Ferguson and Turnbull, and so would be forced to go it alone at this point. Tarleton marched his men up the river road, following the clear tracks left by Sumter’s men. Then: a remarkable stroke of fortune. Two Loyalist women met him on the road, who claimed that Sumter’s men had halted. The women described the Americans’ position and a byway that led to their flank. Losing no time, Tarleton left behind his cannon and those men unable to make a rapid march. He then pressed on with about 100 dragoons and 60 infantry. Leading the way was a vanguard of one sergeant and four privates of the British Legion dragoons [11].

Sumter's Retreat and Tarleton's Pursuit (click to enlarge). Approximate paths taken by Sumter's brigade (in blue) and Tarleton's command (in red) before the battle of Fishing Creek.

Notes:

1. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 20, 1780.

3. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

4. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of William McGarity, transcribed by Will Graves. The distance is based on a straight line from Rocky Creek to Camden town.

5. James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier. The pension application of John Housley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Benjamin Burch, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. At Camden, the 6th Maryland on the left flank of the 2nd Maryland Brigade (see Otho Holland Williams, A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780), where it was engaged with portions of at least three different regiments: The Volunteers of Ireland, the 33rd Foot, and the 71st Foot.

6. As noted previously, Thomas Sumter has been criticized for some of the military decisions that he made in the course of this campaign. The strongest criticisms have been made regarding his defenses (or lack thereof) at the battle of Fishing Creek. On this point, the present account of the battle differs substantially from others. The meme that Sumter was a careless commander received a large boost from William Davie, who wrote that Sumter “strangely neglected the necessary precautions to prevent a surprise… the whole security of the army rested upon two vedettes.” But Davie was not present, and he obtained his information largely from Tarleton’s memoir rather than from the remembrances of American participants. American accounts, in particular those recorded by James Saye and James Collins, point to a very different conclusion: that Tarleton surprised the Americans because he crossed Fishing Creek at an obscure (though still guarded) ford, and in this way suddenly gained the Americans’ flank. This interpretation of course does not completely exonerate Sumter, but it does further suggest that he was a much abler commander than some historians believe.

For Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Saye's account can be found in this extract from his Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot. For Collins' account, see the transcription appearing in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

7. Tarleton, ibid. Davie, ibid. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. According to the pension application of David McCance (transcribed by Will Graves), Sumter slept in a tent.

8. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

9. Tarleton, ibid.

10. Tarleton, ibid.

11. Tarleton, ibid. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

Further Thoughts on Rocky Mount

I recently finished my research on Hanging Rock. In so doing, I came across some additional information on the battle of Rocky Mount that I missed before. The most important information concerns British losses. Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis wrote to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton on August 6, 1780 that “We had on our part an Officer Killed & one wounded, & about ten or twelve men killed & wounded” [1]. Interestingly, the official return of losses submitted by Cornwallis to George Germain on August 20, 1780 lists 8 killed, 31 wounded [2]. I only have access to a summary, not the return itself, so I cannot shed any light on the cause of the discrepancy (e.g., does one total cover only the Provincial forces involved and the other both Provincials and militia?). Neither statement mentions missing, which might be expected given claims by the Americans that some prisoners were taken. The total of 39 killed and wounded is surprisingly high, suggesting British losses of around 13%, and possibly higher. This seems like an unlikely loss rate if the Americans were inflicting casualties only by shooting into the portholes of the British-occupied log houses. (By comparison, American losses, if reported accurately, did not exceed 4%).

There are two plausible ways that such high losses could have been inflicted.

First, some of the defenders may have been struck down while out in the open. As described in that series, a party of British Legion dragoons was caught out in the open at the beginning of the battle. As also noted, some of the Loyalist militia were stationed in a redoubt, but were soon driven into the works. Here is another pension application that supports the latter claim:

William McGarity claimed, “we marched against Col[onel] Turnbull at Rocky Mount and drove them from their works into a house from whence we could not dislodged them” [3]. None of the accounts I’ve read indicates that the Loyalists lost men while fleeing the redoubt, but it’s certainly plausible, especially if they were not near the gate, or if the abatis was difficult to cross.

Second, American Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill claimed that the British were in a frame house and that he expected that the Americans’ bullets would easily penetrate the wood, striking down the defenders inside. I pooh-poohed this description because Hill is not the most reliable source, and other sources agreed that the British were in log houses [see Note 4 in this post]. However, I recently came across a would-be pensioner that agreed with Hill. James McConnel claimed that, “the force of the British & Tories he does not know, these were in a large frame house stockaded round from which the Americans tried to drive them but without success as they were unprovided with cannon" [4].

So possibly one of the buildings that housed defenders was a frame house, and the defenders inside were quite vulnerable to the Americans’ gunfire. Hill claimed that while the frame house appeared to be vulnerable, the British "had placed small logs about a foot from the inside of the wall and rammed the cavity with clay" [5]. But how could he know? The Americans didn’t have an opportunity to inspect the site until almost 2 weeks later (after the British abandoned the post), and this may reflect an improvement that was made after the battle. The gun shot holes from the battle would have remained in the exterior of the building, leading Hill to a false conclusion.

Notes:

1. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to Henry Clinton, August 6, 1780.

2. Enclosure in a letter dated August 20, 1780 from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain. In K. G. Davies (Ed.), Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series), Vol. XVI. Irish University Press.

