St. Kitts (10): The Campaign Concludes

This is the tenth and final entry in a series of posts on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9].

Surrender

On the evening of February 12th, the officers of the St. Kitts militia petitioned Governor Shirley to be allowed to surrender. They stated that they were “fully determined, from our zeal to our Sovereign, and a proper regard to the interest of this island, to defend it while prudence justified us, or till we should be relieved by his Majesty’s fleet or army”. However, “the fleet and troops which we looked upon for relief, have been arrived near three weeks, without affording us any assistance, and in all human probability cannot, from the superiority of the enemy by sea and land.” They feared that if they did not open surrender negotiations now they “would lose their estates and properties, and possibly would be sent to a French island or Old France.” [1]

Governor Shirley and Brigadier-General Thomas Fraser conceded that surrender had become the best option, and sent envoys to the French.

A French officer, the Chevalier de Goussencourt, noted the event in his journal: “On the 12th, to the great joy of all, we saw a white flag raised on the breach of the redoubt. We could scarcely believe our eyes”. He added, “the toil and hardship that de Bouillé’s army had to undergo are incredible… There were officers and men who slept only one night under their tents during the whole siege.” [2]

The Marquis de Bouillé granted the garrison generous terms, including the provision that the troops could return to England so long as they did not serve again against France for the duration of the war.

On the 13th, the British regulars and the St. Kitts militia (close to 1,000 men in total) marched out of the garrison with the honors of war and laid down their arms. The British regulars had lost about 250 men between the siege of Brimstone Hill and the January 28th battle on the Mooring Hills. The Marquis de Bouillé claimed to have lost a little more than 300 men between these affairs. [3]

The French were buoyant after the fall of the island. One of their officers was later heard to boast “that it was not necessary to keep their intentions any longer secret, that Barbadoes and Antigua were the next objects, then Jamaica, and lastly New York, and then they will consent to make peace…” [4]

Hood Escapes

Hood learned that the garrison surrendered on the evening of the 13th. He later wrote, “Under this situation of things I had no longer any business in Basseterre Road”. He also thought it was only a matter of time before the French army began to place guns and mortars on the high ground along the shore in order to bombard his ships. [5]

Fortunately for Hood, on February 14th, de Grasse’s ships were anchored near Nevis, taking on badly needed provisions that had arrived from Europe. [6]

Hood decided to sail that night, under cover of darkness. He added: “I judged it necessary… that every ship should be under sail as nearly as possible at the same moment, for the better preserving [of] a compact body”. The ships’ captains were instructed to cut their cables at the same time. Hood also had lights fixed to small boats or buoys that were placed alongside each of his ships. At the same time, the lights were extinguished on his vessels. When the British fleet set sail, the decoy lights remained behind, making it appear as if the British were still at anchor. [7]

The French did not discover Hood’s departure until morning. The Chevalier de Villebresme, recalled that “when M. de Grasse went on deck to see his enemies ...., they were fifteen leagues away. De Grasse, more and more surprised at the inventive genius of his opponent, returned to the anchorage that he had left [i.e., Basseterre Roadstead]”. [8]

French ships at sea.

Rodney Arrives

After St. Kitts fell to the French, Nevis capitulated as well. De Bouillé’s army then embarked on de Grasse’s navy and they set sail on February 20th for the French base at Martinique. De Bouillé placed Colonel Arthur Dillon (the Comte de Dillon) in command of the captured islands and left him a garrison of 850 men and part of the artillery. En route, Comte de Barras was dispatched to seize Montserrat with some ships and soldiers of regiment Auxerrois. The island had no regular army garrison. [9]

Meanwhile, Admiral George Brydges Rodney (at right) had at last reached the West Indies. He wrote:

On the 19th of February, after five weeks passage with the fleet under my command, I arrived in Carlisle Bay, Barbadoes, and instantly proceeded to join the fleet under Sir Samuel Hood, in hopes of bringing the enemy’s fleet to battle, and saving the island of St. Christopher’s [i.e., St. Kitts], which I heard they were then besieging. [10]

Rodney immediately sailed for St. Kitts, via Antigua. Meanwhile, Hood left Antigua and sailed for Barbados in hopes of finding Rodney. The two fleets took different routes and initially missed each other. It wasn’t until February 25th that Hood and Rodney finally united, in the waters west of Antigua. At that point, according to Rodney, “Every endeavour was used to arrive off Martinique before the enemy”. De Grasse, however, narrowly reached Martinique first, and anchored in Port Royal Harbor on February 26th. [11]

So concluded the St. Kitts campaign of 1782, a campaign that marked the high point of French fortunes in the West Indies. In the spring of 1782, de Bouillé and de Grasse embarked on the conquest of Jamaica. De Grasse’s fleet, however, was attacked and defeated at The Saintes by the united fleet of Rodney and Hood. This bloody battle ended France’s island-hopping campaign, for while they remained strong on land, thereafter the British controlled the seas.

Notes:

1. The Remembrancer, Vol. 14.

2. John Gilmary Shea (1864). The operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as described in two contemporary journals.

3. The 1st Foot lost 30 killed, 97 wounded, and 2 missing. The grenadier and light infantry companies of the 15th Foot lost 7 killed, 17 wounded, and 6 missing. The Royal Artillery detachment lost 1 killed, 10 wounded, and 5 missing. Prescott’s loss on January 28th was around 71 men. De Bouille stated his total loss was 13 officers and about 290 men.

4. The statement was allegedly made by Colonel Arthur Dillon; Captain Robert Manners was relaying a statement he received second hand; see Letters and papers of the Duke of Rutland.

5. David Hannay (1895). Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3.

6. Shea, ibid.

7. Shea, ibid; Hannay, ibid; Souvenirs du Cheavlier de Villebresme.

8. Souvenirs du Cheavlier de Villebresme (Translation is my own).

9. Shea, ibid; R. de Kerallain (1928). Bougainville à l’Armée du Cte de Grasse. Journal de la Société des Américanistes de Paris, 20, 1-70; Attaque et prise de Saint-Christophe dit le «Gibraltar» des Antilles (janvier-février 1782), in Revue Historique des Armées, Vol. 1, 1974. This article includes extracts from «Mémoires Secrets» de Bouillé. René Chartrand and Francis Back (1991). The French Army in the American War of Independence.

10. George Basil Mundy (1830). The life and correspondence of the late Admiral Lord Rodney, Volume 2.

11. Shea, ibid; Mundy, ibid.

St. Kitts (9): The Limits of Endurance

This is the ninth entry in a series of posts on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, or Part 8].

