Cowpens: Battlefield Maps

Cowpens is one of the more frequently written about battles of the American Revolution; it's a staple, at least, of general military histories of the war. Having perused a number of such histories over the year, my feeling is that the textual summaries of the battle found in these histories are more-or-less adequate. However, the battlefield map that accompanies these histories (at least when one is present) is usually quite inaccurate. Why is this?

The oldest extant maps of the battlefield are the so-called "Pigee map" and "Clove map" first published in Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping. These were evidently drawn not long after the battle, although by whom is unclear. My view is that these were not the work of a participant at the battle, but rather that they were produced by someone that had read (and wished to illustrate) the disposition of the British and American forces indicated by Morgan's after action report. Morgan's report mentions in one place that "The light infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, and the Virginia militia under the command of Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground, and extended a line in front." In another place it states that "Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta riflemen, [were] to support the right of the line." Consistent with this description, the author(s) of the maps drew a battle line consisting of Howard's and Triplett's troops with another two companies forming a wing to the right rear consisting of Tate's and Buchanan's companies. This is exactly what someone relying solely on the report would have drawn; a participant would have known that Tate and Buchanan were part of Triplett's command, not a separate entity.

In any case, these maps have only recently come to light. The first battlefield map to be widely circulated was the map that William Johnson included in his 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene. I previously noted that the depiction is inaccurate, but it does have some strong points worth noting.

The Johnson Map (click to enlarge).

First of all, William Johnson clearly visited the battlefield. The three major elevations which I've previously described in connection with the battlefield are both present and correctly placed on his map.

Three Elevations on the Cowpens Battlefield.

Second, Johnson correctly placed the main American line between the first and second elevations on the battlefield. Although counterintuitive, this is indicated in various participant memoirs and pension applications (for a previous discussion, see: The Main Line: Location). For example, in one application, the son of North Carolina militiaman Thomas Lackey learned from his father "That at the Battle of the Cowpens the regulars were situated rather behind a hill."

Third, Johnson shows both troops of British dragoons attached to their front line charging the American militia, a point which most writers overlook, but which does seem indicated, on balance by participant accounts (see: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, Cowpens in Miniature 16, Cowpens in Miniature 18).

Fourth, Johnson shows that at the end of the battle, the British line had broken into two parts, which separately surrendered. This does not appear in Morgan's or Tarleton's description of the battle, but it is indicated in participant accounts (see: Cowpens in Miniature 21, Cowpens in Miniature 23). This further suggests that Johnson made an investment into learning what really happened at Cowpens rather than just rely on authority. This is clearly to his credit, even if he did err in some respects.

The chief problem, however, isn't the problems with Johnson's map, but it's rather with what was done with it. Henry Beebee Carrington printed a modified version of this map in his 1881 Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.

For reasons not easily guessed at, Carrington turned Johnson's three elevations into two and he placed the Broad River on the edge of the battlefield, when in actuality it is miles away. Carrington's other deviations from Johnson were likewise unhelpful: he placed the main line on the crest of the foremost ridge and he reduced the number of charging troops of dragoons from two to one. Strangest of all, Carrington mistook the small rectangles representing the retreating American militia (lower right panel in Johnson's map) for British infantry units, and so has the British infantry drifting off to the right rather than directly advancing on the Continentals.

The Carrington Map (click to enlarge).

Although the Carrington map does not adhere well to the physical geography of the battlefield or participant accounts of the fighting, most of the subsequently-published battlefield maps adhere closely to the Carrington map. Notable exceptions can be found in the histories published by Edwin Bearss, Lawrence Babits, and John Moncure. All three of these distinguished writers prepared detailed maps based on multiple participant accounts and a careful consideration of battlefield topography. Two of these three works can be read in their entirety online, and Bearss' history is more than 40 years old. What does it say about the quality of contemporary treatments of the battle of Cowpens when Carrington should remain the gold standard and Bearss, Babits, and Moncure should have little discernable impact?

One of Edwin Bearss' excellent maps (click to enlarge).

Sources:

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Lackey (.pdf file).

Henry Beebee Carrington's 1881 Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps. (Also valuable is Edwin Bearss' 1974 Historic Grounds and Resource Study).

John Moncure published The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour.

Related: The Cowpens Battlefield, Morgan's Report, Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature

Cowpens in Miniature 19

Part 19: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Previous: The Third Crisis

Next: Washington and Howard Charge

As the Continentals about-faced and moved off in retreat, the British infantry surged towards them, cheering and wielding their bayonets. According to Henry Lee, "Considering this retrograde movement the precursor of flight, the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder." It was fortunate for the Americans that their commanders kept a cool head at this interval and marked out a spot where their men would halt and renew the fight. It was fortunate too that the American rank and file did not realize that the retreat was in error. Morgan and Howard acted "as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted" [see Note 1].

The British infantry were near the Continentals, and perhaps closing the distance with the Continentals, but the British could not overtake them. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie complained that "The infantry were not in condition to overtake the fugitives" [see Note 2]. The British, more so than the Americans "had been in motion day and night" in the days leading up to the battle. "A number [of the British]… had already fallen… fatigue, however, enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss of blood… the infantry, though well disposed, were unable to come up with his [Howard’s] corps [see Note 3].

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, in command of this battalion commented that "This retreat was accidental but was very fortunate as we thereby were extricated from the enemy."

They had fallen back approximately 100 yards [see Note 4], wheeling to their right during the retreat [see Note 5].

The Continentals Halt (click to enlarge).

At this point, according to Howard, "The enemy were now very near us." The distance may have been less than 30 yards [see Note 6].

Howard gave the command "to halt and face about." And with that "the line was perfectly formed in a moment."

For the pursuing British, here was a great shock. One moment they were on the verge of vanquishing their enemy, the next they were eye-to-eye with a wall of infantry.

There was a moment’s pause, and then the next command was given.

According to Anderson, we "then give them a full Volley."

This volley can be regarded as the climatic moment of the battle, an instant that both sides recognized as a turning point. The American after action report stated that we "gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder." The British after action report echoed this remark "General Morgan's Corps faced about & gave them [the British troops] a heavy fire. This unexpected event, occasioned the utmost confusion" [see Note 7].

A Fatal Volley (click to enlarge).

Henry Lee observed that the British were "Stunned by this unexpected shock," and "the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." The Americans, for their part, did not relent. The Continentals, in Howard’s words, gave the British "a few rounds" of "a very destructive fire."

