October 31, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 31st: The British assaults on White Plains and Fort Washington were postponed by rain; Washington was alarmed by the state of his army; Washington ordered the troops to a stronger post.

Previous entry: October 30th; next: November 1st.

A downpour struck White Plains in the early morning hours. The rain increased Lieutenant-General William Howe’s unease, but he did not alter his plans to attack the American army at dawn.

George Washington was expecting an attack, and he had the Americans lie on their arms in the fortifications at White Plains. Brigadier-General George Clinton (Heath’s division) wrote:

“Our lines were manned all night… and a most horrid night it was to lie in cold trenches. Uncovered as we are, drawn on fatigue, making redoubts, fleches, abatis and lines… I fear [these things] will ultimately destroy our army without fighting. This I am sure of, that I am likely to lose more in my brigade by sickness occasioned by extra fatigue and want of covering, than in the course of an active campaign is ordinarily lost in the most severe actions”.

At 5 AM, the British army was in motion. A powerful blow was to be made on the left, where Mirbach’s and Lossberg’s Hessian brigades, the 4th British brigade, the Brigade of Guards, the 2nd and 3rd light infantry battalions, and the 5th and 49th regiments of foot assembled for battle. These forces were entrusted to Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister who apparently had replaced Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton as Howe’s favored subordinate.

Clinton commanded the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right. The forces in this sector included the 1st Light Infantry Battalion, the 1st British brigade, the Hessian grenadiers, the British Reserve, and the 28th, 35th, 44th, 64th, and 71st regiments of foot.

As the troops formed up and moved into place, they looked upon the forbidding American lines. The British redcoats and Hessian bluecoats were cold, wet, and no doubt fearful of what was to follow.

Then, around 7 AM, the men were told that the attack was cancelled, and they marched back to camp.

Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister later wrote: “a heavy rain, fortunately perhaps for the army, frustrated all our plans. The enemy, well advised of everything[,] were prepared and ready to repulse us, sleeping on their arms that night.” Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton noted that the rain “much swelled the river,” and Charles Stedman claimed that the rain “made the ground so slippery that it was thought it could not be possible to mount the face of the hill”.

The cancellation was only temporary. Headquarters ordered that “the army [is] to be in readiness to move upon the shortest notice.” Commissary Charles Stedman claimed that “the weather proved fine about noon, but the commander in chief did not think proper to put his former intentions in execution.” Instead, Howe seemingly preferred to wait until early the next morning when poor visibility would partially mask the attack.

Baurmeister wondered why Howe did not take other steps to hide his intentions:

“Much might have been done on our left wing to mislead them [i.e., the Americans]. For example, we might have built some bridges [over the Bronx] and constructed roads to them—but nothing was done.”

Although the British did not make a major feint, Washington was anxious for their flanks. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Harrison (Washington’s secretary) wrote:

“The enemy are throwing up some lines and redoubts in our front, with a view of cannonading as soon as they are ready, and at the same time [they] are extending their wings further by our right and left. It is supposed that one of their objects is to advance a part of their troops, and seize… the bridge over Croton River, that the communication may be cut off with the upper country” [i.e., upstate New York].

Washington dispatched Brigadier-General Rezin Beall to secure this crossing with several regiments of Maryland militia.

Washington was unable to detach many men because his army was rapidly losing strength. Harrison noted:

“Our army is decreasing fast: several gentlemen who have come to camp within a few days have observed large numbers of militia returning home on the different roads”.

General orders from American headquarters on this date admonished the troops for being away from the fortifications:

“The General, in a ride he took yesterday, to reconnoitre the grounds about this [place], was surprised and shocked to find both officers and soldiers straggling all over the country, under one idle pretence or other, when they cannot tell the hour or minute the camp may be attacked, and their services indispensably necessary. He once more positively orders that neither officer [n]or soldier shall stir out of camp without leave… The provost marshal is to take up all stragglers; and it is enjoined upon all officers to seize every man who fires his gun without leave, and to have him tied up immediately and receive twenty lashes.”

Once again, there were small clashes between the armies.

Lieutenant Colonel William Henshaw (Moses Little’s 12th Continental Regiment, Nixon’s brigade) was stationed on the American right where the armies lay especially close together. He wrote:

“The enemy are now encamped within gunshot of us, so that there is a continual firing of small arms…. We daily expect an engagement with the enemy.”

Brigadier-General George Clinton noted that on this date one Captain Van Wyck was killed while commanding a company of rangers.

“He went out in the morning, with about thirty men, fell in with about one hundred of the enemy, and at once, not far distant from their lines, charged them with spirit, gave them a brisk fire, but unfortunately when loading his piece the second time, was shot in the head and fell dead. His lieutenant shot down the man who killed his captain. The enemy fled. Our party brought off their captain [i.e., Van Wyck]… He was a good man and valiant officer.”

During the day, a British deserter provided Washington with a detailed description of the planned British attack. Washington decided that the new position his men had begun to occupy on the night of October 28-29 was a better place to meet this attack. He ordered the troops to withdraw to the new position during the night.

This image uses a White Plains map of 1891 to illustrate the positions held by Washington and Howe at White Plains. The road network is substantially more developed at this time than it was in 1776; nevertheless, the area was still predominately rural (unlike today). The American positions were chiefly within the blue lines, and the British positions were chiefly within the red lines.

Washington’s initial position was on high ground north just north of the village of White Plains, with his flanks bounded by the Bronx River and St. Mary’s Lake. Part of the British army crossed the Bronx River on October 28, and remained on the high ground west of the river in the days that followed. These forces were opposite the American right, but to attack this flank they had to re-cross the Bronx River.

Washington’s initial position was a good one, but his army was more secure in the position they occupied on the night of October 31-November 1 (the area at the top of the map).

