October 25, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 25th: The British army advanced towards White Plains; Clinton and Howe grew irresolute; the Americans prepared for battle; New Yorkers celebrated George III.

Previous entry: October 24th; next: October 26th.

In the morning, one of the British vessels on the Hudson came under fire near Dobb’s Ferry. The Americans fired on it with a 12-pounder gun they brought down to the shore under cover of darkness. An officer in New Jersey bragged, “They hulled her eleven times out of fifteen” before the British ship was towed out of range. He added, “Little skirmishes happen almost every day; but they are thought so little of that they seldom are mentioned as news.”

Since October 21st, Major-General Charles Lee’s division had been defending the crossings of the Bronx River while the rest of the American army moved to White Plains. It's mission now virtually complete, Lee's men began to move towards White Plains also.

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Nixon’s brigade) wrote:

“about one o’clock in the morning the major called to us in our tents and ordered us to strike out tents at 4 o’clock in the morning and to cook our provisions… and get in readiness to march by day[light][.] We turned out immediately and cooked our provisions… and ate our breakfasts… and got ready to march[.] About 9 or 10 o’clock we began to load our baggage[.] The officers destroyed their chests not being allowed any wagons to carry them… and about 12 o’clock we began to move forward… We marched about northwest 7 or 8 miles and then east 2 miles[.]… we halted about two miles from the White Plains and posted ourselves as a picquet[.] We were 250 in number[.] It was very cold lodging on the ground without tents and but little fire[.]”

At about 9 A.M. the British army marched towards White Plains in two columns. The right column halted “at the distance of four miles from the White Plains”, according to Howe, on the Mamaroneck Road. The left column halted on the East Chester Road, about 6 miles from White Plains.

The troops in the left column could see part of Major-General Charles Lee’s division, but the two forces remained on opposite sides of the Bronx. According to Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) “[we] took a position on the East Chester Road… facing west[,] the Bronx River in our front and the rebels on the heights [on the] other side of the river facing us.”

Situation of the armies on October 25th (click to enlarge). Howe’s forces in Westchester County were divided into three parts. One part, under Henry Clinton, approached White Plains from the direction of Mamaroneck (10). Another part, under Leopold Philip von Heister, approached White Plains from the direction of Eastchester. The third part, under Wilhelm von Knyphausen, remained near New Rochelle. Washington had four divisions at White Plains (11); Charles Lee’s division was at Mile Square (9), and Nathanael Greene’s division was positioned along the Hudson.

This map shows the location of British and American army units between New Rochelle (lower left) and White Plains (upper right). Heister's column encamped on the East Chester Road, near the Bronx River; Clinton's column encamped on the Mamaroneck Road, only 4 miles from White Plains. Lee's division is shown at Mile Square, the position he held in the morning; by nightfall, his brigades were 2 miles from White Plains. North is at upper right.

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British units on the road leading from Mamaroneck to White Plains. Text on the map states that this was the position held by the British army on October 21st, but a comparison with the accounts of the campaign by William Howe and others suggests that this was the position occupied by Clinton’s forces on the 25th. Clinton commanded the first and second battalions of light infantry (red triangles at top), the British Reserve (which included three battalions of British grenadiers), a brigade of British regulars, a brigade of Hessian grenadiers, the Brigade of Guards, part of the 16th Light Dragoons, and a company of jaegers (green triangles at right).

The British were now within easy striking distance of Washington’s army, but Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton had become irresolute. He later wrote, “not knowing the ground about White Plains or how the rebels had posted themselves on it, I could not think an immediate attack of their camp there prudent”. He felt that if Howe “had any such intention” as attacking, he should first “reconnoiter in force,” develop a plan of attack, and then engage in an elaborate ruse so as to surprise the Americans at daybreak. He recommended first marching back to New Rochelle, then making a feint towards the town of Rye (to the east of Mamaroneck, on Long Island Sound), and then finally performing a countermarch to White Plains during the night.