Standoff at Sea

After failing to defeat the British fleet on January 26th, the Comte de Grasse (at right) kept the British navy hemmed in along the southeastern coast of St. Kitts. Each day, the French ships came within sight of the British fleet, and more it looked as if a major attack might commence. The only real combat that occurred, however, was an occasional clash involving a few frigates, schooners, or other, smaller vessels. [1]

De Grasse was frustrated with this business. His fleet had no proper anchorage, and the constant patrols at sea wore down his ships and crew. His vessels ran out of their original store of provisions in early February, and the crews then subsisted on provisions seized or commandeered from merchant ships. The French fleet was also low on ammunition after the several battles with the British on January 25th-26th. De Grasse seems to have feared being caught in this situation once an expected British reinforcement (Admiral George Rodney’s squadron) arrived and made the British fleet larger than his own. [2]

Around the time that the original provisions gave out, de Grasse was arguing that the further prosecution of the siege was inadvisable. However, the Marquis de Bouillé, who commanded the French troops on land, was determined to continue. Through some mysteries grapevine, the British naval officers almost immediately learned of this division and it gave them fresh hope. On February 8th, Captain Robert Manners of the Resolution wrote:

I understand the French commanding officers are all at variance. De Grasse is not for risking his squadron, probably wishing to preserve it for the more important conquest of Jamaica. The Marquis de Bouille declares he will not give the island up, though Dr Grasse should leave him, and [Comte de] Bougainville sides with De Bouille… [3]

De Grasse relented and maintained a thankless watch on the British fleet.

Battered Brimstone Hill

The Marquis de Bouillé’s determination to maintain the siege was well founded. On land the French were at last making good progress battering Brimstone Hill into submission.

On the night of January 31st, French infantry found at the base of Brimstone Hill a large, abandoned cache of artillery. This included eight brass 24-pounders, with 6,000 cannonballs, and two brass 13-inch mortars, with 1,500 shells. These guns had been part of the “travelling artillery of the West Indies,” kept in storage on St. Kitts. As the artillery belonged neither to the British garrison, nor to the island’s militia, neither had thought to remove the guns and mortars to a more secure location when the French invasion began. This windfall allowed the ammunition-starved French army to escalate its bombardment of the British garrison. [4]

A few days later (February 3), de Bouillé was reinforced with a battalion of Regiment Hainault, dispatched from Grenada. Also, the ship of the line Caton lent two of its 18-pounders and ten of its 24-pounders to the besieging army. [5]

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The Marquis de Bouillé (at center, holding sword) at the siege of Brimstone Hill. In the background are burnt-out houses in the town of Sandy Point. At right, a mortar battery fires on the hill. (Excerpt of a French illustration).

Artillery are dragged forward during the siege of Brimstone Hill. (Excerpt of a French illustration).

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The British naval commander, Vice Admiral Samuel Hood, could do little to aid the garrison. Brigadier-General Robert Prescott had returned to Antigua after the inconclusive battle on January 28th. Hood wrote that on February 8th, he was informed by signals from Brimstone Hill “that the enemy’s batteries had been successful in damaging the works and buildings [on the hill], [and] that the garrison was reduced and short of ordnance stores.” Therefore, he dispatched several officers to provide moral support to the garrison, but although the men went at night and worse disguises, all were captured. [6]

By February 11th, the state of the garrison had grown quite grim. Governor Thomas Shirley noted in his journal:

[The French] opened a battery of 4 guns near… the foot of the Hill, against the north-west front, from whence they very much annoyed the garrison on the highest parts. Twenty-three pieces of cannon and all their mortars were this day incessantly played upon the Hill, whereby the breaches already made were greatly widened and the garrison became much reduced by killed and wounded. [7]

Matters were even worse on the 12th. Shirley wrote:

This day, on the northwest front was an entire breach and all the guns disabled. In the curtain were two very large breaches; the whole parapet was destroyed… In the left flank all the guns were disabled and in the left face was a practicable breach of forty feet. [7]

Lieutenant George Lewis Hamilton described the woeful condition of the garrison’s artillery:

Upon our opening the batteries on the lower works, on the first appearance of the enemy, there was two twenty four pounders, four twelve pounders, two nine pounders and one eight inch howitzer mounted… The progress of the enemy, since they have opened their gun batteries, has been so heavy and rapid… that the eight inch howitzer only remains serviceable, and from the present ruinous and exposed state of the whole front[, it] can only be brought into action in the night, when it is supposed that the enemy's fire has abated and they are making approach to assault. [7]

He found the situation to be little better in the upper citadel and concluded that the “guns and carriages… are in the worst state and are absolutely insufficient to prevent the approaches of the enemy.”

The French could clearly see the breeches in the fortress walls, and the Marquis de Bouillé decided to mount an assault. He wrote:

The day of the 13th was to be used to reconnoiter and make dispositions, and the attack was to be on the 14th, one hour before daylight. The Marquis de Chilleau, one of the bravest men that I have known, was to command the head of my attack. The grenadiers and soldiers were full of ardor, and although I assumed that I would lose many, I counted on success. [8]

Notes:

1. John Gilmary Shea (1864). The operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as described in two contemporary journals; John Ross (1838). Memoirs and correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez, Vol. 1.

2. Shea, ibid.

3. Letters and papers of the Duke of Rutland.

4. The Journal Politique for 1782; Attaque et prise de Saint-Christophe dit le «Gibraltar» des Antilles (janvier-février 1782), in Revue Historique des Armées, Vol. 1, 1974. This article includes extracts from «Mémoires Secrets» de Bouillé; The Remembrancer, Vol. 14.

5. Attaque et prise..., ibid.

6. Attaque et prise..., ibid. Charles Middleton (1907). Letters and papers of Charles, Lord Barham, Volume 1. David Hannay (1895). Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3.

7. Algernon Aspinall (1915). West Indian tales of old.

8. Attaque et prise..., ibid. (Translation is my own)

St. Kitts (8): Watching and Waiting

This is the seventh in a series of post on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, or Part 7].

De Bouillé’s March

On January 28th, 1782. The British (under Brigadier-General Robert Prescott) landed troops from the 13th, 28th, and 69th regiments on St. Kitts and fought a French detachment commanded by Comte de Fléchin (Part 7). Although de Fléchin occupied a commanding height, his men were greatly outnumbered, and forced to retreat after an hour or so of heavy fighting. This withdrawal gave the British a clear road into the island’s interior. The Marquis de Bouillé quickly moved to block this opening. According to de Bouillé:

I was told around 4:30pm of the enemy landing and of M. de Flechin’s battle. I departed instantly, after issuing orders… I took 4 pieces of 8 [i.e., four 8-pounders], and I made my march during the night with around 3,000 men.

I was ignorant about the enemy’s force… I deployed my troops in two columns, with one taking the road by the sea, led by M. de Saint-Simon; the other, which I led, by the great road.

I arrived around 9pm at Basse-Terre, where I found in the rear of the town M. de Flechin with his detachment. [1]

At Basseterre, de Bouillé learned that he had more than enough men to defeat Prescott. His chief concern at this point was that the British might get around his left flank and into the mountains. There they might find some way of aiding the besieged garrison on Brimstone Hill. According to de Bouillé, “I had the hussars beat the passes, and I sent detachments to my left, with instructions to prevent an enemy movement to his right.”

When General Prescott discovered this new French force, he pulled back from the Mooring Hills to a more defensible post on St. Timothy’s Hill.

Not longer afterwards, de Bouillé began a pursuit. He wrote:

I made my march in one column. I crossed the field of battle where M. de Flechin had his combat. There I found a great number of wounded, of the English and of ours, which had been abandoned.

