Guy Carleton vs. Ethan Allen

This is another installment in my ongoing series on the American invasion of Canada in 1775.

Governor Guy Carleton made Montréal his headquarters after the Americans began to invade Canada. The colony’s chief defense was Fort Saint-Jean on the Richelieu, where the bulk of the 7th and 26th regiments was garrisoned. Once that fort was besieged, Carleton placed his hopes in raising a large body of Canadian militia to relieve the fort, or to at least prevent the Americans from making any further inroads into Canada. However, the rebellion of Canadian forces in the Richelieu valley and forays made by Colonel Ethan Allen and Major John Brown dashed Carleton’s hopes. On September 21, 1775, he bemoaned [1] that “A few days ago I had hopes of assembling a corps on the Sorell [i.e., the Richelieu river] and another at La Prairie, either of which might have saved the province for this year, but the friends of rebellion dissipated both by their intrigues and lies” (Allen helped capture Carleton’s agents on the Richelieu, and Brown captured La Prairie; cf. here). He determined, however, to “spin out matters as long as I can in hopes that a good wind may bring us relief” (i.e., until reinforcements should arrive from Boston or Britain).

Guy Carleton

In practice, this meant that Carleton remained holed up in Montréal while awaiting events. Carleton had with him a detachment of the 26th Regiment, some Indian Department officers and [Guy] “Johnson’s rangers,” and a small number of Indians. Montréal was a walled city, but Carleton took little comfort in this as the walls were “extensive and defenceless.” The town’s primary defense was its Canadian and English militia. The upper class of Canadians seemed dependable; already a number of these men were serving with the garrison at Fort Saint-Jean. The lower class, however, were at best ambivalent in their sentiments, and quite a few of the English citizens of Montréal had strong ties to the Thirteen Colonies and preferred the American cause.

Meanwhile, Colonel Ethan Allen was heading his way.

Allen distinguished him by co-leading the successful attack on Fort Ticonderoga. However, he afterwards led a meaningless expedition into Canada that almost got him and his command killed or captured [see events of May 17 and May 18, 1775]. (This misadventure in Canada was a primary reason why Allen was bypassed for the leadership of the Green Mountain Boys, when they organized as a regiment in the Continental Army).

A correspondent for the New York Gazette observed that “Allen is a high flying genius, pursues every scheme on its first impression, without consideration, and much less judgment. It was with the utmost difficulty, and through the greatest entreaty, that [Major] General [Philip] Schuyler permitted him to go with the army, knowing his natural disposition…” [2]

Allen's Route to Longue-Pointe: September 18-24, 1775 (click to enlarge).

On September 18, Allen was at Saint-Denis, and contemplated capturing some British vessels anchored at Sorel. On the 20th he was at Saint-Ours, with, he claimed, 250 newly-raised volunteers. He boasted in a letter to Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery that he would raise hundreds, if not thousands, of men, and join Montgomery's army then besieging Fort Saint-Jean. [3] Soon thereafter, Allen marched to Sorel, but made no attempt to capture the British vessels. Instead, his force turned towards La Prairie. Allen could not pay, or feed, or arm his men, and only about 80 left the Richelieu valley with him. Those that did allegedly “plundered the Houses and Farms of the Gentlemen and Habitants, that had joined the King's Forces” “in every Parish on their Road.” [4]

On September 24, Allen’s party left Longueuil for La Prairie, marching along the stretch of St. Lawrence opposite Montréal. En route, he encountered Major Brown. According to Allen, “Col. Brown proposed that, "provided I would return to Longueuil, and procure some canoes, so as to cross the river St. Lawrence a little north of Montreal, he would cross it a little to the south of the town, with near two hundred men, as he had boats sufficient; and that we could make ourselves masters of Montreal."” [5] Allen quickly agreed, picked up 30 Americans that had been with Brown, and returned to Longueuil. His party crossed the river that night and landed in an area known generally as Longue-Pointe. [6]

Notes:

1. Letter to William Legge, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated September 21, 1775.

2. In Frank Moore (1859). Diary of the American Revolution: From newspapers and original documents.

3. The full contents of Allen's letter can be found here.

4. Here I am quoting a letter by Hector de Cramahé, lieutenant governor of the province of Quebec.

5. From Allen's narrative.

6. As shown in the map, Allen landed in a rural area considerably above the "village" of Longue-Pointe. The landing site was almost certainly within the modern-day Hochelaga-Maisonneuve district of Montréal.

Livingston's War

An American army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler crossed into southern Canada on September 4, 1775, and established a base at L’Île-aux-Noix. The next day, Schuyler wrote an address to the people of Canada, informing them of his intentions and requesting their support. He also sent north Colonel Ethan Allen of Vermont and Major John Brown of Massachusetts.

Allen and Brown soon linked up with a body of pro-American Canadians organized by James Livingston. These men kept watch on the British garrisons at Fort Saint-Jean and Fort Chambly, and awaited the advance of Schuyler’s army. On or about September 11, Allen, however, couldn’t resist the temptation to capture five royal artillerymen [1] travelling between the two forts.

At the time, Livingston was operating with a small party of men on Île Sainte-Thérèse, between Fort Chambly and Fort Saint-Jean. He lamented to Schuyler, “I have begun a war,” because of Allen’s action. Livingston could scarcely provide his volunteers with provisions, arms, or ammunition. No matter. The next day, the British sent out two bateaux from Fort Chambly, one of which allegedly contained 20 armed men, and the other stores for Fort Saint-Jean. As the British neared Île Sainte-Thérèse, Livingston’s men blasted them with musket fire, killing or wounding as many as a dozen men, and sending the dazed survivors fleeing to neighboring Île Sainte-Marie. Both boats were captured.

Not long after, Livingston retired to Pointe-Olivier, downriver from Fort Chambly, and Allen and Brown returned to Schuyler’s camp. Schuyler sent out Allen and Brown a second time in preparation for the Americans final push against Fort Saint-Jean. On September 17, Brown, acting with some Canadian volunteers, intercepted supplies heading for Fort Saint-Jean. The next day, Allen and Livingston captured two British agents at Saint-Denis. Soon after, Allen and Brown occupied key towns on the Saint-Lawrence. Brown took up post at La Prairie, and Allen advanced to Sorel.

