October 24, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 24th: The British prepared for another move.

Previous entry: October 23rd; next: October 25th.

At White Plains, the Americans continued to improve their defenses. William Heath’s division was encamped on the left of their position, Joseph Spencer’s division was on the right, and the divisions of John Sullivan and Israel Putnam were in the center. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (Spencer’s division) jotted down in his journal: “A very pleasant day and nothing very special seems to be going on.”

For some days after moving his army to Pell’s Point, British Lieutenant-General William Howe was unsure of where the Americans were and what intentions they had; he also had little knowledge about the layout of the Westchester countryside. He gathered information, deliberated with his officers, and took on stores of provisions and reinforcements.

By the end of this date he had the information he needed and his preparations were complete. He was now ready to make his next move. As he later explained it:

“[the Americans had] quitted their position about King’s Bridge with some precipitation, leaving two thousand men for the defense of Fort Washington, extending their force behind the Bronx from Valentine’s Hill [near Mile Square] to White Plains in detached camps, everywhere entrenched. Their left by this means covering an upper communication with Connecticut as well as the road along the North River [i.e., the Hudson], it was judged expedient to move to White Plains and endeavour to bring them to an action.”

At 9 P.M. he ordered “Tents to be struck tomorrow morning at 6 o’clock; the baggage to be loaded, and the army to be ready to march at seven, in two columns by the right.”

The British army would divide into two parts: the right column was given to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton, and the left column was given to Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister. Clinton would advance towards White Plains from the direction of Mamaroneck, while von Heister would advance towards White Plains from the direction of East Chester. Screening the columns on their march would be the jaegers, the light dragoons, and a company of the New York Volunteers.

Part of the army remained near the coast to safeguard the provisions.

Wilhelm von Knyphausen’s division (minus Ewald’s jaegers) remained near New Rochelle for the time being, but Howe planned to use this force before long.

Further Thoughts on Rocky Mount

I recently finished my research on Hanging Rock. In so doing, I came across some additional information on the battle of Rocky Mount that I missed before. The most important information concerns British losses. Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis wrote to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton on August 6, 1780 that “We had on our part an Officer Killed & one wounded, & about ten or twelve men killed & wounded” [1]. Interestingly, the official return of losses submitted by Cornwallis to George Germain on August 20, 1780 lists 8 killed, 31 wounded [2]. I only have access to a summary, not the return itself, so I cannot shed any light on the cause of the discrepancy (e.g., does one total cover only the Provincial forces involved and the other both Provincials and militia?). Neither statement mentions missing, which might be expected given claims by the Americans that some prisoners were taken. The total of 39 killed and wounded is surprisingly high, suggesting British losses of around 13%, and possibly higher. This seems like an unlikely loss rate if the Americans were inflicting casualties only by shooting into the portholes of the British-occupied log houses. (By comparison, American losses, if reported accurately, did not exceed 4%).

There are two plausible ways that such high losses could have been inflicted.

First, some of the defenders may have been struck down while out in the open. As described in that series, a party of British Legion dragoons was caught out in the open at the beginning of the battle. As also noted, some of the Loyalist militia were stationed in a redoubt, but were soon driven into the works. Here is another pension application that supports the latter claim:

William McGarity claimed, “we marched against Col[onel] Turnbull at Rocky Mount and drove them from their works into a house from whence we could not dislodged them” [3]. None of the accounts I’ve read indicates that the Loyalists lost men while fleeing the redoubt, but it’s certainly plausible, especially if they were not near the gate, or if the abatis was difficult to cross.

Second, American Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill claimed that the British were in a frame house and that he expected that the Americans’ bullets would easily penetrate the wood, striking down the defenders inside. I pooh-poohed this description because Hill is not the most reliable source, and other sources agreed that the British were in log houses [see Note 4 in this post]. However, I recently came across a would-be pensioner that agreed with Hill. James McConnel claimed that, “the force of the British & Tories he does not know, these were in a large frame house stockaded round from which the Americans tried to drive them but without success as they were unprovided with cannon" [4].

So possibly one of the buildings that housed defenders was a frame house, and the defenders inside were quite vulnerable to the Americans’ gunfire. Hill claimed that while the frame house appeared to be vulnerable, the British "had placed small logs about a foot from the inside of the wall and rammed the cavity with clay" [5]. But how could he know? The Americans didn’t have an opportunity to inspect the site until almost 2 weeks later (after the British abandoned the post), and this may reflect an improvement that was made after the battle. The gun shot holes from the battle would have remained in the exterior of the building, leading Hill to a false conclusion.

Notes:

1. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to Henry Clinton, August 6, 1780.

2. Enclosure in a letter dated August 20, 1780 from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain. In K. G. Davies (Ed.), Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series), Vol. XVI. Irish University Press.

3. Pension application of William McGarity, transcribed by Will Graves.

4. Pension application of James McConnel, transcribed by Will Graves.

5. William Hill's memoir, transcribed by Will Graves.

The Battle of Rocky Mount 4

Part 4: "Come and Take It"

Previous: The Assault on Rocky Mount

[Revised 12/31/09]

Come and Take It:

Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter's initial effort to take the British post at Rocky Mount had failed. British Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon, writing of the Americans, noted that "They kept possession however of the Redoubt, from which, and the cover of Rocks, Trees, etc, they continued to fire [on the post] for a long time."

A British officer, Lieutenant Anthony Allaire, heard that some of the Americans shouted for the British to "take back your ammunition again" as they fired their guns. Probably these were some of the men that James Lisle took with him when he defected to the Americans [see Note 1]. The British counterfire was also intense. Adjutant Joseph Graham of North Carolina wrote that: “The Enemy were under cover in the fortified buildings and sustained but little damage from the Americans and the Rocks were not so extensive as to shelter them from the fire of the British… Alexander Haynes [a North Carolina militiaman]… who having fired his Rifle twice from behind the Rocks had loaded his gun a third time, and peeping past the side of the black rock for an object, his face being white became an object for the enemys marksmen one of whom shot him close under the eye. The shot ranged under the brain but missed the vertebrae of the neck… he lost his Eye; it run out shortly [after] he was wounded."

