October 28, 1776 (Part 4)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the fourth of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the evening of October 28th: The battle of White Plains came to an end; Washington prepared for the next British move; Knyphausen occupied Mile Square.

Previous entry: Afternoon of October 28; next: October 29th.

The battle of White Plains gradually petered out after the British and Hessian infantry broke the American line on Chatterton’s Hill.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled that after his regiment was driven from Chatterton’s Hill, “We fell back a little distance and made a stand” and at the same time “detached parties [were] engaging [the enemy] in almost every direction. We did not come in contact with the enemy again that day, and just at night we fell back to our encampment.”

The “detached parties” probably included some groups of Continentals on the northern end of Chatterton’s Hill. Colonel John Haslet of the Delaware Regiment recalled:

“The left of the regiment took post behind a fence on the top of the hill with most of the officers, and twice repulsed the light troops and [light] horse of the enemy; but seeing ourselves deserted on all hands, and the continued column of the enemy advancing, we also retired.”

Captain William Hull of the Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment stated that his command also held out for awhile:

“Colonel Webb’s regiment maintained the conflict for a time, after the other part of the brigade had abandoned the field, and it had the honour to receive the particular thanks of Washington for its bravery and orderly retreat.”

One observer (Sergeant John Smith of Lippitt’s Regiment) wrote, “this battle lasted from 9 in the morning till night tho the hottest of the battle… was but about 20 or 30 minutes”.

During this prolonged phase of the fighting, Washington sent some reinforcements towards Chatterton’s Hill, including Brigadier-General Rezin Beall’s brigade of Maryland militia (the Maryland “flying camp”) and Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. However, as Jacob Francis of Sargent’s Regiment noted, before these troops could cross the Bronx, “the British got possession of the hill, and we retreated back to the camp.”

Afterwards, the British made no further attacks. According to Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jäger), “Since the soldiers had climbed over nothing but hills, cliffs, and stone walls the whole day, constantly dragging their guns over all obstacles, it was impossible to ask anything more from them.”

The British lost around 230 men during the battle: Most of these losses occurred in the 28th Foot (67 men), 35th Foot (about 60 men), 49th Foot (28 men), and Regiment von Lossberg (about 46 men). The Americans lost more than 200 men [see Footnote 1], but the exact total is not known. Among the regiments that had considerable losses were the Maryland Battalion (44 men), the 3rd New York Regiment (34 men) and the Delaware Regiment (32 men).

During the evening, the British discovered that Chatterton’s Hill was of dubious value. Charles Stedman noted: “The possession of that hill… [did] not enable the royalists to annoy their camp, for it rose so gradually from the Bronx that its crest was not within random cannon shot”. In other words, the British could hit the main American defensive works with their cannon, but the range was too great for the fire to be accurate or destructive.

Stedman couldn’t understand why the Americans had detached a part of their army to defend Chatterton’s Hill. He wrote: “The reason of their occupying” the hill “is inexplicable… It seems to have been a blunder of General Washington’s to have placed so considerable a corps entirely out of the capacity of supporting the rest of the army”.

Stedman believed that if the British had attacked the center of the American line instead (as he wanted), the men on Chatterton’s Hill would have had a hard time aiding in the defense. [see Footnote 2]

The Americans kept close watch on the British, not knowing when another attack might come.

Jacob Francis (Sargent’s Regiment) recalled, “I stood sentinel that night in a thicket between the American camp and the hill, so near… that I could hear the Hessians”.

Joseph Plumb Martin observed that:

“The enemy had several pieces of field artillery upon this hill [Chatterton’s], and, as might be expected, entertained us with their music all the evening. We entrenched ourselves where we now lay, expecting another attack. But the British were very civil, and indeed they generally were, after they had received a check from Brother Jonathan, for any of their rude actions”.

Meanwhile, Washington decided that the American army would be in a stronger position if it occupied the hills further north (agreeing with the assessment Major-General Charles Lee made that morning). Therefore, some of the troops were ordered to begin moving their camps to the new position.

Washington expected that the British would either launch a major assault against his defensive works or move to threaten his flank. To shore up his right flank, he sent William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) to occupy high ground between White Plains and the Hudson River.