Meanwhile, the American army, now led by Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, lay siege to Fort Saint-Jean. While this occurred, Livingston, with a force hovering around 300 men, continued operations on the Richelieu. Livingston’s chief responsibilities were to protect Montgomery’s northern flank and to help stop any breakout attempt from Fort Saint-Jean. The poorly-armed Canadians demanded, and eventually received, two 4-pounder field pieces.

Livingston’s War (click to enlarge). The part of the Richelieu in which Livingston’s Canadians operated during September and October, 1775, is indicated by the blue line (i.e., from Fort Saint-Jean to the parish of Saint-Denis). In mid-September, at least, Livingston’s headquarters was at Pointe-Olivier, near Fort Chambly. The British garrisons at Fort Saint-Jean, Fort Chambly, and Montreal are indicated (cf. Carleton Defends Canada), as is Montgomery’s American army besieging Fort Saint-Jean and Brown’s and Allen’s late September advances to the Saint-Lawrence.

Mostly the Canadians were allowed to act with impunity along the Richelieu. One known exception appears in a letter by Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Mott of Connecticut (Montgomery’s chief engineer). He wrote that:

“On the 3d instant there was a severe engagement between the French Whigs on one side, and the French Tories and Regulars on the other side, at Chambly, about thirteen miles from this place. The Tory party had the advantage, as they fired about fifty cannon-shot on our Whigs, when they had only small arms to defend with. They lost several men on each side. The Whigs maintained their ground.”

In the absence of significant threats, Livingston’s men were able to contribute to the siege of Fort Saint-Jean, and attack Fort Chambly.

First, Livingston’s men erected a breastwork northeast of Fort Saint-Jean on the estate of Moses Hazen. The British attacked this force on October 4 with a heavily armed row galley [2]. The Canadians responded with musket fire and their little 4-pounders. The British eventually withdrew after failing to make any impression on Livingston’s men (according to Mott, they lost “only one man, slightly wounded with a grape-shot”).

Soon thereafter, the Canadians moved their cannon closer to Fort Saint-Jean, and on the 13th they were joined by an American gun section consisting of two 12 pounders. The combined battery sank the British schooner the Royal Savage and inflicted a number of casualties among the garrison.

Canadian artillery.

In mid-October, Livingston was granted permission to attack Fort Chambly. The attack was begun by his men, Major John Brown and around 50 Provincials, a 9-pounder cannon, and Lieutenant Johnston and two privates from Lamb’s Artillery company. The bombardment began on October 17. The next morning, a second 9-pounder joined in the firing. After a day and a half of cannonading (i.e., by midday on the 18th), a small breach was made in the fort’s outer wall. At that point, the 88-man British garrison, consisting chiefly of men from the 7th Foot, agreed to surrender. [3]

Notes:

1. They were Thomas Goone, gunner, and Matthew Bell, John Boetle, Osburn Frederick, and Robert Knox, matrosses, of Captain Jones' s Company, 4th battalion, Royal Artillery

2. According to Major Henry Livingston of the 3rd New York, the galley had one 24-pounder in the bow, and 1 four pounder and some swivel guns on each side.

3. The complete list of men can be found here.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (2)

In early September, 1775, Major-General Philip Schuyler led an American army into southern Canada. It was the first American offensive of the war and the first major test of the new Continental army. The first advances against British-held Fort Saint-Jean met with disappointment (see here and here). On September 17-18, however, the Americans were successful in laying siege to the fort. I describe these events in this post and in another that will follow. For an earlier treatment of this subject, see here.

On September 11, 1775, the Americans were encamped south of Fort Saint-Jean. Their supply line consisted of a flotilla of small vessels operating on the Richelieu River. When a British schooner, the Royal Savage, threatened to disrupt this supply line, the Americans retreated to a more secure base on L'Île-aux-Noix.

On September 14, Schuyler learned that a force of Canadian Volunteers had taken the field under the command of James Livingston. Schuyler dispatched Major John Brown of Massachusetts to support Livingston with about 100 Americans and 34 Canadians. These men circled around Fort Saint-Jean and established a base between the American army and the friendly Canadians.

Meanwhile, hundreds of men had fallen ill in the American camp and were either discharged or sent south to recuperate. Fortunately, reinforcements started arriving at L’Île-aux-Noix, which partially offset the loss in strength. The new troops included a company of the 4th New York Regiment, 100 of Bedel’s Rangers, and 170 Green Mountain Boys.

Schuyler was also ill, and he soon turned over command of the army to Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery. Before he left, the two generals made plans for a new attack on Fort Saint-Jean.

The American plan was to divide into three parts: a) 500 men would circle around the fort, and cut the British supply lines, b) 200 men would establish a base south of the fort, and c) 350 men would defend the Americans’ own supply lines against the Royal Savage.

None of the American vessels was strong enough to confront the Royal Savage directly. Instead, the Schuyler and Montgomery planned on using the row galleys Hancock and Schuyler to fire on the vessel, while “picked men” aboard Liberty, Enterprise, and 10 bateaux would board it. [1]

American Invasion of Canada: September 16, 1775 (click to enlarge). The blue circles in the Richelieu River Valley show the positions of the main American army under Mongtomery at L'Île-aux-Noix, Brown's detachment near Fort Saint-Jean, and Livingston's Canadian forces near Chambly.

Schuyler left the army on September 16, and Montgomery led the attack against Saint-Jean on the following day. The operation faced minimal opposition. [2]

To the northwest, John Brown’s men captured eight wagons bringing supplies to the fort. Brown then threw down the bridge over Rivière Saint-Jean and erected a crude fortification from the wooden beams. Fort Saint-Jean was now in a state of siege, although the garrison did not know it.

Interception. Brown's Americans and Canadians seize a British waggon train and hide the supplies in the nearby woods.

To the south, the American flotilla advanced downstream and found that the Royal Savage was stationed near the fort and out of effective fire range. Hancock and Schuyler advanced a short ways further and fired on the fort and on British bateaux in the river. The British in Fort Saint-Jean replied with howitzer shells, but made no other movement.

Montgomery’s land forces disembarked without incident and reoccupied the abandoned breastworks south of the fort. In the words of Lieutenant John Fassett of the Green Mountain Boys, “We arrived at the breast work before night and found no Molestation, tho’ we expected a battle as much as we expected to get there. The whole army soon came up where we all staid that night and had nothing to cover us but the heavens and it was very cold and they flung Bom[b]s among us [i.e., howitzer shells] and we had a very tedious night of it indeed.”

