The Battle of Rocky Mount 3

Part 3: The Assault on Rocky Mount

Previous: Sumter's First Target

Next: "Come and Take It"

[Revised 12/31/09]

Sumter's Plan of Attack:

Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter resolved to attack the British post at Rocky Mount, ahead of the American invasion of South Carolina. This British post was garrisoned by a force significantly smaller than his own, and any British force attempting to come to its relief would have to cross the wide Catawba River [Note 1]. Nevertheless, Rocky Mount would not be an easy post to take, especially as Sumter's militia had no artillery.

Sumter did not leave a written description of his specific plan of attack, but a reconstruction can be made on the basis of British and American statements. Sumter, it seems, planned to send small parties forward to clear the abatis surrounding the post and then set fire to the buildings while protected by covering fire from the rest of his force, which would be on the edge of the surrounding woods. Given that the Americans had a 2 to 1 advantage in numbers, they hoped to bring enough suppressing fire on the buildings to make the operation a success. To improve the odds of success, the American force was to get close to the fort the day before the battle and then make a surprise attack early in the morning. Further, when the Americans attacked they would do so from three directions at once [see Note 2].

The Attack Begins:

Sumter's plan of attack was sound, and he successfully brought his men close to Rocky Mount without detection. Before the Americans made their final advance, Sumter divided his men into three columns. According to Private William Clark, "The attack was made, by dividing the Army into three divisions, each of which was to approach in different directions. The commanders of these three divisions were Colonels [Andrew] Neal, Brannon [i.e., Thomas Brandon] & William Bratton. In line with this view, Private James Clinton remembered that "Sumter divided his men into two or three divisions and ordered the assault to be made from different directions." Likewise, Private Arthur Travis stated that "Our forces were divided into three divisions."

At the time that the Americans were making their final approach march to Rocky Mount, the British garrison was in a normal state of alert, but unsuspecting that Sumter's men were so near. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon (who was not present, but who had received a letter from the post's commander immediately after the battle), "The New York Volunteers... were as usual at the hour standing to their arms." The horses of the British Legion dragoons had "been saddled all night, [and man and horse] were soon after Day-break ordered out to grass."

Rawdon wrote that the dragoons "had scarcely passed an abbatis which surrounded the Post, when they fell in with three large Columns of the Rebels by whom they were fired upon and dispersed" [see Note 3]. According to Sumter, the Americans took "several prisoners, a Great Number of excellent horses, Saddles, Guns, &c."

The firing alerted the post, and the New York Volunteers "were immediately thrown into some Log Houses constructed for the purpose of defence." Although the element of surprise had been lost, the Americans pressed gamely forward. North Carolina militiaman Joseph Graham described what the Americans saw once they reached the British defenses:

"The slope from the top of the hill was gradual, and nearly equal on all sides, and the land cleared. There was no swell in the ground to shelter them from the enemy's fire, only on the west side of a ledge of a blackish kind of rocks at the distance of one hundred and forty yards from the houses. The men were drawn up in a line below these rocks, and advanced up to them, and a party sent around on each flank."

In other words, the three American columns approached the post from the west, but then one column was sent to attack from the north, while another was sent to attack from the south. A comparison of the accounts by Colonel Richard Winn and Private William Clark suggests that Colonel Thomas Brandon led the northern column, Colonel Andrew Neal led the center column, and Colonel William Bratton led the southern column.

The advance of these columns unnerved the Loyalists stationed outside the abatis. According to Rawdon, "some Militia abandoning a Redoubt which they were appointed to garrison... ran into the Houses." South Carolina Militiaman Samuel Gordon claimed that the Americans "drove old Colonel Floyd, a Tory commander into the Fort."

"Blackish kind of Rocks." These boulders, on the western slope of Rocky Mount, are of the same type that the American militia sheltered behind. This image is a screen shot showing a Google Maps "street view" of the area. Appropriate to the American attack, this picture of Rocky Mount was taken in the morning, while the western slope of the hill was cast in shadow.

A Flanking Column Approaches Rocky Mount (click to enlarge). The representations of the battle in miniature on this page are intended to be evocative of the action, but they do not follow a set scale.

Neal's Assault:

With the Americans closing with the post from three directions, Sumter ordered an assault. According to British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, Sumter "selected some of his bravest followers [see Note 4], to remove the [abatis], and to endeavour to set fire to the [buildings], whilst his people, under cover of the trees and rocks, on the declivity of the mountain, maintained a heavy fire upon the garrison."

William Clark, who was with the center column, noted that attack had to be made "through an old field about 200 yards to the house in which the enemy were posted and around which they had fixed huge timbers pointing outwards. On our approach, the enemy poured a destructive fire on us, and in this assault Colonel Neal, and several others were killed."

James Clinton, who was also present, recalled that "Colonel Neal was killed, not 5 feet from where I stood. I saw him fall & heard, and do now remember, his last words: 'I have received a mortal wound – God have mercy on my soul' and instantly died."

