Alexander Chesney's Rivulet

[Minor edits 12/28/09]

One of the few British accounts of the battle of Cowpens was provided by the Loyalist Alexander Chesney. In his Journal, he wrote:

"I rode to my father's who said Morgan was gone to the Old-fields about an hour before; my wife said the same and that they had used or destroyed my crop & took away almost every thing. I immediately returned to Col Tarleton and found he had marched towards the Old fields. I overtook them before 10 oclock near the Cowpens on Thickety Creek where we suffered a total defeat by some dreadful bad management. The Americans were posted behind a rivulet with Rifle-men as a front line and Cavarly in the rear so as to make a third line; Col Tarleton charged at the head of his Regiment of Cavalry called the British Legion which was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden; the Cavalry supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty, but the prisoners on seeing their own Regt opposed to them in the rear would not proceed against it and broke: the remainder charged but were repulsed this gave time to the front line to rally and form in the rear of their Cavalry which immediately charged and broke the 71st (then unsupported) making many prisoners: the rout was almost total. I was with Tarleton in the charge who behaved bravely but imprudently the consequence was his force disperced in all directions the guns and many prisoners fell into the hands of the Americans."

A curious feature of this account is the statement that, "The Americans were posted behind a rivulet," that is a small stream. An examination of the battlefield shows that there is no such stream interposing between the American and British initial positions. Chesney's account suggests that during the battle he was on the left side of the British line, and more specifically, with Tarleton's dragoon reserve. Lawrence Babits in A Devil of a Whipping pointed out that there is an area of low ground near the Green River Road on the left side of the battlefield, and he suggested that "After winter rains, this low ground was probably a near bog at the time of the battle" (p 63). Boggy ground and a small stream would not seem to be the same thing, but Babits' suggestion is nevertheless appealing. Chesney is considered to be a reliable source, and an explanation along these lines seems preferable to ignoring his statement. Given all the tumult, the large numbers of men about him, and perhaps also that his group was moving with some speed, it's not unreasonable that Chesney's remembrance would be less than perfect. Also possible is that the terrain has changed somewhat since the time of the battlefield.

The American Deployment at Cowpens. "Rivulets" exist on the flanks of the American army, but not in front. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = Skirmishers.

Possible Location of Alexander's Chesney's Rivulet. The medium blue line in the bottom half of the map shows the approximate path of Chesney's rivulet, as based on Babits' maps and erosion patterns visible in the topography. (Contour lines are at 20-foot intervals; a more detailed topographic map may suggest a different path).

Chesney indicated that the Americans were posted behind this rivulet. Technically, the map shows this, but Chesney's account implies that the Americans would have been closer to this terrain feature than the map indicates. However, it is again plausible that Chesney was in error and his statement about the Americans being formed behind this barrier may have been no more than supposition on his part. Chesney's statement that he met up with the British "before 10 oclock" may mean that he may have missed the beginning of the battle, as other accounts place the start of the battle considerably earlier (e.g., "about sunrise," according to Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, and "before one hour of daylight had passed," according to Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie). In any case, no American account mentions this rivulet and from this it can be inferred that it did not play a role in the Americans' defensive plans.

Babits took Chesney's statement fairly literally. Specifically, he placed the American skirmish line a little more than 100 yards behind the rivulet. This too may seem to be stretching the definition of "behind," but at least the advancing British would have been well within the range of the Americans' rifles at that juncture.

In my view, this interpretation causes two problems.

First, this interpretation does not wholly jibe with Chesney's statement. Chesney did not describe the existence of a separate American skirmish line. His "riflemen" is the American militia line (the regulars, which are not mentioned, are the second line and the "Cavarly in the rear" are explicitly called "a third line"). All writers agree that the militia line was not posted in the supposed vicinity of Chesney's rivulet.

Second, participant accounts indicate that the main line, the militia line, and the skirmishers were spaced at 150 yard intervals (some put the distance at 200 yards). If the skirmishers were near the rivulet, then the militia and main lines must be placed in advance of the positions usually ascribed to them.

Sources:

The Journal of Alexander Chesney.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Morgan, and Mackenzie.

