November 1, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for November 1st: The Americans pulled back from White Plains; the British abandoned the pursuit of Washington’s army.

Previous entry: October 31st.

In the early morning hours, the last of the Americans in the entrenchments pulled back. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion) noted in his journal:

“This morning our guards come off and leave the lines in the centre of the town called White Plains, and to distress the enemy [they] burn all the barns of hay and grain and houses, where the inhabitants had stores of wheat and corn and also stacks and barracks of hay and grain.”

The British officers looked with surprise on the burning buildings and empty defensive works. When they rode forward they could see American forces encamped on a line of hills to the north, but the American army had been so reduced by sickness and other causes, that they thought this force was no more than a rear guard. Major Stephen Kemble wrote of this force, “[we] suppose them to be about 7,000 strong”.

The British concluded that the rest of Washington’s men had fled even deeper into the hills, which meant that their attack plans had gone to naught. However, as the British were not particularly eager to attack the American lines in the first place, there was undoubtedly some sense of relief.

Lieutenant-General William Howe opted not to attack this “rearguard”. He later explained that the Americans’ actions “plainly” indicated a “desire to avoid coming to action,” and added “I did not think the driving their rearguard further back an object of the least consequence.”

Instead, the British advanced and occupied the Americans’ former entrenchments. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) wrote: “At half after 9 o’clock we got under arms, and pushed into the village of the White Plains, which the enemy had just abandoned, and the army advanced at the same time”.

This advance brought the armies within range of each others’ cannons. Major-General William Heath, on the left of the American army, wrote:

“In the morning, the British advanced, with a number of field-pieces, to the north of the road near late headquarters… and commenced a furious cannonade on General Heath’s division, which was nobly returned by Captain-Lieutenant Bryant and Lieutenant Jackson, of the artillery.”

During this cannonade, according to Heath, George Washington rode up to him and expressed concern over one of Heath’s regiments that was separated by a hollow from the rest of the division. “Take care that you do not lose them”, he warned. But the British did not attack this force. Instead, Heath wrote, the British guns withdrew from his front, “made a circuitous movement, and came down toward the American right.” As these guns moved into position, they were fired upon by some American heavy guns. Heath noted that “upon the discharge” from the American guns, the British crews “made off with their field-pieces as fast as their horses could draw them. A shot from the American cannon, at this place, took off the head of a Hessian artilleryman. They also left one of the artillery horses dead on the field.”

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Lee’s division) witnessed the British movement towards the American right. He wrote:

“we saw the enemy advance down the hill towards us in three parties[,] one party coming towards the road the other [two] through a swamp[.] We sent some 25-pound shot to them that stopped some before they could get over the bridge to us and the others passed through the swamp to a hill opposite to us… we sent over some shot… that knocked down a light horse”. [see footnote]

British Major Stephen Kemble summarized the day’s action by writing: “[they] cannonaded us… the greatest part of the day; we lost 9 men [killed] by this business. Six of them Hessians.”

Isolated fatalities were noted by several British officers.

Ensign Henry Stirke wrote:

“We received a few straggling shot, which did no execution. The 15th regiment had one man killed, and another wounded, by the rebel cannon”.

Captain Francis Rawdon observed:

“We had some cannonading with their rear guard, by which my brother John (who is an excellent soldier in every respect) was very near killed. Two men who stood close to him were killed by a twelve-pounder, and a splinter of one of their skulls stuck in his thigh, but did not hurt him much.”

American losses were even fewer. Apparently one man in Levi Paulding’s New York militia regiment was killed, and two other New Yorkers were wounded. Their brigade commander (George Clinton) commented, “I have heard of no other injury done [to] us.”

Brigade-Major Benjamin Tallmadge characterized the American withdrawal from White Plains as something of a victory: He claimed that Howe was “baffled” by this maneuver, and as a result gave up the pursuit of Washington’s army. Thus, Washington’s army, brought perilously close in this campaign to capture or collapse, had survived to fight another day.

William Howe had a rather different perspective. Howe did not wish to place his own army at risk by chasing the Americans into the wild hills on the New York-New England border. He was sure, too, that if Washington did make a firm stand, it would only be on some set of steep and heavily fortified hills. Howe had had enough of this business. He felt he could now turn his back on Washington without losing face and proceed once again to wage war on his own terms. Howe’s preference was to capture Fort Washington and consolidate his hold on the New York City area. His developing plan also came to include sending expeditions into New Jersey, Rhode Island, and, if all went well, the American capitol at Philadelphia.

Heath noted that during the rest of this day, November 1st:

“The two armies lay looking at each other, and within long cannon-shot [range]. In the night time the British lighted up a vast number of fires, the weather growing pretty cold. These fires, some on the level ground, some at the foot of the hills, and at all distances to their brows… seemed to the eye to mix with the stars, and to be of different magnitudes. The American side, doubtless, exhibited to them a similar appearance.”

The bright orange flames licked the cold November sky, and another chapter of the Revolutionary War came to a close.

Footnote: Smith indicated that this event took place on Friday the 31st. Friday was November 1st. A comparison of Smith’s description of other events occurring at the time with the journals of other Americans suggests that he was right about it being Friday and wrong about it being the 31st.

Concluding Comment: The standoff at White Plains did not end on November 1st. For a few days the two armies glowered at each other, and during that time more men were killed in little brushes or perished from illness. The British left White Plains on November 5-6 and soon joined Knyphausen’s division near Manhattan. On November 16th, Howe captured Fort Washington and completed the conquest of Manhattan.