3. Pension application of William McGarity, transcribed by Will Graves.

4. Pension application of James McConnel, transcribed by Will Graves.

5. William Hill's memoir, transcribed by Will Graves.

The Battle of Rocky Mount 4

Part 4: "Come and Take It"

Previous: The Assault on Rocky Mount

[Revised 12/31/09]

Come and Take It:

Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter's initial effort to take the British post at Rocky Mount had failed. British Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon, writing of the Americans, noted that "They kept possession however of the Redoubt, from which, and the cover of Rocks, Trees, etc, they continued to fire [on the post] for a long time."

A British officer, Lieutenant Anthony Allaire, heard that some of the Americans shouted for the British to "take back your ammunition again" as they fired their guns. Probably these were some of the men that James Lisle took with him when he defected to the Americans [see Note 1]. The British counterfire was also intense. Adjutant Joseph Graham of North Carolina wrote that: “The Enemy were under cover in the fortified buildings and sustained but little damage from the Americans and the Rocks were not so extensive as to shelter them from the fire of the British… Alexander Haynes [a North Carolina militiaman]… who having fired his Rifle twice from behind the Rocks had loaded his gun a third time, and peeping past the side of the black rock for an object, his face being white became an object for the enemys marksmen one of whom shot him close under the eye. The shot ranged under the brain but missed the vertebrae of the neck… he lost his Eye; it run out shortly [after] he was wounded."

Meanwhile, Sumter considered his options. In the words of Colonel Richard Winn, "Genl. Sumter finding nothing Could be done thought it best to refresh his Men for a Short time and bring on the Attack from another Quarter by Marching round the place." In this new position, the Americans were able, thanks to “the Cover of large Rocks” get to a position only "about 50 yards of [i.e., from] the Block H[ouse]." The American fire became so dangerous at this point that "the Enemy was prevented from firing on us as they dare Not come to their post Holes." Hoping to avoid another assault, "Genl. Sumter Directed Colo. Winn to demand a Sunder of the place.”

Winn approached the British post under a flag of true, and gave the following summons to the British [see Note 2]:

"Summons
31 July 1780
Sir
I am directed by Genl. Sumter to Demand a Surrender of Rocky Mount, therefore you will Surrender this place with the Men &c under your Command which will be considered as prisoner of war. S[igned]/ R. Winn"

Winn claimed that the British commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull “required that Hostilities should Cease for one Hour for Consideration.” Sumter agreed. Turnbull had no intention of surrendering the post to the Americans, but perhaps valued a respite. Turnbull then had Winn deliver the following written response to Sumter:

"Sir
I have considered your Summons & return for Answer that duty and Inclination induces me to defend this place to the last extremity. 31 July 1780 S/ Turnbull Colo. Comm[an]d[an]t"

Lieutenant Allaire heard that Turnbull’s message for Sumter was, that if he wanted the fort, “he might come and take it.”

The Americans were not impressed. According to Private James Clinton, “immediately [a] second assault was made.” This attack, like the one before, was repulsed by the garrison [see Note 3].

Desperate Measures:

After the second attack failed, Major William Davie claimed that “various strategems were essayed in vain to set the buildings on fire.” Of these, Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill described a remarkable series of events in which he was involved. Hill wrote that:

“the officers held a council & it was discovered that there was a large rock, and between this rock and the fort, stood a small house which might be fired by throwing fire brands over the rock, & that this house w[oul]d. communicate the fire to the house the Enemy was in [i.e., the blockhouse] and as we had the command of the water [the Americans were between the post and the Catawba River] they could not possibly extinguish the flames — From this ledge of Rocks where the army lay, to the rock near the house was about 100 yds. free of any obstructions.”

Unfortunately, whoever made this attack would have to run straight towards the blockhouse, “& it is well known that when any object is going from or coming to a marksman, the marksman had near as good a chance [to hit it] as if the object was stationary.”According to Hill, Sumter and some other officers “proposed… for 2 men to endeavor to fire that small house. but the undertaking appeared so hazardous, that no two men of the army could be found to undertake it After some considerable time was spent, y[ou]r. author proposed that if any other man w[oul]d. go with him he w[oul]d.: make the attempt, at length a young man, brother to the Johnsons... proposed to undertake with me.”

A lull seems to have developed in the fighting, and during this time, Hill and his comrade “had every assistance that c[oul]d. be obtained — Rich lightwood split & bound with cords to cover the most vital parts of our bodies, as well as a large bundle of the same wood to carry in our arms, being thus equiped we run the 100 yds. to the rock; Mr. Johnson was to manage the fire & y[ou]r. author was to watch the enemys sallying out of the house.” The two men evidently got inside the abatis – the only Americans to do so – and were vulnerable to a counterattack from the garrison [see Note 4].

Hill then related that “before the fire was sufficiently kindled the enemy did sally out with fixed bayonets; the same race was run again, to where the army lay, & under a heavy fire, not only from those who had sallied out [these would be some of Turnbull’s New York Volunteers], but like wise from a large number of Port holes in that end of the house.”

The Americans were encouraged by this small success, and a second attempt was made:

“It was then proposed that the whole of our riflemen sh[oul]d. direct their fire to that space between the small & great house, which was about 15 ft.; we being equipt as before mentioned, made the 2d. attempt. & the plan already mentioned, prevented the Enemy from sallying a 2d. time.” With a steady volume of American gunfire pouring on the building, “We then had an opportunity of making a large fire behind the rock, & throwing fire brands on the roof of the little house & we staid until that roof was in flames. & the heat of it had caused the wall of the great house to smoke — We then concluded the work, was done, & undertook the 4th. race, which was much more hazardous than the former ones, as the Enemy during the interval, had opened a great many more port-holes in that end of the building — And here I beg leave to remark that Providence so protected us both, that neither of us lost a drop of blood, altho' locks of hair was cut from our heads and our garments riddled with balls.”

