Battle of Port Royal Island (3)

This is the third of three posts on the February 3, 1779, battle of Port Royal Island. For the first two parts, see here and here.

On Port Royal Island, British light infantry under Major Valentine Gardiner and South Carolina forces under Brigadier-General William Moultrie deployed for battle.

Major Gardiner galloped up to the Americans with a white handkerchief hanging from the tip of his drawn sword and demanded that they surrender. Allegedly, Lieutenant Francis Kinloch, Moultrie’s aide-de-camp, responded by saying that ‘they had too much British blood in their veins to yield their post without dispute,’ and the American militia cheered.

When Gardiner returned to his lines, the British howitzer fired, and the bursting shell mortally wounded Lieutenant Benjamin Wilkins of the Charleston Artillery.

The American 6-pounders responded, and the second shot struck the British gun carriage. At that moment, the sailor carrying the matchstick fled, leaving the howitzer out of action for the rest of the battle.

Moultrie then advanced his two wings and a general engagement ensued.

Battle of Port Royal Island in Miniature. British light infantry of the 16th (yellow facings) and 60th regiments (blue facings) face off against South Carolina militia, including the Charleston Artillery.

The British tried to turn the flanks of the American line, but those on the left (troops of the 4/60th under Lieutenant Breitenbach) could not negotiate the felled trees, and those on the right (troops of the 16th under Lieutenant Calderwood) found that the Charleston militia presented too extensive a line.

Meanwhile, the American guns raked the British line with both solid shot and grape shot. Ensign Plumer was struck down by the wind of a cannon ball that passed under Major Gardiner’s horse. Major Graham was struck twice by grapeshot, and Ensign Finlay was mortally wounded.

The American infantry then launched their own attack. Captain Murray refused the left flank, and as he dressed the line, he was struck in the right buttocks by a piece of grape shot.

On the other end of the line, Lieutenant Skinner repelled an attack against the British right. Skinner took command of this end of the line after Lieutenant Calderwood was mortally wounded.

The American guns drove the British to seek cover behind brush on either side of the road. Captains Murray and Bruère rallied the troops on the left (eastern) side of the road, and Major Gardiner and Lieutenant Skinner rallied the troops on the right.

Gardiner then decided to retreat and he sent one Corporal Craig of the 16th across the roadway to deliver the orders to Murray and Bruère. Murray, however, claimed he could not safely retreat, and besides, his men were at last pushing back the Americans. The brush provided his men with an opportunity. In the words of Moultrie, “this action was reversed from the usual way of fighting, between the British and Americans; they taking to the bushes and we remaining upon the open ground…” Murray sent Corporal Craig back, and Gardiner rescinded his order.

As the militia fell back, Bruère's men worked their way into range of the American cannon, and appeared to silence the guns. (According to Moultrie, the American guns were running low on ammunition). But then Bruère was struck in the ribs and he made his way to a log house in the rear of the line that had become a makeshift hospital.

During the fight, Captain John Barnwell, who commanded a troop of 15 light horse, remained on the edges of the fight, sending messages back to the American line on the British movements. At about this time, Barnwell saw an opportunity, and his troop swept down on the British line, sending Gardiner fleeing before them, and cutting him off from the British line. Barnwell’s troop then reached the log house where they captured Bruère and 14 other men.

The battlefield at this point must have been a smoke-drenched and confused place, for both sides would be convinced that they had decisively beaten their foe.

Below is historian Peter Young’s description of the conclusion of the battle, which was based primarily on Captain Murray’s written recollection.

“For as the Americans fell back, Murray was advancing: the 16th on the right; the 60th on the left; the centre open. The flank platoons, those of Calderwood and Baron Breitenbach had orders to charge in as soon as they should gain the enemy’s flanks. A solitary American rifleman, doubtless one of the Virginians [sic], stayed behind when the rest gave way and shot Murray through the left arm, just as he was waving it to signal Breitenbach to charge from the flank, while he himself attacked frontally. Murray fainted, and his men paused, giving the Americans time to bring up their horses and draw off the gun.

“The final British charge was made in open order, but the American riflemen did not wait for the bayonet: throwing away their arms, they made off.

“On the British right things followed much the same course. Lieutenant Skinner, now the senior unwounded officer, made a spirited attack and drove the Americans back to the ground from which they had advanced. They retired in confusion, threatened on both flanks.”

By contrast, below is an excerpt from General Moultrie’s after-action report to Major-General Benjamin Lincoln, dated February 4, 1779:

“after some little time finding our men too much exposed to the enemy's fire, I ordered them to take trees; about three quarters of an hour after the action began, I heard a general cry through the line, of ‘no more cartridges ;’ and was also informed by Captains Heyward and Rutledge, that the ammunition for the field-pieces was almost expended, after firing about forty rounds from each piece: upon this I ordered the field-pieces to be drawn off very slowly; and their right and left wings to keep pace with the artillery to cover their flanks, which was done in tolerable order for undisciplined troops: the enemy had beat their retreat before we began to move, but we had little or no ammunition, and could not of consequence pursue: they retreated so hastily as to leave an officer, one sergeant, and three privates, wounded, in a house near the action, and their dead lying on the field. It is impossible as yet to be particular with respect, to the latter. Two officers we have found and seven men they fought from behind the bushes.”

At this point it was late in the day, the British had taken considerable losses (perhaps 1 in 4 had been killed or wounded), and they had used up most of their ammunition. The British decided to withdraw to their boats, leaving behind their killed and some of their wounded.

One small solace was that as the British withdrew, they had a brush with Barnwell’s mounted men, which led to the recovery of most of the men Barnwell had taken. (Barnwell retained only 1 sergeant and 6 rank and file as prisoners).

The action at Port Royal Island brought the British raid into South Carolina to a close. The raid failed to significantly distract the American high command in the south, who continued to focus on preventing the British conquest of the Georgian backcountry (discussed in Part 1).

British Losses:

Several estimates of British losses appear below.

Young stated that the British held together only 70 rank and file by the end of the battle and that about half of the force (total strength was close to 160 men) was made casualties.

General Bull shared the following information in a letter to Moultrie dated February 12, 1779:

“Yesterday seven sailors, deserters from the Lord George Germain ship of war, were brought in by a party from one of our picquets; they say that the fleet is on their way to Savannah; that their land troops lost, in the action with us on Port-Royal, forty killed and wounded, and that the night after the action, an express was sent by a boat to Savannah, for a reinforcement, but the answer was, none could be spared, and that the fleet must return…”

The Royal Georgia Gazette (as cited by The History of Beaufort County, South Carolina: 1514-1861), stated that British casualties were only 30.

American Losses:

Moultrie, in an after action report to Major-General Benjamin Lincoln, stated that there was 1 officer mortally wounded, 3 other officers wounded, “with six or seven privates killed in the field, and fifteen wounded.”

Moultrie identified the officers by name and he later compiled a return of losses for those of other ranks in the two Charleston militia companies (published in Volume 1 of his 1802 memoirs). These add up to 14 named men:

• Charleston Artillery. Mortally wounded: Lieutenant Benjamin Wilkins, S. Wilkins, John Fraser. Wounded: Captain Thomas Heyward (in arm), John Anthony, John Calvert, Anthony Watts, John Green, and John Laurence.
• Charleston Light Infantry. Wounded: Lieutenant Archibald Brown, Lieutenant Sawyer, John Collins, John Righton, and John D. Miller.

