Cowpens in Miniature 20

Part 20: Washington and Howard Charge

Previous: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Next: Collapse

Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington was stationed, with his dragoons, in rear of the American main line during the battle. His cavalry was the Americans’ last line of defense, and like his counterpart, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, he used his cavalry sparingly [see Note 1]. Washington sent mounted militia forward at the beginning of the battle to cover the retreat of the militia, but then had them return to a position in reserve [see Note 2]. When Ogilvie charged, he sent forward a portion of his dragoons to prevent the American right from being wholly swept away, but still he did not commit his entire force. However, when the Continental infantry began to retreat, he was left with no alternative than to bring his remaining dragoons forward and use them to guard against a rout of the American center. With his last dragoons deployed, no force was left to counter the charge of the 17th light dragoons. Mounted militiaman Jeremiah Dial saw "the British broke through the leftwing of the Malitia" (i.e., Triplett’s Virginians) and charge into the American rear. There was, however, no immediate relief for those that were attacked.

William Moultrie stated in his postwar history that "Colonel Washington… [was] close to the rear of the second line [i.e., the Continentals] with his cavalry, and spoke to Colonel Howard, 'that if he would rally his men, and charge the enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry that were got among our militia in the rear' [see Note 3]."

Washington at this moment may also have ordered the recall of the detachment of dragoons that had driven off Ogilvie’s company [see Note 4].

Moments later, Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard ordered the retreating Continentals to halt, about face, and deliver a fatal volley into the astonished British.

Both Howard and Washington then ordered charges, respectively, against the British infantry and cavalry.

The volleys Howard’s Continentals delivered at close range brought down many of the British infantry and left the rest reeling. According to Howard, "While [the British were] in this confusion, I ordered a charge with the bayonet, which order was obeyed with great alacrity."

This was also the experience of Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals. He recorded in his journal that we "Charged them home. They not expecting any Such thing put them in Such Confusion that We Were in amongst them With the Bayonets Which Caused them to give ground."

Similarly, Henry Lee stated that "Howard seized the happy moment, and followed his advantage with the bayonet. This decisive step gave us the day. The reserve [i.e., the 71st Foot] having been brought near the line, shared in the destruction of our fire, and presented no rallying point to the fugitives.

Meanwhile, according to Howard, "Washington observing... [the British cavalry] charged them. As well as I can recollect this charge was made at the same moment that I charged the infantry." Anderson made the same observation in his journal "At the Same time that We Charged, Col. Washington Charged the horse Which Soon gave Way" [see Note 5].

In making this charge, according to Howard, Washington "moved to the left from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse" [see Note 6].

Within moments they passed by elements of the shattered right wing of the main line [see Note 7] and into the ranks of the 17th Light Dragoons.

Washington and Howard Charge. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Cornet James Simons, one of Washington’s cavalrymen, wrote in a letter to William Washington that "your first charge was made on the enemy's Cavalry, (who were cutting down our Militia) and when, after a smart Action, you instantly defeated, leaving in the course of ten minutes 18 of their brave 17th Dragoons dead on the spot."

Ten minutes was probably too long of a duration for this action. Private James Collins remembered that "in a few moments, Col. Washington's cavalry was among them, like a whirlwind, and the poor fellows began to kneel from their horses, without being able to remount. The shock was so sudden and violent, they could not stand it, and immediately betook themselves to flight." Howard wrote that Colonel Washington charged the enemy's cavalry, who were cutting down our militia, and soon drove them off."

The American Counterattack. (two views; click to enlarge). The Continental infantry (under Howard) charge into the heart of the British line. Meanwhile, the American cavalry (under Washington) relieve the militia from the assault of the 17th Light Dragoons.

As the British dragoons retreated, the American cavalry stormed after them in close pursuit. For the British dragoons, according to Collins, "there was no time to rally, and they appeared to be as hard to stop as a drove of wild Choctaw steers, going to a Pennsylvania market. In a few moments the clashing of swords was out of hearing and quickly out of sight." Less colorfully, Howard commented that Washington "never lost sight of them until they abandoned the ground" [see Note 8].

Notes:

1. In eighteenth century Western-style warfare, the commander that committed his reserves last was often the one that emerged victorious. Tarleton used a part of his mounted force in a limited capacity during the middle phase of the battle, while holding back a large reserve. Washington deployed a large portion of his force on both occassions, but this seems chiefly to reflect the extremity of the circumstances. That the Americans had to fully commit their cavalry before the British might have been disastrous to them. Major George Hanger commented years later that the defeat of Ogilvie (and by extension, Nettles too) was inconsequential compared to Tarleton’s inability to make good use of his reserve late in the battle.

2. Private Thomas Young described the mounted militiamen being used in this capacity. See The American Cavalry - Part 2 for details on the initial deployment of the American cavalry. Whether Washington took the initiative in ordering the mounted militia forward or whether the order originated with Morgan is unknown.

3. It is difficult to discern exactly who did what at this critical point in the battle. Moultrie’s statement indicates Washington was the key actor in rallying the Continentals, while the accounts by Morgan and Howard each chiefly credit themselves.

4. Thomas Young recalled that "At this moment the bugle sounded. We about half formed and making a sort of circuit at full speed, came up in the rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen. At this moment Col. Howard gave the word "charge bayonets!" and the day was ours."

One reading of this statement is that the group of American dragoons that had driven off Ogilvie charged around the vulnerable left flank of the British line and passed into the ground behind the 71st Foot. I regard Young as a trustworthy source and have put a great deal of reliance on his account elsewhere, but this part of his statement is difficult to reconcile. Young’s account suggests that his small group of dragoons were the first to counterattack when other sources give that honor to Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard’s Continentals. He also seemingly places his small group of dragoons in an unlikely position between the British infantry and the British cavalry reserve before either had been beaten. The experience of the 71st Foot was described in detail by David Stewart and Roderick Mackenzie, but neither mention such a charge; nor too did other American cavalrymen.

An alternative interpretation is that Washington recalled the dragoons on his right ("the bugle sounded"), these cavalry then followed in the wake of Washington’s own charge, moving behind the Continentals from the right side of the battlefield to the left ("making a sort of circuit at full speed") and then joined with Washington in the charge that helped shatter the British left and broke into the British rear (we "came up in the rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen"). This reading is not problematic so long as "this moment" when "Col. Howard gave the word "charge bayonets!"" preceded the moment when the dragoons "came up in the rear of the British line."