71st Regiment of Foot

[Minor edits 12/28/09]

The 71st Regiment of Foot was raised in 1775 among the Highlanders of Scotland; it was the first British regiment to be raised after the start of the war. At its peak, the regiment had 2,340 men. The regiment was sent to New York in 1776 and participated in the battle of Long Island, and served in a minor capacity at White Plains and Fort Washington. The following spring (1777), the regiment was active in New Jersey and fought at Short Hills; that summer, the 71st accompanied William Howe to Pennsylvania, where it fought at Brandywine. Afterwards, the regiment was used to guard the British baggage and to help secure the Delaware River. The regiment returned to New York in December, 1777. While in New York, the 71st participated in the raid on Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey (1778), and the grenadiers of the regiment were captured at Stony Point (1779). The 71st participated in the capture of Savannah (1778), and Augusta (1779) in Georgia. In that same campaign it served with distinction at Briar Creek, Stono Ferry, and the siege of Savannah (1779). The following year (1780), the 71st participated in the siege of Charleston and was garrisoned at Cheraws, South Carolina, when the British established a system of outposts in that state.

The 71st suffered significant losses in 1779-1780 due to illness. Captain Johann Ewald of the Hessian Jaegers recorded in his diary (February 2, 1780) that "The remainder of the 71st Scottish Regiment, which had arrived from Savannah, joined us here [near Charleston]. The regiment had melted away during this war from three thousand to four hundred men, due partly to the sword and partly to the climate."

The 71st was placed in reserve at Camden (1780), and helped repel the Continentals when the British left began to gave way. Subsequently, the regiment participated in Cornwallis' abortive invasion of North Carolina, and was present at the capture of Charlotte (1780). The 1st battalion of the 71st and the light infantry of both battalions were destroyed at Cowpens. The 2nd battalion fought at Wetzell's Mill and Guilford Courthouse (1781), and was captured at Yorktown (1781).

The images below show my 1st battalion of the 71st advancing into action. The uniform is based on the Troiani painting of an infantryman of the 71st in the South. Among the miniatures is a bagpiper (wearing a enlisted man's coat with some lace added to the shoulders rather than a proper musician's uniform). Colonel Otho Williams mentioned in a letter that the bagpipes of the 71st were captured at Cowpens.

Feud with Tarleton

Immediately after Cowpens, a long-running feud began between Tarleton and the officers of the 71st. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard of the Maryland continentals recalled that the captured, "Major M'Arthur [of the 71st] very freely entered. into conversation, and said that he was an officer before Tarleton was born; that the best troops in the service were put under 'that boy' to be sacrificed." Brigadier-General William Moultrie of South Carolina heard the paroled British officers echoing these sentiments after their arrival in Charleston, where they awaited to be exchanged for American prisoners of war. He recalled, "Some of the old British officers who were made prisoners, and paroled to Charlestown, when they came down, were exceedingly angry indeed, at their defeat, and were heard to say, 'that was the consequence of trusting such a command to a boy like Tarleton.'" David Stewart's 1822 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland related that, "if they [the 71st] had been properly led on and supported, they would have shown themselves at Cowpens the same as in all other actions... The troops were hurried into action, without any previous examination of the ground, or of the disposition of the enemy; and so strong was the impression on the minds of the officers of the Highland regiment that the fault did not lie with their men, that they made a representation to Lord Cornwallis, not to be employed again under the same officer. His Lordship complied with their request." The feud reached its climax with the attacks of Lieutenant Roderick's Mackenzie on Tarleton. The first of these appeared in a London newspaper while the war was still in progress. In this, Mackenzie complained to Tarleton that, "You got yourself and your party completely ambuscaded, completely surrounded, upon all sides, by Mr. Morgan's rifle men. What was the consequence? The two detachments of British were made prisoners after a great slaughter was made among them, your legion dragoons were so broke by galling fire of rifle shot that your charging was in vain, till prudence, on your side, with about twenty men who were well mounted, made your retreat good, by leaving the remains of the poor blended legion in the hands of Mr. Morgan."

Sources:

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

Johann Ewald (1979). Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal. Translated by Joseph P Tustin. New Haven: Yale University Press.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of statements by Tarleton, Cornwallis, Howard, and Mackenzie's August 9, 1782, letter in the London Morning Chronicle.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

A summary of the Otho Williams papers can be found here. The item in question is a letter from Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781.

The Main Line at Cowpens: The Right Wing Collapses

[Minor edits 12/28/09]

In my last post I reviewed the statements of Private Robert Long of the South Carolina militia. Long's statements place him on the right wing of the main line. His statements also indicate that this wing of militia fled shortly after the militia line retreated.