As daylight spread on the 29th, de Bouillé could see Prescott’s force on St. Timothy’s Hill. Just offshore were several British frigates. De Bouillé could not attack Prescott without exposing his troops to a devastating fire from front and flank. Even on the Mooring Hills his men were endangered. The British vessels saw “several parties of the enemies troops drawn up in different places” and the frigates opened fire, killing two men.

Soon, both sides withdrew. The British infantry re-embarked on the frigates, having failed to “distress, puzzle, and embarrass the enemy” as Hood had hoped. De Bouillé, with most of his men, returned to the siege of Brimstone Hill.

The Siege Unabated

Brimstone Hill once again became the locus of military operations.

On the night of the 29th, British boats attempted to get troops into Brimstone Hill fortress from a cove near Sandy Point. De Bouillé had 150 men and two cannon in this area, and they repulsed the attempt.

On the 30th, de Bouillé informed Shirley that the British relief force had received a check and reembarked. He asserted that the garrison’s situation was now hopeless and that they should surrender. Governor Shirley declined.

On the night of the 31st, French infantry found at the base of Brimstone Hill a large, abandoned cache of artillery. This included eight brass 24-pounders, with 6,000 cannonballs, and two brass 13-inch mortars, with 1,500 shells. These guns had been part of the “travelling artillery of the West Indies,” kept in storage on St. Kitts. As the artillery belonged neither to the garrison, nor to the militia, neither had thought to remove the guns and mortars to a more secure location when the invasion began. This windfall would allow the French to escalate their bombardment of the British garrison.

The British now looked forward to the arrival of a naval squadron commanded by Admiral George Brydges Rodney. Rodney had intended to set sail for the West Indies in December, but an unfavorable wind kept his fleet grounded until mid-January. When he did set sail, he encountered difficult weather. At the time that Prescott was abandoning his post on St. Kitts, Rodney was still 3 weeks away from the West Indies.

The key questions at this point were: how long could Brimstone Hill hold out against round-the-clock bombardment? How long could the French continue the siege? What would happen when the ships commanded by Rodney and Samuel Hood united?

Notes:

1. Attaque et prise de Saint-Christophe dit le «Gibraltar» des Antilles (janvier-février 1782), in Revue Historique des Armées, Vol. 1, 1974. This article includes extracts from «Mémoires Secrets» de Bouillé. (Translation of those extracts is my own).

Other information in this post is drawn from: David Hannay (1895). Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3; Algernon Aspinall (1915). West Indian tales of old; Charles Middleton (1907). Letters and papers of Charles, Lord Barham, Volume 1; George Basil Mundy (1830). The life and correspondence of the late Admiral Lord Rodney, Volume 2; the Journal Politique for 1782; Journal of the capture and recovery of Nevis in Charles Ekins (1824). Naval battles, from 1744 to the peace in 1814.

St. Kitts (7): Battle on Land

This is the seventh in a series of post on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, or Part 6].

The Siege Continues

While the French and British fleets battled south of St. Kitts (Parts 5 and 6), the Marquis de Bouillé continued to attack Brimstone Hill, despite shortages of guns, mortars, and ammunition (cf. Parts 3 and 4). On the 25th, his men opened fire from a new 5-gun battery on Binkes’ Plantation, a little over 1,000 yards to the east, on high ground that was about level with Brimstone Hill. Enough guns and mortars were in action by now to begin inflicting significant damage to the fortress. According to British Governor Shirley:

the enemy [on the 25th] began an incessant fire upon the garrison with their mortars and cannon and continued it till midnight. This day [the 26th] the enemy's fire destroyed the building wherein our whole stock of rum was deposited, and a store which contained a considerable quantity of provisions and arms, and every building on the Hill except two small rooms. [1]

A new wrinkle for de Bouillé was the presence of British infantry with the fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Samuel Hood. To help protect his northern flank, de Bouillé ordered a battery to be erected that would command Fig Tree Bay, north of Sandy Point Town. To help protect his southern flank, de Bouillé placed a detachment at Basseterre.

The British Landing

The British regular army troops with Hood’s fleet included the 28th Regiment of Foot and the flank companies of the 13th Regiment of Foot. These men were commanded by Brigadier-General Robert Prescott and had been temporarily drawn from the garrison on Antigua. Hood also had the services of troops serving as marines for his fleet; these included the 69th Regiment of Foot and two battalions of His Majesty’s Marines.

According to a second-hand account by John Moore, Prescott presented Hood with a couple of options for relieving the British garrison on Brimstone Hill.

General Prescott offered to join and reinforce the garrison with 700 or 800 men if Lord Hood would land him near Charles Fort at the bottom of the hill [i.e., Brimstone Hill], or if he would give him a couple of frigates to land him at the back of the island. Such was his knowledge of the country that he expected to reach Brimstone Hill from thence by by-paths over the mountains, unknown to the French army. Both these proposals Lord Hood rejected, and proposed to the General to land at some distance from Basseterre, as he said, to make a diversion. [2]

Hood’s reasoning was stated in a letter to Prescott, dated January 27th. He wrote:

It appears to me of great importance to the king’s service to possess a post on shore, and I beg to submit it to your serious consideration. I can land two battalions of marines of 700 each, rank and file; the 69th Regiment of 500 rank and file, which, with the troops in the frigates [i.e., Prescott’s men from Antigua], including officers, would make a body of 2,400; and you might have as many guns, 12- and 9-pounders, as you please. It would certainly, I should imagine, make a diversion in favour of Brimstone Hill, and very much distress, puzzle, and embarrass the enemy. [3]

Hood appears to have believed that this force would be too small to raise the siege, but too large for the French to ignore. He saw little risk in this enterprise, he told Prescott, “because your retreat can always be secure.” In other words, Prescott’s men would be defended by the guns of the Royal Navy.

According to Moore, “General Prescott endeavoured to show the absurdity of this.” It seems Prescott felt that Hood’s plan was overly cautious and only a bold move would save the island. However, “His Lordship, as usual, was deaf to reason, adhered to his opinion, and told the General that if he did not choose to land the troops he would land the marines.”

This last part is undoubtedly true; Hood concluded his letter of the 27th by stating that if Prescott did not this plan, “I shall be inclined to land a party of marines to rout the French from Basseterre, [and] hoist the English flag.”

Prescott could not get to shore without the cooperation of the Royal Navy. Therefore, he reluctantly agreed to follow Hood’s proposal.

The troops from the 13th, 28th, and 69th regiments disembarked on the morning of the 28th, and landed on the shore of Frigate Bay. The marines remained with the fleet. According to Captain William Cornwallis of the Canada, the day was marked by fresh breezes and cloudy weather.” [4]

The British Landing (click to enlarge). This map shows the site of the clash on January 28th, 1782 between Prescott and de Fléchin. Also shown is the approximate position of Hood's fleet and de Bouillé's army.