October 30, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 30th: The American medical service cannot cope with the sick; William Howe prepared to attack upper Manhattan and White Plains; Henry Clinton balked at Howe’s plans.

Previous entry: October 29th; next: October 31st.

The American army at White Plains grimly held on to their redoubts and trenches. The men continued to suffer from a lack of food, medicine, proper clothing, and all other materials necessary for an army’s survival.

The Americans had established a general hospital in a church in the town of North Castle, 9 miles to the northeast, but it was poorly staffed due to a shortage of physicians.

The head of the American medical service (Doctor John Morgan) later wrote:

“I cannot but feel for the hospital surgeons [at North Castle], who… were suddenly overwhelmed with numbers of sick sent to them, as well as the wounded … at a time when an engagement was considered as inevitable, there were few at hand to give aid… the wounded, who were conveyed to the hospitals, naturally demanded the attention of the whole body of surgeons, to administer aid to them.”

The sick, it seems, were largely left to the informal care of their comrades.

Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote, “Today it being rainy[,] Luke was taking not well[, and] I still being not well… we both set out for North Castle hospital… and we got within 4 miles of the hospital and put up for this night.” They slept in the woods and then completed the arduous journey, unaided, in the morning.

Doctor John Pine, who had recently joined Washington’s army, found that it was impossible to take care of the sick men from his native Maryland. He wrote that on the 29th:

“I waited on Doctor Morgan, Director-General of the hospitals here, for medicines, etc. He told me he had nothing to say to the Maryland troops, and that it was not his business to supply the regimental surgeons with medicines, and that it must have been a mistake [for Maryland]… to send their surgeons here without them and think they were to be supplied here.”

Dr. Pine then sought out Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion, who was 15 miles away and recuperating from two wounds (one in the arm, one in the hip) he received during the fighting on Chatterton’s Hill. Smallwood wrote a letter for the doctor which gave Pine a little leverage.

When Dr. Pine sought out Dr. Morgan again, he was told that “I might have some few things, if I could go to New-York for them”.

Pine was aghast:

“I told him by the time I went there and got back, that… most of the [sick] Maryland troops would be expired. He told me he could not help it, and that medicines were very hard to be got.”

After the battle of White Plains, Lieutenant-General William Howe deferred attacking the American army again partially because he did not like the strength of the American position and partially because he decided to wait for reinforcements. Once those reinforcements arrived, he planned on attacking Washington’s army. At the same time, he wanted Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen to attack the American forces in upper Manhattan.

According to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Knyphausen’s preparations went smoothly:

“[The Americans had] demolished the bridge at Kings Bridge and those called Dyckman’s bridge and Williams’ bridge. Lieutenant General von Knyphausen had them repaired and sent the Grenadier Battalion Köhler and Wutginau’s and Stern’s [i.e., von Stein’s] regiments across the river to encamp at places where they would be safe from the fire of the rebels’ batteries. The rest of his corps encamped behind Fort Independence”.

The Kingsbridge area, circa 1776 (click to enlarge). On October 30th, Knyphausen occupied Fort Independence and crossed some men into upper Manhattan.

Howe’s reinforcements reached him late in the day. Among these troops was the 46th Regiment of Foot. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham, later wrote:

“On the 30th of October we embarked at Hellgate, and after a passage of about thirty miles by water in flat-bottomed boats, we landed at New Rochelle, and immediately marched to join General Howe’s army at the White Plains.” [see footnote]

After the reinforcements arrived, Howe could see no cause for further delay. He had, it seems, accepted that a full-scale attack on the American works was necessary and inevitable. That night (10pm) he issued orders for the troops to be under arms at 5 am. In the ensuing attack, Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister would command the left division of the army, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right.

In the past, Howe typically consulted with Clinton about any major moves, but the campaign severely strained their relationship. Howe made his plans without Clinton’s input, and Clinton took the omission badly. Clinton later complained that “I received [the] orders late at night”, and protested that he was not ready to attack. In fact, Clinton had convinced himself there would be no further attacks on the American army, because he had previously argued against it. He then reminded Howe of his objections:

“I took the liberty of intimating to the Commander in Chief that it might prove rather hazardous to make any attack from center or right until we saw what would be the effect of one from the left… and that even then they [i.e., the attacks] ought to be pressed with caution, as the enemy had a very strong position in the gorges of the mountains behind them.”

Howe was already aware of these concerns and he ignored Clinton’s protests.

Footnote: Captain William Bamford (40th Foot) recorded in his journal that these reinforcements embarked on the 29th.

October 28, 1776 (Part 2)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the second of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for midday on October 28th: American infantry assembled on Chatterton’s Hill; Charles Stedman spotted an opportunity to destroy Washington’s army; the armies exchanged cannon fire; William Howe moved to seize Chatterton’s Hill.

Previous entry: Morning of October 28; next: Afternoon of October 28.

Washington decided to support the American troops on Chatterton’s Hill. It seems he first approached the elite Delaware Regiment (Alexander’s brigade, Spencer’s division) and ordered their commanding officer, Colonel John Haslet, to lead his regiment to the hill and take command of the militia there.

He then ordered Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall’s brigade (Lee’s division) to advance to the hill as well.

Among the men setting out with McDougall’s brigade was Second Lieutenant Elisha Bostwick of Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment. Bostwick recently had a “sickness called bilious fever” which, he said, “took all the hair off my head”. He rejoined his regiment yesterday, but he was “still unable to do duty or guard”. As the troops marched off to battle, “some thought [I was] unable to go with them,” but, he said, “I chose to be with the company”.