The Charleston militia was not the only body of American troops at the battle. According to Boatner's Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, total American losses were 8 killed, 22 wounded.

Sources:

This account of the battle of Port Royal Island is based primarily on Peter Young’s (1967) The British Army, William Moultrie's (Volume 1, 1802) memoirs, and Lawrence Rowland, Alexander Moore, and George Rogers' (Volume 1, 1996) The History of Beaufort County, South Carolina.

Battle of Port Royal Island (2)

In late January, 1779, Major Valentine Gardiner led a British expedition north from Savannah, Georgia, along the South Carolina coast. The British landed on coastal islands, where they burned a number of plantations and captured several hundred slaves. Their excuse for burning plantations was that they “received very abusive language from the people on shore,” “or had found some illiberal words written with chalk on the walls, against them.” [1]

American forces on Port Royal Island consisted of a small detachment of the 4th South Carolina regiment (Captain John de Tréville commanding) and some militia. These men defended Fort Lyttleton, which protected the town of Beaufort, but which could not stop the British from landing and raiding elsewhere. On January 31, the militia abandoned the fort. Captain de Tréville then hastily spiked the guns and blew up the fort [2].

That night, Brigadier-General William Moultrie reached the ferry crossing to Port Royal Island and learned that the fort had been destroyed. A sizeable force of South Carolina militia encamped near the ferry, including men from the relatively well trained and equipped Charleston regiment. [3]

On February 2, Moultrie crossed over to Port Royal Island with close to 300 men, and the next morning he marched into Beaufort. There, Moultrie found that some arms and supplies could be salvaged from Fort Lyttleton, but before any action could be taken, word was received that the British were about 5 miles away. Moultrie then assembled the men and marched after them. [4]

The two forces met about halfway between Beaufort and the island ferry. At this point, the British were between the Americans and the ferry. At the same time, the Americans threatened to separate the British from their boats.

Captain Patrick Murray, who commanded a British light infantry company, claimed that the battle was fought “along the road to the entry of Rhodes’ Swamp, where—on the crest of the Pina Barren beyond the swamp where the trees were felled but not cleared off.” [5]

Schematic Diagram (not to scale) of British and American Forces at the Battle of Port Royal Island.

The Americans halted about 200 yards from the British. The Charleston Artillery deployed in the road, and the infantry were deployed in two wings that extended into the woods on either side. Captain de Tréville took with him a 2-pounder when he abandoned Fort Lyttleton; this gun was positioned in support of the right wing.

The British troops consisted of three light infantry companies supported by a small howitzer (manned by 2 gunners and 6 sailors). The infantry deployed in nine platoons, which from left to right (when facing the Americans), were commanded by Lieutenant Joseph Breitenbach (4th battalion, 60th regiment) Captain Patrick Murray (4/60th), Lieutenant Rowland Hosleton (4/60th), Ensign James Finlay (3rd battalion, 60th regiment), Captain George Bruère (3/60th), Ensign Enoch Plumer (3/60th), Lieutenant John Skinner (16th regiment), Major Colin Graham (16th), Lieutenant William Calderwood (16th). Each platoon contained around 16 men. [6]

Notes:

1. The number of captured slaves is stated in a letter from Stephen Bull to William Moultrie, dated February 12, 1779. The quoted passage appears in a letter from Lieutenant Benjamin Smith to Moultrie. Moultrie’s correspondence appears in his memoirs (published 1802).

2. Moultrie noted that “Although the fort was blown up, yet it was not so totally demolished but that a great many of the stores were left unhurt, and the guns so lightly spiked, that you might draw out the spikes with a pair of pincers.”

3. Two companies of the Charleston regiment served in this battle: the 2nd company (Charleston Artillery, commanded by Captain Thomas Heyward) and the 3rd company (Charleston Light Infantry, commanded by Captain John Baddeley). Also present were other local militia, although I have not been able to divine their numbers or organization. Of these other men, Moultrie singled out a troop of light horse commanded by Captain John Barnwell. Brigadier-General Stephen Bull commanded the militia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard Beekman commanded the artillery. Moultrie had overall command.

According to Moultrie, the only Continentals in this action were in Captain de Tréville’s detachment, which consisted of de Tréville, 2 junior officers, and 6 enlisted men.

Serving with the Charleston Artillery were two signers of the Declaration of Independence: Captains Thomas Heyward and Edward Rutledge.

Some relevant pension applications (links are to. pdf files):

• John Anthony of the Charleston Artillery. He was wounded during the battle and is named in Moultrie’s correspondence.
• Lieutenant Archibald Brown of the Charleston light infantry. He was wounded during the battle and is mentioned in Moultrie’s account.
• Lieutenant George Frederick Dener. He served in the Charleston light infantry.
• Jonathan Johnson. He served in the Charleston light infantry.
• Lieutenant Edward Barnwell. He was Captain John Barnwell’s brother and served in his troop.
• William Elliott. He served in Barnwell’s troop.

4. The number of men that fought in the battle may have been considerably less. Moultrie noted, “The Chehaw company was sent back before the action, about 125 men, on a report that the enemy had landed there.”

5. This quote appears in Peter Young’s (1967) The British Army, which describes the battle of Port Royal Island in considerable detail.

6. This order of battle is based on Young and this history of the 60th regiment.

Battle of Port Royal Island (1)

By 1778, the war in the northern theater had effectively reached a stalemate, and the British began to place increasing importance on the recovery of the southern colonies. In December, 1778, British troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell captured Savannah, Georgia. The following January, Brigadier-General Augustine Prévost arrived in Savannah and took command of British forces in the south.

Prévost laid out his plans to George Germain, Secretary of State for America, in a letter dated January 18, 1779:

“...I shall immediately proceed up the river to see what advantages can be expected from the frontier inhabitants of Carolina who give the strongest hopes of joining heartily whenever they find that they are to be supported. Should it appear that they do not mean to take the active part which they have promised, I shall confine my plan of operations to harassing the enemy by excursions and effectually securing this province, to which all the loyal subjects who have fled to Florida for shelter will soon return if they can be assured of being protected. If, on the contrary, the frontier inhabitants should evince the zeal which they profess, I cannot doubt but great advantages may be delivered from a diversion on their side supported by an attack at Beaufort or any of the settlements on the coast of South Carolina…”

In other words, Prévost intended to drive into the Georgian backcountry in order to galvanize American Loyalists, while at the same time launching a diversionary attack on the South Carolina post.

To effect this plan, Prévost made his headquarters at Ebenezer, Georgia, a town 25 miles northwest of Savannah, and roughly opposite Purrysburg, South Carolina, where Major-General Benjamin Lincoln was assembling a large American army.

Strategic Situation in the South (click to enlarge). This map shows places referred to in this blog post that were occupied by British and American forces in January, 1779. The British held Savannah and Ebenezer in Georgia [red dots], while the Americans held Augusta, Georgia, and Purrysburg, Beaufort (on Port Royal Island), and Charleston, South Carolina [blue dots]. Based on a 1776 map in the David Rumsey collection.

On January 24, Prévost sent Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell with a large force [1] to take Augusta, and sent a diversion against the South Carolina coast. In his words:

“In order to facilitate further the success of Colonel Campbell’s operations... I sent three companies of light infantry that came from Florida to go up Beaufort River under the escort of the Vigilant, and to draw the enemy’s spies about us to conceive that more troops were sent by sending a regiment of Hessians to the place of embarkation two miles from Savannah and marching them in the night back to their barracks.”