Meanwhile, the British were also inflicting heavy losses, but on the American militia.

Major Joseph McJunkin stated that during the battle, "Tarleton… made a charge on the right & left wings, treading & cutting till he got in the rear of Howard's command." The first attack, by Ogilvie, had already been repulsed. The second one, by Lieutenant Henry Nettles and the 17th Light Dragoons, had cut through Triplett’s Virginians. Beyond Triplett’s men, and in the rear of the American position, was a host of targets for the 17th Light Dragoons. The dragoons attacked them all.

Nettles' Attack. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line (Triplett's former company has been broken, but the rest of the line is intact), 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Captain Connelly, who was fleeing with his company from the right wing of the main line towards the militia horses recalled that the British cavalry attacked "our company when just about to catch up [to] our horses which was tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle." They "fell upon us with great fury."

Some men from the right wing of the militia line were also in this area [see Note 8]. These men had already reached their horses when the dragoons attacked. One of these men Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled, "Tarleton's cavalry pursued us; ("now," thought I, "my hide is in the loft;") just as we got to our horses, they overtook us and began to make a few hacks at some, however, without doing much injury. They, in their haste, had pretty much scattered, perhaps, thinking they would have another Fishing creek frolic."

The heaviest blow fell upon the men of Colonel Andrew Pickens’ regiment of South Carolina militia. After serving on the militia line, they had reformed behind Triplett’s Virginians….

Jeremiah Files claimed he "was wounded by Tarleton's Dragoons on the head--on the left Arm and on the right Hand each wound was made with a sword… the wounds Greatly Disabled [him] & stuned him for some time." Private James Pettigrew saw that his, James Caldwell, "was cut almost to death by Tarlton's horsemen so much so that he had to be borne from the field." Michael Cain was wounded "on the head by a sword." His Captain, Andrew Miller, was killed [see Note 9]. Charles Holland "was wounded by a sword thrust through the body."

Private Robert Long, who was on the other side of the battlefield, heard that "At that time Tarleton brought 200 or 300 cavalry round in the rear of our left wing of militia." Nettles in fact had nowhere near this many men. This statement conveys something of the shocking power of this attack, coming upon the militia when and where it was least expected.

Notes:

1. From Francois-Jean de Chastellux’s 1781 interview with Daniel Morgan. During the retreat, Morgan saw that "the English, with more confidence than order, advanced to the attack." His own troops, meanwhile, were able to "keep their ranks." Therefore, Morgan "suffered them [the Continentals] to retreat a hundred paces, and then commanded them to halt and face the enemy, as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted."

2. Mackenzie’s thoughts here and elsewhere are expressed in such a way as to defame Tarleton. The retreating Continentals were not "fugitives," but rather maintained order. Mackenzie is insinuating that Tarleton could not even defeat an already-beaten foe.

3. Mackenzie claimed that "not less than two-thirds of the British infantry officers," "and nearly the same proportion of privates," had been shot. The British had amassed serious casualties by this point, but this is an exaggeration. The casualties Mackenzie alleges to have occurred by this time are greater than those suffered by the British during the entirety of the battle. This is another example in which Mackenzie’s wording implies Tarleton’s mishandling of the battle.

4. According to Howard; others stated different distances. Morgan claimed that "We retired in good order about fifty paces." Francois-Jean de Chastellux claimed that Morgan told him that he let the Continentals "retreat a hundred paces." Private John Thomas of Virginia claimed that the Continentals "retreated from aboutt 80 yards."

5. The postwar histories by Francois-Jean de Chastellux and David Stewart both describe the whole Continental line wheeling. Howard stated that the retreat began on his right flank; the wheeling movement may have resulted from the Continental line breaking off the engagement from right to left (Lawrence Babits, in a Devil of a Whipping, describes in considerable detail how this could have occurred). Whether ordered or accidental, this wheeling motion was particularly fortunate to the Americans because it prevented the 71st Foot from gaining their right flank. The wheeling movement also helps explain why different sources differently estimated the distance of the Continentals’ retreat; in such a maneuver, some parts of the line would have fallen back further than others. A distance of 100 yards for at least part of the line seems likely as this was the distance between the Continentals and Triplett’s Virginians (see The Main Line: Organization). If the Continentals had retreated further, Triplett would have been exposed to a British bayonet charge.

6. How close the two lines were has been variously stated (and perhaps was various at different points on the line). Stewart thought that the 71st Foot had come "within forty yards of the hostile force." Howard claimed the British were "within 30 yards of us with two field pieces." Virginia militiaman John Thomas thought that the British were "within aboutt 30 steps of them."

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals thought that "We let them Come Within ten Or fifteen yards of us." Anderson’s phrase that "we let them come" close, is striking. It is unclear whether Howard intended to have the pursuing British get close to the Continentals. Judging from Anderson’s journal, he was one that evidently believed that "the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted," and perhaps this is his supposition for why his superiors would order such a movement. Chastellux believed something similar before he interviewed Morgan.

7. A number of participants made similar remarks. Howard wrote in one place: "The enemy were now very near us. Our men commenced a very destructive fire, which they little expected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder in their ranks." In another he said, "The enemy pressed upon us in rather disorder, expecting the fate of the day was decided. They were by this time within 30 yards of us with two field pieces; my men with uncommon coolness gave them an unexpected and deadly fire." Banastre Tarleton claimed in his memoir that "An unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans, who came about as they were retreating, stopped the British, and threw them into confusion." Private John Thomas of Virgina recalled that the Continentals "were ordered to wheele and fire. They did so, the British being within aboutt 30 steps of them." Private John Baldwin of North Carolina recalled that "Morgan defeated the British with his regulars, after they concluded the Americans were all running."

Similar comments also appeared in postwar histories of the battle. For example, Henry Lee wrote that "the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder; but, as it drew near, Howard faced about, and gave it a close and murderous fire. Stunned by this unexpected shock, the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." David Stewart wrote that "Colonel Howard, commanding the reserve, threw in a fire upon the 71st when within forty yards of the hostile force. The fire was destructive: nearly one-half of their number fell." This is an exaggeration (see Note 4, above). The British line was so much longer than that of the Continentals that it seems likely a part of the 71st was not struck at all by this volley. More accurately, Stewart also claimed that "The fate of the action was decided by the destructive fire of the Americans' second line."

8. Henry Lee thought they had been detached by Colonel Andrew Pickens to help secure the miltia’s horses. See Flight of the Militia - Part 3.