Meanwhile, the head of the British army reached high ground south of the village of White Plains. For the first time, the British could clearly see how the American army was deployed. Commissary Charles Stedman wrote:

“They were encamped on a long ridge of hill, the brow of which was covered with lines hastily thrown up… The weakest part was the centre. The slope of the hill was very gradual in the direction of the road by the Court House. The lines were by no means formidable, not being fraized; and the rockiness of the soil prevented the ditch from being made of any troublesome depth.”

Stedman was convinced that “an assault… on the centre of the enemy’s works… would have been destruction to the Americans.” He noted that “When our army came in sight their tents were standing.” He could see the Americans were beginning to move their tents and baggage and this “together with the movement of troops backward and forward, in evident uncertainty of purpose, gave an extraordinary picture of alarm.” Thus, “victory was to be reasonably expected, not only from the valor of our troops, but from the confusion of the enemy.”

Unknown to Stedman, the British also had another advantage: the center of the American position was chiefly manned by inexperienced state troops and militia. With very few exceptions (e.g., Hand’s 1st Continental Regiment, Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment), the Continentals were deployed on the left and right flanks of the army.

No immediate assault, however, could be made, as a number of units were still coming up.

As the British moved up and deployed, some of their artillery began to cannonade the mishmash of American troops on Chatterton’s Hill. Haslet recalled:

“We had not been many minutes on the ground, when the cannonade began, and the second shot wounded a militia-man in the thigh, upon which the whole regiment [of militia] broke and fled immediately, and were not rallied without much difficulty.”

In the center of the line, the Americans had a small stroke of success. Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) noted, “about 12 o’clock the [British] light horse came near us[;] we fired and killed three men and 3 horses and took one of the enemy after a smart engagement.”

Major-General William Heath gave a different account of this incident:

“about twenty light-horse [of the 16th Light Dragoons], in full gallop, and brandishing their swords, appeared on the road leading to the courthouse, and now directly in front of General Heath's division. The light-horse leaped the fence of a wheat-field at the foot of the hill, on which Colonel Malcolm's [New York militia] regiment was posted, of which the light-horse were not aware, until a shot from Lieutenant Fenno's field-piece gave them notice, by striking in the midst of them, and [sending] a horseman pitching from his horse. They then wheeled short about, galloped out of the field as fast as they came in, rode behind a little hill in the road, and faced about, the tops of their caps only being visible to General Heath where he stood.”

Back on Chatterton’s Hill, Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall’s brigade came up and deployed for battle. Lieutenant Bostwick described “the place of action” as “a large field of fenced lots”. The British had a clear of these men, and Bostwick complained that they “were wholly exposed to the fire of their artillery”.

McDougall’s men were situated behind the Delaware Regiment, and Haslet noted that “Some of our officers expressed much apprehension from the fire of our friends so posted.” In other words, they didn’t want to be accidentally shot in the back if the British attacked. “On my application to the General [McDougall], he ordered us to the right, formed his own brigade on the left, and ordered [Colonel Eleazer] Brooks' Massachusetts Militia still farther to the right, behind a stone fence.”

This “stone fence” was part of a primitive fortification defended by Colonel John Moseley’s Massachusetts Militia Regiment. Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige remembered that “Brook’s regiment, with some other troops, went into it. Brook’s regiment was next to us.”

All of this activity caught the eye of the British general staff.

Lieutenant-General William Howe later reported that “Colonel [Johann Gottlieb] Rall, who commanded a brigade of Hessians on the left, observing this position of the enemy and seeing a height on the other side of the Bronx unoccupied by them from whence their flank might be galled… took possession of it with great alacrity to the approbation of Lieutenant-General [Leopold Philip von] Heister who was acquainted with this movement by Sir William Erskine.”

Stedman thought that because the Americans were pushing men onto the hill, Howe was led “to imagine this hill to be of more importance than it… appeared to be”. Probably too, the British concluded that if the hill was worth taking, now was the time to take it. Major Stephen Kemble observed that the hill “might have cost us dear had we attempted it the next day”, that is, after the Americans had properly fortified it.

Howe wrote:

“Upon viewing the situation orders were given for a battalion of Hessians to pass the Bronx and attack this detached corps [of Americans on Chatterton’s Hill], supported by the 2nd brigade of British under the command of Brigadier-General [Alexander] Leslie, and the Hessian grenadiers sent from the right commanded by Colonel [Carl von] Donop, giving directions at the same time for Colonel Rall to charge the enemy’s flank”.

The Americans watched these developments with awe.

Captain William Hull (Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment, McDougall’s brigade) remembered:

“we discovered at a distance the approach of the British army. Its appearance was truly magnificent. A bright autumnal sun shed its full luster on their polished arms; and the rich array of dress and military equipage, gave an imposing grandeur to the scene, as they advanced, in all the pomp and circumstance of war, to give us battle.”

This map (click to enlarge) illustrates the position of British (red numbers) and American units (blue circles) prior to the assault on Chatterton’s Hill.

There is some uncertainty as to exactly which American units were on the hill. The units represented are ones for which the source material clearly places on Chatterton’s Hill (as opposed to some other area of combat, such as the Mamaroneck Road). The location of these units on the map is somewhat approximate; particularly important to this reconstruction were the accounts by Joseph Plumb Martin, Benjamin Trumbull, Thomas Craige, John Haslet, John Brooks, and William Hull.

