Ramsour's Mill: Joseph Graham's Timeline

Joseph Graham described for historians not only the battle of Ramsour’s Mill itself, but also the sequence of events that led up to it. A summary of those events appears below.

• May 12, 1780: The American army in the southern theater surrenders to British forces at Charleston, South Carolina.
• May 29: British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton destroys a force of Virginia troops at Waxhaws, South Carolina, the last force of American regulars in South Carolina.
• June 7: British Lieutenant-Colonel John Moore of the Royal North Carolina Regiment returns home to Tryon County, North Carolina. “[H]e arrived at his father's... wearing a sword and an old tattered suit of regimentals.” He encourages local Loyalists by bringing news of the capture of Charleston and the advance of British troops into the South Carolina backcountry.
• June 8: Brigadier-General Griffith Rutherford, of the North Carolina militia, hears that Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon is leading a column of British troops towards the North Carolina border.
• June 10: Rutherford’s militia assemble at Reese’s plantation, 18 miles northeast of Charlotte, North Carolina. Rutherford intends to defend the Charlotte area against Rawdon’s advance.
• June 10: Tryon County Loyalists meet with John Moore at Indian Creek. Moore tells them that the British intend to invade North Carolina in the early fall. In the meantime “they, with all other royal subjects, should hold themselves in readiness [for the British invasion], and in the meantime get in their harvest; that before the getting in of the harvest it would be difficult to procure provisions for the British army, and that as soon as the country could furnish subsistence to the army it would advance into North Carolina and give support to the Royalists.”
• June 10: Moore learns that Major Joseph McDowell, an American (Whig) militia commander, is 8 miles away and searching for Loyalist leaders. McDowell has only 20 men with him, and Moore decides to attack.
• June 11: McDowell’s band leaves the area and Moore’s Loyalists cannot overtake them. Moore temporarily sends his men home with the understanding that they will soon reconvene at Ramsour’s Mill in Tryon County.
• June 12: Griffith Rutherford hears that Francis Rawdon is moving away from the North Carolina border. Rutherford orders his own troops to advance to Mallard’s Creek, 10 miles nearer the border.
• June 13: 200 Loyalists assemble at Ramsour’s Mill.
• June 14: Hundreds of additional Loyalists assemble at Ramsour’s Mill. Major Nicolas Welsh of the Royal North Carolina Regiment brings news of the victory at Waxhaws. “He wore a rich suit of regimentals, and exhibited a considerable number of guineas by which he sought to allure some, whilst he endeavored to intimidate others by an account of the success of the British army in all the operations of the South, and the total inability of the Whigs to make further opposition. His conduct had the desired effect, and much more confidence was placed in him than in Colonel Moore.”
• June 14: Griffith Rutherford creates two elite detachments from the 650 or so militiamen at his disposal. He has 65 men equipped as dragoons and placed under the command of Major William Davie. He also has 100 men designated “light infantry” and placed under the command of Colonel William Davidson.
• June 14: Rutherford learns that Loyalists are organizing in Tryon County, 40 miles to the northwest. He orders Francis Locke of Rowan County, Major Davie Wilson of Mecklenburg County, and other officers, to raise as many men as they can to counter this threat.
• June 15: Rutherford advances two miles to the south of Charlotte: closer yet to the border with South Carolina.
• June 17: Rutherford learns that Francis Rawdon's column has retired to Camden, South Carolina. It is now clear to Rutherford that the British will not soon invade his state. At the same time Rutherford learns that the Tryon County Loyalists are at Ramsour’s Mill.
• June 18: Rutherford marches his men to Tuckaseegee Ford on the Catawba River, which is only 12 miles from Ramsour’s Mill. He requests Francis Locke to bring his forces to Tuckaseegee Ford.
• June 18: Davie Wilson, with 65 men, crosses Tool’s Ford and joins Joseph McDowell, who has 25 men. At McEwen’s Ford they are joined by Captain Gilbraith Falls with 40 men. The combined force marches up the east side of Mountain Creek.
• June 19: It rains in the morning. Rutherford’s men discharge their guns, which alarms the neighborhood. When some of the local men turn out to investigate, they join Rutherford’s command. Rutherford’s command spends the night in a camp 16 miles from Ramsour’s Mill.
• June 19: Wilson, McDowell, and Falls join forces with Francis Locke. Their combined force has approximately 400 men. Locke and his fellow officers are at Mountain Creek, 16 miles from Ramsour’s Mill. They do not receive Rutherford’s request to move to Tuckaseegee Ford. They decide that it is safer for the men’s families to remain in the area than it is to join Rutherford (who they believe is still near Charlotte). They also reason that it is safer to attack the Loyalists than it is to remain in one place. Although the Loyalists are more numerous, they are not expecting an attack. Locke (the senior officer) sends a messenger to Rutherford relaying this decision. His men make a night march in order to surprise the Loyalists early the next morning.
• June 19/June 20: Locke and his fellow officers are on the road to Ramsour's Mill. During a halt, “the officers convened to determine on the plan of attack. It was agreed that the companies commanded by Captains Falls, M’Dowell and Brandon should act on horseback and go in front. No other arrangements were made, and it was left to the officers to be governed by circumstances after they should reach the enemy. They resumed their march and arrived within a mile of the enemy's camp at daybreak.”
• June 20: There are now perhaps as many as 1300 Loyalists at or near Ramsour’s Mill, but ¼ of these are without arms. Rutherford receives Locke’s message and marches his men to Ramsour’s Mill. Rutherford's command is miles from the battlefield at the time Locke's men make their attack.