9. These claims were made by Cain’s widow. She also identified him with Captain Robert Anderson of this regiment.

Sources:

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Mackenzie's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, Anderson, Collins, and Thomas, among others.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's after action report.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Files (.pdf file).

Nan Overton West transcribed the pension application of James Pettigew (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of Michael Cain (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Charles Holland (.pdf file).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Baldwin (.pdf file).

Related: The Fatal Moment, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

Cowpens in Miniature 18

Part 18: The Third Crisis

Previous: The Second Crisis

Next: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Daniel Morgan had put into place a well-thought out plan for defeating the British. At the opening of the battle, that plan was executed perfectly, and significant losses had been inflicted on the British. The improvisation of sending skirmishers forward to gall the British before they reached the militia line had also worked well. After the British advanced on the main line, however, his became completely unraveled. Morgan was now galloping across the battlefield addressing a series of crises.

The first crisis was the charge of Ogilvie’s dragoons, which shattered his right flank. That crisis had been contained when Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington sent forward a detachment of light dragoons to counter Ogilvie’s charge. Morgan also assisted in rallying the broken militia. According to Robert Long of Joseph Hayes’ regiment, "We were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person."

The second crisis was when the 71st Foot advanced towards the right of the Continentals, which triggered an accidental retreat of the Continental infantry. To address this crisis, Morgan ordered a stopgap measure: the Continentals were to halt and form a new line near Washington’s dragoons. His right flank, however, remained vulnerable.

Meanwhile, a new crisis erupted on the American left. As the Continentals retreated towards the rear, Tarleton ordered forward his last unengaged unit on the front line. In Tarleton’s words, "The British rushed forwards: An order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge" [see Note 1].

Lieutenant Henry Nettles’ company of 17th Light Dragoons rounded the right flank of the British line and stormed up the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard could only watch as the dragoons rushed past his infantrymen and into the rear of the American position: "about the time of our retreat, a large body of british cavalry passes round my left flank and pursued the flying militia to their horses" [see Note 2].

The dragoons first encountered Major Francis Triplett’s company of Virginia militia, which were posted, in part, on the road. Within moments, the dragoons inflicted devastating losses on the Virginians with their sabers and pistols [see Note 3].

Charge of the 17th Light Dragoons. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (retreating / reforming), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The Third Crisis (two views; click to enlarge). The Continentals retreat, pursued by the British infantry, while the British Legion dragoons take up a new position in reserve. On the American right, the remnants of Captain David Ogilvie's company retreat in confusion. On the American left, the 17th Light Dragoons collide with Major Francis Triplett's Virginians.

Private Isaac Way remembered that he "was severely wounded on the side, back, arms, head and in the face by the cut of the sword of a British dragoon." Both of the company’s officers were also struck down. John Thomas remembered that "Lieutenant Dearing… was wounded through his hand on this occasion and bled to death. He died the next day." Private George Rogers remembered that "the Captain of the Company to which he belonged at this time was John Combs who was killed." Sergeant Benjamin Martin also remembered Combs’ death: "I was in the road all the time of the action I was covering Capt. Combs he was killed." Martin presumably took over what was left of the company.

Notes:

1. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie assumed that Tarleton was referring to the British Legion dragoons and said that "This order, however, if such was then thought of, being either not delivered or disobeyed, they stood aloof, without availing themselves of the fairest opportunity of reaping the laurels which lay before them." It seems unlikely that this is what Tarleton meant. He had previously ordered "a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy's right flank," but they had not gained that flank.

In the images accompanying this post, the British Legion is shown forming a line on the British left, behind the 71st Foot, rather than advancing around the American flank. The movements of the British Legion dragoon reserve during the battle are not well documented, but this is a likely occurrence. Two plausible reasons for why the dragoons took this action are as follows:

First, the officers commanding the dragoon reserve may have thought this is what Tarleton wanted. By forming a line behind the 71st, they were more-or-less threatening "the enemy’s right flank." Moving beyond or around the 71st may have seemed ill advised because this would have taken them into low ground that included the headwaters of Island Creek.

Second, it’s worth reconsidering the comments by Colonel Richard Winn to Daniel Morgan (originally described in Cowpens in Miniature 6). Winn said that Tarleton’s "mode of Fighting is to Surprise, by doing this he sends up two or three Troops of Horse and if he can throw the party into Confusion with his reserve he falls on and will cut them to pieces." Perhaps this movement of the reserve "to threaten the enemy's right flank" was intended to exploit the damage inflicted by Ogilvie’s charge. However, by the time that the Legion dragoon reserve reached the area, Ogilvie’s men were retreating in confusion and the opportunity was lost. Therefore, the dragoon reserve may have chosen to halt and wait for new orders.

2. The left wing of the militia line had retreated through this same gap a short while earlier. They had meanwhile reformed in rear of Triplett’s Virginians, near the horses of the militia. It’s unclear whether Howard was referring to these men or the militia "flying" past his retreating Continentals from the broken right wing of the main line.

3. This company is particularly well represented in participant accounts of the battle. Perhaps this traumatizing moment helped compel the survivors to leave a record of their experience.

Sources:

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's memoirs, and Mackenzie's critique of them.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard and Thomas, among others.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Isaac Way (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of George Rogers (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the statement by Colonel Richard Winn (.pdf file).

Related: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, 17th Light Dragoons, Flight of the Militia - Part 4

Cowpens in Miniature 8

Part 8: The Americans Deploy
Previous: Initial Contact

Next: Morgan's Plan

Now certain that battle was eminent, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan began his final preparations. He reported:

“An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp [see Note 1]. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them.”

Other writers made a similar remark. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the 1st Delaware would record in his journal, “Before day Reced Information that Col Tarlton Was Within Five Miles of us With a Strong Body of Horse and Infantry Whereon We got up and put Ourselves in Order of Battle.”

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina remembered that Morgan and Colonel Andrew Pickens walked through the American encampment waking up the men and exhorting them to fight.

“Gen. Morgan being apprised of the approach of Tarleton by faithful spies, began before day to go from mess to mess with Gen. Pickens, saying ‘Boys, get up, Benny's coming; & you that have sweethearts or wives or children or parents, must fight for them and above all you must fight for liberty and for your country,’ which appeared to have the ears of Every true friend of this country, & were alive to action, but a few ‘pet Tories’ whom it seemed like poison to.”