Great Mortification:

Panting, Hill stood alongside his comrades-in-arms, waiting for the main building to go up in flames. However, "Scarcily had we time to look back from behind the rock where our men lay, in hopes to see the fire progressing, but to our great mortification, when the great house was beginning to flame — as heavy a storm of rain fell, as hath fallen from that time to the present, & which extinguished the flames" [see Note 5].

The rain ended the Americans' hopes for taking the fort [see Note 6]. In Hill’s words, "We were then forced to retreat under as great mortification, as ever any number of men endured." The Americans gathered up their wounded and prepared to retreat. Rawdon noted that the Americans "carried off all who fell, excepting three dead and one wounded who lay too near the Post." Among those left on the field was Andrew Neal, who had been killed before the abatis. Adjutant Graham wrote of Alexander Haynes that "It was thought he was killed, but seeing life was in him when they were about to retire, his acquaintances carried him off."

British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton claimed that “In the gallant defence of this post, Lieutenant-colonel Turnbull had one officer killed, one wounded, and about ten men killed and wounded.” The officer, evidently, was “Capt. Hulett” who “got wounded in the head,” according to Allaire.

The British did not know exactly how many men the Americans lost, because so many of the fallen had been carried off the field. Rawdon wrote that "Turnbull therefore cannot ascertain the Enemy’s loss; but imagines it to have been pretty severe."

American sources generally downplay the number of casualties they sustained, or give some very low total. James Clinton, for example, said that "Our loss at Rocky Mount was not great in numbers." Thomas Reagan stated that "During this engagement Sumpter's party were protected by the woods and the huge rocks situated near the log house consequently but few were killed of his men. This applicant thinks there were killed and missing about 14 or 15 men and among the killed were Col. Neel [Andrew Neal]—Capt. Jones and Capt. Burns who was shot in the Eye & fell close by this applicant." Thomas Sumter wrote 10 days after the battle that "My Loss, Kild and wounded did not exceed twenty" [see Note 7].

Notes:

1. Allaire was not present, but his journal recorded information passed around among British officers serving in the South Carolina Backcountry at the time and is on the whole reliable. Most likely the quoted passage refers to this point in the battle, but it's possible the incident occurred somewhat earlier or later (the same is true of some of the other incidents described in connection with the battle). The defection of James Lisle was mentioned in Part 1, and is well described in Michael Scoggins' The Day It Rained Militia.

2. The flag of truce is mentioned by Lieutenant Allaire, and privates William Clark and James Clinton. Except where noted, the remainder of the quoted passages in this section are from Winn's memoir.

3. Other sources agreed that the Americans launched more than one attack. Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon wrote that after "The [surrender] proposal was rejected... the attack was repeated with as little success as at first." William Clark likewise stated that at this time "Sumter ordered a second attack, but as in the former attempt we were again repulsed." Arthur Travis recalled that “Sumter endeavored to storm [the British post], but failed after two attacks and some loss.”

4. British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton's history of the Southern Campaign notes that there were “three attacks, in the last of which some of the forlorn hope [evidently Hill and his comrade] penetrated within the abbatis.”

5. A letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, dated August 9, 1780, confirms part of Hill's tale. He wrote, "I Made an attempt to fire them [the British works] in the evening, and should have Succeeded, if the afternoon had Not proved excesively wet." Years later, Winn recalled, "the House could have been Easily Set on fire had it not been for the powerful rains that fell." William Clark stated, "It was possible for us to have set fire to the works, but a rain came on and prevented this last effort." Robert Fleming recalled, "the enemy were in the Fort which we set fire to but a shower of rain commenced falling in a short time which with the exertions of the enemy within extinguished the fire and we failed to drive them out."

6. This is not quite what Sumter claimed. He wrote to Pinckney, "My led [i.e., lead bullets] being exhausted, I withdrew a small distance." This statement implies that the Americans were able to keep their gunpowder dry and could have continued firing on the post longer had they sufficient ammunition. It seems unlikely, however, that a continuation of the Americans' sniping would have affected the outcome.

7. This total, 3%-4% of Sumter's force, belies the claim that Sumter had a "penchant for bloody and repeated frontal assaults" that were "unnecessarily costly."

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's history.

William R. Davie, The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [excerpt]

Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain. (Includes a transcription of Allaire's journal).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Clark. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of James Clinton. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Fleming. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Reagan. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Arthur Travis. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780.

William T. Sherman. (2009). Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed. (.pdf file). [Contains a transcription of Rawdon's letter].

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of the Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

The Battle of Rocky Mount 2

Part 2: Sumter's First Target

Previous: An American Offensive

Next: The Assault on Rocky Mount

[Revised 12/30/09]

At the end of July, several factors convinced Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter to lead his brigade of militia into the field against the system of British outposts in the South Carolina Backcountry. One factor was that the American army in the South was on the move, and aimed to capture the British post at Camden. This left Sumter the choice of either joining in the offensive, or being reduced to a spectator in the critical campaign to liberate his home state.

A second factor was the steady growth of his brigade in July, 1780. At the end of June, his brigade consisted of only a small cadre of South Carolinians (see Sumter's Brigade Forms). However, he had been joined by additional South Carolinians, dozens of Catawba Indians, and, in late July, hundreds of North Carolina militia. In all he commanded around 500-600 men [see Note 1] For the first time, Sumter’s force was large enough to hazard a major action with the British.