Comment: Graham is not an infallible source, and some of the above-listed dates may be in error. For example, Graham claimed that the battle of Hill’s Ironworks took place on July 9, when there is clear evidence that the battle was on either June 17 or June 18.

Battle of Fishing Creek 2

Part 2: Cary's Fort and Camden

Previous: Sumter's Third Target

Next: To Fishing Creek

Cary's Fort

On the morning of August 15, 1780, Thomas Sumter’s brigade of militia was joined by the reinforcement sent to him by Major-General Horatio Gates, bringing his total to around 700 men [1], the largest force he had commanded to date. Sumter then advanced on the Wateree river crossings south and west of Camden. As the Americans approached, they found that the British had evacuated all of their posts except for a redoubt held by Colonel James Cary of the South Carolina Loyalist militia. These men held their ground to keep open the flow of men and supplies into Camden. The Americans quickly attacked and after a brief fight in which seven Loyalists were killed, the Americans "took about thirty prisoners, among which was colonel Cary, their commander, together with thirty odd wagons loaded with corn, rum, etc., also a number of horses" [2].

The British on the other side of the river began to open fire on his men, and Sumter noted with apprehension that "the ground upon this side [is] very bad," and that "the boats are all upon the opposite side of the river" [3]. The Americans withdrew out of gunfire range, leaving a small guard to keep an eye on the British. Among these men was George Weir, a soldier in Edward Lacey’s regiment. He recalled in later years being "left alone" "as a sentinel near the ferry" "and nearly to have been captured by the enemy" [4].

Sumter also had men watching the southern and western approaches to the Wateree. Some of his men saw a party of around 60 British regulars from the 33rd and 71st regiments approaching the Wateree. These regulars had been recalled from the western post at Ninety-Six to aid in the defense of Camden. Oblivious to danger, they marched with their weapons loaded up in a wagon [5]. The Americans "secreted themselves until the British came up, when suddenly rushing upon them [they] took the whole party… without firing a gun" [6].

Meanwhile, Sumter was growing concerned about his safety. Perhaps hoping to spur Gates into action, he wrote to him saying that the British had only 1,200 regulars in Camden, and fewer than 1,000 militia, the latter of whom "are generally sickly and much dispirited." He also claimed that 500 men were en route from Charleston and were expected to arrive on the 17th. He then withdrew his force 10 miles up the river to a more easily defended position [7].

Camden

Gates received Sumter’s letter on the 15th and determined to apply further pressure to the British force in Camden. He would make a nighttime march to a strong position behind Saunders Creek, just 5 miles from Camden. From this position he could further restrict the flow of supplies into Camden and deter the British from attacking Sumter. The position was also strong enough that he could likely repel there any attack by British regulars. Gates’ army marched at 10pm [8].

Meanwhile, Charles Cornwallis had taken control of the British forces in Camden, after arriving there from Charleston the day before (August 14th). Cornwallis could see that Camden was not a strong position and that the Americans’ were likely to ultimately force them from this post. Cornwallis therefore determined to take the fight directly to Gates, reasoning that a victory would wipe out the Americans’ gains, while a defeat would be no worse than avoiding a fight altogether (in either case he would be forced to retreat). In order to maximize the probability of victory, he determined to try and catch the Americans by surprise. During the night of August 15-16, his army marched out of Camden hoping to surprise the Americans at dawn [9].

The two American armies marched along the same road, each expecting to surprise the other. Instead, both armies were surprised when their vanguards collided in the night, a little more than a mile north of Saunders Creek. After a confused flurry of fighting, the armies separated and in the morning (August 16), properly deployed for battle. Cornwallis anchored the left end of his line with the battered veterans of Hanging Rock (the British Legion Infantry, Bryan’s Volunteers, and the Royal North Carolina Regiment). He attacked primarily with several units of British regulars placed on his right. Gates adopted a similar strategy: he placed his weakest troops (North Carolina and Virginia militia) on his left and his strongest troops (Maryland and Delaware Continentals) on his right. The British regulars quickly sent the American militia into flight. The Continentals then found themselves attacked in front, flank, and rear. By the end of the day, the American army was destroyed with the loss of hundreds of men killed or captured. The American baggage train was also captured, and most of the broken militia headed home. This battle, known as Camden, was one of the greatest British victories of the war [10].

Sources:

Note that in some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Letter from Josiah Martin to George Germain, August 18-20, 1780. Both higher and lower totals can be found in later sources.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Horatio Gates, August 15, 1780. [The date was incorrectly transcribed as the 10th in this edition].

3. Sumter to Gates, ibid.

4. The pension application of George Weir, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

5. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Nathan Jaggars, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Dunlap, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves.