As for the Continentals, as soon as the drums started beating, they rose and hastened into formation. According to McJunkin, “the tattoo being sounded, the line was formed commanded by Col. Howard [Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard].” Morgan then spoke to them collectively, saying “My friends in arms, my dear boys, I request you to remember Saratoga, Monmouth, Paoli & Brandywine, & this day you must play your parts for your honor & liberty's cause.”

The troops then began moving onto the battlefield. It was an unpleasant morning. Private William Neel, who was in Captain Buchanan’s company of Virginians, remembered that, “the Army paraded before day a cold morning.” Captain Henry Connelly recalled, “it was cold weather but inclined to be rainey.”

According to McJunkin, “First the regulars and some companies of Virginia militia are posted to where the final issue is expected.” However, Colonel Joseph Hayes’ small regiment may have been the first onto the battlefield. Perhaps they were directed to mark the spot where the Continentals were to deploy or they were designated to cover the Continentals’ deployment with their long-ranged rifles. Robert Long of Hayes’ regiment watched as the Continentals “marched out in sections, and divided two and two as they got [within] ten paces of Hayes' regiment already formed across the road.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 1. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's infantry march down the road behind them, followed by Major Francis Triplett's Virginians.

The Continentals deployed to the southwest of the Green River Road, that is, to the right of Hayes’ regiment [see Note 2]. Thomas Young remembered that, “The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 2. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Howard's Continentals have completed their deployment. Major Francis Triplett's Virginians are beginning to deploy as well. Other units can be seen preparing to deploy.

The Virginia militia deployed behind and to the sides of the Continentals, leaving a gap between the Continentals and either wing of militia [see Note 3]. According to Neel, his company of Virginia militia “formed in single file with the Militia on the right of the Regulars, stood in ranks till Sun rise, at which time the battle commenced” [see Note 4].

Sergeant Major William Seymour of the Delaware Continentals recorded in his journal that “we were drawn up in order of battle, the men seeming to be all in good spirits and very willing to fight.”

Next came the more complicated deployment of the balance of the American militia. According to McJunkin, “the main body of militia under Gen. Pickens are drawn up at the distance of 150 yards” in front of the main line [see Note 5]. They were deployed in two wings, which were aligned with the gaps between the Continentals and militia wings on the main line [see Note 6]. The American cavalry, meanwhile, took up position on the elevation behind the Continentals [see Note 7].

The American deployment was now complete. Brigadier-General William Moultrie, an early historian of the battle, wrote that, “General Morgan drew up his men on an open pine barren in the following order… the militia of about four hundred men formed the first line under General Pickens; the continentals of about five hundred (two hundred of whom were six months men, very raw troops) formed the second line [see Note 8], commanded by Colonel Howard, about two hundred yards in the rear of the first. Colonel Washington, with about seventy-five continental cavalry, and- forty-five mounted militia, with swords, under Colonel M'Call, in the rear of the whole: in this disposition did they wait to receive the enemy.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Colonel Henry Lee made similar observations in his early history [see Note 9]. He concluded, “Erroneous as was the decision to fight in this position, when a better might have been easily gained, the disposition for battle was masterly.”

Morgan indicated in his report of the battle that Hayes’ regiment was deployed on the left wing of the militia wing. However, Robert Long stated that his regiment was deployed on the right wing of the main line (see The Statements of Private Robert Long). Either Morgan or Long was mistaken in their recollection, or Hayes' regiment was ordered to the militia line, but then moved to the main line due to some last-minute adjustment in the deployment.

Why would men have been drawn from the left wing of the militia line to reinforce the right wing of the main line? It is noteworthy that the left wing of the militia line bordered a branch of Suck Creek, while the right wing of the militia line was posted on a high point on the battlefield. Perhaps it was determined that while the left wing could have fewer men without endangering the American position, but the right wing could not be reduced.

No participant account directly says that some men were shifted off of the front line to supplement the main line. However, Robert Long, of Hayes’ regiment did describe his regiment performing some peculiar pre-battle maneuvers. He stated that after the Continentals deployed,

“Hayes regiment then moved to the right of the infantry [the Continentals],” or onto the other side of the battlefield. Once they were there, there seems to have been some confusion over exactly where Hayes’ regiment was to deploy. At first Hayes’ regiment was “70 or 80 yards in advance” of the Continentals, and “70 or 80 yards” behind “Major McDowell, of North Carolina.” In other words, they were midway between the militia line and the main line. The rest of the main line militia were deployed behind the Continentals.

The Americans Deploy, Part 3. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is on the right of the Continentals, midway between the Continentals' right and Major Joseph McDowell's North Carolinians. At this stage, the American deployment is largely complete.

Eventually, the deployment was sorted out. Long noted that “Hayes' regiment having advanced too far were to retreat.” They then fell back to a more appropriate position, perhaps next to Connelly’s company. At that point, Long stood “in the center line on the right wing in Captain Ewing's company commanded by Colonel Joseph Hayes, next to Colonel Howard's Infantry.”

The right wing of the main line was described by few participants. For example, Thomas Young wrote that, “The battle field was almost a plain with a ravine on both hands, and very little under growth in front or near us. The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks, their right flank resting upon the head of the ravine on the right. The militia [of the main line] were formed on the left of the regulars… their left flank resting near the head of the ravine on the left.”

Howard remembered that he had “two companies of Virginia Militia or volunteers, one commanded by Capt Tripolet [Major Francis Triplett] from Fauguhar [Fauquier County], the other by a capt Tate from Rockbridge or one of the western Counties.” He wrote, “I am positive that Triplett and Tate were on my left,” but said nothing about militia units on his right.

The right wing of the main line was on lower ground than the Continentals and the other militia units; perhaps Howard and others didn’t see them there. Alternatively, as the right wing failed to distinguish itself during the battle, their presence, while known at the time, was later forgotten.

Final American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Notes:

1. The scout could be either a militiaman or one of Washington’s dragoons. As noted in my previous post, Sergeant Lawrence Everhart claimed that he was captured when 3 miles away from Morgan’s camp; this suggests that the main British column was 2 miles distant from the site of the initial conflict.

2. This is indicated in the pension application of Sergeant Benjamin Martin of the Virginia militia. Martin stated that "I was in the road all the time of the action... Lieutenant Ewen [James Ewing] was on the left of the Maryland Troops near me." This places Martin on the left of the Continentals, and the Continentals to the southwest of the Green River Road. A number of illustrations of the battle of Cowpens show the Americans deployed equally to either side of the Green River Road. However, the ground was more elevated to the southwest of the road than to the northeast (see The Cowpens Battlefield). Martin’s statement suggests that the American deployment was governed more by the topography of the battlefield than by the location of the road.

