Hanging Rock (and other) Maps

One of the topics I've enjoyed reading and writing about is Thomas Sumter's 1780 campaign against British forces occupying South Carolina.

When I started researching Sumter's August 6, 1780, battle at Hanging Rock, South Carolina, I quickly noticed that the place that has been officially designated as the Hanging Rock battlefield (some hills on the western bank of Hanging Rock Creek, opposite the eponymous rock formation) was unlikely to have been the actual site of the battle to judge from statements in the source material (as explained here and here). I took this as carte blanche to determine where, in this area, the actual fighting took place. Eventually, I concluded that the battle most likely took place over a stretch of ground ranging from a plateau south of Hanging Rock Creek to a hill the northeast (as explained here).

I didn't regard this attribution as definitive because I didn't have access to all sources of information (noted here). And indeed, this year I've come across electronic copies of three old maps of the Hanging Rock battlefield that I wish I had earlier.

One map is attributed to Richard Winn, who was a participant in the battle of Hanging Rock. It can be found here.

The other two appear are in the Draper map collection, and were rendered in the late 19th Century (based, I believe, on local lore). They can be found here and here. (On the first link, north is at right; on the second, north is at top;

The maps partially confirm, and partially disconfirm, my interpretation of the Hanging Rock battlefield site.

All three maps appear to show that I was right about the placement of the main British camp on a plateau south of the creek.

All three maps appear to show that I was wrong about the hill on which British Loyalists were encamped. I concluded the hill was northeast of the main camp; these maps show the Loyalists on a hill northwest of the main camp.

I use the term "appear" because it's unclear how much confidence should be placed in these maps. The Draper maps are of a very late date, and the Winn map is wrong in at least one respect: it appears to show Hanging Rock Creek flowing west into the Catawba River, when it actually flows east into the Lynche's Creek.

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This map is from one of last year's posts on Hanging Rock. The three red squares show places that I suspected to be part of the British encampment. #1 is Hanging Rock, #2 approximately corresponds with the Loyalist camp according to the Winn and Draper maps, #3 and #4 is a flat plateau bisected by the Camden Road; the Draper maps show the main British camp in this area.

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The online Winn and Draper maps also provide insight into two of Sumter's later engagements. See the links listed below.

Battle of Fishdam Ford (November 9, 1780)

• Winn
• Draper

Battle of Blackstock's Plantation (November 20, 1780)

• Winn
• Draper (1)
• Draper (2)

For more on the Draper Manuscripts, see here and here

Looking for More Information on Hanging Rock

Last year I spent a considerable amount of time reading and writing about the battle of Hanging Rock, South Carolina, and turned that into an original, and rather detailed, account posted to this blog.

Recently, however, I came across a new piece of information that has led me to rethink some of my conclusions -- a map that is believed to have been made by Colonel Richard Winn, one of the American commanders at that battle.

The direct link to the map is here. It is one of several Winn maps hosted on John Robertson's Online Library of the Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War website.

On the map, Hanging Rock is at center right. The map identifies the "Tory encampment under Col Brian," the "old field British encampment," and a "Steep Hill"

A map like this should make it easier to understand where and how the battle was fought, but unfortunately I find this map difficult to reconcile with some of the other statements in the source material and with the modern landscape. For example, the map makes it appear that the battle was not fought along Hanging Rock Creek (as has been supposed by myself and others) but along another creek that flowed south and west into the Catawba River. I'm willing to revise my conclusions (including a draft article I prepared), but it seems to me that other information is needed to help make sense of this map. Folks that are familiar with the area -- especially archaeological work that has been performed -- are encouraged to contact me about what they know, or to point me towards persons or sources that may be helpful. Emails can be addressed to me (Adam) at mini_awi "at" yahoo "dot" com.

North Carolina: June, 1780

In June, 1780, the British completed their conquest of South Carolina and were making preparations for an eventual invasion of North Carolina. In anticipation of this invasion, large bands of Loyalist militia began to organize in North Carolina. For the moment, at least, North Carolina remained firmly in American control. Large bodies of North Carolina militia had been embodied, supported by a division of Continentals, a brigade of Virginia militia, and South Carolina refugees. The map shows the approximate distribution of these forces shortly before the battle of Ramsour's Mill (June 20). Please note that some small concentrations of troops have been omitted from this map.

British and American Forces in North Carolina in June, 1780 (click to enlarge). Red letters refer to British forces, blue letters to American forces. Placement of letters is approximate with respect to troop location.

Loyalist Militia:

A: A body of Loyalist militia at Ramsour's Mill, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Moore. This force was estimated to have 1,000 to 1,300 men.

B: A body of Loyalist militia at the forks of the Yadkin River, under the command of Colonel Samuel Bryan. This force was estimated to be as many as 800 men.

American Forces:

A: Continental forces at Hillsborough under the command of Major-General Johann de Kalb. This force included the Maryland division with 1,278 effectives, the 1st Continental artillery with 140 effectives, the Virginia state regiment of artillery with 175 effectives, 36 North Carolina Continentals, and 20 officers from South Carolina and Georgia.

B: American forces at Cross Creek under the command of Major-General Richard Caswell. This forced included approximately 1,500 North Carolina militia and the 200 infantry and cavalry of Armand's Legion.

C: North Carolina militia in the vicinity of Charlotte under the command of Brigadier-General Griffith Rutherford. Rutherford commanded approximately 1,100 men, including detachments sent to counter Moore. Nearby, South Carolina refugees were organizing under Thomas Sumter.

D: Virginia militia in Roanoke. This force included the vanguard of Brigadier-General Edward Stevens' approximately 2,500-man militia brigade.

E: American forces in Guilford County. This force included an unknown number of Guilford County militia, 80 Virginia State infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Porterfield, and 55 Virginia State cavalry under Major John Nelson.

F: American cavalry in Halifax. This force included the remnants of the 1st and 3rd Continental Light Dragoons, which had suffered serious losses during the Charleston campaign. According to one estimate, they now numbered about 200 men.

Note: The above is based on a variety of different sources, the most important of which is a letter from Johann de Kalb to George Washington dated June 29, 1780.

