A Miniature History of the American Revolution

Friday, March 20, 2009

Cowpens in Miniature 1

The Battle of Cowpens in Miniature

Part 1: About this Project

[Rewritten 12/28/09; see this brief explanation]

On January 17, 1781, a British force, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton was decisively defeated by an ad hoc American army under the command of Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan at "Cowpens" South Carolina. This battle is widely regarded as a turning point in the American Revolutionary War in the southern states, and an important step towards the climatic victory of the war at Yorktown.

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Background Information (Wikipedia Links)

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Sunday, March 15, 2009

British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2

Last time, I noted that the British commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, deployed a troop of cavalry on either end of his line of infantry at the beginning of the battle. I also argued that both of these troops were used to assail the two flanks of the American line. I described, in particular, the attack of Captain David Ogilvie's British Legion dragoons against the right wing of the American main line.

The other British cavalry charge was made by Lieutenant Henry Nettles and the 17th Light Dragoons.

Whereas Ogilvie's charge was made at an early point in the British attack on the American main line, Nettles' attack occurred after the American Continentals had begun to retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, who commanded the Continentals, wrote that, “…about the time of our retreat, a large body of british cavalry passes round my left flank and pursued the flying militia to their horses."

This force would have been Nettles' 17th Light Dragoons, which had been stationed on the British right.

Howard, like Major McJunkin, whom I quoted in my last post, believed that the retreating front-line militia was the target of Nettles' attack. However, this may be another case in which the encounter between the British dragoons and the reforming front-line infantry was accidental. South Carolina militiaman Jeremiah Dial stated that the British cavalry "broke through the leftwing of the Malitia," which echoes the statements made about the attack that broke the right wing (see: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses). Private Isaac Way, who was on the left wing of the main line (Triplett's Virginians), evidently was in the line of this charge. He claimed that he “was severely wounded on the side, back, arms, head and in the face by the cut of the sword of a British dragoon.”

There is evidence that around the time of Nettles' charge, at least some of the American cavalry was employed to assist Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard in halting the Continentals during their accidental retreat.

Brigadier-General William Moultrie, who obtained his information second-hand, wrote, “…the second [main] line began to give way. Colonel Washington [i.e., Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington of the American 3rd light dragoons] perceiving this, immediately rode up close to the rear of the second line with his cavalry, and spoke to Colonel Howard, ‘that if he would rally his men, and charge the enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry that were got among our militia in the rear.' Colonel Washington, riding up so close to the rear of our second line stopped the British for a moment, which gave time to Colonel Howard to rally his men, and charge with fixed bayonets… [then] Colonel Washington charged the enemy's cavalry, who were cutting down our militia, and soon drove them off.” (book link)

Howard's account reinforces this point: "Washington observing this [i.e., the British cavalry attack] charged them. As well as I can recollect this charge was made at the same moment that I charged the [British] infantry, for as soon as we got among the enemy & were making prisoners I observed the enemy's cavalry retreating the way the[y] had advanced, by our left flank, and Washington in pursuit of them and he followed them some distance--You will observe by this statement that Washington's charge had no connexion with mine as his movement was to the rear in a quite different direction.”

Washington’s charge “to the rear” was from immediately behind the Continentals to the area in the left rear of the main line where the militia were under attack. Howard repeated this idea in another place in the same letter: “He [Washington] moved to the left from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse.”

Nettles' Attack. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line (Triplett's former company has been broken, but the rest of the line is intact), 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (and parts of the right wing, see: Flight of the Militia - Part 3; both groups are reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Howard.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Dial (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Isaac Way (.pdf file).

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Related: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, 17th Light Dragoons, The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses

Saturday, March 14, 2009

British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1

In a recent series of posts I considered the question of how the militia retreated from the front line to a new position behind the main line during the battle. I noted that histories of the battle generally maintain that the militia retreated around the left flank of the Continental line. I also argued that it is unlikely that the militia would have retreated in this manner. Instead, I argued that the front-line militia were divided into a left and right wing and that the two wings retreated, respectively, around the left and right flanks of the Continentals. I pointed out that a withdrawal in this manner was not only relatively simple and safe, but it also appears to be indicated by a handful of participant accounts. (See Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4).