A third factor was that Sumter received valuable information about the nearby British post at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, that helped convince him it could be taken. Colonel Richard Winn claimed, in his postwar memoir, that he had seized Major John Owens of the Loyalist militia the night before the battle at Williamson’s Plantation, and that Winn “gave Owens a parole & employed him as a Spy without fee or reward to go to Rocky Mount Count the numbers of Men and report the State and Strength of the place.” Major Owens, either out of fear of what would happen if he was captured again, or to hedge his bets lest his side lost the battle for South Carolina, “punctually complied” with Winn’s request. The two of them secretly met on or about July 20th. According to Winn, Owens claimed that “Colo Turnbull [Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull] Commanded had about 300 Men and was posted in a Strong Block House two Stories high properly prepared for defense and sufficient abbates.”

Owens' report corresponds remarkably well with the description that British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton gave of the place [see Note 2]:

“The defences of Rocky mount consisted of two log houses, a loop-holed building [i.e., the blockhouse], and an abbatis; placed upon an eminence, which commanded a view of the neighbouring country.”

A letter from from Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon to Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis (dated July 31, 1780) notes that the site included "Log Houses constructed for the purpose of defence," and that an "abbatis... surrounded the Post." Rawdon also noted the presence of a nearby "redoubt."

The abatis lay a short distance from the houses and surrounded the post. Beyond the abatis lay an old field, which was quite extensive in some directions [see Note 3].

American accounts, like Winn's sometimes mention only the presence of a single building, suggesting that one large house or blockhouse was of particular importance to the defense [see Note 4].

Tarleton claimed that Turnbull's "force was composed of one hundred and fifty provincials, and as many militia." The provincials were Turnbull's own New York Volunteers; the militia are thought to have been commanded by Colonel Matthew Floyd. Rawdon's letter notes the presence of British Legion dragoons; these were probably the remnants of Captain Christian Huck's company, which had fought at Hill's Ironworks and Williamson's Plantation.

The site of the British post at Rocky Mount, as seen using Google Maps (click to enlarge). The post was situated on a high hill overlooking the Catawba River. A topographical view is on the left, a satellite view on the right. The red dot shows the approximate location of the British blockhouse (cf. John A. Robertson et al.'s Global Gazetteer of the American Revolution).

Notes:

1. Sumter claimed that "With about five hundred men I attacked Rockey Mount" in a letter to Thomas Pinckney dated August 9, 1780. Other sources have credited him with more men. Among the principal commanders of the South Carolinians were Richard Winn, Andrew Neal, William Bratton, Edward Lacey, William Hill, and John McClure. The North Carolinians were headed by Colonel Robert Irwin, and the Catawba Indians were led by General New River.

The large number of senior South Carolina officers give the impression that South Carolinians constituted the bulk of Sumter’s brigade. However, as described previously, the South Carolina militia regiments operating with Sumter were quite small in size. Adjutant Joseph Graham of North Carolina made this point explicitly years later:

“From the number of the field officers from South Carolina under their command the reader would believe in the ranks of the former the principal force consisted of the militia from South Carolina, whereas, the fact was, that in the well fought battles of Rocky Mount & Hanging Rock the North Carolinians, under the command of Colos. Irwin and Huggins and Major Davie, constituted the greater part of his Command and the [South Carolina] field officers referred to had not sometimes each a Dozen of men with them.”

2. Winn’s memoir was written after Tarleton’s account of the battle was published, and not impossible is that Winn’s statement was influenced by Tarleton’s description. Some American histories (Davie, Lossing) clearly copied Tarleton’s language. Nevertheless, it is important to observe that Winn remembered Owens’ description as accurate.

3. Thomas Sumter wrote to Thomas Pinckney that "the action... was offten within thirty feet of their works." Because the Americans had difficulty penetrating the abatis, it can be inferred that Sumter believed the abatis was no more than 30 feet away from the buildings. Private William Clark claimed that to attack the post, his regiment had to "attack through an old field about 200 yards to the house."

4. Below are some of the statements made by American participants about the British defenses at Rocky Mount:

North Carolina militiaman Joseph Graham claimed that the British were ensconced in "log buildings... [that] had loop holes to shoot through.”

South Carolina militiaman Hugh Gaston stated that the "Tories & British took shelter in a large log house."

South Carolina militiaman Thomas Reagan said that the British were "in a large log house at a place called 'Rocky Mount' on the Catawba."

An exception to these descriptions appears in the memoir of Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill. He recalled that the British were stationed in “a large framed house: the walls of which were only thin clap boards.” Hill claimed the attack was made because “we supposed that our balls w[oul]d. Have the desired effect by shooting through the wall." But instead, "the Enemy had wrought day & night and had placed small logs about a foot from the inside of the wall and rammed the cavity with clay, and under this delusion we made the attack —; but soon found that we c[oul]d. injure them no way, but by shooting, in their port-holes." He attributed this erroneous information to a strengthening of the British post between Owens' report (about July 20) and the date of the attack (July 30). Hill's description is not compelling in light of the other accounts, and at the very least does not seem to accurately describe the main defensive building on the site.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's postwar memoir.

John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

William R. Davie, The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [excerpt]

William Alexander Graham. (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Clark. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh Gaston. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Reagan. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Benson John Lossing. (1860). Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

David Paul Reuwer. Documentary Resources and Notes on Gen. Thomas Sumter and the North and South Carolina militias Attack on the British forward outpost at Rocky Mount, South Carolina (July 31 or August 1, 1780). In Volume 1, Number 1 of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution newsletter. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780.

