Cowpens in Miniature 8

Part 8: The Americans Deploy
Previous: Initial Contact

Next: Morgan's Plan

Now certain that battle was eminent, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan began his final preparations. He reported:

“An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp [see Note 1]. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them.”

Other writers made a similar remark. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the 1st Delaware would record in his journal, “Before day Reced Information that Col Tarlton Was Within Five Miles of us With a Strong Body of Horse and Infantry Whereon We got up and put Ourselves in Order of Battle.”

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina remembered that Morgan and Colonel Andrew Pickens walked through the American encampment waking up the men and exhorting them to fight.

“Gen. Morgan being apprised of the approach of Tarleton by faithful spies, began before day to go from mess to mess with Gen. Pickens, saying ‘Boys, get up, Benny's coming; & you that have sweethearts or wives or children or parents, must fight for them and above all you must fight for liberty and for your country,’ which appeared to have the ears of Every true friend of this country, & were alive to action, but a few ‘pet Tories’ whom it seemed like poison to.”

As for the Continentals, as soon as the drums started beating, they rose and hastened into formation. According to McJunkin, “the tattoo being sounded, the line was formed commanded by Col. Howard [Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard].” Morgan then spoke to them collectively, saying “My friends in arms, my dear boys, I request you to remember Saratoga, Monmouth, Paoli & Brandywine, & this day you must play your parts for your honor & liberty's cause.”

The troops then began moving onto the battlefield. It was an unpleasant morning. Private William Neel, who was in Captain Buchanan’s company of Virginians, remembered that, “the Army paraded before day a cold morning.” Captain Henry Connelly recalled, “it was cold weather but inclined to be rainey.”

According to McJunkin, “First the regulars and some companies of Virginia militia are posted to where the final issue is expected.” However, Colonel Joseph Hayes’ small regiment may have been the first onto the battlefield. Perhaps they were directed to mark the spot where the Continentals were to deploy or they were designated to cover the Continentals’ deployment with their long-ranged rifles. Robert Long of Hayes’ regiment watched as the Continentals “marched out in sections, and divided two and two as they got [within] ten paces of Hayes' regiment already formed across the road.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 1. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's infantry march down the road behind them, followed by Major Francis Triplett's Virginians.

The Continentals deployed to the southwest of the Green River Road, that is, to the right of Hayes’ regiment [see Note 2]. Thomas Young remembered that, “The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 2. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Howard's Continentals have completed their deployment. Major Francis Triplett's Virginians are beginning to deploy as well. Other units can be seen preparing to deploy.

The Virginia militia deployed behind and to the sides of the Continentals, leaving a gap between the Continentals and either wing of militia [see Note 3]. According to Neel, his company of Virginia militia “formed in single file with the Militia on the right of the Regulars, stood in ranks till Sun rise, at which time the battle commenced” [see Note 4].

Sergeant Major William Seymour of the Delaware Continentals recorded in his journal that “we were drawn up in order of battle, the men seeming to be all in good spirits and very willing to fight.”

Next came the more complicated deployment of the balance of the American militia. According to McJunkin, “the main body of militia under Gen. Pickens are drawn up at the distance of 150 yards” in front of the main line [see Note 5]. They were deployed in two wings, which were aligned with the gaps between the Continentals and militia wings on the main line [see Note 6]. The American cavalry, meanwhile, took up position on the elevation behind the Continentals [see Note 7].

The American deployment was now complete. Brigadier-General William Moultrie, an early historian of the battle, wrote that, “General Morgan drew up his men on an open pine barren in the following order… the militia of about four hundred men formed the first line under General Pickens; the continentals of about five hundred (two hundred of whom were six months men, very raw troops) formed the second line [see Note 8], commanded by Colonel Howard, about two hundred yards in the rear of the first. Colonel Washington, with about seventy-five continental cavalry, and- forty-five mounted militia, with swords, under Colonel M'Call, in the rear of the whole: in this disposition did they wait to receive the enemy.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Colonel Henry Lee made similar observations in his early history [see Note 9]. He concluded, “Erroneous as was the decision to fight in this position, when a better might have been easily gained, the disposition for battle was masterly.”

Morgan indicated in his report of the battle that Hayes’ regiment was deployed on the left wing of the militia wing. However, Robert Long stated that his regiment was deployed on the right wing of the main line (see The Statements of Private Robert Long). Either Morgan or Long was mistaken in their recollection, or Hayes' regiment was ordered to the militia line, but then moved to the main line due to some last-minute adjustment in the deployment.

Why would men have been drawn from the left wing of the militia line to reinforce the right wing of the main line? It is noteworthy that the left wing of the militia line bordered a branch of Suck Creek, while the right wing of the militia line was posted on a high point on the battlefield. Perhaps it was determined that while the left wing could have fewer men without endangering the American position, but the right wing could not be reduced.

No participant account directly says that some men were shifted off of the front line to supplement the main line. However, Robert Long, of Hayes’ regiment did describe his regiment performing some peculiar pre-battle maneuvers. He stated that after the Continentals deployed,

“Hayes regiment then moved to the right of the infantry [the Continentals],” or onto the other side of the battlefield. Once they were there, there seems to have been some confusion over exactly where Hayes’ regiment was to deploy. At first Hayes’ regiment was “70 or 80 yards in advance” of the Continentals, and “70 or 80 yards” behind “Major McDowell, of North Carolina.” In other words, they were midway between the militia line and the main line. The rest of the main line militia were deployed behind the Continentals.

The Americans Deploy, Part 3. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is on the right of the Continentals, midway between the Continentals' right and Major Joseph McDowell's North Carolinians. At this stage, the American deployment is largely complete.

Eventually, the deployment was sorted out. Long noted that “Hayes' regiment having advanced too far were to retreat.” They then fell back to a more appropriate position, perhaps next to Connelly’s company. At that point, Long stood “in the center line on the right wing in Captain Ewing's company commanded by Colonel Joseph Hayes, next to Colonel Howard's Infantry.”

The right wing of the main line was described by few participants. For example, Thomas Young wrote that, “The battle field was almost a plain with a ravine on both hands, and very little under growth in front or near us. The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks, their right flank resting upon the head of the ravine on the right. The militia [of the main line] were formed on the left of the regulars… their left flank resting near the head of the ravine on the left.”