Richard Winn then took over. He wrote that, "being in a Clear Old field and finding his Men much Exposed Ordered a Retrt for a Small Distance." The other columns were also repulsed, although, apparently with fewer losses. Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill (with the southern column, according to Winn) wrote that, "we were forced to retreat behind a ledge of Rocks about a hundred y[ar]ds. from the house."

Attacking the Abatis. A party of militia (one of whom is carrying a torch), rush the abatis under covering fire from riflemen in the woods. According to William Clark, the abatis consisted of "fixed huge timbers pointing outwards."

Notes:

1. Sumter took the precaution of detaching a large party of North Carolina militia, including Major William Davie's dragoons, to occupy the British post at Hanging Rock (the post most likely to send reinforcements to Rocky Mount). Davie's memoir records a successful raid on Hanging Rock the same day that Sumter attacked Rocky Mount.

2. This description of the Sumter's plan of attack is rather different than that which I've encountered elsewhere. Historian John Buchanan claimed the attack mostly entailed sniping and a single, disastrous, frontal assault. However, the present description is well grounded in accounts of the battle. Evidence of the use of covering fire is in the accounts by Major William Davie and Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton (neither of whom was present, but their histories of the Southern Campaign are generally deemed reliable). Evidence of the division of Sumter’s force into three parts is in descriptions of the battle by Colonel Richard Winn, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon, Adjutant Joseph Graham, and Privates William Clark, James Clinton and Arthur Travis. My reading of the various sources has led me to believe that Sumter was a competent tactician, but that does not mean that he is above criticism.

Henry Lee (who was not present, but nevertheless is a good source of information) claimed in his postwar history that Sumter "approached Rocky Mount with his characteristic impetuosity." Lee had a point: My impression is that Sumter was eager to attack the enemy and chose not to wait until a piece of cannon became available, or for some fortunate circumstance to develop (e.g., foggy weather certainly would have helped). Much of the American plan of attack at Rocky Mount seems also improvised.

3. American Colonel Richard Winn was one that participated in this exchange. However, his memoir describes a very different incident. He wrote that we:

"Should have completely Surprised the place had it not have been for a Tory Colonel by the Name of Black with about 100 Tory Militia from Broad River to reinforce the Mount they getting to the place late encampt Out with intention of going on Early in the Morning these people we had no Knowledge until we were among them Winn being in the Advance gave them a fire & they Ran and left many of their Horses & Cloathing, this gave the alarm to the Mount, however in a few Minutes the place was attacked."

This discrepancy can be attributed to faulty memory on Winn's part. However, another, intriguing possibility is that the dragoons were not wearing their uniform jackets and the several dragoons captured by the Americans lied about their unit identification.

4. The privates claiming to have participated in this attack were from Neal's regiment, suggesting that his regiment, in whole or in part, constituted the assaulting force. Given the small size of the South Carolina militia regiments (see Note 1 in Part 2 of this series), it's possible the British would have mistaken his command for a picked force.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's postwar memoir.

John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

William R. Davie, The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [excerpt]

William Alexander Graham. (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Clark. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of James Clinton. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Gordon (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Arthur Travis. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

William T. Sherman. (2009). Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed. (.pdf file). [Contains a transcription of Rawdon's letter].

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of the Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

The Battle of Rocky Mount 2

Part 2: Sumter's First Target

Previous: An American Offensive

Next: The Assault on Rocky Mount

[Revised 12/30/09]

At the end of July, several factors convinced Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter to lead his brigade of militia into the field against the system of British outposts in the South Carolina Backcountry. One factor was that the American army in the South was on the move, and aimed to capture the British post at Camden. This left Sumter the choice of either joining in the offensive, or being reduced to a spectator in the critical campaign to liberate his home state.

A second factor was the steady growth of his brigade in July, 1780. At the end of June, his brigade consisted of only a small cadre of South Carolinians (see Sumter's Brigade Forms). However, he had been joined by additional South Carolinians, dozens of Catawba Indians, and, in late July, hundreds of North Carolina militia. In all he commanded around 500-600 men [see Note 1] For the first time, Sumter’s force was large enough to hazard a major action with the British.

A third factor was that Sumter received valuable information about the nearby British post at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, that helped convince him it could be taken. Colonel Richard Winn claimed, in his postwar memoir, that he had seized Major John Owens of the Loyalist militia the night before the battle at Williamson’s Plantation, and that Winn “gave Owens a parole & employed him as a Spy without fee or reward to go to Rocky Mount Count the numbers of Men and report the State and Strength of the place.” Major Owens, either out of fear of what would happen if he was captured again, or to hedge his bets lest his side lost the battle for South Carolina, “punctually complied” with Winn’s request. The two of them secretly met on or about July 20th. According to Winn, Owens claimed that “Colo Turnbull [Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull] Commanded had about 300 Men and was posted in a Strong Block House two Stories high properly prepared for defense and sufficient abbates.”

Owens' report corresponds remarkably well with the description that British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton gave of the place [see Note 2]:

“The defences of Rocky mount consisted of two log houses, a loop-holed building [i.e., the blockhouse], and an abbatis; placed upon an eminence, which commanded a view of the neighbouring country.”