French Forces at Basseterre

The detachment of French troops defending Basseterre was commanded by Le comte de Fléchin, a senior officer in Regiment Touraine [5]. This detachment consisted of the grenadiers and chasseurs from regiments Agénois and Touraine, a portion of Regiment Dillon, and the Volontaires de Bouillé. [6]

Among those stationed near Basseterre was Chevalier de Montlezun, a sous-lieutenant of chasseurs. [7] De Montlezun, still in his teenage years, would later recall tiring days beneath a burning sun and sleepless nights watching for a British attack. His platoon, it seems, dieted chiefly on the fruit of prickly pear plants. These plants abounded on the hills south and east of Basseterre, and one walking across these hills would be tormented by their sharp spines. Nevertheless, according to de Montlezun, the landscape was enchanting. Looking around, he saw green fields of sugarcane surrounded by steep and wild hills, a pale blue salt pond, rows of coconut trees, and a narrow and hilly peninsula, with the ocean lapping on either shore. [8]

It was on this spot that the principal land combat would occur during the St. Kitts campaign and where de Montlezun would have the fight of a lifetime.

When the British infantry landed, de Fléchin moved to confront the British, despite being greatly outnumbered. De Fléchin felt it his duty to delay the British so that de Bouillé would have time to organize a proper defense of the island. De Fléchin left the grenadier company from regiment Touraine and half of his troops from Regiment Dillon to defend Basseterre. The rest were thrown onto the Mooring Hills, southeast of town. From this commanding height they prevented Prescott from moving inland.

Basseterre, Frigate Bay, and the Mooring Hills (click to enlarge). Basseterre town is at left. Frigate Bay is at center (note the three anchors). The Mooring Hills are just to the left of Frigate Bay, and above Great Potatoe Bay.

The French deployment on the Mooring Hills appears to have been as follows: On the right (closest to the sea) was a detachment of 50 men from Regiment Dillon and the 60-man Volontaires de Bouillé, in the center were the flank companies of regiment Agénois, and one platoon of chasseurs from Regiment Touraine, and on the left was the remainder of the Touraine chasseurs (including de Montlezun). The total force numbered around 300 or so men. [9]

The Battle

The three British regiments assembled in column formation on the beach. Around 1pm, General Prescott ordered the 28th and 69th regiments to occupy the Mooring Hills. According to an eyewitness on Nevis, the British regulars “performed this service with gallantry, though their march was all up hill, and through thick shrubs and prickly pears.” [10]

At the same time that the British infantry were ascending the Mooring Hills from the south, de Fléchin was leading a party of men up the northern slope. As the leading British soldiers neared the summit, they unexpectedly “ran against a detachment of… grenadiers and chasseurs running up at full speed” from the opposite direction. The battle had begun. [11]

The British Infantry Land on St. Kitts. From a 1782 painting by François Lescalet. Several frigates are shown disembarking men along the shore. The British form on the beach and advance into combat with de Fléchin's men on the hill at right.

Close up view of British infantry forming on the beach.

De Montlezun and his men were on the British side of the hills when the fighting began. A few British troops were spotted at a dwelling, and de Montlezun was ordered to attack these with his platoon. However, as the chasseurs rushed forward, more and more British troops came into sight, and drew up in a formidable line of battle in an alley of palm trees. De Montlezun’s men would have been slaughtered were it not for the fact that some of the chasseurs on higher ground could see the danger and called for them to come back.

Close up view of chasseurs from Regiment de Touraine. Possibly these men are intended to depict part of de Montlezun’s platoon.

The movement of two British columns up the hill unmasked de Montlezun’s position, and he and his chasseurs began to be shelled by British frigates (they had four in action).

De Montlezun and his men then joined the scramble for control of the hills, where “The musketry fire began at a distance of 10 paces.” He recalled, “Arriving on the line, through a shower of bullets, I had the misfortune to see fall… the valiant Villebrune, second captain of the Agénois chasseurs [12]. The whiteness of his uniform was replaced by a tinge of blood that covered him entirely.”

Close up showing Comte de Flechin rallying the French infantry.

According to the biographer of Chevalier de Mirabeau, then a staff officer in Regiment Touraine, “There were on both sides desperate efforts, furious and repeated counter-attacks… Many times, the French overwhelmed by the number of assailants and shot down by the frigates in the bay, seemed about to succumb,” but the infantry, exhorted by their officers, grimly hung on. De Mirabeau “stood out among those most careless of danger,” until finally “His horse was killed, [and] he was shot in the thigh.” [11]

De Montlezun remembered that “The battle dragged on relentlessly. A mulatto, my company drummer, had the courage to beat the charge for the whole hour that the combat lasted.” De Montlezun admired “the imperturbable coolness” of this drummer, “surrounded by blood and carnage”, who could “expect no reward for his dedication.”

Finally, General Prescott ordered his reserve (the grenadier and light infantry companies of the 13th Foot) to sweep around the French left flank.

“At last,” according de Montlezun, “the ammunition was totally exhausted and,” he wrote with considerable exaggeration, “half of the officers and men had died.” Those still on their feet could not contest the advance of the British reserve, which “was in motion to turn our flank and place us between two fires.”

De Fléchin, realizing that the situation had become hopeless, ordered a retreat. The British had won a strong post near shore, and an open road into the interior.

French losses were about 86 men killed or badly wounded (about ¼ of those engaged). These losses were heaviest in the grenadier and chasseur companies of Regiment d’Agénois. [13]

De Fléchin, although defeated, was lionized for having put up such a stiff fight against the British forces.

British losses were approximately 17 killed, 47 wounded, and 7 missing (71 in total). The 69th Foot reportedly lost 5 officers and 29 men killed and wounded; this loss in officers was one of the highest by a British regiment during the war. [14]

Admiral Hood singled out for praise Lieutenant-Colonel (and New York land baron) Philip Skene, who led the 69th in this engagement. [4]

Notes:

In October of last year, I made a preliminary assessment of this combat and concluded that the fighting probably took place on St. Timothy's Hill. Further research has led me to conclude that the action almost certainly took place on "the Mooring Hills" instead. None of the sources is explicit on this point, but it is the logical conclusion in view of several pieces of evidence. Most important to my way of thinking was a statement by the anonymous journalist on Nevis, who wrote "This day 700 regulars, being all the effectives General Prescott brought down with him, were landed under cover of the frigates at Frigate and Potatoe Bays [both locations are shown on the map above]. The French had a body of men posted on the hills above them..." Further, his description of events following the battle (these will be covered in the next post in this series) makes clear that the battlefield was closer to Basseterre town than St. Timothy's Hill. See Note #10, below, for the full account.

1. Excerpts from Shirley’s journal are from Algernon Aspinall (1915). West Indian tales of old.

2. The diary of Sir John Moore, Volume 1.

3. Charles Middleton (1907). Letters and papers of Charles, Lord Barham, Volume 1.

4. David Hannay (1895). Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3.

5. Full name: Charles-François-Joseph de Fléchin de Vamin

6. Attaque et prise de Saint-Christophe dit le «Gibraltar» des Antilles (janvier-février 1782), in Revue Historique des Armées, Vol. 1, 1974. This article includes extracts from «Mémoires Secrets» de Bouillé.