Howard remembered that he had “two companies of Virginia Militia or volunteers, one commanded by Capt Tripolet [Major Francis Triplett] from Fauguhar [Fauquier County], the other by a capt Tate from Rockbridge or one of the western Counties.” He wrote, “I am positive that Triplett and Tate were on my left,” but said nothing about militia units on his right.

The right wing of the main line was on lower ground than the Continentals and the other militia units; perhaps Howard and others didn’t see them there. Alternatively, as the right wing failed to distinguish itself during the battle, their presence, while known at the time, was later forgotten.

Final American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Notes:

1. The scout could be either a militiaman or one of Washington’s dragoons. As noted in my previous post, Sergeant Lawrence Everhart claimed that he was captured when 3 miles away from Morgan’s camp; this suggests that the main British column was 2 miles distant from the site of the initial conflict.

2. This is indicated in the pension application of Sergeant Benjamin Martin of the Virginia militia. Martin stated that "I was in the road all the time of the action... Lieutenant Ewen [James Ewing] was on the left of the Maryland Troops near me." This places Martin on the left of the Continentals, and the Continentals to the southwest of the Green River Road. A number of illustrations of the battle of Cowpens show the Americans deployed equally to either side of the Green River Road. However, the ground was more elevated to the southwest of the road than to the northeast (see The Cowpens Battlefield). Martin’s statement suggests that the American deployment was governed more by the topography of the battlefield than by the location of the road.

3. The description of the American deployment provided here is unlike that in many histories of the battle, but it is not wholly unique. A similar arrangement can be found in Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Two Interpretations of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, Bearss' on the right. The positioning of the units per Bearss' account is approximate. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

In both cases, heavy emphasis has been placed on Morgan's after action report and Hammond's description of Morgan's plan (see Morgan's Report, The Hammond Map). I interpreted Hammond somewhat differently than did Bearss. Other differences arose because I drew upon pension applications as a source of information.

One recent history that indicates a very different American deployment than that shown here is Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens.

Comparison of Two Versions of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, and is as described above. Babits' interpretation appears on the right; the positioning of the units per his account is approximate. On the right, 1 = American Cavalry; 2 = Main Line; 3 = Militia Line; 4 = Skirmish Line. The two accounts also differ in terms of the location of the Green River Road. The road in my version follows Bearss and is shown in brown. Babits showed the Green River Road following a different course, which I have partially sketched out in black on the right panel.

There are a number of reasons for the differences in the present account with that by Babits. Chief among these is that Babits concluded (while I did not) that Morgan's and Hammond's descriptions of the American deployment referred to a temporary battle plan that was developed the night before the battle and then greatly modified before the actual fighting began. (see Morgan's Report and The Hammond Map for a transcription of their accounts).

I have devoted a number of previous posts to arguing for the version of the American deployment shown here. In regards to the main line deployment, see in particular The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Composition, and The Main Line: Location.

4. Aside from Neel, the only participant to comment on the number of ranks was Thomas Young, who said that “the regulars… were formed in two ranks.” He did not indicate this deployment for the militia. Indeed, that he should have mentioned this fact at all suggests that he found such a deployment to be exceptional. A single rank for the militia line leads to their covering well the high ground between Suck Creek and Island Creek. Perhaps all of the militia were formed in a single rank, although it's not unreasonable to believe that the men also would have doubled up behind large trees where they were near the line.

5. Some sources say that distance was 150 yards, others that it was 200 yards. In the images the distance between the first and second lines is a little greater than 150 (scale) yards.

6. This is indicated in participant accounts. As noted above, Martin’s statement indicated that gap between the Continentals and the left wing of the main line would have been near the Green River Road. Hammond’s description of the militia line deployment places his regiment on the northeast of the Green River Road and Major John Cunningham’s men on the southwest of the road. In other words, the left wing of the militia line was roughly aligned with the left gap in the main line. I assume, by extension, that the same was true of the right wing of the militia line. See The Hammond Map.

7. For details about where the American cavalry were deployed, see The American Cavalry - Part 2.

8. Moultrie mistakenly referred to 200 of the troops as Continentals that were in fact Virginia militia with long terms of service. They were, in any case, “raw troops.”

9. Lee said that “The main body of the militia composed… [the front] line, with General Pickens at its head. At a suitable distance in the rear of the first line a second was stationed, composed of the continental infantry and two companies of Virginia militia, under Captains Triplett and Taite, commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel Howard. Washington's cavalry, reinforced with a company of mounted militia armed with sabres, was held in reserve; convenient to support the infantry, and protect the horses of the rifle militia, which were tied, agreeably to usage, in the rear.”

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Morgan, Anderson, McJunkin, Neel, Connelly, Young, Seymour, Howard, and Hammond.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan also has a copy of Morgan's report.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Long (.pdf file). See also The Statements of Private Robert Long.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's statement.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf).

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Location, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

Cowpens in Miniature 7

Part 7: Initial Contact
Previous: In the Night

Next: The Americans Deploy

According to Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, the British night march was difficult. “The ground which the Americans had passed… [was] much intersected by creeks and ravines.” Tarleton was also wary of encountering an ambush in the darkness, “the march of the British troops during the darkness was exceedingly slow [see Note 1], on account of the time employed in examining the front and flanks as they proceeded.”

At least two groups of Americans were deployed in front of the American encampment. Closest to the British was scouts, probably operating in small groups. There were at least 30 men detached for this service. Colonel Thomas Brandon and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck operated with them as well, at least for a time.

The other group was comprised of vedettes that would alert the Americans to the approach of the British. These were placed perhaps at a distance of 2 or 3 miles in front of the American camp. They were close enough that the Americans would hear their guns; yet distant enough to allow the Americans time to get up, grab their arms, and assemble before the British reached their camp.

After Tarleton began his march, Colonel Thomas Brandon and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck returned to the Americans’ encampment. The two officers perhaps first detailed the advanced scouts to harass the British during their march. After returning to camp they most likely conferred with Morgan. They were later able to rejoin the balance of their commands and get some rest [see Note 2].

After Brandon and Roebuck’s return, a fresh batch of observers was dispatched to monitor the British advance. . According to Cornet Simons, “you [Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington] selected Sergeant [Lawrence] Everhart from your Regiment and ten men, whom you sent to reconnoitre Lt. Colonel Tarletons Army" [see Note 3].