The British units represent the whole of von Heister’s column, minus several small commands (two battalions of the 71st Foot and some Provincials). This reconstruction of their deployment is based chiefly on the Charles Blaskowitz map of the battle, and, to a lesser extent, the accounts by Carl Leopold Baurmeister and Johann von Ewald. There are several discrepancies among these sources, which makes this representation more approximate than that for the Americans. For example, Blaskowitz did not show the 1st British brigade on his map; the location I’ve assigned to it follows from Ewald’s account, but it cannot be considered definite.

The village of White Plains and the Americans’ main defensive works are off-map to the upper right. Heister’s column advanced from the bottom of the map along the York (or East Chester) Road. Donop’s Hessian grenadiers marched into this area from the right edge of the map, probably near the units marked #6 and #7.

I commented on the development of this map in a couple of previous posts (here and here).

October 26, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 26th: The British raided Mile Square.

Previous entry: October 25th; next: October 27th.

The Americans felt that they had bested the British by reaching White Plains before the British and fortifying the village, but apprehension remained over the looming showdown with the British army.

Colonel Joseph Reed (Washington’s adjutant general) wrote:

“We have taken post here in such a manner, that we hope they will not be able to execute their plan of surrounding us, and cutting off our communication. I can only conjecture that finding themselves baffled in this, they are now advancing to engage us. The business of this campaign, and possibly the next[,] may probably be determined this week.”

Adjutant Samuel Shaw (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote:

“We shall remain at this place till we have a brush with the enemy. They are within three miles of us. Their movements have been such as to occasion us a great deal of trouble, and it is happy for us that they did not effect our ruin... In several skirmishes with the enemy, we have had constantly the better; so that our troops are in good spirits, and impatiently desire an action. Something decisive must soon be done, as cold weather approaches and we want winter-quarters.”

According to Lieutenant Tench Tilghman (aide to George Washington), When Major-General Charles Lee pulled out of Mile Square on the 25th, “he was obliged to leave [behind] eighty or ninety barrels of provisions… for want of wagons.”

A Loyalist informed Hessian Captain Johann von Ewald that the Americans' supplies “could be approached without discovery.”

Ewald was willing to raid this post with his jaegers, but Brigadier-General William Erskine decided a larger force was needed for this operation, and Erskine placed himself at its head. According to Ewald:

“General Erskine arrived at my post with a hundred dragoons from the 17th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry. He ordered me to march with sixty jägers and form the advanced guard, which was to be reinforced with one officer and twenty dragoons.” [see Footnote 1]

At this time, Westchester County, between Kingsbridge and White Plains, was defended by few American troops. Close to Kingsbridge, Colonel John Lasher of New York had 400 men detached from Major-General William Heath’s division (specifically, from two brigades of New York militia and from William Prescott’s 7th Continental Regiment). Lasher’s chief responsibility was to defend Fort Independence near Kingsbridge, but he also had men patrolling the roads to the north and east. It was a weak force, and Lasher lamented that “many of the detachments have not ten rounds a man”.

At Mile Square, Lee had left behind some troops to guard over the supplies that could not be moved. According to Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment), this included “a guard of about 30 men… under the command of Lieutenant [Abraham] Turtelow”.

When the British advanced on Mile Square, they first encountered one of Lasher’s detachments. Ewald described it as “an enemy patrol of riflemen which gave fire and ran back.” He noted that “Several dragoons gave chase, but could not overtake any of them.”

The British expedition continued on until they came to the American depot. The British then swiftly attacked.

Ewald recalled:

“The jägers deployed, supported by the light infantry, with the dragoons following. The enemy guard drew up behind the stone walls which surrounded the plantation and received us with a lively fire. I quickly separated the jägers into four to five parts to surround the enemy and advanced under steady fire from wall to wall. The light infantry likewise divided into three to four parts and attacked the guard with the bayonet. Nearly everyone was struck down and only a few officers and men were taken prisoner.”

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers), who was also present, wrote that “the rebels had a guard of 1 captain and 25 men who ran… The dragoons pursued, killed the officer and 2 others and took 16 or 18 prisoners.”

Lieutenant Turtelow of Lippitt’s Regiment escaped “from the light horse” but he reported (in the words of John Smith) that the British “took the stores… and killed the doctor and some of the men belonging to the hospital”. [see Footnote 2]

Afterwards, according to Hessian Major Carl-Leopold Baurmeister, “We dispensed the wine and rum we could not take with us in bottles and destroyed the flour magazine… We also found the two jagers who had been missing since the attack of the 23rd.”

Ewald summarized how the successful raid concluded:

“Several enemy patrols which ran into our outpost withdrew quickly after a few shots. After midnight we withdrew, the light infantry covering the rear, and at daybreak of the 27th we arrived back at the army. I had the honor to receive a compliment from the commanding general.”

Footnote 1. In addition to the above, Baurmesiter stated that Regiment von Rall was also sent on this expedition. Archibald Robertson wrote that “1 Battalion of Hessians” was present, but didn’t name the unit.

Footnote 2. A return for Daniel Hitchcock’s 11th Continental Regiment (Nixon’s brigade, Lee’s division) stated that 8 men were captured at Mile Square on this date. My guess is that these men were either left behind to help guard the baggage, or had been left at the hospital.

October 22, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 22nd: The Americans concentrated at White Plains; the British received a large reinforcement.

Previous entry: October 21st (Part 2); next: October 23rd.

Two American divisions (those of William Heath and Joseph Spencer) marched to White Plains on the night of October 21-22 [see footnote]. They reached White Plains early in the morning in an exhausted condition. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Spencer’s division) wrote:

“The men slept on the ground in the streets [and] had nothing to cook with or to cover them, and many of them were exceeding[ly] hungry as well as sleepy and weary.”