Notes:

1. Hancock and Schuyler each carried a double-fortified 12-pounder and 12 swivel guns. Enterprise was armed with two 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, and 11 swivel guns. Liberty was armed with two 2-pounders and 10 swivel guns.

2. The British commander, Major Charles Preston, had been abandoned by most of his Indian allies over the past week. Without these men, it was difficult to track (much less stop) American movements in the wilderness surrounding the fort. The Indians left for several reasons, including earlier diplomatic efforts by the Americans and the fact that their Canadian neighbors generally favored the American cause.

New York Regiments of 1775

In 1775, the colony of New York raised four regiments of infantry and one company of artillery. These troops were assigned to the army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, and they participated in the siege of Fort Saint-Jean and the assault on Quebec.

New York had considerable difficulty getting its men into the field, with the result that when the American invasion of Canada was launched, only 5 companies of the 1st New York Regiment were on hand. Many of the troops were awaiting either arms and equipment, or transportation north.

The problems then facing the colony are well-illustrated in a letter by the lieutenant-colonel of the 4th New York, written just 1 week before the invasion got under way.

"I arrived [in Albany] the 26th [of August], finding Captain Henry B. Livingston, with his Company, in a small house in Town. He wants many things, such as shoes, stockings, shirts, underclothes, haversacks, and cash, having advanced all himself that has been paid his men as yet. The day I arrived, came up the following Captains, with their Companies: Captain Herrick, Captain Palmer, Captain Horton, and Captain Mills, all without blankets, excepting Captain David Palmer; many of the men wanting shirts, shoes, stockings, underclothes, and, in short, without any thing fit for a soldier, except a uniform coat; and not more than thirty guns [i.e., muskets], with four Companies, fit for service. They are now on board of the small boats that brought them up, having no place for them to go into, as there is not one tent that I can find for our Battalion, and three Companies without blankets, and none to be had at this place. I do not know how to act or what to do with them; they begin to ask for cash and better lodgings, being much crowded in the small boats in which I am obliged to keep them."

Uniform coats seems to be one of the few items the colony was able to reliably supply to its troops. On June 28, 1775, the New York Provincial Congress ordered the purchase of 712 of each of the following types of short coats: blue broadcloth with crimson facings, light brown coarse broadcloth with blue facings, grey broadcloth with green facings, and dark brown coarse broadcloth with scarlet facings. [see here].

A number of writers have indicated that the above description refers to, in order, the uniforms worn by the four New York regiments. However, in a relatively recent uniform book, Marko Zlatich (1994) wrote that in practice the regiments were clothed as follows: blue faced scarlet (1st New York), blue faced crimson (2nd New York), a variety of coat colors faced green (3rd New York), a variety of coat colors faced blue (4th New York).

Lamb's New York artillery company wore blue coats with buff facings. [see here].

Uniforms of Lamb's Artillery Company (Left) and the 3rd New York (Right) According to Charles Lefferts.

3rd New York Regiment in Miniature. Following Zlatich, I've painted the regiment in a variety of coat colors (blue, brown, and grey) faced green. The miniatures are by Stone Mountain.

Reenactor Units:

• 2nd New York Regiment
• 3rd New York Regiment
• Lamb's Artillery Company

Second Skirmish at Petite-Rivière-du-Nord

An American army, under Major-General Philip Schuyler, advanced into Canada on September 4, 1775. Two days later it made what amounted to a reconnaissance-in-force against British-held Fort Saint-Jean. By September 10, reinforcements increased the size of his army from fewer than 1,000 men to 1,394 effectives. The new arrivals included parts of the 2nd New York and 4th Connecticut regiments, and a small number of cannon. [1]

Schuyler believed himself strong enough to begin siege operations against Fort Saint-Jean. His plan to divide the American force into three parts. One part would consist of infantrymen turned sailors and marines. A second part would consist of infantrymen and the army’s artillery. Together these first two parts would establish a base south of the fort and protect the American supply line. The third part would consist of a detachment of infantry that would circle around the fort and cut the British supply line. Schuyler anticipated that additional men and guns would arrive in the days and weeks ahead, at which point he would be able to begin attacking the fort itself.

Ritzema's Planned Advance (approximate path shown in light blue) and Actual Advance (in dark blue). Click to Enlarge.

Schuyler’s army advanced from L'Île-aux-Noix on the 10th, and landed late in the day at the abandoned “upper breastwork.” Schuyler, who was unwell, gave command of the expedition to Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery. Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema commanded the detachment that was to cut the fort’s supply line.

While the infantry proceeded on land, two American row galleys, the Schuyler and Hancock, proceeded downstream. Each was armed with a 12-pounder cannon and 12 swivel guns. The galleys came under fire as they neared the “lower breastwork” from British forces on land and in the river.

The British commander at Fort Saint-Jean, Major Charles Preston, had anticipated a second American advance. To watch for such a movement, he had dispatched thirty some Canadian gentlemen volunteers and Indian allies under the command of Joseph-Dominique-Emmanuel Le Moyne de Longueuil. This force travelled upstream in two bateaux armed with swivel guns, and halted when it reached the abandoned lower breastwork. There, de Longueuil landed one part of his force, while the others remained in the boats.

Le Moyne de Longueuil

When de Longueuil's men saw the American row galleys, the land forces began a long-range musket fire, and the bateaux fired grape shot from the swivel guns.

According to the one of the Americans, “Our armed boats perceiving the fire on the lake, fired three twelve-pounders, one of which took the enemy' s principal batteau directly in the bow, and tore her from stem to stern; she immediately sunk, with all the men in her, amounting to thirty-five.” [2]

Clearly overmatched, de Longueuil ordered a retreat, and all but six of his land force embarked in the remaining bateau and headed for the fort. The retreating bateau was fired at by the galleys, but the men aboard escaped without injury. The six who remained behind were sieurs Boucherville, de La Bruere, Campion, La Madeleine, and Perthuis, and an Abenaki indian. These men occupied a small house near the lower breastwork and kept watch on American movements.

Meanwhile, Ritzema's detachment set off to make a night march around the fort. Ritzema was in front with a small vanguard. Behind him were 60 men of the 4th Connecticut, followed by 300 men of the 5th Connecticut, and finally 140 men of the 1st New York.

