Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (15)

This is the final entry in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12, Part 13, Part 14.

In the “separate battle” at Guilford Courthouse, British forces attacking Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s flank corps found their flank and rear imperiled by the “Rockbridge Rifles” of Edward Stevens’ brigade of Virginia militia [Part 14].

The British drew men away from their primary attack to counter the Virginians, but they found the riflemen difficult to dislodge. Rifleman Andrew Wiley later remembered, “the British forces… were swept off [a ridge] by the Virginia Riflemen, but formed again and again”. [1]

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The model battlefield as the battle winds down (click to enlarge). The Americans first line was behind the fields near the bottom of the image, the second line was in the woods in the center, and the third line was at the top (where miniature redcoats can be seen driving back the American Continentals). The green-coated British Legion cavalry are massed behind the infantry. The “separate battle” is occurring along the right edge of the image.

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Meanwhile, Lee attempted to break off the action and join the Continentals on the third line. In his words:

Lee dispensed with his cavalry, heretofore held in the rear to cover retreat in case of disaster, ordering it to close with the left of the continental line, and there to act until it should receive further orders. Upon [Regiment von] Bose... [his troops] now turned with increased animation and with confidence of success. [2]

Lee’s men drove the Guardsmen and Hessians back a little ways. At that point:

Every obstacle now removed, Lee pressed forward... and joined his horse close by Guilford court-house.

However, by the time Lee’s troops reached the courthouse area, the battle for the third line was over. Lee then followed the rest of the army on its retreat.

After Lee retreated, the Rockbridge Rifles were the only sizable group of Americans left on the battlefield (Lee, perhaps, had been unaware of their presence). The Rifles soon were imperiled. At about the same time that Lee left the fight, British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton was dispatched to aid the Hessians and Guardsmen with part of his British Legion cavalry. Tarleton recalled that en route:

[they] found officers and men of both corps wounded, and in possession of the enemy: The prisoners were quickly rescued from the hands of their captors, and the dragoons… [continued on] without delay. As soon as the cavalry arrived, the guards and the Hessians were directed to fire a volley upon the largest party of the militia, and, under the cover of the smoke, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton doubled round the right flank of the guards, and charged the Americans with considerable effect. The enemy gave way on all sides, and were routed with confusion and loss. [2]

Samuel Houston of the Rockbridge Rifles recalled running for his life from the charging horsemen: “we were obliged to run, and many were sore chased, and some cut down.” [3]

Houston and a number of other riflemen eventually found each other and made their way towards the American encampment.

Darkness and rainfall halted the movement of both armies. Houston’s party, which had several wounded men in it, spent a miserable night in the woods:

all being almost wearied out, we… encamped, where, through darkness and rain, and want of provisions we were in distress. Some parched a little corn. We stretched blankets to shelter some of us from the rain.

The British army encamped on the battlefield. Commissary General Charles Stedman recalled that:

The night… was remarkable for its darkness, accompanied with rain, which fell in torrents…. The cries of the wounded and dying who remained on the field of action during the night exceed all description. Such a complicated scene of horror and distress, it is hoped, for the sake of humanity, rarely occurs, even in a military life. [4]

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British Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis had been victorious at the battle of Guilford Courthouse as a victory, but only in a very narrow sense. He had driven the Americans from field, but more than 1 in 4 of his men were killed or wounded in the process. He also failed to achieve his primary objective – restoration of a favorable strategic situation in the southern theater through the destruction of the American army.

American Major-General Nathanael Greene’s army, however, had been greatly damaged. Many of his Continentals had been killed or wounded, and much of his militia was scattered. Some of the North Carolina militia simply went home after the battle; some left out of disgust with what they felt was poor leadership by their commanders.

Greene’s situation was in a sense the opposite of that of Cornwallis. He had been unsuccessful on the tactical level (his defense-in-depth had not stopped the British attack), but he was closer than before to achieving his strategic objectives. Cornwallis gave up his pursuit of Greene’s army and moved eastward where he could be supplied. That move gave Greene an open road into South Carolina, and he soon undertook the reconquest of that state.

When Greene moved south, he expected Cornwallis would abandon North Carolina and try to defend British holdings in South Carolina. Instead, Cornwallis, after being resupplied, moved north into Virginia.

Cornwallis later explained that a retreat into South Carolina would have been difficult to undertake and would further weaken his army. Moreover, he suspected that the fight for control of the South Carolina backcountry would be over before his troops arrived. Cornwallis knew that Virginia was Greene’s main source of men and supplies. He reasoned that no action could better preserve British holdings in the south than taking Virginia out of the war. Furthermore, Virginia was vulnerable: its fine ports and rich plantations were defended by little more than militia.

Neither commander got exactly what he wanted from these moves. Greene had considerable trouble driving the British from the South Carolina backcountry; the campaign in this quarter dragged on for months. Cornwallis had an easy and successful campaign when he first arrived in Virginia, but he was unable to stop Greene’s activity in South Carolina. Furthermore, American resistance in Virginia grew stronger with time. By late summer, 1781, Cornwallis’ operations were largely confined to the coast, and in October his army was besieged and forced to surrender at Yorktown.

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Notes:

1. Pension application of Andrew Wiley.

2. Lee's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

3. Houston's account appears in William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia....

4. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

The “Separate Battle” at Guilford Courthouse

The British army at Guilford Courthouse deployed for battle in a well-ordered formation. However, this order did not last very long. As the British routed the first American line, and drove into a forest to attack the second, the British regiments became scattered and disorganized. Two British units drifted so far to the right of the others that they fought what has been called a “separate battle” at Guilford Courthouse.

The two British units in the separate battle were Regiment von Bose and the 1st battalion of Guards. These two unit fought two American formations: Henry Lee’s flank corps and the “Rockbridge Rifles” [1].

The source material does not allow one to trace the exact movements of the units in this fight, but some generalities can be stated with confidence.

One of the most helpful accounts for understanding the course of the separate battle was composed by Charles Stedman, a British staff officer who wrote one of the first military histories of the Revolutionary War [2].

According to Stedman, the advancing 1st Guards found themselves facing, alone, a withering fire from a hilltop. The Guards eventually seized this position, but only to find that “another line of the Americans presented itself to view, extending far beyond the right of the guards, and inclining towards their flank, so as almost to encompass them.” The fire from in front and from the right “completed its confusion and disorder” until the battalion “was at last entirely broken.”

Stedman went on to relate that the Guards were saved by “the fortunate arrival of the regiment of Bose” which “was advancing in firm and compact order on the left of the guards...” The Hessians then wheeled to their right and attacked the Americans while the Guards rallied. The two units then made a unified drive against the Americans.