7. Full name: Barthélemi-Sernin du Moulin de Montlezun de la Barthelle

8. Baron de Montlezun (1818). Souvenirs des Antilles. Translations of this work are my own.

9. De Montlezun described himself as being on the extreme left and he reported seeing only white-coated troops from regiment Agénois and Touraine to his right. This leads me to believe that the troops from Dillon and the Volontaires de Bouillé were even further to the right (outside his field of vision), and nearest the British fleet. Admiral Hood was under the impression that the British were fighting Irish troops in French service [cf. Note #4]; however, the detachment from Regiment Dillon was the only set of Irish troops in de Fléchin’s command. The total of “300 or so” is an estimate based on inconsistent statements about de Fléchin’s numbers across several sources.

10. Journal of the capture and recovery of Nevis in Charles Ekins (1824). Naval battles, from 1744 to the peace in 1814.

11. Eugéne Berger (1904). Le vicomte de Mirabeau (Mirabeau-Tonneau) 1754-1792. Translations of this work are my own.

12. Full name: Servant-Paul le Saige de Villebrune

13. Statements about French losses varied slightly from source to source. cf. Note #6, above, the Journal Politique of April, 1782 (seconde quinzaine), and other French accounts of the campaign.

14. See Note #10, above, and the Remembrancer for 1782.

St. Kitts (6): Battle of Frigate Bay

This is the sixth in a series of post on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, or Part 5].

Hood’s Plans

On January 25th, 1782, British Admiral Samuel Hood outmaneuvered French Admiral François-Joseph-Paul de Grasse and seized an anchorage in near Basseterre town on St. Kitts.

French reactions to this engagement were mixed. The French admired the tactical skill Hood had shown, but downplayed the importance of this engagement. According to one officer:

The most important anchorage for the English admiral, the only one decisive for raising the siege of Brimstone Hill… was that of Sandy Point; there, even under sail, he could have communicated directly with the fortress, he could have landed his troops under his guns, and been protected by them in case of attack; the place would never have been totally invested… and the position of the besiegers would have become very critical; on the other hand the vaunted anchorage [that Hood actually took]… was too far from the besieged place, and the English [infantry] corps was too weak to cut its way through to [the garrison]. [1]

It was true that if Hood had insisted on approaching Sandy Point he could have had a greater impact on the siege of Brimstone Hill. However, Hood’s decision making was influenced by two factors unbeknownst to the French. One was that that Brigadier-General Thomas Fraser of the British garrison had reported that reinforcements were not needed on Brimstone Hill. The other was that Hood was expecting the arrival of a British squadron commanded by George Brydges Rodney. This combined fleet (which Rodney would command) would give the British a decisive advantage over the French. Hood’s secure anchorage near Basseterre allowed him to balance the twin needs of being in supporting distance of the garrison while preserving his ships until Rodney’s arrival.

De Grasse Attacks

De Grasse was disappointed by the result of the action on the 25th, and he had no intention of allowing Hood to peacefully occupy an anchorage at St. Kitts. He chose to strike Hood’s fleet the morning of the 26th.

Hood anticipated an attack, and he specifically feared that the French would direct their ships against the front (eastern end) of his line, where they could use the windward position to their advantage. To protect this end, he rearranged his ships so that the line lay so close to shore that it was virtually unassailable.

The main part of the British line was in an east-west line (from east to west: Bedford, Russell, Montagu, St. Albans, Alcide, America, Intrepid, Torbay, Princessa, Prince George, Ajax, Prince William, Shrewsbury, Invincible, Barfleur). The rear ships lay in a line that curved to the north, towards Basseterre (from southeast to northwest: Monarch, Centaur, Belliqueux, Resolution, Prudent, Canada, Alfred). [2]

The rear ships abutted the 100-fathom depth line which prevented the French ships from anchoring near the British fleet. [3]

On the morning of the 26th, the French formed line of battle in the usual order (i.e., the reverse of that listed here, with Souverain in the lead) and sailed north, towards the British. De Grasse intended to strike the western extremity of the British line. However, the French ships sailed close to shore as they approached the British fleet, and thus the appearance of aiming for the eastern flank. De Grasse, it seems intended to suddenly turn and sail his ships across the length of the British line before closing with the western flank.

Whatever the merits of this plan, it was not carried out as intended. According to an eyewitness on Nevis, “The leading ship of the French [Souverain] stood on with amazing steadiness and resolution, and advanced considerably farther than the rest.” Perhaps Souverain was carried too far forward by wind and waves, or perhaps Souverain’s captain sought to make a name for himself. In any case:

“She [Souverain] kept on advancing till the fire of our line opened upon her, which seemed visibly to stagger her; the fire of the whole line opening in a manner at once, was truly awful; it resembled loud rolling thunder, and was incessant for nearly two hours. The whole French line followed their leader, but none came so near to the English line.” [5]

The Chevalier de Goussencourt concluded that this misaimed attack was a byproduct of infighting between de Grasse and his subordinates. He wrote sarcastically, “in consequence of the good will and affection entertained for the admiral, all efforts were turned to the centre of the [British] fleet” rather than the western flank, or rear. [1]

The French captains responded differently to this changed set of circumstances. According to the observer on Nevis, “the difference among them was very distinguishable… some luffing up and endeavouring to get as close as possible, while others apparently edged out of the heat of our fire.” [5]

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De Grasse’s attack goes awry. The French vessels, with Souverain in the lead, come within range of Hood’s cannon. Ships of the line only are shown; positions are very approximate.

The French Attack. This painting depicts roughly the same events as the map above. The French vessels are sailing from at left. Nevis is in the foreground, and the "Narrows" separating St. Kitts and Nevis is in the middle ground. Brimstone Hill is faintly visible in the far distance at left (a flag appears above the summit and smoke billows from the British fortifications).

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The ships in the British rear began shifting positions once it became apparent that they would come under attack. Captain William Cornwallis, commander of the Canada, was one of those in an exposed position. Seeing “the enemy’s fleet standing in with a press of sail, [we] were obliged to cut the cable…” Canada and the other vessels then began to work eastward, against the wind, to close with the rest of the fleet. [5]

According to de Goussencourt, the French attack did ultimately land hardest against the rear of the British line:

…we were fortunate enough, and our gunners expert enough, to handle the four rear vessels in the English line so severely that they were forced to weigh anchor under our fire, and could hardly have been more cut up than they were. As our ships passed the last English vessels they veered in the same order.

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Battle of the 26th of January, 1782. Hood's fleet is anchored at left. The French ships (with sails unfurled) are shown turning back out to sea after passing the rear-most British vessels.

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The attack killed and wounded many, but nothing of importance was gained. According to de Goussencourt, “This action was simply a brush, which lasted two hours, and amounted to nothing.” A fellow officer pronounced it a “farce” (facétie). [1]

De Grasse Attacks Again

De Grasse soon reformed his fleet; the much-battered Souverain was placed at the rear of the line. The French then made a new attack during the afternoon.

This time, the French attack landed squarely on the rear of the British line as intended. However, according to one of de Grasse’s officers, “only the head of the French line could come into action, and the wind prevented the action from becoming general.” [1] The eyewitness on Nevis recorded that these “six or seven of the French van attacked our rear; two of them seemed to us to luff up very gallantly, almost so as to double round” the British line.