5. Respected histories of the battle, such as those by Edwin Bearss and Lawrence Babits, place Washington’s charge against the British cavalry soon after the militia retreated and well before the Continentals counterattacked. That the charges occurred at the same time is strongly indicated by Howard and Anderson. Another participant, Robert Long, recalled that "Col. Washington charged them with his cavalry; at the same time our infantry charged the British with the bayonet." Henry Lee’s history of the battle stated that "part of the enemy's cavalry, having gained our rear, fell on that portion of the militia who had retired to their horses. Washington struck at them with his dragoons, and drove them before him. Thus, by simultaneous efforts, the infantry and cavalry of the enemy routed."

6. That Washington was charging a British cavalry force to his left (and not Ogilvie’s dragoons, which had been to his right) is indicated in several accounts. Daniel Morgan’s report of the battle stated that "Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that the Tarleton was cutting down our riflemen on the left, pushed forward, and charged them." Private Jeremiah Dial stated in his pension application that "Washington's Cavalry with whom this applicant fought during the engagement were stationed in the rear of Morgan's forces and when the British broke through the leftwing of the Malitia Washington’s cavalry made an attack upon them and defeated them with considerable loss."

Howard also emphasized that the charge was made toward the American rear, rather than towards the British infantry: "Washington's charge had no connexion with mine as his movement was to the rear in a quite different direction."

7. These men, according to the present account of the battle, first broke when Ogilvie charged, and, in retreating for their horses, fell in the path of Nettles’ charge. William Neel of Captain Patrick Buchanan’s company recalled seeing that, "the South Carolina mounted militia," who he had earlier denigrated (see Cowpens in Miniature 14) had "rallied and assisted to complete the victory." Captain Henry Connelly remarked that "we was fortunately relieved by Washingtons legion that hastened to our assistance."

8. François-Jean de Chastellux asked Morgan "how Tarleton's cavalry were employed during the engagement." He learned that "whilst the infantry were engaged, they endeavoured to turn the flanks of General Morgan's army, but were kept in awe by some riflemen, and by the American horse detached by Colonel Washington, to support them, in two little squadrons." The manner in which I have depicted the charges by Ogilvie and Nettles as well as their defeat by the American militia and cavalry is consistent with this description.

Sources:

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Dial (.pdf file).

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, Anderson, Collins, and Young, among others.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Hanger's and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf file).

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

Related: The Fatal Moment, The American Cavalry - Part 1, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 19

Part 19: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Previous: The Third Crisis

Next: Washington and Howard Charge

As the Continentals about-faced and moved off in retreat, the British infantry surged towards them, cheering and wielding their bayonets. According to Henry Lee, "Considering this retrograde movement the precursor of flight, the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder." It was fortunate for the Americans that their commanders kept a cool head at this interval and marked out a spot where their men would halt and renew the fight. It was fortunate too that the American rank and file did not realize that the retreat was in error. Morgan and Howard acted "as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted" [see Note 1].

The British infantry were near the Continentals, and perhaps closing the distance with the Continentals, but the British could not overtake them. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie complained that "The infantry were not in condition to overtake the fugitives" [see Note 2]. The British, more so than the Americans "had been in motion day and night" in the days leading up to the battle. "A number [of the British]… had already fallen… fatigue, however, enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss of blood… the infantry, though well disposed, were unable to come up with his [Howard’s] corps [see Note 3].

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, in command of this battalion commented that "This retreat was accidental but was very fortunate as we thereby were extricated from the enemy."

They had fallen back approximately 100 yards [see Note 4], wheeling to their right during the retreat [see Note 5].

The Continentals Halt (click to enlarge).

At this point, according to Howard, "The enemy were now very near us." The distance may have been less than 30 yards [see Note 6].

Howard gave the command "to halt and face about." And with that "the line was perfectly formed in a moment."

For the pursuing British, here was a great shock. One moment they were on the verge of vanquishing their enemy, the next they were eye-to-eye with a wall of infantry.

There was a moment’s pause, and then the next command was given.

According to Anderson, we "then give them a full Volley."

This volley can be regarded as the climatic moment of the battle, an instant that both sides recognized as a turning point. The American after action report stated that we "gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder." The British after action report echoed this remark "General Morgan's Corps faced about & gave them [the British troops] a heavy fire. This unexpected event, occasioned the utmost confusion" [see Note 7].

A Fatal Volley (click to enlarge).

Henry Lee observed that the British were "Stunned by this unexpected shock," and "the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." The Americans, for their part, did not relent. The Continentals, in Howard’s words, gave the British "a few rounds" of "a very destructive fire."

Meanwhile, the British were also inflicting heavy losses, but on the American militia.

Major Joseph McJunkin stated that during the battle, "Tarleton… made a charge on the right & left wings, treading & cutting till he got in the rear of Howard's command." The first attack, by Ogilvie, had already been repulsed. The second one, by Lieutenant Henry Nettles and the 17th Light Dragoons, had cut through Triplett’s Virginians. Beyond Triplett’s men, and in the rear of the American position, was a host of targets for the 17th Light Dragoons. The dragoons attacked them all.

Nettles' Attack. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line (Triplett's former company has been broken, but the rest of the line is intact), 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Captain Connelly, who was fleeing with his company from the right wing of the main line towards the militia horses recalled that the British cavalry attacked "our company when just about to catch up [to] our horses which was tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle." They "fell upon us with great fury."

Some men from the right wing of the militia line were also in this area [see Note 8]. These men had already reached their horses when the dragoons attacked. One of these men Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled, "Tarleton's cavalry pursued us; ("now," thought I, "my hide is in the loft;") just as we got to our horses, they overtook us and began to make a few hacks at some, however, without doing much injury. They, in their haste, had pretty much scattered, perhaps, thinking they would have another Fishing creek frolic."

The heaviest blow fell upon the men of Colonel Andrew Pickens’ regiment of South Carolina militia. After serving on the militia line, they had reformed behind Triplett’s Virginians….