The "separate battle" at Guilford Courthouse according to Stedman (click to enlarge). The image has been cropped and red arrows drawn onto the map to clearly show the path taken by the 1st Guards and Regiment von Bose (these are indicated by faint dashed lines on the original map).

The Stedman map shows the separate battle to have been centered on a prominent hill south and west of the American third line. This hill will also be included in the Guilford Courthouse diorama I am preparing. The figure below depicts the area I am modeling (at left: the roads, fields, and topographic features that will be modeled; at right: a modern topographic map of the same area).

Below I show how the movements depicted on the Stedman map correspond with my project map. The four panels in this map represent, from left to right, four successive stages in the separate battle (note that the final phases of the separate battle are not shown). The following units are represented by numbers: 1) 1st Guards, 2) Regiment von Bose, 3) Lee’s flank corps. In the first panel, Regiment von Bose attacks the American first line, and the 1st Guards is brought up from reserve to extend the British line. In the second panel, the 1st Guards approaches a hill defended by Lee’s men. In the third panel, the 1st Guards takes the hilltop, but is driven back in disorder. In the fourth panel, Regiment von Bose wheels to the right and attacks the Americans while the 1st Guards rally.

(click to enlarge)

Although the 1st Guards and Regiment von Bose had taken a key position, the separate battle was far from over. According to Stedman:

No sooner had the guards and Hessians defeated the enemy in front, than they found it necessary to return and attack another body of them [Americans] that appeared in the rear; and in this manner were they obliged to traverse the same ground in various directions, before the enemy were completely put to the rout.

The separate battle finally ended when Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton arrived with part of the British cavalry. These troops scattered “a few hardy rifle-men” who had remained behind to harry the British.

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Another valuable source on the separate battle is the journal of Samuel Houston of the Rockbridge Rifles. The Rockbridge Rifles was positioned on the extreme left of the American second line (in Brigadier-General Edward Stevens' brigade). Houston wrote that:

...the enemy appeared to us; we fired on their flank, and that brought down many of them; at which time Capt. Tedford was killed. We pursued them about forty poles [i.e., 660 feet], to the top of a hill, where they stood, and we retreated from them back to where we formed. Here we repulsed them again; and they a second time made us retreat back to our first ground, where we were deceived by a reinforcement of Hessians, whom we took for our own, and cried to them to see if they were our friends, and shouted Liberty! Liberty! and advanced up till they let off some guns; then we fired sharply on them, and made them retreat a little. [3]

Presumably, the “the enemy [who] appeared to us” were men of the 1st Guards, and the “Hessians” were men of Regiment von Bose.

There are two basic ways of reconciling Houston’s account with Stedman’s. One way is to assume that the events described by Houston correspond with the first set of events described by Stedman (the attack of the 1st Guards up a hill, their retreat, and subsequent relief by Regiment von Bose). The other way is to assume that the events described by Houston correspond with the second set of events described by Stedman (the appearance of an American force in the rear of the British and the subsequent round of back-and-forth combat in the woods).

As described below, neither method of reconciling the accounts is wholly satisfactory, leaving as an open question what exactly took place during the separate battle.

First, consider the possibility that the combat described by Houston took place earlier rather than later. In this case, the initial sequence of events in the separate battle might look something like this (click to enlarge):

The four panels in this map represent, from left to right, four successive stages in the separate battle (note that the final phases of the separate battle are not shown). The following units are represented by numbers: 1) 1st Guards, 2) Regiment von Bose, 3) Lee’s flank corps, 4) Rockbridge Rifles. In the first panel, Regiment von Bose attacks the American first line, and the 1st Guards is brought up from reserve to extend the British line. In the second panel, the 1st Guards attacks a hill defended by Lee’s men. The Rockbridge Rifles spy the flank of the Guards and attack it. In the third panel, fighting rages back and forth between the 1st Guards and the Rockbridge Rifles. At last, the 1st Guards is saved by the advance of Regiment von Bose. In the fourth panel, Regiment von Bose wheels to the right and attacks the Americans and the 1st Guards rally and renew the attack.

A difficulty in combining the accounts in this way is that some statements by Stedman and Houston appear to contradict.

• Stedman’s account indicates that the Guards were attacked on their right flank; Houston’s account suggests that the Guards were attacked on their left flank.
• Stedman’s account suggests that the Guards advanced on a relatively straight line, interrupted by one brief retreat. Houston’s account indicates that the fighting raged back and forth over a wide area.
• Stedman’s account suggests that the Guards were forced to retreat from a hill; Houston’s account indicates that the Guards were forced to retreat to a hill.

I tried to finesse these differences in the above figure, but the interpretation is not without problems. For example, the above figure makes it appear that Regiment von Bose was very slow in reaching the separate battle. This seems implausible in light of comments made by the British army commander, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, in his after action report:

the Hessian regiment of Bose deserves my widest praises for its discipline, alacrity, and courage, and does honor to Major Du Buy, who commands it, and who is an officer of superior merit. [4]

Why would Cornwallis have praised the regiment’s “alacrity” if it was slow to advance?

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An alternative way of combining the accounts by Stedman and Houston is to assume that the combat described by Houston occurred relatively late in the battle (when the British discovered an American force to their rear). In this case, the initial sequence of events in the separate battle might look something like the figure below (click to enlarge).

The eight panels in this map represent, from upper left to lower right, eight successive stages in the separate battle (note that the final phases of the separate battle are not shown). The following units are represented by numbers: 1) 1st Guards, 2) Regiment von Bose, 3) Lee’s flank corps, 4) Rockbridge Rifles. In the first panel, Regiment von Bose attacks the American first line, and the 1st Guards is brought up from reserve to extend the British line. In the second panel, the 1st Guards approaches a hill defended by Lee’s men. In the third panel, the 1st Guards reach the top of the hill, only to be forced to retreat when the Americans attack their right flank. The Guards are given time to rally by the arrival of Regiment von Bose. In the fourth panel, Regiment von Bose wheels to the right and attacks the Americans. In the fifth panel, the 1st Guards renews the attack. In the sixth panel, the 1st Guards and Regiment von Bose are forced to fight off party of Americans in their rear. In the seventh panel, the 1st Guards run into a deadly fire from the Rockbridge Rifles while pursuing one group of Americans. Meanwhile, Regiment von Bose continues to fight off small parties of Americans. In the eighth panel, back and forth fighting has begun between the 1st Guards and the Rockbridge Rifles. Panels 7 and 8 correspond with the beginning of the quoted passage in Houston’s journal.

A ninth panel, were it included, would show part of Regiment von Bose advancing on the Rockbridge Rifles, as per Houston’s account. Note that in the first interpretation, the Hessians advanced on the Rifles from the west, while in this case the Hessians advanced on the Rifles from the east. I think the change in direction is a strong point of the second interpretation. It’s more plausible that the Rockbridge Rifles would have been deceived by a body of men advancing from the east – the direction from which reinforcements might be expected – than from the west – the direction from which the British originally attacked.