The fighting, while limited in scope, was nevertheless intense. De Goussencourt claimed “we so harassed the English rear that Admiral Hood replaced the four rear vessels by others which had suffered less in the three engagements…”

Captain Robert Manners commanded one of these British ships (the Resolution), and later wrote:

One of their attacks was pretty severe, and fell mostly on our rear; we came off very well in point of men [Resolution’s losses in the three engagements totaled 5 killed, 11 wounded], but are much cut in the masts and rigging, having our bowsprit, all our lower masts, all our top masts, and all our top gallant masts wounded… [5]

The eyewitness on Nevis believed heavy fire from the British rear ships forced the French van to withdraw:

…the fire from our rear was now so terrible and particularly the Barfleur’s, that they soon bore away and stood up to the southward; when they lay-to for the night.

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The final clash on the 26th. Ships of the line only are shown; positions are very approximate.

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Once again, Hood’s fleet remained secure in its anchorage.

An officer with de Grasse commented,

We should have attacked again on the 27th, if the English squadron had not appeared out of reach of insult; the vessels cut up the day before were removed and eight or nine of the largest had taken their places. They were anchored, the bowsprit of one over the stern of the other; thus unattackable, the fleet contented itself with keeping them there. [1]

The British and French tallied up their losses from the several clashes. The British counted 316 killed and wounded, the French 314. [6]

Notes:

De Grasse’s clashes with Hood on the 25th and 26th have been termed the “battle of Frigate Bay,” but this appears to be a misnomer. Frigate Bay was mentioned in Hood’s report on the St. Kitts campaign, but in connection only with the events of January 28th-29th (to be described in the next two posts), not his battle with de Grasse. Maps of St. Kitts shows Frigate Bay to be only a concave section of coastline, east of Basseterre Town, and some miles distant from where de Grasse and Hood are thought to have clashed. Several histories of the campaign claim that Hood anchored his fleet off Green Point, and this is what I have shown on the maps I’ve prepared (it’s the western “bump” in the coastline near Hood’s vessels). I have not seen Green Point specifically mentioned in primary sources, but several illustrations of the St. Kitts campaign (e.g., the Lescalet painting) show the British fleet anchored near a point of land that appears to correspond with Green Point.

1. The journals of Chevalier de Goussencourt, and another, anonymous French officer, can be found in John Gilmary Shea (1864). The operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as described in two contemporary journals.

2. cf. William Laird Clowes et al. (1898). The royal navy: a history from the earliest times to the present, Volume 3. Isaac Schomberg (1802). Naval chronology...

3. cf. Clowes et al., ibid.

4. Journal of the capture and recovery of Nevis in Charles Ekins (1824). Naval battles, from 1744 to the peace in 1814.

5. The accounts by Captains Cornwallis and Manners can be found in David Hannay (1895) Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3

6. The commanders' reports can be found in the British Remembrancer, and the French Journal Politique for 1782.

St. Kitts (5): The Fleets Clash

This is the fifth in a series of post on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, or Part 4].

Hood’s Mission

Rear Admiral Samuel Hood learned on January 14th that the French were attacking St. Kitts. He and his fleet promptly left Barbados and sailed north for Antigua. En route he was joined by the Russell, which increased his fleet to 21 ships of the line. Hood noted that he had “nothing but flattering winds” on this voyage, but his ships faced “an ugly sea at times” and two ships lost a maintopsail yard and another additionally lost a main topmast and mizzen topmast. [1]

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Hood’s Mission: January 14-24, 1782 (click to enlarge). This map shows Hood’s route from Barbados to Nevis January 14-24 (red line). Also shown is the path taken by the French fleet under de Grasse from Martinique to St. Kitts (January 5-11; blue line). Both paths are approximate.

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On the 21st, Hood reached Antigua, where he was joined by the Prudent and a couple of lesser vessels. The British fleet then began to take on board provisions and part of the island’s garrison. The troops from the garrison included Brigadier-General Robert Prescott, the 28th Regiment of Foot, and the flank companies of the 13th Regiment of Foot. [2]

By the evening of the 23rd, preparations were complete, and the British fleet sailed out of St. John’s Harbour on Antigua, and anchored at sea. The French and British fleets were now about 60 miles apart.

Hood had probably learned that the French fleet at St. Kitts was, as one eye-witness put it, “formed [in] no regular line,” but rather were “in great confusion in Basseterre road, three or four deep.”

Hood’s intention, it seems, was to cross from Antigua to St. Kitts during the night, and to strike the French in Basseterre roadstead at daybreak. There, with the wind at his back, he would strike the eastern end of the French fleet. The rest of the French fleet would have difficulty coming to their assistance (they would be working against the wind). In this manner, he hoped to win a major victory before the French were ready for battle.

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Rear Admiral Samuel Hood

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The British sailed that night with 22 ships of the line in the following order of battle: [3]

Advance Guard (Francis Drake)

Alfred (74 guns), Alcide (74), Intrepid (64), Torbay (74), Princessa (74), Prince George (98), Ajax (74)

Center (Samuel Hood)

Prince William (64), Shrewsbury (74), Invincible (74), Barfleur (98), Monarch (74), Belliqueux (64), Centaur (74), St. Albans (64)

Rear Guard (Edmund Affleck)

Russell (74), Resolution (74), Bedford (74), Canada (74), Prudent (64), Montagu (74), America (64)

De Grasse’s Defense

The French had been expecting the British fleet for some days. The French commander, François-Joseph-Paul de Grasse, concentrated his fleet in Basseterre roadstead and used frigates and other, smaller vessels, as lookouts. The lookouts quickly spotted Hood’s departure from Antigua on the evening of the 23rd.

De Grasse then had to decide how he would face the British fleet. One option was to form a line of battle in Basseterre roadstead. As he had numerical superiority and occupied an excellent harbor, he should have been able to ward off any attempt to oust him. However, he thought this might not be the best position if Hood was determined to aid the British garrison on Brimstone Hill. Instead, it might be better to take to the open sea southwest of Basseterre. There, he would be windward of Hood’s ships and poised to maul the British while they lay close to shore. A third consideration was that he was expecting the arrival of supply ships and other reinforcements. If he remained at Basseterre he would be placing these vessels at grave risk of capture.

On balance, de Grasse decided it would be best to take to the open sea and await the British fleet. He planned to set sail the following day.

Hood Reaches St. Kitts

Hood’s daring plan to strike the French fleet in Basseterre roadstead was foiled before it could put into effect. The early morning hours of January 24th were “squally with rain” and by daylight the British fleet was near the south end of Nevis, but still far short of its destination. Also, one of Hood’s leading ship of the line (Alfred) had collided with one of his frigates (Nymphe) with the result that Alfred’s “fore topmast [was] down, and jib boom and sprit-sailyard gone,” and it appeared “much damaged about the bows…” Alfred was in no shape for immediate action, but, it was determined, the necessary repairs could be made in less than 24 hours. Having lost the advantage of surprise, Hood advanced cautiously towards St. Kitts.