Whether these maneuvers would have improved the odds of a successful assault on White Plains was doubtful; whether the marching would have tired the troops was certain. Howe ignored Clinton’s suggestion, but he clearly harbored reservations of his own, for no attack plans were made.

The Americans closely monitored the British advance. Robert Harrison (Washington’s secretary) wrote: “The general officers are now reconnoitering the several passes leading from the enemy, [so] that the most important may be immediately secured.”

Before long, parties of armed men were sent out to watch the British movements and contest the roads to White Plains. Among these was Sergeant James McMichael of the Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment; he wrote: “One captain, two subalterns, three sergeants with one hundred men, were ordered on a scouting expedition. We left White Plains at 11 P. M. direct for the enemy’s advance sentries.”

At the end of the day, according to British Ensign Henry Stirke, “the pickets” of the two armies were “within musket shot of each other.”

Washington even considered making some kind of preemptive attack. Major-General William Heath recalled that “Eight American regiments were ordered to be ready to march in the approaching night. [Major] General [Israel] Putnam was to command them; and they were intended to make an attack on the enemy’s advance, if it should appear to be practicable.” One of these may have included Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment (Sargent’s brigade, Sullivan’s division). Private How wrote, “This evening we all marched to East Chester in order to attack the enemy there[,] but the General thought best not to attack them there and we returned to camp in the morning.”

Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jaeger Company) was placed in a position to guard the left flank of the British army. He felt vulnerable in this situation and he took every precaution to ensure the security of his men:

“Here I was left alone for the first time with my own theory of partisan warfare, which I had acquired through much reading. I took my post in a large apple orchard surrounded by a wall of fieldstones, behind which, since it lay on a hill, I thought I could defend myself well against an enemy attack. I placed two pickets on two knolls from which we could see far around, and dispatched constant patrols as far as Mile Square.”

In New York City, the British celebrated the anniversary of George III’s accession to the throne. According to the New York Gazette:

“the day was celebrated here with every demonstration of joy. The flag ships hoisted the royal standard; and all the ships in the harbour gave a salute of twenty-one guns each. So noble an appearance, and so grand a salute, was never known in this port before. The two admirals [i.e., Richard Howe and Molyneux Shuldham] gave entertainments, and many loyal toasts were drank upon the occasion.”

October 20, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 20th: British victory appeared close at hand; Rufus Putnam made an unwelcome discovery; Washington decided to move his army to White Plains.

Previous entry: October 19th; next: October 21st (Part 1).

Lieutenant-General William Howe led the British army into the New York mainland from Pell’s Point on October 18th. However, he made no aggressive moves on the 19th or 20th. The inaction was partly due to the need to bring up provisions and other supplies. Perhaps too Howe was trying to get a sense of the lay of the land. He later explained to Parliament, “The [American] country is so covered with wood, swamps and creeks, that it is not open in the least degree to be known, but from post to post, or from accounts to be collected from the inhabitants entirely ignorant of military description. These circumstances were, therefore, the cause of some unavoidable delay in our movements.”

The British may also have felt little urgency because they believed victory was inevitable. A Loyalist in New York City wrote about what he saw as the impending end of the war:

“The Howes [i.e., General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe] do all that is possible to alleviate the sufferings of a persecuted people [i.e., the Loyalists]… we are now protected in our lives and properties; and some thousands have joined the King's troops; and every time they attack the rebels they rout them with great loss; they fly before our victorious army on every onset; and I don't doubt but in a very little time this daring rebellion will be crushed… It is resolved to attack Washington directly. Proper dispositions are making for that purpose; and I hope by the next letter to give you an account of an end being put to a government that have dared to call themselves the Independent States of America. Almost all the New Yorkers have returned to their allegiance, and there is not a doubt but the other colonies will do the same when they dare declare themselves, and be properly supported by [the British] government.

“There is a broad R [for Rebel] put upon every door in New York that is disaffected to government, and examples will be made of its inhabitants; on the other hand, every person that is well affected to government finds protection.”

