British Light Infantry at Cowpens - Part 1

[Minor edits 12/25/09]

Among the British participants at the Battle of Cowpens was a contingent of light infantry made up of men from three different regiments. These included 41 rank and file of the 16th Foot, 69 rank and file of the 71st Foot (representing both battalions), and around 30 men of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. The first two numbers come from Cornwallis’ monthly return dated January 15, 1781. This website [link no longer works] on the Prince of Wales American Regiment includes summaries of the service record for each soldier in the regiment, broken down by companies. The records are incomplete, with only one roster available for the period of time near the battle of Cowpens (April, 1781). Based on this information there appears to have been, by my count, two members of the company gravely wounded at the battle and paroled, including the sole officer of the company present at the battle, Ensign Thomas Lindsay. Two sergeants and 17 privates were captured. An additional corporal and 4 privates were attached to Cornwallis' army at the time, and they presumably escaped capture. Three privates disappeared from the roster while the company was in South Carolina; these plausibly could have been killed at the battle. This totals up to a small company of 1 ensign, 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, and 25 privates. Again, though, this is a rough estimation based on a transcription rather than original records. A sizeable number of men from the company are listed as being "on command" in April, 1781. In many cases these assignments appear to have begun long before Cowpens.

Don Troiani’s painting of the men of the 16th Foot at Cowpens shows them in a typical light infantry uniform. The men actually came from three different companies; I don’t know if one of those was the regiment’s light company. In any case, at least some of these men had previously belonged to the regiment’s “hat” companies.

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie praised the British light infantry at Cowpens in the following terms:

"The company of the 16th regiment was well known by its services in the army commanded by Major General Prevost; those of the seventy-first regiment were distinguished under Sir James Baird at the surprise of General Wayne in Pennsylvania, of Baylor's dragoons in New Jersey, at Briar Creek in Georgia, at the capture and subsequent defence of Savannah, at the battle near Camden under Earl Cornwallis; and even Lieutenant Colonel did them justice at the [battle of Fishing Creek]. The light infantry company of the Prince of Wales's American regiment, when but newly raised and indifferently disciplined, acquired reputation under General Tryon at Danbury.”

Pictured are miniatures representing the British light infantry at Cowpens. From left to right they are from the 16th Foot, Prince of Wales's American Regiment, and the 71st Foot. The uniform of the 16th lights is based on the Troiani painting mentioned above. The uniform of the PoWAR lights is based on the uniform worn by the member of the light infantry company of the recreated Royal Welsh Fusileers. The uniform of the 71st lights is based on a Troiani painting.

Sources:

Copies of Tarleton's and Mackenzie's descriptions of the battle can be found on John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, and Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website.

Michael S. Mallery's Prince of Wales American Regiment webpage contains a wealth of information about that unit. [Link no longer works]

Tarleton's Description of Cowpens

[Revised 12/25/09]

One of the most influential accounts of the battle of Cowpens is British commander Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton's memoirs, published 6 years after the battle. His description is largely consistent with Cornwallis' report, but provides a great deal of additional detail. Whereas Cornwallis differed from Morgan on only a few points (which side had the numerical advantage, how many British casualties were incurred, and when the 71st Foot was added to the fight), Tarleton's account adds additional differences (how the British were deployed during the battle, the timing of a charge by the British cavalry, and the number of American casualties). Interestingly, his description of when the 71st joined the battle is closer to Morgan's report than to Cornwallis.

Tarleton's history includes some demonstrably false statements, including, for example, that "the number of the killed and wounded... amounted to near three hundred on both sides." His account was also clearly written so as to burnish his reputation (e.g., "the disposition was planned with coolness, and executed without embarrassment"). The defeat resulted from "the bravery or good conduct of the Americans, ...the loose manner of forming which had always been practised by the King's troops in America; or ...some unforeseen event, which may throw terror into the most disciplined soldiers, or counteract the best-concerted designs." He also believed that a lack of support from Cornwallis helped turn defeat into disaster.

Tarleton's critic, Lieutenant Rodericak Mackenzie of the 71st Foot, later argued that none of these excuses were adequate and firmly pinned the blame for defeat on Tarleton himself.

The lateness of Tarleton's account, the questionable statements included in it and the questionable motives behind it (the narrative was written at a time when he was becoming increasingly involved in politics) might convince one that it is a good deal less veracious than Morgan's after action report. But in fact Tarleton's description of events has sometimes been given precedence over Morgan's in histories of the battle.