Historians have not recognized an incident of this kind occurring. However, Robert Long is not alone in indicating that such a collapse of the right wing of the main line occurred.

Captain Henry Connelly, who commanded a company of North Carolina state troops wrote that:

"The company which belonged to this applicant was placed under Col Howard, on the extreme right of the division, and this applicant commanded a company in the center. Our company, when just about to catch up our horses which were hid about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of battle, [was attacked by the enemy which] fell upon us with great fury, but we were fortunately relieved by Washington's Legion that hastened to our assistance."

Connelly first places his company on the right wing of the main line ("under Col Howard"), then indicates that his men broke and were overtaken by the British cavalry while in flight. This experience matches those of units in the militia line, but not that of Howard's Continentals or Triplett's Virginians (at least those on the left wing).

British accounts do not describe the right wing of the main line, much less its rout during the battle, but this omission is less significant than it seems. The few extant British accounts of Cowpens are vague in their description of how the Americans were deployed. However, British participants did describe an attack against the main line that can easily be interpreted as breaking the right wing of that line.

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie claimed that “the second [American] line, now attacked, made a stout resistance. Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy. He cut his way through their line, but, exposed to a heavy fire, and charged at the same time by the whole of Washington's dragoons, was compelled to retreat in confusion.”

Loyalist Alexander Chesney recorded in his journal that “the British Legion… supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty.” In other words, Ogilvie's dragoons attacked the American right flank, cut through their line, and broke them without difficulty. This occurred at the same time that the 1st battalion of the 71st Foot was advancing against the right side of the American main line.

The collapse of the right wing, as suggested by the accounts of Long, Connelly, Mackenzie, and Chesney, can be understood as an important event in setting the stage for the climax of the battle. In the words of Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard:

"[When the British] formed their line they shouted and made a great noise to intimidate, and rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen to fire a second time. The militia fell into our rear, and part of them fell into the rear of my right flank where they afterwards renewed the action. The british advanced until my regiment commence firing. I soon observed, as I had but about 350 men and the british about 800, that their line extended much further than mine particularly on my right, where they were pressing forward to gain my flank.--To protect that flank, I ordered the company on my right to change its front so as to oppose the enemy on that flank. Whether my orders were not well understood or whether it proceeded from any other cause, in attempting this movement some disorder ensued in this company which rather fell back than faced as I wished them."

Howard did not explicitly describe a collapse of the right wing of the main line. However, a comparison of Howard's account with William Johnson’s history does implicitly indicate he believed that there was a cavalry attack against the militia on his right. Also, the statement that the British "line extended much further than mine particularly on my right," is consistent with his having lost the covering force on his right flank. The loss of this force also helps explain why he felt compelled to refuse his right.

Crisis at Cowpens. Only Howard's Continentals (#4) and Triplett's Virginians (#5) remain in line to stem the British attack. Howard has begun to refuse his right flank (triggering the accidental retreat of the Continental infantry). Scattered elements of the right wing of the main line (#3), and the right (#6) and left (#7) wings of the militia line are attempting to reform in the rear. The militia are protected by the American cavalry (#1 and #2).

An interesting aside is that when accounts of the battle are compared, the only officers mentioned as commanding several militia units on the main line are Major Francis Triplett of Virginia and Colonel Andrew Pickens of South Carolina. Howard pointed out that Triplett commanded on his left. Pickens commanded the front-line militia. If Triplett remained throughout the battle on the left wing of the main line then perhaps no one had overall command of the various units on the right wing. Perhaps this lack of command and control was responsible for the initial incorrect deployment of Hayes' regiment (see The Statements of Private Robert Long) and was also a contributing factor in the collapse of the right wing.

Sources:

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of statements by Howard and Mackenzie.

The Journal of Alexander Chesney.

The Statements of Private Robert Long

[Minor edits 12/27/09]

Private Robert Long of South Carolina left two statements that described the deployment of American forces and important events during the battle of Cowpens. His accounts strike me as important evidence about the battle, although it has been largely overlooked by historians. Of the histories that I've read, only Lawrence Babits used them to shape his understanding of how Cowpens was fought.