A further reason for confidence was that the arrival of a large reinforcement at New York City: the second Hessian division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen. Ambrose Serle witnessed their arrival and wrote:

“The ships made a most beautiful appearance in coming up this morning, the sun shining clear, and the wind wafting only a gentle breeze. All the colors were flying; and the cheerful congratulations of the sailors as they passed along contributed to the beauty of the scene. Here are now between 4 and 500 sail—a number, which never appeared in this harbor together before.”

Whereas the British army had many thousands of professional soldiers, well equipped and supplied, the American rebellion tottered along.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) was encamped on Valentine’s Hill, near the Bronx River. There, he remembered, “[we were] keeping up the old system of starving. A sheep’s head which I begged of the butchers, who were killing some for the ‘gentleman officers,’ was all the provisions I had for two or three days.”

Washington continued to prepare for the next British move as best he could, and he dispatched his adjutant general (Colonel Joseph Reed), and his chief engineer (Colonel Rufus Putnam) to reconnoiter the position held by the British army.

According to Rufus Putnam, “when we arrived on the heights of East Chester we saw a small body of British near the church”. They dared proceed no further, although they had not yet seen the camps of the British army. Reed then departed and Putnam set out to reconnoiter the area around White Plains, a key crossroads to the north. Putnam wrote that he disguised himself “by taking out my cockade, loping my hat and secreting my sword and pistols under my loose coat”. It was a calculated risk; he reasoned that if he were captured while wearing this disguise “the probability is that I should have been hanged for a spy”.

The journey was especially hazardous because Putnam was liable to run into the British at any time. He wrote:

“I did not then know where White Plains was, nor where the road I had taken could carry me. I had gone about 1 ½ mile, when a road turned off to the right, I followed it perhaps ½ a mile and came to a house, where I learned from woman that this road led to New Rochelle that the British were there and that they had a guard at a house in sight. On this information I turned and pursued my route toward White Plains (the houses on the way all deserted) until I came with[in] 3 or 4 mile[s] of the place. Here I discovered a house a little ahead with men about it[.] [B]y my [eye]glass I found they were not British soldiers, however I approached them with caution.”

Fortunately for Putnam, the men turned out to be friendly militia.

Putnam then explored the White Plains area and found that the Bronx River could be crossed there in two places, that the British were only 9 miles away and that in between there was only “good roads and in general level open country”. In addition, “at White Plains [there] was a large quantity of stores, with only about three hundred militia to guard them”.

In other words, Putnam could see how the British could easily seize these vital stores and cut Washington’s connections with New England and upstate New York. Putnam then set out to share these disturbing findings with Washington. He wrote:

“[I]t was now after sunset…. I took some refreshment, and set off for headquarters… [along] a road I had never traveled, among Tory inhabitants and in the night. I dare[d] not enquire the way, but Providence conducted me – I arrived at headquarters near Kingsbridge (a distance of about 10 miles) about nine o’clock at night. I found the General alone. I reported to him the discoveries I had made, with a sketch of the country[. H]e complained very feelingly of the gentlemen from New York from whom he had never been able to obtain a plan of the country—that from their information he had ordered the stores to White Plains as a place of security— the General sent for [Major] General [Nathanael] Greene, and [Brigadier] General George Clinton [Greene was one of Washington’s most trusted generals, Clinton was from New York]… as soon as General Clinton came in[,] my sketch and statement were shown to him and he was asked if the situation of those places were as I had reported,– General Clinton said they were”.

Washington now knew that the safety of his army, and perhaps the future of the United States, depended on his getting to White Plains before the British. He began issuing orders for his troops to march.

October 19, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 19th: The British consolidated their gains at Pell’s Point.

Previous entry: Afternoon of October 18th; next: October 20th.