Around this time, Tarleton recalled, “Thickelle [Thicketty] creek was passed.” Tarleton then dispatched an “advanced guard of cavalry… to the front.” Like Everhart’s Continentals, this too was a select group. According to Simons, Tarleton’s “advanced guard… were mounted as we understood, and believed, on some of the fleetest race horses which he had impressed from their owners in this Country” [see Note 4].

In the grey light of early morning, the two mounted forces approached each other. Once visual contact was made, the smaller American dragoons turned and raced towards Morgan’s encampment.

Tarleton's Advance Guard Pursues the American Patrol [see Note 5].

According to Tarleton, “The enemy's patrole… was pursued and overtaken.” Simons provided more detail. He said that the British were able “to take Serjeant Everhart and one of the men-but the other, ten men returned, and gave you [Washington] information of the approach of the enemy.” Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie of the 71st Foot also confirmed that two prisoners were taken: [Around] day light… the enemy were discovered in front. Two of their vedettes were taken soon after” [see Note 6].

Sergeant Everhart was one of the two captured dragoons. He explained that his “horse being shot he was captured early in the morning… our army at this point of time being perhaps three miles in the rear.”

Everhart and the other prisoner were sent back to the British column (about 2 miles away) where Tarleton preceded to interview them. Everhart noted that his captor was “Quarter Master Wade of the British Army with whom he had some previous acquaintance & by him [he was] taken to Col Tarlton.” According to Mackenzie, “these [two men] gave information that General Morgan had halted, and prepared for action.”

Everhart recalled the specifics of his interview. “Dismounting from his horse, that officer [Tarleton] asked the petitioner [Everhart]… if he expected Mr. Washington & Mr. Morgan would fight him that day. Yes if they can keep together only two hundred men was the reply. Then he said it would be another Gates' defeat [see Note 7]. I hope to God it will be another Tarlton's defeat said this petitioner. I am Col. Tarlton, Sir. And I am Sergeant Everhart. My wounds were bleeding at this time [see Note 8] but soon afterwards were dressed by the surgeon. I received from the enemy great kindness.”

Although Everhart’s statement was more-or-less truthful, Tarleton persisted in believing that the Americans were retreating through the night to avoid battle. However, he felt sure at least that his quarry was near. Therefore, Tarleton ordered, “Two troops of dragoons [see Note 9], under Captain Ogilvie, of the legion… to reinforce the advanced guard, and to harass the rear of the enemy.” He hoped Ogilvie’s detachment would delay the American retreat and force them to stand and fight.

Notes:

1. Mackenzie claimed that “The pursuit… was rapidly continued through marshes and broken ground.” The difference in Mackenzie’s wording was intended to emphasize the heroism of the British soldiery (and implicitly to demonstrate that Tarleton alone was responsible for the British defeat).

2. Lawrence Babits, in A Devil of a Whipping, described how small parties of militiamen seem to have harassed the British during their march. According to Captain Samuel Otterson, many of the scouts missed the battle; South Carolina militiaman Thomas Young's account places Brandon at the battle.

3. Morgan may have feared that he would either not get accurate information from the militia scouts or no information at all if Tarleton’s dragoons swept down on them and made them prisoners. Morgan knew Tarleton was approaching. His greatest fear at this point was most likely whether or not Tarleton would turn away from the direct approach towards his camp and approach from an unexpected direction.

The transcription of Simon's leter in Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution indicates that the patrol consisted of "Sergeant Everheart" and "thirteen men."

4. Given that the horses were handpicked for this important duty it may be that the men were, too. Babits, however, speculated that this was Captain Hovenden’s company of British Legion dragoons. Babits identified (page 179, n. 50) this “Quarter Master Wade” with Hovenden's company, but cited Tarleton's memoir, which does not contain this information. I have not inspected the muster rolls. Balch claimed that Wade was killed during the battle.

5. At a 1:20 ratio, a single miniature can represent between 10 and 29 men. The American patrol, according to Simons, consisted of 11 men. The strength of the British advance guard is unknown.

6. South Carolina Thomas Young described a different version of what was apparently the same episode. “Three of Washington's dragoons were out on a scout, when they came almost in contact with the advanced guard of the British army; they wheeled, and were pursued almost into camp. Two got in safely; one poor fellow, whose horse fell down, was taken prisoner.”

7. A reference to the American defeat at the battle of Camden.

8. According to Balch, Everhart's left hand was repeatedly cut by a dragoon's sabre. Balch described the initial contact between the British and Americans as "a severe and bloody contest."

9. Although not specifically identified, the two troops were likely Captain David Ogilvie’s own troop of British Legion dragoons and Lieutenant Henry Nettles’ troop of 17th Light Dragoons.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has transcriptions of Tarleton's account and Mackenzie's Strictures.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Tarleton, Mackenzie, Simons, Everhart, and Young.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson (.pdf).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington, and extensive information on Sergeant Everhart. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Related: The British Legion, The American Cavalry - Part 1, The American Cavalry - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 6

Part 6: In the Night
Previous: Tarleton's Pursuit

Next: Initial Contact

Early on the night of January 16, 1781, the American force, commanded by Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, was making final preparations for the battle that was expected the following day.

Captain Samuel Hammond remembered that “Orders… [were] issued to the militia, to have twenty-four rounds of balls prepared and ready for use, before they retired to rest.”

Of special concern to Morgan was the huge British cavalry force. Some days before the battle, Morgan met with Colonel Richard Winn of South Carolina, who had previously fought against Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton. According to Morgan, Winn asked him, “Do you think I shall be attacked by the British?” He answered, “I do and that by a Strong force from Winn's boro….” Morgan then asked, “Can you inform me the Manner Colo. Tarleton brings on his Attack?” Winn responded, “I can, Tarleton never brings on the Attack himself his mode of Fighting is to Surprise, by doing this he sends up two or three Troops of Horse and if he can throw the party into Confusion with his reserve he falls on and will cut them to pieces.”

More than anything, Morgan needed as many cavalrymen as possible to counter Tarleton. He had with him a force of Continental light dragoons under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington, but according to Josiah Martin, this force “amounted [only] to 72 as counted by the applicant the day before the battle.” Tarleton had around 300 mounted men (301 in my order of battle, not counting mounted infantry).

