November 1, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for November 1st: The Americans pulled back from White Plains; the British abandoned the pursuit of Washington’s army.

Previous entry: October 31st.

In the early morning hours, the last of the Americans in the entrenchments pulled back. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion) noted in his journal:

“This morning our guards come off and leave the lines in the centre of the town called White Plains, and to distress the enemy [they] burn all the barns of hay and grain and houses, where the inhabitants had stores of wheat and corn and also stacks and barracks of hay and grain.”

The British officers looked with surprise on the burning buildings and empty defensive works. When they rode forward they could see American forces encamped on a line of hills to the north, but the American army had been so reduced by sickness and other causes, that they thought this force was no more than a rear guard. Major Stephen Kemble wrote of this force, “[we] suppose them to be about 7,000 strong”.

The British concluded that the rest of Washington’s men had fled even deeper into the hills, which meant that their attack plans had gone to naught. However, as the British were not particularly eager to attack the American lines in the first place, there was undoubtedly some sense of relief.

Lieutenant-General William Howe opted not to attack this “rearguard”. He later explained that the Americans’ actions “plainly” indicated a “desire to avoid coming to action,” and added “I did not think the driving their rearguard further back an object of the least consequence.”

Instead, the British advanced and occupied the Americans’ former entrenchments. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) wrote: “At half after 9 o’clock we got under arms, and pushed into the village of the White Plains, which the enemy had just abandoned, and the army advanced at the same time”.

This advance brought the armies within range of each others’ cannons. Major-General William Heath, on the left of the American army, wrote:

“In the morning, the British advanced, with a number of field-pieces, to the north of the road near late headquarters… and commenced a furious cannonade on General Heath’s division, which was nobly returned by Captain-Lieutenant Bryant and Lieutenant Jackson, of the artillery.”

During this cannonade, according to Heath, George Washington rode up to him and expressed concern over one of Heath’s regiments that was separated by a hollow from the rest of the division. “Take care that you do not lose them”, he warned. But the British did not attack this force. Instead, Heath wrote, the British guns withdrew from his front, “made a circuitous movement, and came down toward the American right.” As these guns moved into position, they were fired upon by some American heavy guns. Heath noted that “upon the discharge” from the American guns, the British crews “made off with their field-pieces as fast as their horses could draw them. A shot from the American cannon, at this place, took off the head of a Hessian artilleryman. They also left one of the artillery horses dead on the field.”

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Lee’s division) witnessed the British movement towards the American right. He wrote:

“we saw the enemy advance down the hill towards us in three parties[,] one party coming towards the road the other [two] through a swamp[.] We sent some 25-pound shot to them that stopped some before they could get over the bridge to us and the others passed through the swamp to a hill opposite to us… we sent over some shot… that knocked down a light horse”. [see footnote]

British Major Stephen Kemble summarized the day’s action by writing: “[they] cannonaded us… the greatest part of the day; we lost 9 men [killed] by this business. Six of them Hessians.”

Isolated fatalities were noted by several British officers.

Ensign Henry Stirke wrote:

“We received a few straggling shot, which did no execution. The 15th regiment had one man killed, and another wounded, by the rebel cannon”.

Captain Francis Rawdon observed:

“We had some cannonading with their rear guard, by which my brother John (who is an excellent soldier in every respect) was very near killed. Two men who stood close to him were killed by a twelve-pounder, and a splinter of one of their skulls stuck in his thigh, but did not hurt him much.”

American losses were even fewer. Apparently one man in Levi Paulding’s New York militia regiment was killed, and two other New Yorkers were wounded. Their brigade commander (George Clinton) commented, “I have heard of no other injury done [to] us.”

Brigade-Major Benjamin Tallmadge characterized the American withdrawal from White Plains as something of a victory: He claimed that Howe was “baffled” by this maneuver, and as a result gave up the pursuit of Washington’s army. Thus, Washington’s army, brought perilously close in this campaign to capture or collapse, had survived to fight another day.