A letter from from Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon to Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis (dated July 31, 1780) notes that the site included "Log Houses constructed for the purpose of defence," and that an "abbatis... surrounded the Post." Rawdon also noted the presence of a nearby "redoubt."

The abatis lay a short distance from the houses and surrounded the post. Beyond the abatis lay an old field, which was quite extensive in some directions [see Note 3].

American accounts, like Winn's sometimes mention only the presence of a single building, suggesting that one large house or blockhouse was of particular importance to the defense [see Note 4].

Tarleton claimed that Turnbull's "force was composed of one hundred and fifty provincials, and as many militia." The provincials were Turnbull's own New York Volunteers; the militia are thought to have been commanded by Colonel Matthew Floyd. Rawdon's letter notes the presence of British Legion dragoons; these were probably the remnants of Captain Christian Huck's company, which had fought at Hill's Ironworks and Williamson's Plantation.

The site of the British post at Rocky Mount, as seen using Google Maps (click to enlarge). The post was situated on a high hill overlooking the Catawba River. A topographical view is on the left, a satellite view on the right. The red dot shows the approximate location of the British blockhouse (cf. John A. Robertson et al.'s Global Gazetteer of the American Revolution).

Notes:

1. Sumter claimed that "With about five hundred men I attacked Rockey Mount" in a letter to Thomas Pinckney dated August 9, 1780. Other sources have credited him with more men. Among the principal commanders of the South Carolinians were Richard Winn, Andrew Neal, William Bratton, Edward Lacey, William Hill, and John McClure. The North Carolinians were headed by Colonel Robert Irwin, and the Catawba Indians were led by General New River.

The large number of senior South Carolina officers give the impression that South Carolinians constituted the bulk of Sumter’s brigade. However, as described previously, the South Carolina militia regiments operating with Sumter were quite small in size. Adjutant Joseph Graham of North Carolina made this point explicitly years later:

“From the number of the field officers from South Carolina under their command the reader would believe in the ranks of the former the principal force consisted of the militia from South Carolina, whereas, the fact was, that in the well fought battles of Rocky Mount & Hanging Rock the North Carolinians, under the command of Colos. Irwin and Huggins and Major Davie, constituted the greater part of his Command and the [South Carolina] field officers referred to had not sometimes each a Dozen of men with them.”

2. Winn’s memoir was written after Tarleton’s account of the battle was published, and not impossible is that Winn’s statement was influenced by Tarleton’s description. Some American histories (Davie, Lossing) clearly copied Tarleton’s language. Nevertheless, it is important to observe that Winn remembered Owens’ description as accurate.

3. Thomas Sumter wrote to Thomas Pinckney that "the action... was offten within thirty feet of their works." Because the Americans had difficulty penetrating the abatis, it can be inferred that Sumter believed the abatis was no more than 30 feet away from the buildings. Private William Clark claimed that to attack the post, his regiment had to "attack through an old field about 200 yards to the house."

4. Below are some of the statements made by American participants about the British defenses at Rocky Mount:

North Carolina militiaman Joseph Graham claimed that the British were ensconced in "log buildings... [that] had loop holes to shoot through.”

South Carolina militiaman Hugh Gaston stated that the "Tories & British took shelter in a large log house."

South Carolina militiaman Thomas Reagan said that the British were "in a large log house at a place called 'Rocky Mount' on the Catawba."

An exception to these descriptions appears in the memoir of Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill. He recalled that the British were stationed in “a large framed house: the walls of which were only thin clap boards.” Hill claimed the attack was made because “we supposed that our balls w[oul]d. Have the desired effect by shooting through the wall." But instead, "the Enemy had wrought day & night and had placed small logs about a foot from the inside of the wall and rammed the cavity with clay, and under this delusion we made the attack —; but soon found that we c[oul]d. injure them no way, but by shooting, in their port-holes." He attributed this erroneous information to a strengthening of the British post between Owens' report (about July 20) and the date of the attack (July 30). Hill's description is not compelling in light of the other accounts, and at the very least does not seem to accurately describe the main defensive building on the site.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's postwar memoir.

John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

William R. Davie, The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [excerpt]

William Alexander Graham. (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Clark. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh Gaston. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Reagan. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Benson John Lossing. (1860). Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

David Paul Reuwer. Documentary Resources and Notes on Gen. Thomas Sumter and the North and South Carolina militias Attack on the British forward outpost at Rocky Mount, South Carolina (July 31 or August 1, 1780). In Volume 1, Number 1 of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution newsletter. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780.

William T. Sherman. (2009). Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed. (.pdf file). [Contains a transcription of Rawdon's letter].

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of the Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

The Battle of Rocky Mount 1

The Battle of Rocky Mount
Part 1: An American Offensive
Next: Sumter's First Target

The battle of Williamson's Plantation was a disaster for the British, not because of the British losses that were incurred, but rather because it cooled Loyalist ardor, greatly encouraged the Americans, and put to an end the previously-effective Provincial/Loyalist raids from Rocky Mount.