Participant accounts provide very strong evidence that the militia were assailed during the battle by the British dragoons. A statement in British commander Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s memoir -- “The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy's left" -- is commonly understood to be his way of saying that he dispatched a troop of dragoons to attack the militia during their retreat. Therefore, my position -- that the militia simultaneously retreated to both the left and right rear of the main line -- would seem to be problematic. Why would Tarleton only dispatch a troop of dragoons to attack the militia on the American left when there was also a large body of militia on the American right?

Tarleton indicated that he stationed a troop of dragoons on both of his flanks at the onset of the battle and Lawrence Babits, in A Devil of a Whipping, argued that both of these troops saw combat during the battle. Babits specifically identified the troop on the British right as the company of 17th light dragoons under the command of Lieutenant Henry Nettles, and the troop on the British left as the company of British Legion dragoons under the command of Captain David Ogilvie. I find these arguments convincing.

Babits has both Nettles and Ogilvie in action not long after the militia began their flight. In his account, Nettles on the British right attacked the front-line militia who were mostly (although not entirely) reforming in the left rear of the American main line (his account is fairly conventional on this point; cf. Flight of the Militia - Part 1). He also claimed that Ogilvie, on the British left, helped drive off Major Joseph McDowell’s North Carolinians.

My review of the source documents has convinced me that Babits is correct about the occurrence of separate charges by Nettles and Ogilvie. That two charges occurred is indicated in reliable sources. Major Joseph McJunkin noted that "Tarleton then made a charge on the right & left wings, treading & cutting till he got in the rear of Howard's command, when Col. Washington made a charge upon him." Major-General François-Jean de Chastellux also learned that both flanks were targeted. He wrote that the British cavalry “endeavoured to turn the flanks of General Morgan's army, but were kept in awe by some riflemen, and by the American horse detached by Colonel Washington, to support them, in two little squadrons.”

Other accounts explicitly mention a British cavalry attack on either the American left flank or right flank, further indicating that both flanks were attacked. One mounted militiaman, Jeremiah Dial, remembered that the British cavalry "broke through the leftwing of the Malitia," while another, Thomas Young remembered when "the British cavalry had charged the American right."

However, I take a different view about the timing of and targets of those charges. Specifically, I believe that a) the first British cavalry charge was made by Ogilvie's company, and b) that the British cavalry charges were directed against the retreating militia.

The accounts quoted above do not suggest that the retreating front-line militia were the targets of these attacks. The flanks, rather, seem to be extensions of the main line. In McJunkin's account, the wings are broken through before the cavalry reaches the American rear where the American militia were rallying.

A comparison of the several British accounts of the battle suggest that the first British cavalry charge was directed against the right wing of the American main line.

Tarleton said that "The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy's left," but Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie corrected him, saying "Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy."

Tarleton did seem to have the American right flank in mind as a target. He mentioned in his description of the American deployment that his reserve infantry, the 71st Foot, was placed on behind the far left of the British line, rather than in the center. For a later point in the battle, when the attack on the American main line was underway, he described his intention to envelop the right of the main line:

"Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton thought the advance of the 71st into line, and a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy's right flank, would put a victorious period into the action."

Moreover, British and American accounts suggest that this charge by Ogilvie was successful insofar as it resulted in the rout of the right wing (see: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses for details).

However, Tarleton also claimed that these dragoons were "drove back by the fire of the reserve, and by a charge of Colonel Washington's cavalry." My belief is that when Ogilvie's dragoons succeeded in breaking through the right wing of the main line, they then ran into (most likely unexpectedly) into the right wing of the front line, which would have been at that moment reforming a short distance nearby.

Ogilvie's Attack. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken by Ogilvie's charge), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

This second encounter, between Ogilvie's dragoons and the reforming militia is what gave rise to the impression that the retreating militia had been targeted. In McJunkin's words, "Then there is a charge of the dragoons even past the line of regulars after the retreating militia. Numbers are cut down." This "reserve" (Tarleton's term) was significantly larger than the force Ogilvie had just routed and they, with the assistance of the American cavalry, defeated Ogilvie's attack. Noteworthy is that McJunkin and most of the would-be pensioners mentioning a British cavalry attack were in the units I've located on the right wing of the militia line and that would have been in the line of Ogilvie's charge (see The Militia Line: Composition and Organization; Flight of the Militia - Part 1).

