Ramsour’s Mill: 19th Century Reminiscences and Lore

Joseph Graham’s description of the battle of Ramsour’s Mill is detailed and clear (cf. parts 1, 2, 3, 4), but that does not mean that it’s entirely correct. Graham’s sources were imperfect, and his memory was not infallible. Graham claimed that 8 or 10 veterans of the battle vouched for his description of the battle, but these were old men whose memories were likely clear chiefly for those things they individually saw and did, not the totality of the battle. Would they have known if there were errors in Graham’s account? Even if they suspected errors, would they have been confident enough in their recollection to contradict him?

For these reasons it’s worth considering other sources of information. Available sources on Ramsour's Mill include pension applications, an interview conducted with a participant of the battle, and local lore collected by historians.

Pension Applications:

I have relied on pension applications in making sense of other battles that I’ve written about to date, knowing full well that they were submitted long after the events of the Revolutionary War and that some are quite untrustworthy. Most of the transcribed applications that I’ve read concerning Ramsour’s Mill provide few details of the battle, but some are noteworthy. A sampling appears below.

The widow of John Dickey claimed that her husband, “served as Captain of a Company under Col Locke in the Battle of Ramsours Mill. That he courageously led on the attack in that battle. That when a retreat was ordered by the Commander in that battle the said Captain Dickey refused to quit his post bravely fighting Sword in hand until the line which was broken and driven back was restored and the Battle gained.” [See transcription by C. Leon Harris]. [hat tip to Burton for emailing me about Dickey's role in the battle].

John Hargrave claimed that “in June of the year '80 he again volunteered under one Capt. Thomas Hemphill & Col. Francis Lock, for the purpose of fighting the Tories who were very numerous. That having got together about 400 they heard that the Tories had taken Maj. (then) Edward Hampton & John Russell Lieut. & had condemned them to be hanged, but that they, having determined to rescue them, met the Tories 1400 or 1500 in number at a place called Ramsour's Mill & defeating them took all their baggage & made something like 100 of them prisoners as well as he recollects.” [See transcription by Will Graves].

Captain Samuel Otterson was with the troops under Brigadier-General Griffith Rutherford and Colonel Thomas Sumter that arrived after the battle ended. He recalled, “we marched toward the house of a celebrated Tory by the name of Ramsour for the purpose of defeating some Tories who had encamped at Ramsour's mill, but before we arrived, the Militia from Rowan, N. Carolina had defeated the Tories & we turned our horses into a large field of oats belonging to Ramsour & the oats were just ripening.” [see transcription by Will Graves].

Interview with Adam Reep:

Long after the battle, Adam Reep, a man who lived near the battlefield and claimed to have participated in the fighting, was interviewed by Wallace Reinhardt, the grandson of Christian Reinhardt, the man who owned the land on which the greater part of the fighting took place. Reep’s description of the battlefield and of the fighting was used to create an important map, that served as the basis for my miniature battlefield. (Reinhardt later published an account of the battle; this is not available online).

Reep’s account differed from Graham’s in important ways. Reep claimed that he met the Whig militia, led by Francis Locke, east of the battlefield, and that he provided them important intelligence about enemy strength, position, and intentions. Locke then asked Reep to guide his forces forward. Whereas Graham seemingly described all of Locke’s forces approaching along a single route, Reep claimed that there was a division of forces. Locke’s orders were that:

“Captain Falls will continue on this road, as it runs across the hill to the Mill, and move up to within three or four hundred yards of the enemy (who were on top of the hill), halt, and wait until the main body is near enough to commence the attack from the south side. Captain Dobson will march over towards the creek and into Green’s road (a road laid off by an English surveyor of that name) and will attack the enemy from that direction. Not a gun is to be fired until all are ready; the attack must be simultaneous.”

His map of the battlefield shows Captain Falls and the cavalry advancing down the Sherrill's Ford Road, and the main body, under Locke, swinging off to the southwest in order to gain the Tuckaseegee Ford Road.

According to Graham, Locke’s infantry formed a line opposite the Tories’ center, but the “Reep” map indicates that they instead formed a line opposite the Tories’ flank.

Graham's and Reep's Versions of the Opening Attack at Ramsour's Mill. Water courses are shown in blue, roads are brown, and the outline of a ridge is shown in grey. The Tory line is shown in red, the approach of the Whig horsemen is shown as a light blue arrow, and the approach of the Whig infantry is shown as a dark blue arrow. A = Ramsour's Mill on Clark's Creek, B = Green's Road, C = Tuckaseegee Ford Road, D = Sherrill's Ford Road.

There are, however, also similarities in the two accounts. In both cases, the Whigs initially drove the Tories up the hill, only to be driven back in turn. In both cases, the Whigs eventually gained the crest of the ridge and drove back the left flank of the Tory line. In both cases, the Tories were forced to flee across the bridge spanning Clark’s Creek.

Like Graham, Reep remembered especially vividly the nightmarish condition of the battlefield once the smoke cleared:

“The scene upon the battlefield was indescribable—dead men here and there, broken skulls, a few were seen with gun-locks sunk into their heads; disabled men moving about seeking help, men with shattered shoulders, broken arms and legs, while others were breathing their last breath. Shortly after the battle many women, children and old men came hunting for their loved ones.”

Local Lore:

A compendium of local lore about the battle was collected and published by E. G. Rockwell of Davidson College, in The Historical Magazine... (July, 1867, pages 24-27). Rockwell claimed that his account was “for the most part in the words of the different narrators, from whom the traditions have been taken down.”

There are some notable similarities between Rockwell's account and Graham's. In both cases, on the eve of battle, Francis Locke and his officers decided, after some debate, to attack the numerically superior force of Tories at Ramsour's Mill and sent word to Griffith Rutherford's nearby force of their intentions (see Ramsour's Mill: Joseph Graham's Timeline). For the most part, however, the accounts differ greatly.

According to Rockwell, Locke's infantry “divided into two equal bodies; the first was to advance and fire, then retreat, and form in the rear of the second, in the mean time to load as they retired; the second division was to advance and fire, retreat and in like manner, form in the rear, and load; thus to draw the enemy on, till Rutherford came up with the main body of the army.
This was the plan of attack, with the clear understanding that each was to watch the other’s motions, and act in concert. The arrangement being thus made and understood, the attack was made about sun-rise, while the Tories were engaged in preparing their breakfast; and so complete was the surprise that they found themselves falling by the balls of their enemies almost as soon as they discovered them.”

Graham also described the Whig infantry advancing in two successive lines, but he implied that the two lines had merely become separated during the chaotic opening attack.