One cause for skepticism about this interpretation is that it is terribly complicated. Also problematic is that there is not a lot of evidence to support the fine points depicted in the figure above.

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I'm not sure how I will handle the details of the separate battle when I begin representing the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature later this month. Feel free to leave a comment as to how you would interpret the source material.

Notes:

1. Lee’s flank corps consisted of Lee’s Legion, some militia dragoons, and a corps riflemen. After the battle started, they were joined by some diehards among the North Carolina militia. The Rockbridge Rifles was a regiment of Virginia militia on the extreme left of the American second line. (See The Americans at Guilford Courthouse).

2. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2. Note that Stedman is believed to have been at the battle of Guilford Courthouse, but it has not been established that he was an eyewitness to the separate battle. In any event, his account was probably composed years after the battle.

3. William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia...

4. A copy of Cornwallis' report can be found in this useful compendium of primary sources.

The Third Line at Guilford Courthouse

Earlier this month I began writing about the March 15, 1781, battle of Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina. Most of the posts I have planned will involve the recreation of the battle with military miniatures, but a few are concerned with areas of research.

In this post I discuss the American "third line" at Guilford Courthouse -- the part of the battlefield where the American Continentals were deployed and where the Americans hoped to stop the British attack.

Visitors to Guilford Courthouse National Military Park (website) are probably aware that there has been a certain amount of controversy concerning where the third line was stationed. Some years ago, the National Park Service concluded that the area in which several monuments had been placed was not in fact the correct location. The "old" and "new" third line sites are roughly indicated below.

The map at left is from the one that I prepared for this project; the fields were drawn in such a way as to be consistent with the new interpretation.

Participant accounts strongly support the new interpretation. Here is Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s description of third line area:

“Guilford court house, erected near the great state road, is situated on the brow of a declivity, which descends gradually with an undulating slope for about a half mile. It terminates in a small vale, intersected by a rivulet” [1]

The courthouse is near the junction of the two roads on the map. The "rivulet" presumably what is today called Hunting Creek, the stream that crosses the width of the map. His description goes on to place the open ground on which much of the third line fighting took place as between the courthouse and the rivulet, on either side of the road.

The new third line position is on a hill that is much higher and broader than the old third line position. It more clearly can accommodate the two brigades of Continentals that fought at Guilford Courthouse.

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At the beginning of the battle, the third line consisted of two Virginia regiments that averaged about 385 men each (both officers and enlisted men), two Maryland regiments that averaged about 340 men each, and a two-gun battery commanded by Captain Ebenezer Finley. The Virginia regiments formed a brigade on the right of the line, the Maryland regiments formed a brigade on the left of the line, and Finley’s battery was located roughly between them [2].

Maps of the third line at Guilford Courthouse usually present the American deployment in a simplified manner: either a simple straight line or four closely aligned rectangles (one for each Maryland and Virginia regiment). However, the source material allows for a more precise understanding of how each regiment was positioned. Some key passages are quoted below. [3]

• Major-General Nathanael Greene: the Continentals presented “a double front, as the hill drew to a point where they were posted, and on the right and left were two old fields.”
• Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton: “The flanks [of the two Continental brigades] did not dress up to the center, but were drawn back, so that each brigade presented a different front…”
• Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard: "the first [Maryland] regiment... was formed in a hollow, in the wood, and to the right [west] of the cleared ground about the Court house." "...my station [was] on the left of the first regiment, and next the cleared ground..."
• Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard: "The second [Maryland] regiment was at some distance to the left of the first, in the cleared ground, with its left flank thrown back, so as to form a line almost at right angles with the first regiment."

The exact spacing of the troops on the third line is not known, but a “close order” formation seems likely. As three of the four regiments were in a wooded area, it does not seem likely that the troops were packed closely together (which anyway does not seem to have been the norm by the late war; see this website for a lengthy discussion). A reasonable guess, I think, is that 12 inches separated each man. If correct, than the Virginia regiments had a front of around 480 feet each, and the Maryland regiments had a front of around 425 feet each. [4]

Taking all these points together, I believe the regiments were deployed on or near the spots indicated on the map below. The blue lines represent, from left to right, the 1st Virginia, and 2nd Virginia, the 1st Maryland, and the 2nd Maryland. The two blue “t”s represent the two cannon in Finley’s battery. The orange lines represent watercourses or ravines. Note that the left and right flanks may have been anchored on ravines. The historical New Garden Road roughly corresponds with the road marked in red-and-white that runs from the top of the map to the bottom. Notably, there may have been a gap at this point in the American line – perhaps to accommodate the retreat of the first and second American lines. [5]

Here is what the regiments look like on the battlefield map I created.

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Notes:

1. Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the war in the Southern Department of the United States

2. I discussed the American order of battle here. To the best of my knowledge, the source material does not directly indicate where Finley’s battery was located, although there are certain clues. Based on these, Lawrence E. Babits & Joshua B. Howard (2009) in Long, obstinate, and bloody: The battle of Guilford Courthouse concluded that "Finley's two six-pounders were situated on the terrace's southwest corner" where they covered the most probable British routes of attack (p. 144). I believe this interpretation is probably correct, but there are minor differences in our maps.

3. A useful compendium of sources for the battle of Guilford Courthouse can be found here. Howard’s account is quoted in Babits & Howard, ibid. and in James Herring and James Barton Longacre’s (1835) The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2

4. Here is the very crude math: 18 inches (presumed width of a typical 18th Century soldier) + 12 inches (as described above, the assumed spacing between soldiers) * 385 (estimated men in 1st Virginia) / 2 (usual number of ranks) = 5775 inches, or 481.25 feet.

5. Worth noting is that the interpretation presented here is similar to that described by Babits & Howard, ibid. The only real difference in interpretation, as best I can tell, concerns how much of the 2nd Maryland should be placed south of the New Garden Road (they suggest most, I suggest all). As is so often the case, the source material lends itself to more than one interpretation. To imagine what the line would look like according to their account, one should mentally move the 2nd Maryland regiment north until the right flank of the regiment crosses the New Garden Road.

Battle of Guilford Courthouse Project

From the end of 1778 through the spring of 1780, the British army made significant gains in the American southern colonies, overrunning Georgia and South Carolina, and threatening to capture North Carolina. However, starting in June, 1780, the British began to meet with setbacks in the North and South Carolina backcountry, and these were later followed by major defeats at King’s Mountain and Cowpens. British Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis believed that victory in the south could be secured if he vanquished the Continental army commanded by Major-General Nathanael Greene if he stopped the flow of arms and men from the more northerly colonies. To this end, he advanced his army into North Carolina in early 1781, and chased Greene and his men into Virginia. However, the Americans soon returned to North Carolina, and in greater numbers than before. At Guilford Courthouse, on March 15, 1781, the two armies met in battle, with the fate of the southern colonies on the line.