3. The description of the American deployment provided here is unlike that in many histories of the battle, but it is not wholly unique. A similar arrangement can be found in Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Two Interpretations of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, Bearss' on the right. The positioning of the units per Bearss' account is approximate. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

In both cases, heavy emphasis has been placed on Morgan's after action report and Hammond's description of Morgan's plan (see Morgan's Report, The Hammond Map). I interpreted Hammond somewhat differently than did Bearss. Other differences arose because I drew upon pension applications as a source of information.

One recent history that indicates a very different American deployment than that shown here is Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens.

Comparison of Two Versions of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, and is as described above. Babits' interpretation appears on the right; the positioning of the units per his account is approximate. On the right, 1 = American Cavalry; 2 = Main Line; 3 = Militia Line; 4 = Skirmish Line. The two accounts also differ in terms of the location of the Green River Road. The road in my version follows Bearss and is shown in brown. Babits showed the Green River Road following a different course, which I have partially sketched out in black on the right panel.

There are a number of reasons for the differences in the present account with that by Babits. Chief among these is that Babits concluded (while I did not) that Morgan's and Hammond's descriptions of the American deployment referred to a temporary battle plan that was developed the night before the battle and then greatly modified before the actual fighting began. (see Morgan's Report and The Hammond Map for a transcription of their accounts).

I have devoted a number of previous posts to arguing for the version of the American deployment shown here. In regards to the main line deployment, see in particular The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Composition, and The Main Line: Location.

4. Aside from Neel, the only participant to comment on the number of ranks was Thomas Young, who said that “the regulars… were formed in two ranks.” He did not indicate this deployment for the militia. Indeed, that he should have mentioned this fact at all suggests that he found such a deployment to be exceptional. A single rank for the militia line leads to their covering well the high ground between Suck Creek and Island Creek. Perhaps all of the militia were formed in a single rank, although it's not unreasonable to believe that the men also would have doubled up behind large trees where they were near the line.

5. Some sources say that distance was 150 yards, others that it was 200 yards. In the images the distance between the first and second lines is a little greater than 150 (scale) yards.

6. This is indicated in participant accounts. As noted above, Martin’s statement indicated that gap between the Continentals and the left wing of the main line would have been near the Green River Road. Hammond’s description of the militia line deployment places his regiment on the northeast of the Green River Road and Major John Cunningham’s men on the southwest of the road. In other words, the left wing of the militia line was roughly aligned with the left gap in the main line. I assume, by extension, that the same was true of the right wing of the militia line. See The Hammond Map.

7. For details about where the American cavalry were deployed, see The American Cavalry - Part 2.

8. Moultrie mistakenly referred to 200 of the troops as Continentals that were in fact Virginia militia with long terms of service. They were, in any case, “raw troops.”

9. Lee said that “The main body of the militia composed… [the front] line, with General Pickens at its head. At a suitable distance in the rear of the first line a second was stationed, composed of the continental infantry and two companies of Virginia militia, under Captains Triplett and Taite, commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel Howard. Washington's cavalry, reinforced with a company of mounted militia armed with sabres, was held in reserve; convenient to support the infantry, and protect the horses of the rifle militia, which were tied, agreeably to usage, in the rear.”

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Morgan, Anderson, McJunkin, Neel, Connelly, Young, Seymour, Howard, and Hammond.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan also has a copy of Morgan's report.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Long (.pdf file). See also The Statements of Private Robert Long.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's statement.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf).

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Location, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

Cowpens in Miniature 3

Part 3: American Order of Battle
Previous: British Order of Battle

Next: Morgan's Decision

There is considerable uncertainty about the number of American participants at the battle of Cowpens, a topic about which I have previously commented on at length. I noted that two trustworthy sources (Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan and Sergeant-Major William Seymour) placed the American total at or below 800 men.

In this post I describe the American order of battle in some detail. In this description, Morgan's command has a total of 950 men.

The chief reason why I chose a larger total concerns the question of how many militia were present at the battle. Why Morgan's and Seymour's accounts imply a very low total, other credible sources explicitly indicate otherwise (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?). These statements include a total in the neighborhood of 350 for just the militia line (Otho Williams) to a total for all of the militia of about 500 (Nathanael Greene), 550 (US Congressional Resolution) or 600 men (William Moultrie). In my scheme there are around 590 militia (45 mounted militia, 230 on the main line, and 315 on the militia line).

My total of 950 men is not likely to sit well with some.

Those readers swayed by contemporary author Lawrence Babits would regard this number as too low. He estimated between 1,800 and 2,400 Americans were present at the battle. His estimate of a comparatively large total is based chiefly on an examination of pension applications filed by veterans after the war. I'm in favor of using pension application as a source of information, but I was unswayed by his analysis. This topic was covered in six previous posts (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Problems with Pensions, Veteran Survival, Little River Regiment, Morgan and Seymour, Fitting Large Numbers on the Militia Line).

Conversely, those swayed by early historian James Graham would regard this number as too high. I quoted him before, but a key passage bears repeating.

"It is true, his entire command, including all the militia that arrived previous to the battle, would appear to be about nine hundred and eighty men, if army returns and muster rolls were alone consulted. But every one acquainted with military affairs knows that such evidences of strength always exceed the reality. A number of his regulars were sick at the time, and many of the militia were absent. One detachment had been sent off with the baggage, another had gone to Salisbury in charge of prisoners, and a third guarded the horses of the militia. Besides, after the retreat of the militia from the front line, several of them never again appeared in the field, and a few mounted their horses and fled from the ground. Such men should not be permitted to lesson the glory of the achievement, by sharing in the honors of the victors as well as diminishing the mortification of the vanquished. The forces engaged in the battle under Morgan did not exceed eight hundred and fifty men."

Below I describe in some detail the composition of the American force, and estimate the size of each component. I don't have great confidence in the estimates of the various components, but at least there is some logic behind the decisions and the total is consistent with early sources.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line. Each miniature represents approximately 20 combatants.

Cavalry Reserve

Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington, commanding. Units #1 & #2 in the above figure.

Continental Light Dragoons: 72 men (Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington). See The American Cavalry - Part 1 for additional details.

Mounted Militia: ~45 men (served in two companies commanded by Major James McCall and Captain Banjamin Jolly). See The American Cavalry - Part 2 for additional details.