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a thorough treatment of McJunkin's statements.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Dial (.pdf file).

Related: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses, Flight of the Militia - Part 1, The American Cavalry - Part 1

Thursday, March 12, 2009

Flight of the Militia - Part 4

In a recent series of posts I have considered the question of how the American front line militia retreated safely during the battle of Cowpens. The description of the militia retreat that has most affected my understanding of the battle was provided by Private John Thomas of the Virginia militia.

Thomas recalled that the front-line militia "were 200 yards to the front." Their orders "were to fire... and fall off to the right and flank of the Musquet Line [the Continentals]. When they retreated, they were to pass through "breaks in the Centre... [on] the right and left of the musquetry." This plan is illustrated below.

The Planned American Retreat. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = Skirmishers

The traditional view of the retreat, which follows from William Johnson's history is that the entire militia line retreated around the left flank of the main line to a position in the left rear. Then, the militia circled around behind the main line to reenter the fight to the right of the Continentals.

Below I list 10 serious problems with the traditional account of how the American front-line militia retreated and later rejoined the fighting.

1) The retreating militia would have been passing not only across the front of the Continentals, but also across the front of the British infantry. It seems likely that the British would have attacked their vulnerable flank.

2) Most historians have overlooked or discounted that part of Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan's after action report that indicated the front-line militia were deployed in two wings. In other words, they may not have appreciated just how far the militia would have had to march to gain the left flank of the main line.

3) This method of withdrawal was dangerous not only to the militia, but also to the Americans on the main line. So long as the militia were between the British and the main line, the former would have been able to advance on the latter in safety.

4) The alleged path of retreat and return to the battle involved a remarkably circuitous route. For those on the right side of the militia line in particular, the shortest distance to their ultimate destination on the battlefield was more-or-less straight backwards, not around the left flank. Marching an unnecessary distance would have delayed their reentry into the battle.

5) It would have been impractical, if not dangerous, to have the hundreds of militiamen on the front line converge on a single location behind the main line. The various units could well have become intermixed, leading to extra and unnecessary disorder in their ranks.

6) The horses of the militia were located in the left rear of the main line. Bringing all of the front line militia near their horses during the retreat would have facilitated their flight from the battlefield when American success depended on their re-engagement with the British.

7) In no battle of the war did large bodies of American militiamen complete complex maneuvers on the battlefield after the shooting started. Even if such a maneuver were successfully executed on this one occasion, why would the American commanders have planned on such occurrence?

8) The traditional view of the retreat of the further has it that not only did the front line militia undergo this complex maneuver, but they were charged by British dragoons while the maneuver was taking place, and yet this did not greatly impede their ability to successfully execute this maneuver.

9) At the moment that the front line militia were crossing behind the Continentals, the Continentals were themselves heading towards the rear in an accidental retreat. Somehow, the two forces did not collide, nor did the retreat of the Continentals adversely effect the time it took the militia to complete the maneuver.

10) Lawrence Babits, in A Devil of a Whipping, gave good reasons why one should believe that the duration of the main line fighting was relatively short. If his interpretation is correct, then the retreating militia would have received a charge by the British dragoons, sorted themselves back into their proper formation, and marched across the width of the battlefield in mere minutes.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has his interpretation of the militia retreat and transcriptions of the statement by Thomas.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Flight of the Militia - Part 2, Flight of the Militia - Part 3

Sunday, March 8, 2009

Flight of the Militia - Part 3

The American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, deployed his infantry in two lines during the battle of Cowpens. He knew that the front line, consisting of militia from Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, would not be able to hold off a British bayonet charge. Nevertheless, he deployed them in front of his Continentals in the hope that they would inflict significant damage on the British before his main battle line was engaged.