One of his statements was written in support of Captain Samuel Hammond's pension application. In it, he said, "[Hammond] was in the Battle of Cowpens (that is Tarleton's defeat)... he was then promoted to Major, believes he commanded on the front line left wing and this deponent [i.e., Long] was in the center line on the right wing in Captain Ewing's company commanded by Colonel Joseph Hayes, next to Colonel Howard's Infantry."

(He did not provide any details about his service at Cowpens in his own pension application).

Long's second statement appeared in John Logan's 1859 A History of the Upper Country of South Carolina (not available online). The relevant text is as follows:

"...The infantry marched out in sections, and divided two and two as they got ten paces of Hayes' regiment already formed across the road. Hayes regiment then moved to the right of the infantry, 70 or 80 yards in advance; Major McDowell, of North Carolina, in advance of us 70 or 80 yards, and Major Triplett, of Virginia, in our rear; Cols. Thomas and Roebuck in the extreme right. The left wing was similarly formed of militia. The cavalry in rear of infantry... Hayes' regiment having advanced too far were to retreat and form on our old ground; when the North Carolinians were retreating in order to be ready to cover their retreat; failing of this the Virginians broke before we got to them. We were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person. At that time Tarleton brought 200 or 300 cavalry round in the rear of our left wing of militia. Col. Washington charged them with his cavalry; at the same time our infantry charged the British with the bayonet and took their field pieces, while those on the right and left surrendered or retreated."

The text in Long's statements is somewhat difficult to follow. Below I offer a detailed interpretation of what Long said:

On the morning of the 17th, the Americans deploy on the battlefield. Hayes' regiment was deployed across the Green River Road close to the spot where Morgan planned to place Howard's continentals. The companies comprising Howard's light infantry (referred to as "the infantry" in Long's statement) marched down the road in column formation. They marched to within 10 paces of Hayes' regiment, then deployed in a line of two ranks to the right (south) of the road.

The Americans Deploy, Part 1. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's infantry march down the road behind them, followed by Major Francis' Triplett's Virginians.

The Americans Deploy, Part 2. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Howard's Continentals have completed their deployment. Major Francis' Triplett's Virginians are beginning to deploy as well. Other units can be seen preparing to deploy.

After the continentals deployed, Hayes' regiment moved to the right of the infantry until they reached a point at which they were midway (i.e., about 75 yards) between the Continentals and McDowell's North Carolinians. Describing the rest of the American deployment, Long noted that Triplett's Virginians were in their rear, the South Carolina militia under Thomas and Roebuck were on "the extreme right" of the right wing of the militia, and that there was also a "left wing" "similarly formed of militia." The cavalry were positioned behind the Continentals.

The Americans Deploy, Part 3. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is on the right of the Continentals, midway between the Continentals' right and Major Joseph McDowell's North Carolinians. At this stage, the American deployment is largely complete.

When Hayes' regiment took up this position they had "advanced too far," and were ordered to fall back to their "old ground." This does not mean 10 paces in front of the continentals, but rather further back from the militia line. Completing this move, they were "in the center line on the right wing... next to Colonel Howard's Infantry." Long called this the center line to distinguish it from the militia line in front and "The cavalry in rear." From this position they would "be ready to cover" the retreat of McDowell's North Carolinians.

The Americans Deploy, Part 4. (Click to enlarge). The positions of the American units at the start of the battle. Hayes' regiment has now joined the right wing of the main line.

When the militia line broke early in the battle, Hayes' regiment did not stand their ground (his words were "failing of this"). Falling back, they might have rallied behind the Virginians (Buchanan's company). Instead, "the Virginians broke before we got to them. We were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person."

Sources:

John Logan. (1859). A History of the Upper Country of South Carolina.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Hammond, which includes a statement by Robert Long (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Long (.pdf file).

Barack Obama on the American Revolution

President Barack Obama invoked the American Revolution today in two parts of his inaugural address. His eloquent words made me think of why the story of the American Revolution still matters in modern America.


First Excerpt:

"In reaffirming the greatness of our nation, we understand that greatness is never a given. It must be earned. Our journey has never been one of shortcuts or settling for less. It has not been the path for the faint-hearted — for those who prefer leisure over work, or seek only the pleasures of riches and fame. Rather, it has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things — some celebrated but more often men and women obscure in their labor, who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom.

"For us, they packed up their few worldly possessions and traveled across oceans in search of a new life.

"For us, they toiled in sweatshops and settled the West; endured the lash of the whip and plowed the hard earth.