The day before a "corps of light infantry" passed safely the same way into Camden. See Martin to Germain, ibid.

6. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. In Hicks' account the convoy was captured by just him and two other men. Other veterans remembered this event differently.

7. Sumter to Gates, ibid. This is not to say that Sumter didn’t believe these things. Without a doubt he and his men questioned both the prisoners they took and civilians living in the area and this is likely the best intelligence he possessed. Rather, Sumter’s letter seems designed as an implicit reminder that the British might cross the river and attack him unless Gates provided a credible threat from the north.

The "500 men" was possibly misinformation given out by British officers to convince the locals and their own Loyalist militia that the Americans’ fortunes would soon be reversed. The only approaching reinforcement from that direction mentioned by Cornwallis was a mounted detachment of the 63rd Foot. See letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

8. General Gates' orders for August 15, 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Thomas Pinckney to William Johnson, July 27, 1822.

9. Martin to Germain, ibid. Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

10. Horatio Gates to President of Congress, August 30, 1780. Otho Holland Williams. A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. Martin to Germain, ibid. Cornwallis to Germain, ibid. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

Battle of Hanging Rock 11

Part 11: Rousselet's Gallant Stand

Previous: The British Flank Attack

Next: Stalemate

After the American militia charged the center camp, the Loyalists and Provincials on hand retreated to the south and west, taking their cannon with them. What happened next is not entirely clear because few American participants described the subsequent fighting [1] and British sources are mutually contradictory [2]. This much can be said with some certainty: During the retreat of the British, they continued to fire a cannon at the Americans. This gun was somewhat separate from the Provincials, and it was seized by a party of North Carolinians. A group of Provincials that had rallied then charged and retook the cannon. Another group, consisting of both Loyalists and Provincials, also attempted to rally, but they were dispersed by William Davie's dragoons.

The British Rally (two views; click to enlarge). A group of Provincials and Loyalists rallies in the open space south of the center camp, while a second group rallies on the edge of the woods. The British cannon is defended by Henry Rugeley's South Carolina Loyalist militia [3].

Joseph Graham of North Carolina described the seizure of the British cannon as follows:

"On the British retreat from their position after being forced from their camp on the right of their line they kept firing a three pounder. Captain James Knox of Mecklenburg, gave order to his men to load their guns, and when that piece fired the next time they would take it; on the discharge of the gun they started in full run, and before the artillerists could load got within forty steps and began to fire, the British retreated and Knox and party took the gun and turned her on their adversaries" [4].

Knox Has the Cannon (two views; click to enlarge). Knox's North Carolinians turn a cannon on the Provincials.

Knox’s seizure of the gun threatened to drive the British Provincials off the field of battle. At this moment of crisis, however, Captain John Rousselet of the British Legion, was able to rally his regiment. Fortunately for Rousselet and his men, Knox’s men did not know “how to manage or load” the cannon, although it was “in their possession several minutes” [5].

By standing their ground, these “gallant few gave time for a few of the scattered troops to rally and join the legion” [6]. Among the arrivals was the unengaged portion of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment. They had by this time “recover[ed] from the consternation into which they had been thrown by the flight of Colonel Bryan, and they now joined [the Legion infantry] to defend the British encampment” [7].

Elements of the Royal North Carolina Regiment and Prince of Wales' American Regiment were added to the right of the British line [8], and the British then “came on with fixed bayonets and retook the gun" [9]. George Hanger claimed that when the British charged, John Rousselet accompanied them, and that "this officer, possessing happily not only valour, but also good conduct," did not permit the British to pursue the Americans "in a broken and irregular manner," but instead, "convinced of the advantage of the ground he had been attacked upon, he marched back and took possession of it again" [10].

Soon after this episode [11], William Davie managed to get his dragoons "collected and formed on the margin of the woods." However, he did not send his men into the open field to battle Rousselet and the British three-pounders. Instead, he set his sights on “a large body of the enemy, consisting of the legion infantry, Hamilton's regiment, and Tories... rallying, and formed on the opposite side of the British camp, near the wood." William Davie decided to attack this force with his dragoons, “lest they might be induced to take the Americans in flank.” To avoid the deadly open space, he “passed round the [center] camp under cover of the trees, and charged them with his company of dragoons.” As a result, the British “were routed and dispersed by a handful of men” [12].

Davie Charges Around the Camp (click to enlarge). Davie's dragoons charge through the woods, driving before them Loyalist militia and Provincial infantry.

Rousselet's Gallant Stand and Davie's Charge. As one group of Provincials holds off American attacks south of the center camp, a second group is routed by a charge of William Davie's dragoons.

Notes:

1. Joseph Graham provided the clearest description. The accounts by William Davie and Thomas Sumter also provide invaluable insights, however, the latter two appeared to miss at least parts of this action. Of the other participants who wrote postwar narratives (these do not include pension applications), Richard Winn, William Hill, and Joseph Gaston were wounded elsewhere on the battlefield, and Joseph McJunkin was attending to the wounded and/or guarding prisoners.