William T. Sherman. (2009). Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed. (.pdf file). [Contains a transcription of Rawdon's letter].

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of the Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 5

Part 5: Aftermath

Previous: Huck's Defeat

The British force at Williamson's Plantation was surprised by the early morning American attack and utterly routed. American losses were perhaps limited to one man and certainly did not exceed several men (see Scoggins' history for details). By all accounts, British losses exceeded those of the Americans. However, there is some uncertainty as to the exact numbers.

Estimates of British losses in pension applications filed long after the war express considerable differences in opinion on this subject. Some claimed only that "Capt. Hook a British officer was killed. Several of the enemy were killed & some taken prisoners" (Gaston), or that the British lost "Capt. Hook and Col. Furguson with several others" (Neely). Others, however, claimed that "Huck was killed and many others" (Morrow) or that "a considerable number" were "killed & wounded," plus "near thirty prisoners" were taken (Patton).

Perhaps the most trustworthy American estimates come not from participants but rather from other American officers that wrote about the battle not long after the event. Major Thomas Blount wrote that "Ferguson, Hook, a Lieut. and 11 others were killed on the ground, and a major, 2 Lieuts. & 27 taken, many of whom are since dead of their wounds; the remainder are dispersed.... Our loss was only one man wounded." Colonel Thomas Sumter wrote that "The enemy's loss, Kild upon the Spot, was one Col., one Capt. & Twelve others; one Majr., one Lt. & Twenty-Seven others taken prisoners, Since Which the Number found Dead a Mounts to Twenty-one; the Loss very considerable among the Dragoons."

These statements indicate that 13-14 men were killed outright, and another 7 men later succumbed to their wounds. Approximately another 23 men were captured. Of those captured, some were undoubtedly wounded during the fighting; however, at least several Loyalists were taken before the battle (cf. Winn's memoir), and perhaps some were taken afterwards as well.

A final source of information is two letters that Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull wrote to Colonel Francis Rawdon some hours after the battle.

In one he wrote that "Capt. Huck... is killed. Cornet Hunt is wounded and supposed to be prisoner. Lt. Adamson and Lt. McGrigor of the New York Volunteers, and all our Twenty [here and below, 'our' refers to the New York Volunteers] are Missing. Ens. Cameron of the New York Volunteers, Lt. Lewis of the Militia and Twelve Dragoons and Twelve Militia are Returned." In the second letter he reported that “Nine of our missing men have come in, and one Dragoon... Lt. Adamson Fell of[f] his horse Being much bruised is taken prisoner... seven of ours and a sergt. And two of the Dragoons are Likewise wounded and taken Prisoners. Lt. McGregor and Cornet Hunt we suppose have made their Escape But have not yet arrived--Capt. Huik is the only Person who was killed Dead on the Spot.”

British and American statements, taken in conjunction with Lieutenant Hunt's statements about British strength, suggests that British losses were as follows:

British Legion: Captain Huck killed, Lieutenant Hunt wounded and captured, 2 dragoons wounded and captured, 3 dragoons missing in action. (Twelve dragoons escaped).

New York Volunteers: 1 sergeant and 7 rank and file wounded and captured, 1 rank and file missing in action. (Lieutenant McGrigor, Ensign Cameron, and 9 rank and file escaped). Turnbull claimed that Lieutenant Adamson of the Volunteers was wounded and captured, but according to Michael Scoggins, Adamson was in fact serving with the Loyalist militia.

Loyalist militia: "Colonel" James Ferguson killed; between 3 and 23 men of other ranks were killed or wounded & captured. A number of militia (at least 12 and possibly considerably more) escaped capture and returned to Rocky Mount.

The representation of the battle in miniature is consistent with these totals. With 1 miniature representing 5 participants, 1 casualty was shown for the British Legion, 2 for the New York Volunteers, and 3 for the Loyalist militia.

Sources:

Thomas Blount. Letter to Abner Nash, July 23, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh Gaston. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Joseph Morrow (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of George Neely (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Patton (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of Turnbull's letters to Rawdon).

Thomas Sumter. Letter to Johann De Kalb, July 17, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina.

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 1

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation
Part 1: Huck Rides Again
Next: The British Encampment

[The account appearing in this and subsequent posts is heavily indebted to Michael C. Scoggins' recent history of the battle. The present account is generally consistent with his, although I arrived at a different conclusion about British numbers, as described below. Readers should note that Scoggins' history includes many more details concerning the battle of Williamson's Plantation than are related here].

In early July, 1780, much of Thomas Sumter's brigade of militia temporarily disbanded. The farmers-turned-soldiers returned to their homes to reap their crops, see their families, and otherwise prepare for the coming attempt to retake South Carolina. This dispersal of Sumter's men made them vulnerable, and an attempt was soon made by the British to capture some of the leading figures in the militia. Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull, who commanded the British post at Rocky Mount, wrote on July 12 to his superior officer, Colonel Francis Rawdon, informing him of the attempt.

"…hearing that a noted Partisan McClure [i.e., Captain John McClure] was come home and Reaping his Grain about Twenty Two miles above and that Col. Bratton [i.e., Colonel William Bratton] who Lived Twelve miles farther was publishing Proclamations and Pardons to who should return to their duty, I proposed to Capt. Huck [i.e., Captain Christian Huck, who led the British raid on Hill's Ironworks] that I woud mount twenty of our men and give him some militia to the amount of fifty to Beat up those two Quarters. The party marched from this Monday Evening and found only one of the McClures and no person at Brattons. My orders to him was not to go farther than Prudence should Direct him."