"For us, they fought and died, in places like Concord and Gettysburg; Normandy and Khe Sahn.

"Time and again these men and women struggled and sacrificed and worked till their hands were raw so that we might live a better life. They saw America as bigger than the sum of our individual ambitions; greater than all the differences of birth or wealth or faction."


Second Excerpt:

"Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we meet them may be new. But those values upon which our success depends — hard work and honesty, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism — these things are old. These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility — a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation, and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task.

"This is the price and the promise of citizenship.

"This is the source of our confidence — the knowledge that God calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny.

"This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed — why men and women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent Mall, and why a man whose father less than sixty years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath.

"So let us mark this day with remembrance, of who we are and how far we have traveled. In the year of America's birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river. The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood. At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:

"'Let it be told to the future world ... that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive...that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet (it).'

"America, in the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children's children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God's grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations."

The Militia Line at Cowpens

[Revised 12/26/09]

General:

An 1822 history, Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland, which tells the story of the battle of Cowpens from the perspective of the Scottish soldiers in the 71st Foot, provided one of the clearest descriptions of where the American militia line stood during the battle.

"On the morning of the 17th January 1781, intelligence was received that General Morgan was in front, with his force drawn up on a rising ground, thinly covered with pine trees; the front line being on the crown of the rising ground, and the second 400 paces in rear of the first line."

In other words, there were militia positioned near the number 1 on the map below.

Not all of the militia were deployed in this one spot. Rather, the militia line was divided into two wings, with one wing located near the crest of Elevation #1 (#6 on the map below), and the other wing located near the Green River Road (#7 on the map below).

1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = Skirmishers

Clear evidence for this deployment can be found in the after action report of the American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan. Morgan stated:

"An hour before daylight [on the morning of the battle] one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them... The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of the brave and valuable Col. Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the line, one hundred and fifty yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front, Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolinans, were posted on the right of Maj. McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Maj. Cunningham."

Other participant accounts also indicated that the militia were divided into two parts.

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina recalled that, "the regulars [were] in the center, commanded by Col. Howard, the militia on the right and left—the right commanded by Gen. Pickens, the left by _________ [blank in the original]. Col. Washington in the rear with his troop of cavalry."

Sergeant-Major William Seymour of the Delaware Continentals recorded in his journal that, "The militia were... drawn up in front of the standing troops [i.e., the Continentals] on the right and left banks, being advanced about two hundred yards.”

Private Robert Long of South Carolina described the two militia wings to the front of his regiment. Directly in front of him on the right wing was "Major McDowell, of North Carolina... Cols. Thomas and Roebuck [were] in the extreme right. The left wing was similarly formed of militia." See The Statements of Private Robert Long.

Private Adam Files of South Carolina recalled in his pension application that, "The right of the Army was commanded by General Pickens. The left by Colonel McCall and these Center by General Morgan."

Private John Harris of South Carolina claimed in his pension application that, "I was in the left wing for the militia under Col. McCall."

Composition of the Right Wing:

The right wing of the militia line consisted of North and South Carolinians. The North Carolinans were organized into a single battalion under the command of Major Joseph McDowell. Following, in part, the analysis of Lawrence Babits described in A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Camden, the South Carolinians were organized into three small battalions. These South Carolinians included the 1st Spartan Regiment, under the command of Colonel John Thomas, and two battalions of the 2nd Spartan Regiment, under the command of Colonel Thomas Brandon, and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck. According to South Carolinian Aaron Guyton, these battalions were well linked with each other and Colonel Joseph Hayes' Little River regiment:

"I was under Colonel Brandon who had a few Brave men – who stood true for the cause of liberty in the back part of the State who composed our little Army I was out the most of this time sometimes we had 75 sometimes 150 men, and sometimes we had four or five Colonels with from 50 to 150 men. Each of them had command of a Regiment at home & sometimes not more than 5 of his men with him. The colonels were Brandon, Hase, Roebuck, White." Following Babits, these officers were Colonel Thomas Brandon, Colonel Joseph Hayes, Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck, and Major Henry White (second-in-command to John Thomas).

Morgan placed McDowell's battalion to the left side of the South Carolinians. Robert Long's account further adds that Thomas and Roebuck were on the extreme right. By extension, Brandon's battalion must have been deployed next to McDowell's men.