It took some time for the new arrivals to become established. Major-General William Heath noted that his division “took post on the high strong ground… on the left of the line”. Looking around at the situation of the rest army, he saw that:

“The ground, from General Heath's left to the right, descended gradually a very considerable distance, and then gradually ascended up to the plain, and still on to the right to more commanding ground. On this was the American army formed, the line running nearly from northeast to southwest. There were some strong works thrown up on the plain, across the road, and still to the right of it… Headquarters were on the plain, near the crossroads.”

It wasn’t until the evening that a decision was made as to where to place Trumbull’s battalion. At last they were ordered from the center of the village over to the right side of the line, which meant, according to Trumbull, recrossing “with weary steps the ground we had… with so much labour travelled over [earlier].” Trumbull groused, “The men are worried in a manner to death and are treated with great hardship and severity, and in my opinion are put to much unnecessary hardship and fatigue.”

More men were on the way. On this date John Sullivan’s division marched for White Plains; probably so too did the division of Israel Putnam, which had been manning the defenses in upper Manhattan [see footnote].

Major-General Charles Lee’s men continued to occupy the Mile Square area. They had been defending the left flank of the army. However, the movement of Washington’s army to White Plains meant that their role was becoming one of defending the right flank of the army. In this position they safeguarded the slow-moving procession of provisions and other stores from upper Manhattan to White Plains.

As the British remained near the coast, Lee’s men had the opportunity to forage and look for plunder in the surrounding countryside. According to Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Lee’s division):

“Amaziah Blackmore[,] a sergeant in Captain Blackmore’s company[,] went to Eastchester amongst the deserted houses to see what he could plunder[. He] was surrounded in the house with a lieutenant and a fifer and was made prisoner by about 30 Hessians and plundered of his shoe and knee buckles and 18 dollars in paper money and carried away… he watched [for] an opportunity and sprang from between [his guards]… and kicked away his shoes that were loose on his feet and got clear of them and came into camp again… Last night Captain Bailey and Lieutenant Richmond went down and plundered some houses at East Chester of household furniture to the value of 400 dollars and one colt[,] which the general made a present of to Captain Bailey”.

The British were aware of the desperate condition of the American army. As Commissary Charles Stedman later put it:

“The American army was now in a disagreeable situation. The soldiers were very poorly clothed, and a scarcity of provisions among them had been followed by much illness. Nor, amidst these disadvantages, was their position either secure or eligible in other respects. Their sole resource was to avoid action”.

Meanwhile, the British awaited fresh provisions and welcomed the arrival of more reinforcements. A second division of Hessians had recently crossed the Atlantic and was at New York City. This force consisted of six Hessian regiments (plus jaegers and artillerists) under the command of Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, and an additional regiment from the German state of Waldeck. On this date, the division left New York City and landed near New Rochelle.

Ambrose Serle witnessed the passage of these troops northward:

“This morning the Hessians… passed in flat-boats up the Eastern River towards the grand army. They were all in high spirits, and rowed along with drums beating, trumpets and fifes sounding, and colors flying in a very gallant order. They made a fine appearance altogether.”

The New York Gazette noted:

“It being a very fine day, the scene was rendered extremely beautiful by the crowds upon the water, [and the Hessians] cheering their military brethren and other spectators on shore, and making the hills resound with trumpets, French horns, drums and fifes, accompanied by the harmony of their voices.”

Among the new arrivals was Captain Johann von Ewald, who commanded the detachment of jaegers. Ewald wrote:

“…early on the morning of the 22nd[,] the flatboats appeared and took in the troops. As soon as the boats, each containing fifty men, had assembled on the western side of the city, the journey toward land was started up the East River. It was very pleasant. On the right we observed the well-cultivated shore of Long Island, and on the left the shore of York Island [i.e., Manhattan]. Everything was new to us and we liked it all.”

“Night overtook us and we continued our journey for several more hours in utter darkness. Since no one knew when or where we would land, we were plagued with boredom and curiosity. But at last we set foot on the coast of the province of New York in the vicinity of New Rochelle…. In the darkness all we could see was that the area was wooded. Dogs were barking nearby, hence we could assume that people must reside in the area.”

“The commanding general ordered the regiments to encamp and light fires… which was carried out promptly… sooner had several fires blazed than we heard cries of chickens, geese, and pigs which our resourceful soldiers had discovered. Within the hour, several roasts hung from long sticks before each fire. The whole camp was as busy as an anthill. From this one can see how easily a good soldier knows his way about.”

Footnote: The exact position of Washington’s divisions from one day to the next is difficult to piece together from the source material. That Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) arrived in White Plains on the 21st is indicated by Rufus Putnam’s memoir, the journal of James McMichael, and the presence of men from this brigade in the action at Mamaroneck. That Heath’s division, followed by the remainder of Spencer’s division, reached White Plains on the morning of the 22nd is indicated by William Heath’s memoir, and Benjamin Trumbull’s journal. That Sullivan’s division reached White Plains on the night of the 22nd is indicated by Heath’s memoir and the journal of David How. At about the same time that Sullivan’s men moved, three companies of Knox’s Artillery marched from a point near Kingsbridge to White Plains. An artillerist in this detachment (Solomon Nash) recorded in his journal, “today about 10 o’clock we struck our tents and set out for White Plains and arrived there about 12 o’clock at night and encamped.”

I don’t have a copy of a journal by an infantryman in Israel Putnam’s division, but the overall pattern of activity in the army strongly suggests that Putnam’s men at least started the move from Manhattan to White Plains on the 22nd and that they completed the move no later than the 23rd.