• For Joseph Graham's account, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.
• For William Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.
• For Thomas Sumter's account, see the letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.
• For Richard Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).
• For William Hill's account, see Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.
• For Joseph Gaston's account, see Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Queries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.
• For Joseph McJunkin's account, see Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

2. Francis Rawdon, Banastre Tarleton, and George Hanger claimed that the British Legion was chiefly responsible for maintaining the resistance against the British during this period, while Charles Stedman, Roderick Mackenzie, and an anonymous officer of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment gave important roles to either the Royal North Carolina Regiment or the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

A tentative resolution to these discrepant versions of events is as follows: The British Legion infantry was the first to rally after the center camp was lost and it was central to maintaining a British presence on the battlefield. After they rallied they were joined by other Provincials, and this combined force fought Sumter's men to a draw. Tarleton and Hanger were officers in the British Legion and their accounts probably reflect a certain degree of pro-British Legion partisanship (cf. Mackenzie). However, Rawdon observed that the British Legion infantry alone remained entirely on the battlefield after the action ended and that morale remained good among the Legion infantry, after it had fallen among the other British units fighting at Hanging Rock. Also, Stedman credited Captain John Rousselet of the Legion infantry with a special leadership role at around this point in the battle (cf. Hanger).

• For Francis Rawdon's account, see the letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801
• For Banastre Tarleton's account, see Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
• For George Hanger's account, see An Address to the Army; in Reply to Strictures, by Roderick M'Kenzie, (Late Lieutenant in the 71st Regiment) on Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
• For Charles Stedman's account, see Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.
• For Roderick Mackenzie's account, see Strictures On Lieutenant. Col. Tarleton's History of the Campaigns Of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America.
• For the account of an anonymous officer of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment, see Todd Braisted (2001). A History of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

3. Braisted, ibid.

4. Graham, ibid.

5. Graham, ibid.

6. Hanger, ibid.

7. Tarleton, ibid.

8. Braisted, ibid.

9. Graham, ibid. It was perhaps at this time that, according to Mackenzie, ibid., that "Lieutenant [or Adjutant] Browne, of the North Carolinians... fell in a desperate charge, which the crisis of the action rendered inevitable."

10. Hanger, ibid.

11. Suggested by a comparison of Davie's and Graham's accounts. Davie seemingly missed the taking of the cannon and the subsequent British charge. His account states vaguely that “The remainder of a British line who had also made a movement, retreated hastily towards their former position.” This passage follows his description of the destruction of a detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment, suggesting that his charge came subsequent to the charges by Knox and Rousselet.

12. Davie, ibid. As noted here and here, Davie's dragoons had scattered earlier in the battle.

Battle of Hanging Rock 9

Part 9: Battle for the Center Camp

Previous: An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

Next: The British Flank Attack

At the same time that elements of the Americans center and left divisions were battling McCulloch for possession of the Loyalist camp, other American militia were pursuing Samuel Bryan’s Loyalists to the west and south. These panicked men threw the camps of the Provincials into disorder [1]. Amid the chaos, the Provincials mistook some of Bryan's men for Sumter's militia and shot them [2]. The Americans added to the confusion by closing pursuing Bryan's men. According to one remarkable tale told after the war:

"As the tories fled towards the British camp, many of the whigs [i.e., Sumter’s men] rushed pell-mell with them. One named Walker, hurrying along in their midst, was about to fire on those before him, when a tory close to him caught his arm, crying, ‘Those are on our side!’ and then, as if struck with a sudden suspicion, asked ‘What is that green leaf in your hat for?’ The whigs had taken the precaution to put each a leaf in their hats that morning before going into battle. The soldier pulled out the token, but the discovery was already made; one of the tories seized his gun, the other ran a bayonet through his hunting shirt. Letting the weapon go, he turned and fled back. ‘It appeared to me,’ he said, ‘that they fired fifty guns after me; every leap I gave, I heard something fall on the leaves which I took for blood, and thought I must be badly wounded, and would soon fall exhausted. I thought of the intolerable thirst I had witnessed in those bleeding to death, and my mouth began to feel parched. I had now reached the branch [Hanging Rock Creek or a tributary], and stooped to drink. On examination I found I was not hurt, but my powder horn was severely wounded, being pierced through with a rifle ball, and having lost the greater part of its contents’" [3].

Bryan's Volunteers in Flight (click to enlarge). A portion of Bryan's men flee through the camp of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

The American right division followed those of Bryan's men fleeing westward. For Richard Winn, the purpose of this movement was to attack the British center camp, his original target [4]. Here, the British "were well posted" [5]. When the Americans came into view, "the British immediately commenced firing from behind some bush tents," [6] and "behind a fence" [7]. Many of the men with Winn were simply moving "in pursuit of the Tories," and were surprised "by this unexpected discharge" from the Provincials [8]. But the Americans were quick to recover. Seeing that the Provincials were without loaded muskets, Winn "set up the Indian hollo," and his men "rushed and fire[d] on their enemy as they went with bullets in their mouths and powder in their pockets." They loaded their rifles on the run, not stopping "to take a tree even where trees was" [9]. "The British… finding such a charge made on them," [10] "broke and joined in the flight of the Loyalists" [11].

