October 15, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 15th: The standoff at Throg’s Neck continued; the armies prepared for another movement; Hugh Mercer led a raid onto Staten Island.

Previous entry: October 14th; next: October 16th.

The uneasy standoff at Throg’s Neck (commonly called Frog’s Point) continued into a fourth day. American Major General William Heath noted, “The scattering fire across the marsh continued, and now and then a man was killed.” Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) was witness to one of these incidents:

“in the morning… I walked out to see the country and found plenty of… apples and peaches and [I] went as far as our lower lines and saw the enemy on Frog’s Point where they was at an house over a creek[,] a little beyond musket shot of our guard[.] One who appeared like an officer ventured down to the creek and was shot down by one of our men and was carried up by them to the house”.

Archibald Robertson of the Royal Engineers noted that he spent the day “raising two mock batteries… opposite the bridge… and a line opposite theirs on our right” by the head of the creek. These batteries made it look as if the British would attempt an overland push across Westchester Creek. In actuality, the British were preparing to bypass the American defenses by landing on another part of the coast.

Newly-arrived American Major General Charles Lee did not know what move the British would make next, but he felt that the Americans should not wait for it in their present position. According to Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion)*:

“General Lee… thought that the situation of the army of the States of America was much too confined and cramped, and that it could not be good policy to lie still in such a situation, or to hazard the great cause in which we were embarked in one general action, in which if we should not succeed, the army might be lost, as a retreat would be extremely difficult if not impossible.”

George Washington was also troubled by the situation of the army. He doubted that he had enough men to prevent the British from taking control of the Hudson, maintain the army’s fortifications in upper Manhattan, and counter the British advance into Westchester County. He wrote that:

“…we are obliged to divide our force, and guard every probable place of attack as well as we can; as most of our stores are here [in upper Manhattan] and about King's Bridge, and the preservation of the communication with the States on the other side of Hudson’s River [is] a matter of great importance… I have sent two regiments of the Massachusetts militia up the river to watch the motions of the [British] ships [cf.October 9th & 10th], and to oppose any landing of men that they may attempt. I am also extending every part of my force that I possibly can… to oppose the enemy [inWestchester County], and prevent their effecting their plan… but our numbers being far inferior to the demands for men, I cannot answer for what may happen: the most in my power shall be done.”

The American stance at this time was not wholly defensive.

In Connecticut, Governor Jonathan Trumbull and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Livingston (2ndNew York Regiment) had begun to wage war on British Loyalists occupying Long Island. They were in the process of rounding up men and boats so as to make a major raid.

In New Jersey, Major-General Nathanael Greene and Brigadier-General Hugh Mercer led on this date a raid onto Staten Island. Staten Island was the first base of operations for the British army in the New York City area. However, by this date the island was largely stripped of troops.

Colonel Samuel Patterson was present with a battalion of Delaware militia. He later wrote:

“in the evening, General Mercer ordered part of four battalions to… go on board boats at eight o’clock that evening. We did, in the whole about six hundred men, with two pieces of brass artillery. We crossed all about ten o’clock at night, in order to attack a small fort at the east end of that island, at the watering-place, and to be there by break of day,--seventeen miles, our battalion in front”.

While the Americans were marching across the island, a messenger caught up with the generals and informed them that Washington had called for a council of war that would convene in the morning. Greene left, but Mercer continued ahead.

According to Patterson, “At the same time” we were “informed… that the fort was reinforced the day before by the arrival of fresh troops… to about twelve hundred men.”

Mercer gave up the idea of taking the fort and sent back the artillery. However, he also learned of a target of opportunity. He afterwards reported, “I was then advanced within a few miles of Richmond town [on Staten Island], and received information… that a company of British troops, one of Hessians and one of [Cortland] Skinner’s [Loyalist] militia [the New Jersey Volunteers], lay there.” He issued orders to surround and capture these men.

According to Patterson, Mercer ordered Patterson and one Colonel Samuel Griffin to take the Delaware militia and two rifle companies to a point “about a mile below the town… and to lay about there till near break of day”. There they would cut off the retreat of the British troops. “General Mercer’s plan was—he to attack, with his party, in three places, and we to be ready at the same time in the other quarters.”

Patterson added: “[Mercer] is… as cool in his plans as a philosopher. I love him.”

*The letter was anonymous; Ezra Stiles believed Trumbull was the author.