Ritzema had just reached the lower breastwork when the advance fell apart. The 5th Connecticut had been ambushed in the advance on September 6, and the evening gloom promised another attack. These troops panicked when they unexpectedly encountered another group of men in the woods. Soon they, along with most of Ritzema's other men, were in flight for the upper breastwork. The Americans thought that “they had been waylaid by a party of Regulars and Indians” [emphasis in original], but “not a gun had been fired, except one by a man of the detachment.” The men in the woods had been their own comrades. [3]

After some time, Montgomery, Ritzema, and other officers were able to reorganize the men and put them back on the march. However, they had advanced only about 1/4 mile when the Connecticutians panicked a second time after some random shells from Fort Saint-Jean burst in the woods.

After this second retreat, Ritzema was left with less than half of his original force. Ritzema resolutely pressed on, and his men struggled to keep up in the dark, swampy woods. Near midnight, Ritzema, now with only about 50 men, at last reached the lower breastwork. There, the Americans observed a fire had been lit in a small house, and they moved to surround it. Sieurs Boucherville and La Madeleine, who were outside the house, gave the alarm and fled. When the men inside the house ran out the door, they were met with a hail of gunfire. Sieur Perthuis and the Abenaki were killed, Sieur de La Bruere was shot in both arms (but escaped), and Sieur Campion got away unharmed.

Realizing how few men were still with him, Ritzema halted and waited for stragglers to appear. Meanwhile, his men stripped and scalped Sieur Perthuis and beheaded the dead Abenaki. [4] Sometime before 3am, Montgomery cancelled the operation and ordered Ritzema's men back to the upper breastwork.

The next morning [September 11] the senior officers announced, in a council of war, that they favored continuing operations against Saint-Jean. However, word then came that the enemy was on the move. According to one officer: “we saw their armed schooner [the Royal Savage], of one hundred and eighty tons, carrying twelve nine-pounders, coming towards us.” It was a critical moment: the American flotilla was no match for such a vessel. [5]

According to Ritzema, the New York troops “remained in their Ranks & shewed a ready Spirit to proceed,” but the Connecticutians panicked and fled to the bateaux. Ritzema, in a rage, wounded several fleeing men with his sword, and had to be restrained by a doctor from using his pistol, too. He concluded, “This infamous conduct so much dispirited the General that he ordered the whole to embark and to proceed to Isle au Noix.” [6]

Once again, an American movement against Fort Saint-Jean had ended in disappointment.

Montgomery complained bitterly in a letter to his wife:

“…such a set of pusillanimous wretches never were collected. Could I, with decency, leave the army in its present situation, I would not serve an hour longer. I am much afraid the general character of the people has been too justly represented. However, there are some whose spirit I have confidence in; they are taking pains with the men, and they flatter me with hopes of prevailing on them to retrieve their characters.”

He also feared that any chance that the Canadians would rise up en masse to support the Americans was now lost:

“ We were so unfortunate as to have some Canadians witnesses of our disgrace! What they will think of the brave Bostonians [7], I know not! My own feelings tell me they are not likely to put confidence in such friends.”

Notes:

1. I've had some difficulty discerning the exact composition of Schuyler's army on September 10. The following represents my understanding of the organization as of this writing (keep in mind that I'm working with a limited set of sources):

• 1st Connecticut: 2 companies, commanded by captains William Douglass and David Welch. Douglass commanded a row galley; it's possible that all of these men were used to man vessels in the American flotilla.
• 4th Connecticut: A part of the regiment, commanded by Major Samuel Elmore.
• 5th Connecticut: Most or all of the regiment, commanded by Colonel David Waterbury.
• 6th Connecticut: 1 company, commanded by Captain Edward Mott. These men were likely serving the American cannon and/or helping to man the vessels.
• 1st New York: A part of the regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema.
• 2nd New York: A part of the regiment. The officers that I have been able to place with the army at this time are Captain Christopher Yates, Captain Joseph McCracken, and Lieutenant Cornelius Van Slyck.

2. I haven’t been able to find any confirmation of this disaster among Canadian sources. Although the Americans suspected that most or all of the men aboard this vessel were killed or drowned, this is may have been a case of wishful thinking. The men in the boat were thought to have been either Canadian volunteers or British regulars. At the very least, it appears from Canadian sources that no seigneurs died in his incident.

Another mystery (to me) is when exactly this incident took place. One source implies that it occurred immediately before the skirmish on land, while others imply that it took place considerably earlier.

3. Montgomery believed that the men who inadvertently triggered the panic were stragglers. Another source claimed that they were a party guarding the flank of the American column.

4. The mutilation of the dead bodies was done in retaliation for similar acts attributed to the Indians. One American claimed that after the skirmish on the 6th, “they dug up our dead and mangled them in the most shocking manner.” Perthuis may have been wearing a red coat, for he was mistaken for a British regular. An observer wrote, “We stripped the Regular and found a very fine gun and sword--the gun with two Barrels the neatest I ever saw, a fine watch some money, and very neatly dressed.”

5. The Royal Savage had only recently been launched. It was unavailable to contest the American advance on September 6. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Royal Savage actually carried only 3, 4, and 6-pounders.

6. Ritzema was convinced that the Connecticut troops were the chief problem. Montgomery, who was also a citizen of New York, found cause for complaint with the troops as a whole.

7. This is in reference to the Canadian slang word Bostonnais, which literally means person from Boston, but was used in reference to all Americans. It carried roughly the same meaning as Yankee does today to some non-Americans.

An Aside on Research

A few days ago, I posted a description of the first inaugural skirmish in the American invasion of Canada. For good or ill, the post was just a straightforward description of the skirmish itself. I didn't present a long list of sources or explain how and why my account differed from those of others. Because I intend to continue with this style of post for other incidents in the campaign, I feel I should provide a bit of background information.

When researching a project I rely more on online sources than print ones. In particular, I search Google Books, the Internet Archive, and lists of journals. I then make a library of .pdf files and "copy" and "paste" the relevant text into a single electronic document. Below is a listing of the first-hand accounts of the inaugural skirmish in the invasion of Canada. All of these were found in online, out-of-copyright books or Peter Force's American Archives.