Rockwell attributed the American victory in large part to the coordinated movements of these two lines, and to the heroic actions of a lone horseman:

“The first division, after firing, retreated, opening to the right and left from the centre, for the second to advance, fire, and retreat in the same way. The enemy, not withstanding their surprise, attempted to form a line; but a Whig of more courage than prudence, rode up, seized their colors and rode off with them unhurt amidst a shower of balls. Having now no rallying point, their consternation increased; and the quick succession of destructive fires, kept up by the assailants, rendered their confusion complete. The Whigs not only stood their ground, but advanced, after a few rounds, upon the enemy’s camp; and in a short time obtained a complete victory, taking possession of the camp before General Rutherford arrived with the main body of the army...”

By comparison, in Graham's account the American victory was due chiefly to the Whigs gaining the flanks of the Tory line. There is some recognition of this happening in Rockwell's account, but Graham's heroic Captain Hardin was replaced by one Captain Reed.

“Capt. Reed was ordered to take his men and flank the Tories: in doing so he had to cross a bottom and a branch, and pass through some underbrush. As he emerged in view of the enemy, a man rushed out towards him, and got behind a tree, watching an opportunity to shoot him. But being a good marksman Reed kept his eye on the tree, and seeing the shoulder of the Tory not entirely covered, he took a rifle from one of his men, and shot him through the part exposed. After the close of the battle he went among the wounded, and finding one shot through the shoulder, on inquiry as to the way he received his wound, he found him to be the man he had shot, and dressed the wound for him.”

Sumter’s Brigade Reforms

Sumter’s brigade was broken by the battle of Fishing Creek (August 18, 1780). According to one participant, "the troops dispersed in every direction each taking care of himself." Sumter, on horseback, headed north. On August 19, he reached William Bratton’s house, near Williamson’s Plantation. From there, a handful of men saw him safely across the North Carolina border. He rode alone into Charlotte on August 20 [1].

Fishing Creek and Camden returned British control over northern South Carolina to the same state that it had been in June, before Sumter took the field. So unsafe was it in this area that "orders were then given out that there should be no assembling of companies even of a few men." However, Sumter's defeat also did not end the broader resistance to the British occupation of South Carolina. During Sumter’s campaign, South Carolina partisans organized in the western part of the state under James Williams and in the eastern part of the state under Francis Marion [2].

In North Carolina, now exposed to British invasion, a debate began over whether the conflict should be continued. Joseph Graham recalled that "several aged and respectable citizens insinuated that further resistance would… only produce more certain destruction to themselves and [their] families… But this was indignantly repelled by a great majority, and especially those who had been in action at Hanging Rock. Several of them stated that they then had seen the British soldiers run like sheep, and many of them bite the dust; that they were by no means invincible; that under suitable commanders and proper arrangements, they would at any time risk a conflict with them, man to man" [3].

Although Sumter bore ultimate responsibility for the debacle at Fishing Creek, he does not seem to have lost the esteem of those that had fought under him. It seems to have been generally understood that the defeat stemmed largely from some rather exceptional circumstances. According to Colonel Richard Winn (at the time recuperating from the wound he received at Hanging Rock), the most important factor was "the inattention of his patrols and rear guard Commanded by Major Crofford." Tarleton agreed: Although Sumter "had sent patrols to examine the road... fortunately for the British, they had not proceeded far enough to discover their approach." Indeed, the two Loyalist women that told Tarleton how to gain Sumter’s flank met the British commander just ½ mile in front of the American rear guard [4].

As Summer turned to Fall, Sumter's brigade reformed and returned to the field. Among the returnees was John Murphey, who had lived in the neighborhood of Fishing Creek, and was captured at the battle there. In early September he was released from the Camden jail upon making the following pledge:

"I John Murphy of Fishing Creek acknowledge myself a prisoner on parole to a detachment of his Majesty's troops under the command of the right Honorable Lieutenant General Earl of Cornwallis and I do promise that I will not act directly or indirectly against his Majesty's Government nor stir up others so to do, that I will not speak or say anything that shall be prejudicial to his Majesty's interest and will confine myself to my own plantation not exceeding one mile from thence until further enlarged."

However, Sumter "persuaded him that no good man and patriot would be bound by such a promise," upon which Murphey "tore up his parole and joined General Sumter" [5].

Notes:

1. The pension application of Samuel Watson, transcribed by Susan K. Zimmerman and R. Neil Vance. The pension application of George McLain, transcribed by Will Graves. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract].

2. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

3. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

4. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. "Major Crofford" is very probably Major Robert Crawford of South Carolina. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

5. The pension application of John Murphey, transcribed by Will Graves.

Battle of Fishing Creek 5

Part 5: A Scene of Horror

Previous: Sumter's Defeat

Return to the Battlefield

The greater part of Sumter’s forces fled the Fishing Creek battlefield to the south, over the ford at the river road. As there was no safety in this direction, the Americans scattered. South Carolina militiaman James Collins lingered with some of his comrades near the scene of the fighting because some of his neighbors were missing. He remembered hearing, "little firing, except the pistols of the enemy," and then "all seemed to be silent." These men remained hidden while Tarleton brought off a large party of prisoners, the Americans’ guns, and all of their baggage. Late in the day, he recalled:

"a few blasts of the bugle brought some of our men in sight, who in their hurry had missed the fording place, and had gone up the creek where they found it difficult to pass, and were looking for our trail. Near sunset, a few more came up, but there were still some missing, of whom we could hear nothing. We then left the road, keeping a high, open ridge and went off some distance; night coming on, we dismounted in the woods and tied our horses; we had nothing for man or beast to eat, and the weather being warm, (August,) we kindled no fires. We lay down, every man with his sword by his side, his gun in his hands, and his pistol near his head. All were silent, for we expected the whole army had been taken prisoners, or put to the sword."

In the morning, Collins’ men cautiously approached the battlefield. Five of the men in his company were still missing. The men were also in need of food and water. At the battlefield they encountered some of Sumter’s men on a similar mission. Collins remembered that:

"The dead and wounded lay stretched cold and lifeless; some were yet straggling in the agonies of death, while here and there, lay others, faint with the loss of blood, almost famished for water, and begging for assistance. The scene before me, I could not reconcile to my feelings, and I again began to repent that I had ever taken any part in the matter [i.e., gone to war]; however, by custom, such things become familiar. We commenced our search and soon found two of our own party, one named Enloe, and the other Jackson, some distance apart, both setting up, unable to walk without assistance, and mangled by the sword. The other three we could not find among the living or the dead; what their fate was, we never knew, for we never heard of them afterwards. One was a lieutenant named Bryan, one of our most active men. We collected all the wounded we could; but poor fellows, we had little nourishment to give them; they all craved water, and even the little they received, seemed to revive them. We then began to look out [for] some provisions, for ourselves and horses; we found corn lying about in many places, that had not been consumed the day before, and there were several kettles setting about, where the fire had been kindled, with provisions already cooked—and provisions scattered about on the ground in various places. There was no time for choosing, and every man ate whatever he got hold of, asking no questions; then, taking a glass of cold water, we all felt somewhat braced up. There were horses grazing about the old field, that appeared to be nearly worn out, some with bridles and saddles on, others without."