October 18, 1776 (Part 2)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for the afternoon of October 18th: The British army attacked Glover’s brigade; afterwards they cut one of Washington’s primary supply lines.

Previous entry: Morning of October 18th; next: October 19th.

On the morning of October 18th, the British landed at Pell’s Point and began streaming inland towards New Rochelle and the Boston Post Road. En route, the light infantry received a check from Colonel John Glover’s brigade of Massachusetts Continentals.

The British then halted and Glover anxiously waited for the attack to be renewed. Glover saw in his front “about four thousand [men], with seven pieces of artillery”. He later recalled:

“Oh! the anxiety of mind I was then in for the fate of the day — the lives of seven hundred and fifty men immediately at hazard, and under God their preservation entirely depended on their being well disposed of; besides this, my country, my honour, my own life, and everything that was dear, appeared at that critical moment to be at stake”.

Lieutenant-General William Howe surveyed the scene. He saw “a considerable body appearing in front behind stone walls and in woods”. He then dispatched “some companies of light infantry and a party of chasseurs [jaegers]… to dislodge them”.

Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) wrote that “The 1st Battalion of Light Infantry pushed the rebels from fence to fence”.

Glover’s Continentals were forced to withdraw, but the withdrawal was conducted slowly and skillfully. Glover was with Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment when the British advance began. He wrote:

“we kept our post under cover of the stone wall… till they came within fifty yards of us, [then we] rose up and gave them the whole charge [i.e., volley] of the battalion; they halted and returned the fire with showers of musketry and cannon balls. We exchanged seven rounds at this post, retreated, and formed in the rear of Colonel Shepard and on his left; they then shouted and pushed on till they came on Shepard, posted behind a fine double stone wall; he rose up and fired by grand divisions, by which he kept up a constant fire, and maintained his part till he exchanged seventeen rounds with them”.

When Shepard’s men were forced back, the British pressed against Colonel Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. Baldwin observed, “Our troops were as calm and steady as though expecting a shot at a flock of pigeons, and not in the least daunted or confused.” When the British came within range, he wrote, “We galled the enemy very much”.

Finally, Baldwin’s Regiment was also made to retreat.

According to Glover:

“we retreated to the bottom of the hill, and had to pass through a run of water, (the bridge I had taken up before) and then marched up a hill [on] the opposite side of the creek, where I [had] left my artillery; the ground being rough and much broken I was afraid to risk [bringing] it over. The enemy halted, and played away their artillery at us, and we at them… without any damage on our side, and but very little on theirs.”

Glover’s own 14th Continental Regiment had been left with the guns. The regiment had erected a crude fortification while the rest of the brigade was in action and this gave Glover another strong position to defend.

The cannonade drew more of the British army into the battle, including some of the British grenadiers and Hessian Regiment von Knyphausen.

Captain George Harris (grenadier company, 5th Foot) noted, “The grenadiers did not suffer, being only exposed to the fire of the American batteries, which were very ill served.”

Lieutenant Andreas Wiederholdt (Regiment von Knyphausen) wrote, “The enemy had dug in on the high ground facing us and greeted us with a number of cannon shots, but these had no effect because they flew wide. I skirmished with the enemy and they wounded one of my men, for which I sent one of them into the next world with my rifle.”

Artist Charles Lefferts painted these representations of British soldiers. At left is a light infantryman in the 10th Regiment of Foot (Stirke’s company); at right is a grenadier in the 5th Regiment of Foot (Harris’ company).

Glover’s men blocked the route westward, which led towards the Bronx River and the rear of the American army. However, Howe did not attempt to force Glover from his post. Instead, he kept some men facing the Americans while others were sent to occupy high ground to the east. That night, according to Howe, the men “laid… upon their arms with the left upon a creek opposite to East Chester [i.e., opposite Glover’s position] and the right near to [New] Rochelle.”

Glover had done everything in his power to harass and delay the British army. Now it was time to pull back to a safer position:

“At dark we came off, and marched about three miles… after fighting all day without victuals or drink, laying as a picket all night, the heavens over us and the earth under us, which was all we had, having left our baggage at the old encampment we left in the morning. The next morning [we] marched over to Mile Square. I had eight men killed and thirteen wounded, among which was Colonel Shepard, a brave officer.”

British losses were heavier, but not as heavy as the volume of American fire would suggest. Ensign Stirke claimed there were 34 killed and wounded in the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry. Accounts by others suggest that the total British loss was not much higher.

Situation of the armies on October 18th (click to enlarge). Howe’s army crossed from Throg’s Neck (7) to Pell’s Point, and fought Glover’s brigade on his march inland. By the end of the day, the leading elements of his army were near New Rochelle (8). Meanwhile, Charles Lee prepared to defend Mile Square (9) lest the British attempt to cross the Bronx River and surround the American army.

October 13, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776.Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 13th: The Americans brought reinforcements into Westchester County; the British prepared for their next move.

Previous entry: October 12th; next: October 14th.

Major-General William Heath commanded the American troops in lower Westchester County. He observed that at Throg’s Neck “a large number of vessels, ships, brigs, schooners, sloops… etc.” were at anchor offshore. During the night of October 12-13, “[their] lanthorns were lighted and hung out at their yard arms which made a very extraordinary appearance.”

The Americans suspected the landing on Throg’s Neck was only a feint, and they thought the British might make a new landing elsewhere. Sure enough, the British showed no signs of attempting to force their way overland from Throg’s Neck. Instead, there was only scattered firing between the armies. According to Heath, “Captain Bryant [of Knox’s Artillery Regiment], now and then… saluted the British with a field-piece.”