Total: ~117 men

The Main Line Continentals

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard commanding. Unit #4 in the figure.

1st Delaware Regiment: ~60 men. (one light infantry company under Captain Robert Kirkwood; total is based on Babits' A Devil of a Whipping).

1st Maryland Regiment: ~180 men (three light infantry companies under Captains Richard Anderson, Henry Dobson, and Nicholas Mangers; information from Babits.

Virginian Continentals: ~20 men (one company under Captain Andrew Wallace). William Jewell who fought in this company wrote, "Captain Wallace... marched us to Charlotte in North Carolina where we Joined General Greene: General Morgan was here permitted to select about 20 men to reinforce his own little band of perhaps 300 men against Tarleton at the Cowpens – he was selected as one and after the battle went as guard with the prisoners to Albemarle Barracks in Virginia."

Others: ~33 men.

As noted previously, some Virginia State troops and North Carolina Continentals may have served on the main line. Like Wallace's men, they may have been handpicked to supplement Morgan's other Continentals. Colonel Otho Williams in a January 23, 1781 letter said that Morgan had 290 light infantry. There were perhaps 237 Maryland and Delaware Continentals (number based on U.S. Congressional Resolution of March 9, 1781), plus 20 men with Wallace. An additional 33 men would produce a total force of 290.

That Howard's light infantry was an amalgam of men drawn from several units rather than a single large regiment is a reflection of the destitute condition of the American army in the South. On December 7, 1780, Major-General Nathanael Greene wrote to General George Washington complaining that:

"Nothing can be more wretched and distressing than the condition of the troops, starving with cold and hunger, without tents and camp equipage. Those of the Virginia line are literally naked, and a great part totally unfit for any kind of duty, and must remain so untill clothing can be had."

It was necessary to handpick men for service with Morgan because so many were incapable of a rigorous campaign.

Total: ~290 men (based on Williams)

Main Line Militia

Units #3 & #5 in the figure.

Major Francis Triplett's Virginia militia battalion: ~170 men (four companies under Captains James Tate, Patrick Buchanan, James Gilmore, and either Captain Combs or Lieutenant Dearing). The total number is based on the aforementioned letter by Williams.

Little River Regiment of South Carolina militia: ~40 men (Colonel Joseph Hayes, commanding). Daniel Morgan's letter of Jan 4, 1781 identified "forty militia horsemen under Col. Hays." A regimental strength of about 40 men can be interpreted as being consistent with statements made by Private Aaron Guyton of South Carolina (see Little River Regiment). Statements by Morgan and Seymour likewise suggest that the South Carolina militia regiments were quite small (see Morgan and Seymour).

Babits pointed out that there were last minute arrivals adding to the strength of the militia on the eve of the battle. However, there were also last minute departures. Major Joseph McJunkin observed that these regiments included a significant number of "pet tories" who were reluctant to fight (and prone to desert), and Morgan complained that he couldn't keep the militia together.

Other Units: ~20 men (conjectural). This includes a company of North Carolina State Troops commanded by Captain Henry Connelly.

As noted previously, some other militia units have been identified with the main line by various sources. Babits noted that his review of pension applications placed two companies (50 men) of Major David Campbell's Virginia militia battalion at the battle. The pension applications in question are lacking in details. It is not clear how many companies were in this battalion, how many men were in each company, whether all or only part of the companies served in the battle, or even whether the claims made in the applications are trustworthy. As these men are not mentioned in other participant accounts, this group, if present, was not likely to have been of a significant factor in the battle.

Total: ~230 men.

Placement of Militia Units on the Main Line

Of the Virginia militia, Combs'/Dearing's company (~42 men; based on a four-way division of Triplett's 170 men) and Tate's company (~42 men) appear to have been on the left wing, while Buchanan's company (~42 men), appears to have been on the right. Hayes' Little River Regiment (~40 men), and Connelly's company (~20 men) also appear to have been on the right wing (see The Main Line: Composition). I have not been able to place Gilmore's company on either wing. To even things out, I tentatively place Gilmore's company on the left wing to bring that total over the desired threshold. This gives the left wing 126 men (all Virginians), and the right wing 102 men (a hodgepodge of units from several states).

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard noted that at the climax of the battle that he had only 350 men with him. At this time, the right wing of the main line had fled, but the left wing remained in place. By my calculations, he would have had 290 Continental and Virginia state troops plus 126 riflemen under Major Francis Triplett. This total (416 men) is considerably above the 350 men Howard stated. It could be that some of my assumptions are in error. Alternatively, Howard, in arriving at 350 men, may have thought only half of the Virginian riflemen remained (this would have been 85 men) and forgot about the other units. He might also have subtracted about 20-25 men due to the losses he had sustained from British fire up to this point. This would result in a total of about 350 men.

Militia Line (Left Wing)

Unit #7 in the figure.

Georgia Refugees: One battalion under Major John Cunningham.

South Carolina State Troops: One regiment under Captain (Major) Samuel Hammond. Hammond is referred to as both a captain and a major. Hammond himself noted that he had been promoted to major, but technically he remained a captain, because he had not yet received his commission. Hammond stated that he

"Commanded on the left of the front line as Major of McCall's Regiment. It is here necessary to observe that Col. McCall had been promoted to the command of a Regiment of Cavalry authorized to be enrolled for six months & Applicant appointed to the Majority neither had yet been commissioned & only few armed with swords & pistols. The Refugee militia attached to their respective commands enrolled in the regiment and were promised by the Governor to be provided with clothing & arms as soon as they could be procured --- not a day was lost in recruiting nor was the full number made up before the Battle. The few 25 to 30 that were equipped as Horsemen were placed under Col. McCall and attached to Col. Washington's command. Those who were not so equipped were armed with Rifles & placed under the Applicant."

Upper Ninety-Six Regiment of South Carolina militia: I argued in a previous post that the left wing of the militia line likely included Colonel Andrew Pickens' regiment of South Carolina militia and perhaps also other volunteers from Georgia and South Carolina not affiliated with either Cunningham or Hammond. (see The Militia Line: Composition and Organization).

Total: ~115 men. I have not found information about the number of men in these units, therefore, I defer to Babits' number, which in turn comes from an unpublished study described in the Greene Papers. I haven't read the study and so I can offer no comment other than that the number seems plausible.

Militia Line (Right Wing)

Unit #6 in the figure.