Meanwhile, Sumter considered his options. In the words of Colonel Richard Winn, "Genl. Sumter finding nothing Could be done thought it best to refresh his Men for a Short time and bring on the Attack from another Quarter by Marching round the place." In this new position, the Americans were able, thanks to “the Cover of large Rocks” get to a position only "about 50 yards of [i.e., from] the Block H[ouse]." The American fire became so dangerous at this point that "the Enemy was prevented from firing on us as they dare Not come to their post Holes." Hoping to avoid another assault, "Genl. Sumter Directed Colo. Winn to demand a Sunder of the place.”

Winn approached the British post under a flag of true, and gave the following summons to the British [see Note 2]:

"Summons
31 July 1780
Sir
I am directed by Genl. Sumter to Demand a Surrender of Rocky Mount, therefore you will Surrender this place with the Men &c under your Command which will be considered as prisoner of war. S[igned]/ R. Winn"

Winn claimed that the British commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull “required that Hostilities should Cease for one Hour for Consideration.” Sumter agreed. Turnbull had no intention of surrendering the post to the Americans, but perhaps valued a respite. Turnbull then had Winn deliver the following written response to Sumter:

"Sir
I have considered your Summons & return for Answer that duty and Inclination induces me to defend this place to the last extremity. 31 July 1780 S/ Turnbull Colo. Comm[an]d[an]t"

Lieutenant Allaire heard that Turnbull’s message for Sumter was, that if he wanted the fort, “he might come and take it.”

The Americans were not impressed. According to Private James Clinton, “immediately [a] second assault was made.” This attack, like the one before, was repulsed by the garrison [see Note 3].

Desperate Measures:

After the second attack failed, Major William Davie claimed that “various strategems were essayed in vain to set the buildings on fire.” Of these, Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill described a remarkable series of events in which he was involved. Hill wrote that:

“the officers held a council & it was discovered that there was a large rock, and between this rock and the fort, stood a small house which might be fired by throwing fire brands over the rock, & that this house w[oul]d. communicate the fire to the house the Enemy was in [i.e., the blockhouse] and as we had the command of the water [the Americans were between the post and the Catawba River] they could not possibly extinguish the flames — From this ledge of Rocks where the army lay, to the rock near the house was about 100 yds. free of any obstructions.”

Unfortunately, whoever made this attack would have to run straight towards the blockhouse, “& it is well known that when any object is going from or coming to a marksman, the marksman had near as good a chance [to hit it] as if the object was stationary.”According to Hill, Sumter and some other officers “proposed… for 2 men to endeavor to fire that small house. but the undertaking appeared so hazardous, that no two men of the army could be found to undertake it After some considerable time was spent, y[ou]r. author proposed that if any other man w[oul]d. go with him he w[oul]d.: make the attempt, at length a young man, brother to the Johnsons... proposed to undertake with me.”

A lull seems to have developed in the fighting, and during this time, Hill and his comrade “had every assistance that c[oul]d. be obtained — Rich lightwood split & bound with cords to cover the most vital parts of our bodies, as well as a large bundle of the same wood to carry in our arms, being thus equiped we run the 100 yds. to the rock; Mr. Johnson was to manage the fire & y[ou]r. author was to watch the enemys sallying out of the house.” The two men evidently got inside the abatis – the only Americans to do so – and were vulnerable to a counterattack from the garrison [see Note 4].

Hill then related that “before the fire was sufficiently kindled the enemy did sally out with fixed bayonets; the same race was run again, to where the army lay, & under a heavy fire, not only from those who had sallied out [these would be some of Turnbull’s New York Volunteers], but like wise from a large number of Port holes in that end of the house.”

The Americans were encouraged by this small success, and a second attempt was made:

“It was then proposed that the whole of our riflemen sh[oul]d. direct their fire to that space between the small & great house, which was about 15 ft.; we being equipt as before mentioned, made the 2d. attempt. & the plan already mentioned, prevented the Enemy from sallying a 2d. time.” With a steady volume of American gunfire pouring on the building, “We then had an opportunity of making a large fire behind the rock, & throwing fire brands on the roof of the little house & we staid until that roof was in flames. & the heat of it had caused the wall of the great house to smoke — We then concluded the work, was done, & undertook the 4th. race, which was much more hazardous than the former ones, as the Enemy during the interval, had opened a great many more port-holes in that end of the building — And here I beg leave to remark that Providence so protected us both, that neither of us lost a drop of blood, altho' locks of hair was cut from our heads and our garments riddled with balls.”

Great Mortification:

Panting, Hill stood alongside his comrades-in-arms, waiting for the main building to go up in flames. However, "Scarcily had we time to look back from behind the rock where our men lay, in hopes to see the fire progressing, but to our great mortification, when the great house was beginning to flame — as heavy a storm of rain fell, as hath fallen from that time to the present, & which extinguished the flames" [see Note 5].

The rain ended the Americans' hopes for taking the fort [see Note 6]. In Hill’s words, "We were then forced to retreat under as great mortification, as ever any number of men endured." The Americans gathered up their wounded and prepared to retreat. Rawdon noted that the Americans "carried off all who fell, excepting three dead and one wounded who lay too near the Post." Among those left on the field was Andrew Neal, who had been killed before the abatis. Adjutant Graham wrote of Alexander Haynes that "It was thought he was killed, but seeing life was in him when they were about to retire, his acquaintances carried him off."

British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton claimed that “In the gallant defence of this post, Lieutenant-colonel Turnbull had one officer killed, one wounded, and about ten men killed and wounded.” The officer, evidently, was “Capt. Hulett” who “got wounded in the head,” according to Allaire.

The British did not know exactly how many men the Americans lost, because so many of the fallen had been carried off the field. Rawdon wrote that "Turnbull therefore cannot ascertain the Enemy’s loss; but imagines it to have been pretty severe."

American sources generally downplay the number of casualties they sustained, or give some very low total. James Clinton, for example, said that "Our loss at Rocky Mount was not great in numbers." Thomas Reagan stated that "During this engagement Sumpter's party were protected by the woods and the huge rocks situated near the log house consequently but few were killed of his men. This applicant thinks there were killed and missing about 14 or 15 men and among the killed were Col. Neel [Andrew Neal]—Capt. Jones and Capt. Burns who was shot in the Eye & fell close by this applicant." Thomas Sumter wrote 10 days after the battle that "My Loss, Kild and wounded did not exceed twenty" [see Note 7].