October 30, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 30th: The American medical service cannot cope with the sick; William Howe prepared to attack upper Manhattan and White Plains; Henry Clinton balked at Howe’s plans.

Previous entry: October 29th; next: October 31st.

The American army at White Plains grimly held on to their redoubts and trenches. The men continued to suffer from a lack of food, medicine, proper clothing, and all other materials necessary for an army’s survival.

The Americans had established a general hospital in a church in the town of North Castle, 9 miles to the northeast, but it was poorly staffed due to a shortage of physicians.

The head of the American medical service (Doctor John Morgan) later wrote:

“I cannot but feel for the hospital surgeons [at North Castle], who… were suddenly overwhelmed with numbers of sick sent to them, as well as the wounded … at a time when an engagement was considered as inevitable, there were few at hand to give aid… the wounded, who were conveyed to the hospitals, naturally demanded the attention of the whole body of surgeons, to administer aid to them.”

The sick, it seems, were largely left to the informal care of their comrades.

Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote, “Today it being rainy[,] Luke was taking not well[, and] I still being not well… we both set out for North Castle hospital… and we got within 4 miles of the hospital and put up for this night.” They slept in the woods and then completed the arduous journey, unaided, in the morning.

Doctor John Pine, who had recently joined Washington’s army, found that it was impossible to take care of the sick men from his native Maryland. He wrote that on the 29th:

“I waited on Doctor Morgan, Director-General of the hospitals here, for medicines, etc. He told me he had nothing to say to the Maryland troops, and that it was not his business to supply the regimental surgeons with medicines, and that it must have been a mistake [for Maryland]… to send their surgeons here without them and think they were to be supplied here.”

Dr. Pine then sought out Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion, who was 15 miles away and recuperating from two wounds (one in the arm, one in the hip) he received during the fighting on Chatterton’s Hill. Smallwood wrote a letter for the doctor which gave Pine a little leverage.

When Dr. Pine sought out Dr. Morgan again, he was told that “I might have some few things, if I could go to New-York for them”.

Pine was aghast:

“I told him by the time I went there and got back, that… most of the [sick] Maryland troops would be expired. He told me he could not help it, and that medicines were very hard to be got.”

After the battle of White Plains, Lieutenant-General William Howe deferred attacking the American army again partially because he did not like the strength of the American position and partially because he decided to wait for reinforcements. Once those reinforcements arrived, he planned on attacking Washington’s army. At the same time, he wanted Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen to attack the American forces in upper Manhattan.

According to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Knyphausen’s preparations went smoothly:

“[The Americans had] demolished the bridge at Kings Bridge and those called Dyckman’s bridge and Williams’ bridge. Lieutenant General von Knyphausen had them repaired and sent the Grenadier Battalion Köhler and Wutginau’s and Stern’s [i.e., von Stein’s] regiments across the river to encamp at places where they would be safe from the fire of the rebels’ batteries. The rest of his corps encamped behind Fort Independence”.

The Kingsbridge area, circa 1776 (click to enlarge). On October 30th, Knyphausen occupied Fort Independence and crossed some men into upper Manhattan.

Howe’s reinforcements reached him late in the day. Among these troops was the 46th Regiment of Foot. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham, later wrote:

“On the 30th of October we embarked at Hellgate, and after a passage of about thirty miles by water in flat-bottomed boats, we landed at New Rochelle, and immediately marched to join General Howe’s army at the White Plains.” [see footnote]

After the reinforcements arrived, Howe could see no cause for further delay. He had, it seems, accepted that a full-scale attack on the American works was necessary and inevitable. That night (10pm) he issued orders for the troops to be under arms at 5 am. In the ensuing attack, Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister would command the left division of the army, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right.

In the past, Howe typically consulted with Clinton about any major moves, but the campaign severely strained their relationship. Howe made his plans without Clinton’s input, and Clinton took the omission badly. Clinton later complained that “I received [the] orders late at night”, and protested that he was not ready to attack. In fact, Clinton had convinced himself there would be no further attacks on the American army, because he had previously argued against it. He then reminded Howe of his objections:

“I took the liberty of intimating to the Commander in Chief that it might prove rather hazardous to make any attack from center or right until we saw what would be the effect of one from the left… and that even then they [i.e., the attacks] ought to be pressed with caution, as the enemy had a very strong position in the gorges of the mountains behind them.”

Howe was already aware of these concerns and he ignored Clinton’s protests.

Footnote: Captain William Bamford (40th Foot) recorded in his journal that these reinforcements embarked on the 29th.

October 29, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 29th: The Americans strengthened their position at White Plains while the armies skirmished; Knyphausen advanced to Kingsbridge, and Howe vacillated.

Previous entry: Evening of October 28; next: October 30th.

During the night, the American army at White Plains began moving their camps to a line of hills to the north. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Spencer’s division) wrote, “at 2 o’clock [AM] the troops in General Spencer’s division had orders to strike their tents and carry them out about one mile and an half by hand and then return to the lines [i.e., the fortifications at White Plains].” The troops then made the roundtrip again, this time carrying their camp kettles and other cooking utensils. It was hard work for the exhausted men. Trumbull wrote that many “had no sleep at all” “though they had been engaged almost all day [yesterday] with the enemy and had been obliged to wade through a river [the Bronx] and were very wet”. “I was afraid I should be sick for I had been in the river almost all over, and could not change [clothes]… [and] was much fatigued with the action… but I am today well and vigorous”. Trumbull praised God for seeing him safely through the battle, and wrote that this protection “lay me under new obligations to live wholly to God and to seek his honor and glory in the little time I have to live in the world”.