William Howe had a rather different perspective. Howe did not wish to place his own army at risk by chasing the Americans into the wild hills on the New York-New England border. He was sure, too, that if Washington did make a firm stand, it would only be on some set of steep and heavily fortified hills. Howe had had enough of this business. He felt he could now turn his back on Washington without losing face and proceed once again to wage war on his own terms. Howe’s preference was to capture Fort Washington and consolidate his hold on the New York City area. His developing plan also came to include sending expeditions into New Jersey, Rhode Island, and, if all went well, the American capitol at Philadelphia.

Heath noted that during the rest of this day, November 1st:

“The two armies lay looking at each other, and within long cannon-shot [range]. In the night time the British lighted up a vast number of fires, the weather growing pretty cold. These fires, some on the level ground, some at the foot of the hills, and at all distances to their brows… seemed to the eye to mix with the stars, and to be of different magnitudes. The American side, doubtless, exhibited to them a similar appearance.”

The bright orange flames licked the cold November sky, and another chapter of the Revolutionary War came to a close.

Footnote: Smith indicated that this event took place on Friday the 31st. Friday was November 1st. A comparison of Smith’s description of other events occurring at the time with the journals of other Americans suggests that he was right about it being Friday and wrong about it being the 31st.

Concluding Comment: The standoff at White Plains did not end on November 1st. For a few days the two armies glowered at each other, and during that time more men were killed in little brushes or perished from illness. The British left White Plains on November 5-6 and soon joined Knyphausen’s division near Manhattan. On November 16th, Howe captured Fort Washington and completed the conquest of Manhattan.

October 30, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 30th: The American medical service cannot cope with the sick; William Howe prepared to attack upper Manhattan and White Plains; Henry Clinton balked at Howe’s plans.

Previous entry: October 29th; next: October 31st.

The American army at White Plains grimly held on to their redoubts and trenches. The men continued to suffer from a lack of food, medicine, proper clothing, and all other materials necessary for an army’s survival.

The Americans had established a general hospital in a church in the town of North Castle, 9 miles to the northeast, but it was poorly staffed due to a shortage of physicians.

The head of the American medical service (Doctor John Morgan) later wrote:

“I cannot but feel for the hospital surgeons [at North Castle], who… were suddenly overwhelmed with numbers of sick sent to them, as well as the wounded … at a time when an engagement was considered as inevitable, there were few at hand to give aid… the wounded, who were conveyed to the hospitals, naturally demanded the attention of the whole body of surgeons, to administer aid to them.”

The sick, it seems, were largely left to the informal care of their comrades.

Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote, “Today it being rainy[,] Luke was taking not well[, and] I still being not well… we both set out for North Castle hospital… and we got within 4 miles of the hospital and put up for this night.” They slept in the woods and then completed the arduous journey, unaided, in the morning.

Doctor John Pine, who had recently joined Washington’s army, found that it was impossible to take care of the sick men from his native Maryland. He wrote that on the 29th:

“I waited on Doctor Morgan, Director-General of the hospitals here, for medicines, etc. He told me he had nothing to say to the Maryland troops, and that it was not his business to supply the regimental surgeons with medicines, and that it must have been a mistake [for Maryland]… to send their surgeons here without them and think they were to be supplied here.”

Dr. Pine then sought out Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion, who was 15 miles away and recuperating from two wounds (one in the arm, one in the hip) he received during the fighting on Chatterton’s Hill. Smallwood wrote a letter for the doctor which gave Pine a little leverage.

When Dr. Pine sought out Dr. Morgan again, he was told that “I might have some few things, if I could go to New-York for them”.

Pine was aghast:

“I told him by the time I went there and got back, that… most of the [sick] Maryland troops would be expired. He told me he could not help it, and that medicines were very hard to be got.”

After the battle of White Plains, Lieutenant-General William Howe deferred attacking the American army again partially because he did not like the strength of the American position and partially because he decided to wait for reinforcements. Once those reinforcements arrived, he planned on attacking Washington’s army. At the same time, he wanted Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen to attack the American forces in upper Manhattan.

According to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Knyphausen’s preparations went smoothly:

“[The Americans had] demolished the bridge at Kings Bridge and those called Dyckman’s bridge and Williams’ bridge. Lieutenant General von Knyphausen had them repaired and sent the Grenadier Battalion Köhler and Wutginau’s and Stern’s [i.e., von Stein’s] regiments across the river to encamp at places where they would be safe from the fire of the rebels’ batteries. The rest of his corps encamped behind Fort Independence”.