• Richard Montgomery, general. Letter dated September 5 (but, when compared to other accounts, probably was not written before September 7).
• Benjamin Trumbull, soldier. Journal entry dated September 6, 1775
• Rudolphus Ritzema, officer. Journal entry dated September 6, 1775
• Philip Schuyler, general. Letter dated September 8, 1775
• Anonymous. Letter dated September 8, 1775
• James Van Rensselaer, officer. Letter dated September 14, 1775
• Anonymous. Letter dated September 16, 1775
• Philip Schuyler, general. Letter dated September 20, 1775
• [Guillaume?] de Lorimier, officer. Memorial dated December 1, 1777
• Guillaume de Lorimier, officer. Undated memoir.

Next, I do a little bit of writing, and try to establish what I want to say. I don't trust (with good reason) this initial take on the material, so I then read (and re-read) everything again. Reading and reflection on the source material gets spread out over months. The final write-up happens in an evening.

The product of these efforts is not exactly serious scholarship, but it's also not exactly inconsequential. My descriptions are grounded in primary sources, but my method of researching events is crude, and my writing lacks polish. Both strengths and weaknesses are in evidence when comparisons are made with typical military histories. By way of an example, consider the following description of this inaugural skirmish in Boatner's Encyclopedia of the American Revolution. Boatner's account is admirable in how he engages the interest of the reader with remarkably economical prose. However, the account also relies on some dubious sources, and my numbers in brackets refer to critical comments that follow.

“When the Americans approached on 5 Sept. [1], the place was defended by 200 regulars, several cannon [2], a small Indian contingent, and the British were building two 60-foot, 12-gun vessels. Maj. Chas. Preston was in command of the post…

“Montgomery’s command comprised about 1,200 men and a few cannon [3]; their advance was made in a small fleet of two sailing vessels (the sloop Enterprise and schooner Liberty), gondolas, bateaux, rowing galleys, piraguas, and canoes [4]. (Ward, W.O.R., 150) Troops involved were most of Waterbury’s Conn. Regt., four companies of Ritzema’s 4th N.Y. [5], and Mott’s small artillery section. (Ibid.)

“Schuyler caught up with his aggressive subordinate the morning of 4 Sept., (surprisingly) approved his action, and that night the invaders were at Ile aux Noix. Although the expected Canadian allies did not appear to reinforce them [6], Schuyler stripped his men of baggage and pushed toward St. Johns. Landing a mile and a half away, the Americans were advancing through the swamps to attack when a flank patrol was ambushed by 100 Indians under the command of a N.Y. Tory (Capt. Tice). A skirmish developed in the dense underbrush; the Indians were driven off, but the Americans lost 16 men and did not pursue. That night a man who was apparently sympathetic to the American cause visited Schuyler’s entrenched camp and convinced him that St. Johns was too strongly held for him to capture.” [7]

Comments:

1. Taken as a whole, the first-hand accounts listed above clearly indicate that the skirmish was on the 6th. The journals maintained by Ritzema and Trumbull are particularly convincing.

2. The British were stronger than stated. Compare, for example, this document, and this one with this rather detailed listing of British troop totals. The British also had considerably more than "several cannon."

3. Schuyler claimed to have had fewer than 1,000 men with him on the 6th. The "few cannon" did not include field pieces. From Ritzema's journal, entry dated September 6: “The General ordered the whole army without one Piece of Artillery, save two twelve Pounders in the Bows of the Gondolas, to embark for St Johns.”

4. Ritzema's journal, quoted above, in combination with this document, indicate that the Liberty and the Enterprise did not accompany this expedition. Rather, the only armed vessels were the Hancock and the Schuyler. Boatner might have noted, but did not, that the British also had the service of a variety of small vessels.

5. Ritzema's command consisted of five (not four) companies of the 1st (not 4th) New York. See this document, and his journal entry for September 4.

6. I have seen no evidence that a rendezvous was planned between Canadian and American forces at L'Île-aux-Noix. Certainly it would’ve been difficult for Canadians to get there in large numbers, as Fort Saint-Jean sat astride the only route. It wasn’t until the 5th that Schuyler announced his arrival in Canada (see here and here) and sent envoys to his Canadian supporters.

7. The man was Moses Hazen (compare this document with this one). Schuyler had long known that the fort was quite strong (see, for example, here), and it was not the cause of the American return to L'Île-aux-Noix. The true causes of the retreat can be found here, here, and in Ritzema's journal.

Skirmish at Petite-Rivière-du-Nord

The American invasion of Canada began on September 4, 1775, when an army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler encamped on L'Île-aux-Noix, in southern Canada. Two days later, this force sets out for Fort Saint-Jean. This advance against Fort Saint-Jean is intended primarily to probe the fort’s defenses and to encourage the support of pro-American Canadians. Schuyler’s force consists primarily of the 5th Connecticut Regiment (commanded by Colonel David Waterbury), a part of the 1st New York Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema), and “Mott’s” artillery company [1]. Mott’s men have no field guns; the only American cannon are two 12-pounders that are placed in the bows of the armed bateaux Hancock and Schuyler.

The Americans travel by boat down the Richelieu River and come within sight of the fort around 2pm. The Americans then make an unopposed landing on the western bank, a little more than 1 mile from the fort. Schuyler, who is sickly, remains on board one of the vessels; Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery is given command of the land troops. Montgomery forms a line of battle and orders an advance northward towards the fort. The ground over which the Americans march is swampy and wooded.

Seeing the American vessels, Major Charles Preston, commandant of Fort Saint-Jean, sends out a scouting party consisting of approximately 90 Indians. Around one-quarter of the men are Six Nations Iroquois, the rest are Canadian Indians, including Kahnawake and Kanesetake Mohawk, and some Hurons [2]. The Indian party is accompanied by Captain Samuel Tice of the Indian Department, and the de Lorimier brothers (Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume and Jean-Claude-Chamilly). This party conceals itself among the trees and sedge on the north bank of the Petite-Rivière-du-Nord, “a deep muddy brook” that feeds into the Richelieu [3].

Petite-Rivière-du-Nord (modern day Rivière Bernier), as recently imaged for Google Maps.

As the Americans advance, a detachment of about 50 men advances somewhat ahead and to the left of the main body. This detachment consists of Major Thomas Hobby’s and Captain Matthew Mead’s companies of the 5th Connecticut. When the detachment reaches the stream, they wade out into the waist-deep water. Suddenly, they are suddenly fired upon by the Indian party. A Kahnawake chief called Sotsichoouane charges into the stream and plunges a lance into one American and a knife into another. He is about to kill a third man when he is brought down by two balls. Captain Tice is also soon wounded. Nevertheless, the Americans reel back before the superior numbers.