Later, according to Collins: "After giving what help we could in burying the dead, in haste,--poor fellows it was badly done,--we caught two of the best looking horses we could find, and placing our two wounded men upon them, and supporting them as well as we could, we moved off, taking with us no plunder, (or very little) of what was considered of right to belong to Sumter’s men, being the property of their companions who had fallen… We got to a house, a few miles distant, where we obtained nourishment for the wounded, and finding an old horse-cart, we placed them in it, and next day, got them to their home, where they both recovered, but not without being much disfigured by their wounds" [1].

Prisoners’ Fates

Tarleton brought off 252 prisoners from the battlefield, including 72 Continentals. Their treatment was harsh. According to one, "they were not allowed a draft of water or a mouthful to eat for two days." In the baking heat they were marched down to Camden [2]. From there, some of the militia were placed in the Camden jail. The remainder was brought down to Charleston. Some escaped, but most suffered until they were eventually exchanged or released.

Samuel Eakins of the North Carolina militia was one that had the opportunity to escape. He was detained in Camden to assist American prisoners that had been wounded in the battle of Camden. One night he set off on what he claimed became a 3-week, 300 mile journey home. He walked, "mostly in the night being fearful of the Tories without a hat on his head or a shoe to his feet and not a penny in his pocket entirely dependent upon the charity of the Whigs whenever he fell in with them – he was frequently in a state of starvation – words cannot express the sufferings that [he] underwent in this journey" [3].

Benjamin Burch of the 6th Maryland Regiment was also "fortunate" in that he was exchanged the following year and deposited in Virginia. There, in a "state of nakedness and destitution," "without hat, coat, jacket, stockings or shoes – with only an old and broken shirt and a pair of tattered and worn out short-breeches… he literally begged his way home to Prince George County" [4].

Notes:

1. James Collins (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier. A transcription appears in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

2. British Legion prisoners taken at Catawba Fords. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

3. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves.

4. The pension application of Benjamin Burch, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

Battle of Fishing Creek 4

Part 4: Sumter's Defeat

Previous: To Fishing Creek

Next: A Scene of Horror

Across Fishing Creek

The Americans slaughtered cattle and feasted on beef, roasted ears of corn, and freshly picked peaches. Some men napped, while others shaved or washed their clothes. Men and women living in the neighborhood came out to greet and encourage the soldiers. The American guards detected no danger. The situation in the American camp was idyllic. Yet at that moment, Tarleton’s 160 men were quickly bearing down on the Americans along the byway [1].

The first Americans to see Tarleton’s men were two vedettes. These men stepped out of the bushes and fired, killing one of the five dragoons in the British vanguard. The remaining dragoons killed the vedettes with their sabers and headed towards the creek. Responsibility for guarding the ford by which the byway crossed Fishing Creek had been left to one Captain Thompson. Thompson, however, had left his post and the ford was now unguarded [2].

Among the Americans to see the British vanguard and live to tell of it were John Williams and John Dobbins of the North Carolina militia. These two men and others were collecting peaches in an orchard near Fishing Creek. Fortunately for them, the four remaining dragoons either did not see them, or took no notice of them. The incredulous Americans offered no resistance and swam to safety across the Catawba River [3].

Finally, the dragoons ascended a height from which the main American body was in view. The dragoons crouched upon their horses and waving for their comrades to come on. Tarleton sped ahead and when he reached the height he was amazed to see "the front of the American camp, perfectly quiet, and not the least alarmed by the fire of the vedettes" [4].

The Americans’ had been using rifles to slaughter cattle; although the vedette’s two shots had been heard in camp, they elicited no special notice [5].

Stealthily, Tarleton’s "cavalry and infantry were formed into one line," just out of the Americans’ view. Then, "giving a general shout," the British charged [6].

The Fishing Creek Battlefield. Fishing Creek is the winding stream at left; the Catawba River is at right. The large blue circle shows the approximate position of the main American body on the river road. The smaller blue circle shows the rear guard. The red arrow depicts Tarleton's charge [7]. The main road (brown line) is based on the modern-day Catawba River Road. The byway is not depicted.

Fishing Creek Area. Part of the Fishing Creek battlefield has been flooded by damming on the Catawba River. This excerpt from Mills' 1825 atlas of South Carolina was used to roughly locate the original banks of the Catawba River in the above battlefield map. Islands shown in the 1825 atlas were not included in the battlefield map. Note that Mills' map designates the "Battle of F. C."

"A Perfect Rout"

The dragoons rushed the American encampment, with sabers gleaming brightly in the sunlight. The British infantry came streaming after, charging through the dragoons’ dusty wake.

Tarleton Forms His Line. Infantry and dragoons form a single-rank line of battle. According to Tarleton, most of his infantry came from the corps of light infantry that fought at Camden. Shown are light infantrymen from the 71st Foot and 16th Foot, as well as a soldier of the British Legion infantry. As per usual, the figure to participant ratio is 1:20.

Tarleton described the battle that followed in prosaic terms: "The arms and artillery of the Continentals were secured before the men could be assembled: Universal consternation immediately ensued throughout the camp; some opposition was, however, made from behind the wagons, in front of the militia. The numbers, and extensive encampment of the enemy, occasioned several conflicts before the action was decided" [8].

Young James Collins, who had only recently joined Sumter, recalled that "Before Sumter could wake up his men and form, the enemy were among them cutting down everything in their way" [9].

According to one account, Sumter was sitting next to a wagon and was halfway through a shave when the British attacked. "When the colonel saw the state of things around, he cut a rope with which a horse was tied to a wagon, dropped his razor, mounted the horse and made his escape without saddle or bridle" [10].

At least one knot of resistance developed where the wagons were interposed between the dragoons and the militia. Here, some South Carolinians briefly rallied around Colonel William Bratton before being driven off. Then, according to Collins, the main part of Sumter’s force "retreated across the creek at the main road, leaving the remainder to the mercy of the enemy." Collins was with “the greater part of our number [who] dashed through the creek, at the fording place." These men were desperate "to secure our own safety… and pushing on with all possible speed, reached the highland." He called this "a perfect rout." The fate of those left behind was "an indiscriminate slaughter" [11].

Sumter's Defeat (click to enlarge). British dragoons and infantry overrun unarmed American Continentals at upper right, while a tenuous resistance is made by Carolina militia at lower left.

Tarleton also described the fighting as a "slaughter." According to one militiaman, the British were incensed at the deaths of a sergeant of the Legion dragoons and a captain of the light infantry. "The British officers had great spite at the militia, but ordered that the regulars [Continentals] should have quarters" [12].

The sight of so many enemy soldiers may also have been terrifying to the British, even though they had the upper hand. Relief came when the British found and released the Americans’ prisoners. These men picked up guns (which littered the ground) and joined their comrades. When this reinforcement arrived, the killing stopped [13].

Reinforcement. British prisoners, once released, picked up arms and joined their comrades. Shown here are soldiers of the 33rd and 71st regiments, who were captured on August 15.