According to Thomas Young of South Carolina, “Night came upon us, yet much remained to be done. It was all important to strengthen the cavalry. Gen. Morgan knew well the power of Tarlton's legion, and he was too wily an officer not to prepare himself as well as circumstances would admit. Two companies of volunteers were called for. One was raised by Major Jolly of Union District, and the other, I think, by Major McCall. I attached myself to Major Jolly's company. We drew swords that night, and were informed we had authority to press any horse not belonging to a dragoon or an officer, into our service for the day.

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina had a similar recollection. “On the night before the battle forty-five militia soldiers were enrolled as dragoons and placed under the command of Col. McCall and annexed to Washington's cavalry. These officers and men, in the respective commands, were far from being tyros in the art of war. They were marksmen and had generally been in the war from the commencement.”

In the meantime, Morgan visited his men in their encampment and offered words of encouragement. According to Young, “It was upon this occasion I was more perfectly convinced of Gen. Morgan's qualifications to command militia, than I had ever before been. He went among the volunteers, helped them fix their swords, joked with them about their sweet-hearts, told them to keep in good spirits, and the day would be ours. And long after I had laid down, he was going about among the soldiers encouraging them, and telling them that the old wagoner would crack his whip over Ben. (Tarleton) in the morning, as sure as they lived.

Young continued, “‘Just hold up your heads, boys, three fires,’ he would say, ‘and you are free, and when you return to your homes, how the old folks will bless you, and the girls kiss you, for your gallant conduct!’ I don't believe he slept a wink that night!”

He wasn’t as upbeat with all of the men as he was with Young. William Mitchel remembered Morgan sharing a bit of gallows humor. “General Morgan went around among the troops to give orders &c that when he got to Captain William Wilson's quarters, he said to him ‘Captain, don't let your men sleep too sound tonight, for Tarleton will attack us in the morning & we'll feel damn ugly with cold bayonets in our guts.’”

The British commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, assumed that the Americans were retreating away from his force when in fact they were preparing for battle. Tarleton’s own bone-tired men slept on the grounds of the Americans’ former encampment. Finally, after hearing from his scouts he decided to make a night march of his own in the hope that his force would overtake the Americans before they crossed the Broad River.

Tarleton recorded that “at three o'clock in the morning on the 17th [see Note 1], the pickets… [were] called in, [and] the British troops… were directed to follow the route the Americans had taken the previous evening.” To expedite the march, “the baggage and wagons were ordered to remain upon the ground till daybreak, under the protection of a detachment of each corps” [see Note 2]. During the march, “Three companies of light infantry, supported by the legion infantry, formed the advance; the 7th regiment, the guns, and the 1st battalion of the 71st, composed the center; and the cavalry and mounted infantry brought up the rear.”

Tarleton thought that his movements were conducted in secrecy. In fact his force was being closely monitored. According to Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina, militia Colonels “Brandon and Roebuck, with some others, had the special charge of watching Tarleton's movements from the time he reached the Valley of the Pacolet. They sat on their horses as he approached and passed that stream and counted his men and sent their report to headquarters. They watched his camp on the night of the 16th until he began his march to give battle. Morgan appears to have had the most exact information of everything necessary.”

Notes:

1. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie stated that the march began by 2pm. The earlier time implies that Tarleton gave his troops little time to rest between marches. Mackenzie felt that Tarleton had denigrated the troops in his postwar memoir. Differences in the accounts such as this one were designed to show that the troops had performed heroically under trying circumstances (and, by implication, that it was Tarleton who was at fault for the British defeat).

2. A very rough estimate, based on my earlier analysis of the British order of battle, is that 10 men each were selected for this purpose from the ranks of the 7th Foot, the 71st Foot, and the British Legion infantry. According to Mackenzie these men were placed under the command of Ensign Fraser of the 71st.

Sources:

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's statement.

Will Graves transcribed the statement by Colonel Richard Winn (.pdf file).

Susan K. Zimmerman and R. Neil Vance transcribed the pension application of Josiah Martin (.pdf file).

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Hammond, Martin, Young, Hammond, McJunkin, Tarleton, and Mackenzie.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Wilson (.pdf), which includes the statement by William Mitchell.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has transcriptions of Tarleton's account and Mackenzie's Strictures.

Related: The American Cavalry - Part 1, The American Cavalry - Part 2, Mounted Militia

Cowpens in Miniature 5

Part 5: Tarleton's Pursuit
Previous: Morgan's Decision

Next: In the Night

In the evening of January 16th, the British force commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton reached what had been the encampment of the American army under Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan.

Tarleton’s men were given a chance to rest and eat. Meanwhile, “Patroles and spies were immediately dispatched to observe the Americans.” Tarleton had with him men well suited to this task, including a large body of cavalry and some mounted infantry. He also had the services of a number of Loyalist volunteer scouts. Tarleton remarked that, “The dragoons were directed to follow the enemy till dark, and the other emissaries to continue their inquiries till morning, if some material incident did not occur.” Tarleton did not immediately learn to where his enemy was fleeing. However, “Early in the night the patroles reported that General Morgan had struck into byways, tending towards Thickelle [Thicketty] creek: A party of determined loyalists made an American colonel prisoner, who had casually left the line of march, and conducted him to the British camp.”

Following “The examination of the militia colonel,” [see Note 1] and after receiving other reports, Tarleton made up his mind to pursue Morgan further. At the very least he was convinced of “the propriety of hanging upon General Morgan's rear, to impede the junction of reinforcements, said to be approaching.” Tarleton also knew that ahead of Morgan was a formidable obstacle, the Broad River. Tarleton hoped to “prevent his passing [the] Broad river” if at all possible.

From the state of the Americans’ former encampment, it appeared that they had retreated hastily. Tarleton found there “plenty of provisions, which they had left behind them, half cooked, in every part of their encampment.” He concluded that, “The Americans to avoid an action, left their camp, and marched all night.” One of Tarleton’s junior officers, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie, remembered reaching Morgan’s abandoned encampment “about ten o'clock on the evening of the l6th of January,” and also thought that “Morgan had quitted [only] a few hours before.” In fact, the Americans had begun their retreat in the morning and had arrived at their new encampment by the evening.