The three companies of light infantry belonged to the 16th regiment, and the 3rd and 4th battalions of the 60th regiment. This small force, no more than 160 men, was commanded by Major Valentine Gardiner. Nevertheless, their arrival on the South Carolina coast put the Americans in a state of alarm.

Colonel Charles Cotesworth Pinckney described the popular feeling in Charleston, South Carolina, in a letter to Brigadier-General William Moultrie:

“...many people think, this movement of the enemy is to post themselves at Port-Royal, and there wait reinforcements from the northward; others, that it was done only to cause a division and to weaken your little army, that they might more easily pass the river [i.e., so that Prévost could cross the Savannah River and invade South Carolina]; others, that it was to destroy the town and fort, plunder and return to Tybee [an island near Savannah]; but some with more penetrating looks and significant nods; that the vessels appearing in scull creek, as if intended, (Port-Royal was, or is, only a feint,) to cover a real design of landing suddenly on the Euhaws, march to a pass of consequence near Elliott's hill, on the southern road, and there throw up some field works, which with a few cannon will entirely cut off the communication from town to Gen. Lincoln's army, and put him between two fires; this last manoevre, is thought of so much consequence to the public safety, as to raise the public anxiety...”

Lincoln was not deceived, and he remained at Purrysburg with his army. However, Lincoln also did not want to see a key fort on Port-Royal Island fall to the British. He therefore ordered General Moultrie to take control of South Carolina militia on and near Port-Royal Island and defend that threatened post.

Note:

1. Campbell described the composition of this force in a March 4, 1779, letter to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton:

“A proper supply of provisions having been collected at Ebenezer, I marched on the 24th January with Sir James Baird’s light infantry [a light company of the 71st regiment, with, perhaps, a corps of Provincial light infantry attached], the 1st battalion of the 71st regiment, the New York Volunteers, one troop of light dragoons [commanded by Captain Tawes], Colonel [Alexander] Innes’s Carolina Loyalists [i.e., the South Carolina Royalists], and the Florida Rangers, making in all one thousand effectives, rank and file, with 4 field-pieces, one howitzer and two royal mortars.”

Cowpens in Miniature 22

Part 22: Flight

Previous: Collapse

Next: Surrender

The Continental infantry dealt their British counterparts a deadly blow when first they delivered an unexpected volley at short range and then charged with the bayonets. David Stewart, however, maintained that while the "Highlanders… were checked and repulsed," they were not broken. They were "some distance in the rear, after they retreated, and had formed into some compact order."

The Continentals were still outnumbered by the British regulars, but the British failed to make a dignified withdrawal, much less recover the advantage. American writers claimed they retained the advantage due to the vigorous manner with which the offense was sustained. Daniel Morgan reported that "We pushed our advantage so effectually, that they never had an opportunity of rallying, had their intentions been ever so good."

The Americans "pushed" their "advantage" in several parts of the battlefield at once.

In the middle, the Continentals were close on the heels of the retreating British.

William Wood recalled seeing John Hill, a North Carolina Continental, "pursue a British soldier – some 60 or 75 yards. He the said Hill stuck his Bayonet in the back of the British soldier by throwing his musket at him this wound was slight and the British soldier continued to retreat."

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals wrote in his journal that "We Were in amongst them With the Bayonets Which Caused them to give ground and at last to take to, the flight But We followed them up so Close that they never Could get in Order again."

Sergeant-Major William Seymour, also of Delaware, wrote that "all the officers and men behaved with uncommon and undaunted bravery, but more especially the brave captain Kirkwood and his company, who did that day wonders, rushing on the enemy without either dread or fear, and being instrumental in taking a great number of prisoners."

As the Continentals pressed forward, they were joined on either flank by the American militia.

In Joseph McJunkin’s words, "Howard orders a charge, the militia comes back, and fall in right and left." William Moultrie noted that "our militia at the same time [as Howard’s charge] recovered themselves and charged, which threw them [the British] into the utmost confusion" [see Note 1].

To the British, the danger from the attacking militia was particularly acute on the flank of the 71st Foot [see Note 2]. The 71st Foot had exposed their left flank to them in attempting to turn the right flank of the Continentals [see Note 3]. The militia on the American right had been stunned by Captain Ogilvie’s charge [see Note 4], but at this critical moment, Colonel Andrew Pickens and Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan had succeeded in rallying them. As the militia returned to fight, the men of the 71st found themselves assaulted on the left and rear at the same time that the Continentals attacked to their front and right [see Note 5].

The 71st Foot began to retreat. Stewart claimed that "If they had been supported, they might have made a soldier-like retreat." Nearby was Tarleton’s Legion Dragoon reserves. However, they offered no support. Tarleton wrote that "The part of the cavalry which had not been engaged fell likewise into disorder, and an unaccountable panic extended itself along the whole line."

Tarleton was on hand and attempted to bring the dragoons forward. "In this last stage of defeat Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton made another struggle to bring his cavalry to the charge. The weight of such an attack might yet retrieve the day, the enemy being much broken by their late rapid advance." But there would be no charge: "all attempts to restore order, recollection, or courage, proved fruitless." Instead, "Above two hundred dragoons forsook their leader, and left the field of battle."

Why did the dragoons flee?

Alexander Chesney made the curious comment that "the British Legion… was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden… the prisoners on seeing their own Regt opposed to them in the rear would not proceed against it and broke." It is believable that some former Continentals had been compelled to enlist as British Legion dragoons [see Note 6], but this explanation seems insufficient to explain why they fled.

Daniel Morgan wrote that Washington charged them "with such firmness, that [Tarleton with his dragoons] instead of attempting to recover the fate of the day, which one would have expected from an officer of his splendid character, broke and fled."

William Moultrie further developed this theme:

"There is no doubt but Colonel Tarleton was a brave man, and a good soldier, but in this affair he displayed neither generalship nor courage, but galloped off with his two hundred and fifty horse, when pursued by about seventy continental cavalry, and forty-five militia horse, and left his infantry to be made prisoners of."

Morgan implied Tarleton of cowardice for retreating with his dragoons; Moultrie directly alleged it. Both assessments are too harsh [see Note 7]. Tarleton had to bring his dragoons to order, if only to minimize British losses. It is difficult to see what possible gain would have resulted from remaining with the infantry. Roderick Mackenzie commented that "Two hundred and fifty horse which had not been engaged, fled through the woods with the utmost precipitation, bearing down such officers as opposed their flight." Tarleton was one of these officers. In Major George Hanger’s words, "Exertions were used, and most vigourous ones, to enforce obedience to the orders, of the gallant commander: some officers went so far as to cut down several of their men, in order to stop the flight."

Washington’s dragoons had rounded the right flank of the British line and were heading towards the dragoon reserve at the time that the latter broke. Did the American cavalry drive off their British counterparts? British writers did not think so.

Stewart noted that the highlanders "saw no prospect of support, while their own numbers were diminishing, and the enemy increasing. They began to retire, and at length to run." Mackenzie commented that when "the advance of the British fell back," they "communicated a panick to others, which soon became general: a total route ensued" [see Note 8]. The picture that emerges is that the retreat of the 71st triggered the flight of the British Legion dragoons. In other words, the dragoons panicked and fled just as the mass of retreating Highlanders and closely pursuing Americans was about to break upon them [see Note 9].