The Kingsbridge area, circa 1776 (click to enlarge). On October 30th, Knyphausen occupied Fort Independence and crossed some men into upper Manhattan.

Howe’s reinforcements reached him late in the day. Among these troops was the 46th Regiment of Foot. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham, later wrote:

“On the 30th of October we embarked at Hellgate, and after a passage of about thirty miles by water in flat-bottomed boats, we landed at New Rochelle, and immediately marched to join General Howe’s army at the White Plains.” [see footnote]

After the reinforcements arrived, Howe could see no cause for further delay. He had, it seems, accepted that a full-scale attack on the American works was necessary and inevitable. That night (10pm) he issued orders for the troops to be under arms at 5 am. In the ensuing attack, Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister would command the left division of the army, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right.

In the past, Howe typically consulted with Clinton about any major moves, but the campaign severely strained their relationship. Howe made his plans without Clinton’s input, and Clinton took the omission badly. Clinton later complained that “I received [the] orders late at night”, and protested that he was not ready to attack. In fact, Clinton had convinced himself there would be no further attacks on the American army, because he had previously argued against it. He then reminded Howe of his objections:

“I took the liberty of intimating to the Commander in Chief that it might prove rather hazardous to make any attack from center or right until we saw what would be the effect of one from the left… and that even then they [i.e., the attacks] ought to be pressed with caution, as the enemy had a very strong position in the gorges of the mountains behind them.”

Howe was already aware of these concerns and he ignored Clinton’s protests.

Footnote: Captain William Bamford (40th Foot) recorded in his journal that these reinforcements embarked on the 29th.

October 27, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 27th: Synopsis for October 27: Hugh Percy made a feint at Fort Washington; Waldeckers were ambushed near Mamaroneck; the British planned a move to White Plains.

Previous entry: October 26th; next: Morning of October 28.

On October 18, Lieutenant-General William Howe cut one of the main supply lines of the American forces in Manhattan (the Boston Post Road). Not long after, George Washington pulled his army away from Manhattan, and took a strong post at the town of White Plains, New York. Howe, meanwhile, established a base for his army at New Rochelle, brought up reinforcements, examined the countryside, and made plans to battle the American army.

Howe’s battle plan came to consist of two main parts. First, his army would attack Washington’s men at White Plains. Second, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knypahusen’s recently arrived Hessian division would advance on upper Manhattan from the north. Although Washington had pulled out of Manhattan, some men were left behind to garrison Fort Washington and the other defensive works in upper Manhattan.

The twin advance was scheduled to begin on the 28th. To draw attention away from Knyphausen’s advance, Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy had orders to make a feint at Fort Washington from the south on the 27th. It was hoped he might also seize some of the Americans’ defensive works in the process.

Percy took with him six British regiments (the 10th, 17th, 37th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot), and two Hessian regiments from Stirn’s brigade. The troops advanced in line of battle with the Hessians on the left, and the British regulars on the right. Percy later wrote:

“I approached… with caution, for I had not force enough to attack them. By the time I had advanced within random musket shot [range], their [defensive] lines (three in number) were all completely manned… As our moving forward did not make them evacuate their works, I tried what a few shots from six-pounders and shells from two howitzers would do”.

The shot and shell had little effect: “they were too well secured by their parapets.”

American defenses in upper Manhattan (click to enlarge). Upper Manhattan is bounded on the left by Hudson's River and on the right by the Harlem River. Fort Washington appears at the top of the image; below the fort are three defensive lines spanning the width of the island. On October 27th, Percy's men skirmished with American forces defending the first (lowermost) line. The troop movements shown on this map pertain to a later engagement (the assault on Fort Washington on November 16, 1776).

Charles Lefferts illustration of drummers and infantrymen of the 10th Regiment of Foot.

Percy observed that the Americans brought cannon down to their lines, and he “retired with the main body about halfway between their works and ours.” Soon, he added, “The rebels… began to cannonade us”. This fire, however, was not very dangerous: “Their cannon were so ill pointed, that tho' they fired annoyingly at us, they hit nobody.” Nevertheless, he noted, “I retired a little out of reach.” Percy’s men then encamped for the evening.