By this time, the battleground was covered with scores of dead and grievously wounded Americans, both Continentals and militia. Tarleton claimed that 150 had been struck down, and the total American loss (including unwounded prisoners) was around 300. As for himself, he lost a mere 6 infantrymen, 9 dragoons, and 20 horses [14].

Notes:

In some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the quoted source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of David McCance, transcribed by Will Graves. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

2. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of John Henderson, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves.

4. Tarleton, ibid.

5. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

6. Tarleton, ibid.

7. Saye, ibid. has the British attacking along a relatively unguarded byway. Tarleton, ibid., claimed that the first thing he saw was "the front of the American camp" -- not the rear guard. James Collins in his (1859) Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier, claimed that the Americans "retreated across the creek at the main road," which is at the bottom of the map. This statement implies that the British were attacking from a different direction. Collins also recorded that "the rear guard consisting of militia were posted at the Creek." David McCance, ibid. claimed that "the rear guard was ordered to remain one mile behind" the main body, which is consistent with Collins' statement and Mills' placement of the battlefield. However, McCance also claimed that the rear guard "was taken," which seemingly is contradicted by Tarleton, Saye, and Collins (at least when the three are read together). Militiaman George Cunningham claimed that he was one of those "standing guard," but he was not captured. (see the pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves).

8. Tarleton, ibid.

9. Collins, ibid. A transcription appears in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

10. Saye, ibid.

11. Saye, ibid. Collins, ibid.

12. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

13. Tarleton, ibid.

14. Tarleton, ibid. British Legion killed and wounded at Catawba Fords. British Legion prisoners taken at Catawba Fords. The pension application of George Neely, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Patton, transcribed by Will Graves.

Battle of Fishing Creek 3

Part 3: To Fishing Creek

Previous: Cary's Fort and Camden

Next: Sumter's Defeat

Sumter’s Retreat

On August 16, 1780, the men of Thomas Sumter’s brigade could hear the distant sound of cannon fire from the battle of Camden, and anxiously awaited word of the result. That evening, three or four riders appeared bearing news of the American defeat; they also conveyed orders from Major-General Horatio Gates for Sumter to retreat to a place of safety [1].

Sumter had held onto a toehold of South Carolina since late June, and although his men had galled the British at Williamson’s Plantation, he had been left undisturbed because of "the intense heat of the summer," because British offensive preparations were then incomplete, and because he did not yet register as a serious threat. After the attacks on Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock, Sumter was seen as truly dangerous, but the American offensive under Gates prohibited the British from launching a sustained retaliatory campaign. Now, Gates' army was destroyed, and Sumter’s protection was gone [2].

Sumter well appreciated the new strategic situation, and wasted no time in seeking the relative safety of the North Carolina border. That night his men marched north along the western bank of the Wateree [3]. This night march was not as rapid as the one he made before the battles of Rocky Mount or Hanging Rock. On those occasions his force was mounted; now he was responsible for hundreds of men (the force lent by Gates and his British prisoners) who would travel by foot.

Sumter pushed his men again the following day (August 17), and got his force by nightfall to Rocky Mount, some 25 miles from Camden, and on the edge of his former sphere of operations. At dawn on August 18, Sumter burned the post at Rocky Mount (which had been abandoned by the British some days earlier) and headed north again [4].

By this time, Sumter had picked an unlooked-for reinforcement. A band of mounted militia led by Captain John Moffett met him on the road, which was fleeing from a different danger: a growing Loyalist militia presence in the western part of the state. On the morning of the 18th, Sumter’s men also met up with several Maryland Continentals who had journeyed from the Camden battlefield. These men included privates John Housley and Benjamin Burch of the 6th Maryland Regiment, which had been in the very center of the fighting. Housley had made the grueling journey despite a flesh wound [5].

By midday, Sumter’s force had made another 8 miles, and was on a ridge a short distance north of Fishing Creek. Both he and his men were exhausted and at least one wagon had broken down. He ordered a rest. Sumter had previously posted a lookout at the ford over the Catawba at Rocky Mount, and he now placed a patrol on the road south of Fishing Creek, and a strong guard at the ford across Fishing Creek. Vedettes kept watch over other approaches to the American position [6]. After issuing these orders, Sumter partly undressed and napped under a wagon [7].

Tarleton’s Mission

Soon after the battle of Camden ended, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis plotted the destruction of Sumter’s brigade. Cornwallis had two forces that were capable of catching Sumter. On the far side of the wide Wateree, Major Patrick Ferguson and Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull commanded a force of Provincials and Loyalist militia collected from Rocky Mount and other points in western South Carolina. This force was not as numerous as Sumter’s brigade, but they were well positioned to cut off his retreat. On the near side of the river, he had Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, a great driver of men. It was hoped that the two forces would act in concert, and orders were issued to both commands [8].

Tarleton set off early on the 17th with his British Legion dragoons, a 3-pounder cannon, and a number of infantry. By nightfall, he had reached the Catawba/Wateree near Rocky Mount. At that moment, Sumter’s men were on the other side of the river [9].

At dawn on the 18th, some of the British sentries reported that the Americans were pulling out. Fearing a ruse, Tarleton ordered Captain Charles Campbell to take a small party across the river to assess the situation. Campbell’s party captured the lookout the Americans had left at Rocky Mount, and confirmed that the Americans had departed. When Tarleton saw Campbell waving a white handkerchief from the top of the height, the British set off with the cannon and the light infantry in several boats, while the horses (with riders) first waded out into the river and then swam across the deepest part [10].

Tarleton was unable to make contact with Ferguson and Turnbull, and so would be forced to go it alone at this point. Tarleton marched his men up the river road, following the clear tracks left by Sumter’s men. Then: a remarkable stroke of fortune. Two Loyalist women met him on the road, who claimed that Sumter’s men had halted. The women described the Americans’ position and a byway that led to their flank. Losing no time, Tarleton left behind his cannon and those men unable to make a rapid march. He then pressed on with about 100 dragoons and 60 infantry. Leading the way was a vanguard of one sergeant and four privates of the British Legion dragoons [11].

Sumter's Retreat and Tarleton's Pursuit (click to enlarge). Approximate paths taken by Sumter's brigade (in blue) and Tarleton's command (in red) before the battle of Fishing Creek.

Notes:

1. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 20, 1780.

3. The pension application of Jonas Clark, transcribed by Will Graves.

4. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of William McGarity, transcribed by Will Graves. The distance is based on a straight line from Rocky Creek to Camden town.

5. James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier. The pension application of John Housley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Benjamin Burch, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. At Camden, the 6th Maryland on the left flank of the 2nd Maryland Brigade (see Otho Holland Williams, A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780), where it was engaged with portions of at least three different regiments: The Volunteers of Ireland, the 33rd Foot, and the 71st Foot.