Battle of Fishing Creek 2

Part 2: Cary's Fort and Camden

Previous: Sumter's Third Target

Next: To Fishing Creek

Cary's Fort

On the morning of August 15, 1780, Thomas Sumter’s brigade of militia was joined by the reinforcement sent to him by Major-General Horatio Gates, bringing his total to around 700 men [1], the largest force he had commanded to date. Sumter then advanced on the Wateree river crossings south and west of Camden. As the Americans approached, they found that the British had evacuated all of their posts except for a redoubt held by Colonel James Cary of the South Carolina Loyalist militia. These men held their ground to keep open the flow of men and supplies into Camden. The Americans quickly attacked and after a brief fight in which seven Loyalists were killed, the Americans "took about thirty prisoners, among which was colonel Cary, their commander, together with thirty odd wagons loaded with corn, rum, etc., also a number of horses" [2].

The British on the other side of the river began to open fire on his men, and Sumter noted with apprehension that "the ground upon this side [is] very bad," and that "the boats are all upon the opposite side of the river" [3]. The Americans withdrew out of gunfire range, leaving a small guard to keep an eye on the British. Among these men was George Weir, a soldier in Edward Lacey’s regiment. He recalled in later years being "left alone" "as a sentinel near the ferry" "and nearly to have been captured by the enemy" [4].

Sumter also had men watching the southern and western approaches to the Wateree. Some of his men saw a party of around 60 British regulars from the 33rd and 71st regiments approaching the Wateree. These regulars had been recalled from the western post at Ninety-Six to aid in the defense of Camden. Oblivious to danger, they marched with their weapons loaded up in a wagon [5]. The Americans "secreted themselves until the British came up, when suddenly rushing upon them [they] took the whole party… without firing a gun" [6].

Meanwhile, Sumter was growing concerned about his safety. Perhaps hoping to spur Gates into action, he wrote to him saying that the British had only 1,200 regulars in Camden, and fewer than 1,000 militia, the latter of whom "are generally sickly and much dispirited." He also claimed that 500 men were en route from Charleston and were expected to arrive on the 17th. He then withdrew his force 10 miles up the river to a more easily defended position [7].

Camden

Gates received Sumter’s letter on the 15th and determined to apply further pressure to the British force in Camden. He would make a nighttime march to a strong position behind Saunders Creek, just 5 miles from Camden. From this position he could further restrict the flow of supplies into Camden and deter the British from attacking Sumter. The position was also strong enough that he could likely repel there any attack by British regulars. Gates’ army marched at 10pm [8].

Meanwhile, Charles Cornwallis had taken control of the British forces in Camden, after arriving there from Charleston the day before (August 14th). Cornwallis could see that Camden was not a strong position and that the Americans’ were likely to ultimately force them from this post. Cornwallis therefore determined to take the fight directly to Gates, reasoning that a victory would wipe out the Americans’ gains, while a defeat would be no worse than avoiding a fight altogether (in either case he would be forced to retreat). In order to maximize the probability of victory, he determined to try and catch the Americans by surprise. During the night of August 15-16, his army marched out of Camden hoping to surprise the Americans at dawn [9].

The two American armies marched along the same road, each expecting to surprise the other. Instead, both armies were surprised when their vanguards collided in the night, a little more than a mile north of Saunders Creek. After a confused flurry of fighting, the armies separated and in the morning (August 16), properly deployed for battle. Cornwallis anchored the left end of his line with the battered veterans of Hanging Rock (the British Legion Infantry, Bryan’s Volunteers, and the Royal North Carolina Regiment). He attacked primarily with several units of British regulars placed on his right. Gates adopted a similar strategy: he placed his weakest troops (North Carolina and Virginia militia) on his left and his strongest troops (Maryland and Delaware Continentals) on his right. The British regulars quickly sent the American militia into flight. The Continentals then found themselves attacked in front, flank, and rear. By the end of the day, the American army was destroyed with the loss of hundreds of men killed or captured. The American baggage train was also captured, and most of the broken militia headed home. This battle, known as Camden, was one of the greatest British victories of the war [10].

Sources:

Note that in some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Letter from Josiah Martin to George Germain, August 18-20, 1780. Both higher and lower totals can be found in later sources.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Horatio Gates, August 15, 1780. [The date was incorrectly transcribed as the 10th in this edition].

3. Sumter to Gates, ibid.

4. The pension application of George Weir, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

5. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Nathan Jaggars, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Dunlap, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves.

The day before a "corps of light infantry" passed safely the same way into Camden. See Martin to Germain, ibid.

6. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. In Hicks' account the convoy was captured by just him and two other men. Other veterans remembered this event differently.

7. Sumter to Gates, ibid. This is not to say that Sumter didn’t believe these things. Without a doubt he and his men questioned both the prisoners they took and civilians living in the area and this is likely the best intelligence he possessed. Rather, Sumter’s letter seems designed as an implicit reminder that the British might cross the river and attack him unless Gates provided a credible threat from the north.

The "500 men" was possibly misinformation given out by British officers to convince the locals and their own Loyalist militia that the Americans’ fortunes would soon be reversed. The only approaching reinforcement from that direction mentioned by Cornwallis was a mounted detachment of the 63rd Foot. See letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

8. General Gates' orders for August 15, 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Thomas Pinckney to William Johnson, July 27, 1822.

9. Martin to Germain, ibid. Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

10. Horatio Gates to President of Congress, August 30, 1780. Otho Holland Williams. A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. Martin to Germain, ibid. Cornwallis to Germain, ibid. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

Battle of Hanging Rock 8

Part 8: An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

Previous: Bryan's Defeat

Next: Battle for the Center Camp

The Provincial regiments were not idle while Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers were being assailed. In the camp of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment, a detachment of men was sent north towards the Loyalist militia and other Provincials [1]. In the center camp, the British Legion infantry and Royal North Carolina regiment were formed into a line of battle [2]. Also, Captain Kenneth McCulloch's company of British Legion infantry left the center camp to go to Bryan’s aid.

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment Responds (click to enlarge). A detachment is sent north towards the sound of battle.

McCulloch’s company was dispatched “on the first alarm,” and “they arrived on the eminence [where Bryan was encamped] just after the tories had left it” [3]. Here, the Provincials found the Americans in a state of complete disarray. Half of the men, including all of Davie’s dragoons, had scattered in pursuit of the Loyalists [4], while the remainder were taking guns and ammunition from the abandoned Loyalist camp [5].