While these movements took place on land, the frigates Repulse and Pearl advanced up Hudson’s River. Soon the vessels began to be bombarded by the guns from Fort Washington and Fort Lee (the renamed Fort Constitution).

Major-General Nathanael Greene boasted about the battering the Repulse received:

“Colonel [Robert] Magaw got down an eighteen-pounder and fired sixty shot at her, twenty-six of which went into her. She slipped her cable and left her anchor, and was towed off by four boats. I think we must have killed a considerable number of their men, as the confusion and distress exceeded all description.”

Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, acknowledged that “Many shots were thrown into the Repulse, and some into the Pearl”. However, he heard that “no men [were] killed in either, and only one man's leg broke on board the Repulse.”

Percy’s losses were also modest: five were killed or wounded in the 37th Foot; two in the 10th Foot, and three among the Hessians.

Greene stated that one man “was killed by a shell that fell upon his head” and that Major Andrew Colburn (Knowlton’s Rangers) was wounded.

The British made light of the whole affair. Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham of the 46th Foot wrote that “Lord Percy very properly called it ‘the little excursion.’”

Closer to White Plains, the British sent out parties to reconnoiter. Archibald Robertson noted that he accompanied William Erskine on another expedition to the Mile Square area. He was surprised that “We returned [to that area] without firing a shot… as the enemy might have suspected our intention of occupying these heights.” Instead, according to Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Erskine “brought back nine prisoners and the assurance that all the rebels had left this part of the country and gone to White Plains”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton was ordered, as he later wrote, “to take out a part of the army to reconnoiter” the American position at White Plains. Clinton made a cursory effort, turned around, and gave Howe a discouraging report: “I suspected that the enemy’s lines at the White Plains shouldered to the Bronx and to the mountains, whereby their flanks were safe and their retreat practicable when[ever] they pleased.” He concluded, “[I] could not from what I saw recommend a direct attack”.

Howe could not have been pleased either with the incomplete information or the lack of support for his plans.

American scouting parties were also active. Baurmeister noted that one party attacked some men from the Waldeck Regiment:

“Eighteen men of this regiment went marauding in the region around Mamaroneck, where they were surprised and attacked by forty rebels and disarmed. One subaltern and twelve soldiers were captured and hurriedly sent away. Two men remained on the field, wounded.”

October 15, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 15th: The standoff at Throg’s Neck continued; the armies prepared for another movement; Hugh Mercer led a raid onto Staten Island.

Previous entry: October 14th; next: October 16th.

The uneasy standoff at Throg’s Neck (commonly called Frog’s Point) continued into a fourth day. American Major General William Heath noted, “The scattering fire across the marsh continued, and now and then a man was killed.” Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) was witness to one of these incidents:

“in the morning… I walked out to see the country and found plenty of… apples and peaches and [I] went as far as our lower lines and saw the enemy on Frog’s Point where they was at an house over a creek[,] a little beyond musket shot of our guard[.] One who appeared like an officer ventured down to the creek and was shot down by one of our men and was carried up by them to the house”.

Archibald Robertson of the Royal Engineers noted that he spent the day “raising two mock batteries… opposite the bridge… and a line opposite theirs on our right” by the head of the creek. These batteries made it look as if the British would attempt an overland push across Westchester Creek. In actuality, the British were preparing to bypass the American defenses by landing on another part of the coast.

Newly-arrived American Major General Charles Lee did not know what move the British would make next, but he felt that the Americans should not wait for it in their present position. According to Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion)*:

“General Lee… thought that the situation of the army of the States of America was much too confined and cramped, and that it could not be good policy to lie still in such a situation, or to hazard the great cause in which we were embarked in one general action, in which if we should not succeed, the army might be lost, as a retreat would be extremely difficult if not impossible.”