Although not obvious from Turnbull's letter to Rawdon, Huck's force consisted of three groups: British Legion dragoons, New York Volunteers, and Loyalist militia. All were mounted.

There are two key sources of information on the strength of these commands: Lieutenant-Colonel Turnbull, who wrote several letters to Rawdon about Huck's mission and defeat, and Lieutenant Hunt of the British Legion. Hunt was in the battle, and the account he related to Lieutenant Anthony Allaire and Dr. Uzal Johnson appeared in their journals the day after Huck's defeat.

According to Allaire's journal:

"Lieut. Hunt of the Legion Cavalry came to our quarters... He was one of the party defeated the twelfth inst. He gave an imperfect account of the affair. Capt. Huck commanded the party consisting of one subaltern and seventeen dragoons of the Legion, three subalterns and eighteen New York Volunteers, twenty-five militia men."

Lieutenant Hunt was speaking candidly to another officer the day after the battle, and his account is not suspect. However, the numbers he stated (as recorded by Allaire) differed somewhat from that stated by others. Below I comment on why I am generally accepting of Hunt's statement.

British Legion: Captain Huck, Lieutenant Hunt, and 17 rank and file.

Turnbull did not report the number of dragoons to his superiors (at least in extant correspondence). Cornwallis reported to Clinton that the number of dragoons was between 30 and 40. Cornwallis may have given this number because he knew this to be the approximate strength of Huck's troop and he assumed (not having been told otherwise) that all of Huck's dragoons were present [see Note 1]. But were they? Huck had been dispatched on a search-and-seize mission, not a combat mission. Turnbull may have felt it wiser to give more experience to his Loyalist militia and a group of New York Volunteers that were recently mounted than to dispatch all of his dragoons. Turnbull did not expressly indicate this in his correspondence, but his comments to Rawdon on casualties (to be covered in an upcoming post) make considerably more sense if only a portion of the dragoons were present.

New York Volunteers: Lieutenant McGrigor, Ensign Cameron, and 18 rank and file.

Turnbull's letters to Rawdon name the officers with this group. Turnbull identifies Lieutenant Adamson as a third officer, but Uzal Johnston recorded in his journal that there were only two subalterns, and Michael Scoggins' research suggests that Adamson was not with the Volunteers, but rather the militia.

Loyalist Militia: 25 or so militiamen under Colonel Matthew Floyd and "Colonel" James Ferguson [see Note 2].

Hunt claimed that there were 25 militia; Cornwallis wrote Clinton that there were 60. Hunt's total for the militia is less reliable than his other figures because he is less likely to have been informed of their total or to have performed a head count. However, Hunt's statement should not be dismissed. American militia would leave the ranks at times for various reasons, and it could well be that the Loyalist militia were no different. It should be recalled that the British were not anticipating combat, and some men (perhaps many) might have been allowed to visit home while they were out on this expedition. Indeed, there may even have been some military value in such departures as it would help raise morale and allow the men to gather supplies. These militiamen might even have been able to learn of the Americans' latest movements from family members. There is at least some evidence of Loyalist militiamen leaving the ranks. Colonel Richard Winn wrote of capturing Major John Owens on the night preceding the battle and two privates the morning of the battle.

If the number of militiamen fluctuated, then it is all the more unlikely that Hunt's number is definite. His statement of 25 men sounds like an estimation, and in the confusion of the early morning fight, he hardly could have been sure.

Using Hunt as a source, Huck's force totaled 65 men or so [see Note 3]. Notably, American sources provided much higher estimates. The difference in their statements is so large that it seems safest to dismiss the latter estimates out of hand. These estimates include that there were “two or three hundred Tories” (Samuel Killough), “About 300 Tories under Colonel Floyd and fifty dragoons under Capt. Hook, and Capt. Adamson with fifty Light Infantry” (John Craig), and "100 horse &... of the Tory militia... about 300 men” (William Hill). It should be noted that the battle was short in duration, that the battle was fought under conditions of reduced visibility, and that these statements by American participants were made many years after the fact.

Notes:

1. One might wonder why Cornwallis would have given a number for the British Legion dragoons if he did not know it for certain. My supposition is that Cornwallis was concerned about what Clinton would see in American newspapers. Both sides habitually magnified their opponent's strength and losses, and Cornwallis wanted Clinton to know that Huck's force was small in size and that the defeat was not of great military consequence (the political consequences, however, were another matter). Stating a number -- even if imprecise -- established this point.

2. It is questionable whether the British ever gave Ferguson a colonel's commission. He is not listed in Lambert's seminal history of South Carolina Loyalists.

3. Michael Scoggins sided with Cornwallis over Hunt on the question of the number of British Legion dragoons and Loyalist militia. Consequently, he had almost twice as many British participants in the battle as I state here.

Sources:

Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain. (Includes a transcription of Allaire's journal).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Grabes transcribed the pension application of John Craig (.pdf file).

Robert S. Lambert. (1987). South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution.

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of British corresepondence, and statements by many participants).