McCulloch’s men struck the American center and left divisions [6], and “advanced firing in platoons” [7]. However, the attack was ineffective. The Americans “took to trees and rocks,” [8] and the British “overshot their opponents” [9]. The Americans formed “a half circle around the eminence,” and “by taking steady aim” “in a short time caused one third of them to fall” [10]. The Provincials “fell so fast by their unseen enemy that their officers were obliged to push them forward by their sabers” [11].

McCulloch Under Fire. Having gained Bryan's encampment, McCulloch's company confronts an arc of gunfire.

At last, McCulloch’s company broke. More of his men fell when the American left division “began to cut off their flank” [12]. The survivors “retreated to the main body,” all the while “briskly pursued by Sumpter’s men” [13]. Among the fallen, Joseph McJunkin recalled finding Captain McCulloch “near the Tory camp… begging for water” [14]. He would soon be dead [15]. Casualties in McCulloch’s company were so extensive that the company was subsequently removed from the rolls of the British Legion [16].

McCulloch's Defeat. While Bryan's Volunteers flee, McCulloch's lone company is destroyed by Sumter's militia. Some of the unit actions shown on this map will be described in subsequent posts. Bryan's men fled south and west; their flight, and the American pursuit, was less organized and more scattered than the arrows indicate. PoWAR = Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

Notes:

1. William Davie's account of the battle refers to "a part of Colonel Brown's Regiment." Likewise, Banastre Tarleton referred to the actions of "a detachment of Colonel Brown's regiment" [This is the Prince of Wales' American Regiment; emphasis mine]. The activities ascribed to the "part" or "detachment" are so distinct in the two accounts as to suggest that the regiment was divided into two parts early in the battle and that the two parts fought in different parts of the battlefield. One part, as will be seen, became engaged near Bryan's camp and was destroyed. The other part ended up fighting alongside the Legion infantry near the center camp and suffered only light casualties. Why would a division in the regiment have occurred? The most likely reason is that one part of the regiment was sent in the direction of the fighting when the battle began, while the remainder defended the regiment's encampment. More about the activities of this regiment will appear in upcoming posts.

For Davie's account of the battle, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. For Tarleton's account of the battle, see Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.

2. Inference based on comments made by Davie. Davie found these regiments in a defensive posture shortly after the events described in this post.

3. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

4. William Hill claimed half of the men had pursued Bryan’s men “a considerable distance,” and could not “be brought off from the pursuit of the Tories,” before McCulloch arrived. See Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution. Graham, ibid., claimed that the dragoons were so scattered that they could not be collected again until late in the battle.

5. Joseph Johnson (1851). Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South.

6. The main commentators identified with these commands (Joseph Graham, Joseph McJunkin, and William Hill), described this attack in some detail. The main commentators with the right division (William Davie, Richard Winn) did not mention it.

7. Hill, ibid. Graham, ibid. also mentioned the firing by platoons.

8. Hill, ibid.

9. Graham, ibid.

10. Graham, ibid.

11. Hill, ibid.

12. Joseph McJunkin's account, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

13. Graham, ibid.

14. McJunkin, ibid. McJunkin also claimed that he “got a canteen out of the Tory camp… and gave him a drink.”

15. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.

16. Don Gara. Service summary of officers of the British Legion Infantry, sorted by troop. The only other officer of the Legion infantry to be killed during the battle was Lieutenant Ralph Cunningham of McCulloch’s company. See Don Gara. Biographical sketches of the infantry officers of the British Legion. (Retrieved February 19, 2010).

Battle of Hanging Rock 7

Part 7: Bryan's Defeat

Previous: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Next: An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

Battle plan in place, the Americans remounted their horses and filed off towards the British camps. For a brief moment, everything went as planned. According to Richard Winn, "the main body [i.e., the center and left divisions] wheeled to the left," while Winn and Davie’s men moved "to the right." The American commanders knew their targets, but they did not know the terrain. Therefore, they were forced to rely on the services of local guides to lead them to their destinations. Unfortunately, the guides leading the right division knew only that they were to lead this column towards the center camp on the Camden Road; they had not been briefed on the placement of Samuel Bryan’s Volunteers [1]. As a consequence, they led the right division into the Hanging Rock Creek bottom and past the front of Samuel Bryan’s men.

At this moment, Bryan’s men were having breakfast [2], but they could hardly fail to notice the Americans. Indeed, Richard Winn claimed that "his party was within 30 steps" of some of Bryan’s men when they began to receive fire. Sumter’s intended plan of attack was quickly abandoned. There was no choice now but for all three American divisions to assail Bryan’s camp.

Davie’s dragoons were in the lead when the right division came under attack. Winn claimed that Davie’s men were "ordered to move on to make room for the [infantry]" [3]. Winn’s men hurriedly began to dismount. At this moment, he recalled, "we received a most tremendous fire from Brian," but "The enemy being on the top of a big hill over shot us." Davie, however, complained that his men "suffered much while tying their horses, and forming under a heavy fire from the Tories" [4].

The Americans Advance Up the Hill (click to enlarge). Leaving their horses near the creek bottom, the Americans advance under fire towards Bryan's Volunteers at upper left.

Bryan’s men, for their part, formed up so as to face all three American divisions, their lines following the contours of the hill. Opposite the American left division, the hill looked "something like a half moon or a workman’s square," [5] and here, their "lines were extended from a point at right angles" [6]. The left division had not yet reached its assigned ground when the firing began. As a consequence, the center and left divisions were forced into an almost head-on assault of the Loyalist camp. William Hill recalled that "This action commenced under many very unfavorable circumstances to the Americans, as they had to march across a water course and climb a steep cliff, being all this time under the enemy's fire" [7].

Bryan's Line of Defense (click to enlarge). In the foreground, a camp follower awaits the outcome of the fighting. Brush huts and barrels mark the site of Bryan's camp.

The first Americans to be attacked were the first to ascend the hill. On the right, "Winn's party was ordered to put up the Indian hollow and rush up the hill before they discharged their pieces. This took place in an instance at this same time [Davie’s troop] was ordered to charge" [8].