The most striking sign of this change in fortunes consisted of the defection of a body of Loyalist militia to the Americans. British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton lamented that:

"An instance of treachery which took place about this time, ruined all confidence between the regulars and the militia: The inhabitants in the districts of the rivers Ennoree and Tyger had been enrolled since the siege of Charles town, under the orders of Colonel [Matthew] Floyd; Colonel [Andrew] Neale, the former commanding officer, having fled out of the province for his violent persecution of the loyalists. One [James] Lisle, who had belonged to the same corps, and who had been banished to the islands, availing himself of the proclamation to exchange his parole for a certificate of his being a good citizen, was made second in command: And as soon as the battalion was completed with arms and ammunition, he carried it off to Colonel Neale, who had joined Colonel Sumpter's command on the Catawba."

Also boosting American morale was the assemblage of a new American army in the South under the command of Major-General Horatio Gates and seconded by Major-General Johann de Kalb. This army consisted primarily of a division of Maryland and Delaware Continentals, backed up by large numbers of Virginia and North Carolina militia. Their mission was to liberate British-occupied South Carolina.

Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter, who commanded a brigade of militia based in the Catawba Nation, intended to loosely cooperate with this American army. Writing to de Kalb shortly after the action at Williamson's Plantation, Sumter boasted that:

"I having Collected a party of men, attacked and Dispersed the enemy, So As to Cleare two Regiments of them [see Note 1]."

For all this bravado, however, Sumter remained deeply concerned about the numbers of South Carolina militia potentially in British employment. He wrote that if the British "have an opportunity of Collecting the Tories and imbodying the militia, who they Compell to do Duty... they will... add above ten thousand men to their army—and thereby be come so strong as Not only to Keep possession of Charles Town, but also a Great part of the State besides."

Sumter advised de Kalb that the main American army should send "a Body of Light Troops" to sweep down the eastern portion of the state and "take post upon the South Side of Santee River, at Neilson's and Marigalutes Ferries." In this position they "woud effectually Cut of their [the British] Retreat to Towns [i.e., the eastern seaboard] and thereby prevent them from forcing the Militia to retreat with them, or from there Gethering to gether the Forces, and also from Striping the Country of all its Resources." Sumter believed that in one fell swoop, the British would be forced to abandon all of their posts in the BackCountry. Sumter's proposed advance would have been dangerous to the British, but such a force would have had numerous rivers to cross and could have been easily delayed. What's more, as the Americans advanced deep into British-held territory, they would themselves run the risk of being cut off and destroyed. Gates and de Kalb would ultimately adopt a much more conservative (and in my view, sensible) strategy.

Sumter had no intention of adding his numbers to the main American army, but rather saw their offensive as an opportunity when he might "be the better inabled to act aGainst the enemy With a probability of success."

Rocky Mount and Vicinity, July, 1780 (click to enlarge). 1) British post at Rocky Mount, 2) British post at Hanging Rock Creek, 3) site of the battle of Williamson's Plantation, 4) British post at Camden. Shaded area is the Catawba Nation. The dark line at the top of the map is part of the border between North and South Carolina.

Notes:

1. Sumter is referring to the regiments of Ferguson and Floyd, which were routed at Willamson's Plantation.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's postwar memoir.

Thomas Sumter. Letter to Johann De Kalb, July 17, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina.

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 3

Part 3: The Americans Gather

Previous: The British Encampment

Next: Huck's Defeat

"...it was determined to attack Lord Hook"

Captain Christian Huck, on a mission to seize local American militia commanders, failed to find either Colonel William Bratton or Captain John McClure. As his force advanced far from its base at Rocky Mount, it unwittingly entered into a dangerous game of cat and mouse with the Americans. Huck was looking for the Americans, but soon the Americans were also looking for him. The Americans were not at their individual homes, but had kept together in small bands for safety; further, they reacted to Huck's advance by drawing together into a fairly large ad hoc force.

The Americans sought to put a stop to Huck's raid, although they inconsistently described the underlying motives.

James Collins cited the destruction of Hill's Ironworks ("it was determined to attack Lord Hook, and take vengeance for the burning of the ironworks"). However, William Hill, who had owned the ironworks, described Huck's "blasphemy" and his seizure of "all the horses fit for his purpose, so that many of the aged men had to walk many miles home afoot." He concluded that "This ill behaviour of the enemy made an impression on the minds of the most serious men in this little band and raised their courage under the belief that they would be made instruments in the hand of Heaven to punish this enemy for his wickedness and blasphemy — and no doubt the recent injuries that many of their families received from the said Hook and his party had an effect to stimulate this little band to a proper courage." John Craig claimed that Huck had made refugees of the Americans' families, and when they reached the Catawba River on their way home, they saw that "the far bank was lined with women and children, who had been ordered from their homes by the British and Tories on account of their relations generally having joined themselves to the Whig party [i.e., Sumter's militia]... The situation of these women and children driven from their firesides, excited in every bosom a sympathy for the distressed, and an indignation against the hard-hearted foe who could perpetrate such an inhuman deed."

Craig's account seems suspect because he alone recalled a heart-rending scene that others seemingly would have remembered. Other accounts have William Bratton's family remaining at home after a visit from Huck and his men, even though Bratton was the most notorious "rebel" in the vicinity.