One who would have had a better knowledge of the timing of the Americans’ retreat was the Loyalist Alexander Chesney. Chesney was out scouting for Tarleton on the 16th and was perhaps the first scout to discover the Americans’ retreat. When he reached their encampment he “found the fires burning but no one there.” This must have been at some time in the afternoon. However, rather than immediately report this fact to Tarleton, he apparently first tried to learn where the Americans were heading. He “rode to my father's who said Morgan was gone to the Old-fields about an hour before” [see Note 2]. Chesney then rode home, where his wife confirmed what his father had said. There he also learned that the Americans “had used or destroyed my crop & took away almost every thing.” At this point he “immediately returned to col Tarleton,” but did not find him. By this time (early morning on the 17th), Tarleton had long since “marched to the Old fields.”

Notes:

1. The identity of this alleged colonel is unknown.

2. The “old-fields” was evidently another term used to refer to the Cowpens area; one American participant used the same term.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has transcriptions of Tarleton's account, Mackenzie's Strictures, and other records pertaining to the British Legion.

The Journal of Alexander Chesney

Related: Tarleton's Narrative, Alexander Chesney's Rivulet, The Cowpens Battlefield

Cowpens in Miniature 4

Part 4: Morgan's Decision
Previous: American Order of Battle

Next: Tarleton's Pursuit

The account of the battle of Cowpens that begins with this post is geared towards individuals that are already well acquainted with the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution. If this were a formal history of the battle, pains would be taken to explain the circumstances leading up to the battle of Cowpens and to introduce the major characters that were involved. Instead, this account begins on the eve of the battle and without such background information.

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The small American army under Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan encamped near “the Cowpens” on the evening of January 16th, 1781. Not far from Morgan, and in pursuit of his army, was a British force under Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton. Morgan monitored Tarleton’s movements carefully. The British had recently occupied a campground that the Americans had abandoned in the morning. Morgan later stated, “I received regular intelligence of the enemy's movements from the time they were first in motion. On the evening of the 16th inst., they took possession of the ground I had removed from in the morning, distant… about twelve miles.”

Unless the Americans resumed their retreat, the British would soon overtake his force. A further retreat would have been the prudent choice, and prudence had led him to abandon his previous encampment in favor of that near the Cowpens. Now, however, he had a change of heart. According to an acquaintance, Colonel Henry Lee, Morgan, “having been accustomed to fight and to conquer, did not relish the eager and interrupting pursuit of his adversary; and sat down at the Cowpens to give rest and refreshment to his harassed troops, with a resolution no longer to avoid action, should his enemy persist in pressing it.”

Morgan rode over the area and settled on a prospective battlefield. Captain Dennis Tramel of South Carolina was with Morgan at this time because he was “well acquainted with the local Situation of the ground.” Tramel, and “the company under his command” “went out and selected the ground upon which the Battle was fought” “with Genl. Morgan and his life-guard and Aide d camp.” [see Note 1]

According to Tramel, Morgan remarked, “Captain here is Morgan's grave or victory.” Colonel Richard Winn spoke with Morgan after the battle; Morgan told him that his words had been “on this ground I will Defeat the British or lay my Bones,” after which he chose “the place for his grave.”

Miniature Version of the Cowpens Battlefield.

Colonel Winn looked over the battlefield afterwards and said that it “would not have been my Choice.” The battlefield, he thought, was inadequate to the defense, especially against Tarleton’s large force of dragoons. He said, “In the first place it was Even Enough to make race paths Covered Over with a Small Growth of trees midling Open without underwoods.” In other words, there was nothing to impede a British cavalry charge. Furthermore, the British could easily maneuver around the American position because there was “Nothing to defend Either in front Rear or flank.” Under these circumstances, with “the force of the British Horse and Advantage of the Ground they had, the Advantage Over Morgan [was] as two is to One.”

Henry Lee made similar remarks. “The ground about the Cowpens is covered with open wood, admitting the operation of cavalry with facility, in which the enemy trebled Morgan. His flanks had no resting place, but were exposed to be readily turned.” Even worse, “the Broad river ran parallel to his rear, forbidding the hope of a safe retreat in the event of disaster.”

At this point, Morgan likely met with his principal subordinates, Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard of the Continental infantry and Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington of the Continental cavalry. Their reaction to his decision is not recorded, but Lee knew both men well, and their concerns may have shaped Lee’s postwar comments.

Lee wrote, “This decision grew out of irritation of temper, which appears to have overruled the suggestions of his sound and discriminating judgment.” Lee thought that Morgan should have immediately crossed the Broad before Tarleton could reach him. Not far beyond was King’s Mountain, a well-known landmark. According to Lee, “Had Morgan crossed this river, and approached the mountain, he would have gained a position disadvantageous to cavalry, but convenient for riflemen; and would have secured a less dangerous retreat.” Perhaps Washington or Howard suggested as much. “But these cogent reasons, rendered more forcible by his inferiority in numbers, could not prevail. Confiding in his long tried fortune, conscious of his personal superiority in soldiership, and relying on the skill and courage of his troops, he adhered to his resolution.”

Morgan knew that the inexperienced militia were often unreliable once the fighting began. After the war he defended his decision to fight at Cowpens in cynical terms. “[A]s to covering my wings,” which as Winn and Lee pointed out, were vulnerable to attack, “I knew my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. As to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down 1 broke from the ranks. When men are forced to fight, they will sell their lives dearly; and I knew that the dread of Tarleton's cavalry would give due weight to the protection of my bayonets, and keep my troops from breaking as Bufort's regiment did” [Note 2]. Besides, Morgan thought, crossing the Broad River would not have really brought his men to safety. “Had I crossed the river, one half of the militia would immediately have abandoned me.”

Morgan (with perhaps the assistance of Washington and Howard) then developed his battle plan.

That evening the American camp was abuzz with the news that Morgan intended to fight the British. Militiaman Thomas Young recalled that "We arrived at the field of the Cowpens about sun-down, and were then told that there we would meet the enemy. The news was received with great joy by the army." The militia either did not appreciate the fact that their position was a relatively disadvantageous one, or their eagerness to fight the British overruled whatever reservations they may have had about the chosen battlefield.

William Mitchel recalled that “on the night previous to the battle, a Council of war was held where it was determined that they should fight the next morning.” Morgan personally had decided to fight the British, but he was unable to offer battle without the full cooperation of the commanders of the Southern militia serving with him.