Davie's Dragoons Charge Bryan's Left

Bryan’s line was soon rolled up from left to right. On the left, his Volunteers were only able to get off a single volley, and American losses were relatively light: just one killed and two wounded [9]. In the center, the Loyalists got off two volleys before their line collapsed [10]. The most severe losses were inflicted by Bryan’s right. Here, John McClure led his men against the angle in the Loyalist lines. They ran forward in two ranks with a terrific fire began pouring down on them. In a few moments, McClure, Joseph Gaston, and two of his brothers "fell in the front of the action." Gaston "received a ball on the bridge of his nose" that "went under the left eye and out by the ear." One of Gaston’s brothers lay "dead on the ground," while McClure and another brother lay mortally wounded [11]. Much lore developed around the mortal wounding of John McClure. According to one tradition,

"Colonel McClure was shot through the thigh, early in the action, but stuffing the wound with wadding, he rushed ahead of his command, and his clear voice was still heard, urging on his men to the continued charge. Just as the tories fled, he fell, pierced by several wounds. Those near him ran up to his relief, but he ordered them back to the fight, and his voice continued to be heard, urging and encouraging them in the pursuit" [12].

Battle Amid the Trees. The southern end of the Loyalist (left) and American (right) lines during the assault on Bryan's camp.

As Bryan's line was rolled up, many of his men began fleeing toward the south. Just then, a part of the American left "got around the side of their camp" [13], "and as Brian's men went by," the Americans gave them "a severe fire" [14].

Bryan’s men were in full rout, "attacked in front and flank, and routed with great slaughter," [15] they "fled with the utmost precipitation, and spread confusion through every quarter of the post" [16]. Even flight was precarious, for Davie’s dragoons "could not be restrained, but pursued them" across the woodland [17]. Further, some of those Loyalists that fled towards the center camp were mistaken for Sumter's men and shot by Provincials [18]. Winn boasted that "many of these men was so frightened they never stopped [running] until they got into Georgia" [19].

Bryan's Volunteers in Flight

Assault on Bryan's Camp. Some of the unit actions occurring at this time will be described in subsequent posts. PoWAR = Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

Notes:

1. The error of the guides is described by William Davie, Joseph Graham, and Richard Winn. For William Davie's account, see John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. For Graham's account, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. For Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. The pension application of Samuel Saxon, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. Winn, ibid.

4. Davie, ibid.

5. Joseph McJunkin's account, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

6. Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Queries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.

7. Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.

8. Winn, ibid.

9. Winn, ibid. However, as already noted, his description of American losses is at odds with Davie’s.

10. Graham, ibid., who was with Robert Irwin and the center division.

11. The pension application of Joseph Gaston, transcribed by Will Graves.

12. Joseph Johnson (1851). Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South. See Elizabeth Fries Ellet. (1850). Domestic history of the American Revolution for another version of this story. McClure’s death was mentioned by many participants.

13. Hill, ibid.

14. Winn, ibid.

15. Davie, ibid.

16. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

17. Graham, ibid.

18. Saxon, ibid.

19. Winn, ibid. This is an exaggeration of course, but some of the Loyalists continued their retreat at least as far as Rawdon’s force on Lynche’s Creek, 12 miles away. They reached this point in the evening and were joined there by soldiers from the Royal North Carolina Regiment and the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment who fled during a later stage in the fighting. See Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

Battle of Hanging Rock 6

Part 6: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Previous: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Next: Bryan's Defeat

Thomas Sumter did not command enough men to simply overpower the British in the South Carolina Backcountry, and what men he had were deficient in arms and ammunition. Therefore, he chose to rely on surprise to give him an advantage over his opponents. The battle plan he developed for the attack on Hanging Rock was a repeat of that used at Rocky Mount. On both occasions, he sought to achieve surprise by making a night march to suddenly close with his target. Then, he planned to launch his attack at daybreak from multiple directions. Sumter's subordinates had also adopted this stratagem several weeks earlier at Williamson's Plantation.

The American plans at Williamson's Plantation and Rocky Mount were spoiled by an unexpected obstacle on the eve of the attack [1]. Hanging Rock would be no different. In this case, Sumter's men found the Catawba River to be unexpectedly difficult to cross. Sumter noted:

“I… began to pass the river on Saturday evening [i.e., August 5, 1780]. The rapidity of the current was so great I was not only much delayed, but met with considerable loss; however, [I] proceeded on.” [2].

Once across, Sumter proceeded with some caution. Scouts were dispatched in advance of Sumter’s column [3], and “two spies” had been placed in the British camp before Sumter made his march. During the night, these men stole their way north and reported their findings. They “claimed that “the British camp… did not exceed 300 and that their reinforcement sent to Rocky Mount had not returned” [4].

Armed with this good news, Sumter’s men made their final approach march. According to William Davie, the column “turned to the left of the road to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol, with an intention to return to it under cover of a defile near the camp” [5].

Soon, the Americans could hear “the sound of horse bells” and see “the smoke settled along the valley of Hanging Rock Creek” [6]. “A whispering order came along the line that any might sit down with arms in hand to be ready” [7]. Sumter had wanted to attack at daybreak, but he claimed that “[I] was obliged to alter my mode of attack” because of the time it had taken during the night to get across the Catawba. Therefore, he “concealed” his men near the British camp, waiting for the British “to scatter” [8].

Both sides understood that early morning was an ideal time to launch a surprise attack. At Rocky Mount, George Turnbull kept his infantry under arms at daybreak, lest an attack should come. Sumter implies that by delaying the attack, the British relaxed and went about their daily routine.

While the Americans waited, they “took two Tories,” who claimed “that the reinforcement sent to Rocky Mount had returned” since the spies’ departure. This was very alarming news, and a council of war was held with Sumter and his principal commanders. Initial opinion was divided: “some for fighting others for retreating.” A consensus, however, was quickly achieved in favor of going forward because “no officer was willing to be out done by the other in bravery” [9].

What the Americans had learned, according to William Davie, was that the British were “pretty strongly posted in three divisions.” This force included “Regulars” [actually Provincials] “on the [American] right; a part of the British legion and Hamilton's Regiment were at some houses in the centre; and Bryan's Regiment, and other Loyalists some distance on the [American] left.”

Sumter downscaled the scope of the attack in view of this unwelcome news. Because the “three large encampments” were “so extensive,” “it was impossible to attack the whole at once.” Therefore, he wrote, “I proceeded against the most considerable of the Tory encampments and that of the British, which lay in the center” [10].

Sumter’s men would attack in three divisions. His left and center divisions would attack Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers. The center division would attack in front, while the left division curled around to the rear [11]. These two divisions had “orders not to fire a gun” until the left division had “passed between the British and Tory lines to the extremities [i.e., the flank and rear] [12]. The Americans might not be able to seize the entire post, but the North Carolina Loyalists, at least, were going to get thrashed. Sumter’s right division was sent against the center camp [13]. If this force was unable to capture the center camp on its own, they would at least occupy the Provincials while Bryan’s men were slaughtered.