Major Joseph McDowell's battalion of North Carolina militia: ~120 men. This total is based on a letter from Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, dated December 31, 1780.

1st Spartan Regiment of South Carolina militia: ~40 men (Colonel John Thomas, commanding). The estimate is an extension of that for Hayes' regiment (see above).

2nd Spartan Regiment of South Carolina militia: ~80 men (two battalions; Colonel Joseph Brandon and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck, commanding). Again, the estimate is an extension of the reasoning applied to Hayes' regiment.

The battalions of McDowell, Thomas, Brandon, and Roebuck are estimated to have had a total force of 240 men. However, there were some significant detachments. Captain Samuel Otterson of Brandon's battalion indicated that 30 men were detached as serving as spies and missed the battle. Captain Benjamin Jolly, also of Brandon's battalion, commanded a company of mounted militia contained men drawn, in part, from the South Carolinians' ranks (see The American Cavalry - Part 2).

Total: ~200 men (240 men - detachments).

Grand Total

• Cavalry: ~117 men
• Main Line Continentals: ~290 men
• Main Line Militia: ~230 men
• Militia Line (Left Wing): ~115 men
• Militia Line (Right Wing): ~200 men

Total ~950 men

Sources:

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Jewell (.pdf file).

A summary of the Otho Williams papers can be found here. The item in question is a letter from Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781.

A transcription of the letter from Greene to Washington can be found here.

January 23, 1781 letter from Major-General Nathanael Greene to Brigadier-General Francis Marion (not available online).

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has the U.S. Congressional Resolution, a copy of the statement by Jackson, and various statements by Morgan.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Samuel Hammond (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson (.pdf file).

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan

Related: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, The Main Line: Composition, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2

Last time, I noted that the British commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, deployed a troop of cavalry on either end of his line of infantry at the beginning of the battle. I also argued that both of these troops were used to assail the two flanks of the American line. I described, in particular, the attack of Captain David Ogilvie's British Legion dragoons against the right wing of the American main line.

The other British cavalry charge was made by Lieutenant Henry Nettles and the 17th Light Dragoons.

Whereas Ogilvie's charge was made at an early point in the British attack on the American main line, Nettles' attack occurred after the American Continentals had begun to retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, who commanded the Continentals, wrote that, “…about the time of our retreat, a large body of british cavalry passes round my left flank and pursued the flying militia to their horses."

This force would have been Nettles' 17th Light Dragoons, which had been stationed on the British right.

Howard, like Major McJunkin, whom I quoted in my last post, believed that the retreating front-line militia was the target of Nettles' attack. However, this may be another case in which the encounter between the British dragoons and the reforming front-line infantry was accidental. South Carolina militiaman Jeremiah Dial stated that the British cavalry "broke through the leftwing of the Malitia," which echoes the statements made about the attack that broke the right wing (see: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses). Private Isaac Way, who was on the left wing of the main line (Triplett's Virginians), evidently was in the line of this charge. He claimed that he “was severely wounded on the side, back, arms, head and in the face by the cut of the sword of a British dragoon.”

There is evidence that around the time of Nettles' charge, at least some of the American cavalry was employed to assist Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard in halting the Continentals during their accidental retreat.

Brigadier-General William Moultrie, who obtained his information second-hand, wrote, “…the second [main] line began to give way. Colonel Washington [i.e., Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington of the American 3rd light dragoons] perceiving this, immediately rode up close to the rear of the second line with his cavalry, and spoke to Colonel Howard, ‘that if he would rally his men, and charge the enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry that were got among our militia in the rear.' Colonel Washington, riding up so close to the rear of our second line stopped the British for a moment, which gave time to Colonel Howard to rally his men, and charge with fixed bayonets… [then] Colonel Washington charged the enemy's cavalry, who were cutting down our militia, and soon drove them off.” (book link)

Howard's account reinforces this point: "Washington observing this [i.e., the British cavalry attack] charged them. As well as I can recollect this charge was made at the same moment that I charged the [British] infantry, for as soon as we got among the enemy & were making prisoners I observed the enemy's cavalry retreating the way the[y] had advanced, by our left flank, and Washington in pursuit of them and he followed them some distance--You will observe by this statement that Washington's charge had no connexion with mine as his movement was to the rear in a quite different direction.”

Washington’s charge “to the rear” was from immediately behind the Continentals to the area in the left rear of the main line where the militia were under attack. Howard repeated this idea in another place in the same letter: “He [Washington] moved to the left from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse.”

Nettles' Attack. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line (Triplett's former company has been broken, but the rest of the line is intact), 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (and parts of the right wing, see: Flight of the Militia - Part 3; both groups are reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Howard.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Dial (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Isaac Way (.pdf file).

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Related: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, 17th Light Dragoons, The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses

The Main Line at Cowpens: The Right Wing Collapses

[Minor edits 12/28/09]

In my last post I reviewed the statements of Private Robert Long of the South Carolina militia. Long's statements place him on the right wing of the main line. His statements also indicate that this wing of militia fled shortly after the militia line retreated.

Historians have not recognized an incident of this kind occurring. However, Robert Long is not alone in indicating that such a collapse of the right wing of the main line occurred.

Captain Henry Connelly, who commanded a company of North Carolina state troops wrote that:

"The company which belonged to this applicant was placed under Col Howard, on the extreme right of the division, and this applicant commanded a company in the center. Our company, when just about to catch up our horses which were hid about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of battle, [was attacked by the enemy which] fell upon us with great fury, but we were fortunately relieved by Washington's Legion that hastened to our assistance."

Connelly first places his company on the right wing of the main line ("under Col Howard"), then indicates that his men broke and were overtaken by the British cavalry while in flight. This experience matches those of units in the militia line, but not that of Howard's Continentals or Triplett's Virginians (at least those on the left wing).

British accounts do not describe the right wing of the main line, much less its rout during the battle, but this omission is less significant than it seems. The few extant British accounts of Cowpens are vague in their description of how the Americans were deployed. However, British participants did describe an attack against the main line that can easily be interpreted as breaking the right wing of that line.

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie claimed that “the second [American] line, now attacked, made a stout resistance. Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy. He cut his way through their line, but, exposed to a heavy fire, and charged at the same time by the whole of Washington's dragoons, was compelled to retreat in confusion.”

Loyalist Alexander Chesney recorded in his journal that “the British Legion… supported by a detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty.” In other words, Ogilvie's dragoons attacked the American right flank, cut through their line, and broke them without difficulty. This occurred at the same time that the 1st battalion of the 71st Foot was advancing against the right side of the American main line.