Flight. 1 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Flight (two views; click to enlarge). The Continentals and American militia press the retreating British on front and flank. As the British Legion dragoons flee the battlefield, the American dragoons cut off the retreat of the British infantry.

Notes:

1. It is likely that the militia on the right were the first to reenter the battle as they had more time to recover from being charged by the British cavalry. The militia on the American right can be seen first reengaging the British (albeit at long range) at about the same time as the American counterattack (see Cowpens in Miniature 20).

Morgan rallied the militia on the right after Ogilvie’s charge (see Cowpens in Miniature 18). He seems to have rallied the militia on the left after Nettles was repulsed. According to James Collins: "by this time, both lines of the infantry were warmingly engaged and we being relieved from the pursuit of the enemy [i.e., the British cavalry charge] began to rally and prepare to redeem our credit, when Morgan rode up in front, and waving his sword, cried out, "Form, form, my brave fellows! give them one more fire and the day is ours. Old Morgan. was never beaten." These militia then moved against the British right, but because it was some distance in front, they could not have immediately attacked it.

For Collins to have joined in the counterattack, he would have had to pass through the ranks of Triplett’s Virginians. It seems unlikely that the Virginians would have remained stationary. Therefore, I have shown the Virginians joining (even leading) the counterattack on the map and in the accompanying images of the miniatures. However, this depiction is speculative. Aside from some participant-provided insights into the experience of Triplett’s former company (see especially Cowpens in Miniature 18), very little is known about the experience of the left wing of the main line during the battle.

2. Noting in particular this counterattack, Howard wrote that of the front-line militia that "part of them… [were in] the rear of my right flank," and that these men "renewed the action." In his history of the 71st Foot, Stewart noted that the militia "rallied, returned to the field."

3. The ground occupied by these militia was not much lower than that on which the main fighting was taking place, but the British seemed to have poor awareness of the presence of militia there. Tarleton apparently did not know that the front-line militia were not far behind the right wing of the main line when he ordered Ogilvie to charge. Likewise, Tarleton’s unfulfilled directive for the Legion dragoons to advance to the left seems to have been made in ignorance of these militiamen.

4. Morgan is mentioned by participants as being both with the Continentals and with the militia during the main-line fighting. I argued previously that it was essential to Morgan’s plan for victory that the front-line militia be brought back into the fighting after their initial retreat (see Cowpens in Miniature 9). The Continentals were ably led by Lieutenant-Colonels John Eager Howard and William Washington; it is likely that Morgan devoted the greater part of his energies to overseeing the militia.

5. Alexander Chesney’s account indicates that the 71st was partially attacked from behind. In his words, the militia went "from the rear of their Cavalry which immediately charged and broke in the rear of the 71st (then unsupported) making many prisoners: The rout was almost total" This is an unfortunately ambiguous description. Who "immediately charged," the cavalry or the militia? In the present interpretation, a part of the American cavalry helped drive off Ogilvie’s charge on the American right (see Cowpens in Miniature 16) and thus may have had the militia behind them at one point, but the American cavalry subsequently moved off to assist Washington. Upon rallying, it was the American militia that attacked the flank and rear of the 71st. (For a different take on a possible American cavalry charge against the British left, see Cowpens in Miniature 20, Note 4).

6. It was not uncommon for prisoners of war on both sides to volunteer to serve with the other side as a means of avoiding imprisonment. Some did so in the hope of eventually deserting back to their former army; others because they placed income, health, and safety above patriotic principle. The British could (and did) send those prisoners willing to switch sides to remote posts where they would cause little trouble. But not always, as Chesney’s account reveals.

7. Lee, a cavalryman who fought Tarleton and his dragoons on more than one occasion, was notably more neutral in tone: "The British cavalry, having taken no part in the action, except the two troops attached to the line [i.e., Ogilvie and Nettles], were in force to cover the retreat. This, however, was not done."

8. Stewart elaborated on Mackenzie’s language and assigned the 71st the role of the troops in advance and claimed that the rest of the British infantry were the ones that panicked upon the 71st’s retreat. This description does not mesh well with Tarleton’s account of the battle. Tarleton and Hanger implied that the 71st and the 7th were fighting side-by-side, their flanks entangled. I showed all of the British infantry maintaining a single line while the Continentals retreated, but this is primarily interpretative; there are few indications in participant accounts about the location of specific British units during the middle or late phases of the battle.

9. Even before this the Legion dragoons were likely severely demoralized. Delaware Continental Henry Wells recalled that "During the day, at every turn we Seemed to gain new advantages." From the British perspective, the reverse would have been true – during the battle at every turn they experienced some new loss. The dragoons, on horseback and in reserve, had a panoramic view of the battle, and perhaps a bit more perspective than did Tarleton. They could see that the battle was lost, even if he could not.

To speculate further, another possibility is that one or more dragoon officers even ordered their men to fall back some ways so as to preserve a certain amount of distance between the (retreating) infantry and the cavalry reserve. Under the circumstances, such a minor repositioning of the troops could have led to an unintended retreat, not unlike what happened with Wallace’s Virginians (see Cowpens in Miniature 17).

Sources:

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Hill (.pdf).

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Anderson and Collins, among others.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, Hanger's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

The Journal of Alexander Chesney.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

Related: The British Legion, 71st Foot, Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature

Cowpens in Miniature 17

Part 17: The Second Crisis

Previous: The First Crisis

Next: The Third Crisis

In the center of the battlefield, the British front line bore down on the American Continentals.

Major-General Chastellux commented that when the British were on the offensive, their "attack is not hot, but consists in general of a brisk fire, rather than in closing with the enemy." This seems to have been the tactic used on this occasion. The British front line advanced steadily on the Continentals, stopping repeatedly to fire. At the same time, the Continentals repeatedly volleyed at the British. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals recorded that the British "advanced On boldly under a Very heavy fire until they got Within a few yards of us" [see Note 1].

Tarleton saw that the American Continentals would not easily be driven off. He saw too that the right wing of the main line had fled. Now was the moment to launch the final attack that would end the battle in a decisive British victory.

"As the contest between the British infantry in the front line and the continentals seemed equally balanced, neither retreating, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton thought the advance of the 71st into line, and a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy's right flank, would put a victorious period into the action. No time was lost in performing this manoeuvre. The 71st were desired to pass the 7th before they gave their fire, and were directed not to entangale their right flank with the left of the other battalion."

In making this maneuver, the two regiments did become entangled. Major George Hanger learned that the 71st "moved up; and when moving up to form in line with the rest of the troops, whether from their not taking ground enough, or from some other circumstance, their right flank brushed the left flank of the 7th regiment, and intermixed one with the other."

Meanwhile, according to Tarleton, "The cavalry were ordered to incline to the left, and to form a line, which would embrace the whole of the enemy's right flank."

The entanglement between the 71st and the 7th was not allowed to slow the attack. In Tarleton’s words, "Upon the advance of the 71st, all the infantry again moved on."

The 71st Foot Enters the Fight. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken by Ogilvie's charge), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming / retreating), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Main Line Fighting (two views; click to enlarge). The events shown in this image overlap with some of those shown in the last post. Ogilvie’s charge is visible in both images. The British front line advances on the Continentals. Meanwhile, the 71st Foot has advanced alongside the 7th Foot and the British Legion dragoon reserve advances towards the American right.