6. As noted previously, Thomas Sumter has been criticized for some of the military decisions that he made in the course of this campaign. The strongest criticisms have been made regarding his defenses (or lack thereof) at the battle of Fishing Creek. On this point, the present account of the battle differs substantially from others. The meme that Sumter was a careless commander received a large boost from William Davie, who wrote that Sumter “strangely neglected the necessary precautions to prevent a surprise… the whole security of the army rested upon two vedettes.” But Davie was not present, and he obtained his information largely from Tarleton’s memoir rather than from the remembrances of American participants. American accounts, in particular those recorded by James Saye and James Collins, point to a very different conclusion: that Tarleton surprised the Americans because he crossed Fishing Creek at an obscure (though still guarded) ford, and in this way suddenly gained the Americans’ flank. This interpretation of course does not completely exonerate Sumter, but it does further suggest that he was a much abler commander than some historians believe.

For Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Saye's account can be found in this extract from his Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot. For Collins' account, see the transcription appearing in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

7. Tarleton, ibid. Davie, ibid. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. According to the pension application of David McCance (transcribed by Will Graves), Sumter slept in a tent.

8. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

9. Tarleton, ibid.

10. Tarleton, ibid.

11. Tarleton, ibid. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

Battle of Fishing Creek 2

Part 2: Cary's Fort and Camden

Previous: Sumter's Third Target

Next: To Fishing Creek

Cary's Fort

On the morning of August 15, 1780, Thomas Sumter’s brigade of militia was joined by the reinforcement sent to him by Major-General Horatio Gates, bringing his total to around 700 men [1], the largest force he had commanded to date. Sumter then advanced on the Wateree river crossings south and west of Camden. As the Americans approached, they found that the British had evacuated all of their posts except for a redoubt held by Colonel James Cary of the South Carolina Loyalist militia. These men held their ground to keep open the flow of men and supplies into Camden. The Americans quickly attacked and after a brief fight in which seven Loyalists were killed, the Americans "took about thirty prisoners, among which was colonel Cary, their commander, together with thirty odd wagons loaded with corn, rum, etc., also a number of horses" [2].

The British on the other side of the river began to open fire on his men, and Sumter noted with apprehension that "the ground upon this side [is] very bad," and that "the boats are all upon the opposite side of the river" [3]. The Americans withdrew out of gunfire range, leaving a small guard to keep an eye on the British. Among these men was George Weir, a soldier in Edward Lacey’s regiment. He recalled in later years being "left alone" "as a sentinel near the ferry" "and nearly to have been captured by the enemy" [4].

Sumter also had men watching the southern and western approaches to the Wateree. Some of his men saw a party of around 60 British regulars from the 33rd and 71st regiments approaching the Wateree. These regulars had been recalled from the western post at Ninety-Six to aid in the defense of Camden. Oblivious to danger, they marched with their weapons loaded up in a wagon [5]. The Americans "secreted themselves until the British came up, when suddenly rushing upon them [they] took the whole party… without firing a gun" [6].

Meanwhile, Sumter was growing concerned about his safety. Perhaps hoping to spur Gates into action, he wrote to him saying that the British had only 1,200 regulars in Camden, and fewer than 1,000 militia, the latter of whom "are generally sickly and much dispirited." He also claimed that 500 men were en route from Charleston and were expected to arrive on the 17th. He then withdrew his force 10 miles up the river to a more easily defended position [7].

Camden

Gates received Sumter’s letter on the 15th and determined to apply further pressure to the British force in Camden. He would make a nighttime march to a strong position behind Saunders Creek, just 5 miles from Camden. From this position he could further restrict the flow of supplies into Camden and deter the British from attacking Sumter. The position was also strong enough that he could likely repel there any attack by British regulars. Gates’ army marched at 10pm [8].

Meanwhile, Charles Cornwallis had taken control of the British forces in Camden, after arriving there from Charleston the day before (August 14th). Cornwallis could see that Camden was not a strong position and that the Americans’ were likely to ultimately force them from this post. Cornwallis therefore determined to take the fight directly to Gates, reasoning that a victory would wipe out the Americans’ gains, while a defeat would be no worse than avoiding a fight altogether (in either case he would be forced to retreat). In order to maximize the probability of victory, he determined to try and catch the Americans by surprise. During the night of August 15-16, his army marched out of Camden hoping to surprise the Americans at dawn [9].

The two American armies marched along the same road, each expecting to surprise the other. Instead, both armies were surprised when their vanguards collided in the night, a little more than a mile north of Saunders Creek. After a confused flurry of fighting, the armies separated and in the morning (August 16), properly deployed for battle. Cornwallis anchored the left end of his line with the battered veterans of Hanging Rock (the British Legion Infantry, Bryan’s Volunteers, and the Royal North Carolina Regiment). He attacked primarily with several units of British regulars placed on his right. Gates adopted a similar strategy: he placed his weakest troops (North Carolina and Virginia militia) on his left and his strongest troops (Maryland and Delaware Continentals) on his right. The British regulars quickly sent the American militia into flight. The Continentals then found themselves attacked in front, flank, and rear. By the end of the day, the American army was destroyed with the loss of hundreds of men killed or captured. The American baggage train was also captured, and most of the broken militia headed home. This battle, known as Camden, was one of the greatest British victories of the war [10].

Sources:

Note that in some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Letter from Josiah Martin to George Germain, August 18-20, 1780. Both higher and lower totals can be found in later sources.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Horatio Gates, August 15, 1780. [The date was incorrectly transcribed as the 10th in this edition].

3. Sumter to Gates, ibid.

4. The pension application of George Weir, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

5. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Nathan Jaggars, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Dunlap, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves.

The day before a "corps of light infantry" passed safely the same way into Camden. See Martin to Germain, ibid.

6. The pension application of Hicks Chappell, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. In Hicks' account the convoy was captured by just him and two other men. Other veterans remembered this event differently.

7. Sumter to Gates, ibid. This is not to say that Sumter didn’t believe these things. Without a doubt he and his men questioned both the prisoners they took and civilians living in the area and this is likely the best intelligence he possessed. Rather, Sumter’s letter seems designed as an implicit reminder that the British might cross the river and attack him unless Gates provided a credible threat from the north.

The "500 men" was possibly misinformation given out by British officers to convince the locals and their own Loyalist militia that the Americans’ fortunes would soon be reversed. The only approaching reinforcement from that direction mentioned by Cornwallis was a mounted detachment of the 63rd Foot. See letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

8. General Gates' orders for August 15, 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Thomas Pinckney to William Johnson, July 27, 1822.

9. Martin to Germain, ibid. Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 21, 1780.

10. Horatio Gates to President of Congress, August 30, 1780. Otho Holland Williams. A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract]. Martin to Germain, ibid. Cornwallis to Germain, ibid. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

Battle of Fishing Creek 1

The Battle of Fishing Creek
Part 1: Sumter's Third Target
Next: Cary's Fort and Camden

[This account follows an earlier series of posts describing the battle of Hanging Rock. Some earlier posts provide useful background information, see especially Occupied South Carolina, Sumter's Brigade Forms, and Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina].