George Washington was also troubled by the situation of the army. He doubted that he had enough men to prevent the British from taking control of the Hudson, maintain the army’s fortifications in upper Manhattan, and counter the British advance into Westchester County. He wrote that:

“…we are obliged to divide our force, and guard every probable place of attack as well as we can; as most of our stores are here [in upper Manhattan] and about King's Bridge, and the preservation of the communication with the States on the other side of Hudson’s River [is] a matter of great importance… I have sent two regiments of the Massachusetts militia up the river to watch the motions of the [British] ships [cf.October 9th & 10th], and to oppose any landing of men that they may attempt. I am also extending every part of my force that I possibly can… to oppose the enemy [inWestchester County], and prevent their effecting their plan… but our numbers being far inferior to the demands for men, I cannot answer for what may happen: the most in my power shall be done.”

The American stance at this time was not wholly defensive.

In Connecticut, Governor Jonathan Trumbull and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Livingston (2ndNew York Regiment) had begun to wage war on British Loyalists occupying Long Island. They were in the process of rounding up men and boats so as to make a major raid.

In New Jersey, Major-General Nathanael Greene and Brigadier-General Hugh Mercer led on this date a raid onto Staten Island. Staten Island was the first base of operations for the British army in the New York City area. However, by this date the island was largely stripped of troops.

Colonel Samuel Patterson was present with a battalion of Delaware militia. He later wrote:

“in the evening, General Mercer ordered part of four battalions to… go on board boats at eight o’clock that evening. We did, in the whole about six hundred men, with two pieces of brass artillery. We crossed all about ten o’clock at night, in order to attack a small fort at the east end of that island, at the watering-place, and to be there by break of day,--seventeen miles, our battalion in front”.

While the Americans were marching across the island, a messenger caught up with the generals and informed them that Washington had called for a council of war that would convene in the morning. Greene left, but Mercer continued ahead.

According to Patterson, “At the same time” we were “informed… that the fort was reinforced the day before by the arrival of fresh troops… to about twelve hundred men.”

Mercer gave up the idea of taking the fort and sent back the artillery. However, he also learned of a target of opportunity. He afterwards reported, “I was then advanced within a few miles of Richmond town [on Staten Island], and received information… that a company of British troops, one of Hessians and one of [Cortland] Skinner’s [Loyalist] militia [the New Jersey Volunteers], lay there.” He issued orders to surround and capture these men.

According to Patterson, Mercer ordered Patterson and one Colonel Samuel Griffin to take the Delaware militia and two rifle companies to a point “about a mile below the town… and to lay about there till near break of day”. There they would cut off the retreat of the British troops. “General Mercer’s plan was—he to attack, with his party, in three places, and we to be ready at the same time in the other quarters.”

Patterson added: “[Mercer] is… as cool in his plans as a philosopher. I love him.”

*The letter was anonymous; Ezra Stiles believed Trumbull was the author.

October 11, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 11th: Friendly fire killed men on the Hudson; Joseph Reed contemplated defeat; Ambrose Serle watched the new offensive get underway.

Previous entry: October 10th; next: October 12th.

The Americans closely watched Hudson’s River for signs of renewed British activity. A vessel was observed coming down the river. Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) noted “she hoisted an uncommon sail,” and Major-General William Heath wrote that she was thought “to be one of the British tenders”.

Henry Hallowell (Hutchinson’s 27th Continental Regiment) remembered: “I was ordered with a party to place ourselves near the shore [with muskets] all loaded to stop [the vessel]… and [we were] just about to fire” when “Knox’s Artillery threw a shot from the fort” at it. In fact, the Americans were firing on their own men – the vessel was one of the few vessels to have escaped the Royal Navy on the 9th.

According to Smith, the shot “killed three men as they was sitting aft and wounded the captain slightly”. Afterwards, the dead men were “landed at the ferry and buried in one grave”. Hallowell called it “a sorrowful sight.”

Colonel Joseph Reed was Washington’s adjutant general. He was shocked by the poor showing of American troops when the British first landed on Manhattan one month earlier (September 15, 1776), and he was convinced that the American army lacked the discipline to defeat the British in battle. Reed also didn’t think the situation was likely to improve. He complained in a letter to his wife:

“To attempt to introduce discipline and subordination into a new army must always be a work of much difficulty, but where the principles of democracy so universally prevail, where so great an equality and so thorough a leveling spirit predominate, either no discipline can be established, or he who attempts it must become odious and detestable…”

Reed previously informed the Continental Congress that he wished to resign from his post, but he was stuck in this position as they had not appointed a replacement.