Jeremiah Files claimed he "was wounded by Tarleton's Dragoons on the head--on the left Arm and on the right Hand each wound was made with a sword… the wounds Greatly Disabled [him] & stuned him for some time." Private James Pettigrew saw that his, James Caldwell, "was cut almost to death by Tarlton's horsemen so much so that he had to be borne from the field." Michael Cain was wounded "on the head by a sword." His Captain, Andrew Miller, was killed [see Note 9]. Charles Holland "was wounded by a sword thrust through the body."

Private Robert Long, who was on the other side of the battlefield, heard that "At that time Tarleton brought 200 or 300 cavalry round in the rear of our left wing of militia." Nettles in fact had nowhere near this many men. This statement conveys something of the shocking power of this attack, coming upon the militia when and where it was least expected.

Notes:

1. From Francois-Jean de Chastellux’s 1781 interview with Daniel Morgan. During the retreat, Morgan saw that "the English, with more confidence than order, advanced to the attack." His own troops, meanwhile, were able to "keep their ranks." Therefore, Morgan "suffered them [the Continentals] to retreat a hundred paces, and then commanded them to halt and face the enemy, as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted."

2. Mackenzie’s thoughts here and elsewhere are expressed in such a way as to defame Tarleton. The retreating Continentals were not "fugitives," but rather maintained order. Mackenzie is insinuating that Tarleton could not even defeat an already-beaten foe.

3. Mackenzie claimed that "not less than two-thirds of the British infantry officers," "and nearly the same proportion of privates," had been shot. The British had amassed serious casualties by this point, but this is an exaggeration. The casualties Mackenzie alleges to have occurred by this time are greater than those suffered by the British during the entirety of the battle. This is another example in which Mackenzie’s wording implies Tarleton’s mishandling of the battle.

4. According to Howard; others stated different distances. Morgan claimed that "We retired in good order about fifty paces." Francois-Jean de Chastellux claimed that Morgan told him that he let the Continentals "retreat a hundred paces." Private John Thomas of Virginia claimed that the Continentals "retreated from aboutt 80 yards."

5. The postwar histories by Francois-Jean de Chastellux and David Stewart both describe the whole Continental line wheeling. Howard stated that the retreat began on his right flank; the wheeling movement may have resulted from the Continental line breaking off the engagement from right to left (Lawrence Babits, in a Devil of a Whipping, describes in considerable detail how this could have occurred). Whether ordered or accidental, this wheeling motion was particularly fortunate to the Americans because it prevented the 71st Foot from gaining their right flank. The wheeling movement also helps explain why different sources differently estimated the distance of the Continentals’ retreat; in such a maneuver, some parts of the line would have fallen back further than others. A distance of 100 yards for at least part of the line seems likely as this was the distance between the Continentals and Triplett’s Virginians (see The Main Line: Organization). If the Continentals had retreated further, Triplett would have been exposed to a British bayonet charge.

6. How close the two lines were has been variously stated (and perhaps was various at different points on the line). Stewart thought that the 71st Foot had come "within forty yards of the hostile force." Howard claimed the British were "within 30 yards of us with two field pieces." Virginia militiaman John Thomas thought that the British were "within aboutt 30 steps of them."

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals thought that "We let them Come Within ten Or fifteen yards of us." Anderson’s phrase that "we let them come" close, is striking. It is unclear whether Howard intended to have the pursuing British get close to the Continentals. Judging from Anderson’s journal, he was one that evidently believed that "the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted," and perhaps this is his supposition for why his superiors would order such a movement. Chastellux believed something similar before he interviewed Morgan.

7. A number of participants made similar remarks. Howard wrote in one place: "The enemy were now very near us. Our men commenced a very destructive fire, which they little expected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder in their ranks." In another he said, "The enemy pressed upon us in rather disorder, expecting the fate of the day was decided. They were by this time within 30 yards of us with two field pieces; my men with uncommon coolness gave them an unexpected and deadly fire." Banastre Tarleton claimed in his memoir that "An unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans, who came about as they were retreating, stopped the British, and threw them into confusion." Private John Thomas of Virgina recalled that the Continentals "were ordered to wheele and fire. They did so, the British being within aboutt 30 steps of them." Private John Baldwin of North Carolina recalled that "Morgan defeated the British with his regulars, after they concluded the Americans were all running."

Similar comments also appeared in postwar histories of the battle. For example, Henry Lee wrote that "the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder; but, as it drew near, Howard faced about, and gave it a close and murderous fire. Stunned by this unexpected shock, the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." David Stewart wrote that "Colonel Howard, commanding the reserve, threw in a fire upon the 71st when within forty yards of the hostile force. The fire was destructive: nearly one-half of their number fell." This is an exaggeration (see Note 4, above). The British line was so much longer than that of the Continentals that it seems likely a part of the 71st was not struck at all by this volley. More accurately, Stewart also claimed that "The fate of the action was decided by the destructive fire of the Americans' second line."

8. Henry Lee thought they had been detached by Colonel Andrew Pickens to help secure the miltia’s horses. See Flight of the Militia - Part 3.

9. These claims were made by Cain’s widow. She also identified him with Captain Robert Anderson of this regiment.

Sources:

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Mackenzie's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, Anderson, Collins, and Thomas, among others.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's after action report.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Files (.pdf file).

Nan Overton West transcribed the pension application of James Pettigew (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of Michael Cain (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Charles Holland (.pdf file).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Baldwin (.pdf file).

Related: The Fatal Moment, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

Cowpens in Miniature 18

Part 18: The Third Crisis

Previous: The Second Crisis

Next: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Daniel Morgan had put into place a well-thought out plan for defeating the British. At the opening of the battle, that plan was executed perfectly, and significant losses had been inflicted on the British. The improvisation of sending skirmishers forward to gall the British before they reached the militia line had also worked well. After the British advanced on the main line, however, his became completely unraveled. Morgan was now galloping across the battlefield addressing a series of crises.

The first crisis was the charge of Ogilvie’s dragoons, which shattered his right flank. That crisis had been contained when Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington sent forward a detachment of light dragoons to counter Ogilvie’s charge. Morgan also assisted in rallying the broken militia. According to Robert Long of Joseph Hayes’ regiment, "We were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person."

The second crisis was when the 71st Foot advanced towards the right of the Continentals, which triggered an accidental retreat of the Continental infantry. To address this crisis, Morgan ordered a stopgap measure: the Continentals were to halt and form a new line near Washington’s dragoons. His right flank, however, remained vulnerable.