A portion of Tarleton's description appears below:

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Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton having attained a position, which he certainly might deep advantageous, on account of the vulnerable situation of the enemy, and the supposed vicinity of the two British corps on the east and west of Broad river, did not hesitate to undertake those measures which the instructions of his commanding officer imposed, and his own judgement, under the present appearances, equally recommended. He ordered the legion dragoons to drive in the militia parties who covered the front, that General Morgan's disposition might be conveniently and distinctly inspected. He discovered that the American commander had formed a front line of about one thousand militia, and had composed his second line and reserve of five hundred continental light infantry, one hundred and twenty of Washington's cavalry, and three hundred back woodsmen. This accurate knowledge being obtained, Tarleton desired the British infantry to disencumber themselves of every thing, except their arms and ammunition: The light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line: The legion infantry were added to their left; and, under the fire of a three-pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to advance within three hundred yards of the enemy. This situation being acquired, the 7th regiment was commanded to form upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th: A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps, who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and threaten the flanks of the enemy: The 1st battalion of the 71st was desired to extend a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near two hundred cavalry, composed the reserve. During the execution of these arrangements, the animation of the officers and the alacrity of the soldiers afforded the most promising assurances of success. The disposition being completed, the front line received orders to advance; a fire from some of the recruits of the 7th regiment was suppressed, and the troops moved on in as good a line as troops could move in open files: The militia, after a short contest, were dislodged, and the British approached the continentals. The fire on both sides was well supported, and produced much slaughter: The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy's left: They executed the order with great gallantry, but were drove back by the fire of the reserve, and by a charge of Colonel Washington's cavalry.

As the contest between the British infantry in the front line and the continentals seemed equally balanced, neither retreating, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton thought the advance of the 71st into line, and a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy's right flank, would put a victorious period to the action. No time was lost in performing this manoeuvre. The 71st were desired to pass the 7th before they gave their fire, and were directed not to entangle their right flank with the left of the other battalion. The cavalry were ordered to incline to the left, and to form a line, which would embrace the whole of the enemy's right flank. Upon the advance of the 71st, all the infantry again moved on: The continentals and back woodsmen gave ground. The British rushed forwards: An order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge: An unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans, who came about as they were retreating, stopped the British, and threw them into confusion. Exertions to make them advance were useless. The part of the cavalry which had not been engaged fell likewise into disorder, and an unaccountable panic extended itself along the whole line. The Americans, who before thought they had lost the action, taking advantage of the present situation, advanced upon the British troops, and augmented their astonishment. A general flight ensued. Tarleton sent directions to his cavalry to form about four hundred yards to the right of the enemy, in order to check them, whilst he endeavoured to rally the infantry to protect the guns. The cavalry did not comply with the order, and the effort to collect the infantry was ineffectual: Neither promises nor threats could gain their attention; they surrendered or dispersed, and abandoned the guns to the artillery men, who defended them for some time with exemplary resolution. In this last stage of defeat Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton made another struggle to bring his cavalry to the charge. The weight of such an attack might yet retrieve the day, the enemy being much broken by their late rapid advance; but all attempts to restore order, recollection, or courage, proved fruitless. Above two hundred dragoons forsook their leader, and left the field of battle. Fourteen officers and forty horsemen were, however, not unmindful of their own reputation, or the situation of their commanding officer. Colonel Washington's cavalry were charged, and driven back into the continental infantry by this handful of brave men. Another party of the Americans, who had seized upon the baggage of the British troops on the road from the late encampment, were dispersed, and this detachment retired towards Broad river unmolested. On the route Tarleton heard with infinite grief and astonishment, that the main army had not advanced beyond Turkey creek: He therefore directed his course to the south east, in order to reach Hamilton's ford, near the mouth of Bullock creek, whence he might communicate with Earl Cornwallis.

The number of the killed and wounded, in the action at the Cowpens, amounted to near three hundred on both sides, officers and men inclusive: This loss was almost equally shared; but the Americans took two pieces of cannon, the colours of the 7th regiment, and near four hundred prisoners.

Sources:

Copies of Tarleton's and Mackenzie's descriptions of the battle can be found on John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, and Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website.

Cornwallis' Report on Cowpens

[Minor edits 12/25/09]

The day after the battle of Cowpens, British commander Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton reached the camp of his commander, Major-General Charles Cornwallis. Later that same day, Cornwallis wrote the following report to the British Commander-in-Chief in North America, Henry Clinton.