Notes:

1. Allaire was not present, but his journal recorded information passed around among British officers serving in the South Carolina Backcountry at the time and is on the whole reliable. Most likely the quoted passage refers to this point in the battle, but it's possible the incident occurred somewhat earlier or later (the same is true of some of the other incidents described in connection with the battle). The defection of James Lisle was mentioned in Part 1, and is well described in Michael Scoggins' The Day It Rained Militia.

2. The flag of truce is mentioned by Lieutenant Allaire, and privates William Clark and James Clinton. Except where noted, the remainder of the quoted passages in this section are from Winn's memoir.

3. Other sources agreed that the Americans launched more than one attack. Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon wrote that after "The [surrender] proposal was rejected... the attack was repeated with as little success as at first." William Clark likewise stated that at this time "Sumter ordered a second attack, but as in the former attempt we were again repulsed." Arthur Travis recalled that “Sumter endeavored to storm [the British post], but failed after two attacks and some loss.”

4. British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton's history of the Southern Campaign notes that there were “three attacks, in the last of which some of the forlorn hope [evidently Hill and his comrade] penetrated within the abbatis.”

5. A letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, dated August 9, 1780, confirms part of Hill's tale. He wrote, "I Made an attempt to fire them [the British works] in the evening, and should have Succeeded, if the afternoon had Not proved excesively wet." Years later, Winn recalled, "the House could have been Easily Set on fire had it not been for the powerful rains that fell." William Clark stated, "It was possible for us to have set fire to the works, but a rain came on and prevented this last effort." Robert Fleming recalled, "the enemy were in the Fort which we set fire to but a shower of rain commenced falling in a short time which with the exertions of the enemy within extinguished the fire and we failed to drive them out."

6. This is not quite what Sumter claimed. He wrote to Pinckney, "My led [i.e., lead bullets] being exhausted, I withdrew a small distance." This statement implies that the Americans were able to keep their gunpowder dry and could have continued firing on the post longer had they sufficient ammunition. It seems unlikely, however, that a continuation of the Americans' sniping would have affected the outcome.

7. This total, 3%-4% of Sumter's force, belies the claim that Sumter had a "penchant for bloody and repeated frontal assaults" that were "unnecessarily costly."

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's history.

William R. Davie, The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [excerpt]

Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain. (Includes a transcription of Allaire's journal).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Clark. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of James Clinton. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Fleming. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Reagan. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Arthur Travis. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780.

William T. Sherman. (2009). Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed. (.pdf file). [Contains a transcription of Rawdon's letter].

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of the Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

The Battle of Rocky Mount 2

Part 2: Sumter's First Target

Previous: An American Offensive

Next: The Assault on Rocky Mount

[Revised 12/30/09]

At the end of July, several factors convinced Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter to lead his brigade of militia into the field against the system of British outposts in the South Carolina Backcountry. One factor was that the American army in the South was on the move, and aimed to capture the British post at Camden. This left Sumter the choice of either joining in the offensive, or being reduced to a spectator in the critical campaign to liberate his home state.

A second factor was the steady growth of his brigade in July, 1780. At the end of June, his brigade consisted of only a small cadre of South Carolinians (see Sumter's Brigade Forms). However, he had been joined by additional South Carolinians, dozens of Catawba Indians, and, in late July, hundreds of North Carolina militia. In all he commanded around 500-600 men [see Note 1] For the first time, Sumter’s force was large enough to hazard a major action with the British.

A third factor was that Sumter received valuable information about the nearby British post at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, that helped convince him it could be taken. Colonel Richard Winn claimed, in his postwar memoir, that he had seized Major John Owens of the Loyalist militia the night before the battle at Williamson’s Plantation, and that Winn “gave Owens a parole & employed him as a Spy without fee or reward to go to Rocky Mount Count the numbers of Men and report the State and Strength of the place.” Major Owens, either out of fear of what would happen if he was captured again, or to hedge his bets lest his side lost the battle for South Carolina, “punctually complied” with Winn’s request. The two of them secretly met on or about July 20th. According to Winn, Owens claimed that “Colo Turnbull [Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull] Commanded had about 300 Men and was posted in a Strong Block House two Stories high properly prepared for defense and sufficient abbates.”

Owens' report corresponds remarkably well with the description that British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton gave of the place [see Note 2]:

“The defences of Rocky mount consisted of two log houses, a loop-holed building [i.e., the blockhouse], and an abbatis; placed upon an eminence, which commanded a view of the neighbouring country.”

A letter from from Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon to Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis (dated July 31, 1780) notes that the site included "Log Houses constructed for the purpose of defence," and that an "abbatis... surrounded the Post." Rawdon also noted the presence of a nearby "redoubt."

The abatis lay a short distance from the houses and surrounded the post. Beyond the abatis lay an old field, which was quite extensive in some directions [see Note 3].

American accounts, like Winn's sometimes mention only the presence of a single building, suggesting that one large house or blockhouse was of particular importance to the defense [see Note 4].

Tarleton claimed that Turnbull's "force was composed of one hundred and fifty provincials, and as many militia." The provincials were Turnbull's own New York Volunteers; the militia are thought to have been commanded by Colonel Matthew Floyd. Rawdon's letter notes the presence of British Legion dragoons; these were probably the remnants of Captain Christian Huck's company, which had fought at Hill's Ironworks and Williamson's Plantation.

The site of the British post at Rocky Mount, as seen using Google Maps (click to enlarge). The post was situated on a high hill overlooking the Catawba River. A topographical view is on the left, a satellite view on the right. The red dot shows the approximate location of the British blockhouse (cf. John A. Robertson et al.'s Global Gazetteer of the American Revolution).

Notes:

1. Sumter claimed that "With about five hundred men I attacked Rockey Mount" in a letter to Thomas Pinckney dated August 9, 1780. Other sources have credited him with more men. Among the principal commanders of the South Carolinians were Richard Winn, Andrew Neal, William Bratton, Edward Lacey, William Hill, and John McClure. The North Carolinians were headed by Colonel Robert Irwin, and the Catawba Indians were led by General New River.