Alexander’s brigade moved quickly, and without their baggage. It was a hard night for men already exhausted by the day’s fighting. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford of the Delaware Regiment had been shot in the arm on Chatterton’s Hill (it was a flesh wound). He wrote that he and his men spent the night “without a tent or anything but the ground to lay on, and not a blanket to cover us”. Similarly, Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered that “This night we lay in the woods without tents or blankets. It was cold and we made a fire in the woods,--turned our feet to the fire and slept comfortably, although it snowed in the night.”

Situation of the armies on October 28th (click to enlarge). While Howe fought Washington at White Plains (11), Knyphausen advanced on the Mile Square (9) / Valentine's Hill area.

Off to the west, Colonel John Lasher had a detachment of men guarding the landward approaches to Manhattan. After the British raided Mile Square he was ordered to abandon his position and join the American army at White Plains. On this date he burned the American barracks at Kingsbridge and set out on a wide arch that would take his men north and east towards White Plains, and around the British army.

The same day, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, occupied Valentine’s Hill with his division of Hessians. These troops missed cutting off Lasher’s command by a matter of hours. However, by seizing Valentine’s Hill they did cut off the landward retreat of the American forces garrisoning upper Manhattan.

Footnote 1: I’ve estimated a greater American number of casualties than are stated by most authors. If one simply totals up all the numbers available in Peter Force’s American Archives, the total is 53 killed, 96 wounded, and 24 missing (or 175 in total). The relatively high proportion of killed to wounded is at least partially due to the fact that two regiments reported only the former total, not the latter. After estimating, through extrapolation, the number wounded in these regiments, the total American loss becomes about 197.

Doctor John Pine of Maryland wrote after the battle, “the number of killed and wounded, as the report is in the camp, amounts only to about 90, but from the wounded I saw myself in the hospital, and adjacent houses, there must at least be an hundred and twenty or thirty wounded[,] the number of killed I don’t know.”

Documents show that there were several casualties between the Pennsylvania State troops and New Hampshire militia not listed in Force. Brooks’ and Moseley’s Massachusetts militia regiments likely suffered a fair number of casualties on Chatterton’s Hill, but no return exists of their losses. A conservative estimate of losses in these units, added to the losses in the other units, raises the American total to close to the reported British total.

Footnote 2: To the best of my knowledge, Washington did not describe why he chose to defend Chatterton’s Hill. Tallmadge claimed he alerted Washington to the presence of American militia on Chatterton’s Hill and the advance of British troops in their direction. Afterwards, Washington directed several units to the hill, and ordered a trusted officer (John Haslet) to take command of the militia. Perhaps Washington intended simply to support troops (militia) that were well-positioned to impede the British attack. In other words, the defense of Chatterton’s Hill may have been another manifestation of Washington’s general strategy of harassing the British at every opportunity (consider how Washington used his forces on the 21st, the 26th, and the morning of the 28th). The Staten Island raid, the American defense of Pell’s Point and the engagement near East Chester can be understood in these terms as well.

October 28, 1776 (Part 3)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the third of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the afternoon of October 28th: British and Hessian regiments attacked and seized Chatterton’s Hill.

Previous entry: Midday on October 28; next: Evening of October 28.

The first British troops to attack the Americans on Chatterton’s Hill were Regiment von Lossberg and the 28th and 35th Regiments of Foot. They crossed the Bronx River under cover of a cannonade

The Americans had two or three of their own field pieces on the hill. Colonel John Haslet (Delaware Regiment) tried to gall the approaching British infantry with one piece. However:

“[the gun was] so poorly appointed, that myself was forced to assist in dragging it along [in] the rear of the regiment. While so employed, a cannon-ball struck the carriage, and scattered the shot about, a wad of tow blazing in the middle. The artillerymen fled. One alone was prevailed upon to tread out the blaze and collect the shot. The few that returned made not more than two discharges, when they retreated with the field-piece.”

The two British foot regiments crossed at a ford, and made it across the river quickly. Then, according to Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige, they “turned to their left and came up to storm the entrenchment” occupied by the Massachusetts militia regiments of John Moseley and Eleazer Brooks.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall sent the Maryland battalion to the support of the militia. According to a Maryland officer, “Colonel [William] Smallwood… was ordered to march down the hill and attack the enemy... and a smart contest ensued, in which the enemy gave way”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton attributed this setback to the officer leading this advance. He observed that when the British “suddenly found themselves exposed to a very heavy fire… The officer who led them… marched forward about twenty paces… halted, fired his fuzee, and began to reload (his column remaining during the time under the enemy’s fire)”. Watching this, he predicted “that they would break. It happened as I said [it would]”.