Meanwhile, a new crisis erupted on the American left. As the Continentals retreated towards the rear, Tarleton ordered forward his last unengaged unit on the front line. In Tarleton’s words, "The British rushed forwards: An order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge" [see Note 1].

Lieutenant Henry Nettles’ company of 17th Light Dragoons rounded the right flank of the British line and stormed up the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard could only watch as the dragoons rushed past his infantrymen and into the rear of the American position: "about the time of our retreat, a large body of british cavalry passes round my left flank and pursued the flying militia to their horses" [see Note 2].

The dragoons first encountered Major Francis Triplett’s company of Virginia militia, which were posted, in part, on the road. Within moments, the dragoons inflicted devastating losses on the Virginians with their sabers and pistols [see Note 3].

Charge of the 17th Light Dragoons. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (retreating / reforming), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The Third Crisis (two views; click to enlarge). The Continentals retreat, pursued by the British infantry, while the British Legion dragoons take up a new position in reserve. On the American right, the remnants of Captain David Ogilvie's company retreat in confusion. On the American left, the 17th Light Dragoons collide with Major Francis Triplett's Virginians.

Private Isaac Way remembered that he "was severely wounded on the side, back, arms, head and in the face by the cut of the sword of a British dragoon." Both of the company’s officers were also struck down. John Thomas remembered that "Lieutenant Dearing… was wounded through his hand on this occasion and bled to death. He died the next day." Private George Rogers remembered that "the Captain of the Company to which he belonged at this time was John Combs who was killed." Sergeant Benjamin Martin also remembered Combs’ death: "I was in the road all the time of the action I was covering Capt. Combs he was killed." Martin presumably took over what was left of the company.

Notes:

1. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie assumed that Tarleton was referring to the British Legion dragoons and said that "This order, however, if such was then thought of, being either not delivered or disobeyed, they stood aloof, without availing themselves of the fairest opportunity of reaping the laurels which lay before them." It seems unlikely that this is what Tarleton meant. He had previously ordered "a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy's right flank," but they had not gained that flank.

In the images accompanying this post, the British Legion is shown forming a line on the British left, behind the 71st Foot, rather than advancing around the American flank. The movements of the British Legion dragoon reserve during the battle are not well documented, but this is a likely occurrence. Two plausible reasons for why the dragoons took this action are as follows:

First, the officers commanding the dragoon reserve may have thought this is what Tarleton wanted. By forming a line behind the 71st, they were more-or-less threatening "the enemy’s right flank." Moving beyond or around the 71st may have seemed ill advised because this would have taken them into low ground that included the headwaters of Island Creek.

Second, it’s worth reconsidering the comments by Colonel Richard Winn to Daniel Morgan (originally described in Cowpens in Miniature 6). Winn said that Tarleton’s "mode of Fighting is to Surprise, by doing this he sends up two or three Troops of Horse and if he can throw the party into Confusion with his reserve he falls on and will cut them to pieces." Perhaps this movement of the reserve "to threaten the enemy's right flank" was intended to exploit the damage inflicted by Ogilvie’s charge. However, by the time that the Legion dragoon reserve reached the area, Ogilvie’s men were retreating in confusion and the opportunity was lost. Therefore, the dragoon reserve may have chosen to halt and wait for new orders.

2. The left wing of the militia line had retreated through this same gap a short while earlier. They had meanwhile reformed in rear of Triplett’s Virginians, near the horses of the militia. It’s unclear whether Howard was referring to these men or the militia "flying" past his retreating Continentals from the broken right wing of the main line.

3. This company is particularly well represented in participant accounts of the battle. Perhaps this traumatizing moment helped compel the survivors to leave a record of their experience.

Sources:

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's memoirs, and Mackenzie's critique of them.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard and Thomas, among others.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Isaac Way (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of George Rogers (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the statement by Colonel Richard Winn (.pdf file).

Related: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, 17th Light Dragoons, Flight of the Militia - Part 4

Cowpens in Miniature 17

Part 17: The Second Crisis

Previous: The First Crisis

Next: The Third Crisis

In the center of the battlefield, the British front line bore down on the American Continentals.

Major-General Chastellux commented that when the British were on the offensive, their "attack is not hot, but consists in general of a brisk fire, rather than in closing with the enemy." This seems to have been the tactic used on this occasion. The British front line advanced steadily on the Continentals, stopping repeatedly to fire. At the same time, the Continentals repeatedly volleyed at the British. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals recorded that the British "advanced On boldly under a Very heavy fire until they got Within a few yards of us" [see Note 1].

Tarleton saw that the American Continentals would not easily be driven off. He saw too that the right wing of the main line had fled. Now was the moment to launch the final attack that would end the battle in a decisive British victory.

"As the contest between the British infantry in the front line and the continentals seemed equally balanced, neither retreating, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton thought the advance of the 71st into line, and a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy's right flank, would put a victorious period into the action. No time was lost in performing this manoeuvre. The 71st were desired to pass the 7th before they gave their fire, and were directed not to entangale their right flank with the left of the other battalion."

In making this maneuver, the two regiments did become entangled. Major George Hanger learned that the 71st "moved up; and when moving up to form in line with the rest of the troops, whether from their not taking ground enough, or from some other circumstance, their right flank brushed the left flank of the 7th regiment, and intermixed one with the other."

Meanwhile, according to Tarleton, "The cavalry were ordered to incline to the left, and to form a line, which would embrace the whole of the enemy's right flank."

The entanglement between the 71st and the 7th was not allowed to slow the attack. In Tarleton’s words, "Upon the advance of the 71st, all the infantry again moved on."

The 71st Foot Enters the Fight. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken by Ogilvie's charge), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming / retreating), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Main Line Fighting (two views; click to enlarge). The events shown in this image overlap with some of those shown in the last post. Ogilvie’s charge is visible in both images. The British front line advances on the Continentals. Meanwhile, the 71st Foot has advanced alongside the 7th Foot and the British Legion dragoon reserve advances towards the American right.

As the British made their final push, the Continentals began to retreat. François-Jean de Chastellux learned that "the whole line… [wheeled] to the right," and wondered at its cause. Other writers noted the retreat but gave no explanation for it. Tarleton, for example, recalled only that "The continentals and back woodsmen gave ground" [see Note 2].