In my last two posts, I explored the question of how the American militia might have retreated from the front line in a manner that 1) would have been minimally disruptive to the main American line and 2) is relatively well supported by participant accounts. In so doing, I indicated that the traditional description of the militia retreat (that the entire front line passed around the left flank of the main line) fails on both counts. Instead, I argued that the model of the militia retreat that is both most plausible and best supported by participant accounts is one in which the left and right wings of the militia line retreated around the left and right flanks of the main line, respectively.

Although the version of events I've proposed has strong features, I'm also cognizant of its limitations. The most significant of these, in my view, concerns the location of the militia's horses. The militia were generally mounted and rode when the Continentals had to walk. A few reliable accounts of the battle of Cowpens mention these horses as being staked or tied up not far from where the Continentals and militia were deployed.

Colonel Henry Lee, in his first history of the Southern Campaign, wrote that, "Washington's cavalry, reinforced with a company of mounted militia armed with sabres, was held in reserve; convenient to support the infantry, and protect the horses of the rifle militia, which were tied, agreeably to usage, in the rear."

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, in the letter I quoted previously, wrote that, "The militia all rode to the ground and their horses were tied in the woods in the rear of my left flank." This passage, along with Lee's, suggests that all of the horses had been collected in one spot, and this location was the area east or northeast of the Green River Road, somewhere between Suck Creek (see image below; Suck Creek is at the upper right) and Elevation #3. This area is large enough to have accommodated hundreds of horses.

Three Elevations on the Cowpens Battlefield.

Although I believe the right wing of the militia line (#6 in the image below) retreated to the right rear of the main line (i.e., behind #3), one of the militiamen that I've located on the right side of the battlefield recalled encountering the horses (on the far right of the image) after he retreated.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled, "We gave the enemy one fire, when they charged us with their bayonets; we gave way and retreated for our horses, Tarleton's cavalry pursued us; ("now," thought I, "my hide is in the loft;") just as we got to our horses, they overtook us and began to make a few hacks at some, however, without doing much injury."

How could Collins and the men with him encounter their horses?

An answer can be found in Lee's first history. Lee wrote, "The enemy, shouting, rushed forward upon the front line, which retained its station, and poured in a close fire; but, continuing to advance with the bayonet on our militia, they retired, and gained with haste the second line. Here, with part of the corps, Pickens took post on Howard's right, and the rest fled to their horses—probably with orders to remove them to a further distance."

In other words, most of the right wing of the militia line did fall back to a point in the right rear of the main line, where they later returned to the fight, but some (with or without orders) instead ran to the horses. Collins' statement marks him as one of those individuals.

If Collins did cross the battlefield from the right to the left to get to the horses, then this passage surely occurred behind the Continentals, rather than in front of them, and before the Continentals accidentally retreated approximately 100 yards.

Another veteran of the battle that recalled encountering the horses while retreating was Captain Henry Connelly of the North Carolina state troops. Connelly stated in his pension application that he was, "just about to catch up our horses which was tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle [when the British dragoons] fell upon us with great fury but we was fortunately relieved by Washingtons legion that hastened to our assistance."

Connelly was not on the militia line, but rather on the right militia wing of the main line. Previously I argued that this formation broke apart during the battle. Perhaps Connelly and his men were also attempting to secure their horses. However, when this formation broke apart the area in the right rear of the main line no longer offered sanctuary. These men may have been running towards their horses solely because they were fleeing from danger.

Connelly specifically noted that the horses were "four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle." He did not specify that the horses were tied behind the left rear of the main line, as did Howard.

Location of the Militia Horses Behind the Main Line (click to enlarge).

If Connelly's distance is correct and describes how far the horses were tied up behind Triplett's Virginians (the left wing of the main line), then the horses would have been roughly in the area shown. Connelly's statement does not indicate the exact location because it is unclear what distance he understood to be a "pace," how accurate was his assessment of the distance, and whether he was referring to his company's horses or the horses in general.

