Ramsour’s Mill: Initial Descriptions

Despite the fact that Ramsour's Mill appears to have been a crucial American victory – even a turning point, in the southern theater – the battle is little discussed in correspondence from that time.

Consider three letters written shortly after the battle: North Carolina governor Abner Nash to Virginia governor Thomas Jefferson on June 25, James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson on June 26, and Major-General Johann de Kalb to General George Washington on June 29.

Nash and Monroe referred to a brigade of North Carolina militia commanded by Brigadier-General Griffith Rutherford, but provided no hint that some of Rutherford’s men have won a victory at Ramsour’s Mill. In fact, their letters do not even suggest that there was significant Loyalist opposition in that part of the state. The letter by de Kalb is the only one of the three to refer to a Loyalist threat: he mentioned to Washington that a detachment of his men were in Guilford County helping the local militia defend themselves against their Loyalist counterparts. It’s unclear whether de Kalb was even aware of Rutherford’s force. Although he complained that “I am quite in the dark as to all eternal News from the South as well as from the East,” Rutherford’s force to the west was missing from a report he gave of American forces in the state.

Nash, Monroe, and de Kalb agreed on one thing: the main problem facing the Americans was a lack of provisions. Monroe noted that because of a lack of provisions, “…the Army under General de Kalb at Hillsboro, and that under General Caswell here [Cross Creek], are no longer able to hold those Stations and are in that dilemma, that they have only the alternative of advancing shortly on the Enemy or retiring to Virginia.” De Kalb complained that “We live from hand to mouth, and get very little, but what is collected by Detachments, and brought in with our Baggage Waggons [from] the Scatter’d few farms in this part…” As a consequence he was forced to put his men on reduced rations. [for a map of American dispositions, see here].

Perhaps the earliest written record of the battle of Ramsour’s Mill appears in the journal of Anthony Allaire, a lieutenant with the American Volunteers. On June 23 (i.e., 3 days afterwards), he wrote:

“Lay in the field at Ninety-Six [South Carolina]. Some friends came in, four were wounded. The militia had embodied at Tuckasegie [Tuckasegee], on the South Fork of Catawba river-were attacked by a party of Rebels, under command of Gen. [Griffith] Rutherford. The [Loyalist] militia were scant of ammunition, which obliged them to retreat. They were obliged to swim the river at a mill dam. The Rebels fired on them and killed thirty. Col. [Patrick] Ferguson, with forty American Volunteers, pushed with all speed in pursuit of the Rebels. It is seventy miles distance from Ninety-Six. The militia are flocking to him [i.e., Ferguson] from all parts of the country.”

It was not until July that American authorities referred to the victory in their correspondence. In a July 4 letter, South Carolina militia Colonel James Williams wrote that the Loyalists had 1,300 men at Ramsour’s Mill, that 35 were killed, and that 500 horses and all of their baggage had been taken. On July 23, North Carolina militia Major Thomas Blount claimed that the Loyalists had 70 men killed, 100 taken prisoners, and lost 300 horses and all of their baggage. Blount also claimed that the Americans lost a mere 7 killed and 19 wounded.

On the British side, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, did not refer to the battle in his correspondence with London until August 20, when he wrote:

“[O]ur Friends in Tryon County, North Carolina, in the latter end of June, who, having assembled without concert, plan, or proper leaders, were, two days, after, surprised and totally routed by the Son of Genl. Rutherford. Many of them fled into this Province, where their reports tended much to terrify our friends and encourage our enemies.”

Cornwallis perhaps chose to withhold this information until he could also report on positive developments. In this case, news of the defeat in North Carolina was accompanied by news of the British victories at Camden and Fishing Creek.

Note: Of course one's conclusions depend on the sources. In this case I searched the Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, the Thomas Jefferson papers, the George Washington papers, and the records of the Continental Congress. Additional mentions of the battle may have been found were I able to search newspaper articles from that time.

Battle of Fishing Creek 3

Part 3: To Fishing Creek

Previous: Cary's Fort and Camden

Next: Sumter's Defeat

Sumter’s Retreat

On August 16, 1780, the men of Thomas Sumter’s brigade could hear the distant sound of cannon fire from the battle of Camden, and anxiously awaited word of the result. That evening, three or four riders appeared bearing news of the American defeat; they also conveyed orders from Major-General Horatio Gates for Sumter to retreat to a place of safety [1].

Sumter had held onto a toehold of South Carolina since late June, and although his men had galled the British at Williamson’s Plantation, he had been left undisturbed because of "the intense heat of the summer," because British offensive preparations were then incomplete, and because he did not yet register as a serious threat. After the attacks on Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock, Sumter was seen as truly dangerous, but the American offensive under Gates prohibited the British from launching a sustained retaliatory campaign. Now, Gates' army was destroyed, and Sumter’s protection was gone [2].

Sumter well appreciated the new strategic situation, and wasted no time in seeking the relative safety of the North Carolina border. That night his men marched north along the western bank of the Wateree [3]. This night march was not as rapid as the one he made before the battles of Rocky Mount or Hanging Rock. On those occasions his force was mounted; now he was responsible for hundreds of men (the force lent by Gates and his British prisoners) who would travel by foot.