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"Sir: ... General Morgan... [had] by the best accounts I could get... about five hundred men, Continentals & Virginia State Troops, & one hundred Cavalry under Colonel Washington, & six or seven hundred Militia, but that Body is so fluctuating, that it is impossible to ascertain its number, within some hundreds... Lieut. Col. Tarleton conducted his march so well & got so near to General Morgan, who was retreating before him, as to make it dangerous for him to pass the Broad River, and came up with him at 8:00 AM on the 17th instant. Everything now bore the most promising Aspect. The Enemy were drawn up in an open wood and, having been lately joined by some Militia, were more numerous; but the different Quality of the Corps under Lieut. Col. Tarleton's Command, and his great superiority in cavalry, left him no room of doubt of the most brilliant Success. The attack was begun by the first Line of Infantry, consisting of the 7th Regiment, the Infantry of the Legion & Corps of Light Infantry annexed to it; & Troop of Cavalry was placed on each Flank: the 1st Battalion of the 71st, and the Remainder of the Cavalry, formed the reserve. The Enemy's Line soon gave way, & their Militia quitted the Field; but, on our Troops having been thrown in some disorder by the pursuit, General Morgan's Corps faced about & gave them a heavy fire. This unexpected event, occasioned the utmost confusion in the first Line. The 1st Battalion of the 71st & the cavalry were successively ordered up; but neither the exertions, entreaties, or Example of Lieut. Colonel Tarleton could prevent the panic from becoming general; the two three pounders were taken, & I fear the Colors of the seventh Regiment shared the same fate. In justice to the Detachment of the Royal Artillery, I must here observe that no terrors could induce them to abandon their Guns, & they were all either killed or wounded in defense of them. Lieut. Colonel Tarleton with difficulty assembled fifty of his Cavalry, who having had time to recollect themselves, & being animated by the Bravery of the Officer who had so often led them to victory, charged & repulsed Colonel Washington's Horse, retook the Baggage of the Corps, & cut to pieces the detachment of the Enemy who had taken possession of it, & after destroying what they could not conveniently bring off, retired with the Remainder, unmolested, to Hamilton's Ford, near the Mouth of Bullock's Creek. The Loss of our Cavalry is inconsiderable, but I fear, about 400 of the Infantry are either killed or wounded, or taken. I will transmit the particular account of the Loss, as soon as it can be ascertained."

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Like Morgan's report, this is one of the most important documents pertaining to the battle of Cowpens. Cornwallis may not have been an eye-witness to the battle, but his account reflects the immediate post-battle views of the most important British participant. Of note is that account is fundamentally similar to Morgan's. The two accounts tend to focus on different details, but they contradict each other on few points. Morgan reported far higher British casualties than Cornwallis admits. Throughout the war, the Americans and British provided different estimates of losses, so this is not unusual. Cornwallis was also writing at a time when it was unclear how many stragglers would make it back to his camp and probably did not wish to overstate his losses. Morgan claimed that he was outnumbered by the British; Cornwallis claimed that Morgan had the numerically superior force. Again, such varying estimates are not unusual. Morgan's report indicates that the 71st was in action with the rest of the infantry before what is known as the 'main line' fight. Cornwallis' report indicates that the 71st was first committed at a later point in the battle.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of Cornwallis' report.

Related: Cowpens in Miniature 1, Morgan's Report, Tarleton's Narrative

Morgan's Report on Cowpens

[Minor edits 12/25/09]

Two days after the battle of Cowpens, the American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, wrote the following report of his victory to his superior, Major-General Nathanael Greene.

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"Dear Sir: The troops I have the honor to command have gained a complete victory over the detachment from the British Army commanded by Lieut.-Col. Tarleton. The action happened in the 17th inst., about sunrise, at the Cowpens... An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them. The light infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, and the Virginia militia under the command of Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground, and extended a line in front. The third regiment of dragoons, under Lieut. Col. Washington, were posted at such a distance in their rear, as not to be subjected to the line of fire directed at them, and to be so near as to be able to charge them should they be broken. The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of the brave and valuable Col. Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the line, one hundred and fifty yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front, Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolinans, were posted on the right of Maj. McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Maj. Cunningham. Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta [Virginia] riflemen, to support the right of the line.

"The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front moved two pieces of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line.

"The disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy, upon which their whole line moved on with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. McDowall and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for their support. The whole of Col, Pickens' command then kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeably to their orders. When the enemy advanced on our line, they received a well-directed and incessant fire. But their numbers being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position. We retired in good order about fifty paces, formed, and advanced on the enemy, and gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder. Lieut. Col. Howard observing this, gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address that they fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces in our possession. We pushed our advantage so effectually, that they never had an opportunity of rallying, had their intentions been ever so good.

"Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that the Tarleton was cutting down our riflemen on the left, pushed forward, and charged them with such firmness, that instead of attempting to recover the fate of the day, which one would have expected from an officer of his splendid character, broke and fled.