As the British made their final push, the Continentals began to retreat. François-Jean de Chastellux learned that "the whole line… [wheeled] to the right," and wondered at its cause. Other writers noted the retreat but gave no explanation for it. Tarleton, for example, recalled only that "The continentals and back woodsmen gave ground" [see Note 2].

This retreat would become one of the most commented upon features of the battle.

Historian David Stewart assumed that the retreat of the Continentals was related to the retreat of the front line. "the second [line], which had as yet taken no share in the action, observing confusion and retrograding in their front, suddenly faced to the right, and inclined backwards; a manoeuvre by which a space was left for the front line to retreat, without interfering with the ranks of those who were now to oppose the advance of the Highlanders, "who ran in, with characteristic eagerness, desirous to take advantage of the confusion which appeared among the enemy." This description, however, does not mesh well with participant accounts.

More credibly, others claimed that the retreat occurred because the Continentals had been outflanked. Thomas Anderson wrote in his journal that "their line Was So much longer than ours the turn'd our Flanks Which Caused us to fall back Some Disstance." This is also the reason that Daniel Morgan gave in his official report of the battle: "their numbers being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position."

However, there was another reason for the retreat. Morgan admitted "very candidly" to François-Jean de Chastellux, "that the retrograde movement he had made, was not premeditated." The retreat, in other words, was an accident.

Henry Lee, who knew Morgan and Howard, elaborated on this theme in his history of the battle. He noted that the British, "outstretching our front, endangered Howard's right." The threat stemmed from the dissolution of the right wing of the main line and the advance of the 71st Foot. Therefore, Howard "instantly took measures to defend his flank, by directing his right company to change its front; but, mistaking this order, the company fell back; upon which the line began to retire, and General Morgan directed it to retreat to the cavalry. This manoeuvre being performed with precision, our flank became relieved, and the new position was assumed with promptitude."

After historian William Johnson inaccurately described the causes of this retreat (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1), Howard felt compelled to comment on this incident at length. This retreat, he said:

"was not occasioned by the fire of the enemy… I soon observed, as I had but about 350 men and the british about 800 [see Note 3], that their line extended much further than mine particularly on my right, where they were pressing forward to gain my flank.--To protect that flank, I ordered the company on my right to change its front so as to oppose the enemy on that flank [see Note 4]. Whether my orders were not well understood or whether it proceeded from any other cause, in attempting this movement some disorder ensued in this company which rather fell back than faced as I wished them." As a consequence, "first a part, and then the whole of the company commenced a retreat."

Regarding the cause of the confusion, Howard (fairly or not) placed the blame firmly on the company commander:

"This company on my right were Virginians, commanded by Capt. Wallace who some time previous had formed a connexion with a vile woman of the camp, and the infatuation was so great that on guard or any other duty he had this woman with him and seemed miserable when she was absent. He seemed to have lost all sense of the character of an officer. He was in this state of mind at the time of the action. As well as I can recollect Morgan afterwards reprimanded him severely & forced him to break off the connexion."

In any case, the effect of this error was not limited to Wallace’s company. "The rest of the line expecting that a retreat was ordered, faced about and retreated but in perfect order."

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson recorded what happened next: "The Enemy thinking that We Were broke set up a great Shout Charged us With their bayonets but in no Order."

The British had paid a steep price in blood, but now at least victory seemed imminent. The Continentals, the last significant form of resistance on the battlefield, were retreating. They would not be allowed to retreat peacefully. The British infantry stormed after them.

According to Howard, "Morgan, who had mostly been with the militia, quickly rode up to me and expressed apprehensions of the event; but I soon removed his fears by pointing to the line, and observing that the men were not beaten who retreated in that order. He then ordered me to keep with the men, until we came to the rising ground near Washington's horse; and he rode forward to fix on the most proper place for us to halt and face about.

Howard clearly indicated that he was ordered to take a position near Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s dragoon reserve, or at least that portion not engaged with Ogilvie. "At this moment Genl. Morgan rode to me and ordered me to retreat to Washington's horse about 100 yards, and there form."

Other sources, however, indicate that not only were the Continental infantry retreating to the rear, but that Washington’s dragoons approached the Continental infantry as they were retreating.

William Moultrie stated in his postwar history that "Colonel Washington perceiving this [retreat], immediately rode up close to the rear of the second line [i.e., the Continentals] with his cavalry… Colonel Washington, riding up so close to the rear of our second line stopped the British for a moment, which gave time to Colonel Howard to rally his men."

On the British side, Lieutenant Mackenzie also believed this is what occurred. Morgan "ordered Colonel Washington, with his dragoons, to cover his [Howard’s] retreat, and to check the pursuit."

The Continentals in Retreat. The Continentals are retreating to the rear and wheeling to the right. A portion of the American cavalry marks the spot where they will halt. Meanwhile, the British infantry pursue.

Notes:

1. That the Continentals fired repeatedly on the advancing British is also indicated in the statement by John Thomas, who lost track of the number of volleys. He noted that when the British began their attack, "The musquetry [i.e., Continentals]… had orders to fire but doesn't know how many times they fired before they retreated."

2. Tarleton knew that the right wing of the main line had retreated. Unclear from this or other statements is whether the left wing of the main line retreated at the same time as the Continentals. It seems unlikely that they did. Virginian rifleman John Thomas notably used "they" rather than "we" to describe the retreat of the Continentals. Lawrence Babits also quotes a Virginian riflemen by the name of Jeremiah Preston who claimed to have "fired 17 rounds," which also suggests that Triplett’s Virginians remained in place (and continued to fire on the British as the Continentals retreated). Triplett’s Virginians probably would have remained behind the Continentals, after the latter completed their retreat, which makes it plausible that Triplett would have remained in place.

3. According to my order of battle, he has somewhat overstated British strength and understated American strength. See Cowpens in Miniature 2, Cowpens in Miniature 3.

4. In my order of battle, I noted that Wallace’s Virginians numbered only 20 men. This number would seem to be far too few to have effectively checked the more than 250 men of the 71st Foot. It’s possible that Wallace’s small company was augmented with some of the miscellaneous troops assigned to Howard’s battalion (specifically, the North Carolina continentals and Virginia State Troops; see the American order of battle for details). However, even in that case this company would still have been outnumbered 5-1. A retreat, it would seem, was unavoidable.

Sources:

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Anderson, Howard, and Thomas, among others.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, Hanger's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses, The American Cavalry - Part 1, Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature

Cowpens in Miniature 8

Part 8: The Americans Deploy
Previous: Initial Contact

Next: Morgan's Plan

Now certain that battle was eminent, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan began his final preparations. He reported:

“An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp [see Note 1]. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them.”

Other writers made a similar remark. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the 1st Delaware would record in his journal, “Before day Reced Information that Col Tarlton Was Within Five Miles of us With a Strong Body of Horse and Infantry Whereon We got up and put Ourselves in Order of Battle.”

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina remembered that Morgan and Colonel Andrew Pickens walked through the American encampment waking up the men and exhorting them to fight.

“Gen. Morgan being apprised of the approach of Tarleton by faithful spies, began before day to go from mess to mess with Gen. Pickens, saying ‘Boys, get up, Benny's coming; & you that have sweethearts or wives or children or parents, must fight for them and above all you must fight for liberty and for your country,’ which appeared to have the ears of Every true friend of this country, & were alive to action, but a few ‘pet Tories’ whom it seemed like poison to.”