Composition of the Left Wing:

The left wing of the militia line consisted of Georgians and South Carolinians.

Major John Cunningham commanded a small battalion of Georgia militia. According to Major James Jackson of Georgia, Cunningham's command was comprised of three companies under the commands of Captains Samuel Hammond, Joshua Inman, and George Walton. Babits named a Captain Richard Heard in place of Hammond. One David Thurmond claimed, in his pension application, to have been a captain in this battalion at the battle.

Major (soon to be Colonel) James McCall commanded a regiment of South Carolina State Troops. McCall's regiment was recruited from Georgia and South Carolina "refugees." This regiment was supposed to be equipped as dragoons, but the regiment was still being organized at the time of the battle, and only a relatively small number were prepared to fight in that capacity. McCall took personal command of those troops equipped as dragoons and fought alongside Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington and the remainder of the American cavalry during the battle. The rest of the troops served under McCall's second-in-command, Captain (soon to be Major) Samuel Hammond. (Hammond's pension application is the source of many of these details).

Morgan's account indicates that the Georgians served on the right end of the left wing, while South Carolinians served on the left. Morgan placed Colonel Joseph Hayes' regiment of South Carolinians on the left wing, but Long convincingly placed it on the main line.

There are some other bodies of troops that were likely a part of the left wing that are generally not described in accounts of the battle. These may have included Captain John Irby's company of Georgia refugees (see Little River Regiment), and other, miscellaneous volunteers (see pension application of George Harbinson).

More significantly, Colonel Andrew Pickens' Upper Ninety-Six District Regiment of South Carolina militia was likely on the left wing. The few references to Pickens' regiment in accounts of the battle may reflect the absence of the regiment's senior leadership. Pickens was given overall command of the front-line militia and so was away from his regiment. Major Alexander Noble possibly had command of the American baggage (at least this was his assignment after the battle). Private Patrick Norris mentioned that Noble was "officer of the guard" and after the battle "conducted the forge wagon with a considerable number of arms, that were taken from Tarleton at his defeat to Gilbertstown in North Carolina."

McCall was well known to the men of Pickens' regiment having come from the same part of the state and having been, at one time, a captain in the regiment. It can be difficult to distinguish in some pension applications whether the applicant was a South Carolina refugee attached to McCall or whether the individual was in Pickens' regiment.

John Harris is one individual whose account is somewhat ambiguous.

Early in the war he was clearly in what would become Pickens' regiment: "In the summer of 1778–I was again called out and went in Captain Noble’s Company under Col. Andrew Williamson and Maj. Andrew Pickens." This was before Noble and Pickens had been promoted.

Sometime in 1780, however, he "joined Col. (then Capt McCall) in an enterprise which he under took to surprize the British at Augusta... [later] McCall retreated up the Saluda River spent two weeks in the mountains on the border of North Carolina, almost without food, and joined Gen’l. Morgans army in North Carolina a short time after the Battle of Kings Mountain. With this army I remained until the battle of the Cowpens Jan’y. 1781, in which I was in the left wing for the militia under Col. McCall."

A number of pension applications, however, clearly establish Pickens' regiment as one present at the battle.

Charles Holland was a private in Joseph Pickens' company of Colonel Andrew Pickens' regiment:

"he volunteered, some time in the month of September (as well as he can recollect) 1776, in a company of militia under the command of Captain James McCall, in the District then called Ninety-Six, now Abbeville, in the State of South Carolina, that said company was attached to a Regiment, or corps of men, under the command of Major Andrew Williamson or Winson, the Colonel, if any, not recollected; that he continued with Captain McCall until about a month July 1777, when the Captain was taken prisoner by the Indians & this relator was transferred to a militia company commanded by Captain Andrew Pickens, in the same Regiment; that soon after this, Williamson was promoted to the command of the Regiment & Captain Pickens was made the Major... [later,] one Joseph Pickens was promoted to the captaincy of said Company... and Major Andrew Pickens became the Commandant of this Regiment; and one Alexander Noble became Major."

Holland was also at the battle of Cowpens, where a British cavalryman wounded him "by a sword thrust through the body, which disabled him for active service for two or three months." Others in his regiment experienced the same fate.