He told his wife, “I never meant to make arms a profession, my duty to you and my dear children will lead me to pursue that course of life which will contribute most to their and your happiness, for though I would wish to serve my country… I have not the least desire to sacrifice you and them to fame, even if I was sure to attain it.”

He feared that “if France or some other foreign power does not interfere” in this conflict “we shall not be able to stand” against the British “next spring”. But he consoled his wife that if the war were lost, they would not suffer too much for it: “my estate is no object of confiscation, my rank is not so high as to make me an example”.

New York City was devastated by a massive fire on September 21st. Its port was closed, many of its inhabitants had fled, and it was now occupied by hundreds of British soldiers. The remaining citizens attempted to maintain a degree of normalcy. Ambrose Serle (Vice Admiral Richard Howe’s secretary) recorded that he “walked about the town, which begins to fill, and has some of its markets open for meat and vegetables.” He noted disparagingly that “The meat is sweet, but generally lean: the vegetables are mostly good: but both very inferior to those of England; at least, what I have seen.”

In the afternoon Serle saw that the invasion of Westchester County was getting underway:

“all the flat-boats, belonging to the fleet were ordered up the East River in order to effect a landing for the troops… The admiral [Howe] and the other principal officers of the navy went up to conduct the embarkation and debarkation, intended in the morning; so that tomorrow or next day, warm work may be expected.”

He exulted, “May God prosper the king’s arms, and the cause of my country!”

No spies or deserters warned the Americans of the British plans. Nevertheless, the Americans closely watched the shore, and they had an inkling of what was coming. Major-General William Heath observed, “There was a considerable movement among the British boats”.

October 10, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 10th: Gunning Bedford described life in the American army; the Americans feared the British would seize key points on the Hudson; William Howe prepared for the move to Throg’s Point.

Previous entry: October 9th; next: October 11th.

The passage of the British ships up the Hudson on the 9th alarmed the American army. Once it became clear that no major movement was afoot, the officers and men returned to their usual routine. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford (the Delaware Regiment) described the situation of the army on this date:

“We are strengthening our [defensive] lines,--the enemy are also busy with theirs. Our duty continues hard, having the lines to man every morning before day, and they are a mile and a half from here, and [we have] a great deal of other duty… many of our men have deserted to the enemy, though none from our regiment... [British] deserters say the enemy are apprehensive of an attack from us. They all, likewise, say they are healthy, and their army strong,--above thirty thousand… Our army is very sickly yet. We have one hundred and forty of our regiment unfit for duty. We have neither hospitals nor medicines for them, which makes them suffer much… Our army seems in good spirits, and we think our lines are secure, if they should be attempted.”

Although the British vessels on the Hudson posed no immediate threat to the American army, their presence was suggestive of Britain’s longer-term plans. Writing from the town of Fishkill, the New York Committee of Safety described to George Washington their fears that British vessels, acting in conjunction with local Loyalists, would take control of key points on the river:

“Nothing can be more alarming than the present situation of our state; we are daily getting the most authentic intelligence of bodies of men [i.e., Loyalists] enlisted and armed in order to assist the enemy[.] We much fear that they[,] cooperating with the enemy may seize such passes as will cut off all communication, between the army and us and prevent your supplies.”

This map (click to enlarge) shows the lower Hudson River, which was a primary route for the flow of men and materials to and from Washington’s army. On October 9th, a handful of British vessels successfully passed Fort Washington (4) and Fort Constitution (5) and took post in a wide stretch of the Hudson’s River near Dobb’s Ferry (7) and Tarrytown (8). The Americans had previously begun construction on Fort Montgomery (10) to defend one vital chokepoint on the river, but other points seemed vulnerable, such as Stony Point (9) and West Point (11).

The painting is Dominic Serres’ depiction of the frigates Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar passing, on October 9th, between the American batteries in and around Fort Constitution (left) and Fort Washington (right).