This retreat would become one of the most commented upon features of the battle.

Historian David Stewart assumed that the retreat of the Continentals was related to the retreat of the front line. "the second [line], which had as yet taken no share in the action, observing confusion and retrograding in their front, suddenly faced to the right, and inclined backwards; a manoeuvre by which a space was left for the front line to retreat, without interfering with the ranks of those who were now to oppose the advance of the Highlanders, "who ran in, with characteristic eagerness, desirous to take advantage of the confusion which appeared among the enemy." This description, however, does not mesh well with participant accounts.

More credibly, others claimed that the retreat occurred because the Continentals had been outflanked. Thomas Anderson wrote in his journal that "their line Was So much longer than ours the turn'd our Flanks Which Caused us to fall back Some Disstance." This is also the reason that Daniel Morgan gave in his official report of the battle: "their numbers being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position."

However, there was another reason for the retreat. Morgan admitted "very candidly" to François-Jean de Chastellux, "that the retrograde movement he had made, was not premeditated." The retreat, in other words, was an accident.

Henry Lee, who knew Morgan and Howard, elaborated on this theme in his history of the battle. He noted that the British, "outstretching our front, endangered Howard's right." The threat stemmed from the dissolution of the right wing of the main line and the advance of the 71st Foot. Therefore, Howard "instantly took measures to defend his flank, by directing his right company to change its front; but, mistaking this order, the company fell back; upon which the line began to retire, and General Morgan directed it to retreat to the cavalry. This manoeuvre being performed with precision, our flank became relieved, and the new position was assumed with promptitude."

After historian William Johnson inaccurately described the causes of this retreat (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1), Howard felt compelled to comment on this incident at length. This retreat, he said:

"was not occasioned by the fire of the enemy… I soon observed, as I had but about 350 men and the british about 800 [see Note 3], that their line extended much further than mine particularly on my right, where they were pressing forward to gain my flank.--To protect that flank, I ordered the company on my right to change its front so as to oppose the enemy on that flank [see Note 4]. Whether my orders were not well understood or whether it proceeded from any other cause, in attempting this movement some disorder ensued in this company which rather fell back than faced as I wished them." As a consequence, "first a part, and then the whole of the company commenced a retreat."

Regarding the cause of the confusion, Howard (fairly or not) placed the blame firmly on the company commander:

"This company on my right were Virginians, commanded by Capt. Wallace who some time previous had formed a connexion with a vile woman of the camp, and the infatuation was so great that on guard or any other duty he had this woman with him and seemed miserable when she was absent. He seemed to have lost all sense of the character of an officer. He was in this state of mind at the time of the action. As well as I can recollect Morgan afterwards reprimanded him severely & forced him to break off the connexion."

In any case, the effect of this error was not limited to Wallace’s company. "The rest of the line expecting that a retreat was ordered, faced about and retreated but in perfect order."

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson recorded what happened next: "The Enemy thinking that We Were broke set up a great Shout Charged us With their bayonets but in no Order."

The British had paid a steep price in blood, but now at least victory seemed imminent. The Continentals, the last significant form of resistance on the battlefield, were retreating. They would not be allowed to retreat peacefully. The British infantry stormed after them.

According to Howard, "Morgan, who had mostly been with the militia, quickly rode up to me and expressed apprehensions of the event; but I soon removed his fears by pointing to the line, and observing that the men were not beaten who retreated in that order. He then ordered me to keep with the men, until we came to the rising ground near Washington's horse; and he rode forward to fix on the most proper place for us to halt and face about.

Howard clearly indicated that he was ordered to take a position near Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s dragoon reserve, or at least that portion not engaged with Ogilvie. "At this moment Genl. Morgan rode to me and ordered me to retreat to Washington's horse about 100 yards, and there form."

Other sources, however, indicate that not only were the Continental infantry retreating to the rear, but that Washington’s dragoons approached the Continental infantry as they were retreating.

William Moultrie stated in his postwar history that "Colonel Washington perceiving this [retreat], immediately rode up close to the rear of the second line [i.e., the Continentals] with his cavalry… Colonel Washington, riding up so close to the rear of our second line stopped the British for a moment, which gave time to Colonel Howard to rally his men."

On the British side, Lieutenant Mackenzie also believed this is what occurred. Morgan "ordered Colonel Washington, with his dragoons, to cover his [Howard’s] retreat, and to check the pursuit."

The Continentals in Retreat. The Continentals are retreating to the rear and wheeling to the right. A portion of the American cavalry marks the spot where they will halt. Meanwhile, the British infantry pursue.

Notes:

1. That the Continentals fired repeatedly on the advancing British is also indicated in the statement by John Thomas, who lost track of the number of volleys. He noted that when the British began their attack, "The musquetry [i.e., Continentals]… had orders to fire but doesn't know how many times they fired before they retreated."

2. Tarleton knew that the right wing of the main line had retreated. Unclear from this or other statements is whether the left wing of the main line retreated at the same time as the Continentals. It seems unlikely that they did. Virginian rifleman John Thomas notably used "they" rather than "we" to describe the retreat of the Continentals. Lawrence Babits also quotes a Virginian riflemen by the name of Jeremiah Preston who claimed to have "fired 17 rounds," which also suggests that Triplett’s Virginians remained in place (and continued to fire on the British as the Continentals retreated). Triplett’s Virginians probably would have remained behind the Continentals, after the latter completed their retreat, which makes it plausible that Triplett would have remained in place.

3. According to my order of battle, he has somewhat overstated British strength and understated American strength. See Cowpens in Miniature 2, Cowpens in Miniature 3.

4. In my order of battle, I noted that Wallace’s Virginians numbered only 20 men. This number would seem to be far too few to have effectively checked the more than 250 men of the 71st Foot. It’s possible that Wallace’s small company was augmented with some of the miscellaneous troops assigned to Howard’s battalion (specifically, the North Carolina continentals and Virginia State Troops; see the American order of battle for details). However, even in that case this company would still have been outnumbered 5-1. A retreat, it would seem, was unavoidable.