According to Captain Samuel Hammond of South Carolina, “A general order, forming the disposition of the troops, in case of coming to action" had been prepared earlier. At the meeting, this "was read to Colonels [Andrew] Pickens and [James] McCall, Major [James] Jackson and the author of these notes [Hammond]." Morgan's plan was sound and helped convince the militia commanders that Tarleton could be defeated. [see Note 3].

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina, who may also have been present, remembered that “On the night of Jan. 16… [Morgan] now had his entire force [assembled] and the question must be decided, "Shall we fight or fly?" The South Carolina Militia demanded a fight… Here the final decision is to risk battle.”

Notes:

1. The aide-de-camp was either Peter William Joseph Ludwig, the “Baron de Glaubeck.” or Major Edward Giles of the Maryland Regiment Extraordinary.

2. A reference to the destruction of Colonel Abraham Buford's command at the Battle of Waxhaws.

3. These were some of the principal commanders of the Southern militia with Morgan. Probably also present were Major Joseph McDowell of North Carolina, and Colonels Joseph Hayes and John Thomas of South Carolina, but Hammond did not mention them. Details of Morgan's plan will appear in a future post.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of Morgan's report, and the statements by Tramel, Young, Hammond, and McJunkin.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

Will Graves transcribed the statement by Colonel Richard Winn.

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene has the final quote from Morgan.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Wilson (.pdf), which includes the statement by William Mitchell.

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's statement.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Related: The Cowpens Battlefield, Morgan's Report, The Hammond Map

Cowpens in Miniature 3

Part 3: American Order of Battle
Previous: British Order of Battle

Next: Morgan's Decision

There is considerable uncertainty about the number of American participants at the battle of Cowpens, a topic about which I have previously commented on at length. I noted that two trustworthy sources (Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan and Sergeant-Major William Seymour) placed the American total at or below 800 men.

In this post I describe the American order of battle in some detail. In this description, Morgan's command has a total of 950 men.

The chief reason why I chose a larger total concerns the question of how many militia were present at the battle. Why Morgan's and Seymour's accounts imply a very low total, other credible sources explicitly indicate otherwise (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?). These statements include a total in the neighborhood of 350 for just the militia line (Otho Williams) to a total for all of the militia of about 500 (Nathanael Greene), 550 (US Congressional Resolution) or 600 men (William Moultrie). In my scheme there are around 590 militia (45 mounted militia, 230 on the main line, and 315 on the militia line).

My total of 950 men is not likely to sit well with some.

Those readers swayed by contemporary author Lawrence Babits would regard this number as too low. He estimated between 1,800 and 2,400 Americans were present at the battle. His estimate of a comparatively large total is based chiefly on an examination of pension applications filed by veterans after the war. I'm in favor of using pension application as a source of information, but I was unswayed by his analysis. This topic was covered in six previous posts (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Problems with Pensions, Veteran Survival, Little River Regiment, Morgan and Seymour, Fitting Large Numbers on the Militia Line).

Conversely, those swayed by early historian James Graham would regard this number as too high. I quoted him before, but a key passage bears repeating.

"It is true, his entire command, including all the militia that arrived previous to the battle, would appear to be about nine hundred and eighty men, if army returns and muster rolls were alone consulted. But every one acquainted with military affairs knows that such evidences of strength always exceed the reality. A number of his regulars were sick at the time, and many of the militia were absent. One detachment had been sent off with the baggage, another had gone to Salisbury in charge of prisoners, and a third guarded the horses of the militia. Besides, after the retreat of the militia from the front line, several of them never again appeared in the field, and a few mounted their horses and fled from the ground. Such men should not be permitted to lesson the glory of the achievement, by sharing in the honors of the victors as well as diminishing the mortification of the vanquished. The forces engaged in the battle under Morgan did not exceed eight hundred and fifty men."

Below I describe in some detail the composition of the American force, and estimate the size of each component. I don't have great confidence in the estimates of the various components, but at least there is some logic behind the decisions and the total is consistent with early sources.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line. Each miniature represents approximately 20 combatants.

Cavalry Reserve

Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington, commanding. Units #1 & #2 in the above figure.

Continental Light Dragoons: 72 men (Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington). See The American Cavalry - Part 1 for additional details.

Mounted Militia: ~45 men (served in two companies commanded by Major James McCall and Captain Banjamin Jolly). See The American Cavalry - Part 2 for additional details.

Total: ~117 men

The Main Line Continentals

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard commanding. Unit #4 in the figure.

1st Delaware Regiment: ~60 men. (one light infantry company under Captain Robert Kirkwood; total is based on Babits' A Devil of a Whipping).

1st Maryland Regiment: ~180 men (three light infantry companies under Captains Richard Anderson, Henry Dobson, and Nicholas Mangers; information from Babits.

Virginian Continentals: ~20 men (one company under Captain Andrew Wallace). William Jewell who fought in this company wrote, "Captain Wallace... marched us to Charlotte in North Carolina where we Joined General Greene: General Morgan was here permitted to select about 20 men to reinforce his own little band of perhaps 300 men against Tarleton at the Cowpens – he was selected as one and after the battle went as guard with the prisoners to Albemarle Barracks in Virginia."

Others: ~33 men.

As noted previously, some Virginia State troops and North Carolina Continentals may have served on the main line. Like Wallace's men, they may have been handpicked to supplement Morgan's other Continentals. Colonel Otho Williams in a January 23, 1781 letter said that Morgan had 290 light infantry. There were perhaps 237 Maryland and Delaware Continentals (number based on U.S. Congressional Resolution of March 9, 1781), plus 20 men with Wallace. An additional 33 men would produce a total force of 290.

That Howard's light infantry was an amalgam of men drawn from several units rather than a single large regiment is a reflection of the destitute condition of the American army in the South. On December 7, 1780, Major-General Nathanael Greene wrote to General George Washington complaining that:

"Nothing can be more wretched and distressing than the condition of the troops, starving with cold and hunger, without tents and camp equipage. Those of the Virginia line are literally naked, and a great part totally unfit for any kind of duty, and must remain so untill clothing can be had."

It was necessary to handpick men for service with Morgan because so many were incapable of a rigorous campaign.

Total: ~290 men (based on Williams)

Main Line Militia

Units #3 & #5 in the figure.