Joseph Plumb Martin, who was also in the 5th Connecticut, was not so fortunate. He recalled:

“During the night we remained in our new made trenches, the ground of which was in many parts springy; in that part where I happened to be stationed, the water, before morning, was nearly over [our] shoes, which caused many of us to take violent colds… I was one who felt the effects of it, and was… sent back to the baggage to get well again, if I could, for it was left to my own exertions to do it, and no other assistance was afforded me. I was not alone in my misery; there were a number in the same circumstances. When I arrived at the baggage, which was not more than a mile or two, I had the canopy of heaven for my hospital, and the ground for my hammock. I found a spot where the dry leaves had collected between the knolls; I made up a bed of these, and nestled in it, having no other friend present but the sun to smile upon me. I had nothing to eat or drink, not even water, and was unable to go after any myself, for I was sick indeed. In the evening, one of my messmates found me out, and soon after brought me some boiled hog’s flesh (it was not pork) and turnips, without either bread or salt. I could not eat it, but I felt obliged to him notwithstanding; he did all he could do—he gave me the best he had to give, and had to steal that, poor fellow;--necessity drove him to do it to satisfy the cravings of his own hunger, as well as to assist a fellow sufferer.”

Beginning in the morning and continuing throughout the day, the two armies skirmished.

For Captain Peter Kimball (Stickney’s New Hampshire militia regiment), it was a tense day:

“we lay on our arms. The enemy appeared all round on every hill[,] the riflemen [were] firing on their guards. One of the riflemen [was] killed this day and at night our guard was alarmed. Another fired and killed Captain Buntin.”

Matters were no easier for the British light infantry across the way. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) noted:

“I had a very troublesome picket, at the entrance of the village[;] at daylight my sentries were fired on which continued by popping shots all day. I had one man wounded”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General William Howe had an enormously difficult decision to make. He had at last caught up with Washington’s army, but he loathed sending his troops against the Americans’ entrenchments. Although he was sure he could carry these works, he believed the assault would lead to the death of many of his men and produce little strategic gain.

The obvious alternative was to force the Americans from their trenches by threatening their flank. He later stated that this was his preference:

“I do not hesitate to confess, that if I could by any manoeuvre remove an enemy from a very advantageous position, without hazarding the consequences of an attack, where the point to be carried was not adequate to the loss of men to be expected… I should certainly adopt that cautionary conduct, in the hopes of meeting my adversary upon more equal terms.”

But on this occasion, Howe was unable to find a low-risk way of turning the Americans’ flank. Thus Howe was left with the unpalatable choices of either making a bloody frontal assault, or retreating.

Howe vacillated. His official excuse for not attacking was that the situation at White Plains had changed and that he now needed more men. He later explained:

“The enemy drew back their encampment on the night of the 28th, and observing their lines next morning much strengthened by additional works, the designed attack upon them was deferred, and the 4th brigade, left with Lord Percy, with two battalions of the 6th brigade were ordered to join the army.” [see footnote]

Curiously, when pressed by Parliament several years later to explain his conduct at White Plains, Howe mysteriously claimed that “I have political reasons, and no other, for declining to explain why that assault was not made”.

To the west, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen continued his operation against upper Manhattan. First he detached Major General Martin Conrad Schmidt with regiments von Wissenbach and von Huyne to hold Valentine’s Hill. Then he proceeded with grenadiere battalion Köhler and regiments Wutginau, von Stein, and Buenau to Kingsbridge.

Footnote: The 4th brigade consisted of the 17th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot. The two regiments drawn from the 6th brigade were the 44th and 64th regiments of foot. The 6th brigade had been encamped near Mamaroneck since October 25th.

October 28, 1776 (Part 4)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the fourth of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the evening of October 28th: The battle of White Plains came to an end; Washington prepared for the next British move; Knyphausen occupied Mile Square.

Previous entry: Afternoon of October 28; next: October 29th.

The battle of White Plains gradually petered out after the British and Hessian infantry broke the American line on Chatterton’s Hill.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled that after his regiment was driven from Chatterton’s Hill, “We fell back a little distance and made a stand” and at the same time “detached parties [were] engaging [the enemy] in almost every direction. We did not come in contact with the enemy again that day, and just at night we fell back to our encampment.”

The “detached parties” probably included some groups of Continentals on the northern end of Chatterton’s Hill. Colonel John Haslet of the Delaware Regiment recalled:

“The left of the regiment took post behind a fence on the top of the hill with most of the officers, and twice repulsed the light troops and [light] horse of the enemy; but seeing ourselves deserted on all hands, and the continued column of the enemy advancing, we also retired.”

Captain William Hull of the Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment stated that his command also held out for awhile:

“Colonel Webb’s regiment maintained the conflict for a time, after the other part of the brigade had abandoned the field, and it had the honour to receive the particular thanks of Washington for its bravery and orderly retreat.”

One observer (Sergeant John Smith of Lippitt’s Regiment) wrote, “this battle lasted from 9 in the morning till night tho the hottest of the battle… was but about 20 or 30 minutes”.

During this prolonged phase of the fighting, Washington sent some reinforcements towards Chatterton’s Hill, including Brigadier-General Rezin Beall’s brigade of Maryland militia (the Maryland “flying camp”) and Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. However, as Jacob Francis of Sargent’s Regiment noted, before these troops could cross the Bronx, “the British got possession of the hill, and we retreated back to the camp.”

Afterwards, the British made no further attacks. According to Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jäger), “Since the soldiers had climbed over nothing but hills, cliffs, and stone walls the whole day, constantly dragging their guns over all obstacles, it was impossible to ask anything more from them.”