The Battle of Guilford Courthouse is one that I’ve long wanted to represent with military miniatures. About 20 years I painted up a number of 25mm Minifigs with this goal in mind, but I was quite unskilled, and that plus, well, life (I was a college undergraduate) led me to abandon the endeavor.

At left, 25mm British Guards, painted about 20 years ago; at right, 15mm British Guards, painted last year. (Both sets are by Minifigs).

When I got back into the hobby some years ago, creating a Guilford Courthouse diorama was no longer a major priority, but it continued to be a goal. Earlier this year I decided the time was right for such an undertaking.

There are three major parts to this project: 1) create 15mm miniature versions of each unit at the battle of Guilford Courthouse (specifically at a 1:20 ratio), 2) create a miniature version of the battlefield, and 3) use the miniatures to illustrate the different parts of the battle.

At present, I’m painting the last of the units I need for this representation, and I’m preparing to get started on the miniature battlefield.

In planning out the miniature battlefield, I started with a topographic map of the area, removed modern landscape features and traced the following contour lines: 780, 800, 830, 850, 880. Using MS Paint I filled in the area within each contour line and used lighter colors to represent higher elevations. My intention is to create a series of tiered hills and ridges based on these contour lines that will represent the basic topography of the area, while still providing flat surfaces for the miniatures. The area that I’ve selected to represent includes the scene of most of the fighting. [1]

Decisions about where to place the roads and fields on this map were based on several sources, including the present-day topography of the area, statements by participants in the battle, a map prepared by Lieutenant Henry Haldane (and its derivatives), and statements and maps by historians.

At left, a copy of the Haldane map (click to enlarge), with arrows and text by the National Park Service (a larger version can be found on their website). At right, a modified version of this map, showing the position of the British army (in red), and three American lines defensive lines (in blue) as they were deployed at the beginning of the battle.

For example, the set of fields at the western (bottom) edge of the map represents the Joseph Hoskins Plantation. According to a National Park Service publication, archaeological evidence has shown that these fields abutted the western boundary of the modern National Military Park. I drew in one edge of the fields based on this location (specifically using the maps in Thomas E. Baker’s (1981) Another Such Victory as a guide) and completed the other boundaries based on the Haldane map and present-day topography.

I was (and am) unsure about the exact location of the separate field that is south (right) of the main fields. Banastre Tarleton published a cleaned-up version of the Haldane map in his early history of the southern campaign, but a few years later, Charles Stedman included a modified version of this map in his history of the Revolutionary War. On the Stedman map, the separate field was moved westward (towards the bottom).

Stedman may have intentionally deviated from the Haldane/Tarleton map based on his recollections (Haldane, Tarleton, and Stedman were all present at the battle). Perhaps Haldane’s judgment of the separate field was influenced primarily by its incorporation into the American First Line, while Stedman's judgment was influenced primarily by the proximity of the field to a woodland stream the British right wing had to cross [2]. In any case, I’ve represented the field in a manner that attempts to draw a balance between the Haldane and Stedman maps, and local topography.

Notes:

1. Areas not represented: the site of the skirmishing near New Garden Meeting House, the site where the “separate battle” is thought to have ended (most of the “separate battle” area is included, however), and the site of a rearguard action between Virginia Continentals and the British Legion. Note that the selected area includes

There has been some controversy concerning the site of the “Third Line” fighting at the battle, with the National Military Park changing its stance on this subject a number of years ago. The map is based on the “new” interpretation.

2. The stream can be seen running diagonally across the lower right portion of the map I prepared. This stream is nearly, but not quite, perpendicular to the road along which the British advanced -- thus this stream may have appeared to be a good basis by which to judge the westerly limits of the Hoskins' fields.

New Research on Cowpens

Recently, I’ve come across new evidence about how the British force was deployed at the onset of the fateful battle of Cowpens. This evidence has convinced me that the deployment that I described last year (and which is the same as appears in histories of the battle) is likely in error.

To the best of my knowledge, every published description of the British deployment at Cowpens has followed Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s account. None have suggested there is reason to doubt the accuracy of his description. Consider the weight of evidence described below and ask yourself a) whether the question of how the British deployed should be regarded as settled, and b) whether Tarleton’s description is most likely the correct one.

Below is a listing of the earliest descriptions of the British deployment at Cowpens, followed by two different representations of the deployment in miniature.

Lieutenant Harry Calvert, on or shortly after January 17, 1781:

Comments: Calvert was not present at the battle but he evidently spoke with men that had been present, and he summarized their discussion in his journal. Mark Urban summarized Calvert's take on Cowpens in Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution. According to Urban:

"As one fugitive after another wandered into the British camp, Calvert pierced together the story of what had gone wrong. Tarleton, as was his custom, had hurled his troops into action before they were all up, and the 71st had advanced towards their enemy, taking significant losses from enemy sharpshooters as they went" (p 226).

Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, January 18, 1781:

Comments: Cornwallis was not present at the battle but he spoke with Tarleton shortly afterward. Cornwallis briefly summarized the British deployment in a letter to his superior, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton. He did not describe the relative positioning of the various units aside from identifying them with a front line or with a reserve.

“The attack was begun by the first Line of Infantry, consisting of the 7th Regiment, the Infantry of the Legion & Corps of Light Infantry annexed to it; & Troop of Cavalry was placed on each Flank: the 1st Battalion of the 71st, and the Remainder of the Cavalry, formed the reserve.”

Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, January 19, 1781:

Comments: Morgan was an eyewitness writing about the event shortly afterwards. He reportedly rode up to the front line before the battle began where (presumably) he could clearly observe how the British were deploying. Because a number of British officers were later made prisoners, he also had the opportunity to question them at length about their numbers, battle plan, etc. The following passage is from his official report of the battle.

“The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front moved two pieces of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line.”

Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, February 21, 1781:

Comments: Baurmeister was not present at Cowpens, but he recorded a description of the battle in his journal. Apparently, one or more paroled British officers that had returned to Charleston, South Carolina, described the battle to James Wemyss, a major in the 63rd Foot. Wemyss, who was recuperating from a wound, soon after departed for New York where he described his second-hand information to officers there. In this way, Baurmeister learned of the battle. Baurmeister’s description of the British deployment is strikingly similar to that in Morgan’s report. However, Wemyss’ description, rather than Morgan’s report, seems to have been the source of Baurmeister’s description. Baurmeister’s account shows a poor understanding of the American side of the battle. For example, Baurmeister wrote that it was the "the Georgia volunteers" that broke the British line and captured the cannon; he made no mention of the Maryland and Delaware Continentals. This is the kind of error that might be expected if Baurmeister got his information from Wemyss, who in turn got it from an officer in the battle -- not the kind of error that would occur if Baurmeister was restating Morgan’s published report. Baurmeister's description of the British deployment also differs from Morgan's in several minor respects.