The two advance-most British frigates (Lizard and Convert) in Hood’s fleet reached the western shore of Nevis far ahead of the ships of the line. A large French cutter (l’Espion), then just arriving from Martinique, mistook the British frigates for French ones and was promptly captured. The cutter was bringing to St. Kitts mortar shells and other ordinance, which the French could ill afford to lose.

That afternoon, the French fleet began to get underway, and headed south. At 10:00pm, Hood could see from the deck of his command ship (Barfleur) “20 strange vessels in the N.W., which proved to be the French fleet.” Neither commander sought battle at this late hour. Instead, the British sailed south, to a point near Isle Redondo, while the French drew closer to St. Kitts.

The Fleets Clash

The two fleets maneuvered during the night of January 24th-25th. Cannon discharges and rockets were used (at least among the French) to transmit signals in the darkness. Hood, by this time, had formed a new plan -- to take anchorage in Frigate Bay, a short distance southeast of Basseterre. Hood later called this “the only chance I had of saving the island, if it was to be saved.”

Specifically, Hood intended to gain a defensive position that would neutralize the French advantage in numbers. Ships at anchor could be carefully arranged into a defensive line that would be difficult to attack. Also, ships at anchor were relatively still and could fire with greater accuracy than those rolling on the open water.

Although Hood occupied the windward position (meaning that the winds favored his movements), a lunge towards Basseterre carried with it considerable risk. He would be placing his vessels between the French fleet and the rocky shores of St. Kitts and Nevis. Hood acted carefully before committing himself to this course of action. He later noted, “At daylight we plainly discerned thirty-three sail of the enemy’s ships… I made every appearance of an attack, which drew the Count de Grasse a little from the shore.” Close to midday, the situation appeared favorable to Hood – the main part of the French fleet was some 4 or 5 miles to the west and it appeared that the planned dash would be successful. Hood therefore ordered his fleet to sail north, hugging the coastline of the islands.

De Grasse had decided to concentrate on keeping his line of communications open and protecting the siege of Brimstone Hill. Not unaware that the Basseterre anchorage had been left vulnerable, he ordered François-Aymar, Baron de Monteil, “to hug the point of Isle Nevis” with the French “light squadron” (Caton, Hector, Sagittaire, and Experiment). As the British neared Nevis, de Grasse ordered the “light squadron and van… to bear down on the enemy’s [van].” The rest of the fleet followed “in a bow and quarter line.”

The French main body sailed in approximately the following order (note that the French were doubling back towards Nevis and consequently were in reverse order). [4]

Rear Guard (Louis-Antoine, Comte de Bougainville)

Pluton (74 guns), Bourgogne (74), Auguste (80), Neptune (74), Ardent (64), Scipion (74), Citoyen (74), Réfléchi (64), Glorieux (74)

Center (François-Joseph-Paul, Comte de Grasse)

Diadème (74), Northumberland (74), César (74), Ville de Paris (104), Sceptre (74), Saint-Esprit (80), Eveillé (64), Zélé (74)

Advance Guard (Jacques-Melchior, Comte de Barras)

Magnanime (74), Palmier (74), Jason (64), Marseillais (74), Duc de Bourgogne (80), Languedoc (80), Hercule (74), Souverain (74)

Contrary to de Grasse’s wishes, the light squadron did not contest the British advance. According to an officer with the French fleet,

…the French light squadron instead of continuing to bear down on the enemy, bore away. The admiral [de Grasse] surprised at this manoeuvre, thought that Nevis intercepted their wind [i.e., he thought that the mountainous island might have created a windless calm off its western shore]; to assure himself of it, [de Grasse] signaled [de Monteil] to lie to, which the squadron did; assured by this that it was by no fault of wind that they bore away, the admiral repeated his first signal to the squadron and the van; but it was too late... [5]

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Hood’s Dash to St. Kitts (click to enlarge). Hood’s fleet passes the western end of Nevis en route to an anchorage off St. Kitts. De Grasse attempts to intercept Hood, while the light squadron, under de Monteil, bears away. Positioning of the British and French vessels is approximate. Ships carrying fewer than 50 guns are not shown.

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The French then aimed at overtaking the center and rear of the British line (the British van was by now beyond their reach). However, the British vessels were moving too quickly and only the British rear found itself in real danger.

An eyewitness on Nevis described the engagement that followed:

About half-past two the Ville de Paris [de Grasse’s flagship]… fired about three single shots, probably to try the range of his guns; which were taken no notice of.

At about three o’clock the French Admiral began in earnest, seeming to direct his fire at the sixth ship from our rear [i.e., the Resolution]. He was immediately followed by about thirteen or fourteen of his ships nearest to him a-head and a-stern. This being returned by the six or seven or our rear, a most dreadful cannonade ensued, which spread by degrees to about the twelfth ship from our rear [i.e., Hood’s flagship, the Barfleur]. But the heaviest of the French fire fell on our last ships; for whose fate we trembled, as they had the fire of twelve or fourteen of the enemy on them at once; yet they never moved an inch out of line, but kept their stations and distances as steadily as if they had been at anchor; at the same time we could distinctly perceive they shot a-head of the enemy. [6]

At one point, de Grasse, aboard his flagship Ville de Paris, came close to cutting off the last three vessels in the British line (Prudent, Montagu, and America). According to Hood, “The Prudent had the misfortune to have her wheel shot to pieces [by] the first broadside”. Soon a gap began to develop between the Prudent and the vessel ahead (Canada), which the Ville de Paris attempted to exploit. However, Canada, followed by the vessels still further ahead (Resolution and Bedford) astutely slowed down and closed the gap.

The British Anchor

As the British vessels neared St. Kitts, they turned and anchored in line of battle in Frigate Bay. From this anchorage, some of the British vessels opened fire again as the French ships passed.

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Hood Anchors (click to enlarge). Hood’s lead vessel (St. Albans) turns towards shore and anchors off of Green Point, on the southwest corner of St. Kitts. The following vessels anchor behind St. Albans, forming a line of battle. Meanwhile, the rear of the British fleet is engaged with the Ville de Paris and other French vessels. Some of the French ships, perhaps de Barras’ vessels, did not participate in this portion of the engagement. Positioning of the British and French vessels is approximate. Only ships of the line are shown.

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A French officer, Chevalier de Goussencourt, glumly noted, “In spite of our fire, the English admiral managed his fleet so well that it anchored in our place with a spring on the cable, under our fire, without Mr. de Grasse preventing them” [5]. The French fleet turned and headed south for open waters. The last shots were fired around 5:30pm.

Only one British vessel was lost in this action, the frigate Solebay, which ran aground off Nevis at the beginning of the engagement. The observer on Nevis recorded that

Several French ships kept firing on her in this distress, and the Captain returned it; but, finding she must inevitably fall into the enemy’s hands, Captain Everett set fire to her and quitted her. She burnt for an hour or more, and blew up about eight o’clock with a most tremendous report; having 160 barrels of powder on board. [6]

The captain and his crew took shelter on Nevis.

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Notes:

1. For primary accounts of Hood's actions during this period, see David Hannay (1895) Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3 and Charles Middleton (1907) Letters and papers of Charles, Lord Barham.