The large number of senior South Carolina officers give the impression that South Carolinians constituted the bulk of Sumter’s brigade. However, as described previously, the South Carolina militia regiments operating with Sumter were quite small in size. Adjutant Joseph Graham of North Carolina made this point explicitly years later:

“From the number of the field officers from South Carolina under their command the reader would believe in the ranks of the former the principal force consisted of the militia from South Carolina, whereas, the fact was, that in the well fought battles of Rocky Mount & Hanging Rock the North Carolinians, under the command of Colos. Irwin and Huggins and Major Davie, constituted the greater part of his Command and the [South Carolina] field officers referred to had not sometimes each a Dozen of men with them.”

2. Winn’s memoir was written after Tarleton’s account of the battle was published, and not impossible is that Winn’s statement was influenced by Tarleton’s description. Some American histories (Davie, Lossing) clearly copied Tarleton’s language. Nevertheless, it is important to observe that Winn remembered Owens’ description as accurate.

3. Thomas Sumter wrote to Thomas Pinckney that "the action... was offten within thirty feet of their works." Because the Americans had difficulty penetrating the abatis, it can be inferred that Sumter believed the abatis was no more than 30 feet away from the buildings. Private William Clark claimed that to attack the post, his regiment had to "attack through an old field about 200 yards to the house."

4. Below are some of the statements made by American participants about the British defenses at Rocky Mount:

North Carolina militiaman Joseph Graham claimed that the British were ensconced in "log buildings... [that] had loop holes to shoot through.”

South Carolina militiaman Hugh Gaston stated that the "Tories & British took shelter in a large log house."

South Carolina militiaman Thomas Reagan said that the British were "in a large log house at a place called 'Rocky Mount' on the Catawba."

An exception to these descriptions appears in the memoir of Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill. He recalled that the British were stationed in “a large framed house: the walls of which were only thin clap boards.” Hill claimed the attack was made because “we supposed that our balls w[oul]d. Have the desired effect by shooting through the wall." But instead, "the Enemy had wrought day & night and had placed small logs about a foot from the inside of the wall and rammed the cavity with clay, and under this delusion we made the attack —; but soon found that we c[oul]d. injure them no way, but by shooting, in their port-holes." He attributed this erroneous information to a strengthening of the British post between Owens' report (about July 20) and the date of the attack (July 30). Hill's description is not compelling in light of the other accounts, and at the very least does not seem to accurately describe the main defensive building on the site.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's postwar memoir.

John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

William R. Davie, The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [excerpt]

William Alexander Graham. (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Clark. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh Gaston. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Reagan. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Benson John Lossing. (1860). Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

David Paul Reuwer. Documentary Resources and Notes on Gen. Thomas Sumter and the North and South Carolina militias Attack on the British forward outpost at Rocky Mount, South Carolina (July 31 or August 1, 1780). In Volume 1, Number 1 of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution newsletter. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780.

William T. Sherman. (2009). Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed. (.pdf file). [Contains a transcription of Rawdon's letter].

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of the Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 5

Part 5: Aftermath

Previous: Huck's Defeat

The British force at Williamson's Plantation was surprised by the early morning American attack and utterly routed. American losses were perhaps limited to one man and certainly did not exceed several men (see Scoggins' history for details). By all accounts, British losses exceeded those of the Americans. However, there is some uncertainty as to the exact numbers.

Estimates of British losses in pension applications filed long after the war express considerable differences in opinion on this subject. Some claimed only that "Capt. Hook a British officer was killed. Several of the enemy were killed & some taken prisoners" (Gaston), or that the British lost "Capt. Hook and Col. Furguson with several others" (Neely). Others, however, claimed that "Huck was killed and many others" (Morrow) or that "a considerable number" were "killed & wounded," plus "near thirty prisoners" were taken (Patton).

Perhaps the most trustworthy American estimates come not from participants but rather from other American officers that wrote about the battle not long after the event. Major Thomas Blount wrote that "Ferguson, Hook, a Lieut. and 11 others were killed on the ground, and a major, 2 Lieuts. & 27 taken, many of whom are since dead of their wounds; the remainder are dispersed.... Our loss was only one man wounded." Colonel Thomas Sumter wrote that "The enemy's loss, Kild upon the Spot, was one Col., one Capt. & Twelve others; one Majr., one Lt. & Twenty-Seven others taken prisoners, Since Which the Number found Dead a Mounts to Twenty-one; the Loss very considerable among the Dragoons."

These statements indicate that 13-14 men were killed outright, and another 7 men later succumbed to their wounds. Approximately another 23 men were captured. Of those captured, some were undoubtedly wounded during the fighting; however, at least several Loyalists were taken before the battle (cf. Winn's memoir), and perhaps some were taken afterwards as well.

A final source of information is two letters that Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull wrote to Colonel Francis Rawdon some hours after the battle.

In one he wrote that "Capt. Huck... is killed. Cornet Hunt is wounded and supposed to be prisoner. Lt. Adamson and Lt. McGrigor of the New York Volunteers, and all our Twenty [here and below, 'our' refers to the New York Volunteers] are Missing. Ens. Cameron of the New York Volunteers, Lt. Lewis of the Militia and Twelve Dragoons and Twelve Militia are Returned." In the second letter he reported that “Nine of our missing men have come in, and one Dragoon... Lt. Adamson Fell of[f] his horse Being much bruised is taken prisoner... seven of ours and a sergt. And two of the Dragoons are Likewise wounded and taken Prisoners. Lt. McGregor and Cornet Hunt we suppose have made their Escape But have not yet arrived--Capt. Huik is the only Person who was killed Dead on the Spot.”

British and American statements, taken in conjunction with Lieutenant Hunt's statements about British strength, suggests that British losses were as follows:

British Legion: Captain Huck killed, Lieutenant Hunt wounded and captured, 2 dragoons wounded and captured, 3 dragoons missing in action. (Twelve dragoons escaped).

New York Volunteers: 1 sergeant and 7 rank and file wounded and captured, 1 rank and file missing in action. (Lieutenant McGrigor, Ensign Cameron, and 9 rank and file escaped). Turnbull claimed that Lieutenant Adamson of the Volunteers was wounded and captured, but according to Michael Scoggins, Adamson was in fact serving with the Loyalist militia.

Loyalist militia: "Colonel" James Ferguson killed; between 3 and 23 men of other ranks were killed or wounded & captured. A number of militia (at least 12 and possibly considerably more) escaped capture and returned to Rocky Mount.