Major Francis Triplett's Virginia militia battalion: ~170 men (four companies under Captains James Tate, Patrick Buchanan, James Gilmore, and either Captain Combs or Lieutenant Dearing). The total number is based on the aforementioned letter by Williams.

Little River Regiment of South Carolina militia: ~40 men (Colonel Joseph Hayes, commanding). Daniel Morgan's letter of Jan 4, 1781 identified "forty militia horsemen under Col. Hays." A regimental strength of about 40 men can be interpreted as being consistent with statements made by Private Aaron Guyton of South Carolina (see Little River Regiment). Statements by Morgan and Seymour likewise suggest that the South Carolina militia regiments were quite small (see Morgan and Seymour).

Babits pointed out that there were last minute arrivals adding to the strength of the militia on the eve of the battle. However, there were also last minute departures. Major Joseph McJunkin observed that these regiments included a significant number of "pet tories" who were reluctant to fight (and prone to desert), and Morgan complained that he couldn't keep the militia together.

Other Units: ~20 men (conjectural). This includes a company of North Carolina State Troops commanded by Captain Henry Connelly.

As noted previously, some other militia units have been identified with the main line by various sources. Babits noted that his review of pension applications placed two companies (50 men) of Major David Campbell's Virginia militia battalion at the battle. The pension applications in question are lacking in details. It is not clear how many companies were in this battalion, how many men were in each company, whether all or only part of the companies served in the battle, or even whether the claims made in the applications are trustworthy. As these men are not mentioned in other participant accounts, this group, if present, was not likely to have been of a significant factor in the battle.

Total: ~230 men.

Placement of Militia Units on the Main Line

Of the Virginia militia, Combs'/Dearing's company (~42 men; based on a four-way division of Triplett's 170 men) and Tate's company (~42 men) appear to have been on the left wing, while Buchanan's company (~42 men), appears to have been on the right. Hayes' Little River Regiment (~40 men), and Connelly's company (~20 men) also appear to have been on the right wing (see The Main Line: Composition). I have not been able to place Gilmore's company on either wing. To even things out, I tentatively place Gilmore's company on the left wing to bring that total over the desired threshold. This gives the left wing 126 men (all Virginians), and the right wing 102 men (a hodgepodge of units from several states).

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard noted that at the climax of the battle that he had only 350 men with him. At this time, the right wing of the main line had fled, but the left wing remained in place. By my calculations, he would have had 290 Continental and Virginia state troops plus 126 riflemen under Major Francis Triplett. This total (416 men) is considerably above the 350 men Howard stated. It could be that some of my assumptions are in error. Alternatively, Howard, in arriving at 350 men, may have thought only half of the Virginian riflemen remained (this would have been 85 men) and forgot about the other units. He might also have subtracted about 20-25 men due to the losses he had sustained from British fire up to this point. This would result in a total of about 350 men.

Militia Line (Left Wing)

Unit #7 in the figure.

Georgia Refugees: One battalion under Major John Cunningham.

South Carolina State Troops: One regiment under Captain (Major) Samuel Hammond. Hammond is referred to as both a captain and a major. Hammond himself noted that he had been promoted to major, but technically he remained a captain, because he had not yet received his commission. Hammond stated that he

"Commanded on the left of the front line as Major of McCall's Regiment. It is here necessary to observe that Col. McCall had been promoted to the command of a Regiment of Cavalry authorized to be enrolled for six months & Applicant appointed to the Majority neither had yet been commissioned & only few armed with swords & pistols. The Refugee militia attached to their respective commands enrolled in the regiment and were promised by the Governor to be provided with clothing & arms as soon as they could be procured --- not a day was lost in recruiting nor was the full number made up before the Battle. The few 25 to 30 that were equipped as Horsemen were placed under Col. McCall and attached to Col. Washington's command. Those who were not so equipped were armed with Rifles & placed under the Applicant."

Upper Ninety-Six Regiment of South Carolina militia: I argued in a previous post that the left wing of the militia line likely included Colonel Andrew Pickens' regiment of South Carolina militia and perhaps also other volunteers from Georgia and South Carolina not affiliated with either Cunningham or Hammond. (see The Militia Line: Composition and Organization).

Total: ~115 men. I have not found information about the number of men in these units, therefore, I defer to Babits' number, which in turn comes from an unpublished study described in the Greene Papers. I haven't read the study and so I can offer no comment other than that the number seems plausible.

Militia Line (Right Wing)

Unit #6 in the figure.

Major Joseph McDowell's battalion of North Carolina militia: ~120 men. This total is based on a letter from Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, dated December 31, 1780.

1st Spartan Regiment of South Carolina militia: ~40 men (Colonel John Thomas, commanding). The estimate is an extension of that for Hayes' regiment (see above).

2nd Spartan Regiment of South Carolina militia: ~80 men (two battalions; Colonel Joseph Brandon and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck, commanding). Again, the estimate is an extension of the reasoning applied to Hayes' regiment.

The battalions of McDowell, Thomas, Brandon, and Roebuck are estimated to have had a total force of 240 men. However, there were some significant detachments. Captain Samuel Otterson of Brandon's battalion indicated that 30 men were detached as serving as spies and missed the battle. Captain Benjamin Jolly, also of Brandon's battalion, commanded a company of mounted militia contained men drawn, in part, from the South Carolinians' ranks (see The American Cavalry - Part 2).

Total: ~200 men (240 men - detachments).

Grand Total

• Cavalry: ~117 men
• Main Line Continentals: ~290 men
• Main Line Militia: ~230 men
• Militia Line (Left Wing): ~115 men
• Militia Line (Right Wing): ~200 men

Total ~950 men

Sources:

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Jewell (.pdf file).

A summary of the Otho Williams papers can be found here. The item in question is a letter from Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781.

A transcription of the letter from Greene to Washington can be found here.

January 23, 1781 letter from Major-General Nathanael Greene to Brigadier-General Francis Marion (not available online).

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has the U.S. Congressional Resolution, a copy of the statement by Jackson, and various statements by Morgan.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Samuel Hammond (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson (.pdf file).

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan

Related: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, The Main Line: Composition, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

Cowpens in Miniature 2

Part 2: British Order of Battle
Previous: About the Recreation

Next: American Order of Battle

The American commander Brigadier-General Morgan indicated that the British force at Cowpens was comprised of 1,150 men (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?). I assume that this number included both the men (of all ranks) that fought at the battle and the detachment that was left behind to guard the British baggage train.