“Believing that he had forced General Morgan to retreat and that his force was superior to the rebels', he [Tarleton] went in search of General Morgan on the 17th of January. He found him in battle formation at the Cowpens, close to the Pacolet River. Colonel Tarleton had to defend himself as well as he could in a space of four hundred yards. He posted the 7th Regiment on his right, the 1st Battalion of the 71st on his left, and the dismounted Legion in the center. His dragoons covered the flanks… in front of the left wing of the 7th Regiment he had two light fieldpieces.

“The British attack was too furious for the enemy's right wing—nothing withstood the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment….”

Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, 1787:

Comments: Tarleton issued the orders for the British deployment and observed their execution. He wrote about the event approximately 6 years later in his history of the southern campaign of the American Revolution.

“Tarleton desired the British infantry to disencumber themselves of every thing, except their arms and ammunition: The light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line: The legion infantry were added to their left; and, under the fire of a three-pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to advance within three hundred yards of the enemy. This situation. being acquired, the 7th regiment was commanded to form upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th: A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps, who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and threaten the flanks of the enemy: The 1st battalion of the 71st was desired to extend a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near two hundred cavalry, composed the reserve.”

--------------

Two different conceptions of the British deployment at Cowpens appear below. (For information on the deployment of American forces in the background, see The Militia Line at Cowpens, The Main Line at Cowpens: Organization, The Americans Deploy). Each miniature represents approximately 20 combatants. The two British guns are represented by a single piece. Per Tarleton's account (and what was likely standard practice), the infantry are in open order [cf. Modeling Notes]. The flags are carried by the 7th Foot; the British Legion infantry is clothed in green [cf. British Legion Redux]. Not all of the British Legion dragoons can be seen in these images.

Banastre Tarleton's Description of the British Deployment at Cowpens. The front line consists of (from left to right), a troop of dragoons, the 7th Foot, a contingent of Royal Artillery, the British Legion infantry, a contingent of light infantry, and a troop of dragoons. The 71st Foot and the greater part of the British Legion dragoons are in reserve.

Alternative Conception of the British Deployment at Cowpens. The British line is anchored on either end by a troops of dragoons (Baurmeister, Tarleton). The 71st Foot is on the left of the British line where it is close enough to the front to participate in the attack on the American militia (Calvert, Morgan, Baurmeister), but far enough from the front where it can be called accurately a reserve (Cornwallis, Tarleton). With the 71st is part of the light infantry (Morgan). The center of the line consists of the British Legion infantry (Morgan, Baurmeister), and the right consists of the 7th Foot (Morgan, Baurmeister), supported by the remainder of the light infantry (Morgan). A contingent of Royal Artillery is in advance of the infantry (Morgan, Baurmeister). The greater part of the British Legion dragoons are in reserve (Cornwallis, Morgan, Baurmeister, Tarleton).

Battle of Fishing Creek 5

Part 5: A Scene of Horror

Previous: Sumter's Defeat

Return to the Battlefield

The greater part of Sumter’s forces fled the Fishing Creek battlefield to the south, over the ford at the river road. As there was no safety in this direction, the Americans scattered. South Carolina militiaman James Collins lingered with some of his comrades near the scene of the fighting because some of his neighbors were missing. He remembered hearing, "little firing, except the pistols of the enemy," and then "all seemed to be silent." These men remained hidden while Tarleton brought off a large party of prisoners, the Americans’ guns, and all of their baggage. Late in the day, he recalled:

"a few blasts of the bugle brought some of our men in sight, who in their hurry had missed the fording place, and had gone up the creek where they found it difficult to pass, and were looking for our trail. Near sunset, a few more came up, but there were still some missing, of whom we could hear nothing. We then left the road, keeping a high, open ridge and went off some distance; night coming on, we dismounted in the woods and tied our horses; we had nothing for man or beast to eat, and the weather being warm, (August,) we kindled no fires. We lay down, every man with his sword by his side, his gun in his hands, and his pistol near his head. All were silent, for we expected the whole army had been taken prisoners, or put to the sword."

In the morning, Collins’ men cautiously approached the battlefield. Five of the men in his company were still missing. The men were also in need of food and water. At the battlefield they encountered some of Sumter’s men on a similar mission. Collins remembered that:

"The dead and wounded lay stretched cold and lifeless; some were yet straggling in the agonies of death, while here and there, lay others, faint with the loss of blood, almost famished for water, and begging for assistance. The scene before me, I could not reconcile to my feelings, and I again began to repent that I had ever taken any part in the matter [i.e., gone to war]; however, by custom, such things become familiar. We commenced our search and soon found two of our own party, one named Enloe, and the other Jackson, some distance apart, both setting up, unable to walk without assistance, and mangled by the sword. The other three we could not find among the living or the dead; what their fate was, we never knew, for we never heard of them afterwards. One was a lieutenant named Bryan, one of our most active men. We collected all the wounded we could; but poor fellows, we had little nourishment to give them; they all craved water, and even the little they received, seemed to revive them. We then began to look out [for] some provisions, for ourselves and horses; we found corn lying about in many places, that had not been consumed the day before, and there were several kettles setting about, where the fire had been kindled, with provisions already cooked—and provisions scattered about on the ground in various places. There was no time for choosing, and every man ate whatever he got hold of, asking no questions; then, taking a glass of cold water, we all felt somewhat braced up. There were horses grazing about the old field, that appeared to be nearly worn out, some with bridles and saddles on, others without."

Later, according to Collins: "After giving what help we could in burying the dead, in haste,--poor fellows it was badly done,--we caught two of the best looking horses we could find, and placing our two wounded men upon them, and supporting them as well as we could, we moved off, taking with us no plunder, (or very little) of what was considered of right to belong to Sumter’s men, being the property of their companions who had fallen… We got to a house, a few miles distant, where we obtained nourishment for the wounded, and finding an old horse-cart, we placed them in it, and next day, got them to their home, where they both recovered, but not without being much disfigured by their wounds" [1].

Prisoners’ Fates

Tarleton brought off 252 prisoners from the battlefield, including 72 Continentals. Their treatment was harsh. According to one, "they were not allowed a draft of water or a mouthful to eat for two days." In the baking heat they were marched down to Camden [2]. From there, some of the militia were placed in the Camden jail. The remainder was brought down to Charleston. Some escaped, but most suffered until they were eventually exchanged or released.