To the south, Regiment von Lossberg also experienced difficulty. According to Johann Caspar Ries, “[we] found a little river [the Bronx] before us, though which we had to wade, the water going into the cartouche pouches of most of the men. Scarcely were we through the water, than a rain of shot fell upon us, by which many were wounded.”

Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister claimed that the regiment was exposed because “On the far side [of the river there] is a steep slope, where the right wing had to halt while the left maneuvered to the front”. Ries added that “the left wing had to march through a wood that had been set alight, so that many men burnt the shoes on their feet.”

The Hessians advanced towards the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions, which were jointly led by Colonel William Douglas. The Connecticutians claimed that they drove back the Hessians just as the Massachusetts militia and Marylanders had with the British regulars.

One of the Connecticutians wrote that:

“[the Hessians] came up in the front of Colonel Douglas' s regiment, and we fired a general volley upon them, at about twenty rods distance, and scattered them like leaves in a whirlwind; and they ran off so far, that some… ran out to the ground where they were… and brought off their arms and accoutrements, and rum, that the men who fell had with them, which we had time to drink round… before they came on again.” [see Footnote 1]

More succinctly, Colonel Gold Silliman of the 1st Connecticut wrote, “We gave them a heavy fire which made them retreat but they soon returned”.

The British, it seems, intensified their cannonade after this initial check; possibly some field pieces were wheeled closer to the hill. Haslet described this as a “cannonade from twelve or fifteen pieces, well served, [which] kept up a continual peal of reiterated thunder.” A Connecticutian recalled, “the air and hills smoked and echoed terribly with the bursting of shells: the fences and walls were knocked down, and torn to pieces, and men' s legs, arms, and bodies, mingled with cannon and grape-shot all round us.” [see Footnote 1]

The British formed a line of battle on the lower part of Chatterton’s Hill. The troops crowded together, as there was little room for them to form. According to Thomas Sullivan (49th Regiment of Foot):

“Lieutenant Colonel [Robert] Carr, who commanded the 35th Regiment, behaved with great courage, being obliged to force the left of his battalion through the right wing of the 28th… The 49th Battalion formed as well as the ground would admit, [and] every company engaged as they came up… The hill was so narrow that the right-hand company of our battalion had scarcely room to form”.

The 49th Foot found itself opposite the Delaware Regiment. According to Thomas Sullivan:

“Captain[-Lieutenant William] Gore, who commanded the right wing of our battalion, seeing the rebels which we engaged on the right wing were dressed in blue, took them to be Colonel Rall’s brigade of Hessians, and immediately ordered us to cease firing; for, says he, ‘you are firing at your own men.’ We ceased for about two minutes. The rebels, hearing him, made answer that they were no Hessians, and that we should soon know the difference”.

Other British units moved to threaten the flanks of the American position.

Regiment von Rall advanced against the American right flank, with Regiment von Knyphausen and the Lieb Regiment in support.

According to Major John Brooks of Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment, the American left flank was threatened by “a body of light infantry and jaegers”.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall spotted the threat to the left, and he ordered Webb’s Regiment, (and perhaps also the 3rd New York Regiment), partially down the hill to meet them.

This movement greatly exposed the men to British cannon fire. According to Second Lieutenant Elisha Bostwick of Webb’s Regiment:

“a cannon ball cut down Lieutenant Young’s platoon which was next to that of mine[;] the ball first took the head of [Nathaniel] Smith, a stout heavy man and dashed it open, then it took off Chilson’s arm… it then took [Joel] Taylor across the bowels, it then struck Sergeant [Amasa] Garret of our company on the hip [and] took off the point of the hip bone[.] Smith and Taylor were left on the spot. Sergeant Garret was carried [away] but died the same day[.] Now to think, oh! What a sight that was to see within a distance of six rods those men with their legs and arms and guns and packs all in a heap[.] There was not a better sergeant in the army than Sergeant Garret when the soldiers were murmuring, weary, without shelter cold and hungry[;] he would stir about among them build fires and get them all in good humour and cheerful.”

For this cost, Webb’s Regiment succeeded in turning back the threat to the left. According to Captain William Hull, “After a sharp conflict, the object was completely attained.”