The collapse of the right wing, as suggested by the accounts of Long, Connelly, Mackenzie, and Chesney, can be understood as an important event in setting the stage for the climax of the battle. In the words of Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard:

"[When the British] formed their line they shouted and made a great noise to intimidate, and rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen to fire a second time. The militia fell into our rear, and part of them fell into the rear of my right flank where they afterwards renewed the action. The british advanced until my regiment commence firing. I soon observed, as I had but about 350 men and the british about 800, that their line extended much further than mine particularly on my right, where they were pressing forward to gain my flank.--To protect that flank, I ordered the company on my right to change its front so as to oppose the enemy on that flank. Whether my orders were not well understood or whether it proceeded from any other cause, in attempting this movement some disorder ensued in this company which rather fell back than faced as I wished them."

Howard did not explicitly describe a collapse of the right wing of the main line. However, a comparison of Howard's account with William Johnson’s history does implicitly indicate he believed that there was a cavalry attack against the militia on his right. Also, the statement that the British "line extended much further than mine particularly on my right," is consistent with his having lost the covering force on his right flank. The loss of this force also helps explain why he felt compelled to refuse his right.

Crisis at Cowpens. Only Howard's Continentals (#4) and Triplett's Virginians (#5) remain in line to stem the British attack. Howard has begun to refuse his right flank (triggering the accidental retreat of the Continental infantry). Scattered elements of the right wing of the main line (#3), and the right (#6) and left (#7) wings of the militia line are attempting to reform in the rear. The militia are protected by the American cavalry (#1 and #2).

An interesting aside is that when accounts of the battle are compared, the only officers mentioned as commanding several militia units on the main line are Major Francis Triplett of Virginia and Colonel Andrew Pickens of South Carolina. Howard pointed out that Triplett commanded on his left. Pickens commanded the front-line militia. If Triplett remained throughout the battle on the left wing of the main line then perhaps no one had overall command of the various units on the right wing. Perhaps this lack of command and control was responsible for the initial incorrect deployment of Hayes' regiment (see The Statements of Private Robert Long) and was also a contributing factor in the collapse of the right wing.

Sources:

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of statements by Howard and Mackenzie.

The Journal of Alexander Chesney.

The Statements of Private Robert Long

[Minor edits 12/27/09]

Private Robert Long of South Carolina left two statements that described the deployment of American forces and important events during the battle of Cowpens. His accounts strike me as important evidence about the battle, although it has been largely overlooked by historians. Of the histories that I've read, only Lawrence Babits used them to shape his understanding of how Cowpens was fought.

One of his statements was written in support of Captain Samuel Hammond's pension application. In it, he said, "[Hammond] was in the Battle of Cowpens (that is Tarleton's defeat)... he was then promoted to Major, believes he commanded on the front line left wing and this deponent [i.e., Long] was in the center line on the right wing in Captain Ewing's company commanded by Colonel Joseph Hayes, next to Colonel Howard's Infantry."

(He did not provide any details about his service at Cowpens in his own pension application).

Long's second statement appeared in John Logan's 1859 A History of the Upper Country of South Carolina (not available online). The relevant text is as follows:

"...The infantry marched out in sections, and divided two and two as they got ten paces of Hayes' regiment already formed across the road. Hayes regiment then moved to the right of the infantry, 70 or 80 yards in advance; Major McDowell, of North Carolina, in advance of us 70 or 80 yards, and Major Triplett, of Virginia, in our rear; Cols. Thomas and Roebuck in the extreme right. The left wing was similarly formed of militia. The cavalry in rear of infantry... Hayes' regiment having advanced too far were to retreat and form on our old ground; when the North Carolinians were retreating in order to be ready to cover their retreat; failing of this the Virginians broke before we got to them. We were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person. At that time Tarleton brought 200 or 300 cavalry round in the rear of our left wing of militia. Col. Washington charged them with his cavalry; at the same time our infantry charged the British with the bayonet and took their field pieces, while those on the right and left surrendered or retreated."

The text in Long's statements is somewhat difficult to follow. Below I offer a detailed interpretation of what Long said:

On the morning of the 17th, the Americans deploy on the battlefield. Hayes' regiment was deployed across the Green River Road close to the spot where Morgan planned to place Howard's continentals. The companies comprising Howard's light infantry (referred to as "the infantry" in Long's statement) marched down the road in column formation. They marched to within 10 paces of Hayes' regiment, then deployed in a line of two ranks to the right (south) of the road.

The Americans Deploy, Part 1. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's infantry march down the road behind them, followed by Major Francis' Triplett's Virginians.

The Americans Deploy, Part 2. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Howard's Continentals have completed their deployment. Major Francis' Triplett's Virginians are beginning to deploy as well. Other units can be seen preparing to deploy.

After the continentals deployed, Hayes' regiment moved to the right of the infantry until they reached a point at which they were midway (i.e., about 75 yards) between the Continentals and McDowell's North Carolinians. Describing the rest of the American deployment, Long noted that Triplett's Virginians were in their rear, the South Carolina militia under Thomas and Roebuck were on "the extreme right" of the right wing of the militia, and that there was also a "left wing" "similarly formed of militia." The cavalry were positioned behind the Continentals.

The Americans Deploy, Part 3. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is on the right of the Continentals, midway between the Continentals' right and Major Joseph McDowell's North Carolinians. At this stage, the American deployment is largely complete.

When Hayes' regiment took up this position they had "advanced too far," and were ordered to fall back to their "old ground." This does not mean 10 paces in front of the continentals, but rather further back from the militia line. Completing this move, they were "in the center line on the right wing... next to Colonel Howard's Infantry." Long called this the center line to distinguish it from the militia line in front and "The cavalry in rear." From this position they would "be ready to cover" the retreat of McDowell's North Carolinians.

The Americans Deploy, Part 4. (Click to enlarge). The positions of the American units at the start of the battle. Hayes' regiment has now joined the right wing of the main line.

When the militia line broke early in the battle, Hayes' regiment did not stand their ground (his words were "failing of this"). Falling back, they might have rallied behind the Virginians (Buchanan's company). Instead, "the Virginians broke before we got to them. We were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person."

Sources:

John Logan. (1859). A History of the Upper Country of South Carolina.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Hammond, which includes a statement by Robert Long (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Long (.pdf file).