Samuel Eakins of the North Carolina militia was one that had the opportunity to escape. He was detained in Camden to assist American prisoners that had been wounded in the battle of Camden. One night he set off on what he claimed became a 3-week, 300 mile journey home. He walked, "mostly in the night being fearful of the Tories without a hat on his head or a shoe to his feet and not a penny in his pocket entirely dependent upon the charity of the Whigs whenever he fell in with them – he was frequently in a state of starvation – words cannot express the sufferings that [he] underwent in this journey" [3].

Benjamin Burch of the 6th Maryland Regiment was also "fortunate" in that he was exchanged the following year and deposited in Virginia. There, in a "state of nakedness and destitution," "without hat, coat, jacket, stockings or shoes – with only an old and broken shirt and a pair of tattered and worn out short-breeches… he literally begged his way home to Prince George County" [4].

Notes:

1. James Collins (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier. A transcription appears in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

2. British Legion prisoners taken at Catawba Fords. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

3. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves.

4. The pension application of Benjamin Burch, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

Battle of Fishing Creek 4

Part 4: Sumter's Defeat

Previous: To Fishing Creek

Next: A Scene of Horror

Across Fishing Creek

The Americans slaughtered cattle and feasted on beef, roasted ears of corn, and freshly picked peaches. Some men napped, while others shaved or washed their clothes. Men and women living in the neighborhood came out to greet and encourage the soldiers. The American guards detected no danger. The situation in the American camp was idyllic. Yet at that moment, Tarleton’s 160 men were quickly bearing down on the Americans along the byway [1].

The first Americans to see Tarleton’s men were two vedettes. These men stepped out of the bushes and fired, killing one of the five dragoons in the British vanguard. The remaining dragoons killed the vedettes with their sabers and headed towards the creek. Responsibility for guarding the ford by which the byway crossed Fishing Creek had been left to one Captain Thompson. Thompson, however, had left his post and the ford was now unguarded [2].

Among the Americans to see the British vanguard and live to tell of it were John Williams and John Dobbins of the North Carolina militia. These two men and others were collecting peaches in an orchard near Fishing Creek. Fortunately for them, the four remaining dragoons either did not see them, or took no notice of them. The incredulous Americans offered no resistance and swam to safety across the Catawba River [3].

Finally, the dragoons ascended a height from which the main American body was in view. The dragoons crouched upon their horses and waving for their comrades to come on. Tarleton sped ahead and when he reached the height he was amazed to see "the front of the American camp, perfectly quiet, and not the least alarmed by the fire of the vedettes" [4].

The Americans’ had been using rifles to slaughter cattle; although the vedette’s two shots had been heard in camp, they elicited no special notice [5].

Stealthily, Tarleton’s "cavalry and infantry were formed into one line," just out of the Americans’ view. Then, "giving a general shout," the British charged [6].

The Fishing Creek Battlefield. Fishing Creek is the winding stream at left; the Catawba River is at right. The large blue circle shows the approximate position of the main American body on the river road. The smaller blue circle shows the rear guard. The red arrow depicts Tarleton's charge [7]. The main road (brown line) is based on the modern-day Catawba River Road. The byway is not depicted.

Fishing Creek Area. Part of the Fishing Creek battlefield has been flooded by damming on the Catawba River. This excerpt from Mills' 1825 atlas of South Carolina was used to roughly locate the original banks of the Catawba River in the above battlefield map. Islands shown in the 1825 atlas were not included in the battlefield map. Note that Mills' map designates the "Battle of F. C."

"A Perfect Rout"

The dragoons rushed the American encampment, with sabers gleaming brightly in the sunlight. The British infantry came streaming after, charging through the dragoons’ dusty wake.

Tarleton Forms His Line. Infantry and dragoons form a single-rank line of battle. According to Tarleton, most of his infantry came from the corps of light infantry that fought at Camden. Shown are light infantrymen from the 71st Foot and 16th Foot, as well as a soldier of the British Legion infantry. As per usual, the figure to participant ratio is 1:20.

Tarleton described the battle that followed in prosaic terms: "The arms and artillery of the Continentals were secured before the men could be assembled: Universal consternation immediately ensued throughout the camp; some opposition was, however, made from behind the wagons, in front of the militia. The numbers, and extensive encampment of the enemy, occasioned several conflicts before the action was decided" [8].

Young James Collins, who had only recently joined Sumter, recalled that "Before Sumter could wake up his men and form, the enemy were among them cutting down everything in their way" [9].

According to one account, Sumter was sitting next to a wagon and was halfway through a shave when the British attacked. "When the colonel saw the state of things around, he cut a rope with which a horse was tied to a wagon, dropped his razor, mounted the horse and made his escape without saddle or bridle" [10].

At least one knot of resistance developed where the wagons were interposed between the dragoons and the militia. Here, some South Carolinians briefly rallied around Colonel William Bratton before being driven off. Then, according to Collins, the main part of Sumter’s force "retreated across the creek at the main road, leaving the remainder to the mercy of the enemy." Collins was with “the greater part of our number [who] dashed through the creek, at the fording place." These men were desperate "to secure our own safety… and pushing on with all possible speed, reached the highland." He called this "a perfect rout." The fate of those left behind was "an indiscriminate slaughter" [11].

Sumter's Defeat (click to enlarge). British dragoons and infantry overrun unarmed American Continentals at upper right, while a tenuous resistance is made by Carolina militia at lower left.

Tarleton also described the fighting as a "slaughter." According to one militiaman, the British were incensed at the deaths of a sergeant of the Legion dragoons and a captain of the light infantry. "The British officers had great spite at the militia, but ordered that the regulars [Continentals] should have quarters" [12].

The sight of so many enemy soldiers may also have been terrifying to the British, even though they had the upper hand. Relief came when the British found and released the Americans’ prisoners. These men picked up guns (which littered the ground) and joined their comrades. When this reinforcement arrived, the killing stopped [13].

Reinforcement. British prisoners, once released, picked up arms and joined their comrades. Shown here are soldiers of the 33rd and 71st regiments, who were captured on August 15.

By this time, the battleground was covered with scores of dead and grievously wounded Americans, both Continentals and militia. Tarleton claimed that 150 had been struck down, and the total American loss (including unwounded prisoners) was around 300. As for himself, he lost a mere 6 infantrymen, 9 dragoons, and 20 horses [14].

Notes:

In some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the quoted source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of David McCance, transcribed by Will Graves. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

2. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of John Henderson, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves.