Rank and file totals for most British units can be found in a British report dated January 15, 1781. This includes the detachment of the 16th Foot (44 men), the 7th Foot (167 men), the 1st Battalion of the 71st Foot (249 men), the light infantry companies of the 71st Foot (69 men), and the British Legion (451 men).

I also reviewed the rolls for the Prince of Wales American Regiment (PoWAR) light infantry company, and determined that there were as many as 1 officer and 28 rank and file of this company present at Cowpens.

Finally, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie recorded the number of officers present in most of the units at Cowpens, including the 7th Foot (7), the 71st Foot (16 between the battalion and light companies), the PoWAR light infantry company (1), and the detachment of the 17th Light Dragoons (2).

Some assumptions had to be made fill in the gaps in the records.

Rank and File Estimates

The two 3-pounders that the British had at the battle had a crew in the neighborhood of 22 men and no officers (an estimate based primarily on John Moncure's estimate in The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour and Lawrence Babits' estimate in A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens).

Tarleton's account implies that the 17th Light Dragoons had around 50 men, but he was speaking very loosely. The other numbers he gave are demonstrably wrong, such as his statement that his total force was 1000 men, and that the 7th Foot, and 1st battalion of the 71st Foot both had 200 men. A U.S. intelligence report of Jan 6, 1781 gives 35 men for the 17th (see excerpt, below). This is also not entirely trustworthy. However a number between 35 and 50 men is probably accurate. For this reason, the 17th Light Dragoons are assumed to have had around 40 men.

The British report does not indicate how many of the rank and file in the British Legion were infantry and how many were dragoons. Tarleton's account implies that there were 250 dragoons, which would leave about 200 infantrymen. The US intelligence report, mentioned above, indicates that the infantry and cavalry components were of equal size (this is not shown in the excerpt above). An annotation on the Pigee Map (Babits, page 71) lists 280 men for Tarleton's cavalry. This number also appeared in a New Jersey newspaper account of the battle. My assumption is that the cavalry had around 240 men (280 rank and file total - 40 rank and file for the 17th light dragoons); this leaves about 210 rank and file for the infantry.

Officer Estimates

Using the number of officers listed by Mackenzie, and the rank and file numbers indicated above, it is possible to determine for some units the ratio of officers to rank and file. There were 9 officers for 167 rank and file in the 7th Foot (1:19), 16 officers for 318 rank and file in the 71st Foot (1:20) 2 officers for 40 rank and file in the 17th Light Dragoons (1:20), and 1 officer for 28 rank and file in the PoWAR light infantry (1:28). The average ratio is 1:20. By extension the number of officers in other units can be estimated.

Musician Estimates

British companies at the Cowpens were badly understrength. I'm assuming that there was not more than 1 musician per company. Following Babits, I'm further assuming that the detachment of the 16th Foot was organized as a single company, and that the 7th Foot was organized into four companies. The number of infantry and dragoon companies in the British Legion are based on records found on Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website.

Esimated Totals

British Regulars

16th Foot: ~44 men (41 rank and file, 2 officers, and 1 musician).

7th Foot: ~180 men (167 rank and file, 9 officers, and 4 musicians).

71st Foot (1st battalion): ~269 men (249 rank and file, 12 officers, and 8 musicians)

71st Foot (light infantry companies): ~75 men (69 rank and file, 4 officers and 2 musicians).

17th Light Dragoons: ~43 men (40 rank and file, 2 officers, and 1 musician).

Royal Artillery detachment: ~ 22 men (all rank and file).

Loyalists

British Legion Infantry: ~226 men (about 210 rank and file plus about 10 officers and 6 musicians).

British Legion Dragoons: ~258 men (about 241 rank and file, 12 officers and 5 musicians)

Prince of Wales American Regiment light infantry: ~29 men (28 rank and file, 1 officer, and 0 musicians).

Grand Totals

Total: 1,146 men of all ranks (1,067 rank and file, 52 officers, 27 musicians)

This total almost exactly matches the total of 1,150 men Morgan named.

Morgan said that the British claimed to have "fought" 1,037 during the battle. I'm assuming that this number was the total number of rank and file with Tarleton, minus the baggage detachment. The size of this detachment is unknown, however Mackenzie said that it was under the command of Ensign Fraser of the 71st. If the detachment was comprised of Ensign Fraser and 30 men then the total number of British present during the battle would be as follows:

Revised Total: 1,115 men of all ranks (1,037 rank and file, 51 officers, 27 musicians).

Tarleton and Mackenzie said the British force had 1,000 men. They were probably counting only rank and file that were on the battlefield.

American Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard wrote that at the climax of the battle, his 350 men were confronted by 800 Bitish. I show he was facing 814 men (1146 for the British overall - 31 men for the baggage detachment - 258 men for the British Legion dragoons - 43 men for the 17th Light Dragoons = 814) minus whatever losses the British sustained earlier in the battle).

American Major-General Nathanael Greene estimated that there were 50 Loyalist militiamen accompanying Tarleton's baggage train and presumably serving as drivers and/or guards. Tarleton probably also had a number of African Americans serving as drivers. Morgan recorded, in his after action report, the capture of "ten negroes." Tarleton mentioned having the service of Loyalist guides, but they were probably very few in number. Of these, South Carolina militaman Thomas Young encountered the Loyalists "Littlefield and Kelly" after the battle. Loyalist Captain Alexander Chesney scouted for Tarleton and participated at least during the late stages of the fighting.

The British Force in Miniature

(click to enlarge)

7th Foot (left) and 71st Foot (right)


British Legion infantry (left) and British Legion dragoons (right)


17th Light Dragoons (left) and light infantry companies (right)


Royal Artillery detachment (left) and baggage guard (right)

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of statements by Morgan, Mackenzie, Tarleton, Howard, and Greene.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has transcriptions of Tarleton's account, Mackenzie's Strictures, and other records pertaining to the British Legion.

François-Jean de Chastellux's (1787) Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782 is one place to find a copy of the British rank and file returns.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has Morgan's account of the battle as it appeared in a New Jersey newspaper.

Related: Cowpens in Miniature 1, Tarleton's Narrative, Cornwallis' Report