Elements of the center and left divisions soon began arriving after having pursued the survivors of McCulloch’s company to the center camp [12]. Among these, two companies of North Carolinians began taking fire from "A party of fifteen or twenty of the enemy," who had taken "shelter in a cabin with a clapboard door," and were "firing through the cracks." In response, "Captain [James] Knox, with half the men, charged the front door, Lieutenant [George] Graham with the rest charged the rear door. Captain Knox ran against and broke down the door, the enemy fled out of the rear door, and Graham's party shot down several of them" [13].

The British Flee the Center Camp (click to enlarge). Loyalist militia, the Royal North Carolina Regiment (red coats), and British Legion infantry (green jackets) abandon the center camp to American riflemen and dragoons. The British manage to retain their cannon.

All-in-all, the Provincials had delivered only "a few discharges," before giving up the center camp. They retreated "for about 300 yards." Here, Joseph Graham thought, was the opportunity to launch the knockout blow against the British garrison. The British infantry "turned their backs for 300 yards," and "a charge of 70 cavalry would have made them surrender, but at that period but few of the cavalry had returned from pursuit of the tories and they were yet unformed." That Davie’s dragoons had charged and scattered so early in the action was a "great blunder" for the Americans [14].

Battle for the Center Camp. The Americans pursue a portion of Bryan's Volunteers to the center camp and attack the British Provincials stationed there. Meanwhile, a portion of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment (PoWAR) advances towards Bryan's former encampment.

Notes:

1. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

2. The pension application of Samuel Saxon, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. Elizabeth Fries Ellet. (1850). Domestic history of the American Revolution.

4. Suggested by the accounts of William Davie and Richard Winn; both describe early attack on center camp, and neither mentioned the battle with McCulloch described in my previous post. Winn's account notes, "as soon as Brian gave way [Winn] marched with his party for the British camp which he found in an open old field about [one] half mile from where Brian was posted." For Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. For Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).

5. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

6. Winn, ibid.

7. Davie, ibid.

8. Davie, ibid.

9. Winn, ibid.

10. Winn, ibid.

11. Davie, ibid.

12. Implicit in the account of Joseph Graham, and explicit in the account of Joseph McJunkin. For Graham's account, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. For McJunkin's account, see Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

13. Graham, ibid. According to this source, Knox commanded one company, Graham the other. Graham took over Captain David Reid’s company after Reid was killed in the assault on Bryan’s camp.

14. Graham, ibid.

Battle of Hanging Rock 4

Part 4: British Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Previous: Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina

Next: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Statements about the British forces at Hanging Rock were made by British and American participants and their contemporaries. Most reliable is Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon's statement that Hanging Rock was defended by "400 provincials and 800 militia" [1].

Provincials:

The Provincials included men from three different regiments: The British Legion infantry, The Prince of Wales’ American Regiment, and the Royal North Carolina Regiment [2]. Total losses for the Provincials were 38 men killed, 69 wounded, 71 missing [3]. The strength and losses of each unit are as follows:

Prince of Wales’ American Regiment: Lost 93 of 181 men (51%) [4]

Royal North Carolina Regiment: Lost 50 of approximately 100 men (~50%) [5]

British Legion Infantry: Lost 35 of 161 men (22%) [6]

In regards to the number of missing, 43 men were captured by the Americans [7]. Half of these men were privates and noncommissioned officers of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment that surrendered to the Americans during the fighting [8]. The other half had been both wounded and captured (most, if not all of these, were also of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment).

Loyalist Militia:

Two forces of Loyalist militia were at Hanging Rock: Colonel Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers (called in some sources the North Carolina Refugees, because they had been forced to flee their native state), and Colonel Henry Rugeley’s South Carolina regiment [9]. Bryan organized between 600-700 men in North Carolina, however, he brought only 250 men with him to Camden after Hanging Rock [10]. Bryan surely had a fair number of his men killed, wounded, or missing as a result of the battle, but there is no reason to believe that his losses ran into the hundreds. Rather, his original force had likely been greatly reduced by August 6 by desertion, sickness, and combat [11].

Rugeley’s regiment, like other South Carolina Loyalist militia regiments, likely numbered around several dozen men [12].

Some sources claimed Bryan lost many men [13], while others thought his losses were negligible [14]. One clue to Bryan's actual loss is Thomas Sumter's account of the battle, which implies that around 30 of the Loyalists were captured [15]. As these men were likely wounded before being captured, and as a common ratio of killed to wounded during the war was 1:3, Bryan's losses were likely in the neighborhood of 40 men.

It is not possible to make any estimate of losses in Rugeley's regiment.

Based on this rather imperfect information, I estimate the total force of Loyalist militia at the battle of Hanging Rock as near 400 men. The numbers listed above suggest a lower total (250 for Bryan's survivors + ~40 for Bryan's losses + several dozen for Rugeley = ~325), but this does not include men that would have remained missing, or would have left Bryan's command altogether, after his defeat at Hanging Rock.