4. Tarleton, ibid.

5. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

6. Tarleton, ibid.

7. Saye, ibid. has the British attacking along a relatively unguarded byway. Tarleton, ibid., claimed that the first thing he saw was "the front of the American camp" -- not the rear guard. James Collins in his (1859) Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier, claimed that the Americans "retreated across the creek at the main road," which is at the bottom of the map. This statement implies that the British were attacking from a different direction. Collins also recorded that "the rear guard consisting of militia were posted at the Creek." David McCance, ibid. claimed that "the rear guard was ordered to remain one mile behind" the main body, which is consistent with Collins' statement and Mills' placement of the battlefield. However, McCance also claimed that the rear guard "was taken," which seemingly is contradicted by Tarleton, Saye, and Collins (at least when the three are read together). Militiaman George Cunningham claimed that he was one of those "standing guard," but he was not captured. (see the pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves).

8. Tarleton, ibid.

9. Collins, ibid. A transcription appears in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

10. Saye, ibid.

11. Saye, ibid. Collins, ibid.

12. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

13. Tarleton, ibid.

14. Tarleton, ibid. British Legion killed and wounded at Catawba Fords. British Legion prisoners taken at Catawba Fords. The pension application of George Neely, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Patton, transcribed by Will Graves.

Battle of Fishing Creek 3

Part 3: To Fishing Creek

Previous: Cary's Fort and Camden

Next: Sumter's Defeat

Sumter’s Retreat

On August 16, 1780, the men of Thomas Sumter’s brigade could hear the distant sound of cannon fire from the battle of Camden, and anxiously awaited word of the result. That evening, three or four riders appeared bearing news of the American defeat; they also conveyed orders from Major-General Horatio Gates for Sumter to retreat to a place of safety [1].

Sumter had held onto a toehold of South Carolina since late June, and although his men had galled the British at Williamson’s Plantation, he had been left undisturbed because of "the intense heat of the summer," because British offensive preparations were then incomplete, and because he did not yet register as a serious threat. After the attacks on Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock, Sumter was seen as truly dangerous, but the American offensive under Gates prohibited the British from launching a sustained retaliatory campaign. Now, Gates' army was destroyed, and Sumter’s protection was gone [2].

Sumter well appreciated the new strategic situation, and wasted no time in seeking the relative safety of the North Carolina border. That night his men marched north along the western bank of the Wateree [3]. This night march was not as rapid as the one he made before the battles of Rocky Mount or Hanging Rock. On those occasions his force was mounted; now he was responsible for hundreds of men (the force lent by Gates and his British prisoners) who would travel by foot.

Sumter pushed his men again the following day (August 17), and got his force by nightfall to Rocky Mount, some 25 miles from Camden, and on the edge of his former sphere of operations. At dawn on August 18, Sumter burned the post at Rocky Mount (which had been abandoned by the British some days earlier) and headed north again [4].

By this time, Sumter had picked an unlooked-for reinforcement. A band of mounted militia led by Captain John Moffett met him on the road, which was fleeing from a different danger: a growing Loyalist militia presence in the western part of the state. On the morning of the 18th, Sumter’s men also met up with several Maryland Continentals who had journeyed from the Camden battlefield. These men included privates John Housley and Benjamin Burch of the 6th Maryland Regiment, which had been in the very center of the fighting. Housley had made the grueling journey despite a flesh wound [5].

By midday, Sumter’s force had made another 8 miles, and was on a ridge a short distance north of Fishing Creek. Both he and his men were exhausted and at least one wagon had broken down. He ordered a rest. Sumter had previously posted a lookout at the ford over the Catawba at Rocky Mount, and he now placed a patrol on the road south of Fishing Creek, and a strong guard at the ford across Fishing Creek. Vedettes kept watch over other approaches to the American position [6]. After issuing these orders, Sumter partly undressed and napped under a wagon [7].

Tarleton’s Mission

Soon after the battle of Camden ended, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis plotted the destruction of Sumter’s brigade. Cornwallis had two forces that were capable of catching Sumter. On the far side of the wide Wateree, Major Patrick Ferguson and Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull commanded a force of Provincials and Loyalist militia collected from Rocky Mount and other points in western South Carolina. This force was not as numerous as Sumter’s brigade, but they were well positioned to cut off his retreat. On the near side of the river, he had Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, a great driver of men. It was hoped that the two forces would act in concert, and orders were issued to both commands [8].

Tarleton set off early on the 17th with his British Legion dragoons, a 3-pounder cannon, and a number of infantry. By nightfall, he had reached the Catawba/Wateree near Rocky Mount. At that moment, Sumter’s men were on the other side of the river [9].

At dawn on the 18th, some of the British sentries reported that the Americans were pulling out. Fearing a ruse, Tarleton ordered Captain Charles Campbell to take a small party across the river to assess the situation. Campbell’s party captured the lookout the Americans had left at Rocky Mount, and confirmed that the Americans had departed. When Tarleton saw Campbell waving a white handkerchief from the top of the height, the British set off with the cannon and the light infantry in several boats, while the horses (with riders) first waded out into the river and then swam across the deepest part [10].

Tarleton was unable to make contact with Ferguson and Turnbull, and so would be forced to go it alone at this point. Tarleton marched his men up the river road, following the clear tracks left by Sumter’s men. Then: a remarkable stroke of fortune. Two Loyalist women met him on the road, who claimed that Sumter’s men had halted. The women described the Americans’ position and a byway that led to their flank. Losing no time, Tarleton left behind his cannon and those men unable to make a rapid march. He then pressed on with about 100 dragoons and 60 infantry. Leading the way was a vanguard of one sergeant and four privates of the British Legion dragoons [11].

Sumter's Retreat and Tarleton's Pursuit (click to enlarge). Approximate paths taken by Sumter's brigade (in blue) and Tarleton's command (in red) before the battle of Fishing Creek.

Notes:

1. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 20, 1780.

3. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

4. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of William McGarity, transcribed by Will Graves. The distance is based on a straight line from Rocky Creek to Camden town.

5. James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier. The pension application of John Housley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Benjamin Burch, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. At Camden, the 6th Maryland on the left flank of the 2nd Maryland Brigade (see Otho Holland Williams, A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780), where it was engaged with portions of at least three different regiments: The Volunteers of Ireland, the 33rd Foot, and the 71st Foot.

6. As noted previously, Thomas Sumter has been criticized for some of the military decisions that he made in the course of this campaign. The strongest criticisms have been made regarding his defenses (or lack thereof) at the battle of Fishing Creek. On this point, the present account of the battle differs substantially from others. The meme that Sumter was a careless commander received a large boost from William Davie, who wrote that Sumter “strangely neglected the necessary precautions to prevent a surprise… the whole security of the army rested upon two vedettes.” But Davie was not present, and he obtained his information largely from Tarleton’s memoir rather than from the remembrances of American participants. American accounts, in particular those recorded by James Saye and James Collins, point to a very different conclusion: that Tarleton surprised the Americans because he crossed Fishing Creek at an obscure (though still guarded) ford, and in this way suddenly gained the Americans’ flank. This interpretation of course does not completely exonerate Sumter, but it does further suggest that he was a much abler commander than some historians believe.

For Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Saye's account can be found in this extract from his Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot. For Collins' account, see the transcription appearing in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

7. Tarleton, ibid. Davie, ibid. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. According to the pension application of David McCance (transcribed by Will Graves), Sumter slept in a tent.

8. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

9. Tarleton, ibid.

10. Tarleton, ibid.

11. Tarleton, ibid. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

Battle of Hanging Rock 2

Part 2: Sumter's Second Target

Previous: Introduction

Next: Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina

Retreat from Rocky Mount

Thomas Sumter had tried, without success, to capture the British post of Rocky Mount, South Carolina, on July 30, 1780. That battle ended after a rain shower put an end to the Americans' efforts to burn down the British-occupied buildings. The Americans subsequently withdrew, but only for a short distance. The rain raised the level of Rocky Creek, which crossed their path of retreat [1]. Sumter might have directed his men towards a shallow ford upstream, but remaining close to the British post was good for morale, or at least his pride. He claimed that he spent this period "relieving and covering the country" from excursions by Provincials and Loyalist militia [2].

Sumter's decision to remain close to Rocky Mount was a dangerous one, for the British soon learned of the attack on Rocky Mount [3] and organized a retaliatory expedition against Sumter’s men. This force reached Rocky Mount on August 1 [4]. Late the following morning, the Americans found that the waters in the creek had receded somewhat, and a crossing was effected. Once on the other side, “the men turned out their horses and they themselves scattered about in search of roasting ears and green peaches” [5]. Sumter’s men did not realize their danger until “the enemy to the number [of] 8 or 900 men and 2 pieces of artillery was in a mile in our rear” [6]. According to one soldier, the British force reached the creek crossing “before our vittles were cooked,” and the Americans promptly fled, “leaving our provisions and some baggage” [7].

Colonel Richard Winn assembled an ad hoc rear guard, but the British could not close with the Americans before the latter made their escape. Winn then followed Sumter and detailed one “Captain Coleman from Midway in Georgia,” and a South Carolinian “by the name of Stroud” “to watch and give notice of the Enemy's motions.” Unfortunately, “these two men ventured too near the British. Both was made prisoner stripped naked and immediately hung up by the side of the road” [8].

Sumter’s Next Target

Sumter’s brigade returned to the Catawba Nation, its former base of operations. The brigade had grown steadily in size since its initial formation in late June, and new arrivals once again began to appear [9]. Sumter immediately began considering how to strike another blow at the British, even though he had by this time used up most of his ammunition.

Some authors, in considering Sumter’s actions during this period, have determined that he was at best imprudent, and at worse foolish. Others regarded him as a kind of genius. Banastre Tarleton claimed that, “This active partizan was thoroughly sensible, that the minds of men are influenced by enterprize, and that to keep undisciplined people together, it is necessary to employ them” [10]. Joseph Graham held the same opinion:

“[Sumter] had discovered that his men, while marching and fighting and fighting and marching would keep with him, but to encamp and remain stationary he might calculate with certainty his force might diminish; therefore if he failed in his enterprise the loss to the Country would only be those who were killed and wounded, the remainder might be organized in a short time as formidable as before. If he succeeded it would considerably weaken the Enemy’s effective force and have considerable weight in the operations which he expected shortly would take place” [11].

Having determined it was most prudent to remain on the offensive, he began to consider his options. Rocky Mount, now reinforced, was clearly unassailable, but the nearby post of Hanging Rock was defended by only 250 men [12]. The post at Hanging Rock was "very weak," because "the principle part of their troops" had been sent to reinforce Rocky Mount [13]. Moreover, Hanging Rock, he realized, was “of very great consequence” to the British. If Hanging Rock fell, Rocky Mount would have to be abandoned, and the central part of the state would be accessible to the Americans [14]. The British realized this, too, and they ensured that Hanging Rock was not vulnerable [15]. Before Sumter could strike, the post would receive a large reinforcement.

Notes:

1. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

3. For the circumstances in which the British learned of this attack, and their initial reaction to it, see the letter from Francis Rawdon to Charles Cornwallis, July 31, 1780. (In William T. Sherman, 2009, Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed).

4. Winn, ibid. Winn claims that this event occurred on Tuesday, August 2nd, but Tuesday was the 1st. Similarly, his account has the correct day of the week, but the wrong date, for the battles of Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. The pension application of John Whelchel, transcribed by Will Graves. Whelchel served in Thomas Brandon’s regiment.

8. Winn's notes. Whelchel also referred to the capture and hanging of the two men.

9. This is claimed by several sources. See Winn’s memoir, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, Joseph Graham's papers, and the pension application of John Whelchel.

10. Tarleton, ibid.

11. Graham, ibid.

12. See this intelligence report.

13. Letter from Thomas Polk to Thomas Pinckney, August 6, 1780.

14. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. William Davie claimed that the loss of Hanging Rock would cause the abandonment of Rocky Mount. See The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

15. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 20, 1780.

British Legion Redux

When I first decided, last summer, to spend a lot of time with the battle of Hanging Rock, I thought that I would be able to use many of the same miniatures I had painted for my Cowpens project. Gradually, however, I’ve been moving away from that decision and I’ve painted up a number of minis that will be of specific value to this battle. The latest batch I’ve been working on are British Legion Infantry. The first 15mm-high British infantry I painted (some years ago) was a group representing the 64th Foot; I used these for the Legion infantry at Cowpens for reasons briefly articulated here.

In researching Hanging Rock, it's become clear to me that the Legion infantry were dressed in green jackets similar to those worn by the Legion dragoons. A party of mounted Legion infantry arrived at Hanging Rock near the close of the battle (Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton described them as “Captains Stewart and M'Donald, of the British legion… with forty mounted infantry.” However, American sources mistook them for the dragoons (e.g., William Davie claimed that “some of the legion cavalry appeared”).

To create green-jacketed Legion infantry, I selected some Minifigs British light infantry figures that I had primed some time ago but not painted. The figures were painted using Vallejo Game Colors. I don't have a large selection, so I routinely mix my paints. The jackets, for example, are the result of mixing Sick Green, Beastly Brown, and Stonewall Gray. The figures were primed with white, but I first painted all the metal parts black. Faces were painted with Pale Flesh and then given a brown wash. I drybrushed the caps and feathers with white.

The mostly-completed figures appear below. I still have to varnish the figures and flock the bases.