James Pettigrew was a private in James Caldwell's company:

"The next battle he was in of any note was at the Cowpens under General Morgan. General Pickens, Col. Anderson, Colonel McCall, Major Noble, Lieut. Carlile [Francis Carlisle] were in that engagement and most of them, if not all, were under the command of General Pickens and from Abbeville District. He recollects that Colonel Washington with his cavalry was there and saved the militia from inevitable destruction. James Caldwell commanded this applicant's company and was cut almost to death by Tarlton's horsemen so much so that he had to be borne from the field."

Jeremiah Files was a private in John Files' company:

Jeremiah "enrolled himself as a volunteer under Colonel Andrew Pickens and at the time of his enrollment resided in Abbeville District in the State of South Carolina and marched from thence as a volunteer with Col.Pickens to Granvile Shoals on Packlet River and there joined General Morgan about the first of January in the year 1781 and then placed under the command of Captain McKall [James McCall] in the Battalion of Major Noble in the Regiment of Colonel Andrew Pickens of the South Carolina Militia... we marched under General Morgan to the Cowpens and was at the Battle fought there against Tarltons Legion on the Wednesday Morning on the 17th day of January 1781... This Deponent was wounded by Tarleton's Dragoons on the head – on the left arm and on the right hand each wound was made with a sword & the wounds are now visible the wounds Greatly Disabled this Deponent -- & Stunned him for some time & one Captain Alexander of Rowan County North Carolina was the first man to come to his relief & informed him of our victory."

Samuel Hammond's dubious sketch of the battle shows Pickens' regiment on the left wing of the main line (see The Hammond Map). However, Pettigrew's statement (see above) links McCall with Pickens' regiment, suggesting that their regiments served together during the battle.

Sources:

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland is available through Google Books.

Morgan's report of the battle can be found in James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan.

For a transcription of Long's accounts of the battle see The Statements of Private Robert Long.

John Moncure's The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage has a transcription of the statements by Hammond, Seymour, and Howard.

This issue of the online magazine, Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution has complete transcriptions and commentary on McJunkin's statements.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of David Thurmond (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Adam Files, which can be read here (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of John Harris, which can be read here (.pdf file).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Aaron Guyton (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Hammond (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of George Harbinson (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Patrick Norris (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Charles Holland (.pdf file).

Nan Overton West transcribed the pension application of James Pettigew (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Files (.pdf file).

The Main Line at Cowpens: Location

[Revised 12/26/09]

There are three elevations of note on the Cowpens battlefield, designated by the numbers 1-3.

Elevation #1 is the location best associated with the battle. Recent histories of the battle all place the militia line on this elevation (although not all on exactly the same spot).

Captain Samuel Hammond of South Carolina described the battlefield in these terms: “The ground on which the troops were placed, was a small ridge [Elevation #1], crossing the road at nearly right angles. A similar ridge [Elevation #2], nearly parallel with this, lay between three hundred and five hundred yards in his rear. The valley between was made by a gentle slope; it was, of course, brought within range of the eye; passing from one to the other ridge, the land was thickly covered with red oak and hickory with little if any underbrush. The valleys extending to the right of the general's camp, terminated in a small glade or savanna."

Hammond also stated that "The front line" was placed on "the rising ground beyond the valley," meaning Elevation #1. He noted that the second, or main line, was to be 150 yards behind the front line. Other sources either agreed with him or gave a slightly longer distance (2oo yards). This indicates that the main and militia lines were situated roughly in the positions shown below. (The contour lines are at 20-foot intervals; with access to a more fine-grain map I would perhaps shift the units slightly in one direction or another).

1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = Skirmishers

The position of the main line seems somewhat odd being positioned between Elevations 1 and 2, rather than on either one. However, participant accounts do indicate that the main line was in this area. The son of North Carolina militiaman Thomas Lackey learned from his father "That at the Battle of the Cowpens the regulars were situated rather behind a hill" (i.e., Elevation #1). Thomas Young of South Carolina remembered that “The battle field was almost a plain with a ravine on both hands, and very little under growth in front or near us." Young was serving with the mounted militia (Unit #2 on the map above). He noted that the main line's "right flank [was] resting upon the head of the ravine on the right... [and the] left flank [was]resting near the head of the ravine on the left." The location of these "ravines" is indicated, in part, by the two creeks on either side of the main line.

Sources:

John Moncure's The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage has a transcription of the statements by Samuel Hammond and Thomas Young.

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's statement.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Lackey (.pdf file).