Sources:

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

John Moncure's The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage has a transcription of one of Howard's letter, and the statements by Collins and Connelly.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Thursday, March 5, 2009

Flight of the Militia - Part 2

In my last post, I raised the question of how the American militia retreated from the front line during the battle of Cowpens. I pointed out that while a number of histories maintain that the Americans retreated from right to left in front of the Continentals, there is little support for this view in participant accounts (none directly describe the retreat in this manner). I suggested that this view of the retreat arose from a misunderstanding by an early chronicler of the battle.

Although Edwin Bearss accepted the traditional view of how the American militia retreated (see his 1967 book, and especially this map), other modern writers have not. John Moncure, in the online Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour book, showed the militia retreating to the left and right around either flank of the main line in apparently equal proportions (see this map), but in his text he claimed that in retreating the militia "streamed around both flanks but mostly around the left."

Lawrence Babit's description of the retreat of the militia in A Devil of a Whipping is more complicated. Like Moncure, he took the view that the militia fell back to positions in the left rear and right rear of the main line with more moving to the left than to the right. However, he also had one part of the militia reforming alongside the main line (the commands of Major John Cunningham and Captain Samuel Hammond) and a second part of the militia remaining engaged with the British after the rest of the militia had fallen back (the command of Major Joseph McDowell).

Babits astutely pointed out the logical problems with having the militia retreat across the front of the Continentals. In particular, such a maneuver would have shielded the advancing British from the fire of the Continentals, and it would have exposed the retreating militia to destruction (those militia units furthest on the right of the militia line, at least, seemingly would have been unable to complete their retreat before the advancing British cut them off).

Babits' solution to this implausibility was to have the greater part of the militia retreating straight backwards from the militia line, through temporary gaps in the main line. He pointed to a statement in David Stewart's (1825) Sketches... of the Highlanders (book link) as support for this position.

Stewart wrote, "the enemy's front line moved off precipitately; and the second, which had as yet taken no share in the action, observing confusion and retrograding in their front, suddenly faced to the right, and inclined backwards; a manoeuvre by which a space was left for the front line to retreat, without interfering with the ranks of those who were now to oppose the advance of the Highlanders."

According to Babits, certain companies in the main line fell back a short distance, allowing the militia to retreat through the main line without disrupting the main line as a whole.

The quote from Stewart does not actually support Babits' account, but rather indicates that the whole line drew back. In fact, when the passage is read in context it is clear that what Stewart understood to be a retrograde movement to make room for the retreating militia was actually the accidental retreat of Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's Continentals in the climatic moments of the battle.

The full passage is as follows:

"[T]he Highlanders were ordered up; and, rapidly advancing in charge, the enemy's front line moved off precipitately; and the second, which had as yet taken no share in the action, observing confusion and retrograding in their front, suddenly faced to the right, and inclined backwards; a manoeuvre by which a space was left for the front line to retreat, without interfering with the ranks of those who were now to oppose the advance of the Highlanders, "who ran in, with characteristic eagerness, desirous to take advantage of the confusion which appeared among the enemy." But the confusion was only in the front line; for Colonel Howard, commanding the enemy's Reserve, threw in a fire upon the 71st when within forty yards of the hostile force. The fire was destructive; nearly one-half of their number fell."

There are other reasons to doubt that the militia retreated straight back through gaps in the main line. It is generally thought that when the militia line fired at the British, the two forces were only a short distance apart, perhaps as little as 30 yards. If thereafter the militia and the British began moving towards the Continentals at the same speed, then the British should have been able to close to within 30 yards of the main line before the Continentals would have had a clear field of fire. One could argue that the British would have been staggered by the fire of the militia line and that they would have been slow to react to the flight of the militia. However, even if the militia did have a head start, there is still reason to be skeptical of the feasibility of this maneuvre. Babits' maps show two gaps in the main line. The militia units (many of them anyways) had to retreat at an angle to reach these gaps; the British had only to advance straight ahead. In Babits' account, at least 600 men were converging on these two locations, creating the possibility of a significant bottleneck effect at the main line. Further, his maps show the main line units falling back about 30 yards back to allow the militia units to pass. Once the militia were out of the way, these companies would have had to march forward the same distance to close the gaps in the main line. All of this suggests that even if the militia had a head start, some of the advancing British could have either reached the main line, or gotten very close to it, before they were subjected to the fire of the Continentals. The American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, is broadly credited for his superb plan at Cowpens; it is difficult to believe that his battle plan would have included such an extremely risky element when simpler alternatives were available.