The British lost around 230 men during the battle: Most of these losses occurred in the 28th Foot (67 men), 35th Foot (about 60 men), 49th Foot (28 men), and Regiment von Lossberg (about 46 men). The Americans lost more than 200 men [see Footnote 1], but the exact total is not known. Among the regiments that had considerable losses were the Maryland Battalion (44 men), the 3rd New York Regiment (34 men) and the Delaware Regiment (32 men).

During the evening, the British discovered that Chatterton’s Hill was of dubious value. Charles Stedman noted: “The possession of that hill… [did] not enable the royalists to annoy their camp, for it rose so gradually from the Bronx that its crest was not within random cannon shot”. In other words, the British could hit the main American defensive works with their cannon, but the range was too great for the fire to be accurate or destructive.

Stedman couldn’t understand why the Americans had detached a part of their army to defend Chatterton’s Hill. He wrote: “The reason of their occupying” the hill “is inexplicable… It seems to have been a blunder of General Washington’s to have placed so considerable a corps entirely out of the capacity of supporting the rest of the army”.

Stedman believed that if the British had attacked the center of the American line instead (as he wanted), the men on Chatterton’s Hill would have had a hard time aiding in the defense. [see Footnote 2]

The Americans kept close watch on the British, not knowing when another attack might come.

Jacob Francis (Sargent’s Regiment) recalled, “I stood sentinel that night in a thicket between the American camp and the hill, so near… that I could hear the Hessians”.

Joseph Plumb Martin observed that:

“The enemy had several pieces of field artillery upon this hill [Chatterton’s], and, as might be expected, entertained us with their music all the evening. We entrenched ourselves where we now lay, expecting another attack. But the British were very civil, and indeed they generally were, after they had received a check from Brother Jonathan, for any of their rude actions”.

Meanwhile, Washington decided that the American army would be in a stronger position if it occupied the hills further north (agreeing with the assessment Major-General Charles Lee made that morning). Therefore, some of the troops were ordered to begin moving their camps to the new position.

Washington expected that the British would either launch a major assault against his defensive works or move to threaten his flank. To shore up his right flank, he sent William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) to occupy high ground between White Plains and the Hudson River.

Alexander’s brigade moved quickly, and without their baggage. It was a hard night for men already exhausted by the day’s fighting. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford of the Delaware Regiment had been shot in the arm on Chatterton’s Hill (it was a flesh wound). He wrote that he and his men spent the night “without a tent or anything but the ground to lay on, and not a blanket to cover us”. Similarly, Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered that “This night we lay in the woods without tents or blankets. It was cold and we made a fire in the woods,--turned our feet to the fire and slept comfortably, although it snowed in the night.”

Situation of the armies on October 28th (click to enlarge). While Howe fought Washington at White Plains (11), Knyphausen advanced on the Mile Square (9) / Valentine's Hill area.

Off to the west, Colonel John Lasher had a detachment of men guarding the landward approaches to Manhattan. After the British raided Mile Square he was ordered to abandon his position and join the American army at White Plains. On this date he burned the American barracks at Kingsbridge and set out on a wide arch that would take his men north and east towards White Plains, and around the British army.

The same day, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, occupied Valentine’s Hill with his division of Hessians. These troops missed cutting off Lasher’s command by a matter of hours. However, by seizing Valentine’s Hill they did cut off the landward retreat of the American forces garrisoning upper Manhattan.

Footnote 1: I’ve estimated a greater American number of casualties than are stated by most authors. If one simply totals up all the numbers available in Peter Force’s American Archives, the total is 53 killed, 96 wounded, and 24 missing (or 175 in total). The relatively high proportion of killed to wounded is at least partially due to the fact that two regiments reported only the former total, not the latter. After estimating, through extrapolation, the number wounded in these regiments, the total American loss becomes about 197.

Doctor John Pine of Maryland wrote after the battle, “the number of killed and wounded, as the report is in the camp, amounts only to about 90, but from the wounded I saw myself in the hospital, and adjacent houses, there must at least be an hundred and twenty or thirty wounded[,] the number of killed I don’t know.”

Documents show that there were several casualties between the Pennsylvania State troops and New Hampshire militia not listed in Force. Brooks’ and Moseley’s Massachusetts militia regiments likely suffered a fair number of casualties on Chatterton’s Hill, but no return exists of their losses. A conservative estimate of losses in these units, added to the losses in the other units, raises the American total to close to the reported British total.

Footnote 2: To the best of my knowledge, Washington did not describe why he chose to defend Chatterton’s Hill. Tallmadge claimed he alerted Washington to the presence of American militia on Chatterton’s Hill and the advance of British troops in their direction. Afterwards, Washington directed several units to the hill, and ordered a trusted officer (John Haslet) to take command of the militia. Perhaps Washington intended simply to support troops (militia) that were well-positioned to impede the British attack. In other words, the defense of Chatterton’s Hill may have been another manifestation of Washington’s general strategy of harassing the British at every opportunity (consider how Washington used his forces on the 21st, the 26th, and the morning of the 28th). The Staten Island raid, the American defense of Pell’s Point and the engagement near East Chester can be understood in these terms as well.

October 28, 1776 (Part 3)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the third of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the afternoon of October 28th: British and Hessian regiments attacked and seized Chatterton’s Hill.

Previous entry: Midday on October 28; next: Evening of October 28.

The first British troops to attack the Americans on Chatterton’s Hill were Regiment von Lossberg and the 28th and 35th Regiments of Foot. They crossed the Bronx River under cover of a cannonade

The Americans had two or three of their own field pieces on the hill. Colonel John Haslet (Delaware Regiment) tried to gall the approaching British infantry with one piece. However:

“[the gun was] so poorly appointed, that myself was forced to assist in dragging it along [in] the rear of the regiment. While so employed, a cannon-ball struck the carriage, and scattered the shot about, a wad of tow blazing in the middle. The artillerymen fled. One alone was prevailed upon to tread out the blaze and collect the shot. The few that returned made not more than two discharges, when they retreated with the field-piece.”