In any event, participant accounts make clear that on July 11, 1780, several bands of Americans united and decided what to do about Huck. Craig claimed that "we received orders to turn out our horses to graze, and meanwhile the officers called a council and soon determined to risk all consequences and attack the inhuman ruffians." According to Colonel Richard Winn, the decision to attack Huck was not made easily. Winn noted that "both Officers & Men seemed loath to Engage the Horse [i.e., Huck's British Legion dragoons] as they had cut Buford Men to pieces so shortly before." A month and a half before a sizeable force of Continentals had been slaughtered by British Legion dragoons at the Waxhaws. How could they take on such men? Nevertheless, "about 130 agreed to follow Winn and try the Business."

Estimating American Total Strength:

It is difficult to determine the exact size of American militia forces at American Revolutionary War battles because of a paucity of reliable records. I commented on this issue at length during my Cowpens project. I noted that if statements by American officials are taken at face value than one concludes that the American militia numbered around 500 or so (How Many Fought at Cowpens?). However, if one estimates American numbers based on the number of pension applications filed by survivors (Problems with Pensions, Veteran Survival), or the number of officers that were present (Little River Regiment), then the number would be about three times as large (Cowpens in Miniature 3). Concern for this issue represents more than an interest in fine details. Whether the Americans' victory at Cowpens should be regarded as a triumph of underdogs hinges on which interpretation one makes [see Note 1]. I suggested one could test the plausibility of different approaches by making comparisons with other battles. Williamson's Plantation, which has been especially well studied among battles in the Southern campaign, happens to make an ideal test case.

One of the striking features about Williamson's Plantation is that there is relatively good agreement on the question of how many Americans were present:

In correspondence written by nonparticipants shortly after the battle, Thomas Sumter wrote that “I had about one hundred and thirty in the action." Major Thomas Blount said that the Americans fielded "a party of 80 or 90 Militia."

In pension statements or memoirs written many years later, participants claimed that there was "about 130" (Winn), "The number of the Americans was 133, and many of them without arms" (Hill), "We numbered one hundred and thirty-three" (Craig), there were "a few militia Boys" (Hillhouse), the Americans consisted of "Col. Bratton and Capt. Jenkins with about one hundred men" (Jenkins), the Americans consisted of "Coll. Neel... with 110 men" (Lofton).

Early secondary sources provided similar information: Ramsay wrote there were 133 men. Lossing said there were initially 133 men, but 23 left the American force before the battle, leaving only 110. Lossing explicitly claimed to have obtained his information from a veteran. Ramsay probably did as well.

The specificity in these numbers strongly suggest that a headcount was taken before the battle and the participants well remembered the result (133). However, there is still room for varying interpretations -- does this total represent the initial strength or the total after some dropped out? Does it include men without arms and/or men left to guard the horses? Does it include, as will be described in the next post, other detachments that were made shortly before the battle? Given this uncertainty, one can argue for a total considerably above or below 133 men. Michael Scoggins' recent history of the battle, for example, has 159 Americans participating in the fighting [see Note 2]. However, one can build a case around the statements by Winn, Lossing, Blount, Jenkins and Lofton, that the true total was closer to 100. Nevertheless, the variation among these estimates is fairly low: the total seems to have been about 133, plus or minus 30 men.

Michael Scoggins' history allows the validity of different methods of estimating troop totals to be tested because it includes a table that lists every alleged participant, the sources that identify that individual as a participant, and the individual's rank and likely unit affiliation. Therefore, if the method of estimating the number of participants by examining pension applications or counting the number of captains present is valid, then the estimates generated by these methods should be within 133 plus-or-minus 30 men.

Taking the approach of estimating totals based on pension applications, one finds that 58 persons claimed to have been at the battle. Using Lawrence Babits' estimate of around 3.5 actual participants for every pension application filed, one arrives at a total American force of 203 men. This method of estimation produces a total that is a little more than 50% above the actual approximate size of the American force, suggesting moderately poor validity.

Taking the approach of estimating one 25-man company for every captain identified at the battle, one finds in Scoggins' table that there were 23 participants with the rank of captain. By extension, 575 participants (25 * 23) would have been present. The estimated total is far above the likely historical total, suggesting that the method has very poor validity.

At the time that I wrote about Cowpens I observed that the logic behind these methods of estimation seems sound, yet the results they produce are questionable. An examination of these methods with the numbers for Williamson's Plantation confirms for me that opinion. I gave some reasons previously why I thought the results could be flawed even though the logic seems sound. I also have some new thoughts on the subject, which I'll share in an upcoming post.

American Order of Battle:

The American order of battle, described below, is based on Michael Scoggins' history of the battle. The totals for each regiment are approximate because a handful of men could not be clearly linked to a specific unit. In these cases I randomly assigned the participant to one of the units to which he plausibly could have belonged. The accuracy of information in original sources is assumed. The rank and file indicated below includes mostly privates, a few men are identified as sergeants, none as corporals. Richard Winn claimed to have been commander of this force (as did others); he evidently was present, but not his regiment.