Morgan's after action report and other sources indicate that the American militia were deployed in two wings separated by a gap squarely in front of the Continentals. Morgan expressly indicated that these wings were intended to protect his flanks. An additional benefit of this formation is that it would have facilitated the retreat of the militia. The gap between the two wings of the militia line allowed the Continentals to check a British pursuit of the retreating militia from the moment that the British came within range of their muskets.

This interpretation is also directly supported by participant accounts.

Last time, I pointed out that Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's letter to Colonel Henry Lee explicitly indicated that some of the militia in his front retreated to his right rear and implicitly indicated that others retreated to his left rear.

Private John Baldwin, who was in Major Joseph McDowell's battalion of North Carolinians on the militia line recalled that the plan for the militia was "to take aim when they fired, and as they retreated to divide to the right & left & form in the rear."

Private John Thomas, who was in Major Francis Triplett's battalion of Virginians on the main line recalled that the militia "fired five rounds and broke in the centre and flanked the right and left of the musquetry [i.e., the continentals, who carried muskets rather than rifles]. The British then charged bayonets on the musquety."

Major Joseph McJunkin, who was with the South Carolinians on the militia line recalled that when the Continentals counterattacked late in the battle, "the militia comes back, and fall in right and left." This statement suggests that militia units previously in the left rear and right rear joined in the counterattack on either flank of the Continentals.

Sources:

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has his interpretation of the militia retreat and transcriptions of the statements by Morgan, Howard, Baldwin, Thomas, and McJunkin.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Related: Flight of the Militia - Part 1, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, Flight of the Militia - Part 4

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

Flight of the Militia - Part 1

Below is a diagram of the battle of Cowpens found on the wikipedia entry for the battle (the image is attributed to the United States Army Center of Military History). The diagram clearly shows the militia retreating across the front of the Continentals before circling around behind the Continentals to reenter the fray. This sequence of movements appears in a number of histories of the battle, including that of respected NPS historian Edwin Bearss (see this map). However, it is also wrong.

Rather, one part of the militia line retreated to the left rear of the main line, while the other part retreated to the right rear of the main line. More specifically, I believe that the militia line was divided into a left and right wing and that when the militia fell back, the left wing retreated to the left rear and the right wing retreated to the right rear.

The traditional view of the retreat of the militia is not supported by an examination of participant accounts. Instead, the view that the militia retreated across the front of the Continentals originated with William Johnson's 1822 history, Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene. This view also should have ended with him. Johnson had the advantage of being one of the first to write a history of the battle, and he was writing at a time when many of the participants in the battle still lived. Nevertheless, his history is wrong on many counts. Colonel Henry Lee's second history, The Campaign of 1781 in the Carolinas: With Remarks, Historical and Critical, on Johnson's Life of Greene (1824) is devoted in large part to refuting Johnson's history. For the section of his book concerned with the battle of Cowpens, Lee included excerpts from a letter by Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, one of the principal architects of the American victory, that serves essentially as a point-by-point refutation of Johnson's version of events.

Johnson: "The cavalry of Tarleton's left wing had poured upon the rear of the retreating militia. As the right of the line of militia had to traverse the whole front of the second line to reach the ground on which they were ordered to rally, they were necessarily very much exposed to this danger.

Howard: "The militia were formed in front of me, and the moment the british militia [see Note 1] formed their line they shouted and made a great noise to intimidate, and rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen to fire a second time. The militia fell into our rear, and part of them fell into the rear of my right flank where they afterwards renewed the action."

In other words, Howard is saying yes, the cavalry of Tarleton's left wing did attack the militia, but the militia did no such thing as retreat en masse across Howard's front. A part retreated to the rear of his "right flank where they afterwards renewed the action," and, by, extension, a part retreated to the rear of his left flank.

Johnson: "Washington flew to their assistance, and repulsing the enemy, enabled the militia to regain the tranquillity necessary for returning to a state of order. The eminence which had covered the reserve was exceedingly favourable to this purpose, and Pickens knew how to avail himself of it. Here most of them gathered round him and were soon reduced to order.