In order to maximize surprise, Sumter wanted his men to ride up to the camps and dismount in sight of the enemy. Davie claimed that “This plan was approved by all the officers” excepting himself. Davie “insisted on leaving the horses at this place and marching to the attack on foot, urging the confusion always consequent on dismounting under a fire, and the certainty of losing the effect of a sudden and vigorous attack. This objection was, however, overruled” [14].

Notes:

1. At Williamson's Plantation, the Americans were led to believe that the British were encamped at a neighboring plantation, which threw off somewhat the planned timing of the attack, and possibly cost them the services of some of their best men (See Richard Winn's account, in General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves). At Rocky Mount, the Americans unexpectedly ran into a detachment of the British Legion before they were in position to attack.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. The difficulty in crossing the river might be connected to the rain showers on July 30.

3. The pension application of Edward Rogers, transcribed by Will Graves. He recalled that “The night before the battle he got wounded while spying out the enemy's camp.”

4. Winn, ibid.

5. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. There are some basic disagreements between the accounts of Thomas Sumter, Richard Winn, and William Davie on events during this time. Sumter’s and Winn’s accounts are fairly compatible, and as Sumter’s account is especially trustworthy, I side with them over Davie where there are disagreements.

6. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

7. Joseph McJunkin's account of the battle, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

8. Sumter, ibid. McJunkin, ibid., recalled how he spent the time: “I and a fellow soldier sat down by a pine and both slept a little.”

9. Winn, ibid.

10. Sumter, ibid.

11. Inference based on statements by Winn and McJunkin

12. McJunkin, ibid.

13. Winn and Davie have the right division attacking the Provincials.

14. Davie, ibid. His apprehension may stem, in part, from the particularly dangerous undertaking assigned to his men (the right division).

The Hanging Rock Battlefield in Miniature

Recently, I described how I was working on a version of the Hanging Rock battlefield, at a 1:20 scale for 15mm miniatures. That battlefield is now more-or-less complete and is shown below.

I first had to identify the area in which the fighting was likely to have taken place (see here, here, and here). Early on I realized that I couldn't make an exact representation of the area as it likely appeared in 1780. Therefore, I settled on a certain amount of abstraction. I didn't create miniature hills, ravines, and watercourses per se, but rather represented these things using variations in the "vegetation." Also, the trees are spaced somewhat far apart; this is necessary so that I can move the miniatures about on the battlefield. As a consequence of these decisions, the miniature battlefield may not closely resemble the Hanging Rock Creek area in 1780, but it at least captures something of the flavor of the time and place.

Two Maps of the Hanging Rock Battlefield (click to enlarge). The map on the left is from Google Maps. The map on the right is from ACME Mapper. In both cases, today's Flat Rock Road (which follows roughly the same path as the 18th-Century Camden Road) runs from north (at top) to south. Hanging Rock Creek runs from the top of the map to the right. I believe Bryan's North Carolinians were encamped on the hill near the upper right. The lakes in the area were not present in the 18th Century. Several small streams in the area are not represented on the map on the left.

Hanging Rock Battlefield in Miniature (click to enlarge). As per above, the Camden road runs from north to south. The farmland at center left is the site of the center camp (note the brush hut near the cabin). The encampment of Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers is in the woods at the upper right. The encampment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment is in "Cole's Old Fields" near the lower right.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 4

An Alternative Proposal

In the previous two posts, I considered two different points of view about the location of British forces at the battle of Hanging Rock in South Carolina (see here and here). To evaluate these accounts, I developed an "objective" rating system that compared how well the landscape identified by these accounts matches that appearing in descriptions of the battlefield. Noteworthy, is that neither account rated better than a 75% under this system, suggesting that there is room for improvement. I therefore set about examining the terrain features in this area carefully, in order to determine whether there is some constellation of terrain features that would match participants at a higher rate.

A scheme that is a good match for participant accounts is shown in the map below. A description follows.

The center camp is located on top of a hill overlooking Hanging Rock Creek, at the approximate spot identified as the Hanging Rock battlefield on Mills' 1825 map of Kershaw District, South Carolina. (#3 on the map).

The right camp is located on top of a nearby high that is bounded by Hanging Rock Creek on two sides, a short distance upstream from the eponymous rock formation (the rock formation is #1 on the map).

The left camp is located on the Camden Road, at the approximate site of Cole's Old Fields. (#4 on the map).

Objective Assessment

1) The three camps were on elevations. 2 points.

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. 2 points.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek. 2 points.

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." 2 points.

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. 2 points. Remarkably, the hill has exactly this feature, as shown in the topographic map below. To highlight the hill shape, I've marked two of the contour lines in bold. Also important that this bend in the hill is pointed towards a defile (on which a blue arrow is placed) through which I believe the Americans advanced (see section below concerning William Davie's account of the American advance).

The red circles on this map are the three camps. The green box is described below.

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. 1 point. There is a flat patch of ground in the appropriate area in which several streams converge, but there is no "swamp" icon on this spot. This area is marked by the green box in the map above. The absence of a swamp icon may only be because the area is not large in extent.

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. 2 points. The distance is about .37 miles.

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." 2 points.

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road. 2 points. This is the brown line on the map above.

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. 2 points.

Total Score: 19 points (95%).

Subjective Assessment

Aside from agreement with the 10-item list, there are several good reasons to adopt this interpretation of the placement of the British camps at Hanging Rock. These include 1) agreement with William Davie's description of the American route of attack, 2) agreement with participant descriptions of a British flank attack during the battle, and 3) the relative military soundness of this alignment.

1) William Davie on the American Advance. William Davie described the difficulties the Americans faced in attacking the British post as follows:

"the situation of the regular troops could not be approached without an entire exposure of the assailants, and a deep ravine and creek covered the whole point of the Tory camp."

In the account that I've described, this makes perfect sense. The center camp included two 3-pounders and a force of infantry. The cannon probably could not stop movement over the creek (both because of the distance and because of tall trees obscuring the view of the creek). However, south of the creek, an American force advancing along the Camden Road, would come to a high hill that was cleared of trees (participant accounts indicate that the center camp was on farmland). At that point, the cannon would have been a very significant obstacle to advancing infantry.