Division of Forces:

The British were divided into three camps. The center camp included the British Legion infantry and the Royal North Carolina Regiment [16]. The right camp included Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers [17]. The left camp included the Prince of Wales' American Regiment [18]. It is not possible to place Rugeley's regiment at any one of these camps with confidence, but the center camp seems most probable [19].

Notes:

1. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

2. Todd Braisted (2001). A History of the Prince Of Wales' American Regiment; The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

Some secondary accounts claim that the King’s Rangers, commanded by Colonel Thomas Brown, were at the battle. This stems from a misreading of Tarleton’s description of the battle, which refers to Brown’s regiment, but means Colonel Montfort Browne, commander of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment. Browne was not present on this occasion, and command of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment was left to Major John Carden. Because of absences in the field officers for the other regiments, Carden also commanded the entire post.

3. Enclosure in a letter dated August 20, 1780 from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain. In K. G. Davies (Ed.), Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series), Vol. XVI. Irish University Press.

4. Braisted, ibid., Donald E. Graves. Guide to Canadian Sources Related to Southern Revolutionary War National Parks. (Retrieved February 6, 2010).

5. See this return of losses; Braisted, ibid. The Royal North Carolina Regiment appears to have been a detachment only; its strength was estimated from subtracting the strength of the Legion infantry and the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment from Rawdon’s stated 400.

6. Braisted, ibid. The strength of the regiment is estimated by adding these losses to their strength on August 15, 1780. Approximately forty of the Legion infantry were in the companies of Patrick Stewart and Charles McDonald, according to Banastre Tarleton’s A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. These companies arrived at the close of the battle, and William Davie claimed they lost 1 man. Of the Legion infantry who were present at the beginning of the battle, 34 men were lost of approximately 121 (or 28%).

7. Pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves. Sumter claimed that the number was 40 or so; see Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

8. National Archives of Canada: List of the Killed Wounded & Prisoners of ye P.W.A.Regt [posted on a geocities website that is no longer available].

9. Braisted, ibid.

10. Judicary report on Samuel Bryant, John Hampton and Nicholas White, April 5, 1782.

11. Desertion, as noted previously, was a natural occurrence when militia units were not regularly employed. Sickness was likely a factor given that Bryan's men were encamped briefly at Cheraws, South Carolina, where the 71st Foot became debilitated. Losses in combat occurred primarily at Colson's Ferry, North Carolina, on July 21 (see letter from Thomas Blount to Abner Nash, July 23, 1780), and at Hanging Rock on July 30 (see Davie, ibid.).

12. By way of comparison, Mathew Floyd's Loyalist militia regiment, which fought at Hill's Ironworks, Williamson's Plantation, and (probably) Rocky Mount had only 30 men in mid June. See Michael C. Scoggins, More on the Battle of Hill's Ironworks, Volume 2, Number 7 of Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution. This unsourced website gives Rugeley's regiment 40 men at the battle.

13. For example, Davie, ibid., claimed that during the battle, Bryan's men were "routed with great slaughter."

14. Tarleton, ibid., stated that "Colonel Bryan's North-Carolina refugees were greatly dispersed, but did not suffer considerably by the fire of the enemy."

15. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

16. Davie, ibid.

17. The rationale behind this placement was described in this post.

18. The site of their encampment was determined by process of elimination in the absence of clear statements among the available sources.

19. Davie said Bryan's camp included "Bryan's Regiment, and other Loyalists." This can be interpreted to include Rugeley's regiment, but it is not a necessary conclusion. Given how small American and Loyalist militia regiments typically were in this campaign, Davie may simply be indicating that a Loyalist force consisting of hundreds of men must have included more than a single regiment. Sumter said that Bryan's was "the most considerable of the Tory encampments," clearly implying that some of the Loyalist militia were encamped elsewhere. Oddly, he indicated that the left British camp belonged to Joseph Robinson, an officer in the South Carolina Royalists, who was stationed at the British post at Ninety-Six, South Carolina. Sumter's statement could be read, though not very convincingly, to mean that the South Carolina militia were encamped there. Braisted, ibid., has Rugeley's militia defending one of the British guns after the Legion infantry was driven from the center camp. As the British forces were in considerable disarray at the time, it is more believable that both the Legion infantry and Rugeley's militia had been in the center camp than that Rugeley's militia came to their assistance from some other quarter. The Legion infantry and Rugeley's militia also appear to be the units stationed longest at this post. It's plausible that when they were first stationed at Hanging Rock, they chose to encamp near each other on the site of the center camp.

Images of the Hanging Rock Battlefield

Previously, I made the case that the battle of Hanging Rock was fought on a height south of where present-day Flat Rock Road crosses Hanging Rock Creek, and on a neighboring hill. A map that I presented in that post appears below. The red circles show the locations of the three British camps. The circle nearest the upper right represents the encampment of Samuel Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers, the circle below and to the left of this point represents the encampment of the British Legion infantry and the Royal North Carolina Regiment (this is also known as the center camp), and the circle nearest the bottom represents the encampment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment (PoWAR). These British forces guarded the Camden Road (the brown line; this followed approximately the same path as today's Flat Rock Road).