Sumter pushed his men again the following day (August 17), and got his force by nightfall to Rocky Mount, some 25 miles from Camden, and on the edge of his former sphere of operations. At dawn on August 18, Sumter burned the post at Rocky Mount (which had been abandoned by the British some days earlier) and headed north again [4].

By this time, Sumter had picked an unlooked-for reinforcement. A band of mounted militia led by Captain John Moffett met him on the road, which was fleeing from a different danger: a growing Loyalist militia presence in the western part of the state. On the morning of the 18th, Sumter’s men also met up with several Maryland Continentals who had journeyed from the Camden battlefield. These men included privates John Housley and Benjamin Burch of the 6th Maryland Regiment, which had been in the very center of the fighting. Housley had made the grueling journey despite a flesh wound [5].

By midday, Sumter’s force had made another 8 miles, and was on a ridge a short distance north of Fishing Creek. Both he and his men were exhausted and at least one wagon had broken down. He ordered a rest. Sumter had previously posted a lookout at the ford over the Catawba at Rocky Mount, and he now placed a patrol on the road south of Fishing Creek, and a strong guard at the ford across Fishing Creek. Vedettes kept watch over other approaches to the American position [6]. After issuing these orders, Sumter partly undressed and napped under a wagon [7].

Tarleton’s Mission

Soon after the battle of Camden ended, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis plotted the destruction of Sumter’s brigade. Cornwallis had two forces that were capable of catching Sumter. On the far side of the wide Wateree, Major Patrick Ferguson and Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull commanded a force of Provincials and Loyalist militia collected from Rocky Mount and other points in western South Carolina. This force was not as numerous as Sumter’s brigade, but they were well positioned to cut off his retreat. On the near side of the river, he had Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, a great driver of men. It was hoped that the two forces would act in concert, and orders were issued to both commands [8].

Tarleton set off early on the 17th with his British Legion dragoons, a 3-pounder cannon, and a number of infantry. By nightfall, he had reached the Catawba/Wateree near Rocky Mount. At that moment, Sumter’s men were on the other side of the river [9].

At dawn on the 18th, some of the British sentries reported that the Americans were pulling out. Fearing a ruse, Tarleton ordered Captain Charles Campbell to take a small party across the river to assess the situation. Campbell’s party captured the lookout the Americans had left at Rocky Mount, and confirmed that the Americans had departed. When Tarleton saw Campbell waving a white handkerchief from the top of the height, the British set off with the cannon and the light infantry in several boats, while the horses (with riders) first waded out into the river and then swam across the deepest part [10].

Tarleton was unable to make contact with Ferguson and Turnbull, and so would be forced to go it alone at this point. Tarleton marched his men up the river road, following the clear tracks left by Sumter’s men. Then: a remarkable stroke of fortune. Two Loyalist women met him on the road, who claimed that Sumter’s men had halted. The women described the Americans’ position and a byway that led to their flank. Losing no time, Tarleton left behind his cannon and those men unable to make a rapid march. He then pressed on with about 100 dragoons and 60 infantry. Leading the way was a vanguard of one sergeant and four privates of the British Legion dragoons [11].

Sumter's Retreat and Tarleton's Pursuit (click to enlarge). Approximate paths taken by Sumter's brigade (in blue) and Tarleton's command (in red) before the battle of Fishing Creek.

Notes:

1. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 20, 1780.

3. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

4. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of William McGarity, transcribed by Will Graves. The distance is based on a straight line from Rocky Creek to Camden town.

5. James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier. The pension application of John Housley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Benjamin Burch, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. At Camden, the 6th Maryland on the left flank of the 2nd Maryland Brigade (see Otho Holland Williams, A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780), where it was engaged with portions of at least three different regiments: The Volunteers of Ireland, the 33rd Foot, and the 71st Foot.

6. As noted previously, Thomas Sumter has been criticized for some of the military decisions that he made in the course of this campaign. The strongest criticisms have been made regarding his defenses (or lack thereof) at the battle of Fishing Creek. On this point, the present account of the battle differs substantially from others. The meme that Sumter was a careless commander received a large boost from William Davie, who wrote that Sumter “strangely neglected the necessary precautions to prevent a surprise… the whole security of the army rested upon two vedettes.” But Davie was not present, and he obtained his information largely from Tarleton’s memoir rather than from the remembrances of American participants. American accounts, in particular those recorded by James Saye and James Collins, point to a very different conclusion: that Tarleton surprised the Americans because he crossed Fishing Creek at an obscure (though still guarded) ford, and in this way suddenly gained the Americans’ flank. This interpretation of course does not completely exonerate Sumter, but it does further suggest that he was a much abler commander than some historians believe.

For Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Saye's account can be found in this extract from his Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot. For Collins' account, see the transcription appearing in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

7. Tarleton, ibid. Davie, ibid. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. According to the pension application of David McCance (transcribed by Will Graves), Sumter slept in a tent.

8. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

9. Tarleton, ibid.

10. Tarleton, ibid.

11. Tarleton, ibid. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.