Howard: "I do not think there was such an eminence; there was a slight rise in the ground."

Howard doesn't deny that Washington aided the militia at this point or that Pickens was acting to rally the militia, but he does dispute Johnson's characterization of the terrain.

Johnson: "Apprehensive that the reserve could not be brought up in time to defend his exposed flank, or if it were, that it would leave his other flank too much exposed, Morgan dispatched an order to the militia on his right, to fall back from their right so as to form at right angles with his line, and repel the enemy's, advance upon his right flank. To effect this manoeuvre with precision and dispatch, the commanding officer ordered his men to face to the right about, and wheel on their left. The first part of the order was executed with coolness and recollection, and the militia began to move. At this point of time it was that fortune, ever hovering over fields of battle, played off that celebrated freak which at first threatened destruction to the American arms, but in a moment after, crowned them with the most signal success; Seeing the movement of the right of their line, and supposing that this was the state of things which required a retreat to the eminence in their rear, the whole American line faced about and began to move rather in an accelerating step, but still in perfect order, towards their intended second position. Howard presuming the order must have emanated from the commander, made no opposition, but bent his whole attention to the preservation of order, and encouragement- of his men. Morgan also under the impression that the movement was made under the order of Howard, and thinking favourably of it, under existing circumstances, rode along the rear of the line reminding the officers to halt and face as soon as they reached their ground. But just at that crisis they were accosted by another officer, and their attention drawn to some facts which produced an immediate change of measures."

Howard: "Seeing my right flank was exposed to the enemy, I attempted to change the front of Wallace's company, (Virginia regulars;) in doing it, some confusion ensued, and first a part, and then the whole of the company commenced a retreat. The officers along the line seeing this, and supposing that orders had been given for a retreat, faced their men about, and moved off. Morgan, who had mostly been with the militia, quickly rode up to me and expressed apprehensions of the event; but I soon removed his fears by pointing to the line, and observing that the men were not beaten who retreated in that order. He then ordered me to keep with the men, until we came to the rising ground near Washington's horse; and he rode forward to fix on the most proper place for us to halt and face about. In a minute we had a perfect line."

Johnson is describing here the unordered withdraw of Wallace's company of Virginians. Howard identifies the command and points out that they were regulars, not militia. Then he points out that the order originated not with Morgan, who with Pickens was rallying the militia, but with himself. Then he points out that he (Howard) was in control of the situation. The farcical situation that Johnson describes in which both Howard and Morgan think the retreat has been ordered by the other commander did not occur.

I could go on and on. Reading Johnson and Howard side-by-side is quite instructive. However, my concern is with the retreat of the militia. Where did Johnson obtain the erroneous idea that the militia retreated the field while crossing from right to left in front of the Continentals? My supposition is that he read earlier accounts of the battle, such as the Tarleton-Mackenzie-Hanger exchange, and attempted to reconcile the various contradictory statements in them.

Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton said that, "A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps... The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy's left"

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie, however, said that, "Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy."

Saying that the Americans retreated from right to left, would allow both of their statements to be correct, if they referred to different points in time (the retreating militia were moving from right to left). However, this attempt to finesse Tarleton's and Mackenzie's statements makes no sense. Mackenzie was not adding detail to Tarleton's comments but rather offering a corrective to them. Johnson should have understood as much.

Unfortunately, despite the rhetorical drubbing that Howard delivered, historians remained respectful of Johnson's version of events and his description has had a very large influence on subsequent histories of the battle of Cowpens.

Notes:

1. The word "militia" was seemingly written in error. If it was not, then by "british militia," Howard may have meant the British Legion infantry, whose members were Loyalists. If the latter interpretation is correct then this suggests that the British Legion infantry were most directly opposed to the Continentals.

Sources:

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene

Henry Lee's 1824 The Campaign of 1781 in the Carolinas: With Remarks, Historical and Critical, on Johnson's Life of Greene

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a complete transcription of Howard's letter, plus the statements by Tarleton and Mackenzie.