On October 18th, the British landed at Pell’s Point and advanced into the New York mainland. This placed Washington in a delicate situation. The only important barrier separating his army from the British was the Bronx River. If the British pushed across the Bronx, the result would be catastrophic: Washington’s army would be hemmed in near Manhattan and possibly forced to surrender. Washington’s army was not strong enough to drive the British back from Pell’s Point nor mobile enough to quickly escape the potential trap (the troops could march quickly, but there was a shortage of wagons to move the provisions and other baggage). Washington therefore focused on defending the crossing points on the Bronx while the stores kept in Manhattan were moved to places of safety.

Meanwhile, the British were enthusiastic about their prospects. Ambrose Serle heard Vice Admiral Richard Howe boast “that the army had landed, and posted themselves upon the heights beyond Kingsbridge; so that now the rebels are nearly surrounded.” But how to finish the campaign was not obvious, and Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton later recalled, “Many plans for our further proceedings became now… the subject of deliberation.”

While the British commanders held their discussions, the men in the ranks discovered many temptations in the neighborhood of Pell’s Point. Almost all of the residents had fled upon the approach of the British army, and abandoned homes dotted the countryside.

According to Colonel Loammi Baldwin (Glover’s brigade), “The enemy lay pretty still this day, only plundering the Point [i.e., Pell’s Point] indiscriminately, showing no more favor to a Tory than a Whig.”

British headquarters tried to curtail this behavior by proclaiming that “The Commander in Chief is greatly disappointed that the repeated orders… for the suppression of plundering and marauding, have not been attended to by the troops,” and warning that there would be “no mercy to any person proved guilty” of these crimes.

The Americans, although hungry and poorly clothed, had largely abstained from this sort of behavior. However, Baldwin found that the men were upset to see that by being “careful of the property of the country people and farmers,” they were “only saving it for our enemies”. Therefore, “near the disputed ground” (East Chester) they began to behave in the same manner: “the fields of corn and stacks of wheat serve for fodder for our horses,” and “the pigs, poultry, etc.” provide a “change of diet for the soldiers”.

October 12, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 12th: The British army crossed to Throg’s Neck; the Americans prevented the British from advancing far inland.

Previous entry: October 11th; next: October 13th.

During the night, the British army began to cross to Throg’s Neck (also known as Frog’s Point). Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, oversaw part of the crossing. He wrote:

“About three o'clock [on] Saturday morning, the 12th, the troops were embarked in the flat boats and bateaux, to the number of between four and five thousand men; the Guards and 42nd regiment, between fourteen and fifteen hundred men, were embarked on board sloops under my direction. At daybreak in the morning the boats set off, and no sooner had they put off, with an amazing strong tide, but it came on a fog equal to pitch darkness, with now and then an interval of light for a few seconds. The boats were put off; to attempt to stop them would have been very dangerous, for the headmost boats must have anchored, and the boats that followed would in all probability run [a]foul of them, to the imminent danger of sinking each other; the admiral [i.e., Vice Admiral Richard Howe], therefore, rather chose to run the risk of passing Hell Gate with all the boats in that rapid tide and dark fog. I went astern and ordered all the boats to move forward. Soon after their putting off, a galley towing one of the artillery boats, in endeavouring to cross a vessel lying in the passage, towed her athwart hawse; the boat ran directly up her cable, and overset instantly. Many of the people were picked up; there were three field-pieces lost, and I suppose five or six people. There were very few people in the flat boats [that] had ever been through or knew anything of the passage of Hell Gate. This made the danger much the greater.”

Captain George Harris (grenadier company, 5th Regiment of Foot) also had a close call:

“the point of an island… divides the river into two rapid streams, and causes a very dangerous whirlpool…. through the ignorance of our pilot, we were on the edge of the pool… too late to avoid the suction, and found ourselves, circle after circle, attracted to the centre, in spite of all our efforts, till at last the boatmen were on the point of quitting their oars, despairing of escape, when, animated I suppose by the love of life, I began to storm at them for their cowardice, and made them stick to their oars. We at length perceived that we made progress, and emerged from the whirlpool, escaping without other accident than the dislocation of a man's wrist”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton had much praise for Vice Admiral Richard Howe and his fellow Royal Navy officers for getting the army through Hell Gate “almost miraculously” despite the heavy fog and treacherous waters. He added:

“About eight o’clock we arrived off Frog’s Point, where we found a frigate stationed to cover our embarkations. A few rebels made their appearance as we approached the shore; but some scattering shots soon dispersed them, and the landing was effected without loss.”