Battle of Longueuil (2)

At the end of October, 1775, Guy Carleton, governor of Quebec, prepared to cross the St. Lawrence River and do battle with the American Continentals gathered on the far shore. To carry out this mission, he had a small army consisting of about 130 British regulars, 80 Native Americans, and around 500 Canadian militia [1]. He had also around 34 boats of various sizes to carry his troops across the river, plus the armed schooner Gaspé.

A significant problem facing Carleton was that the river did not lend itself to amphibious operations. Major Henry Livingston, who commanded the American forces at La Prairie, noted that the river “is very unsafe to navigate. The rocks often projecting just out of the water above a mile from either shore & some but a few Inches under the surface & very dangerous for Battoes or Canoes to strike on.” [2]

Perhaps for this reason, Carleton decided to make his attack near Longueuil, in a place where the water was so shallow that men could wade to shore from an island [Île Ste Hélène] well out in the river. This permitted the attack to be made in two parts: “a number were to wade and the rest to come with their boats.”

The nearest American defenders were 2 miles away in the village of Longueuil. This force, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Seth Warner, included all or nearly all of the Green Mountain Boys, and 5 or 6 companies of the 2nd New York regiment. There, the officers took lodging in some houses while the men encamped in or about an ancient stone fort. [4]

Carleton organized the Canadian militia into “brigades,” and asked the prominent citizens of Montreal to select one from their ranks to lead the Canadians and Indians. They chose Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume de Lorimier, a 31-year-old volunteer who had previously distinguished himself in operations around Fort Saint-Jean. [5]

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A view of Montreal, from the St. Lawrence River.

A view of Montreal from Mont Royal. The city and its suburbs are visible in the middle ground. At center left is Île Ste Hélène. The battle of Longueuil was fought between this island and the far shore of the river.

The fort at Longueuil. This drawing shows the fort's appearance in the early 19th-Century, before it was demolished.

Maps of the area between Île Ste Hélène and the southern shore of the St. Lawrence, dating from 1866 (top), 1915 (middle), and 1952 (bottom). The river is quite shallow at this point, and in various places the sandbars create small islands. A comparison of the three maps suggests that these small islands would change over time.

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Notes:

1. Simon Sanguinet, a resident of Montreal, claimed in his memoir that there were 130 regulars, 80 Native Americans, and 800 Canadian militia. Other sources suggest that Carleton's army was smaller, especially in terms of Canadian militia. For example, the day after the battle Lieutenant John Fassett (a copy of his journal is available here) learned from a Canadian prisoner that Carleton had commanded “660 men, that 100 were Regulars, and the rest Canadians and a few Indians.”

2. A copy of Livingston's journal is available here.

3. Sanguinet and de Lorimier stated that the attack was made from Île Ste Hélène. The quoted passage is from Fassett's journal and it refers to a prisoner's description of Carleton's plan of attack.

4. cf. journals by Fassett and Livingston.

5. This description is based on de Lorimier's memoir. In September he co-led the party that halted the first American advance on Fort Saint-Jean. When Moses Hazen was captured by the British on September 18, de Lorimier was given the assignment of taking him back to Montreal. At this time, almost everyone making the journey between Montreal and Fort Saint-Jean was captured by the Americans; de Lorimier was successful despite having a prisoner in tow. Afterwards, de Lorimier claimed that John Brown offered him the position of major with the Americans if he would switch sides. He did not.

Fort Saint-Jean

War came to Canada soon after the beginning of the American Revolution. On May 17, 1775 (less than 1 month after the inaugural battle at Lexington and Concord), Colonel Benedict Arnold led a raid against British Fort Saint-Jean in southern Quebec, capturing the personnel, boats, and stores located there. Despite this setback, British governor Guy Carleton did not abandon the post. Instead, Fort Saint-Jean was transformed over the summer of 1775 into the most important point of defense for the province of Quebec.

Fort Saint-Jean was situated at a strategic point in the Richelieu-Champlain-Hudson corridor, a traditional invasion route between the American colonies and Canada. Boats launched from Saint-Jean could sail as far south as Skenesborough, deep within the province of New York (cf. New York: May, 1775). However, no large boat could sail north from Saint-Jean because of nearby rapids in the Richelieu River.