The Ambush is Sprung.

The Connecticut troops in the main body are quick to respond. According to one private, “The Army immediately wheeled to the Left in order to Face the Fire of the Enemy, and charged them with great Spirit & Firmness.” The New Yorkers, however, are “little acquainted with wood-fighting” and fail to get into action. Nevertheless, the arrival of the Connecticutians is decisive: the Indian party falls back through the trees under cover of a scattering fire.

Indians losses were between 6 and 8 killed and as many wounded. The Americans had five men killed outright: Privates Patrick Kenney, James Shaw, Caleb Hutchins, Samuel Knap of Hobby’s company, and Corporal Elijah Scribner of Meade’s company. Eleven men were wounded, including three officers: Major Hobby was shot through the thigh, Captain Mead was shot through the shoulder, and Lieutenant Bazaleel Brown (Hobby’s company) was shot in the hand.

The Americans build a breastwork south of the stream. After a while, the British in Fort Saint-Jean open fire with their mortars. According to Montgomery, the men “showed a degree of apprehension that displeased me much” and some flee the breastwork. He therefore orders the men to reembark. After much confusion, his force lands about 1 mile upstream where a second breastwork is constructed. The Americans then settle down for the night.

Operations at Fort Saint-Jean: September 6, 1775 (click to enlarge).

At the new campsite, Schuyler receives an unexpected visitor: retired British officer and local resident Moses Hazen. Hazen provides intelligence to the Americans, and in return, Schuyler promises Hazen that his property will not be stolen or damaged. Hazen claims, perhaps duplicitously, that the British force in the fort is quite strong and that the Canadians will not aid the Americans. This dispiriting news, plus the poor performance of the troops and the lack of cannon, convinces Schuyler to return his force to Isle-aux-Noix the following day (September 7). Three of the wounded men in Mead’s company die during the night (Sergeant John Avery and Privates William McKee and Issac Morehouse), and Lieutenant Benjamin Mills of the 4th Connecticut is wounded by a British shell in the morning [4].

Notes:

1. I haven’t been able to divine the composition of Mott’s Artillery company from the sources I’ve read. A modern-day reenactor unit implies that Mott’s Artillery was made up of Captain Gershom Mott’s company of the 1st New York. However, the journal of Rudolphus Ritzema, which is where the term appears, seems to indicate that Mott’s company remained infantry. Perhaps then Mott’s Artillery consisted of Captain Edward Mott’s company of the 6th Connecticut, which was sent to Schuyler in June, 1775. Another possibility is that this was a unit of Connecticut volunteers commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Mott, who was chief engineer to Schuyler’s Army. In any event, these men were clearly drawn from the infantry, and Schuyler tried to get them additional pay as compensation for the hazardous duty they agreed to perform.

2. Some time ago, when I had read fewer sources, I imagined that this force might have had Abenaki serving with it. I now consider that possibility doubtful.

3. The term “Petite-Rivière-du-Nord” appears next to this stream on several maps from the mid-to-late 18th Century. However, the term does not appear in any of the journals or correspondence that I have read pertaining to operations against Fort Saint-Jean. The Americans, at least, seemed to have regarded it as just another muddy brook. The term also would prove to be of short endurance; since at least the 19th Century this stream has been known as Rivière Bernier.

4. How the Americans should have come under relatively accurate shell fire at both the upper and lower breastworks is an interesting question. The Americans were far from the fort’s walls and screened from view by intervening woods. A British journal notes in an entry for September 17 that Captain-Lieutenant Edward Williams of the Royal Artillery had some pieces of artillery “fixt so as to serve as a Mortar,” which I think means rigging a cannon barrel to fire shells at a mortar-like trajectory. The diary provides little information on such weapons. Perhaps the shells fired at the American breastworks on the 6th and 7th were fired from such guns.

235 Years Ago Today

Today marks the 235th anniversary of the American invasion of Canada. On this day, an American army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler occupied L'Île-aux-Noix in southern Canada. The post would remain in American posession until the summer of 1776. Below are links to clips from the excellent series Canada: A People's History that concern the American invasion of Canada. Unfortunately, the sound is out of sync with the video on these youtube uploads. Still, the production values are quite good and they are worth watching for those that are relatively unfamiliar with this facet of the American Revolution (and what will be a recurring topic over the next few months).

The Montreal Campaign and Benedict Arnold's March on Quebec.

Attack on Quebec.

Screenshots:

British Soldiers at the Siege of Fort Saint-Jean

American Soldiers Blockade Quebec

Carleton Defends Canada

At the time that Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold captured Fort Ticonderoga and raided Saint-Jean in the province of Quebec [cf. Allen and Arnold: 30 Days to Glory], the only British regulars in Quebec were the 7th and 26th regiments of Foot and two companies of the Royal Artillery. These forces, like all British forces in North America, fell under the command of Lieutenant-General Thomas Gage. Gage, however, was preoccupied by events in and around Boston and he issued few orders to Canada. The important local commanders were the governor of the province of Quebec, Guy Carleton, and Lieutenant-Colonel (and acting brigadier-general), Richard Prescott [1].

The British were aware that the Americans were amassing thousands of men and that they might try to invade Canada and make it a “fourteenth colony.” The British could have sent additional regiments to Canada to turn back the American invasion in the early summer, but this did not occur due to the crisis in Boston and the false hope that thousands of Canadians and Native Americans would fight alongside the British regulars. By the time the American invasion got underway, and the British fully realized their peril, it was impossible to send reinforcements due to the slowness of communications and the worsening weather on the North Atlantic and in the Gulf of Saint-Lawrence.

Carleton knew little about American intentions, but he reasoned there were four routes by which the Americans plausibly could gain entry into Canada. The most likely route, he determined, was via the Richelieu River, which flowed north from American-controlled Lake Champlain in the province of New York. Also possible, though considerably more difficult, was that the Americans would attempt to invade via the Saint-François or Chaudière river valleys, or even along the upper Saint-Lawrence via the western frontier. Carleton therefore placed the greater part of his regulars in the Richelieu valley, kept watch over the other routes, and maintained garrisons in the key towns of Montréal and Québec.

Strategic Situation (click to enlarge).