Sources:

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Anderson, Howard, and Thomas, among others.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, Hanger's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses, The American Cavalry - Part 1, Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature

Cowpens in Miniature 16

Part 16: The First Crisis

Previous: Attack on the Main Line

Next: The Second Crisis

Thomas Young and the American mounted militiamen had adhered closely to the front line militia during the fighting on the skirmish line and militia line. After the British assailed the militia line, these militia “retreated again-and then formed a second line” behind the main line. The mounted militia covered the second retreat and then took post even further in the rear, near Washington’s dragoons.

Young commented that “After the second forming [of the militia], the fight became general and unintermitting.” The American cavalry could plainly see the British front line bearing down on the Continentals to their front. Smoke billowed from the infantry lines and there was a continuous flash and roar from the hundreds of discharging muskets.

Oblivious to the disaster that was unfolding to their right, the Continentals continued the desperate and unequal contest with the British front line. By all accounts, both British and Americans fought well. Tarleton stated in his memoir that “The fire on both sides was well supported and produced much slaughter.” Lee wrote in his postwar history that when “Tarleton pushed forward… [he] was received… with unshaken firmness. The contest became obstinate, and each party, animated by the example of its leader, nobly contended for victory” [see Note 1]. In the case of the Americans, two leaders stood out. Seymour recalled that “The courage and conduct of the brave General Morgan in this action is highly commendable, as likewise Colonel Howard, who at all times of the action rode from right to left of the line encouraging the men.”

As the British front line became engaged with the Continentals, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton looked to his left. There he had the greatest advantage. The 71st Foot was relatively fresh and well positioned to attack the American right flank, and the ground was more elevated than on his right.

To begin the attack on the American right, he ordered Captain David Ogilvie’s troop of British Legion dragoons to assault the American militia to their front: the right wing of the main line [see Note 2]. Tarleton recalled that the dragoons “executed the order with much gallantry.”

The right wing of the main line outnumbered Ogilvie’s dragoons by a margin of 2 or 3 to 1. Nevertheless, they were at a severe disadvantage. The men of the right wing were not deployed in a compact mass and they lacked bayonets to protect themselves. They also were without support as the American mounted militia had retired to the rear after the front-line militia had reached safety. As Ogilvie’s men thundered down the slope towards them, the American militia quickly sized up the situation, turned, and fled through the trees [see Note 3].

Loyalist Alexander Chesney recorded this event in his journal: “[the] Regiment of Cavalry called the British Legion [i.e., Ogilvie’s company]… supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur [i.e., the first battalion of the 71st Foot] broke the Riflemen without difficulty” [see Note 4].

Hayes’ regiment was closest to the oncoming dragoons and perhaps the first in the right wing to break. Robert Long, who was with this regiment, implied that his regiment had intended to rally alongside Captain Patrick Buchanan’s company of Virginians, however, “the Virginians broke before we got to them” [see Note 5].

Ogilvie's Attack. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken by Ogilvie's charge), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The Right Wing Breaks (two views; click to enlarge). As the Continentals begin to fire on the advancing British, Ogilvie's British Legion dragoons charge the American right, sending the right wing of the main line into flight. Meanwhile, other militia units are reforming.

According to Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie: “Captain Ogilvie, with his troop… cut his way through their line.” Pension applications do not strongly indicate that the men in this line were cut down by the British dragoons. Most, it would seem, got out of the way in time. However, upon driving off the right wing of the main line, the dragoons soon encountered an even larger quarry – the right wing of the militia line. These men had reached the rear, and were preparing to reform. They were, however, still disorganized and utterly unready to defend against a cavalry attack. Ogilvie’s men plunged in.

Some of the injuries reported by these militiamen were horrific. Joseph Rogers James, who was with McDowell’s North Carolinians, stated that he “was then charged on by a British Dragoon and struck on the head with his sword and left on the ground for dead… his ribs were broken loose from his back as he supposes by the horse of the Dragoon.” John Whelchel, who was with Brandon’s South Carolinians, stated that he “was attacked by Tarleton's horse.” He “was severely wounded receiving four cuts on the head and three or four stabs.” He “was left on the ground it being supposed that he would die of his wounds – that the wounds in the head opened the skull to the brains.”

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina vividly recalled seeing “Two dragoons assault a large rifleman, Joseph Hughes by name. His gun was empty, but with it he parries their blows and dodges round a tree, but they still persist. At the moment the assault on Hughes began John Savage was priming his rifle, Just as they pass the tree to strike Hughes he levels his gun and one of the dragoons tumbles from his horse pierced with a bullet, The next moment the rifle carried by Hughes, now literally backed over, slips out of his hands and inflicts such a blow upon the other dragoon that he quits the contest and retires hanging by the mane of his horse.”

Ogilvie Assaults McDowell and Brandon (click to enlarge). After sending the right wing of the main line into flight, Ogilvie's dragoons collide with the reforming front-line militia. Meanwhile, the British and American front lines have become fully engaged.

The militia were on their own at this moment, but help was soon on the way. Young recalled that “In the hottest of it [the main-line fighting], I saw Col. Brandon coming at full speed to the rear, and waving his sword to Col. Washington.” Here was one of the principal commanders of the right wing of the militia line desperately trying to get Washington’s attention. Ogilvie’s charge had gone unnoticed. “In a moment the command to charge was given, and I soon found that the British cavalry had charged the American right. We made a most furious charge, and cutting through the British cavalry, wheeled and charged them in the rear. In this charge, I exchanged my tackey for the finest horse I ever rode; it was the quickest swap I ever made in my life!”

Major Joseph McJunkin was close at hand and remembered seeing “the militia… relieved from the British dragoons by a charge of the American light horse.” Moments later, “The British cavalry… [were] borne from the field.”

Other accounts indicated that it was not only the charge of Washington’s dragoons that drove back Ogilvie, but also the fire of the militia. Tarleton observed that the British cavalry “were drove back by the fire of the reserve, and by a charge of Colonel Washington's cavalry.”

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie provided more detail. He claimed that the “legion dragoons were… broke by galling fire of rifle shot;” “exposed to a heavy fire and charged at the same time by the whole of Washington's dragoons,” Ogilvie’s troop “was compelled to retreat in confusion [see Note 6]”

Ogilvie Defeated. The militia rally and, aided by the American cavalry, succeed in driving off Ogilvie's dragoons.