The representation of the battle in miniature is consistent with these totals. With 1 miniature representing 5 participants, 1 casualty was shown for the British Legion, 2 for the New York Volunteers, and 3 for the Loyalist militia.

Sources:

Thomas Blount. Letter to Abner Nash, July 23, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh Gaston. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Joseph Morrow (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of George Neely (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Patton (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of Turnbull's letters to Rawdon).

Thomas Sumter. Letter to Johann De Kalb, July 17, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina.

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 4

Part 4: Huck's Defeat

Previous: The Americans Gather

Next: Aftermath

The American force spent the night of July 11-12, 1780 searching for Captain Christian Huck's British force. It wasn't until the early hours of the morning that they learned that Huck was encamped near Colonel William Bratton's plantation. By this time the Americans were doubtlessly exhausted, but they remained committed to the attack.

Although virtually every high ranking officer with the Americans would be credited by at least one source with holding the overall command, it seems more likely that decisions were made by committee. Colonel Richard Winn (who claimed to have been the American commander in his memoir), described the Americans' approach in some detail. The Americans, on horseback, were travelling along a road on or near the path of today's Brattonsville Road. He wrote that "it was then about one hour to day brake here Colo Winn Ordered the party to file off to the Left of the Road & Dismount and immediately had the whole paraded then Capt. Read a bold daring Officer was Ordered to pick Out twenty five Men and file off to the left of Col. Brattons plantation and as soon as the Action begun in front he was to attack the rear of the Enemy & take all Straggling parties..." The Americans were as of yet unfamiliar with how Huck and his men were deployed, but sent Read's group off into the woods to attempt to surround the Bratton house.

According to Winn, "at the same time Capt Read received his Orders the Remaining part of the Men Commenced their march to bring on the Action." The main part of the American force expected to encounter the British at any moment. However, "on coming to the fork of the Road was informed by two Tories in Search of their Horses that Colo. Ferguson with his party lay in the Edge of a field which was in advance of the British Horse about three Hundred yards." In other words, when the Americans reached the point where Williamson's Lane began, they learned that the British were not at Bratton's plantation, but at Williamson's neighboring plantation. There, "Capt. Hook who Commanded posted himself in a Strong log House around him prepared to Mount in a moment if Required."

The Americans paused and worked out a new plan of attack. Again, the tactical plan was to send a detachment in rear of the British position. Winn wrote, "you must Understand when I took the two Tories I halted for a short time and sent Capt. McClure with his Company Round Williams plantation to attack the Enemy as soon as he heard the first firing." Not mentioned by Winn is whether an effort was made to recall Read or redirect his movements [see Note 1].

The Americans approached the plantation from the west. Evidently, visibility was poor. Although the Loyalists and provincials were awake and their equipage packed, they did not see the Americans before they had closed to within rifle range. Winn wrote, "the Sun was about to rise and notwithstanding I marched in 10 or 15 Steps for at least 200 yards of Colo Fergusons party [i.e., Loyalist militia] I was not discovered until they were fired on Colo Ferguson and some of his Men was killed the first onset the rest ran and Chiefly left their Horses tho saddled and ready to Mount." John Craig likewise remembered Ferguson as being among the first to fall. He "stood at the end of the lane and was shot down, and his clothing was blackened with the gun powder." This description suggests that the Americans very quickly closed with the Loyalists. This rapid headlong rush sent first the Loyalist militia and then the New York Volunteers into headlong flight.

The Americans Attack (click to enlarge). Here and below, 1 miniature represents 5 participants in the battle.

John Craig remembered that "We heard the words, 'boys take over the fence,'" "and our men rushed after the Tories and British as they fled before us." Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill wrote that "there were many of their carcasses found in the woods some days after." Hill's statement implies that the fleeing soldiers did not rush down the lane en masse (which would have made them easy targets), but many instead fled through the fields and into the woods with a number of the Americans in pursuit.

"Take Over the Fence" (click to enlarge). Loyalists and Provincials flee before the American surprise attack.

At the same time that British resistance collapsed on the west end of the plantation, a second American force emerged from the woods behind the Williamson house. Militiaman James Collins, a 16-year-old armed with an obsolete shotgun, was with this force.

Collins wrote, "Not long after sunrise, we came in sight of their headquarters, which were in a log building. In the rear of the building was a large peach orchard; at some distance behind the peach orchard we all dismounted and tied our horses [see Note 2]; we then proceeded on foot through the orchard, thinking the peach trees would be a good safeguard, against the charge of the horsemen. We had not proceeded far until the sentinels discovered us--fired on us and fled. The troops were soon mounted and paraded. This, I confess, was a very imposing sight, at least to me, for I had never seen a troop of British horse before, and thought they differed vastly in appearance from us--poor hunting-shirt fellows. The leader drew his sword, mounted his horse, and began to storm and rave, and advanced on us; but we kept close to the peach orchard. When they had got pretty near the peach trees, their leader called out, “disperse you d--d rebels, or I will put every man of you to the sword.”

"We Did Not Stop One Minute" (two views; click to enlarge). The main American force advances from the west while a detachment approaches the Williamson house through the orchard.

Under ordinary conditions, this American detachment would have been overwhelmed by the British Legion dragoons. However, the dragoons didn't have the opportunity to mount a charge. At the same time that Huck responded to the danger in his rear, the main American force pressed towards the Williamson house. Winn wrote that "here we did not stop one Minute [after driving off the Loyalists and Provincials] but went on to commence our Attack on the British horse in a clear open old field we was paraded in About one Hundred yards from them." Collins, in the peach orchard, watched as "Our rifle balls began to whistle among them." John Craig, who was with the main American force claimed that "John Carroll led the way, I was next to him, and Charles Miles next." Huck was doomed. "We halted to fire and both Miles and Carroll fired at the same time, and brought down the Captain of the British Dragoons."

Collins saw that "Hook was shot off his horse and fell at full length; his sword flew out of his hand as he fell and lay at some distance, and both lay till some of his men gathered about him and around him two or three times. At length one halted and pointed his sword downward, seemed to pause a moment, then raising his sword, wheeled off and all started at full gallop. We then moved on to the house without opposition, but all had disappeared. There Collins saw two more dragoons that had been struck. "In the yard sat two good looking fellows bleeding pretty freely, their horses standing at no great distance: one of whom was shot through the thigh."

Huck's End. Huck lies in the yard of the Williamson house, his command scattered.