Key:

British forces are in red, Americans in blue. Totals include all ranks. The French language is used for places in the province of Québec.

A: Fort Saint-Jean on the Richelieu: 390 men of the 7th and 26th Foot (Major Charles Preston commanding), and 44 men of the Royal Artillery

B: Fort Chambly on the Richelieu: 114 men of the 7th Foot (Major Joseph Stopford commanding), and 5 men of the Royal Artillery

C: Rivière Saint-François: 35 men of the 7th and 26th Foot The placement of this force on the map is quite approximate.

D: Rivière Chaudière: 26 men of the 7th Foot. The placement of this force on the map is quite approximate.

E: Oswegatchie: 28 men of the 8th Foot, and 1 man of the Royal Artillery. This post was on the upper Saint Lawrence, to the west of the area shown on the map. The remainder of the 8th was divided among several posts further west.

F: Lachine: 14 men of the 26th Foot. These men guarded a store of gunpowder and other supplies.

G: Montréal: 110 men of the 26th Foot (plus Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Prescott), and 4 men of the Royal Artillery.

H: Québec (ville): 59 men of the 7th Foot, and 6 men of the Royal Artillery.

In addition to these numbers, 11 of the regulars were on furlough and 69 men of the 26th Foot and 4 men of the Royal Artillery were prisoners of the Americans.

In September, American forces advanced along two of the four possible invasion routes:

A: The American army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery that invaded Canada via the Richelieu.

B: American force commanded by Colonel Benedict Arnold that invaded Canada via the Chaudière (shown here first advancing along the Kennebec River in modern-day Maine).

Note:

1. At the time of the Saint-Jean raid, and before Prescott’s arrival, the senior officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Templer of the 26th; he was no longer with the army at the time of the above dispositions.

Sources:

I'm working from a number of sources, but the above information on troop totals and location comes primarily from the following document:

Towards a Continental Army

The American people were gradually moving into armed conflict with Great Britain during the early 1770s. In the Spring of 1775, two events turned what had been a slow-burning fuse into an open conflagration. One was the British raid on colonial stores that resulted in the battle of Lexington and Concord. The other was the capture of Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point. A crisis was at hand because the American colonies were ill-prepared for open warfare with Great Britain. The American army that formed in Massachusetts after Lexington and Concord was bereft of the instruments of war, and the garrisons for the newly-captured British forts in New York were grossly lacking in men and provisions.

Neither Massachusetts nor New York was able to solve these crises are their own. Both colonies looked to the Continental Congress to provide direction and support. However, the Congress could not quickly act. No system of government existed beyond those for the individual colonies. Congress, therefore, effectively needed a unanimous consent in order to act on any major issue.

A brief timeline appears below:

May 10: The Second Continental Congress convenes. Also on this date: Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold seize Fort Ticonderoga in New York; news of Lexington and Concord reaches Georgia.

May 15: Congress forms “a committee to consider what posts are necessary to be occupied in the Colony of New-York, and that they be desired to report as speedily as possible.” The members are Virginia’s George Washington, Massachusetts’ Samuel Adams, Thomas Lynch of South Carolina, and the full New York delegation. Adams is one of the conspirators behind the expedition against Fort Ticonderoga [see past blog posts concerning April 25 and April 29, 1775], and he likely briefs the committee on what is afoot.

May 18: Congress receives word that Ticonderoga has fallen and it hears allegations that the British are planning to form an invasion army in Canada. [see past blog post concerning May 18, 1775].

May 26: Congress passes a resolution that reads, in part:

“Hostilities being actually commenced in the Massachusett’s-Bay, by the British troops under the command of General Gage, and the lives of a number of the inhabitants of that Colony destroyed, the town of Boston having not only been long occupied as a garrisoned town in an enemy’s country, but the inhabitants thereof treated with a severity and cruelty not to be justified even towards declared enemies; large re-inforcements too being ordered and soon expected, for the declared purpose of compelling these Colonies to submit to the operation of the said acts; that therefore, for the express purpose of securing and defending these Colonies, and preserving them in safety against all attempts to carry the said acts into execution by force of arms, these Colonies be immediately put into a state of defence.”

May 27: Congress forms “a Committee to consider on ways and means to supply these Colonies with ammunition and military stores,” that consists of George Washington, Samuel Adams, New York’s Philip Schuyler, Connecticut’s Silas Deane, and Pennsylvania’s Thomas Mifflin and Robert Morris.

May 30: Congress receives a letter from Benedict Arnold, who is at Crown Point. He warns that 400 British regulars have assembled at Fort Saint-Jean in southern Canada, and he expects that these men, with the help of Indian forces, will attempt to retake Ticonderoga and Crown Point. Arnold asks for reinforcement and supplies.

Congress begins to provide direction to the war effort. They pass a resolution calling for Connecticut to provide men and New York to provide supplies for the defense of Ticonderoga and Crown Point.

June 3: There is a tacit acceptance of the need for a Continental Army under Congressional supervision and direction, as evidenced by two sources:

1. The secret journal of the Continental Congress records the passing of a resolution “That a committee be appointed for the purpose of borrowing the sum of six thousand pounds… [for] the purchase of gunpowder for the use of the continental army.” [emphasis added].

2. The New York delegates to the Continental Congress send a letter to the New York Provincial Congress, in which they state: “We think it an object of great consequence to know in whom you would wish to vest the command of the Continental Army [emphasis added] in our Province… As General Officers will, in all probability, be shortly appointed by this Congress...”

The reason why discussions about the army are prolonged is revealed in a letter of this date by Silas Deane to his wife: “The Congress, tho' not numerous, are yet a very unwieldly Body, in their very nature, as no motion or resolution can be started or proposed but what must be subject to much canvassing before it will pass with the unanimous approbation of Thirteen Colonies whose situation and circumstances are various. And Unanimity is the basis on which we mean to rise...”

June 9: The secret journal of the Continental Congress records the passing of a resolution calling for New York to convey 5,000 barrels of flour to “the continental army” [emphasis added] in Massachusetts. There is still no consensus on the more difficult questions, including who will lead the army.

June 14: This date will come to be regarded as the birth date of the Continental Army. A committee is formed “to prepare Rules and Regulations for the government of the army.” The committee consists of Washington, Schuyler, Deane, Massachusetts’ Thomas Cushing, and North Carolina’s Joesph Hewes.