Two watercourses lay between Throg’s Neck and the American army: Westchester Creek and the Bronx River. Securing the passage over Westchester Creek was especially important as a single bridge over this creek provided the only good route inland. Therefore, according to Clinton, “As soon as the troops could be formed, we pushed for Westchester Bridge in hopes of securing it.”

The area nearest Throg’s Neck was defended by Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade of Pennsylvanians (this included Hand’s own 1st Continental Regiment, Colonel Henry Haller’s Berks County Regiment, and Colonel James Cunningham’s 1st Lancaster County Regiment; see footnote).

Major-General William Heath had previously stationed “25 picked men” from Hand’s brigade to watch over the Westchester Creek bridge at all times, “and, in case the enemy made a landing… to take up the planks of the bridge”.

The men quickly performed their duty, and when the head of the British column appeared, they “commenced a firing with their rifles.”

Clinton lamented: “the enemy had been too quick for us”.

The British then attempted to bypass the wrecked bridge and cross at the head of Westchester Creek. However, according to Heath, they “found here also the Americans in possession of the pass.”

Both sides called up reinforcements.

Situation of the British and American armies on October 12, 1776 (click to enlarge).

Throg's Neck area circa 1781. The map shows the solitary road leading inland from Throg's Neck, which crossed Westchester Creek. Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade had its headquarters at DeLancey's Mills on the Bronx River, but a detachment carefully guarded the Westchester Creek bridge. The town of West Chester was a short distance west of the bridge.

The site of the British landing on October 12th; from a map by Charles Blaskowitz.

Heath stated that “he immediately ordered Colonel Prescott, the hero of Bunker Hill, with his regiment, and Captain-Lieutenant Bryant of the artillery, with a 3 pounder, to reinforce the riflemen at West Chester causeway [i.e., the bridge]; and Colonel Graham of the New-York line, with his [militia] regiment, and Lieutenant Jackson of the artillery, with a 6 pounder, to reinforce at the head of the creek; all of which was promptly done, to the check and disappointment of the enemy.”

Captain-Lieutenant Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) wrote that “the [British] guns were taken forward to the bridge, 16 pieces” but no attempt was made to take either pass by force. Instead, he wrote, “we were ordered to encamp.” He noted that the remainder of the day was punctuated by “popping shots across the water.”

George Washington arrived in person to examine the situation of the British army. He later wrote that Throg’s Neck “is a kind of island” although “the water that surrounds it is fordable at low tide.” However, he was pleased to find that “The grounds from Frog's Point are strong and defensible, being full of stone fences, both along the road and across the adjacent fields, which will render it difficult for artillery, or indeed a large body of foot, to advance in any regular order, except through the main road.” He then ordered fortifications erected to guard the road and the pass at the head of the creek. He noted that “Our men, who are posted on the passes, seemed to be in good spirits”.

These fortifications, according to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, soon made “everything still more unapproachable.” At the same time, the Americans “cannonaded the camp of the 71st Regiment, which lost six killed and three wounded.” He claimed that “If the rebels had accurately aimed their guns, the balls of which flew over English headquarters, they could have annihilated the Guards and the 33rd Regiment in the reserve.”

October 11, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 11th: Friendly fire killed men on the Hudson; Joseph Reed contemplated defeat; Ambrose Serle watched the new offensive get underway.

Previous entry: October 10th; next: October 12th.

The Americans closely watched Hudson’s River for signs of renewed British activity. A vessel was observed coming down the river. Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) noted “she hoisted an uncommon sail,” and Major-General William Heath wrote that she was thought “to be one of the British tenders”.