With that, the battle of Williamson's Plantation was over [see Note 3].

Winn reflected that "we was in full possession of the field in five Minutes without the loss of a Single Man Either Kild or Wounded, as I am well convinced the Enemy during the Action Never fired a Single gun or pistol." Another participant, Hugh Gaston, likewise believed that "The action continued but a few minutes."

Notes:

1. Given the small size of the companies and regiments it seems surprising that Captains Read and McClure would be charged with commanding these important detachments and not one of the higher-ranking officers that were present. It may be that each of the senior officers regarded himself as the rightful commander of the main force and so chose to remain with it (Sumter was not present and he seemingly had not designated a second in command). Perhaps the several colonels eschewed command of a secondary force because it would serve as tacit acknowledgment of one's subordinate position. Alternatively, rank was sometimes determined by political considerations rather than by military ability (such was the case with Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill); perhaps Read and McClure were given these commands because they were recognized as especially active and able.

2. On this detail, accounts differ. According to Winn, the Americans had all dismounted some time earlier.

3. Or perhaps not. Winn described the the British fleeing eastward and wrote that "as they ran by Capt. McClure he gave them a fire but was not near enough to do them much damage he had the misfortune to lose one Man being a little advanced before the rest was I was inform kild by One of his Own party." Winn believed there were two groups of Americans on the battlefield: the main body, with which he served, and McClure's party. Winn wrote ruefully, "I do believe had I have not lost the Service of Capt. Read but few of the British or Tories would have been able to have Escaped." If Winn's account is accurate, then the group of Americans in the peach orchard must have been commanded by Captain McClure. The representation in miniature shows how Winn's account can be connected to Collins': the fleeing Loyalist militia and New York Volunteers cross the path of the Americans in rear of the house, allowing the Americans to have given them a fire before approaching Huck and the British Legion dragoons. Collins wrote that "For my own part, I fired my old shot gun only twice in the action. I suppose I did no more harm than burning so much powder." He did not mention seeing a group of retreating British infantry -- only some sentries and the British Legion dragoons. Rather than conclude that Collins omitted an important detail, Michael Scoggins concluded that Winn was mistaken about Read's absence. Scoggins placed Read's group (including Collins) behind the Williamson house, and McClure's group further to the east. The representation in miniature is consistent with this interpretation as well -- it just doesn't show such a third group, because it would have encountered the fleeing British outside the area I modeled.

William Hill's account of the battle touches somewhat on this issue. He wrote: "The plan was to attack both ends of the Lane at the same time, but unfortunately the party sent to make the attack on the east end of the lane met with some embarrassments, by fences, brush, briars &c. that they could not get to the end of the lane until the firing commenced at the west end." His account places two forces of Americans in the battle, which is consistent with the view that Collins was with McClure. However, he places the second group near the road, rather than behind the house, which is consistent with the view that Collins was with Read.

Sources:

James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh Gaston. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of statements by many participants).

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 2

Part 2: The British Encampment

Previous: Huck Rides Again

Next: The Americans Gather

The location of Williamson's Plantation is generally known, although the original structures vanished long ago. Several sketches were made of the battlefield in the mid-to-late 19th Century based on local family traditions. Unfortunately, these sketches differ in terms of some of the most basic details. However, these, in combination with participant accounts, suggests that the Williamson house was about 500 yards from Colonel William Bratton's plantation. The Bratton house is now part of Historic Brattonsville.

The William Bratton house today, as seen using Google Maps (click to enlarge). Google Maps is now set up much like Google Earth (see this post) and includes the same "street view" function and links to Panoramio pictures.

Various sources also provide some details about what this plantation would have looked like in 1780. The Williamson house was probably a sturdy, two-story house, built of logs, on the north side of a road running east by southeast from the vicinity of the Bratton house. The land along the road was cleared to the west all the way to the Bratton house. The road itself was a lane lined by "a strong fence" in William Hill's words. To the north and south was forested country. The Williamson house was in old field, with various outbuildings nearby. An orchard was in the rear of the house. There was at least one large oat field west of the house. A corn crib was mentioned in some descriptions of the battle; wheat is another likely crop. The land was clear west of the plantation, all the way to the Bratton house.

Williamson's Plantation (click to enlarge). A satellite view (left) of Historic Brattonsville and the site of Williamson's Plantation The Williamson house was located within or near to the red circle. The street view on the right is from Percival Road looking in the direction of the site of the Williamson house. The area is covered by second-growth forest.

Below is the miniature version of the Williamson Plantation that I assembled. Some compromise is necessary between a realistic looking farm and one that is correctly scaled. The representation will be at a 1:5 scale, rather than the 1:20 I plan to follow generally, but even so, a single building has a "footprint" equivalent to 25 buildings (because it is both 5 times too long and 5 times too wide). Therefore, the farmhouse and the various outbuildings is represented by a single resin building that I had handy. The small clump of trees behind the house represents the orchard. Several farm fields are also represented. Distances are not to a set scale. The result is a far cry from a realistic portrayal of an 18th-Century Backcountry plantation, but it's more attractive and practical than many alternatives.

Williamson's Plantation in miniature.

When the British encamped, Huck stayed in the Williamson house, perhaps with Hunt and some other dragoons. The rest of the dragoons were nearby. The New York Volunteers appear to have encamped in the lane. The Loyalist militia were at the western end of the plantation, either in the lane or in a field. When the Americans attacked, the men were up and preparing for the day. Their gear had been stowed on their horses, and, were it not for the attack, they would have departed before long.

Sources:

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of British correspondence, and statements by many participants).

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 1

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation
Part 1: Huck Rides Again
Next: The British Encampment

[The account appearing in this and subsequent posts is heavily indebted to Michael C. Scoggins' recent history of the battle. The present account is generally consistent with his, although I arrived at a different conclusion about British numbers, as described below. Readers should note that Scoggins' history includes many more details concerning the battle of Williamson's Plantation than are related here].

In early July, 1780, much of Thomas Sumter's brigade of militia temporarily disbanded. The farmers-turned-soldiers returned to their homes to reap their crops, see their families, and otherwise prepare for the coming attempt to retake South Carolina. This dispersal of Sumter's men made them vulnerable, and an attempt was soon made by the British to capture some of the leading figures in the militia. Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull, who commanded the British post at Rocky Mount, wrote on July 12 to his superior officer, Colonel Francis Rawdon, informing him of the attempt.