Congress also undertakes the raising of troops with the following resolution:

“Resolved, That six companies of expert riflemen be immediately raised in Pennsylvania, two in Maryland, and two in Virginia… That each company, as soon as completed, march and join the army near Boston…

“That the form of the inlistment be in the following words:

“I [blank] have this day voluntarily inlisted myself as a soldier in the American Continental Army [emphasis added] for one year, unless sooner discharged: And I do bind myself to conform in all instances to such rules and regulations, as are or shall be established for the government of the said army.”

One of the Virginia delegates writes, “Col. Washington has been pressed to take the supreme command of the American Troops... and I believe will accept the appointment, though with much reluctance...”

June 15: Congress appoints George Washington “to command all the Continental Forces, raised or to be raised for the defence of American liberty.” He formally accepts this appointment on the 16th.

Sources:

Journal of the proceedings of the congress: held at Philadelphia, May 10, 1775.

Secret journals of the acts and proceedings of Congress, from the first meeting thereof to the dissolution of the Confederation, Vol 1.

Letters of members of the Continental Congress, Vol. 1.

Peter Force's American Archives.

Fort Saint-Jean

War came to Canada soon after the beginning of the American Revolution. On May 17, 1775 (less than 1 month after the inaugural battle at Lexington and Concord), Colonel Benedict Arnold led a raid against British Fort Saint-Jean in southern Quebec, capturing the personnel, boats, and stores located there. Despite this setback, British governor Guy Carleton did not abandon the post. Instead, Fort Saint-Jean was transformed over the summer of 1775 into the most important point of defense for the province of Quebec.

Fort Saint-Jean was situated at a strategic point in the Richelieu-Champlain-Hudson corridor, a traditional invasion route between the American colonies and Canada. Boats launched from Saint-Jean could sail as far south as Skenesborough, deep within the province of New York (cf. New York: May, 1775). However, no large boat could sail north from Saint-Jean because of nearby rapids in the Richelieu River.

The Richelieu River Valley. Fort Saint-Jean is rendered in English on the map as Fort St. John. The upper part of the Richelieu is labelled River Chambly -- a distinction no longer in use. Note that there were two supply routes connecting Fort Saint-Jean to the rest of Canada. Supplies could be sent by water along the Richelieu, or they could be sent overland from La Prairie (near Montréal).

Fort Saint-Jean was originally constructed by the French of earth and wood, but little remained of those fortifications by 1775. Therefore, the British began from scratch, constructing two earthen redoubts along the river, with a wharf between them. This fort was garrisoned by most of the British regulars in Quebec, including the greater part of the 7th and 26th regiments of foot, and a detachment of Royal Artillery. Others serving at the fort included (French) Canadian volunteers and militia, Scottish emigrants, and Native Americans (the Kahnawake Mohawk were nearest).

The new fort and its garrison were first put to the test in early September, 1775, when an American army, led by Major-General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, invaded southern Quebec. These commanders found the fort difficult to approach, for aside from its guns and mortars, much of the surrounding countryside was a vast, flat, swampy woods.

Fort Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). The Americans approached from the south (bottom of the map) via the Richelieu. This map was created by overlaying two early maps of the area on a modern map. The location of the roads and the course of the stream near Hazen's estate are quite approximate. Most difficult to determine was the areas of cleared land (shown on the map in yellow). The approximate dimensions of the cleared area around the redoubts is inferred from several sources. Much less is known about the cleared areas north of the fort; their representation here is speculative. There was likely also some cleared land near Petite-Rivière-du-Nord (at least there was a small house there), but this is not shown for lack of substantive information.

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One of the better descriptions of Fort Saint-Jean appears in the journal of American Major Henry Livingston of the 3rd New York Regiment. He wrote the following (edited to bring the text in line with modern standards for capitalization and punctuation) in an entry dated November 21, 1775:

"The fortress of St. Johns lies near 130 miles north from Ticonderoga on the brink of Lake Champlain and about a quarter of a mile from the first rapid. [Note: Livingston evidently believed that the fort was on an arm of Lake Champlain]. It consists of 2 forts or redoubts near 100 yards asunder. The southern one rather the largest. In this is a brick house containing 2 clever rooms and Lintels back of them-- and a small potash house near it.

"In the north redoubt is a very large white stone house 2 stories high but unfinished within... The forts are about 100 feet wide each way in the inside; and mounted between them, upwards of 30 iron cannon besides brass field pieces (6 pounders) and several mortars.

"The wall is composed altogether of earth, and neatly sodded without, looking as green as the field around it.

"The whole surrounded with a ditch of 7 feet deep and 8 or 9 feet wide--picketed on the interiour side with timbers projecting from under the wall and over the ditch, and a little elevated, with their points made very sharp.

"Between the 2 forts there was a line of pickets placed (or posts) 10 feet high and close together...

"A ditch was also dug deep enough for men to pass unseen thro from one fort to the other, and between the pickets and the lake. Both the pickets and ditch were constructed after we built our eastern battery [i.e., in October, 1775].

"In each redoubt the enemy kept a union [i.e., a flag] displayed.

"It's 2 or 300 yards from the forts to the nearest woods or bushes. In general it's 5 or 600 to the woods--a low plain wet, and covered with excellent grass surrounds the fortress. If there is any elevation of the earth at all, it is where the forts stand.

"The wilderness west of St. Johns is an impassable quagmire--low, wet and covered with timber and brush--and for 7 or 8 miles north [sic, northwest] of the fort we meet with but one sorry log tenement which stood in our grand camp.

"Opposite the forts on the east of the lake the soil is also very wet and low; a perfect howling swamp. There are a considerable number of large hemloc trees [that] grow on this side and plenty of the balm-of-Gilead firs. North east of St. Johns at the distance of about a mile stands a large elegant house belonging to one Captain Hasen [i.e., Moses Hazen] with a considerable quantity of cleared ground around it. The captain has a saw mill standing on the rapids which are just by his house. These rapids are not so great but what rafts of boards and timber can at any time go down them and so into the River St. Lawrence. Our people frequently sent battoes down with cannon in them--and empty ones can be drawn up against the current.

"The fall is perhaps 100 yards in length. The breadth of the lake here as at St. Johns [is] between 3 and 400 yards.

"On the west side of the lake, from St. Johns northward there are settlements all the way to Chamblee [Chambly]; a house or two being in sight of the fort."