The two British foot regiments crossed at a ford, and made it across the river quickly. Then, according to Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige, they “turned to their left and came up to storm the entrenchment” occupied by the Massachusetts militia regiments of John Moseley and Eleazer Brooks.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall sent the Maryland battalion to the support of the militia. According to a Maryland officer, “Colonel [William] Smallwood… was ordered to march down the hill and attack the enemy... and a smart contest ensued, in which the enemy gave way”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton attributed this setback to the officer leading this advance. He observed that when the British “suddenly found themselves exposed to a very heavy fire… The officer who led them… marched forward about twenty paces… halted, fired his fuzee, and began to reload (his column remaining during the time under the enemy’s fire)”. Watching this, he predicted “that they would break. It happened as I said [it would]”.

To the south, Regiment von Lossberg also experienced difficulty. According to Johann Caspar Ries, “[we] found a little river [the Bronx] before us, though which we had to wade, the water going into the cartouche pouches of most of the men. Scarcely were we through the water, than a rain of shot fell upon us, by which many were wounded.”

Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister claimed that the regiment was exposed because “On the far side [of the river there] is a steep slope, where the right wing had to halt while the left maneuvered to the front”. Ries added that “the left wing had to march through a wood that had been set alight, so that many men burnt the shoes on their feet.”

The Hessians advanced towards the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions, which were jointly led by Colonel William Douglas. The Connecticutians claimed that they drove back the Hessians just as the Massachusetts militia and Marylanders had with the British regulars.

One of the Connecticutians wrote that:

“[the Hessians] came up in the front of Colonel Douglas' s regiment, and we fired a general volley upon them, at about twenty rods distance, and scattered them like leaves in a whirlwind; and they ran off so far, that some… ran out to the ground where they were… and brought off their arms and accoutrements, and rum, that the men who fell had with them, which we had time to drink round… before they came on again.” [see Footnote 1]

More succinctly, Colonel Gold Silliman of the 1st Connecticut wrote, “We gave them a heavy fire which made them retreat but they soon returned”.

The British, it seems, intensified their cannonade after this initial check; possibly some field pieces were wheeled closer to the hill. Haslet described this as a “cannonade from twelve or fifteen pieces, well served, [which] kept up a continual peal of reiterated thunder.” A Connecticutian recalled, “the air and hills smoked and echoed terribly with the bursting of shells: the fences and walls were knocked down, and torn to pieces, and men' s legs, arms, and bodies, mingled with cannon and grape-shot all round us.” [see Footnote 1]

The British formed a line of battle on the lower part of Chatterton’s Hill. The troops crowded together, as there was little room for them to form. According to Thomas Sullivan (49th Regiment of Foot):

“Lieutenant Colonel [Robert] Carr, who commanded the 35th Regiment, behaved with great courage, being obliged to force the left of his battalion through the right wing of the 28th… The 49th Battalion formed as well as the ground would admit, [and] every company engaged as they came up… The hill was so narrow that the right-hand company of our battalion had scarcely room to form”.

The 49th Foot found itself opposite the Delaware Regiment. According to Thomas Sullivan:

“Captain[-Lieutenant William] Gore, who commanded the right wing of our battalion, seeing the rebels which we engaged on the right wing were dressed in blue, took them to be Colonel Rall’s brigade of Hessians, and immediately ordered us to cease firing; for, says he, ‘you are firing at your own men.’ We ceased for about two minutes. The rebels, hearing him, made answer that they were no Hessians, and that we should soon know the difference”.

Other British units moved to threaten the flanks of the American position.

Regiment von Rall advanced against the American right flank, with Regiment von Knyphausen and the Lieb Regiment in support.

According to Major John Brooks of Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment, the American left flank was threatened by “a body of light infantry and jaegers”.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall spotted the threat to the left, and he ordered Webb’s Regiment, (and perhaps also the 3rd New York Regiment), partially down the hill to meet them.

This movement greatly exposed the men to British cannon fire. According to Second Lieutenant Elisha Bostwick of Webb’s Regiment:

“a cannon ball cut down Lieutenant Young’s platoon which was next to that of mine[;] the ball first took the head of [Nathaniel] Smith, a stout heavy man and dashed it open, then it took off Chilson’s arm… it then took [Joel] Taylor across the bowels, it then struck Sergeant [Amasa] Garret of our company on the hip [and] took off the point of the hip bone[.] Smith and Taylor were left on the spot. Sergeant Garret was carried [away] but died the same day[.] Now to think, oh! What a sight that was to see within a distance of six rods those men with their legs and arms and guns and packs all in a heap[.] There was not a better sergeant in the army than Sergeant Garret when the soldiers were murmuring, weary, without shelter cold and hungry[;] he would stir about among them build fires and get them all in good humour and cheerful.”

For this cost, Webb’s Regiment succeeded in turning back the threat to the left. According to Captain William Hull, “After a sharp conflict, the object was completely attained.”

Meanwhile, the British began a major push against the right and center of the American position. Their line now included, from left to right, Regiment von Lossberg, the 28th, 35th, and 49th regiments of Foot. Behind these troops crowded up two battalions of Hessians grenadiers (von Linsing and Block) and the 5th Regiment of Foot.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled:

“There was in our front, about ten rods distant, an orchard of apple trees. The ground on which the orchard stood was lower than the ground that we occupied, but was level from our post to the verge of the orchard, when it fell off so abruptly that we could see the lower parts of the trees. A party of Hessian troops [Regiment von Lossberg], and some English [the 28th Regiment of Foot], soon took possession of this ground: they would advance so far as just to show themselves above the rising ground, fire, and fall back and reload their muskets. Our chance upon them was, as soon as they showed themselves above the level ground, or when they fired, to aim at the flashes of their guns—their position was as advantageous to them as a breastwork.”