As for the Continentals, as soon as the drums started beating, they rose and hastened into formation. According to McJunkin, “the tattoo being sounded, the line was formed commanded by Col. Howard [Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard].” Morgan then spoke to them collectively, saying “My friends in arms, my dear boys, I request you to remember Saratoga, Monmouth, Paoli & Brandywine, & this day you must play your parts for your honor & liberty's cause.”

The troops then began moving onto the battlefield. It was an unpleasant morning. Private William Neel, who was in Captain Buchanan’s company of Virginians, remembered that, “the Army paraded before day a cold morning.” Captain Henry Connelly recalled, “it was cold weather but inclined to be rainey.”

According to McJunkin, “First the regulars and some companies of Virginia militia are posted to where the final issue is expected.” However, Colonel Joseph Hayes’ small regiment may have been the first onto the battlefield. Perhaps they were directed to mark the spot where the Continentals were to deploy or they were designated to cover the Continentals’ deployment with their long-ranged rifles. Robert Long of Hayes’ regiment watched as the Continentals “marched out in sections, and divided two and two as they got [within] ten paces of Hayes' regiment already formed across the road.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 1. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's infantry march down the road behind them, followed by Major Francis Triplett's Virginians.

The Continentals deployed to the southwest of the Green River Road, that is, to the right of Hayes’ regiment [see Note 2]. Thomas Young remembered that, “The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 2. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Howard's Continentals have completed their deployment. Major Francis Triplett's Virginians are beginning to deploy as well. Other units can be seen preparing to deploy.

The Virginia militia deployed behind and to the sides of the Continentals, leaving a gap between the Continentals and either wing of militia [see Note 3]. According to Neel, his company of Virginia militia “formed in single file with the Militia on the right of the Regulars, stood in ranks till Sun rise, at which time the battle commenced” [see Note 4].

Sergeant Major William Seymour of the Delaware Continentals recorded in his journal that “we were drawn up in order of battle, the men seeming to be all in good spirits and very willing to fight.”

Next came the more complicated deployment of the balance of the American militia. According to McJunkin, “the main body of militia under Gen. Pickens are drawn up at the distance of 150 yards” in front of the main line [see Note 5]. They were deployed in two wings, which were aligned with the gaps between the Continentals and militia wings on the main line [see Note 6]. The American cavalry, meanwhile, took up position on the elevation behind the Continentals [see Note 7].

The American deployment was now complete. Brigadier-General William Moultrie, an early historian of the battle, wrote that, “General Morgan drew up his men on an open pine barren in the following order… the militia of about four hundred men formed the first line under General Pickens; the continentals of about five hundred (two hundred of whom were six months men, very raw troops) formed the second line [see Note 8], commanded by Colonel Howard, about two hundred yards in the rear of the first. Colonel Washington, with about seventy-five continental cavalry, and- forty-five mounted militia, with swords, under Colonel M'Call, in the rear of the whole: in this disposition did they wait to receive the enemy.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Colonel Henry Lee made similar observations in his early history [see Note 9]. He concluded, “Erroneous as was the decision to fight in this position, when a better might have been easily gained, the disposition for battle was masterly.”

Morgan indicated in his report of the battle that Hayes’ regiment was deployed on the left wing of the militia wing. However, Robert Long stated that his regiment was deployed on the right wing of the main line (see The Statements of Private Robert Long). Either Morgan or Long was mistaken in their recollection, or Hayes' regiment was ordered to the militia line, but then moved to the main line due to some last-minute adjustment in the deployment.

Why would men have been drawn from the left wing of the militia line to reinforce the right wing of the main line? It is noteworthy that the left wing of the militia line bordered a branch of Suck Creek, while the right wing of the militia line was posted on a high point on the battlefield. Perhaps it was determined that while the left wing could have fewer men without endangering the American position, but the right wing could not be reduced.

No participant account directly says that some men were shifted off of the front line to supplement the main line. However, Robert Long, of Hayes’ regiment did describe his regiment performing some peculiar pre-battle maneuvers. He stated that after the Continentals deployed,

“Hayes regiment then moved to the right of the infantry [the Continentals],” or onto the other side of the battlefield. Once they were there, there seems to have been some confusion over exactly where Hayes’ regiment was to deploy. At first Hayes’ regiment was “70 or 80 yards in advance” of the Continentals, and “70 or 80 yards” behind “Major McDowell, of North Carolina.” In other words, they were midway between the militia line and the main line. The rest of the main line militia were deployed behind the Continentals.

The Americans Deploy, Part 3. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is on the right of the Continentals, midway between the Continentals' right and Major Joseph McDowell's North Carolinians. At this stage, the American deployment is largely complete.

Eventually, the deployment was sorted out. Long noted that “Hayes' regiment having advanced too far were to retreat.” They then fell back to a more appropriate position, perhaps next to Connelly’s company. At that point, Long stood “in the center line on the right wing in Captain Ewing's company commanded by Colonel Joseph Hayes, next to Colonel Howard's Infantry.”

The right wing of the main line was described by few participants. For example, Thomas Young wrote that, “The battle field was almost a plain with a ravine on both hands, and very little under growth in front or near us. The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks, their right flank resting upon the head of the ravine on the right. The militia [of the main line] were formed on the left of the regulars… their left flank resting near the head of the ravine on the left.”

Howard remembered that he had “two companies of Virginia Militia or volunteers, one commanded by Capt Tripolet [Major Francis Triplett] from Fauguhar [Fauquier County], the other by a capt Tate from Rockbridge or one of the western Counties.” He wrote, “I am positive that Triplett and Tate were on my left,” but said nothing about militia units on his right.

The right wing of the main line was on lower ground than the Continentals and the other militia units; perhaps Howard and others didn’t see them there. Alternatively, as the right wing failed to distinguish itself during the battle, their presence, while known at the time, was later forgotten.

Final American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Notes:

1. The scout could be either a militiaman or one of Washington’s dragoons. As noted in my previous post, Sergeant Lawrence Everhart claimed that he was captured when 3 miles away from Morgan’s camp; this suggests that the main British column was 2 miles distant from the site of the initial conflict.

2. This is indicated in the pension application of Sergeant Benjamin Martin of the Virginia militia. Martin stated that "I was in the road all the time of the action... Lieutenant Ewen [James Ewing] was on the left of the Maryland Troops near me." This places Martin on the left of the Continentals, and the Continentals to the southwest of the Green River Road. A number of illustrations of the battle of Cowpens show the Americans deployed equally to either side of the Green River Road. However, the ground was more elevated to the southwest of the road than to the northeast (see The Cowpens Battlefield). Martin’s statement suggests that the American deployment was governed more by the topography of the battlefield than by the location of the road.

3. The description of the American deployment provided here is unlike that in many histories of the battle, but it is not wholly unique. A similar arrangement can be found in Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Two Interpretations of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, Bearss' on the right. The positioning of the units per Bearss' account is approximate. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

In both cases, heavy emphasis has been placed on Morgan's after action report and Hammond's description of Morgan's plan (see Morgan's Report, The Hammond Map). I interpreted Hammond somewhat differently than did Bearss. Other differences arose because I drew upon pension applications as a source of information.

One recent history that indicates a very different American deployment than that shown here is Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens.