The Battle of Hill's Ironworks 3

Part 3: Huck Attacks

Previous: A Center of Resistance

The Day of Battle:

There is some uncertainty as to exactly when Captain Christian Huck attacked the American force at Hill's Ironworks. June 18 is the date given by several authors, but Michael Scoggins has made a strong argument in favor of the 17th. The evidence for the 18th is this:

On June 19th, Huck's superior, Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull, wrote to Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis that:

"I have the Pleasure to Acquaint your Lordship that by a Letter from Capt. Huck of the British Legion Dated yesterday some miles this side of the Iron Works. That the Rebells were assembled at that Place about one hundred and fifty strong that He with his Detachment of the Legion and about Sixty militia attacked them. The Rebells had time to pull down a Bridge very near the Iron Works which Impeded them for some time. That Repairing the Bridge they were Lucky enough to overtake their Rear Killed seven and took four Prisoners the Rest Fled to the mountains.

"I am Likewise to Inform your Lordship that Capt. Huck has Completely Destroyed the Iron works which has been the Head Quarters of the Rebells in arms for some time past."

Adjutant Joseph Graham of the North Carolina militia remembered being in arms with his men during Sunday service, and that "After sermon, parting with their families, the men were organized and marched down the east side of the river. The enemy advanced the same day as far as Hill's Iron Works, about ten miles below said church [Steel Creek], on the west side. They set the works on fire. In the evening when our party approached within four miles of the works on the hills above Bigger's Ferry, they saw the smoke ascending and heard the enemy there."

Graham incorrectly claimed this happened on Sunday, July 9. However, June 18th was a Sunday, and perhaps he at least correctly remembered the sequence of leaving church, riding to war, and seeing the ironworks in flames.

Neither Huck's statement to Turnbull nor Graham's remembrance provides definitive evidence (in the case of the former it's not clear whether Huck wrote to Turnbull the evening of the battle or the following day; in the case of the latter, the problem is with Graham's imperfect memory). Michael Scoggins favored the 17th because of a statement Lieutenant-Colonel Will Hill made on behalf of one of his captains. He said:

"This to Certify that on 17th June 1780 when a Great part of the State of South Carolina was overrun by the British, that there was a party of Our friends made a Stand at the Iron works in York County in Said State, & that I Sent Capt. John Henderson to endeavor to make discovery of the Enemeies movements, who in the execution of that endeavor, was Taken prisoner by the british..."

However, this statement, too, is not definitive in my opinion, because Henderson could have been taken before the battle, while Huck's force was moving through the countryside, or on the day of the battle itself.

Huck's Attack.

Not only is the day of the battle of Hill's Ironworks in question, but what happened during the battle is also uncertain. Huck's description of the action, as related by Turnbull, is, to the best of my knowledge, the only description of the fighting. Nevertheless, this brief description does contain important clues as to what took place.

First, consider the site of the ironworks.

Map of Hill's Ironworks. 1 = The ironworks and associated buildings, 2 = The William Hill house, 3 = a hill south of the ironworks and the likely site of the American defenses.

This map reconciles the contemporary topography of the area [see Note 1] with an 1813 plat map of the ironworks (the original can be seen in the issue of Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution linked to below). Note that the ironworks are on the south side of the stream (Allison Creek), the same side as the British outpost at Rocky Mount, yet Huck had to first cross a bridge before attacking. This suggests that Huck's force crossed somewhere upstream of the ironworks, and circled around to attack from the north. Why? Michael Scoggins maintained the Americans had set up a swivel gun on a hill south of the ironworks, defending the most likely route an attacking force would take. Perhaps Huck was appraised of this obstacle by the Loyalists accompanying his force and therefore determined to attack from an unexpected direction.

Below I show Huck's force approaching the ironworks from the north. Each miniature represents 20 combatants; therefore there are two British Legion dragoons (Scoggins estimated Huck's company at 30-40 men) and three mounted Loyalists (per Turnbull's letter to Cornwallis, claiming 60 militia).

The set-up of the scene is crude and not to scale. The hills are not represented. What is shown is the creek, road, and bridge. The ironworks are at the lower left, the many stumps in the area depict the extensive deforestation needed to meet the energy demands of the ironworks. The small field represents agricultural activity near the William Hill house.

The Americans were evidently sensitive to danger. William Hill had dispatched Captain Henderson to scout for Huck, a call for help was dispatched to the militia in North Carolina (implied in Graham's statement), and the Americans detected Huck's force before it reached the bridge. In the image above, a militiaman (representing a small group), is disabling the bridge as Huck's force approaches.

With the bridge out, and the Americans appraised of the danger, how did Huck's force cross the creek? The dragoons were armed only with sabers and pistols, and a small number of militiamen could have detained them indefinitely. Perhaps the Loyalist militia dismounted and forced the Americans away with the bridge with their rifles.

Once the bridge repair was underway, the Americans abandoned the ironworks. That the Americans pulled out at this point suggests that they were not as numerous as Huck claimed and/or that the ironworks and associated buildings were determined to be poor points of defense. In any case, the British quickly pressed their advantage, and the dragoons swarmed after the retreating Americans, overtaking some and brutally dispatching them with their sabers (note the high proportion of dead in Turnbull's letter: 7 killed and 4 captured).

Once the Americans had been routed, the British razed all of the buildings in the area, including the ironworks and the William Hill house.

I suggested previously (see Occupied South Carolina) that British provincials, operating in cooperation with Loyalist militia, would have been key to a successful British subjugation of South Carolina. The battle of Hill's Ironworks was a highpoint (maybe the highpoint) of such combined operations. If the present account of the battle of Hill's Ironworks is correct, then the Loyalists provided key intelligence of the American dispositions, helped Huck find an unguarded ford across the creek, and cleared the Americans from the bridge. The provincials provided discipline to the enterprise and the raw force to overpower their opponents.

Notes:

1. A complicating factor is that the landscape has been dramatically altered since 1780. a downstream dam has dramatically widened Alison Creek, covering the site of the ironworks.