The Americans were well aware that their supply lines extending north and east of Manhattan were also vulnerable. Although they had no forts to control the shoreline (like they did on the Hudson), the Americans were at least aided by geography: British vessels moving troops into Long Island Sound would have to pass through a treacherous passageway known as Hell Gate.

Colonel George Weedon (3rd Virginia Regiment) wrote with amazement that the British kept a vessel anchored in this passage: “at this time a 28 gun frigate lays in Hellgate, a place not much wider than the streets of Williamsburg, [Virginia]”

Lieutenant-General William Howe had in fact decided to move his entire army through this passage and land on Throg’s Point (cf. October 8, 1776). At this time he was attending to the details of this operation. In brief, the British occupied several posts in the New York City area: the lower half of Manhattan, western Long Island, Staten Island, Paulus Hook on the New Jersey shore, and a couple of islands in New York’s East River. Howe decided to largely strip these posts of troops, although on Manhattan Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy would be left with three brigades of British troops and one of Hessians.

Howe’s force would consist, at first, of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th brigades of British regulars, the British Reserve (three battalions of British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the brigade of Guards, one brigade of Hessian grenadiers, one brigade of Hessian musketeers and fusiliers, three battalions of light infantry, two battalions of the 71st Foot, some light dragoons, the Hessian jaegers, and a couple of recently formed Loyalist corps.

Howe expected to receive substantial reinforcements while the campaign was underway, including an entire division of Hessian troops that was then crossing the Atlantic. In addition, Percy would be able to release some of his men to Howe if and when Washington pulled back from Manhattan.

The exact timing of these decisions was unrecorded, but by this time the British were nearly ready for the offensive to begin. On this date the army was issued 6 days’ worth of provisions (a sure sign that a move was imminent) and they were ordered to “dress” these provisions on the 11th.

October 9, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 9: British vessels on the Hudson River cut an important communications link to George Washington’s army.

Previous entry: October 8th; next: October 10th.

The Americans defended their position in and about upper Manhattan with an extensive series of fortifications. Particularly impressive were the forts and batteries designed to keep the British navy from ascending the Hudson River (then commonly called the North River). British vessels would have to pass between a series of batteries in and around Fort Constitution on the New Jersey side of the river and Fort Washington on the New York side. In between, the river was obstructed by hulks that had been intentionally sunk. The Americans also had a small flotilla of row galleys on the far side of the obstacles.

Captain Andrew Snape Hamond of HMS Roebuck recalled that “the rebel army was chiefly supplied by the North River, and placed great dependence upon it… they looked upon it to be perfectly secure: and it is possible, from seeing the great preparation they had made, we might also have thought so”.

But then, in early October:

“a deserter… informed the admiral [Vice Admiral Richard Howe] that there was a passage open between two of the sunken vessels… and offered himself as a pilot. This intelligence was exceedingly agreeable to both the General [Lieutenant-General William Howe] and admiral, conceiving, that if ships could be got up the North River, the rebel’s supplies would not only be cut off from Albany and that country, but even their communication with the Jerseys would become very uncertain and unsafe which could not fail of distressing them, and would very much assist in the intended operation of surrounding their army”.

On October 9th, a southerly breeze made the expedition possible. The British dispatched three frigates (Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar), a schooner (Tyral), and two tenders.

According to Captain Hammond:

“Much praise is due to Captain [Hyde] Parker on this occasion (who led, in the Phoenix) for his steadiness and good conduct – when they drew near to the danger, the pilot, in great confusion told him, that the marks which then appeared were not those that had been described to him, and he was totally at a loss[,] upon which Captain Parker, very prudently, immediately determined to take his chance where he knew the deepest water to be, which was close to the eastern shore…”

The Americans watched with incredulity as the British vessels eased past their defenses.

George Washington wrote, “to our surprise and mortification, they all ran through without the least difficulty, and without receiving the least apparent damage from our forts, which kept playing on them from both sides of the river.”

Appearances were a little deceiving: the British lost 9 killed and 18 wounded. Among these were a servant boy killed by a cannonball on the Phoenix and a Captain-Lieutenant of His Majesty’s Marines flayed by splinters on the Tartar. The ships were also considerably damaged, although none came close to sinking.