Notes:

1. Comparable observations were made by Morgan (“When the enemy advanced on our line, they received a well-directed and incessant fire”), Moultrie, (“The British immediately advanced upon the second line, who received them very warmly, and a heavy fire commenced between them”), and Mackenzie (“the second line, now attacked, made a stout resistance“).

2. Tarleton’s memoir indicates that at this time, “The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy's left.” However, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie corrected him on this point and stated that “Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy.” See British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1 .

3. Historians of the battle have relied chiefly on Morgan’s description of events for an American viewpoint. Morgan’s account is very good, but a limitation is that it emphasizes the key actions that positively contributed to the American victory and largely ignores the setbacks and disappointments the Americans experienced en route to that victory. Early histories of the battle have adopted the same tone. For this phase of the battle, emphasis is placed on the brave stand of the Continentals; the existence of a right wing of the main line is not always recognized and its flight has not been hitherto discussed. However, American participants who described only their personal experiences during the battle (and did not craft an account intended for public consumption) provide critical clues indicating that such a collapse occurred. Statements by British observers support this view as well. See The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses.

4. Chesney’s full statement was that “Col Tarleton charged at the head of his Regiment of Cavalry called the British Legion which was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden; the Cavalry supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty.” Tarleton did not lead this charge, nor did it involve his entire regiment. It’s possible Chesney had not yet reached the battlefield and was not a direct eyewitness to this event, or possibly he was in a different part of the battlefield at the time. See Alexander Chesney's Rivulet.

5. See The Main Line: Composition for more on the deployment of American forces on the main line.

6. Mackenzie claimed that charge was made “by the whole of Washington's dragoons;” this would appear to be elaboration on Tarleton’s statement that the cavalry was repelled “by a charge of Colonel Washington's cavalry.” The elaboration is in error. Only a portion of the American cavalry participated in this charge. Young is the only dragoon that unambiguously places himself in this attack; Cornet James Simons provided a very detailed account of his movements on the battlefield, and says nothing about this action. It would seem then that Washington committed only some men to this charge. Noteworthy is that Simons "commanded the left division" of Washington’s dragoons and would’ve been furthest from Ogilvie’s attack.

Sources:

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Young's account of the battle, and includes a description of Simon's service.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

The Journal of Alexander Chesney

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Joseph Rogers James (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Whelchel (.pdf file).

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Related: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, Flight of the Militia - Part 4

Cowpens in Miniature 15

Part 15: Attack on the Main Line

Previous: The Militia Line

Next: The First Crisis

When the British attacked the American militia, they were, in the words of William Moultrie, “soon obliged to give way and retreat behind the second line.” In retreating, Private John Thomas of Virginia saw that the militia “flanked the right and left of the musquetry”[see Note 1].

The Militia Retreat. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (in retreat), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (in retreat), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The Retreat in Miniature (two views; click to enlarge). Covered by the American cavalry, the front-line militia safely gain the main line. Meanwhile, the ragged British front line is beginning to reform.

The British infantry did not immediately pursue [see Note 2]. To their front was Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard’s Continentals, an enemy that had to be approached with some caution. Besides, as far as the British were concerned, the militia had “quitted the Field,” they could afford caution [see Note 3].

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson with the Delaware Continentals, recorded in his journal that “the Enemy Seeing us Standing in Such good Order Halted for Some time to dress their line.” So effective was this deterrent that the front-line militia, in the words of fellow-Delawarean Sergeant-Major Seymour, were able to retreat “in very good order, not seeming to be the least bit confused” [see Note 4].

The orderly retreat of the militia was a singular accomplishment considering that the British attack had been launched by the exceptionally aggressive Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton and relentless pursuit was a part of his modus operandi. Morgan’s plan was, for the moment, working perfectly. The American militia had delivered their lethal volley and were escaping retaliation.

The British infantry stopped to “dress their line,” in Anderson’s words, because of losses inflicted by the militia. Also likely is that the British line became further disordered during the subsequent bayonet charge. As the British reformed and the two opponents sized each other up, Anderson could see that the British line “Outflanked ours Considerably.” Despite heavy losses [see Note 5], The British front line nevertheless still outnumbered the Continentals; their line was also longer because they were deployed in open order whereas the Continentals were in close order. Another threat also loomed. The 71st Foot had moved up to a position behind the left end of the British line, where it was well positioned to crush the right flank of the Americans.

The British infantry then resumed the advance and shortly drew near the Americans. In response, the Continentals let loose a terrific volley, with each platoon firing in rapid succession. Militiaman Thomas Young, now in rear of the main line, remembered that “when the regulars fired, it seemed like one sheet of flame from right to left. Oh! it was beautiful!”

The commander of the Continentals, Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, stated that “The british advanced until my regiment commenced firing.” Receiving this fire, the British stopped and fired a volley of their own. According to Seymour, “the enemy… attacked our light infantry with both cannon and small arms.”

Notes:

1. This is a topic to which I’ve given special consideration. See Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4.

2. Based on Anderson’s journal; the key passage is quoted elsewhere in this post. Anderson’s journal is one of the most trustworthy accounts of the battle. According to Moultrie, “The British immediately advanced upon the second line.”

3. Quotation derived from Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' report of the battle.

4. The militia were not panic struck during their retreat. This does not imply, however, that they retired casually to the rear. In all likelihood, the militia were moving very quickly. Lee commented that the militia “gained with haste the second line.”

5. The miniature recreation shows accumulated losses of 15% among the front-line infantry and artillery, but this is very approximate.

Sources:

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Thomas, Anderson, Young, and Howard, among others.

A transcription of Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' report of the battle can be found here.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Related: Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Flight of the Militia - Part 4, The Main Line: Location

Cowpens in Miniature 14

Part 14: The Militia Line

Previous: Fighting on the Skirmish Line

Next: Attack on the Main Line

The American skirmishers fell back as the British advanced and took up new positions with the militia line. British historian David Stewart thought that the British were “running;” probably they advanced at the quick step.

Now the men on the militia line steeled themselves for their assigned mission, one massive, lethal blast, delivered at close range. A single shot, fired too soon, had the possibility of triggering a premature volley. Thomas Young on horseback behind these men remembered that “Every officer was crying don't fire! for it was a hard matter for us to keep from it.”