Comparison of Two Versions of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, and is as described above. Babits' interpretation appears on the right; the positioning of the units per his account is approximate. On the right, 1 = American Cavalry; 2 = Main Line; 3 = Militia Line; 4 = Skirmish Line. The two accounts also differ in terms of the location of the Green River Road. The road in my version follows Bearss and is shown in brown. Babits showed the Green River Road following a different course, which I have partially sketched out in black on the right panel.

There are a number of reasons for the differences in the present account with that by Babits. Chief among these is that Babits concluded (while I did not) that Morgan's and Hammond's descriptions of the American deployment referred to a temporary battle plan that was developed the night before the battle and then greatly modified before the actual fighting began. (see Morgan's Report and The Hammond Map for a transcription of their accounts).

I have devoted a number of previous posts to arguing for the version of the American deployment shown here. In regards to the main line deployment, see in particular The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Composition, and The Main Line: Location.

4. Aside from Neel, the only participant to comment on the number of ranks was Thomas Young, who said that “the regulars… were formed in two ranks.” He did not indicate this deployment for the militia. Indeed, that he should have mentioned this fact at all suggests that he found such a deployment to be exceptional. A single rank for the militia line leads to their covering well the high ground between Suck Creek and Island Creek. Perhaps all of the militia were formed in a single rank, although it's not unreasonable to believe that the men also would have doubled up behind large trees where they were near the line.

5. Some sources say that distance was 150 yards, others that it was 200 yards. In the images the distance between the first and second lines is a little greater than 150 (scale) yards.

6. This is indicated in participant accounts. As noted above, Martin’s statement indicated that gap between the Continentals and the left wing of the main line would have been near the Green River Road. Hammond’s description of the militia line deployment places his regiment on the northeast of the Green River Road and Major John Cunningham’s men on the southwest of the road. In other words, the left wing of the militia line was roughly aligned with the left gap in the main line. I assume, by extension, that the same was true of the right wing of the militia line. See The Hammond Map.

7. For details about where the American cavalry were deployed, see The American Cavalry - Part 2.

8. Moultrie mistakenly referred to 200 of the troops as Continentals that were in fact Virginia militia with long terms of service. They were, in any case, “raw troops.”

9. Lee said that “The main body of the militia composed… [the front] line, with General Pickens at its head. At a suitable distance in the rear of the first line a second was stationed, composed of the continental infantry and two companies of Virginia militia, under Captains Triplett and Taite, commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel Howard. Washington's cavalry, reinforced with a company of mounted militia armed with sabres, was held in reserve; convenient to support the infantry, and protect the horses of the rifle militia, which were tied, agreeably to usage, in the rear.”

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Morgan, Anderson, McJunkin, Neel, Connelly, Young, Seymour, Howard, and Hammond.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan also has a copy of Morgan's report.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Long (.pdf file). See also The Statements of Private Robert Long.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's statement.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf).

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Location, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2

Last time, I noted that the British commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, deployed a troop of cavalry on either end of his line of infantry at the beginning of the battle. I also argued that both of these troops were used to assail the two flanks of the American line. I described, in particular, the attack of Captain David Ogilvie's British Legion dragoons against the right wing of the American main line.

The other British cavalry charge was made by Lieutenant Henry Nettles and the 17th Light Dragoons.

Whereas Ogilvie's charge was made at an early point in the British attack on the American main line, Nettles' attack occurred after the American Continentals had begun to retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, who commanded the Continentals, wrote that, “…about the time of our retreat, a large body of british cavalry passes round my left flank and pursued the flying militia to their horses."

This force would have been Nettles' 17th Light Dragoons, which had been stationed on the British right.

Howard, like Major McJunkin, whom I quoted in my last post, believed that the retreating front-line militia was the target of Nettles' attack. However, this may be another case in which the encounter between the British dragoons and the reforming front-line infantry was accidental. South Carolina militiaman Jeremiah Dial stated that the British cavalry "broke through the leftwing of the Malitia," which echoes the statements made about the attack that broke the right wing (see: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses). Private Isaac Way, who was on the left wing of the main line (Triplett's Virginians), evidently was in the line of this charge. He claimed that he “was severely wounded on the side, back, arms, head and in the face by the cut of the sword of a British dragoon.”

There is evidence that around the time of Nettles' charge, at least some of the American cavalry was employed to assist Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard in halting the Continentals during their accidental retreat.

Brigadier-General William Moultrie, who obtained his information second-hand, wrote, “…the second [main] line began to give way. Colonel Washington [i.e., Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington of the American 3rd light dragoons] perceiving this, immediately rode up close to the rear of the second line with his cavalry, and spoke to Colonel Howard, ‘that if he would rally his men, and charge the enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry that were got among our militia in the rear.' Colonel Washington, riding up so close to the rear of our second line stopped the British for a moment, which gave time to Colonel Howard to rally his men, and charge with fixed bayonets… [then] Colonel Washington charged the enemy's cavalry, who were cutting down our militia, and soon drove them off.” (book link)

Howard's account reinforces this point: "Washington observing this [i.e., the British cavalry attack] charged them. As well as I can recollect this charge was made at the same moment that I charged the [British] infantry, for as soon as we got among the enemy & were making prisoners I observed the enemy's cavalry retreating the way the[y] had advanced, by our left flank, and Washington in pursuit of them and he followed them some distance--You will observe by this statement that Washington's charge had no connexion with mine as his movement was to the rear in a quite different direction.”

Washington’s charge “to the rear” was from immediately behind the Continentals to the area in the left rear of the main line where the militia were under attack. Howard repeated this idea in another place in the same letter: “He [Washington] moved to the left from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse.”

Nettles' Attack. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line (Triplett's former company has been broken, but the rest of the line is intact), 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (and parts of the right wing, see: Flight of the Militia - Part 3; both groups are reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Howard.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Dial (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Isaac Way (.pdf file).

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Related: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, 17th Light Dragoons, The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses

How Many Fought at Cowpens?

[Revised 12/28/09]

My previous posts have generally focused on specific British and American units that fought at the battle of Cowpens, and how they were deployed during the battle. In this post I explore the question of how many totals soldiers fought at the battle.

British Numbers

Statements about the number of British soldiers at Cowpens fall within a relatively narrow range. The British commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, estimated his total force at about 1000 men. American estimates put the total only a little bit higher. In his after action report, the American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, estimated the British force at 1,150 men, including those that had served as a baggage guard. Morgan and his subordinates had the opportunity to converse with a number of British officers after the battle. From this, Morgan learned that, "Their own officers confess that they fought one thousand and thirty-seven.” The specificity of this number makes it seem conclusive, but in fact it's not clear (at least to me) whether this number refers to rank and file only or to all personnel. A letter by Morgan's superior, Major-General Nathanael Greene, confirmed the total of "1150 British troops," but also added "50 Militia." The largest estimate of British forces was provided by Sergeant William Seymour of Delaware, who said that Tarleton had 1,300 men, but it is unlikely that he had access to information that Morgan and Greene did not.

American Numbers

By comparison with estimates of British totals, statements about the number of Americans at Cowpens vary to a greater degree. At the lower extreme is Morgan: in his after action report, he stated that he had only 800 men. Other sources indicate a larger number of men, but a number agree that Morgan had fewer than 900 men in his command. This agreement may be partly aritificial because other sources relied on Morgan for their information. There is, however, enough variability among such sources to suggest that the totals were at least somewhat independently derived.