The Richelieu River Valley. Fort Saint-Jean is rendered in English on the map as Fort St. John. The upper part of the Richelieu is labelled River Chambly -- a distinction no longer in use. Note that there were two supply routes connecting Fort Saint-Jean to the rest of Canada. Supplies could be sent by water along the Richelieu, or they could be sent overland from La Prairie (near Montréal).

Fort Saint-Jean was originally constructed by the French of earth and wood, but little remained of those fortifications by 1775. Therefore, the British began from scratch, constructing two earthen redoubts along the river, with a wharf between them. This fort was garrisoned by most of the British regulars in Quebec, including the greater part of the 7th and 26th regiments of foot, and a detachment of Royal Artillery. Others serving at the fort included (French) Canadian volunteers and militia, Scottish emigrants, and Native Americans (the Kahnawake Mohawk were nearest).

The new fort and its garrison were first put to the test in early September, 1775, when an American army, led by Major-General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, invaded southern Quebec. These commanders found the fort difficult to approach, for aside from its guns and mortars, much of the surrounding countryside was a vast, flat, swampy woods.

Fort Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). The Americans approached from the south (bottom of the map) via the Richelieu. This map was created by overlaying two early maps of the area on a modern map. The location of the roads and the course of the stream near Hazen's estate are quite approximate. Most difficult to determine was the areas of cleared land (shown on the map in yellow). The approximate dimensions of the cleared area around the redoubts is inferred from several sources. Much less is known about the cleared areas north of the fort; their representation here is speculative. There was likely also some cleared land near Petite-Rivière-du-Nord (at least there was a small house there), but this is not shown for lack of substantive information.

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One of the better descriptions of Fort Saint-Jean appears in the journal of American Major Henry Livingston of the 3rd New York Regiment. He wrote the following (edited to bring the text in line with modern standards for capitalization and punctuation) in an entry dated November 21, 1775:

"The fortress of St. Johns lies near 130 miles north from Ticonderoga on the brink of Lake Champlain and about a quarter of a mile from the first rapid. [Note: Livingston evidently believed that the fort was on an arm of Lake Champlain]. It consists of 2 forts or redoubts near 100 yards asunder. The southern one rather the largest. In this is a brick house containing 2 clever rooms and Lintels back of them-- and a small potash house near it.

"In the north redoubt is a very large white stone house 2 stories high but unfinished within... The forts are about 100 feet wide each way in the inside; and mounted between them, upwards of 30 iron cannon besides brass field pieces (6 pounders) and several mortars.

"The wall is composed altogether of earth, and neatly sodded without, looking as green as the field around it.

"The whole surrounded with a ditch of 7 feet deep and 8 or 9 feet wide--picketed on the interiour side with timbers projecting from under the wall and over the ditch, and a little elevated, with their points made very sharp.

"Between the 2 forts there was a line of pickets placed (or posts) 10 feet high and close together...

"A ditch was also dug deep enough for men to pass unseen thro from one fort to the other, and between the pickets and the lake. Both the pickets and ditch were constructed after we built our eastern battery [i.e., in October, 1775].

"In each redoubt the enemy kept a union [i.e., a flag] displayed.

"It's 2 or 300 yards from the forts to the nearest woods or bushes. In general it's 5 or 600 to the woods--a low plain wet, and covered with excellent grass surrounds the fortress. If there is any elevation of the earth at all, it is where the forts stand.

"The wilderness west of St. Johns is an impassable quagmire--low, wet and covered with timber and brush--and for 7 or 8 miles north [sic, northwest] of the fort we meet with but one sorry log tenement which stood in our grand camp.

"Opposite the forts on the east of the lake the soil is also very wet and low; a perfect howling swamp. There are a considerable number of large hemloc trees [that] grow on this side and plenty of the balm-of-Gilead firs. North east of St. Johns at the distance of about a mile stands a large elegant house belonging to one Captain Hasen [i.e., Moses Hazen] with a considerable quantity of cleared ground around it. The captain has a saw mill standing on the rapids which are just by his house. These rapids are not so great but what rafts of boards and timber can at any time go down them and so into the River St. Lawrence. Our people frequently sent battoes down with cannon in them--and empty ones can be drawn up against the current.

"The fall is perhaps 100 yards in length. The breadth of the lake here as at St. Johns [is] between 3 and 400 yards.

"On the west side of the lake, from St. Johns northward there are settlements all the way to Chamblee [Chambly]; a house or two being in sight of the fort."