Both according to Davie's account and the maps above, an American force that crossed the creek further downstream would have had to cross a ravine and creek directly in front of the Loyalist militia. Note that in Davie's account, and that of other American participants, the Loyalists are called "Tories," and the Provincials are called "regulars."

Davie's description does not fit well with the Battlefield Property site. The creek covers the front of both camps, and attacking one hilltop camp would not seem to have entailed more exposure than attacking the other.

Davie also described the route the Americans took to the battlefield: "They [Sumter's force] turned to the left of the road to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol, with an intention to return to it under cover of a defile near the camp, but the guides, either from ignorance or timidity, led them so far to the left that the right, centre, and left divisions, all fell on the Tory encampment."

As shown on the maps above, advancing parallel to the road, but on its east side (i.e., left, when one is heading south), would lead the Americans in the direction of the "Tory" camp. The defile that Davie referred to is readily identifiable in the account I've proposed: it runs parallel to the Camden Road, beginning in modern-day Heath Springs, and then joins the ravine through which Hanging Rock Creek runs. In the map below, the grey arrow shows the extent of the defile; the hilltop on which I've proposed that Bryan's Loyalist militia were encamped is at the bottom.

As will be seen when I describe the battle, the guides did not know that the Loyalist militia were on a hilltop across from this juncture, and thus this path lead Davie's men into Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers.

Davie's description of the route taken by the Americans, however, is not a good fit for the Battlefield Property site. They didn't leave the road "to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol," but evidently swung far off to the east with the purpose of reaching the well-known Hanging Rock. Once at this point, they were directly across the creek from the Loyalist militia and Provincials. There would not have been a defile to follow from this position to reach the British encampments -- the only avenue of attack was to cross the creek.

2) The British Flank Attack. Thomas Sumter, writing 3 days after the battle, noted that "They [i.e., the Provincials] had Detached a Colum[n] to support Bryant [i.e., Samuel Bryan, commander of the Loyalist militia], who, through a swamp, found means to turn my Right flank." This "column" consisted of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

Richard Winn's force at that time was assaulting the center camp, but upon "hearing a Severe firing to my Right," from this column, he moved his men towards the regiment "as quick as possible." They then arrived "on the back [i.e., rear] of the British," who were engaged with another party of Americans. Once Winn's men opened up, the British detachment was caught "between two fires [and] gave way." Davie claimed that this attack occurred "between the Tory and centre encampments."

A comparison with the terrain I've identified as the battle site shows that there is a flat patch of ground fed by several streams between the center and right camps. A British force advancing into this area from the direction of the Camden Road would have run into the Americans that had seized the Loyalists' camp. A force of Americans attacking the center camp (i.e., Winn's men)could have turned around and fallen on the rear of this force. In short, the pieces appear to fit. (Some additional explanation is required concerning the movements of all of the units involved; that will appear in the description of the battle).

A comparison of these statements by Sumter, Winn, and Davie with the Hanging Rock Battleground Property is not a good fit. Yes, there is a swampy patch of ground on the right flank of the Americans' initial position east of Hanging Rock Creek, but not on their right flank once they seized Bryan's camp and turned south. The only way for a British force to get between the two camps would be to enter a wooded ravine dividing the hills on which the Loyalist militia and Provincials were allegedly camped. Such an attack would not have been a turning maneuver.

3) Strength of the Position. The British post was in place to defend the Camden Road at the point it crossed Hanging Rock Creek. The camps, one might expect, would be laid out in a way to provide for a strong defense of the crossing. The scheme I've described seems to have this feature. The British are deployed in three camps so as to prevent a coup de main, yet the three camps are within close supporting distance of each other, forming a kind of defensive "triangle." Each camp is also in a strong location. One camp (the center camp) is on high hill south of the creek, on the Camden Road. A second camp covers the right flank of this position, on a high hill next to the creek. The third camp is also on the Camden Road, in position to either cover the left flank of the position or to act as a reserve. Befitting the fighting style of the different forces on hand, the Provincials were on cleared land along the road, while the Loyalist militia were encamped in a wooded area.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 3

The "Fish Hatchery" Hypothesis

As noted previously, there is some uncertainty about the site of the August 6, 1780, battle of Hanging Rock, South Carolina, and the Hanging Rock Battlefield Property may not be the site of the actual fighting. Mills' 1825 Atlas of the State of South Carolina places the fighting near a present-day fish hatchery on Hanging Rock Creek, and John A. Robertson et al.'s Global Gazetteer of the American Revolution places Samuel Bryan's camp in this vicinity as well. The map below shows the approximate positions indicated for the British camps. (See this post for the meaning of the numbers). The pink square with the number 2 shows the approximate site of the fighting per Mills' atlas; presumably this specifically indicates Bryan's camp. The pink square below it shows the site of Bryan's camp according to the Global Gazetteer. The two red squares correspond (if I'm interpreting the Gazetteer website correctly) with the other two camps.

Objective Assessment

Below I indicate how well this placement of the battlefield does on the scoring system I developed.

1) The three camps were on elevations. 2 points.

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. 0 points. This account has the British camps facing roughly northeast, with Bryan on the left of the line.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek. 2 points.

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." 2 points. In this case, Bryan's camp was between 1.3 and 1.5 miles away from Hanging Rock. That may seem to be stretching the definition of near, but then again, the Cowpens battlefield was named after a locale 2 miles distant.

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. 1 point. Neither of the possible hills obviously have this property; but who can tell what the terrain looked like at ground level in 1780?

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. 0 points. This is clearly not true for the uppermost hill, where Hanging Rock Creek runs through a steeply-sided ravine. Not impossible is that a stream running across the lower hill had this property in 1780, but the ground seems to have a fairly steep slope in this area also.

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. 0 points. For the uppermost hill, the distance is about 1 mile; for the lowermost hill, the distance is about .7 miles.

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." 2 points.

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road. 2 points.

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. 2 points.

Total Score: 13 points (65%).

Notably, this placement of the British camps would score just as well as the Battlefield Property interpretation if only the center camp were moved a bit further north along the Camden Road (cf. Item #7 in the 10-item list).