"…hearing that a noted Partisan McClure [i.e., Captain John McClure] was come home and Reaping his Grain about Twenty Two miles above and that Col. Bratton [i.e., Colonel William Bratton] who Lived Twelve miles farther was publishing Proclamations and Pardons to who should return to their duty, I proposed to Capt. Huck [i.e., Captain Christian Huck, who led the British raid on Hill's Ironworks] that I woud mount twenty of our men and give him some militia to the amount of fifty to Beat up those two Quarters. The party marched from this Monday Evening and found only one of the McClures and no person at Brattons. My orders to him was not to go farther than Prudence should Direct him."

Although not obvious from Turnbull's letter to Rawdon, Huck's force consisted of three groups: British Legion dragoons, New York Volunteers, and Loyalist militia. All were mounted.

There are two key sources of information on the strength of these commands: Lieutenant-Colonel Turnbull, who wrote several letters to Rawdon about Huck's mission and defeat, and Lieutenant Hunt of the British Legion. Hunt was in the battle, and the account he related to Lieutenant Anthony Allaire and Dr. Uzal Johnson appeared in their journals the day after Huck's defeat.

According to Allaire's journal:

"Lieut. Hunt of the Legion Cavalry came to our quarters... He was one of the party defeated the twelfth inst. He gave an imperfect account of the affair. Capt. Huck commanded the party consisting of one subaltern and seventeen dragoons of the Legion, three subalterns and eighteen New York Volunteers, twenty-five militia men."

Lieutenant Hunt was speaking candidly to another officer the day after the battle, and his account is not suspect. However, the numbers he stated (as recorded by Allaire) differed somewhat from that stated by others. Below I comment on why I am generally accepting of Hunt's statement.

British Legion: Captain Huck, Lieutenant Hunt, and 17 rank and file.

Turnbull did not report the number of dragoons to his superiors (at least in extant correspondence). Cornwallis reported to Clinton that the number of dragoons was between 30 and 40. Cornwallis may have given this number because he knew this to be the approximate strength of Huck's troop and he assumed (not having been told otherwise) that all of Huck's dragoons were present [see Note 1]. But were they? Huck had been dispatched on a search-and-seize mission, not a combat mission. Turnbull may have felt it wiser to give more experience to his Loyalist militia and a group of New York Volunteers that were recently mounted than to dispatch all of his dragoons. Turnbull did not expressly indicate this in his correspondence, but his comments to Rawdon on casualties (to be covered in an upcoming post) make considerably more sense if only a portion of the dragoons were present.

New York Volunteers: Lieutenant McGrigor, Ensign Cameron, and 18 rank and file.

Turnbull's letters to Rawdon name the officers with this group. Turnbull identifies Lieutenant Adamson as a third officer, but Uzal Johnston recorded in his journal that there were only two subalterns, and Michael Scoggins' research suggests that Adamson was not with the Volunteers, but rather the militia.

Loyalist Militia: 25 or so militiamen under Colonel Matthew Floyd and "Colonel" James Ferguson [see Note 2].

Hunt claimed that there were 25 militia; Cornwallis wrote Clinton that there were 60. Hunt's total for the militia is less reliable than his other figures because he is less likely to have been informed of their total or to have performed a head count. However, Hunt's statement should not be dismissed. American militia would leave the ranks at times for various reasons, and it could well be that the Loyalist militia were no different. It should be recalled that the British were not anticipating combat, and some men (perhaps many) might have been allowed to visit home while they were out on this expedition. Indeed, there may even have been some military value in such departures as it would help raise morale and allow the men to gather supplies. These militiamen might even have been able to learn of the Americans' latest movements from family members. There is at least some evidence of Loyalist militiamen leaving the ranks. Colonel Richard Winn wrote of capturing Major John Owens on the night preceding the battle and two privates the morning of the battle.

If the number of militiamen fluctuated, then it is all the more unlikely that Hunt's number is definite. His statement of 25 men sounds like an estimation, and in the confusion of the early morning fight, he hardly could have been sure.

Using Hunt as a source, Huck's force totaled 65 men or so [see Note 3]. Notably, American sources provided much higher estimates. The difference in their statements is so large that it seems safest to dismiss the latter estimates out of hand. These estimates include that there were “two or three hundred Tories” (Samuel Killough), “About 300 Tories under Colonel Floyd and fifty dragoons under Capt. Hook, and Capt. Adamson with fifty Light Infantry” (John Craig), and "100 horse &... of the Tory militia... about 300 men” (William Hill). It should be noted that the battle was short in duration, that the battle was fought under conditions of reduced visibility, and that these statements by American participants were made many years after the fact.

Notes:

1. One might wonder why Cornwallis would have given a number for the British Legion dragoons if he did not know it for certain. My supposition is that Cornwallis was concerned about what Clinton would see in American newspapers. Both sides habitually magnified their opponent's strength and losses, and Cornwallis wanted Clinton to know that Huck's force was small in size and that the defeat was not of great military consequence (the political consequences, however, were another matter). Stating a number -- even if imprecise -- established this point.

2. It is questionable whether the British ever gave Ferguson a colonel's commission. He is not listed in Lambert's seminal history of South Carolina Loyalists.

3. Michael Scoggins sided with Cornwallis over Hunt on the question of the number of British Legion dragoons and Loyalist militia. Consequently, he had almost twice as many British participants in the battle as I state here.

Sources:

Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain. (Includes a transcription of Allaire's journal).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Grabes transcribed the pension application of John Craig (.pdf file).

Robert S. Lambert. (1987). South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution.

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of British corresepondence, and statements by many participants).

Behind the Scenes

I've begun posting to this blog once a week on weekends. Hopefully, I'll be able to continue at this pace for some time. Although I've been posting weekly, I've been doing something related to this blog most nights. Since the start of the summer, I've gone back to edit a few older posts. I realize that's probably not good "netiquette," but I nevertheless feel compelled to put things in reasonably good order. What I've done is rework posts on British units so they're not specifically about Cowpens (my first project), but rather summarize the service of those units throughout the war. This will better allow me to refer back to those posts in the future (the units in question are the 7th Regiment of Foot, the 17th Light Dragoons, The British Legion, and the 71st Foot). I've also reworked several posts about Cowpens specifically, so as to better explain my reasoning regarding the placement of American militia units (The Militia Line: Composition and Organization) and the numbers of men in those units (Cowpens in Miniature 3). I also deleted some dubious speculation about how the Americans deployed (Cowpens in Miniature 8).