"The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight-the list of their killed, wounded, and prisoners, will inform you with what effect. Tarleton, with the small remains of his cavalry, and a few scattered infantry he had mounted on his wagonhorses, made their escape. He was pursued twenty-four miles, but owing to our having taken a wrong trail at first, we could never overtake him.

"As I was obliged to move off of the field of action in the morning, to secure the prisoners, I cannot be so accurate as to the killed and wounded of the enemy as I could wish. From the reports of an officer whom I sent to view the ground, there were one hundred non-commissioned officers and privates, and ten commissioned officers killed, and two hundred rank and file wounded. We now have in our possession five hundred and two non-commissioned officers and privates prisoners, independent of the wounded, and the militia are taking up stragglers continually. Twenty-nine commissioned officers have fell into our hands... The officers I have paroled: the privates I am conveying by the safest route to Salisbury.

"Two standards, two fieldpieces, thirty-five wagons, a travelling forge, and all their music are ours. Their baggage, which was immense, they have in a great measure destroyed.

"Our loss is inconsiderable, which the enclosed return will evince. I have not been able to ascertain Col. Pickens loss, but know it to be very small.

"From our force being composed of such a variety of corps, a wrong judgment may be formed of our numbers. We fought only eight hundred men, two-thirds of which were militia. The British, with their baggage-guard, were not less than one thousand one hundred and fifty, and these veteran troops. Their own officers confess that they fought one thousand and thirty-seven.

"Such was the inferiority of our numbers that our success must be attributed, under God, to the justice of our cause and the bravery of our troops. My wishes would induce me to mention the name of every sentinel in the corps I have the honor to command. In justice to the brave and good conduct of the officers, I have taken the liberty to enclose you a list of their names from a conviction that you will be pleased to introduce such characters to the world."

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This is clearly an important document pertaining to the battle. Probably the most important document. Morgan was the architect of the victory, he was able to view the entirety of the battle. In the 2 days since the end of the battle, he had time to replay the events of the day in his head and confer not only with his officers afterwards, but with those of the enemy that became his prisoners. The events of the day were no doubt very clear to him; clearer certainly than participants writing about the battle many years later. It was also imperative for him to get the account right. His description of how the battle was fought and won would likely influence the behavior of other American commanders in future engagements.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of Morgan's report.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan also has a copy of his report, including an appendix naming many of the officers that fought at Cowpens.

17th Light Dragoons

[Minor edits 12/25/09]

The 17th Light Dragoons was one of two regiments of horse that the British dispatched to North America during the American Revolution. The 17th was sent to Boston and dismounted volunteers of the regiment served at Bunker Hill (1775). The following year, the regiment accompanied William Howe to New York and led the nighttime flanking march preceding the battle of Long Island (1776). At White Plains (1776), the regiment attacked the retreating Americans in what was probably the first cavalry charge of the war. The regiment was also at Fort Washington (1776), albeit in a minor capacity. The following year, the regiment participated in operations around New York, including the Danbury raid (1777), and the capture of Forts Clinton and Montgomery (1777). In the winter of 1777-1778, the regiment was with Howe at Philadelphia, and detachments saw action at White Marsh (1777), Crooked Billet (1778), and Barren Hill (1778). As the war shifted back to New York, the regiment was present at Monmouth (1778), New Jersey, and Pound Ridge (1778), New York. At the end of 1778, the 16th Light Dragoons was returned to England and the able horses and enlisted men were drafted into the 17th. In December, 1779, a part of the regiment accompanied Henry Clinton to South Carolina and participated in the siege of Charleston (1780), Monck's Corner (1780), Lenud's Ferry (1780), and Waxhaws (1780). Another part remained in New York and participated in Knyphausen's raid into New Jersey and saw action at New Bridge (1780). The detachment in the South returned to New York after the battle of Waxhaws; another detachment, however, was sent to South Carolina in January, 1781, where it subsequently suffered heavily at Cowpens (1781). Some members of the 17th were also present at Yorktown (1781), where Banastre Tarleton credited them with rescuing him during an engagement with Lauzun's hussars and lancers.

Cornet James Simmons of the American 3rd Light Dragoons remembered that at Cowpens the 17th “wore a uniform of red and buff, with Sheep Skin, on their caps.” The official facing color of the regiment was white. Don Troiani has completed a couple of paintings depicting the 17th at the time of Cowpens (here and here).

Sources:

Thomas Balch (1857). Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution. Balch's book has a transcription of Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Richard Cannon (1841). Historical Record of the Seventeenth Regiment of Light Dragoons-- Lancers.