To prepare against the various possible British moves, the Americans poured reinforcements into Westchester County. Alexander McDougall’s marched into Westchester County from Manhattan, and the brigades of John Glover and John Nixon were sent across the Hudson from New Jersey to Kingsbridge.

Screenshot of a Google Maps satellite view of Throg’s Neck (click to enlarge). The marked sites of the British landing and of Westchester Creek bridge are based on the Charles Blaskowitz map, shown partially below.

Excerpt of a Charles Blaskowitz showing the position of British and American forces on either side of Westchester Creek (click to enlarge). The American positions at the bridge (lower left) and at the head of the creek (upper left) were defended by troops from Colonel Edward Hand’s Pennsylvania brigade, Colonel William Prescott’s 7th Continental Regiment, Colonel Morris Graham’s New York militia regiment, and a couple of pieces of artillery. These troops (among others) were commanded by Major-General William Heath. Only part of the British army is visible. Blaskowitz depicted close to the bridge some companies of British light infantry (the red triangles), the 1st Jäger Company (two green triangles), and a detachment of light dragoons (the red and white square). Near the head of the creek is the 2nd British brigade (5th, 28th, 35th, 49th regiments of foot). The rest of the British army was encamped to the east or southeast.

The Throg’s Neck area is today heavily urbanized. The image below (screenshot using Google Maps) shows that the humble Westchester Creek Bridge has given way to several major traffic arteries.

British Commissary Charles Stedman later criticized Lieutenant-General William Howe for not immediately making another move. He called the landing on Throg’s Neck a “mistake” and said that it “should have been remedied instantly, by pushing along some other route”. The British landing craft were on hand, and the troops were already carrying provisions for this day and the next, but no move was made. Howe explained later that another move “would have been an imprudent measure, as it could not have been executed without much unnecessary risk.” Instead, Howe decided to wait until he was more fully prepared. During this time, he later wrote, “we were employed in getting up stores and provisions” and “the carriages and horses for transporting provisions, artillery, ammunition, and baggage.” More men were on the way as well.

October 12, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 12th: The British army crossed to Throg’s Neck; the Americans prevented the British from advancing far inland.

Previous entry: October 11th; next: October 13th.

During the night, the British army began to cross to Throg’s Neck (also known as Frog’s Point). Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, oversaw part of the crossing. He wrote:

“About three o'clock [on] Saturday morning, the 12th, the troops were embarked in the flat boats and bateaux, to the number of between four and five thousand men; the Guards and 42nd regiment, between fourteen and fifteen hundred men, were embarked on board sloops under my direction. At daybreak in the morning the boats set off, and no sooner had they put off, with an amazing strong tide, but it came on a fog equal to pitch darkness, with now and then an interval of light for a few seconds. The boats were put off; to attempt to stop them would have been very dangerous, for the headmost boats must have anchored, and the boats that followed would in all probability run [a]foul of them, to the imminent danger of sinking each other; the admiral [i.e., Vice Admiral Richard Howe], therefore, rather chose to run the risk of passing Hell Gate with all the boats in that rapid tide and dark fog. I went astern and ordered all the boats to move forward. Soon after their putting off, a galley towing one of the artillery boats, in endeavouring to cross a vessel lying in the passage, towed her athwart hawse; the boat ran directly up her cable, and overset instantly. Many of the people were picked up; there were three field-pieces lost, and I suppose five or six people. There were very few people in the flat boats [that] had ever been through or knew anything of the passage of Hell Gate. This made the danger much the greater.”

Captain George Harris (grenadier company, 5th Regiment of Foot) also had a close call:

“the point of an island… divides the river into two rapid streams, and causes a very dangerous whirlpool…. through the ignorance of our pilot, we were on the edge of the pool… too late to avoid the suction, and found ourselves, circle after circle, attracted to the centre, in spite of all our efforts, till at last the boatmen were on the point of quitting their oars, despairing of escape, when, animated I suppose by the love of life, I began to storm at them for their cowardice, and made them stick to their oars. We at length perceived that we made progress, and emerged from the whirlpool, escaping without other accident than the dislocation of a man's wrist”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton had much praise for Vice Admiral Richard Howe and his fellow Royal Navy officers for getting the army through Hell Gate “almost miraculously” despite the heavy fog and treacherous waters. He added:

“About eight o’clock we arrived off Frog’s Point, where we found a frigate stationed to cover our embarkations. A few rebels made their appearance as we approached the shore; but some scattering shots soon dispersed them, and the landing was effected without loss.”

Two watercourses lay between Throg’s Neck and the American army: Westchester Creek and the Bronx River. Securing the passage over Westchester Creek was especially important as a single bridge over this creek provided the only good route inland. Therefore, according to Clinton, “As soon as the troops could be formed, we pushed for Westchester Bridge in hopes of securing it.”

The area nearest Throg’s Neck was defended by Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade of Pennsylvanians (this included Hand’s own 1st Continental Regiment, Colonel Henry Haller’s Berks County Regiment, and Colonel James Cunningham’s 1st Lancaster County Regiment; see footnote).

Major-General William Heath had previously stationed “25 picked men” from Hand’s brigade to watch over the Westchester Creek bridge at all times, “and, in case the enemy made a landing… to take up the planks of the bridge”.

The men quickly performed their duty, and when the head of the British column appeared, they “commenced a firing with their rifles.”