Subjective Assessment

This view of the position of the British camps does not score particularly well on the rating scale I developed, but it does have some strong features worthy of consideration. The Battlefield Property interpretation places the British in a relatively weak position. The British post was designed to defend the point where Camden Road crossed Hanging Rock Creek, but none of the camps are well positioned to do so, and the alleged orientation of the camps (facing eastward) leaves the point closest to the enemy, the northern flank of the line, vulnerable to attack. Worse, the least trained troops (the Loyalist militia) were placed on that exposed flank.

The "Fish Hatchery" hypothesis, entails a militarily stronger position. The British camps do not exactly face northward, but the Provincials are at least in a better position to defend the creek crossing, and the Loyalist militia are in a less vulnerable position.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 2

Was the Battle of Hanging Rock Fought on the Hanging Rock Battlefield Property?

Although I recently raised the question of where the battle of Hanging Rock was fought, the site is presumably known. Today, the Hanging Rock battleground is public property, and visitors to the site can visit the eponymous rock formation and walk over the (alleged) battlefield.

Site of the Hanging Rock Battleground Property, as shown in Google Maps. (Click to enlarge).

A nomination form filed by the State of South Carolina for the National Register of Historic Places filed on December 31, 1974, described the battlefield and the events that took place there. The nomination form reads in part:

“The property nominated for Hanging Rock Historic Site includes the high ground around Hanging Rock, a portion of Hanging Rock Creek, and the plateau to the west of the creek that centers around county road 58. Hanging Rock itself, near which General Sumter’s men left their horses before going into battle, is east of the creek on a high bluff. The whole area on the east side of the creek is strewn with huge, rounded boulders and is heavily wooded with steep banks. To the west of the creek, the ground rises sharply and reaches a plateau, where the British and Tories camped. Bryan’s Tories were camped to the north, the British Legion troops immediately to the south, and Major Bryan’s [sic] troops south of the Legion. This plateau was partly wooded and partly open fields, some of which are still visible along road 58. On the extreme south end of the nominated property, along road 58, are several houses and the Mt. Zion Church and cemetery."

“North of Hanging Rock, on Hanging Rock Creek immediately above the county road bridge, is an old Indian ford. Large flat boulders in the creek bed connect the two banks at this point."

“The British garrison was held by 1,400 men under the command of Major Carden of the Prince of Wales Regiment. They were encamped on the west side of the creek, on high ground protected by a deep ravine formed by the creek. The British units lay in three divisions, from north to south along the ridge: about 900 Tories under Colonel Samuel Bryan on a hill south of Hanging Rock Creek, (separated from the center by a ravine and a band of woods; about 160 of Colonel Tarleton’s Legion and Hamilton’s Regiment in some houses at the center; and the British regulars under Colonel Brown in open ground to the south."

Bryan's "Tories" are North Carolina Loyalist militia, "Tarleton's Legion" are the British Legion infantry, "Hamilton's Regiment" is the Royal North Carolina Regiment, and "the British regulars under Colonel Brown" is the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. The map below illustrates the location attributed to these units. Bryan's North Carolina volunteers are represented by the uppermost red square, the Legion infantry and the Royal North Carolina Regiment are represented by the middle square, and the PoWAR is represented by the lower square.

British Dispositions at Hanging Rock, according to the State of South Carolina (click to enlarge).

Sumter's men were encamped in the lands of the Catawba Nation, miles to the northwest of the British encampment. A force moving to attack Hanging Rock would most likely advance from the north along the Flat Rock (then Camden) Road, running north to south through the middle of the map.

The disposition of British troops described here seems peculiar on several counts: 1) The least-experience troops, Samuel Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers, were placed in the position closest to the enemy, 2) none of the camps were well positioned to dispute a crossing of Hanging Rock Creek along the Camden Road, 3) the principle strength of the position lay on its eastern side, where a steep slope ran down to the creek, not facing the Americans to the north.

The nomination form describes the beginning of the battle as follows:

“Sumter’s surprise attack began at six o’clock, the men advancing across the creek against Bryan’s Tory militia. Sumter meant to attack the entire British line, but misjudged; the American units met instead the northern end of the British line. Within half an hour the Americans had taken the Tory camp, sending the Tories fleeing through the woods into the center of the British line."

Although Sumter's men presumably would have approached from the north along the Camden Road, this version of events indicates that they swung away from the road so as to approach the British post from the east (and towards its main strength).

The account places Sumter's brigade in the immediate vicinity of Hanging Rock at the start of the battle. On the other side of Hanging Rock Creek were two hills. On the northern hill was Samuel Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers. On the southern hill was the infantry of the British Legion and the Royal North Carolina Regiment. (The Prince of Wales' American Regiment was encamped further to the south). Sumter intended to attack the two camps closest to him simultaneously. Although the two camps were a short distance away, an error was allegedly made in crossing the creek, causing all of the troops to become engaged with Bryan's camp.

So far I have given a number of reasons why this description of the site of the fighting is improbable. However, I recognize that there could be good reasons (just not obvious ones), as to why events unfolded in this manner. A better way of assessing the validity of this account is to compare it against the 10 statements about the Hanging Rock battlefield I listed previously.

In this post, and in two upcoming posts, I will measure the validity of an account of the Hanging Rock battlefield using these 10 statements. In making this assessment, I will determine for each statement whether it is consistent with the alleged battle site. If the site and statement are consistent, I will award 2 points to the account. Each time the site and statement may be consistent, but there is some ambiguity, I will award 1 point to the account. Each time the site and statement are inconsistent, I will award 0 points to the account. In this manner, the claimed site of the fighting can earn between 0 and 20 points.

Here is the scoring for the site of the battlefield as described in this nomination form:

1) The three camps were on elevations. 2 points.

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. 0 points. This account has the British facing eastward, with Bryan on the left of the line.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek. 2 points.

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." 2 points.

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. 1 point. The hill does not obviously have this property; but who can tell what the terrain looked like at ground level in 1780?

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. 2 points. Swamp symbols appear to the left of Bryan along the banks of Hanging Rock Creek.

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. 2 points. The distance is about .28 miles.

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." 1 point. This field was likely nearer the road than the hill along the creek.

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road. 1 point. The center camp is not placed on the road, but on a hill bordering the creek. The account does have the Prince of Wales' American Regiment on the road, albeit to the south near modern-day Mount Zion Church.

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. 2 points. In this case, the "left" camp is that of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. They are located more than 1/4 mile from the center camp. The nomination form claims that during the battle "The British retreated further south to Colonel Robinson’s camp [i.e., the third camp], but Sumter moved in and took two-thirds of that camp also." This statement is broadly inconsistent with participant accounts.