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

The recreated 17th Light Dragoons have a very informative website, which can be found here.

7th Regiment of Foot

The 7th Foot, or Royal Fusileers, were garrisoned in Quebec at the start of the war. The greater part of the regiment was captured in the at Fort Saint-Jean (1775) and Fort Chambly (1775) in the first American offensive. The remainder of the regiment (63 men), served with distinction during the defense of Quebec (1775). The regiment was reconstituted at New York in the winter of 1776-1777 following prisoner exchanges. The 7th was present for the attacks on Fort Clinton (1777) and Fort Montgomery (1777) and was stationed in Philadelphia for the winter of 1777-1778. Over the following 2 years, the regiment participated in the battle of Monmouth (1778) and William Tyron's Connecticut raid (1779). The following year, the 7th accompanied Henry Clinton's expedition to South Carolina, and participated in the siege of Charleston (1780). At the conclusion of the siege, the 7th was placed in garrison at Charleston, joining Charles Cornwallis' field army after the battle of Camden (1780). The 7th was later intended to be garrisoned at Ninety-Six, South Carolina, but was instead diverted to assist Banastre Tarleton's pursuit of Daniel Morgan. Subsequently, the regiment was captured at Cowpens (1781). It is believed that some men of the 7th continued to serve with Cornwallis after Cowpens; these men would have been captured at Yorktown (1781). The regiment was reformed in later years and was stationed in Charleston and Savannah before those towns were evacuated. According to Johann Ewald, it was one of the last four British regiments to depart New York in November, 1783 (the others were the 22nd, 23rd, and 40th regiments).

According to Tarleton, the regiment was made up of "chiefly recruits," at the time of Cowpens, which caused problems on the battlefield (early in the fight, he reported, it was necessary to put a stop to "a fire from some of the recruits of the 7th regiment"). Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie of the 71st Foot, however, extolled the Fusileers for having "attained the summit of military discipline." Neither description is wholly reliable. Tarleton's narrative was written at a time after the war when his reputation was under attack; Mackenzie accused Tarleton of slighting the men under his command to mitigate his own culpability. Mackenzie, however, loathed Tarleton, and was not above stretching the truth if it would do his former commander injury.

In a dramatic painting, Don Troiani portrayed the moment at which Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard’s Continentals captured the colors of the 7th Foot at the battle of Cowpens. This is, to the best of my knowledge, the only instance of a British regiment losing its colors on a battlefield during the Revolution (if only because flags were sometimes left behind).

The website of the recreated 7th Foot has a transcription of a letter from Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan to Samuel Huntington, president of the Continental Congress, that seems to confirm that the flags were taken during the battle itself. It states, in part, that he is sending to Huntington, "the standard of the 7th British Regt, which fell into my hands in the action of the 17th Jany – the other that was taken at the same time, I believe fell into the hands of some of the Militia." This suggests that one of the flags was taken by, or surrendered to, the Continentals, while the other was captured in some manner by the militia. At the time of the letter, Morgan didn't know what had become of the flag that the militia captured, because when the battle ended he was so caught up with other matters that "a proper inquiry could not be made after it."

Sources:

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

There are two recreated versions of the 7th Foot: here and here. Both have informative websites.

This website is a wonderful resource for all things related to Banastre Tarleton, and includes transcriptions of Tarleton's memoir and Mackenzie's Strictures.

Introduction

I have a long-standing interest in the American Revolutionary War (or American War of Independence), especially it's military history. I intend to use this blog as a creative outlet in which I will share my thoughts about specific battles of the American Revolution, the people that fought in them and how they were won or lost. I am also painting military miniatures (15mm in height) and will use these to visually demonstrate how specific battles were fought.

The first battle that I will focus on is the Battle of Cowpens, which was fought January 17, 1781 in the State of South Carolina. Few battles of the Revolution have received as much attention as the Cowpens (in fact, its recreation in miniature is even the subject of another blog), but I chose this one in part because a number of visually appealing military units were involved, in part because the total number of soldiers involved was modest compared with other engagements (which makes recreating the battle in miniature viable), and in part because the battle was of special historical significance (arguably, whether or not the Deep South became a part of the United States hinged on the outcome of this battle). Perhaps the most important reason why I've chosen to begin with this battle over others, however, is because of easy access to a treasure trove of documents pertaining to the battle. I have a copy of Lawrence Babits' seminal A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens). Several early histories of the battle can be found online as well as two modern histories (here and here). Also, the website southerncampaign.org has posted thousands of transcribed pension applications by veterans of Revolutionary War, including many by those that served at Cowpens. This makes it possible to work out a particularly detailed account of this battle.