What I've been spending most of my time on is getting ready for the next battle on which I will focus: Williamson's Plantation (July 12, 1780). I've spent a fair amount of time painting American militiamen in summer clothes and making the battlefield. I hope to be able to start describing this battle in a couple of weeks.

When I started painting miniatures a few years back I spent an agonizing amount of time on each one. Lately, I've grown much more efficient. Faces were particularly difficult for me, and the minis I've painted so far reflect various experiments, some more successful than others. What I've finally settled on is painting each face with Vallejo Game Color "pale flesh," then doing a thick wash of Vallejo Game Color "beasty brown" and then painting the highlights (cheeks, nose, chin, and forehead if visible) in pale flesh again. The result is far from great art, but it well suits my needs, works with a variety of different miniatures and produces a better result than other techniques I've tried. I've also been getting better at how I apply paint. Most of the time I'm still applying thick blocks of color onto the miniature, but increasingly often I've been able to apply thin coats that allow one color to shine through another. The Musket Miniatures militiaman below is a good example of this. The white primer is visible through the earth-tone vest and breeches.

Below are some of the latest Brits I've painted. These Minifigs are not intended to depict a specific unit, but rather will be used to represent at least a couple of units that saw hard service in the South. They will depict New York Volunteers at the battle of Williamson's Plantation and Royal North Carolinians at the battle of Hanging Rock. The brown trousers were selected partially on the basis of the striking aesthetic effect and partially on the basis of several Don Troiani paintings (such as this one).

Occupied South Carolina

[Minor revisions May 2, 2010]

On May 12, 1780, the American army in the Southern states, commanded by Major-General Benjamin Lincoln, surrendered at Charleston to a British army commanded by Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton. It was the worst American defeat of the war. Subsequently, Clinton left Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis with command in the South.

The British soon established a network of outposts across South Carolina. On the Atlantic coast, posts were established at Georgetown and Beaufort. The main base of operations was at Charleston. In the central part of the state, a post was set up at Camden. To defend the border with North Carolina, posts were established at Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and Cheraws. In the west, posts were established at at Ninety-Six, "Sennica Fort," and Fair Forest.

A Section of Henry Mouzon et al.'s 1775 An accurate map of North and South Carolina... (click to enlarge). 1 is "Sennica Fort," 2 is Fair Forest, 3 is Ninety-Six, 4 is Rocky Mount, 5 is Hanging Rock, 6 is Camden, and 7 is Cheraws.

Clinton left Cornwallis with six regiments of British infantry (the 7th, 23rd, 33rd, 63rd, and 64th regiments of foot), and two regiments of German infantry (Fusilier Regiment Ditfurth and Garrison Regiment von Huyn). Cornwallis generally did not place his regulars in the more vulnerable posts (although there are exceptions: the 23rd was at Hanging Rock for a short while in early July and the 71st was at Cheraws for a longer period). Rather, the northern and western posts were manned chiefly by regiments of provincials. For example, the 3rd battalion of New Jersey Volunteers, the 1st battalion of DeLancey's brigade, and the South Carolina Royalists were assigned to Ninety-Six, the American Volunteers were at Fair Forest, and the New York Volunteers were at Rocky Mount.

Cornwallis was concerned with establishing a Loyalist militia in the state, and 18 regiments were organized. The outposts were important to the formation of these militia regiments, because they provided places where Loyalists could gather in safety, and receive arms and instructions. The placement of provincials in these outposts was perhaps deliberate. The provincials, of course, were diehard Loyalists, and it may have been thought that their presence would have a good effect on the civilian population.

A South Carolina Loyalist militia backed up by provincial regiments would seem like an effective strategy for completing the subjugation of the state. The former were well acquainted with the countryside and knew the "rebel" leaders. The latter were well armed veterans. It's not unreasonable to believe that the Loyalists should have been able to track down the bands of American militia, even infiltrate their organizations, and, with the help of the provincials, wipe out the remaining resistance.

If Cornwallis' strategy was effective in South Carolina, it reasonably might have worked in some other parts of the United States (North Carolina most obviously being the next target). Therefore, events in the South Carolina backcountry in the summer of 1780 would provide a critical test of Britain's ability to win the war.

Sources:

Letter from Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter to Major-General Johann de Kalb, July 17, 1780.

John A. Robertson et al.'s Global Gazetteer of the American Revolution.

William T. Sherman. (2009). Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. (pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (link to amazon.com).

Rodney Atwood. (2002). The Hessians. (link to amazon.com).

The On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies. A History of the 3rd Battalion, New Jersey Volunteers.

The On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies. A History of the 1st Battalion, DeLancey's Brigade

The On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies. New York Volunteers Officers' Memorial.

New York Volunteers

The New York Volunteers were one of several regiments of Provincials (Loyalists that were essentially trained and equipped in the manner of British regulars) that served in the Southern campaign of the American Revolution.

Loyalist refugees in New York began fleeing in 1775 to the British authorities, and these were formed in early 1776 at Halifax into two companies of Volunteers. The companies were first deployed at the battles of Long Island (1776) and White Plains (1776). The Volunteers were subsequently expanded and in 1779 were placed on the American Establishment and designated the 3rd American Regiment (although they continued to be referred to as the New York Volunteers). The Volunteers participated in the storming of Fort Montgomery, New York (1777), the capture of Savannah, Georgia (1778), the siege of Savannah (1779), and the siege of Charleston, South Carolina (1780). Following the capture of the American army at Charleston, the regiment was assigned to garrison the post at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, one of a string of posts across the northern portion of the state. The regiment was engaged at the battle of Rocky Mount (1780), and, after that post was abandoned, Hobkirk's Hill (1781), and Eutaw Springs (1781). Detachments were also present at Williamson's Plantation (1780), Camden (1780), and King's Mountain (1780).

The regiment appears to have worn red coats, faced blue, while in South Carolina.

Bibliography:

René Chartrand (2008). American Loyalist Troops 1775-84. Osprey.

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

The On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies. New York Volunteers Officers' Memorial.