Total Score: 15 points (75%).

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 1

What Did Participants Say about the Hanging Rock Battlefield?

The largest battle of Sumter's first campaign against British-occupied South Carolina was the bloody battle of Hanging Rock (August 6, 1780). As will be seen, Hanging Rock was a remarkable battle in a number of respects, but unfortunately, it has not received the kind of detailed treatment from historians that it deserves. One hindrance to a detailed account of the battle is that the exact site of the fighting is unknown. The topographical map below (click to enlarge) shows four locales linked to the battlefield during the 19th Century. All are on or near Hanging Rock Creek, south of the present-day town of Heath Springs, South Carolina.

Briefly, Heath Springs is at the top of the map. Flat Rock Road (or State Road S-29-15) runs north to south. Hanging Rock Creek flows from the top left of the map down to the bottom right.

Locations on the map:

1. "Hanging Rock" -- a peculiar rock formation which lent its name to both the creek and the general area. It has long been believed that the battle took place not far from this rock formation. However, to the best of my knowledge, no account has claimed that the fighting actually occurred on this spot.

2. Site of the Hanging Rock battlefield, as indicated by Mills' 1825 Atlas of the State of South Carolina.

3. Site of the Hanging Rock battlefield, as indicated by Mills' 1825 map of Kershaw District, South Carolina.

4. The approximate site of Cole's Old Field. Benjamin Lossing, in his Field Book of the Revolution, Volume 2 (1850) visited the Hanging Rock battlefield, and noted that "Along a by-road, across the high rolling plain upon which (at Coles’s Old Field) tradition avers the hottest of the battle was fought." The farm of one "Colly" is shown in James Cook's 1773 A Map of the Province of South Carolina...

Lossing's sketch of Hanging Rock.

A complicating factor is that when Sumter attacked the British post at Hanging Rock, the British were encamped in three distinct position (e.g., William Davie wrote that the British "were pretty strongly posted in three different encampments the British Regulars... were encamped on the right, a part of the British Legion and Hamiltons regiment at some Houses in the centre, and Bryan's regiment with the other Loyalists... some distance on the left.") A complete treatment of the battle should identify the location of each of these camps.

In the next few posts I will consider the location of each encampment. Later, I will use this information to describe, in considerable detail, how I believe the battle of Hanging Rock was fought. In identifying the location of the Hanging Rock battlefield, I relied mainly on statements made by participants in the battle; an exception is that I was also influenced by Benjamin Lossing's mid-19th Century description of the battlefield. Below are ten clues about the location of the British camps appearing in these sources.

1) The three camps were on elevations. Thomas Sumter claimed that "The enemy had three large encampments... all upon exceeding advantageous hights."

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. William Davie wrote that before the battle, "the army turned to the left of the road... the guides... led them so far to the left, that... [Sumter's whole force ran up against] the Tory encampment." This statement indicates that Bryan's men were on the right of the British position. Davie also wrote that when Bryan was attacked, the British attempted to support him by making "a movement to their right."

In a seeming contradiction of this description, Davie also wrote that "the British Regulars... were encamped on the right, a part of the British Legion and Hamiltons regiment at some Houses in the centre, and Bryan's regiment with the other Loyalists... some distance on the left." However, he doesn't indicate in this passage whether he is referring to his left and right or that of the British. If he meant his left and right, then there is no discrepancy.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek (presumably, Hanging Rock Creek). William Hill wrote that the Americans "had to march across a water course & climb a steep cliff" to attack Bryan. William Davie wrote that "a Creek with a deep ravine covered the whole front of the Tory camp." Richard Winn recorded that Bryan's men were "On the top of a big hill."

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." Joseph McJunkin stated that Bryan's regiment was "to the South of Hanging Rock creek." Benjamin Lossing recorded that "Bryan’s corps [was] on the verge of the western bank of the creek, near the Great Rock."

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. Joseph McJunkin stated that the hill formed "something like a half moon or a workman's square." Joseph Gaston recalled, "The enemy's lines [i.e., Bryan's men on the hill] were extended from a point at right angles."

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. Thomas Sumter wrote that while the Americans were attacking Bryan, the British sent "a Colum to support Bryant, who, through a swamp, found means to turn my Right flank." Samuel Saxon stated that "a body of British had taken up a position near that of the Tories separated from them by a marsh."

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. Edward Doyle claimed, "the British Troops were stationed about four hundred yards from the Tories." William Hill claimed that "the British camp [was] about one quarter of a mile from this Tory camp." Joseph Graham noted that "the British [were] near a quarter of a mile distant" from Bryan's men. Joseph Gaston recalled that "From that [Bryan's] post, the British lay about a quarter of a mile." Matthew McClurkin claimed that "the British soldiers [were] encamped about half a mile from the place where the Tories were attacked." Richard Winn claimed that the British were "about half [a] Mile from where Brian was posted." Benjamin Lossing wrote that Bryan’s corps... [was] half a mile from the British camp."

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." Richard Winn wrote that the British were "in an Open Old field." Private Thomas Gill said that he "marched to the hanging rock Coles old fields where he was in another battle with the British & Tories." Lossing claimed that "the main body [of troops were] stationed upon the plain at Coles’s Old Field." [cf. #4 in the above map]

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road [i.e., today's Flat Rock Road]. Joseph McJunkin stated that "the British were... encamped in Camden road." William Davie claimed that the Provincials in the center camp were "at some Houses."

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. During the battle, the British were forced to give up their center camp; they fell back on their third camp, which they successfully defended. Joseph Graham, describing this retreat, noted that the British first retreated "about 300 yards where they rallied," and then "they were compelled gradually to give ground 200 yards further." Presumably, the third camp was not far behind this final position.

The "high rolling plain" at Hanging Rock. This image previously appeared in the post Touring the Revolution with Google Earth.

Sources:

William R. Davie. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie. [excerpt]

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Edward Doyle. (.pdf file).

Joseph Gaston. (1873). A reminiscence of the war of the revolution, in South Carolina. The Historical Magazine..., Vol 2.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of Thomas Gill. (.pdf file).

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of a letter from Joseph Graham to Archibald D. Murphey, March 9, 1821.

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Benson John Lossing. (1860). Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Matthew McClurkin. (.pdf file).

Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of a Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).