On the far side of the forts, “the enemy began to fire small arms from the woods,” according to Captain Cornthwaite Ommanney of the Tartar. Apparently, the British fired back, for Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered:

“they gave us some volleys of grape-shot… and some bombs. The grape-shot made holes in our tents, and some of the bombs broke in the air. One fell amidst our tents, but one of our boys ran and soon had pulled out the fuse. We had one man wounded.”

Heading north, the British gave chase to the American vessels on the river.

Captain Hyde Parker of the Phoenix wrote, “at Noon… [we were] in chase of four of the rebel galleys[,] etc. [and I] sent the Tartar ahead to cut them off… at 1 P.M. two of [the] galleys, a schooner, and two sloops ran onshore”. At 1:30 the Phoenix “anchored … [and] fired several broadsides to scour the shore…”

Among the men on the row galleys were two junior officers of Hutchinson’s 27th Continental Regiment. They claimed the vessels were run on shore once it became clear they could not outrun the British vessels. They recalled, “We run her [i.e., their vessel] on shore just above Dobb’s Ferry where we had not time enough to get our people and things on shore…” Instead, the fast approaching enemy “obliged us to swim on shore. But no lives [were] lost”. Then the British “fired a broad side of grape shot as we lay in the bushes…”

In the end the British captured two of the American row galleys (Independence and Crane), two sloops, and a schooner. According to Major-General William Heath of Massachusetts, one of the sloops “had on board the machine invented by… a Mr. Bushnell, intended to blow up the British ships.” This was the famous Turtle, the world’s first submarine.

The American infantry now had the awkward task of chasing the British navy. Orders went down the line from George Washington (the commander in chief), to Major-General William Heath (a division commander), to Colonel Paul Dudley Sargent (a brigade commander), to send men north and prevent the British from doing additional damage.

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General Heath’s orders to Colonel Sargent:

“Sir: The enemy, as it is reported, have landed a number of troops at or near Dobbs's Ferry; and it being thought indispensably our duty to dislodge them, you are immediately to take the command of the detachment designed for that purpose, consisting of five hundred men. You will march without the least loss of time, with the said detachment and forty light-horse, to Dobbs's Ferry, taking with you one howitzer and a detachment of the artillery, now at Philips’s Mills [i.e., two 12-pounders]… You will take particular care that the howitzer is properly covered, and defended by the battalion men.

You will, if possible, dislodge the enemy; killing or taking prisoners, as occasion may require…”

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The British expedition caused a good deal of marching and countermarching for some of the Continentals. Among these was Private Davie How of Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. Like many journalists of this era he described the events of the day in simple terms, and left out how difficult such marches were for poorly clothed and often inadequately fed troops:

“This morning three ships sailed up the North River[.] Our people kept a hot fire at them[.] We were all alarmed and marched down to Morrisania – 6 miles – then we all marched back before night [another 6 miles]. This night I went with a party of men to Dobb’s Ferry[,] about 12 miles[; we] got there at daybreak.”

Brigade of Guards

Coming off the workbench at the moment are the battalion companies of the British Brigade of Guards. I have primarily used the Minfigs' American Marines pack to depict British this unit. The minis come with the cut-down round hats turned up on one side, like those worn by reenactors portraying this unit (cf. Brigade of Guards' picture gallery). The only problem is that these minis come with a backpack/blanket roll configuration that is not accurate to this unit.

A Completed Battalion (click to enlarge)

The Guards saw extensive service throughout the war, beginning with the invasion of New York. The Guards participated in the battle of Long Island (August 27, 1776), and served in a reserve capacity at the subsequent battles of White Plains (October 28) and Fort Washington (November 16). In the following months, the brigade saw service in New Jersey, most notably at Short Hills (June 26, 1777). The brigade also participated in the 1777 invasion of Pennsylvania and the 1778 retreat through New Jersey. During these campaigns, the brigade was instrumental in breaking the American line at the battles of Brandywine, (September 11, 1777), and Monmouth (June 28, 1778). The last major battle in which the brigade served in the northern theater was Springfield, New Jersey (June 7, 1780). The following year, the brigade was active in the southern theater, most notably at Guilford Courthouse (March 15, 1781) and Yorktown, where it was captured (October 19, 1781).