Sources:

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (link to amazon.com).

Michael C. Scoggins. More on the Battle of Hill's Ironworks (.pdf file). Article in Volume 2, Number 7 of the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine.

William Alexander Graham. (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

Keith Krawczynski. Aera Ironworks (.pdf file). Article in Volume 2, Number 7 of the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine.

The Battle of Hill's Ironworks 2

Part 2: A Center of Resistance

Previous: Strategic Overview

Next: Huck Attacks

The British Post at Rocky Mount:

Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull commanded the British outpost at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, with his New York Volunteers and Captain Christian Huck‘s company of British Legion dragoons [see Note 1]. The South Carolina Backcountry was a patchwork of different communities, some predominately aligned with the “American“ cause, or “Whigs,” while others were loyal to the Crown, or “Tories.” Within a given community could be found persons that preferred to stay out of the conflict or that supported (secretly perhaps) a different cause than their neighbors. It was Turnbull's responsibility to organize and support the Loyalists in his area and to suppress rebellion. Turnbull largely remained in Rocky Mount, relying chiefly on Captain Huck and the Loyalist militia (who, like the dragoons, were mounted) to control the countryside.

Turnbull had several bands of Loyalist militia at his disposal in early June, including companies commanded by Henry Houseman, James Ferguson, and John Owens. On June 15, Matthew Floyd joined the Rocky Mount garrison with around 30 men. Floyd was the rare man that was clearly committed to the Crown, influential among his neighbors, and experienced in war. Turnbull promptly gave him a colonel’s commission.

Soon after Floyd reached Rocky Mount, word arrived that the Americans were destroying the homes and property of Floyd and his men. Turnbull promptly dispatched Huck’s troop and all the Loyalists on hand (a mere 60 men) “to give these fellows [the Americans] a Check.” Either because of exhaustion or other pressing business, the newly-appointed Colonel Floyd did not participate in this mission. Instead, command of the Loyalists devolved on his son, Captain Abraham Floyd. Captains Huck and Floyd set off on the morning of June 16. They would "Check" the Americans by destroying Hill’s Ironworks, the chief center of American resistance in the area.

Hill’s Ironworks:

William Hill’s Ironworks was a well-known locale that included sawmills, a gristmill, and a blast furnace. The ironworks was the most productive in the state, supplying Backcountry settlers with plows, kitchen wares, and other implements. Once the war began, the ironworks were used to manufacture cannon, cannonballs, rifles, and other materials of war for the American army. As the British overran the Backcountry, proprietor William Hill turned the ironworks into an important center of resistance. On June 12, Hill spoke out against a British officer sent to the ironworks to take the submission of the area settlers, raising the spirits of his neighbors. Hill then encouraged them to reactivate the New Acquisition militia regiment, which had disbanded after the British advanced into the Backcountry. The men of this regiment then elected Andrew Neal as their colonel and William Hill as their lieutenant colonel [see Note 2].

American Forces at the Ironworks:

It is uncertain which American commanded the forces at the ironworks when Huck attack and what units were present. According to William Hill, Andrew Neal, colonel of the New Acquisition militia regiment, departed the ironworks to attack Floyd shortly before the battle, leaving 12-15 men behind. These men may have belonged to Captain Joseph Howe's company, to judge from the pension applications filed by Samuel Gordon and James Clinton. Two sources link John Thomas’ 1st Spartan militia regiment (see pension applications of Samuel Gordon and James McIlhenny) and Captain John Moffett’s company of militia (see James Collins’ autobiography and Robert Patteson’s pension application) to the battle.

William Hill did not indicate, in his memoir, either that he accompanied Neal's mission to stop Floyd's Loyalists, or that he was at the ironworks at the time of the battle. Michael Scoggins observed that a statement he wrote on behalf of Captain John Henderson implicitly places him at the battle. If Hill was present, he was arguably in command; Colonel John Thomas also could have held that position.

Christian Huck told George Turnbull that the Americans had 150 men when he made his attack. This number could be close to correct, but it's doubtful that he had either the opportunity to count the Americans for himself or that he would have obtained accurate information from the men he captured. Michael Scoggins conservatively accepted as present only the 12-15 men mentioned by Hill; Patrick O'Kelley estimated the total as 50 men.

Notes:

1: “Huck” is the anglicized spelling of a German surname, most likely Houck or Hauck. Early writers sometimes called him Hook, or used other spellings; Huck is the spelling most often given, and it is the spelling that Huck chose for himself (for more, see this discussion on Marg Baskin’s Banastre Tarleton website; a longer biography appears in Michael Scoggins’ book on Huck‘s Defeat).

2. Neal was chosen colonel because he was experienced in war; Hill was not.

Sources:

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (link to amazon.com).

Patrick O'Kelley. Hill's Iron Works, South Carolina: The Presbyterian Rebellion -- 18 June 1780 (or June 9th or 11th) (.pdf file). Article in Volume 2, Number 6 of the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine.

Michael C. Scoggins. More on the Battle of Hill's Ironworks (.pdf file). Article in Volume 2, Number 7 of the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine.

Keith Krawczynski. Aera Ironworks (.pdf file). Article in Volume 2, Number 7 of the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine.

James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier.

Robert S. Lambert. (1987). South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution. (link to amazon.com).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Gordon (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of James Clinton (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the postwar memoir of William Hill (.pdf file)

Michael G. Williams transcribed the pension application of James McIlhenny (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Patteson (.pdf file).