Clinton lamented: “the enemy had been too quick for us”.

The British then attempted to bypass the wrecked bridge and cross at the head of Westchester Creek. However, according to Heath, they “found here also the Americans in possession of the pass.”

Both sides called up reinforcements.

Situation of the British and American armies on October 12, 1776 (click to enlarge).

Throg's Neck area circa 1781. The map shows the solitary road leading inland from Throg's Neck, which crossed Westchester Creek. Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade had its headquarters at DeLancey's Mills on the Bronx River, but a detachment carefully guarded the Westchester Creek bridge. The town of West Chester was a short distance west of the bridge.

The site of the British landing on October 12th; from a map by Charles Blaskowitz.

Heath stated that “he immediately ordered Colonel Prescott, the hero of Bunker Hill, with his regiment, and Captain-Lieutenant Bryant of the artillery, with a 3 pounder, to reinforce the riflemen at West Chester causeway [i.e., the bridge]; and Colonel Graham of the New-York line, with his [militia] regiment, and Lieutenant Jackson of the artillery, with a 6 pounder, to reinforce at the head of the creek; all of which was promptly done, to the check and disappointment of the enemy.”

Captain-Lieutenant Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) wrote that “the [British] guns were taken forward to the bridge, 16 pieces” but no attempt was made to take either pass by force. Instead, he wrote, “we were ordered to encamp.” He noted that the remainder of the day was punctuated by “popping shots across the water.”

George Washington arrived in person to examine the situation of the British army. He later wrote that Throg’s Neck “is a kind of island” although “the water that surrounds it is fordable at low tide.” However, he was pleased to find that “The grounds from Frog's Point are strong and defensible, being full of stone fences, both along the road and across the adjacent fields, which will render it difficult for artillery, or indeed a large body of foot, to advance in any regular order, except through the main road.” He then ordered fortifications erected to guard the road and the pass at the head of the creek. He noted that “Our men, who are posted on the passes, seemed to be in good spirits”.

These fortifications, according to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, soon made “everything still more unapproachable.” At the same time, the Americans “cannonaded the camp of the 71st Regiment, which lost six killed and three wounded.” He claimed that “If the rebels had accurately aimed their guns, the balls of which flew over English headquarters, they could have annihilated the Guards and the 33rd Regiment in the reserve.”

October 11, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 11th: Friendly fire killed men on the Hudson; Joseph Reed contemplated defeat; Ambrose Serle watched the new offensive get underway.

Previous entry: October 10th; next: October 12th.

The Americans closely watched Hudson’s River for signs of renewed British activity. A vessel was observed coming down the river. Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) noted “she hoisted an uncommon sail,” and Major-General William Heath wrote that she was thought “to be one of the British tenders”.

Henry Hallowell (Hutchinson’s 27th Continental Regiment) remembered: “I was ordered with a party to place ourselves near the shore [with muskets] all loaded to stop [the vessel]… and [we were] just about to fire” when “Knox’s Artillery threw a shot from the fort” at it. In fact, the Americans were firing on their own men – the vessel was one of the few vessels to have escaped the Royal Navy on the 9th.

According to Smith, the shot “killed three men as they was sitting aft and wounded the captain slightly”. Afterwards, the dead men were “landed at the ferry and buried in one grave”. Hallowell called it “a sorrowful sight.”

Colonel Joseph Reed was Washington’s adjutant general. He was shocked by the poor showing of American troops when the British first landed on Manhattan one month earlier (September 15, 1776), and he was convinced that the American army lacked the discipline to defeat the British in battle. Reed also didn’t think the situation was likely to improve. He complained in a letter to his wife:

“To attempt to introduce discipline and subordination into a new army must always be a work of much difficulty, but where the principles of democracy so universally prevail, where so great an equality and so thorough a leveling spirit predominate, either no discipline can be established, or he who attempts it must become odious and detestable…”

Reed previously informed the Continental Congress that he wished to resign from his post, but he was stuck in this position as they had not appointed a replacement.

He told his wife, “I never meant to make arms a profession, my duty to you and my dear children will lead me to pursue that course of life which will contribute most to their and your happiness, for though I would wish to serve my country… I have not the least desire to sacrifice you and them to fame, even if I was sure to attain it.”

He feared that “if France or some other foreign power does not interfere” in this conflict “we shall not be able to stand” against the British “next spring”. But he consoled his wife that if the war were lost, they would not suffer too much for it: “my estate is no object of confiscation, my rank is not so high as to make me an example”.

New York City was devastated by a massive fire on September 21st. Its port was closed, many of its inhabitants had fled, and it was now occupied by hundreds of British soldiers. The remaining citizens attempted to maintain a degree of normalcy. Ambrose Serle (Vice Admiral Richard Howe’s secretary) recorded that he “walked about the town, which begins to fill, and has some of its markets open for meat and vegetables.” He noted disparagingly that “The meat is sweet, but generally lean: the vegetables are mostly good: but both very inferior to those of England; at least, what I have seen.”

In the afternoon Serle saw that the invasion of Westchester County was getting underway:

“all the flat-boats, belonging to the fleet were ordered up the East River in order to effect a landing for the troops… The admiral [Howe] and the other principal officers of the navy went up to conduct the embarkation and debarkation, intended in the morning; so that tomorrow or next day, warm work may be expected.”

He exulted, “May God prosper the king’s arms, and the cause of my country!”

No spies or deserters warned the Americans of the British plans. Nevertheless, the Americans closely watched the shore, and they had an inkling of what was coming. Major-General William Heath observed, “There was a considerable movement among the British boats”.