Henry Hallowell (Hutchinson’s 27th Continental Regiment) remembered: “I was ordered with a party to place ourselves near the shore [with muskets] all loaded to stop [the vessel]… and [we were] just about to fire” when “Knox’s Artillery threw a shot from the fort” at it. In fact, the Americans were firing on their own men – the vessel was one of the few vessels to have escaped the Royal Navy on the 9th.

According to Smith, the shot “killed three men as they was sitting aft and wounded the captain slightly”. Afterwards, the dead men were “landed at the ferry and buried in one grave”. Hallowell called it “a sorrowful sight.”

Colonel Joseph Reed was Washington’s adjutant general. He was shocked by the poor showing of American troops when the British first landed on Manhattan one month earlier (September 15, 1776), and he was convinced that the American army lacked the discipline to defeat the British in battle. Reed also didn’t think the situation was likely to improve. He complained in a letter to his wife:

“To attempt to introduce discipline and subordination into a new army must always be a work of much difficulty, but where the principles of democracy so universally prevail, where so great an equality and so thorough a leveling spirit predominate, either no discipline can be established, or he who attempts it must become odious and detestable…”

Reed previously informed the Continental Congress that he wished to resign from his post, but he was stuck in this position as they had not appointed a replacement.

He told his wife, “I never meant to make arms a profession, my duty to you and my dear children will lead me to pursue that course of life which will contribute most to their and your happiness, for though I would wish to serve my country… I have not the least desire to sacrifice you and them to fame, even if I was sure to attain it.”

He feared that “if France or some other foreign power does not interfere” in this conflict “we shall not be able to stand” against the British “next spring”. But he consoled his wife that if the war were lost, they would not suffer too much for it: “my estate is no object of confiscation, my rank is not so high as to make me an example”.

New York City was devastated by a massive fire on September 21st. Its port was closed, many of its inhabitants had fled, and it was now occupied by hundreds of British soldiers. The remaining citizens attempted to maintain a degree of normalcy. Ambrose Serle (Vice Admiral Richard Howe’s secretary) recorded that he “walked about the town, which begins to fill, and has some of its markets open for meat and vegetables.” He noted disparagingly that “The meat is sweet, but generally lean: the vegetables are mostly good: but both very inferior to those of England; at least, what I have seen.”

In the afternoon Serle saw that the invasion of Westchester County was getting underway:

“all the flat-boats, belonging to the fleet were ordered up the East River in order to effect a landing for the troops… The admiral [Howe] and the other principal officers of the navy went up to conduct the embarkation and debarkation, intended in the morning; so that tomorrow or next day, warm work may be expected.”

He exulted, “May God prosper the king’s arms, and the cause of my country!”

No spies or deserters warned the Americans of the British plans. Nevertheless, the Americans closely watched the shore, and they had an inkling of what was coming. Major-General William Heath observed, “There was a considerable movement among the British boats”.

October 9, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 9: British vessels on the Hudson River cut an important communications link to George Washington’s army.

Previous entry: October 8th; next: October 10th.

The Americans defended their position in and about upper Manhattan with an extensive series of fortifications. Particularly impressive were the forts and batteries designed to keep the British navy from ascending the Hudson River (then commonly called the North River). British vessels would have to pass between a series of batteries in and around Fort Constitution on the New Jersey side of the river and Fort Washington on the New York side. In between, the river was obstructed by hulks that had been intentionally sunk. The Americans also had a small flotilla of row galleys on the far side of the obstacles.

Captain Andrew Snape Hamond of HMS Roebuck recalled that “the rebel army was chiefly supplied by the North River, and placed great dependence upon it… they looked upon it to be perfectly secure: and it is possible, from seeing the great preparation they had made, we might also have thought so”.