Topographic maps provide an imperfect sense of place; it helps that one can take a virtual tour of Revolutionary War battlefields using Google Earth. Below are several screen shots I made of the approximate site of the center camp and the PoWAR camp, as seen from Flat Rock Road.

The Flat Rock Road, near the site of the center camp. The view is northwest; the crest of the elevation is to the right. Near the trees in the middle ground, the road slopes steeply downwards and turns towards the north. The British post at Hanging Rock was designed to prevent the Americans from coming down this road (i.e., towards the viewer).

The same location, but looking in the opposite direction (i.e., southeast). The area near Hanging Rock is hilly and cut by numerous ravines. This relatively flat plateau was attractive to early settlers.

The same location, looking northeast. The crest of the height is at the right edge of the image, a short distance behind the trees. The profile of the slope can be made out in the distance. William Davie claimed that "the regular troops [actually, Provincials] could not be approached without an entire exposure of the assailants." The slope is gentle enough that this land may well have been cleared by settlers prior to the battle. A nearby stream would have helped make this site attractive. If this interpretation is correct, one can understand Davie's apprehension: The direct approach to Hanging Rock would have led the American troops to advance up this slope from the left towards the British infantry and two 3-pounder guns on the right. To circumvent this danger, the Americans chose to attack the center camp on its flank.

Much of the area around Hanging Rock is woodland today, just as it was in 1780. Today the area is covered by second-growth forest, but the mix of deciduous and coniferous trees one finds in the area today is probably not unlike the original forest.

This image (looking east) was taken near the site of the PoWAR's camp (the lower red circle). The Flat Rock Road is in the foreground; the road heading into the background passes near the Hanging Rock. The distant trees are on the Hanging Rock Battlefield Property. The historical marker at right is for the James Ingram house. To read the marker, click here; the site of the John Ingram house can be seen on Mills' 1825 map of Kershaw District; note the proximity to the marked site of the battle of Hanging Rock.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 2

Was the Battle of Hanging Rock Fought on the Hanging Rock Battlefield Property?

Although I recently raised the question of where the battle of Hanging Rock was fought, the site is presumably known. Today, the Hanging Rock battleground is public property, and visitors to the site can visit the eponymous rock formation and walk over the (alleged) battlefield.

Site of the Hanging Rock Battleground Property, as shown in Google Maps. (Click to enlarge).

A nomination form filed by the State of South Carolina for the National Register of Historic Places filed on December 31, 1974, described the battlefield and the events that took place there. The nomination form reads in part:

“The property nominated for Hanging Rock Historic Site includes the high ground around Hanging Rock, a portion of Hanging Rock Creek, and the plateau to the west of the creek that centers around county road 58. Hanging Rock itself, near which General Sumter’s men left their horses before going into battle, is east of the creek on a high bluff. The whole area on the east side of the creek is strewn with huge, rounded boulders and is heavily wooded with steep banks. To the west of the creek, the ground rises sharply and reaches a plateau, where the British and Tories camped. Bryan’s Tories were camped to the north, the British Legion troops immediately to the south, and Major Bryan’s [sic] troops south of the Legion. This plateau was partly wooded and partly open fields, some of which are still visible along road 58. On the extreme south end of the nominated property, along road 58, are several houses and the Mt. Zion Church and cemetery."

“North of Hanging Rock, on Hanging Rock Creek immediately above the county road bridge, is an old Indian ford. Large flat boulders in the creek bed connect the two banks at this point."

“The British garrison was held by 1,400 men under the command of Major Carden of the Prince of Wales Regiment. They were encamped on the west side of the creek, on high ground protected by a deep ravine formed by the creek. The British units lay in three divisions, from north to south along the ridge: about 900 Tories under Colonel Samuel Bryan on a hill south of Hanging Rock Creek, (separated from the center by a ravine and a band of woods; about 160 of Colonel Tarleton’s Legion and Hamilton’s Regiment in some houses at the center; and the British regulars under Colonel Brown in open ground to the south."

Bryan's "Tories" are North Carolina Loyalist militia, "Tarleton's Legion" are the British Legion infantry, "Hamilton's Regiment" is the Royal North Carolina Regiment, and "the British regulars under Colonel Brown" is the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. The map below illustrates the location attributed to these units. Bryan's North Carolina volunteers are represented by the uppermost red square, the Legion infantry and the Royal North Carolina Regiment are represented by the middle square, and the PoWAR is represented by the lower square.

British Dispositions at Hanging Rock, according to the State of South Carolina (click to enlarge).

Sumter's men were encamped in the lands of the Catawba Nation, miles to the northwest of the British encampment. A force moving to attack Hanging Rock would most likely advance from the north along the Flat Rock (then Camden) Road, running north to south through the middle of the map.

The disposition of British troops described here seems peculiar on several counts: 1) The least-experience troops, Samuel Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers, were placed in the position closest to the enemy, 2) none of the camps were well positioned to dispute a crossing of Hanging Rock Creek along the Camden Road, 3) the principle strength of the position lay on its eastern side, where a steep slope ran down to the creek, not facing the Americans to the north.