Rawdon's Dilemma

On the evening of August 6th, 1780 a trickle of Provincials and Loyalist militia arrived in Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon's camp at East Lynche's Creek. These men described how Thomas Sumter had routed their units and seized the British post at Hanging Rock. The news was a shock. Sumter had evidently cleared a route towards his base of operations at Camden. Worse, Sumter’s men were mounted; his were on foot.

Rawdon knew that even if Sumter could not seize Camden, he could at least get in rear of his command. This was a most unwelcome prospect because the main American army under Major-General Horatio Gates was simultaneously approaching from in front.

Deciding that no time was to be lost, Rawdon decided to abandon his strong post and make a night march towards Camden. He thought the situation might even turn in his favor if he could catch and defeat Sumter before Gates appeared. In the morning (August 7), however, he learned the truth of the battle of Hanging Rock: The British Legion infantry, aided by other detachments, had held their ground, forcing Sumter to withdraw. By now, the movements of Gates' army made it too hazardous to reestablish the post at East Lynche’s Creek. Rawdon therefore settled on a new (and weaker) defensive line closer to Camden. The troops at Hanging Rock were withdrawn to Rugeley’s Mill, and Rawdon's command encamped at West Lynche’s Creek. The post at Rocky Mount was not in imminent danger, but on August 12 Rawdon gave orders for it to withdraw as well to a more secure position [1].

Sumter Advances

Although Sumter was forced to withdraw from Hanging Rock, he took comfort in the fact that in the following days, "both British and Tories" were "pannick struck," by the Americans' gains [2]. As Gates' army closed with Rawdon's new position, Sumter wished to contribute to his operations by cutting the flow of men and supplies into Camden. To accomplish this, he proposed to march his brigade down the western side of the Catawba/Wateree River [3] and take control of key ferry crossings south of Camden [4]. On about August 13, Sumter's brigade set out on this mission. Sumter's brigade was much reduced in size by this time: in addition to the men killed and wounded at Hanging Rock, he lost the services of all of his North Carolina troops [5]. Some of his South Carolinians also left him in order to protect the western part of their native state from the Loyalist militia [6].

Rawdon's New Defensive Line: 1) British base at Camden, 2) British post at Rugeley's Mill, 3) British post at West Lynche's Creek. The arrow at upper left shows route of Sumter's advance (Sumter was in the marked area on or about August 14). The arrow at upper right shows Gates' advance (Gates' vanguard was in the marked area on August 8). (Compare with this map).

On August 14, Sumter informed Gates that a wagon train bringing men, ammunition, and clothing was approaching Camden from the south and that he was poised to capture it. By this time, Gates had maneuvered Rawdon out of his second defensive line and had become confident of his ability to take Camden. To support Sumter's small force (now only about 250 men), Gates lent him 100 Continentals, 300 North Carolina militia and 2 pieces of artillery. These men left Gates' army the night of August 14-15 and joined Sumter at daybreak [7].

Notes:

1. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801. Letter from Josiah Martin to George Germain, August 18-20, 1780. Journal of Lieutenant Anthony Allaire, in Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

3. The river is known as the Wateree in the vicinity of Camden, but as the Catawba at Rocky Mount and points further north.

4. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 12, 1780.

5. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

6. Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

7. Letter from General Gates to the President of Congress, August 20, 1780. Otho Holland Williams. A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780. Journal of Johann Christian Senf [extract].

The Continental infantry was drawn mainly from the Maryland line, although there were also a few of the 1st Delaware and a company-sized detachment of Armand's Legion. The whole was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Woolford of the 5th Maryland. Two 3-pounder cannon, accompanied by a small crew, were detached from the Continental artillery. The North Carolina militia were commanded by Colonel Elijah Isaacks.

See: Prisoners Taken at Catawba Fords. Pension application of Peter Scrum, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. Letter from General Gates to the President of Congress, August 20, 1780. Pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

Battle of Hanging Rock 13

Part 13: Reinforcement and Retreat

Previous: Stalemate

The final British bayonet charge and the withdrawal to the center of the open area effectively brought the battle of Hanging Rock to an end. Nevertheless, the British remained apprehensive about another American attack. According to Charles Stedman, the outcome remained "doubtful," until:

"the appearance of a reinforcement changed entirely the fortune of the day. This reinforcement consisted of forty mounted infantry of the Legion who were returning from Rocky Mount: But the captains [Patrick] Stewart and [Charles] MacDonald, who commanded it, by ordering the men to extend their files, gave it the appearance of a formidable detachment. The bugle horns were directed to sound a charge: And the Americans, already kept at bay, were now fearful of being overpowered" [1].

Reinforcement. While the American militia plunder the center camp, the Provincials holding the open area receive an unexpected reinforcement.

Mounted Infantry Arrive (click to enlarge). Two companies of mounted Legion infantry advance up the Camden Road towards the Americans. The Provincials are in square formation.

William Davie and was dragoons "were returning towards the centre," after driving off a number of Provincials and Loyalist militia, when they saw that Stewart's and MacDonald's companies had "advanced up in the Camden road." Davie turned his men around and charged. The British "took the woods in flight, and one only was outdone" [2].

Davie's Final Charge (click to enlarge). The American dragoons send the mounted Legion infantry into the woods.

This repulse would seem to be the end of the affair, except that these green-jacketed mounted infantry were mistaken for the vanguard of Tarleton's dreaded British Legion dragoons [3]. According to Joseph McJunkin, Sumter remarked, "Boys, it is not good to pursue a victory too far," and began pulling his troops back [4]. A number of American participants and British commentators referred to this reinforcement as the cause of the American retreat [5].

Before the retreat was effected, "about an hour" was spent "plundering the [center] camp, taking the parole of the British officers, and preparing litters for the wounded" [6]. According to William Davie, "All this was done in full view of the British army, who consoled themselves with some military music [7] and an interlude of three cheers for King George" [8]. Hearing this, Sumter called out, "'Boys, can't you raise a whoop of victory?' Then the air was rent with the cry of victory" [9].

Plundering the British Camp (click to enlarge). The Americans raid the British Commissary's stores before abandoning the Hanging Rock battlefield.

Davie concluded, "The militia at length got into the line of march, Davie and his dragoons covering the retreat, but as the troops were loaded with plunder, and encumbered with their wounded friends, and many of them intoxicated, this retreat was not performed in the best military style. However, under all these disadvantages, they filed off unmolested, along the front of the enemy" [10]. Sumter claimed that he "brought off one hundred horses, two hundred and fifty stand of arms, with other articles of considerable value" [11].