But then, in early October:

“a deserter… informed the admiral [Vice Admiral Richard Howe] that there was a passage open between two of the sunken vessels… and offered himself as a pilot. This intelligence was exceedingly agreeable to both the General [Lieutenant-General William Howe] and admiral, conceiving, that if ships could be got up the North River, the rebel’s supplies would not only be cut off from Albany and that country, but even their communication with the Jerseys would become very uncertain and unsafe which could not fail of distressing them, and would very much assist in the intended operation of surrounding their army”.

On October 9th, a southerly breeze made the expedition possible. The British dispatched three frigates (Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar), a schooner (Tyral), and two tenders.

According to Captain Hammond:

“Much praise is due to Captain [Hyde] Parker on this occasion (who led, in the Phoenix) for his steadiness and good conduct – when they drew near to the danger, the pilot, in great confusion told him, that the marks which then appeared were not those that had been described to him, and he was totally at a loss[,] upon which Captain Parker, very prudently, immediately determined to take his chance where he knew the deepest water to be, which was close to the eastern shore…”

The Americans watched with incredulity as the British vessels eased past their defenses.

George Washington wrote, “to our surprise and mortification, they all ran through without the least difficulty, and without receiving the least apparent damage from our forts, which kept playing on them from both sides of the river.”

Appearances were a little deceiving: the British lost 9 killed and 18 wounded. Among these were a servant boy killed by a cannonball on the Phoenix and a Captain-Lieutenant of His Majesty’s Marines flayed by splinters on the Tartar. The ships were also considerably damaged, although none came close to sinking.

On the far side of the forts, “the enemy began to fire small arms from the woods,” according to Captain Cornthwaite Ommanney of the Tartar. Apparently, the British fired back, for Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered:

“they gave us some volleys of grape-shot… and some bombs. The grape-shot made holes in our tents, and some of the bombs broke in the air. One fell amidst our tents, but one of our boys ran and soon had pulled out the fuse. We had one man wounded.”

Heading north, the British gave chase to the American vessels on the river.

Captain Hyde Parker of the Phoenix wrote, “at Noon… [we were] in chase of four of the rebel galleys[,] etc. [and I] sent the Tartar ahead to cut them off… at 1 P.M. two of [the] galleys, a schooner, and two sloops ran onshore”. At 1:30 the Phoenix “anchored … [and] fired several broadsides to scour the shore…”

Among the men on the row galleys were two junior officers of Hutchinson’s 27th Continental Regiment. They claimed the vessels were run on shore once it became clear they could not outrun the British vessels. They recalled, “We run her [i.e., their vessel] on shore just above Dobb’s Ferry where we had not time enough to get our people and things on shore…” Instead, the fast approaching enemy “obliged us to swim on shore. But no lives [were] lost”. Then the British “fired a broad side of grape shot as we lay in the bushes…”

In the end the British captured two of the American row galleys (Independence and Crane), two sloops, and a schooner. According to Major-General William Heath of Massachusetts, one of the sloops “had on board the machine invented by… a Mr. Bushnell, intended to blow up the British ships.” This was the famous Turtle, the world’s first submarine.

The American infantry now had the awkward task of chasing the British navy. Orders went down the line from George Washington (the commander in chief), to Major-General William Heath (a division commander), to Colonel Paul Dudley Sargent (a brigade commander), to send men north and prevent the British from doing additional damage.

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General Heath’s orders to Colonel Sargent:

“Sir: The enemy, as it is reported, have landed a number of troops at or near Dobbs's Ferry; and it being thought indispensably our duty to dislodge them, you are immediately to take the command of the detachment designed for that purpose, consisting of five hundred men. You will march without the least loss of time, with the said detachment and forty light-horse, to Dobbs's Ferry, taking with you one howitzer and a detachment of the artillery, now at Philips’s Mills [i.e., two 12-pounders]… You will take particular care that the howitzer is properly covered, and defended by the battalion men.