The nomination form describes the beginning of the battle as follows:

“Sumter’s surprise attack began at six o’clock, the men advancing across the creek against Bryan’s Tory militia. Sumter meant to attack the entire British line, but misjudged; the American units met instead the northern end of the British line. Within half an hour the Americans had taken the Tory camp, sending the Tories fleeing through the woods into the center of the British line."

Although Sumter's men presumably would have approached from the north along the Camden Road, this version of events indicates that they swung away from the road so as to approach the British post from the east (and towards its main strength).

The account places Sumter's brigade in the immediate vicinity of Hanging Rock at the start of the battle. On the other side of Hanging Rock Creek were two hills. On the northern hill was Samuel Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers. On the southern hill was the infantry of the British Legion and the Royal North Carolina Regiment. (The Prince of Wales' American Regiment was encamped further to the south). Sumter intended to attack the two camps closest to him simultaneously. Although the two camps were a short distance away, an error was allegedly made in crossing the creek, causing all of the troops to become engaged with Bryan's camp.

So far I have given a number of reasons why this description of the site of the fighting is improbable. However, I recognize that there could be good reasons (just not obvious ones), as to why events unfolded in this manner. A better way of assessing the validity of this account is to compare it against the 10 statements about the Hanging Rock battlefield I listed previously.

In this post, and in two upcoming posts, I will measure the validity of an account of the Hanging Rock battlefield using these 10 statements. In making this assessment, I will determine for each statement whether it is consistent with the alleged battle site. If the site and statement are consistent, I will award 2 points to the account. Each time the site and statement may be consistent, but there is some ambiguity, I will award 1 point to the account. Each time the site and statement are inconsistent, I will award 0 points to the account. In this manner, the claimed site of the fighting can earn between 0 and 20 points.

Here is the scoring for the site of the battlefield as described in this nomination form:

1) The three camps were on elevations. 2 points.

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. 0 points. This account has the British facing eastward, with Bryan on the left of the line.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek. 2 points.

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." 2 points.

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. 1 point. The hill does not obviously have this property; but who can tell what the terrain looked like at ground level in 1780?

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. 2 points. Swamp symbols appear to the left of Bryan along the banks of Hanging Rock Creek.

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. 2 points. The distance is about .28 miles.

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." 1 point. This field was likely nearer the road than the hill along the creek.

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road. 1 point. The center camp is not placed on the road, but on a hill bordering the creek. The account does have the Prince of Wales' American Regiment on the road, albeit to the south near modern-day Mount Zion Church.

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. 2 points. In this case, the "left" camp is that of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. They are located more than 1/4 mile from the center camp. The nomination form claims that during the battle "The British retreated further south to Colonel Robinson’s camp [i.e., the third camp], but Sumter moved in and took two-thirds of that camp also." This statement is broadly inconsistent with participant accounts.

Total Score: 15 points (75%).

Behind the Scenes

I've begun posting to this blog once a week on weekends. Hopefully, I'll be able to continue at this pace for some time. Although I've been posting weekly, I've been doing something related to this blog most nights. Since the start of the summer, I've gone back to edit a few older posts. I realize that's probably not good "netiquette," but I nevertheless feel compelled to put things in reasonably good order. What I've done is rework posts on British units so they're not specifically about Cowpens (my first project), but rather summarize the service of those units throughout the war. This will better allow me to refer back to those posts in the future (the units in question are the 7th Regiment of Foot, the 17th Light Dragoons, The British Legion, and the 71st Foot). I've also reworked several posts about Cowpens specifically, so as to better explain my reasoning regarding the placement of American militia units (The Militia Line: Composition and Organization) and the numbers of men in those units (Cowpens in Miniature 3). I also deleted some dubious speculation about how the Americans deployed (Cowpens in Miniature 8).

What I've been spending most of my time on is getting ready for the next battle on which I will focus: Williamson's Plantation (July 12, 1780). I've spent a fair amount of time painting American militiamen in summer clothes and making the battlefield. I hope to be able to start describing this battle in a couple of weeks.

When I started painting miniatures a few years back I spent an agonizing amount of time on each one. Lately, I've grown much more efficient. Faces were particularly difficult for me, and the minis I've painted so far reflect various experiments, some more successful than others. What I've finally settled on is painting each face with Vallejo Game Color "pale flesh," then doing a thick wash of Vallejo Game Color "beasty brown" and then painting the highlights (cheeks, nose, chin, and forehead if visible) in pale flesh again. The result is far from great art, but it well suits my needs, works with a variety of different miniatures and produces a better result than other techniques I've tried. I've also been getting better at how I apply paint. Most of the time I'm still applying thick blocks of color onto the miniature, but increasingly often I've been able to apply thin coats that allow one color to shine through another. The Musket Miniatures militiaman below is a good example of this. The white primer is visible through the earth-tone vest and breeches.

Below are some of the latest Brits I've painted. These Minifigs are not intended to depict a specific unit, but rather will be used to represent at least a couple of units that saw hard service in the South. They will depict New York Volunteers at the battle of Williamson's Plantation and Royal North Carolinians at the battle of Hanging Rock. The brown trousers were selected partially on the basis of the striking aesthetic effect and partially on the basis of several Don Troiani paintings (such as this one).