Neal's Regiment:

Colonel Andrew Neal, Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill, Major James Hawthorne, about 7 captains, 4 lieutenants, 19 rank and file.

Bratton's Regiment:

Colonel William Bratton, Major John Wallace, about 11 captains, 6 lieutenants, 42 rank and file.

Lacey's Regiment:

Colonel Eward Lacey, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick McGriff, Major Michael Dickson, about 5 captains, 7 lieutenants, 30 rank and file.

One pension application (Samuel Wallace) identifies two units of North Carolina militia at the battle; the absence of confirmation by other applications or sources suggests that North Carolina militia regiments were not present.

A stand-out feature of this order of battle is the exceptionally high ratio of officers to rank and file: 1:1.36 for Neal's regiment, 1:2.21 for Bratton's regiment, and 1:2.00 for Lacey's regiment. A similarly high ratio may have been present among the South Carolina militia regiments at Cowpens. This does not mean, of course, that such a high ratio was always present among South Carolina militia regiments, to say nothing of regiments from other states.

Notes:

1. The high-end estimates of American totals at cowpens have the Americans outnumbering the British by more than 2:1. The low-end estimates have the British outnumbering the Americans by about 1.3:1.

2. This estimate is based on a combination of participant statements and a compilation of state and federal records (such as pension applications) that identify participants by name.

Sources:

Thomas Blount. Letter to Abner Nash, July 23, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina.

James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier.

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Hillhouse (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Jenkins (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Lofton (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Wallace (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Benson John Lossing. (1860). Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

David Ramsay (1811). The History of the American Revolution (Vol. 2).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of statements by many participants).

Thomas Sumter. Letter to Johann De Kalb, July 17, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina.

Sumter's Brigade Forms

[Minor edits May 2, 2010]

As the British overran the South Carolina Backcountry in June, 1780, scattered bands of American militia coalesced just across the border in North Carolina. A number of militia commanders convened and elected one of their number, Thomas Sumter, as their "brigade" commander [see Note 1].

Sumter had been the colonel of the 6th South Carolina regiment, but he resigned his commission and returned to private life in 1778. The virtual elimination [see Note 2] of the commanders of the South Carolina Continental line at the siege of Charleston, elevated Sumter from has-been to one of the most important men in the state. Knowing that he was a wanted man, Sumter fled to North Carolina in May, 1780.

Sumter has attracted some rather remarkable character sketches.

Here is Henry Lee describing Sumter in his postwar history:

"He was not over scrupulous as a soldier in his use of means, and apt to make considerable allowances for a state of war. Believing it warranted by the necessity of the case, he did not occupy his mind with critical examinations oi' the equity of his measures, or of their bearings on individuals; but indiscriminately pressed forward to his end—the destruction of his enemy and liberation of his country. In his military character he resembled Ajax; relying more upon the fierceness of his courage than upon the results of unrelaxing vigilance and nicely adjusted combination. Determined to deserve success, he risked his own life and the lives of his associates without reserve. Enchanted with the splendor of victory, he would wade in torrents of blood to attain it. This general drew about him the hardy sons of the upper and middle grounds; brave and determined like himself, familiar with difficulty, and fearless of danger."

Here is John Buchanan in the modern history, The Road to Guilford Courthouse:

"Thomas Sumter (1734-1832) is not a sympathetic character. Wearing his ego on his shoulder, he had few peers as a prima donna and could spot a slight, intended or not, around a corner. He was careless with security and lives. His penchant for bloody and repeated frontal assaults was unnecessarily costly and finally led one officer to swear to Sumter's face and before others that never again would he serve under the Gamecock. But of all his partisan foes, Lord Cornwallis considered Sumter the most troublesome and obstinate. Thomas Sumter was a fighter who kept alive the flame of resistance and acted as a beacon for like-minded men at a time when others believed all was lost..."

Buchanan's claims that Sumter "was careless with security and lives," and that he had a "penchant for bloody and repeated frontal assaults" that were "unnecessarily costly," rest on events occurring during the battles of Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and Fishing Creek. To anticipate my coverage of these battles in the months ahead, my description will suggest that Sumter behaved imprudently on each of these occasions, but otherwise it will be much less critical [see Note 3].

The date of Sumter's election is usually given as June 15 (cf. Buchanan's history and Robert Bass' biography of Sumter). However, some of the participants in this event remembered the election being held on June 19, or the day before the battle of Ramsour's Mill. I haven't examined this discrepancy well enough to form an opinion on its cause. Several descriptions of the election are quoted below. Note that on June 20, Sumter's newly-organized brigade sought to join in the attack against Loyalist forces at Ramsour's Mill, but because of poor communication between the various American militia forces, they only arrived on the battlefield some hours after the fighting had ended.