You will, if possible, dislodge the enemy; killing or taking prisoners, as occasion may require…”

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The British expedition caused a good deal of marching and countermarching for some of the Continentals. Among these was Private Davie How of Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. Like many journalists of this era he described the events of the day in simple terms, and left out how difficult such marches were for poorly clothed and often inadequately fed troops:

“This morning three ships sailed up the North River[.] Our people kept a hot fire at them[.] We were all alarmed and marched down to Morrisania – 6 miles – then we all marched back before night [another 6 miles]. This night I went with a party of men to Dobb’s Ferry[,] about 12 miles[; we] got there at daybreak.”

October 8, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 8th: British leaders planned to drive George Washington’s army from Manhattan.

Next entry: October 9th.

George Washington’s army was ejected from New York City in mid-September. Afterwards, the Americans established their headquarters in upper Manhattan. They also erected strong fortifications spanning the width of the island. The British wished to complete their conquest of Manhattan without having to storm these works. Therefore, the British looked to drive the Americans from Manhattan by threatening their lines of supply and communication with New England.

In the words of the British commander in chief, Lieutenant-General William Howe:

“The very strong positions the enemy had taken on this island [Manhattan] and fortified with incredible labour determined me to get upon their principal communication with Connecticut, with a view of forcing them to quit the strongholds in the neighbourhood of King’s Bridge and if possible to bring them to action.”

In early October, General Howe, along with his brother, Vice Admiral Richard Howe, examined the coastline of the New York mainland to the east of Manhattan (New York’s Westchester County). They identified several possible landing sites. Not far from the shore lay the Boston Post Road, the principle connection between New York and New England.

On this date (the 8th), the British leadership apparently debated how to make this move into the New York mainland. According to Major Stephen Kemble (deputy adjutant-general), there was “a long council of general officers with the commander in chief and admiral [that] did not break up till half past three in the afternoon.”

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton’s memoir provides insight into the deliberations. He noted that “many different plans were suggested”. He believed:

“our landing should be made at such a distance from the enemy’s gross [i.e., main part] that our whole army might have time to be disembarked before they could come upon us in numbers sufficient to disturb us, yet at the same time so near their three communications with the continent [that] they must be obliged to fight us on our own terms or fall back.”

This probably was not a controversial position. However, the generals disagreed about where exactly the landing should take place.

Clinton wanted the army to land near New Rochelle, where it could easily cut the “three communications” from Manhattan. Specifically, by seizing New Rochelle, the British would cut the Boston Post Road, which ran to the east. A short march later and they would seize the crossroads at White Plains and cut the northeastern route. One more march and they would seize the bridge over the Croton River and cut the northern route.

However, General Howe disapproved of landing at New Rochelle because of doubts that the British could be easily supplied there.

Instead, according to Clinton, Howe preferred to land at the mouth of Westchester Creek. There the British would have a shorter supply line of their own while also being closer to the supply lines of the Americans. However, this suggestion was dropped because a landing could be made only at high tide.

Finally, Brigadier-General William Erskine proposed a landing near Throg’s Point (also known as Frog’s Point), which lay just to the east of Westchester Creek.

Howe agreed to this proposal. Clinton did as well; he stated, “though roundabout, it led finally to the object I had in view.”

This map (click to enlarge) is based on a modern photograph of the New York City area, taken from the Space Shuttle Columbia. In 1776, New York City occupied only the lower tip of Manhattan Island (Number 7). The British intended to land behind Washington’s army on the northern shore of Long Island Sound (at the points designated by Numbers 8, 9, or 10). Washington’s army would then either have to retreat or face entrapment once the British began cutting the roads leading north and east from Manhattan.

The British had good reason to be optimistic about the success of this movement. On this date, Ambrose Serle (secretary to Vice Admiral Howe) spoke with several American deserters in New York City who told him that their army was “very sickly, ill clothed, and much dispirited.”

The American army had lost over the previous month-and-a-half the battle of Long Island and possession of New York City. The army was ill clothed – indeed, they were poorly supplied with almost every military necessity — and illness was rampant. However, morale had not reached a crisis point; the American army, as a whole, remained determined to continue the fight.