Colonel Otho Williams of Maryland recorded in his notebook on Jan 23, 1781 that Morgan had "290 Continentals under Lt. Col. Howard, the South Carolina and Georgia volunteers, about 350 men under Col. Pickens," and, "170 Virginia militia under Major Triplett." Morgan seems to have been the source of these numbers, which total 810. This suggests that Morgan's total of 800 leaves out some of the men under his command, including, at a minimum, Washington's light dragoons, and possibly some other commands.

Two days before the battle, Morgan wrote to Greene and complained that, "I have now with me only two hundred South Carolina and Georgia, and one hundred and forty North Carolina, volunteers."* This total, 340, suggests that the 350 militiamen recorded by Williams does include McDowell's North Carolinians at least, and perhaps other militiamen as well (the mounted militia, for example, had not yet been detached to that purpose). Morgan was joined the following day by additional militiamen, but perhaps he saw no reason to later revise his estimated totals. Of the 340 militiamen, Morgan complained in his letter to Greene, "I [do not] expect to have more that two-thirds of these to assist me, should I be attacked, for it is impossible to keep them collected.”

An authoritative report on American numbers appeared in a Congressional Resolution passed on March 9, 1781. The Resolution reads, in part, "The United States, in Congress assembled, considering it as a tribute to distinguished merit to give a public approbation to the conduct of Brigadier General Morgan and of the officers and men under his command on the 17th of January last, when with eighty cavalry and two hundred and thirty-seven infantry of the troops of the United States and five hundred and fifty-three militia from the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia he obtained a complete and important victory over a select and well appointed detachment of more than eleven hundred British Troops commanded by Lieut. Col. Tarleton..."

The Resolution identifies a total of 870 American participants at Cowpens, a total that exceeds Williams' numbers because it enumerates the American dragoons. There are also some differences between Williams and the Congressional Resolution on the numbers of continentals and militia. Williams recorded 290 Continental light infantry, and the Resolution referred to 237. Williams recorded 520 militiamen, and the Resolution referred to 553. The specificity of the Resolution numbers seems compelling, but it is not clear on what information they were based and it seems unlikely than an exact count of the militiamen serving at Cowpens could have been performed.

James Graham, in The Life of General Daniel Morgan... (1856), reported that at Cowpens there were 280 continentals, 120 militiamen with Triplett, 80 dragoons with Washington, 40 mounted militiamen, and 350 men in the militia line. Like the Resolution numbers, this is also a total of 870 men. He further noted that, "his [Morgan's] entire command, including all the militia that arrived previous to the battle, would appear to be about nine hundred and eighty men, if army returns and muster rolls were alone consulted. But every one acquainted with military affairs knows that such evidences of strength always exceed the reality. A number of his regulars were sick at the time, and many of the militia were absent. One detachment had been sent off with the baggage, another had gone to Salisbury in charge of prisoners, and a third guarded the horses of the militia. Besides, after the retreat of the militia from the front line, several of them never again appeared in the field, and a few mounted their horses and fled from the ground. Such men should not be permitted to lesson the glory of the achievement, by sharing in the honors of the victors as well as diminishing the mortification of the vanquished. The forces engaged in the battle under Morgan did not exceed eight hundred and fifty men."

I am generally distrustful of Graham's history, especially because, like other early histories, he generally does not provide evidence to support his assertions. However, he does at least make a fair point that the number of men on the books and the number of men that actually stand in line on the day of battle may be quite different.

American Brigadier-General William Moultrie wrote an earlier history of the battle that can be deemed more reliable. William Dobein James in A Sketch of The Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion (1821) suggested that Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington was the source of Moultrie's information. Moultrie recorded that the Americans had "two hundred and ninety infantry, eighty cavalry and about six hundred militia," or 970 men. This is about equal to the 980 men Graham reported, "if army returns and muster rolls were alone consulted."

Other American accounts confirm that the Americans were outnumbered at Cowpens. Private Henry Wells of Delaware remembered that, "Our whole force at this time numbered Some thing less than 900 men a greater proportion of whom were militia & less than 100 horse… we fell in with a much Superior force of the enemy, at the Cowpens under Col. Tarleton. He outnumbered us with infantry and he had three or four times as many Cavalry”* (also see this .pdf file). Major McJunkin of South Carolina recalled that, "His [Morgan's] force was considerably inferior to that arrayed against him." Governor John Rutledge of South Carolina congratulated Morgan shortly after the battle and wrote that, "This total defeat of chosen Veteran British Troops by a number far inferior to theirs will for Ever distinguish the gallant men by whom the Glorious Victory was obtained, & endear them to their country."

The exact number of Americans at Cowpens may not be knowable, but it seems safe to conclude in any case that the total was less than 1,000 men for certain, and maybe even less than 900 men.

The only sources to suggest a larger total of Americans were those of the British commanders.

Major General Charles Cornwallis, in reporting the battle, wrote that, "his [Morgan's] Corps by the best accounts I could get, consisted of about five hundred men, Continentals & Virginia State Troops, & one hundred Cavalry under Colonel Washington, & six or seven hundred Militia, but that Body is so fluctuating, that it is impossible to ascertain its number, within some hundreds.” This is a total force of about 1,200 to 1,300 men, or a number slightly superior to the British total.

The British commander at Cowpens, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, was one of the primary sources for Cornwallis' report. The reputations of both men were tarnished by the defeat. If Tarleton had discovered that the American army was larger than the British had expected, it is unlikely that Cornwallis would have left this out of his report.

Cornwallis' estimate is much less reliable than those provided by American sources. The British in general, and Cornwallis in particular, habitually overestimated the size of American forces they faced. It's possible that the Americans were deliberately feeding them bad information. One David George of South Carolina wrote Tarleton on January 1, 1781 that, "My Wife's sister Last Night came to my house out of strong Rebel Settlement up at Princes fort; by her I have heard the Design & Intention of the Rebels... Morgan with five or six Hundred Light horse had Crossed broad River at Smiths ford... and Washington with their artillery and foot men was to Cross broad River at the same ford... they say they will have Three Thousand men."* At this point, the Americans did not have anywhere near 500 or 600 horsemen (even counting militia, who often rode the horses they owned), and at no point did they have artillery. Bad information like this, however, would have helped keep the British unsure and on the defensive while American plans unfolded.

Tarleton reported a much higher American troop total in his postwar memoir than had previously appeared in Cornwallis' report. Tarleton wrote that “He [Tarleton] discovered that the American commander had formed a front line of about one thousand militia, and had composed his second line and reserve of five hundred continental light infantry, one hundred and twenty of Washington's cavalry, and three hundred back woodsmen.” This is a total force of 1,920 men, or approximately 700 more Americans than the British claimed on January 19, 1781. It's possible that Tarleton acquired new information in the months or years after the battle, but it's not clear where this would have come from. If he relied on American sources, he would have read only about smaller totals, not larger ones. My suspicion is that he either misread Cornwallis' report, or his numbers were invented.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's postwar memoir.

William Dobein James (1821). A Sketch of The Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion.

James Graham. (1856). The Life of General Daniel Morgan. (Has a copy of Morgan's account of the battle).

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

For Joseph McJunkin's accounts of the battle, see:

• James Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.
• Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. (.pdf file).

John Moncure's excellent Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage has copies of most of the accounts described here.

William Moultrie. (1802). Memoirs of the American Revolution.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

A summary of the Otho Williams papers can be found here.