The Americans had marched about a mile when a mounted British caught up to the rear of the column with a flag of truce, ostensibly to gain permission to bury their dead [12], but probably also to verify that the Americans were in fact retreating. Joseph McJunkin was near the rear of the column at this time, escorting the prisoners. Turning to Sumter he said, "You have through the Divine hand of Providence, achieved a great victory today." Sumter agreed, but ruefully noted that "it will scarcely ever be heard of, because we are nothing but a handful of raw militia, but if we had been commanded by a Continental officer it would have sounded loud to our honor" [13].

Sumter was correct: Hanging Rock was a remarkable battle, but destined to be mostly forgotten.

Notes:

1. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

2. For William Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

3. Cf. Davie, ibid., and Joseph McJunkin's account, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

4. McJunkin, ibid.

5. For example, among the Americans, Mark Jackson stated that "it being rumored that Tarleton’s Corps were coming we retreated." James Kincaid noted, "we failed of success by a reinforcement of the British Army from Rocky Mount but we marched off in order." Zachary Kitchens observed that "after a hard and long fight we retreated, upon being informed that a reinforcement was coming to the aid of the British." As for British commentators, the connection between the arrival of this reinforcement and the American retreat is made by Charles Stedman, Banastre Tarleton, and Anthony Allaire.

• The pension application of Mark Jackson, transcribed by Will Graves.
• The pension application of James Kincaid, transcribed by Will Graves.
• The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris.
• Stedman, ibid.
• Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
• Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain. (Includes a transcription of Allaire's journal).

Other causes for the American retreat were mentioned previously.

6. Davie, ibid.

7. The British Legion had a regimental band. See the letter from Otho Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781, and summarized here.

8. Davie, ibid.

9. McJunkin, ibid. This cheer was recalled somewhat differently by others. According to Davie, ibid., "three cheers [were given] for the hero of America." Richard Winn claimed that Sumter "gathered his men and for victory three cheers was given by the true friends of America." For Richard Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

10. Davie, ibid.

11. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

12. McJunkin, ibid.

13. McJunkin, ibid.

Battle of Hanging Rock 12

Part 12: Stalemate

Previous: Rousselet's Gallant Stand

Next: Reinforcement and Retreat

The battle of Hanging Rock began as a major assault on one part of the British camp, but degenerated over time into "skirmishing with detached parties" [1]. These scattered engagements had caused many of the British troops to be driven from the battlefield [2], but the Americans had difficulty completing the victory because "the rout and pursuit of these various [British] corps by a part" of Sumter’s force, "and plunder of the camp by others, had thrown the Americans into great confusion" [3].

South of the British center camp, a mixed force of Provincials, backed up by two cannon, held on in an open area. But although the Americans were disorganized, with "some intoxicated, others plundering in the British camp," still "a respectable number," [4], perhaps 200 in total [5], continued "facing the enemy and pressing them closely" [6]. In this manner, the Provincials "were compelled gradually to give ground 200 yards," [7] or beyond the effective range of the Americans’ rifles.

Sniping Near the Center Camp (two views; click to enlarge). The Americans send long-range rifle fire against the Provincials, who continue to hold the open space south of the center camp.

The British withdrawal was made grudgingly, and they made perhaps two quick bayonet charges against the Americans before falling back to a more secure position [8]. At the time of these charges, the British were under attack "in a peculiarly steep part" of the plateau [9]. The final counterattack was a "vigorous charge with the bayonet," which they claimed left the militia "not merely… repulsed but… broken and dismayed" [10]. In this charge, the British may have briefly succeeded in closing with Sumter’s men. James McConnel of Irvine’s battalion "was wounded in the right arm by a bayonet thrust" [11]. In any event, the Americans "abandoned the whole ridge" [12]. Francis Rawdon claimed this final charge was made by the Legion infantry; a first-hand account places a part of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment on the scene as well [13].

The Final Bayonet Charge (two views; click to enlarge). A fierce bayonet charge drives the Americans off the plateau.

American accounts do not describe such a defeat as the British claimed. Instead, they asserted that Sumter intentionally "had his men withdrawn a small distance." This was done so that the men could be properly "formed" and "stragglers collected." Sumter's intention was "to renew the action." However, as "he rode along the line, personally inquiring of each man his stock of ammunition," he "found that they had not on an average three rounds per man" [14].

There were other serious problems as well. Because "the weather was warm," [15] men were "fainting with heat and drought" [16]. Also, the final British position was "in the centre of the cleared ground" and following William Davie’s charge they "formed a hollow square" [17]. Davie noted that "The distance of the square from the woods, and the fire of the two pieces of field artillery, prevented the militia from making any considerable impression on the British troops" [18].

A final significant factor was the considerable losses that the Americans had sustained. Among the officers, for example, David Reid of North Carolina and John McClure were both mortally wounded in the assault on Bryan’s camp [19]. Richard Winn was shot during the fighting with the Prince of Wales' American Regiment; William Hill was also shot around the same time [20]. William Robison "was wounded by a musket shot through the shoulder," [21] Samuel Otterson was shot "in my left arm which severed" "about midway" "the bone between the elbow and shoulder," [22] and one Captain Petty "had his arm shot off" [23]. James Jamieson "was wounded by a musket shot through the body" [24], left on the field of battle, and subsequently "taken prisoner" [25].

The British Square (click to enlarge). The British form a defensive square in the center of the open area, daring the Americans to attack.

Stalemate. The Provincials launch a desperate bayonet charge against the Americans that have gathered south of the center camp. Neither side is strong enough to completely drive the other from the field.

Notes:

1. The pension application of James Clinton, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. cf. the letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

3. William Davie's account; see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

4. Joseph Graham's account; see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

5. Davie, ibid.

6. Graham, ibid.

7. Graham, ibid.

8. American sources are almost silent on the subject of British charges during this period. Charles Stedman wrote that the Provincials made, "three desperate charges with the bayonet." One of these would have been the earlier charge that retook a cannon. George Hanger was less precise: "Sumpter renewed the attack; he was again and again beat off, charged, and pursued, but with regularity." Banastre Tarleton mentioned two charges and attributed these solely (and probably incorrectly) to the British Legion. His account is unclear as to whether one or more additional charges took place after other Provincials joined the Legion’s resistance.

• For Charles Stedman's account, see Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.
• For George Hanger's account, see An Address to the Army; in Reply to Strictures, by Roderick M'Kenzie, (Late Lieutenant in the 71st Regiment) on Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
• For Banastre Tarleton's account, see Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.

9. Rawdon, ibid. Although there is not a consensus about where the fighting took place, each of the several possibilities I considered previously identified the final part of the battle with the plateau transected by the Camden Road (links to these posts can be found here). The plateau itself does not have "peculiarly steep" slopes. However, there is a place several hundred yards south of the point I’ve identified as the center camp where a kind of gully comes close to the Camden Road (the open area where the Provincials made their stand). Perhaps this terrain feature was used by the Americans to approach and fire on the Provincials in relative safety.

10. Rawdon, ibid.

11. The pension application of James McConnel, transcribed by Will Graves. It is usually difficult to tell when and where participants' injuries occurred. McConnel could plausibly have been stabbed by a bayonet at other points and places. This charge, however, seems to have been the most successful of the battle, and some of Irvine’s men are known to have been present (cf. Joseph Graham, ibid.).