Lieutenant Enoch Anderson (Delaware Regiment) remembered:

“Now began our firing with small arms on the hill and a hot fire was kept up for some time. Many lives were lost on both sides and many were wounded.”

He remembered in particular seeing a mortally wounded soldier of his regiment who “fell to the ground” and “in falling, his gun fell from him.” Then “He picked it up,--turned on his face,--took aim at the British, who were advancing,--fired,--the gun fell from him,--he turned over on his back and expired.”

This map (click to enlarge) illustrates the position of British (red numbers) and American units (blue circles) during the British assault on Chatterton’s Hill.

I relied on Thomas Sullivan's account for the placement of the British foot regiments on Chatterton's Hill. Other details about the construction of this map can be found in the post for Midday on October 28.

Although the Connecticut battalions and Delaware Regiment offered stiff resistance, the units in between soon began to collapse. First, according to Haslet, “The [Massachusetts] militia regiment behind the fence fled in confusion, without more than a random, scattering fire” [see Footnote 2].

The Maryland battalion gave way next. According to Lieutenant William Harrison:

“We were badly disposed to receive the attack of the enemy’s small arms, and unfortunately much exposed to their artillery, which flanked us so heavily as to render the post tenable but a short time. The matter was ended by a confused and precipitate retreat on our part”.

The remaining American units were soon hard pressed. Haslet wrote that “the first three Delaware companies [those closest to the retreating troops] also retreated in disorder, but not till after several were wounded and killed.”

The Connecticut state troops found themselves almost surrounded. The collapse of the center of the American line allowed British and Hessian troops to threaten the left flank of the Connecticut men, while at the same time Regiment von Rall drove against their right flank.

One of the Connecticut men wrote:

“they advanced in solid columns upon us, and were gathering all round us ten to our one. Colonel Douglas's and Silliman's regiments fired four or five times on them as they were advancing, and then retreated; but not till the enemy began to fire on their flanks. Colonels Silliman, Douglas and Arnold behaved nobly, and the men [afterwards] gained much applause.” [see Footnote 1]

Most of the Connecticutians who were killed or wounded were struck down when they fled. According to Colonel Silliman, “we were obliged to retreat which we did through a most furious fire from the enemy for half a mile for so far there was nothing to cover us from it…”

Joseph Plumb Martin recalled:

“finding ourselves flanked and in danger of being surrounded, we were compelled to make a hasty retreat from the stone wall. We lost comparatively speaking, very few at the fence: but when forced to retreat, we lost, in killed and wounded, a considerable number. One man who belonged to our company… said, “Now I am going out to the field to be killed;”… and he was—he was shot dead on the field.”

Footnote 1: This passage is from an anonymous letter published in newspapers after the battle. Ezra Stiles believed the author was Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull of the 5th Connecticut State Battalion.

Footnote 2: Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige of Moseley’s Regiment offered this curious recollection:

“While they [the British] were rallying [after the first unsuccessful attack], the Highlanders came down, stacked their arms, drew their broadswords, and formed in rear of the [British] infantry. Then they all came up. Our men opened fire as before, and soon the enemy’s infantry opened, and the Highlanders marched into our entrenchments, and the Americans retreated down the hill westwardly.”

None of the British or Hessian accounts make mention of a Highlander regiment participating in this attack (though there were two with the army – the 42nd and 71st regiments). This description would make considerably more sense if Hessian grenadiers were substituted for highlanders. The Hessian grenadiers were placed in the second line, and although they were not armed with broadswords, they did carry short swords called hangers.

October 28, 1776 (Part 2)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the second of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for midday on October 28th: American infantry assembled on Chatterton’s Hill; Charles Stedman spotted an opportunity to destroy Washington’s army; the armies exchanged cannon fire; William Howe moved to seize Chatterton’s Hill.

Previous entry: Morning of October 28; next: Afternoon of October 28.

Washington decided to support the American troops on Chatterton’s Hill. It seems he first approached the elite Delaware Regiment (Alexander’s brigade, Spencer’s division) and ordered their commanding officer, Colonel John Haslet, to lead his regiment to the hill and take command of the militia there.

He then ordered Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall’s brigade (Lee’s division) to advance to the hill as well.

Among the men setting out with McDougall’s brigade was Second Lieutenant Elisha Bostwick of Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment. Bostwick recently had a “sickness called bilious fever” which, he said, “took all the hair off my head”. He rejoined his regiment yesterday, but he was “still unable to do duty or guard”. As the troops marched off to battle, “some thought [I was] unable to go with them,” but, he said, “I chose to be with the company”.

Meanwhile, the head of the British army reached high ground south of the village of White Plains. For the first time, the British could clearly see how the American army was deployed. Commissary Charles Stedman wrote:

“They were encamped on a long ridge of hill, the brow of which was covered with lines hastily thrown up… The weakest part was the centre. The slope of the hill was very gradual in the direction of the road by the Court House. The lines were by no means formidable, not being fraized; and the rockiness of the soil prevented the ditch from being made of any troublesome depth.”

Stedman was convinced that “an assault… on the centre of the enemy’s works… would have been destruction to the Americans.” He noted that “When our army came in sight their tents were standing.” He could see the Americans were beginning to move their tents and baggage and this “together with the movement of troops backward and forward, in evident uncertainty of purpose, gave an extraordinary picture of alarm.” Thus, “victory was to be reasonably expected, not only from the valor of our troops, but from the confusion of the enemy.”