The British Attack the Militia Line. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

"Make Ready!"

"Fire!"

At last, the order was given. Henry Lee wrote that “The enemy, shouting, rushed forward upon the front line, which retained its station, and poured in a close fire.” Fellow American historian William Moultrie thought that the Americans waited “till the enemy came within fifty yards.” Stewart gave the distance as “thirty or forty paces.”

Daniel Morgan wrote that “The whole of Col. Pickens' command then kept up a fire by regiments.” Hammond’s South Carolinians, Cunningham’s Georgians, McDowell’s North Carolinians, and the several small battalions under Brandon, Thomas, and Roebuck all let loose within moments of each other. Thomas Young remembered this as “a whole volley.”

At some point the British fired at the militia as well. William Moultrie noted that the British “threw in a heavy fire upon the militia” before the front-line militia fired. In Stewart’s history, however, they fired second and did so without “vivacity or impression.”

British casualties in this exchange were in all likelihood heavy [see Note 1]. Some losses also occurred among the militia [see Note 2].

In the immediate aftermath, the British had the advantage: they were armed with bayonets while the Americans were not. Private James Collins remembered that “We gave the enemy one fire, when they charged us with their bayonets; we gave way and retreated for our horses” [see Note 3]. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, watching the fighting from the main line saw that the British “rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen to fire a second time.” This is exactly what Morgan had expected. “The whole of Col. Pickens' command then… [began] retreating agreeably to their orders.”

The statements by Collins, Howard, Morgan, and others all imply that the militia quickly retreated, keeping ahead of British bayonets. However, the fighting on the front line may not have been of a single character, and there was perhaps at least one place where the British and Americans entered into close combat. On the left wing of the front line, Captain John Irby recalled that militiaman “Richard Griffin was wounded… by a bayonet in his left thigh by the Enemy and he [the British soldier] would have killed him [Griffin] had he not been shot down by… the Ensign of the Company” [see Note 4].

Thomas Young noted that the militia had “fought for some time, and retreated again.” Once again, the mounted militia interposed between the advancing British and the retreating Americans. Young stated, “I recollect well that the cavalry was twice, during the action, between our army and the enemy.” They did not, however, come to blows with the British infantry. Private William Neel of Virginia was disappointed, observing that “At this battle the South Carolina mounted militia under Colo Brannon proved very defective in the commencement of the action” [see Note 5].

Notes:

1. American participants, somewhat surprisingly, did not comment on the effects of this volley. Statements indicating heavy British casualties at this point in the battle appeared only in postwar histories.

David Stewart asserted that the British front line was “exhausted by running… it received the fire of the enemy at the distance of thirty or forty paces. The effect of the fire was considerable: it produced something like a recoil, but not to any extent. The fire was returned, but not with vivacity or impression; and it continued ten or twelve minutes in a state of balance, both parties keeping their ground. The light infantry made two attempts to charge, but were repulsed with loss- The action making no progress, the Highlanders were ordered up; and, rapidly advancing in charge, the enemy's front line moved off precipitately.”

William Johnson claimed that “At the assigned distance they [the militia] delivered their fire with unerring aim, and it was the magnanimous confession of a gallant officer of the Maryland line who fought on this day, ‘that here the battle was gained.’ The killed and wounded of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers who lay on the field of battle where the fire of the riflemen Was delivered, and the high proportion which the killed and wounded of this description bore to the whole number, sufficiently justified the assertion.”

Neither of these histories is terribly reliable (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1 for my treatment of Johnson). Stewart claimed that the fighting on the militia line was prolonged. However, participant accounts, both British and American, indicate that the militia retreated quickly. Stewart has the 71st Foot breaking the deadlock on the militia line. Others generally indicate that the 71st entered the fighting at a later point in the battle. The quotation that Johnson supplies from an anonymous Maryland officer is believable, but it is not clear what it indicates. The statement surely means that for once the militia did their assigned duty and this was instrumental in the American victory (no doubt the officer had the battle of Camden in mind for comparison). Whether or not Johnson’s description also indicates that the front-line militia inflicted heavy casualties is less clear.

The British casualties I’ve indicated for this moment in the battle (3 miniatures; these will be more clearly visible in future images) are modest compared with the losses suggested by Stewart's and Johnson's histories. I arrived at this number first by making an estimate of total British casualties and second by dividing those casualties across the various phases of the battle in a manner that is primarily consistent with participant statements (and, to a lesser extent, later histories). There are other points in the battle at which the British received a greater volume of fire and for which heavy British casualties are more strongly indicated. Even if this one volley was particularly well aimed, it is difficult to see how it could have inflicted many more casualties, for example, than the British received in advancing on the Continentals. About as many men fired at the British on the main line as did on the militia line. However, the militia were only able to deliver a single volley, while the main line fired repeatedly.

2. It is quite likely that the militia suffered considerably fewer casualties than the British, despite being outnumbered. From Lexington and Concord until the final battles of the war, American sources spoke disparagingly about the accuracy of British musket fire. Many militiamen also likely stooped low to the ground or stood behind trees as a means of protecting themselves. Casualties, however, did occur. Lawrence Babits reviewed and cited pension applications from former militiamen that strongly imply they were shot on the militia line.

3. Collins' statement was given special consideration in a previous post. See Flight of the Militia - Part 3.

4. Babits placed Irby in Hayes’ regiment. However, in reviewing the composition of Hayes’ regiment, I noted that participant accounts do not appear to link Irby’s company with Hayes’ regiment (see Little River Regiment). Rather, Irby appears to have commanded a company of Georgia Refugees and as such likely served with Captain Samuel Hammond and Major John Cunningham on the left wing of the militia line. Griffin was from Georgia. It’s not clear that this passage refers to an incident that took place at this time during the battle. Also possible (but in my view less likely) is that Griffin was wounded during the American counterattack late in the battle.

5. Colonel Thomas Brandon did not command the mounted militia. However, Young links Brandon with the mounted militia at a later point in the battle, and Captain Benjamin Jolly, who commanded one of the two companies of mounted militia, was in Brandon’s regiment.

Sources:

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Young, Collins, and Howard, among other sources.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Richard Griffin (which contains the statement by Irby) (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of William Neel (.pdf file).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, The Cowpens Battlefield, Mounted Militia