2. The 28th Foot saw significant action in the Thirteen Colonies earlier in the war, distinguishing itself in the storming of Chatterton’s Hill at the battle of White Plains (October 28th, 1776). The regiment was sent to the West Indies in the fall of 1778. There, the 28th had significant losses, chiefly from disease. The regiment’s strength was kept up my drafting into it the rank and file from other weak regiments (which were then sent home to recruit). The flank companies of the 13th Foot saw little or no combat prior to the St. Kitts campaign. Seven of the regiment’s battalion companies were captured in November, 1781, when the Marquis de Bouillé stormed St. Eustatius.

3. cf. William Laird Clowes et al. (1898). The royal navy: a history from the earliest times to the present, Volume 3. Isaac Schomberg (1802). Naval chronology...

4. cf. Odet-Julien Leboucher (1788). Histoire de la derniere guerre...

5. John Gilmary Shea (1864). The operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as described in two contemporary journals.

6. cf. Journal of the capture and recovery of Nevis in Charles Ekins (1824). Naval battles, from 1744 to the peace in 1814.

St. Kitts (4): Brimstone Besieged

This is the fourth in a series of post on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1 or Part 2, or Part 3].

Brimstone Besieged

Governor Thomas Shirley and Brigadier-General Thomas Fraser were faced with overwhelming French numbers. They commanded a little more than 1,000 men, and were opposed by about 7,000 of the enemy [1]. However, Shirley and Fraser defended Brimstone Hill, a virtually impregnable fortress, and they were optimistic that they could hold out long enough to be relieved by the Royal Navy (specifically, the West Indies squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Samuel Hood).

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British Defenses at Brimstone Hill (click to enlarge). This map is based on a 1775 Anthony Ravell map of St. Kitts. Brimstone Hill is at center. Two defenses can be seen on the hill. The square citadel was located on the highest point of the hill. Southeast of the citadel, a fortified “curtain” was placed on a lower plateau. Prior to the siege, the British also held coastal batteries at Fig Tree Bay (upper left) and Fort Charles (center left) on either side of Sandy Point Town. De Bouillé occupied Sandy Point Town on January 12th. On the other side of Brimstone Hill, the French established a camp east of “Goodwin’s Gutt.” [Original Image]

The View Towards Sandy Point (click to enlarge). The view today from Brimstone Hill, looking northwest towards Sandy Point Town. The island of St. Eustatius is visible in the distance. [Original Image by Ukexpat; licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license].

Brimstone Hill in 1783 (click to enlarge). This view is from Sandy Point Town, looking southeast towards Brimstone Hill. The citadel is at the uppermost part of the hill. Part of the curtain is visible on the plateau on the right side of the hill. Fort Charles is on the low-lying promontory at right center.

The View Up the Slope (click to enlarge). The French infantry feared being called upon to assault the British fortress. This modern day image reveals the great difficulty they would have faced. Part of the stone fortifications are visible near the top of the image. These would have been lined with infantry and artillery. [Original Image]

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The Marquis de Bouillé, who commanded the French army, determined that an infantry assault on Brimstone Hill was unlikely to succeed. Therefore, he resolved to use heavy guns to batter the garrison into submission and to only use an assault as a last resort. According to Governor Shirley, de Bouillé “carried on his approaches and opened trenches under all the formalities of the most regular siege." [2] Shirley, for his part, was resolved to keep the French at bay.

On January 15th, the British shelled the town of Sandy Point, which the French had occupied and where de Bouillé had his headquarters. The town soon caught fire and much of it was destroyed.

De Bouillé opened his first entrenchments against Brimstone Hill the night of the 16th-17th. Under cover of darkness, 300 workers, covered by 200 troops from the flank companies and a battalion of fusiliers (possibly Viennois [3]), dug an earthwork about 700 yards northwest of the fortress, on the plantation of one Stafford Somersall. After daybreak, the British spotted the work and began firing on the position.

The French launched a similar operation on the night of January 17th-18th. This time, the earthwork was dug 700 yards southeast of the fortress, on a plantation owned by one Stedman Rawlins. Again, after daybreak, the British used their heavy guns to impede French progress.

The French finally opened fire on Brimstone Hill on the 19th, when, according to Shirley, “a battery of seven mortars… bombarded the garrison very briskly” from Rawlins’ plantation. The British responded with “a warm cannonade.”

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Section of the Rossel de Cercy Painting, Prise des Iles de Saint Christophe et de Nevis (click to enlarge). In this image, the mortar battery on Rawlins’ Plantation can be seen shelling the British fortifications on Brimstone Hill. A part of the defensive “curtain” is at upper center; the citadel is at upper right. [Original image]

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Artillery exchanges were frequent over the days that followed. The French continued to dig entrenchments and gradually put into more and more artillery into action. On the 21st, three mortars became active on Wells’ Estate, east of Brimstone Hill. On the 23rd, a 6 or 7 mortar battery opened fire from Somersall’s plantation, near Sandy Point. [4]

The artillery exchanges were especially punishing for the French on the exposed plain. In a single incident, 20 men (fusiliers from Regiment Touraine and artillerists) were killed or wounded when a British shell ignited the magazine for the Rawlins battery. [5]

On January 24th it appeared that the worst of the garrison’s troubles were over. Samuel Hood came in sight of the island with 22 ships of the line, plus a number of frigates and other vessels. It was not an overwhelming force (indeed, the French navy was larger), but it was well led. Hopes among the British ran high.

Notes:

1. Details of the French order of battle were described previously (see Part 2). The British garrison at this point consisted of about 600 effectives of the regular army (specifically, the first battalion of the 1st Foot and the flank companies of the 15th Foot), 350 militia, and 70 sailors. Governor Shirley mentioned in a journal entry dated January 17th that “A working party of seamen and negroes were employed in placing the mortars and forming platforms for them,” indicating some blacks were on hand, but it seems that they were not considered to be part of the garrison.

2. Information on the British perspective, including Shirley’s journal, comes primarily from Algernon Aspinall (1915). West Indian Tales of Old.

3. The description of French actions is based primarily on a) Attaque et prise de Saint-Christophe dit le «Gibraltar» des Antilles (janvier-février 1782), in Revue Historique des Armées, Vol. 1, 1974. This article includes extracts from «Mémoires Secrets» de Bouillé. For the role of Regiment Viennois, see Paul Jean Louis Azan. Service of the Azans in America.Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Volume 50, p 429-433.

4. Note that the battery on Somersall’s plantation was slow to get into action although the first entrenchment was dug there. Presumably the delay is related to the sinking of the Lion Britannique at Sandy Point on January 13 (see Part 3). I suspect the guns used at the Rawlins battery were landed at Old Road on January 13th, but I have not found the name of the transport. The three mortars for the battery established on Wells’ plantation possibly arrived aboard the vessel Citoyen on January 19th. Bougainville's journal mentions on this date that “Le Citoyen est revenu de la Guadeloupe avec 3 mortiers et des munitions de guerre” (R. de Kerallain (1928). Bougainville à l’Armée du Cte de Grasse. Journal de la Société des Américanistes de Paris, 20, 1-70).

5. For the losses in Regiment Touraine, see: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. (1903). Les combattants Français de la Guerre Américaine: 1778-1783.