Unknown to Stedman, the British also had another advantage: the center of the American position was chiefly manned by inexperienced state troops and militia. With very few exceptions (e.g., Hand’s 1st Continental Regiment, Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment), the Continentals were deployed on the left and right flanks of the army.

No immediate assault, however, could be made, as a number of units were still coming up.

As the British moved up and deployed, some of their artillery began to cannonade the mishmash of American troops on Chatterton’s Hill. Haslet recalled:

“We had not been many minutes on the ground, when the cannonade began, and the second shot wounded a militia-man in the thigh, upon which the whole regiment [of militia] broke and fled immediately, and were not rallied without much difficulty.”

In the center of the line, the Americans had a small stroke of success. Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) noted, “about 12 o’clock the [British] light horse came near us[;] we fired and killed three men and 3 horses and took one of the enemy after a smart engagement.”

Major-General William Heath gave a different account of this incident:

“about twenty light-horse [of the 16th Light Dragoons], in full gallop, and brandishing their swords, appeared on the road leading to the courthouse, and now directly in front of General Heath's division. The light-horse leaped the fence of a wheat-field at the foot of the hill, on which Colonel Malcolm's [New York militia] regiment was posted, of which the light-horse were not aware, until a shot from Lieutenant Fenno's field-piece gave them notice, by striking in the midst of them, and [sending] a horseman pitching from his horse. They then wheeled short about, galloped out of the field as fast as they came in, rode behind a little hill in the road, and faced about, the tops of their caps only being visible to General Heath where he stood.”

Back on Chatterton’s Hill, Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall’s brigade came up and deployed for battle. Lieutenant Bostwick described “the place of action” as “a large field of fenced lots”. The British had a clear of these men, and Bostwick complained that they “were wholly exposed to the fire of their artillery”.

McDougall’s men were situated behind the Delaware Regiment, and Haslet noted that “Some of our officers expressed much apprehension from the fire of our friends so posted.” In other words, they didn’t want to be accidentally shot in the back if the British attacked. “On my application to the General [McDougall], he ordered us to the right, formed his own brigade on the left, and ordered [Colonel Eleazer] Brooks' Massachusetts Militia still farther to the right, behind a stone fence.”

This “stone fence” was part of a primitive fortification defended by Colonel John Moseley’s Massachusetts Militia Regiment. Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige remembered that “Brook’s regiment, with some other troops, went into it. Brook’s regiment was next to us.”

All of this activity caught the eye of the British general staff.

Lieutenant-General William Howe later reported that “Colonel [Johann Gottlieb] Rall, who commanded a brigade of Hessians on the left, observing this position of the enemy and seeing a height on the other side of the Bronx unoccupied by them from whence their flank might be galled… took possession of it with great alacrity to the approbation of Lieutenant-General [Leopold Philip von] Heister who was acquainted with this movement by Sir William Erskine.”

Stedman thought that because the Americans were pushing men onto the hill, Howe was led “to imagine this hill to be of more importance than it… appeared to be”. Probably too, the British concluded that if the hill was worth taking, now was the time to take it. Major Stephen Kemble observed that the hill “might have cost us dear had we attempted it the next day”, that is, after the Americans had properly fortified it.

Howe wrote:

“Upon viewing the situation orders were given for a battalion of Hessians to pass the Bronx and attack this detached corps [of Americans on Chatterton’s Hill], supported by the 2nd brigade of British under the command of Brigadier-General [Alexander] Leslie, and the Hessian grenadiers sent from the right commanded by Colonel [Carl von] Donop, giving directions at the same time for Colonel Rall to charge the enemy’s flank”.

The Americans watched these developments with awe.

Captain William Hull (Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment, McDougall’s brigade) remembered:

“we discovered at a distance the approach of the British army. Its appearance was truly magnificent. A bright autumnal sun shed its full luster on their polished arms; and the rich array of dress and military equipage, gave an imposing grandeur to the scene, as they advanced, in all the pomp and circumstance of war, to give us battle.”

This map (click to enlarge) illustrates the position of British (red numbers) and American units (blue circles) prior to the assault on Chatterton’s Hill.

There is some uncertainty as to exactly which American units were on the hill. The units represented are ones for which the source material clearly places on Chatterton’s Hill (as opposed to some other area of combat, such as the Mamaroneck Road). The location of these units on the map is somewhat approximate; particularly important to this reconstruction were the accounts by Joseph Plumb Martin, Benjamin Trumbull, Thomas Craige, John Haslet, John Brooks, and William Hull.

The British units represent the whole of von Heister’s column, minus several small commands (two battalions of the 71st Foot and some Provincials). This reconstruction of their deployment is based chiefly on the Charles Blaskowitz map of the battle, and, to a lesser extent, the accounts by Carl Leopold Baurmeister and Johann von Ewald. There are several discrepancies among these sources, which makes this representation more approximate than that for the Americans. For example, Blaskowitz did not show the 1st British brigade on his map; the location I’ve assigned to it follows from Ewald’s account, but it cannot be considered definite.

The village of White Plains and the Americans’ main defensive works are off-map to the upper right. Heister’s column advanced from the bottom of the map along the York (or East Chester) Road. Donop’s Hessian grenadiers marched into this area from the right edge of the map, probably near the units marked #6 and #7.

I commented on the development of this map in a couple of previous posts (here and here).

October 28, 1776 (Part 1)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the first of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the morning of October 28th: The British marched to White Plains; Washington dispatched men to meet their advance; the armies skirmished south of White Plains.

Previous entry: October 27th; next: Midday of October 28.

The British army struck their tents at 5am. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) thought the troops began to march at 7:30am. Once again, the British advanced in two columns, with Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister commanding the left column and Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton the right.