Meanwhile, the British began a major push against the right and center of the American position. Their line now included, from left to right, Regiment von Lossberg, the 28th, 35th, and 49th regiments of Foot. Behind these troops crowded up two battalions of Hessians grenadiers (von Linsing and Block) and the 5th Regiment of Foot.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled:

“There was in our front, about ten rods distant, an orchard of apple trees. The ground on which the orchard stood was lower than the ground that we occupied, but was level from our post to the verge of the orchard, when it fell off so abruptly that we could see the lower parts of the trees. A party of Hessian troops [Regiment von Lossberg], and some English [the 28th Regiment of Foot], soon took possession of this ground: they would advance so far as just to show themselves above the rising ground, fire, and fall back and reload their muskets. Our chance upon them was, as soon as they showed themselves above the level ground, or when they fired, to aim at the flashes of their guns—their position was as advantageous to them as a breastwork.”

Lieutenant Enoch Anderson (Delaware Regiment) remembered:

“Now began our firing with small arms on the hill and a hot fire was kept up for some time. Many lives were lost on both sides and many were wounded.”

He remembered in particular seeing a mortally wounded soldier of his regiment who “fell to the ground” and “in falling, his gun fell from him.” Then “He picked it up,--turned on his face,--took aim at the British, who were advancing,--fired,--the gun fell from him,--he turned over on his back and expired.”

This map (click to enlarge) illustrates the position of British (red numbers) and American units (blue circles) during the British assault on Chatterton’s Hill.

I relied on Thomas Sullivan's account for the placement of the British foot regiments on Chatterton's Hill. Other details about the construction of this map can be found in the post for Midday on October 28.

Although the Connecticut battalions and Delaware Regiment offered stiff resistance, the units in between soon began to collapse. First, according to Haslet, “The [Massachusetts] militia regiment behind the fence fled in confusion, without more than a random, scattering fire” [see Footnote 2].

The Maryland battalion gave way next. According to Lieutenant William Harrison:

“We were badly disposed to receive the attack of the enemy’s small arms, and unfortunately much exposed to their artillery, which flanked us so heavily as to render the post tenable but a short time. The matter was ended by a confused and precipitate retreat on our part”.

The remaining American units were soon hard pressed. Haslet wrote that “the first three Delaware companies [those closest to the retreating troops] also retreated in disorder, but not till after several were wounded and killed.”

The Connecticut state troops found themselves almost surrounded. The collapse of the center of the American line allowed British and Hessian troops to threaten the left flank of the Connecticut men, while at the same time Regiment von Rall drove against their right flank.

One of the Connecticut men wrote:

“they advanced in solid columns upon us, and were gathering all round us ten to our one. Colonel Douglas's and Silliman's regiments fired four or five times on them as they were advancing, and then retreated; but not till the enemy began to fire on their flanks. Colonels Silliman, Douglas and Arnold behaved nobly, and the men [afterwards] gained much applause.” [see Footnote 1]

Most of the Connecticutians who were killed or wounded were struck down when they fled. According to Colonel Silliman, “we were obliged to retreat which we did through a most furious fire from the enemy for half a mile for so far there was nothing to cover us from it…”

Joseph Plumb Martin recalled:

“finding ourselves flanked and in danger of being surrounded, we were compelled to make a hasty retreat from the stone wall. We lost comparatively speaking, very few at the fence: but when forced to retreat, we lost, in killed and wounded, a considerable number. One man who belonged to our company… said, “Now I am going out to the field to be killed;”… and he was—he was shot dead on the field.”

Footnote 1: This passage is from an anonymous letter published in newspapers after the battle. Ezra Stiles believed the author was Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull of the 5th Connecticut State Battalion.

Footnote 2: Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige of Moseley’s Regiment offered this curious recollection:

“While they [the British] were rallying [after the first unsuccessful attack], the Highlanders came down, stacked their arms, drew their broadswords, and formed in rear of the [British] infantry. Then they all came up. Our men opened fire as before, and soon the enemy’s infantry opened, and the Highlanders marched into our entrenchments, and the Americans retreated down the hill westwardly.”

None of the British or Hessian accounts make mention of a Highlander regiment participating in this attack (though there were two with the army – the 42nd and 71st regiments). This description would make considerably more sense if Hessian grenadiers were substituted for highlanders. The Hessian grenadiers were placed in the second line, and although they were not armed with broadswords, they did carry short swords called hangers.