12. Rawdon, ibid.

13. For the account of an anonymous officer of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment, see Todd Braisted (2001). A History of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

14. Graham, ibid. In light of the fact that the Americans were later compelled to abandon the ground, Graham claimed that this shortage "was the true cause of [Sumter's] retreating" Sumter agreed, writing not long after the battle that "the true cause of my not totally defeating [the British] was the want of lead, having been obliged to make use of arms and ammunition taken from the enemy." See the letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

Clearly by this point in the battle, Sumter was on the scene of the fighting south of the center camp. Earlier he oversaw the destruction of a detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. In consequence, Sumter's account of the battle (Sumter, ibid.) provides few details about the fighting near the center camp. He wrote that the British "sustained [the battle for the center camp] with great bravery for near an hour; at length [they] gave way, leaving me in full possession of their camp." They then, "rallied again in Col. Robinson’s encampment," which seems to mean in or near the camp of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment. From this point on, however, "their opposition was but feeble."

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Robinson was an officer in a different Provincial regiment: the South Carolina Royalists. Neither he nor his men were at Hanging Rock.

15. Clinton, ibid.

16. Sumter, ibid.

17. Davie, ibid. Graham, ibid., also mentions this feature. Davie has the British adopting this formation as soon as they rallied south of the center camp, a view that is difficult to reconcile with British statements strongly pointing to a more active defense. More believable is that the several British accounts are essentially correct and that the British adopted the square formation only after Davie's dragoons chased a number of Loyalists and Provincials from the woods in their rear.

18. Davie, ibid.

19. Graham, ibid; Davie, ibid; Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Queries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.

20. Davie, ibid; General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.

21. The pension application of William Robison, transcribed by Will Graves.

22. The pension application of Samuel Otterson, transcribed by Will Graves.

23. The pension application of Daniel Carter, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

24. The pension application of James Jamieson, transcribed by Will Graves.

25. The pension application of Henry Rea, transcribed by Will Graves.

Battle of Hanging Rock 10

Part 10: The British Flank Attack

Previous: Battle for the Center Camp

Next: Rousselet's Gallant Stand

Around the time the battle opened, a detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment (PoWAR) was dispatched northward towards the sound of battle. This contingent seemingly reached the center camp while the fighting was still raging at Bryan's encampment. At the time, the British commander at Hanging Rock, Major John Carden, would not have known that Bryan's men had been completely routed or that McCulloch’s company was in the process of being destroyed. He therefore sent this detachment to Bryan's support, while keeping the remainder of the Provincials in a defensive posture [1].

At about the time the men of the PoWAR advanced towards Bryan's camp and "passed into a wood between the Tory and centre encampments" [2], the Americans began their assault on the center camp. Hearing the resulting gunfire, the PoWAR "drew up unperceived" into a line of battle, "and poured in a heavy fire on the militia." The Americans had quickly succeeded in taking the center camp, and at this moment "were forming from the disorder of the pursuit" [3]. Receiving this attack was a band of 30 militiamen [4]. By this "bold and skillful [British] manoeuvre," [5] these soldiers were "separated from the main [American] body" still near Bryan's camp [6]. One Samuel Saxon, a company commander, recalled that they turned about and "rushed upon the [British] line and broke our way [through,] losing in killed and missing 15 men" [7].

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment's Flank Attack (click to enlarge). Saxon's company and others attempt to retreat through the attacking PoWAR. Hanging Rock Creek is at far left. The green patch in the middle distance designates the ravine separating Bryan's camp from the British center camp.

The PoWAR detachment pursued these men towards Bryan's camp, and "nearly changed the fate of the day" [8]. At that moment, however, numbers of Americans led by Thomas Sumter and Robert Irwin were heading towards the center camp, and the attacking British. The Americans were in what appeared to be "an old field," [9] when Sumter saw that the British had "found means to turn my right flank" [10]. "The British advanced in good order" [11] through what appeared to be "a swamp," [12], or "a marsh" [13], while the Americans "halted and awaited their approach." Saxon stopped fleeing once he reached this group and "turned about, and took part in the battle which ensued" [14].

According to one participant:

"The contest was severe and of doubtful issue for some considerable time at length the American troops retreated and occupied a more favorable situation, where undergrowth and brush protected them much from the musketry of the enemy" [15].

Richard Winn, who was at the center camp, recalled that "On hearing a severe firing to my right I ordered my men to repair to the place." They joined the action "as quick as possible," and came upon "the back of the British" who were "in action" with "a party of our men." Winn gave the order to "commence firing as usual," which caught "the British between two fires." Their line soon "gave way," [16] and the Redcoats "took instinctively to the trees and bush heaps," to defend themselves [17].

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment Under Attack (click to enlarge).

Soon "there was not a British officer standing, and many of the regiment had fallen," but still they "returned the fire with deadly effect." [18] Robert Irwin "had his clothes perforated with four separate balls," but "escaped unhurt" [19]. Richard Winn was not so lucky; he received "a most dangerous wound" [20].

At last, 22 men, all the rank and file that were left unhurt, "threw down their arms" "on being offered quarters" [21]. Robert Irwin, who had particularly distinguished himself during the fighting [22] approached an obstinate sergeant major and "wrenched the bayonet" from his hands. Then he too surrendered. [23]

Capitulation (click to enlarge).

The British Flank Attack. A detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment is beset by American militia near Bryan's camp. Meanwhile, the British Legion infantry rally near the center camp.

Notes:

1. That it was a detachment of the regiment that was sent north, and not the whole regiment, was discussed previously, see Note 1 in this post. The timing of these events is not discussed in participant accounts, but this is the most parsimonious explanation. Several American participants, including Thomas Sumter, asserted that this detachment was sent to Bryan's relief. For Sumter's account, see the letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

2. William Davie's account; see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

3. Davie, ibid.

4. The pension application of Samuel Saxon, transcribed by Will Graves.

5. Davie, ibid.

6. Saxon, ibid.

7. Saxon, ibid.

8. Davie, ibid.

9. The pension application of John L. Davies, transcribed by Will Graves. Sumter, ibid., places this event near Bryan's camp.

10. Sumter, ibid.

11. Davies, ibid.

12. Sumter, ibid.

13. Saxon, ibid.

14. Saxon, ibid.

15. Davies, ibid.

16. Richard Winn; see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).

17. Davie, ibid.

18. Davie, ibid.

19. Joseph Graham; see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

20. Winn, ibid.

21. Davie, ibid. for the quote; Sumter, ibid., and George Cunningham are the source of the number of surrendered men. For Cunnigham's account, see the pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves.

22. According to Joseph McJunkin, before this battle, he was "called Granny Irwin," but "afterwards [he] was spoken very highly of on account of his good conduct that day." See Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

23. Davies, ibid.