Colonel Richard Winn [see Note 4] wrote after the war that: [T]he next day Arrive at Genl Rutherford's Camp near Charlotte in No. Carolina where I found 44 of the So. Carolinians in the Same Situation of myself[.] [W]e got together and held a Consultation, notwithstanding the Smallness of Our No. [I]t was unanimously Agreed on to oppose the British & Tories under Expectation when the panick [sic, panic] of the people was over many would Join us, [T]he next Question was who Should Command[.] Capt. R Winn was Chosen without a Desenting Voice, Capt. Winn obsd. that Colo Sumter was on the ground An Old Experienced Officer[.] [H]e shorely [sic, surely] was the most proper person to take the Command, for the memd [?] this was Objected too, however it was Agreed on that Colo Patton & Capt. Winn should without delay Consult the Colo on the Subject[.] [A]fter some Converstation and Explination Colo Sumter Accepted the nomination and the Next day Set Out with his party on Horse back and made a forced March to Reinforce Colo. Lock in Order to Attack a body of about 1000 Tories who had Collected at Ramsowers Mill in No. Carolina on the So. fork of Catawba under their leader Colo Moore, however Colo Sumter did not Arrive untill the Action was over..."

Captain Samuel Otterson recalled that "On the day after the election, we marched toward the house of a celebrated Tory by the name of Ramsour for the purpose of defeating some Tories who had encamped at Ramsour's mill, but before we arrived, the Militia from Rowan, N. Carolina had defeated the Tories."

Captain Joseph McJunkin [see Note 5] recalled that "...we unanimously chose Col. Thos. Sumter to be our leader or General, to lead us to face the Enemy, &... Sumter joined Rutherford that day, & [we]... could hardly be constrained from proceeding that evening to attack the above Tories; but Rutherford would not consent for him to start until next morning, him & men, all anxious to meet the Enemy, started by time, & posted on with all possible speed, but the distance being too great, our hero & his party did not get to the place of action until it was over.

It has been supposed, by some authors, that all of Sumter's regimental commanders were present at his election. Winn, however, claimed that there were only 44 men with Sumter at the time, exclusive of those in his own command. Sumter's brigade is known to have grown steadily after Ramsour's Mill until it numbered in the hundreds by late July. Perhaps some of the regiments that fought with Sumter in July and August attached themselves to his brigade after its initial formation. William Hill is one of the American commanders credited with helping to elect Sumter, but in my reading of his postwar memoir, quoted below, he and Andrew Neal retained an independent command at the time, and did not join Sumter's brigade until after Ramsour's Mill.

"About this time [i.e., shortly after the battle of Hill's Ironworks of June 17 or 18, 1780], I was informed that Col. Sumter was then in Salisbury with a few men waiting for a reinforcement — I then wrote to him, informing him of our situation & that there was a probability of our making a handsome stand — and that we were about to form a junction with Genl. Rutherfd. in N. Cara. that we were going to attack a large body of Tories that had collected at a place called Ramsour's Mill — But so it was that a detached party of about 300 horse from Genl Ruthd. attacked the Tory camp said to be upwards of a 1000 men, killed & dispersd. the whole — and then it was that Col. Sumter met with us from So. Ca. He then got authority from the civil & military authority of that State to impress or take waggons horses, provisions of all kinds, from the enemy that was in that action — & to give a receipt to that state for the same —"

The victory at Ramsour's Mill and the arrival in North Carolina of a large force of Maryland and Delaware Continentals commanded by Major-General Johann de Kalb gave the Americans the initiative.

Sumter's brigade would play a major role in the campaign that followe. In late June, Sumter moved his forces into the lands of the Catawba Nation, giving the Americans a toehold in South Carolina. The value of this position was more psychological than military. The Americans were badly lacking in provisions, arms, and ammunition. In early July, most of the brigade was temporarily disbanded. As the big American push into South Carolina would not occur before August, Sumter's men were given an opportunity to see to their farms and families and obtain supplies from home before the campaign began. Sumter himself returned to North Carolina in search of supplies.

Notes:

1. South Carolina Governor John Rutledge commissioned Sumter as brigadier general in October, 1780; because the election had no official standing, he is referred to in various sources as both a colonel and a general during the preceding summer.

2. A notable exception was Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Marion of the 2nd South Carolina regiment, who had been injured prior to the siege.

3. I'm also inclined to be less praiseworthy of Sumter. Buchanan implied that American resistance in the Backcountry somehow would have collapsed without Sumter. However, the accounts of Winn, Hill, and others make clear that a serious resistance to the British was organized in a number of places and before Sumter attained a prominent position. It seems likely that these various commands would have coalesced without Sumter -- just under a different leader. If participant accounts are to believed, there was no shortage of talented and determined officers in Sumter's brigade.

4. Richard Winn is credited as being colonel of the Fairfield militia regiment at this time (see J. D. Lewis' South Carolina military organization (or lack thereof): June 1, 1780, for a reconstruction). He calls himself captain in this account, but notes that "Capt. Winn begun to Rank as a Colonel" in early July.

5. Major Joseph McJunkin was frequently cited in my Cowpens project; McJunkin held the rank of captain during the summer of 1780.

Sources:

Robert Duncan Bass. (1961). Gamecock: The Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter.

John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson. (.pdf file).

Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

The Battle of Hill's Ironworks 2

Part 2: A Center of Resistance

Previous: Strategic Overview

Next: Huck Attacks

The British Post at Rocky Mount:

Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull commanded the British outpost at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, with his New York Volunteers and Captain Christian Huck‘s company of British Legion dragoons [see Note 1]. The South Carolina Backcountry was a patchwork of different communities, some predominately aligned with the “American“ cause, or “Whigs,” while others were loyal to the Crown, or “Tories.” Within a given community could be found persons that preferred to stay out of the conflict or that supported (secretly perhaps) a different cause than their neighbors. It was Turnbull's responsibility to organize and support the Loyalists in his area and to suppress rebellion. Turnbull largely remained in Rocky Mount, relying chiefly on Captain Huck and the Loyalist militia (who, like the dragoons, were mounted) to control the countryside.

Turnbull had several bands of Loyalist militia at his disposal in early June, including companies commanded by Henry Houseman, James Ferguson, and John Owens. On June 15, Matthew Floyd joined the Rocky Mount garrison with around 30 men. Floyd was the rare man that was clearly committed to the Crown, influential among his neighbors, and experienced in war. Turnbull promptly gave him a colonel’s commission.

Soon after Floyd reached Rocky Mount, word arrived that the Americans were destroying the homes and property of Floyd and his men. Turnbull promptly dispatched Huck’s troop and all the Loyalists on hand (a mere 60 men) “to give these fellows [the Americans] a Check.” Either because of exhaustion or other pressing business, the newly-appointed Colonel Floyd did not participate in this mission. Instead, command of the Loyalists devolved on his son, Captain Abraham Floyd. Captains Huck and Floyd set off on the morning of June 16. They would "Check" the Americans by destroying Hill’s Ironworks, the chief center of American resistance in the area.

Hill’s Ironworks:

William Hill’s Ironworks was a well-known locale that included sawmills, a gristmill, and a blast furnace. The ironworks was the most productive in the state, supplying Backcountry settlers with plows, kitchen wares, and other implements. Once the war began, the ironworks were used to manufacture cannon, cannonballs, rifles, and other materials of war for the American army. As the British overran the Backcountry, proprietor William Hill turned the ironworks into an important center of resistance. On June 12, Hill spoke out against a British officer sent to the ironworks to take the submission of the area settlers, raising the spirits of his neighbors. Hill then encouraged them to reactivate the New Acquisition militia regiment, which had disbanded after the British advanced into the Backcountry. The men of this regiment then elected Andrew Neal as their colonel and William Hill as their lieutenant colonel [see Note 2].

American Forces at the Ironworks:

It is uncertain which American commanded the forces at the ironworks when Huck attack and what units were present. According to William Hill, Andrew Neal, colonel of the New Acquisition militia regiment, departed the ironworks to attack Floyd shortly before the battle, leaving 12-15 men behind. These men may have belonged to Captain Joseph Howe's company, to judge from the pension applications filed by Samuel Gordon and James Clinton. Two sources link John Thomas’ 1st Spartan militia regiment (see pension applications of Samuel Gordon and James McIlhenny) and Captain John Moffett’s company of militia (see James Collins’ autobiography and Robert Patteson’s pension application) to the battle.

William Hill did not indicate, in his memoir, either that he accompanied Neal's mission to stop Floyd's Loyalists, or that he was at the ironworks at the time of the battle. Michael Scoggins observed that a statement he wrote on behalf of Captain John Henderson implicitly places him at the battle. If Hill was present, he was arguably in command; Colonel John Thomas also could have held that position.

Christian Huck told George Turnbull that the Americans had 150 men when he made his attack. This number could be close to correct, but it's doubtful that he had either the opportunity to count the Americans for himself or that he would have obtained accurate information from the men he captured. Michael Scoggins conservatively accepted as present only the 12-15 men mentioned by Hill; Patrick O'Kelley estimated the total as 50 men.

Notes:

1: “Huck” is the anglicized spelling of a German surname, most likely Houck or Hauck. Early writers sometimes called him Hook, or used other spellings; Huck is the spelling most often given, and it is the spelling that Huck chose for himself (for more, see this discussion on Marg Baskin’s Banastre Tarleton website; a longer biography appears in Michael Scoggins’ book on Huck‘s Defeat).

2. Neal was chosen colonel because he was experienced in war; Hill was not.

Sources:

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (link to amazon.com).

Patrick O'Kelley. Hill's Iron Works, South Carolina: The Presbyterian Rebellion -- 18 June 1780 (or June 9th or 11th) (.pdf file). Article in Volume 2, Number 6 of the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine.

Michael C. Scoggins. More on the Battle of Hill's Ironworks (.pdf file). Article in Volume 2, Number 7 of the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine.

Keith Krawczynski. Aera Ironworks (.pdf file). Article in Volume 2, Number 7 of the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine.

James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier.

Robert S. Lambert. (1987). South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution. (link to amazon.com).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Gordon (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of James Clinton (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the postwar memoir of William Hill (.pdf file)

Michael G. Williams transcribed the pension application of James McIlhenny (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Patteson (.pdf file).