That morning, George Washington and some of his general officers began to reconnoiter the hills surrounding the American position at White Plains. According to Heath, “to the southwest there appeared to be a very commanding height, worthy of attention.” This was Chatterton’s Hill. Heath noted, “When [we] arrived at the ground, although very commanding, it did not appear so much so as other grounds to the north… ‘Yonder,’ says Major-General [Charles] Lee, pointing to the grounds [to the north]… ‘is the ground we ought to occupy.’”

Washington agreed to inspect it, but at that moment “a light-horseman came up in full gallop, his horse almost out of breath, and addressed General Washington, ‘The British are on the camp, sir.’ The General observed, ‘Gentlemen, we have now other business than reconnoitring,’ putting his horse in full gallop for the camp, and followed by the other officers.”

At headquarters, Washington was informed by Colonel Joseph Reed that the American pickets had been driven in, and that the army was prepared for action. Then, according to Heath, “The Commander-in-Chief turned round to the officers, and only said, ‘Gentlemen, you will repair to your respective posts, and do the best you can.’”

This late 19th Century map shows White Plains at a time when the area was still predominately rural. The blue lines roughly correspond with the site of the American entrenchments in 1776. The red arrows show the direction from which von Heister (left) and Clinton (right) approached White Plains.

Benjamin Tallmadge (brigade major for Wadsworth’s brigade, Spencer’s division) noted that:

“[Washington had taken] possession of the high ground north and east of the town. Here he seemed determined to take his stand, his lines extending from a mountain on the right, called Chatterton’s Hill, to a lake or large pond of water on his left. An entrenchment was thrown up from right to left, behind which our army formed. Long poles with iron pikes upon them, supplied the want of bayonets.”

At right: a drawing of several types of spears used by the American army (click to enlarge).

Major-General Joseph Spencer was dispatched with a number of regiments to meet the advancing British army and harass them on their approach.

Part of Spencer’s force went down the Mamaroneck Road to confront Clinton, while the other part went down the York Road (towards East Chester) to confront von Heister. Each British column was preceded by a battalion or two of light infantry, a company of jaegers, and a detachment of light dragoons.

Sergeant James McMichael (Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment) was with the troops sent down the Mamaroneck Road. He wrote:

“My regiment was sent to the front to bring on the action, but not endanger ourselves enough to be taken prisoners. We had not marched two miles before we saw them coming. We were attacked by their right wing (all Hessians) and after keeping up an incessant fire for an hour, we were informed by our flanking party, that their light horse was surrounding us… [and then] we retreated to the lines.”

These forces probably consisted of the 1st Jäger Company, and a detachment of the 16th Light Dragoons.

Ensign Stirke of the British light infantry also described the skirmishing on the Mamaroneck Road:

“The army… dislodged several large parties of rebels, that threw themselves into the woods, in our front[,] in order to impede our march; but on our field pieces being fired into the woods, they immediately ran.”

The skirmishing on the York Road attracted more attention. Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige of Moseley’s Massachusetts Militia Regiment was on Chatterton’s Hill, which loomed above the York Road. These militiamen could see the British advance guard approaching Spencer’s men on the far side of the Bronx River, and they promptly took measures to protect themselves:

“[The] regiment… went into entrenchments already to some extent prepared [on Chatterton’s Hill] and immediately began to extend them... There was an orchard in front… which the men… cut down and made into pickets for entrenchments.”

Colonel Gold Silliman of the 1st Connecticut State Battalion described the action on the York Road:

“I with my regiment and 3 others were ordered out about 1 ½ miles below our lines to take post on a hill to gall them [i.e., the British] in their march as they advanced. We accordingly took our post and mine and one other regiment had the advantage of a stone wall… the enemy came up within 6 or 8 rods… [then] our men rose from behind the wall, [and] poured in a most furious fire.”

As was the case at Pell’s Point on the 19th, the Americans’ fire appeared “most furious” but mostly was innocent. Perhaps, as often occurred during the war, inexperienced soldiers aimed too high.

Captain Johann von Ewald’s 2nd Jäger Company led the opposing British column, but he scarcely took notice of the Connecticut troops:

“The army had marched scarcely two hours when the left column encountered an advanced corps of the enemy, which I had to engage supported by the [3rd battalion of] light infantry. The area was intersected by hills, woods, and marshes, and every field was enclosed with a stone wall. This enemy corps had taken a stand behind the stone walls on the steep hills between two plantations. Several guns were set up on the main road at some distance, which were covered by cavalry. General Heister immediately mounted a battery on the main road and cannonaded the enemy, who withdrew…”

At least two of the Connecticut State Battalions (the 1st and 5th) fled towards Chatterton’s Hill. To get there, they had to cross the Bronx River.

According to Brigade-Major Benjamin Tallmadge:

“The troops immediately entered the river and ascended the Hill, while I[,] being in the rear, and mounted on horseback, endeavored to hasten the last of our troops, the Hessians then being within musket shot. When I reached the bank of the river, and was about to enter it, our chaplain, the Rev. Dr. [Benjamin] Trumbull, sprang up behind me on my horse, and came with such force as to carry me with my accoutrements, together with himself, headlong into the river. This so entirely disconcerted me, that by the time I reached the opposite bank of the river, the Hessian troops were about to enter it, and considered me as their prisoner.” [see footnote]

Tallmadge, however, was able to scramble out of the way, just as some militia on the western bank gave the Hessians a check.

Then, Tallmadge wrote:

“I rode to headquarters, near the courthouse, and informed General Washington of the situation of the troops on Chatterton's Hill.”

Footnote: Benjamin Trumbull kept a journal during the campaign. He did not mention in it his embarrassing mishap with Tallmadge, but he did write that “I had been in the river almost all over”.