Showing posts with label 1st Maryland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1st Maryland. Show all posts

Sunday, October 30, 2011

October 30, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 30th: The American medical service cannot cope with the sick; William Howe prepared to attack upper Manhattan and White Plains; Henry Clinton balked at Howe’s plans.

Previous entry: October 29th; next: October 31st.


The American army at White Plains grimly held on to their redoubts and trenches. The men continued to suffer from a lack of food, medicine, proper clothing, and all other materials necessary for an army’s survival.

The Americans had established a general hospital in a church in the town of North Castle, 9 miles to the northeast, but it was poorly staffed due to a shortage of physicians.

The head of the American medical service (Doctor John Morgan) later wrote:

“I cannot but feel for the hospital surgeons [at North Castle], who… were suddenly overwhelmed with numbers of sick sent to them, as well as the wounded … at a time when an engagement was considered as inevitable, there were few at hand to give aid… the wounded, who were conveyed to the hospitals, naturally demanded the attention of the whole body of surgeons, to administer aid to them.”

The sick, it seems, were largely left to the informal care of their comrades.

Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote, “Today it being rainy[,] Luke was taking not well[, and] I still being not well… we both set out for North Castle hospital… and we got within 4 miles of the hospital and put up for this night.” They slept in the woods and then completed the arduous journey, unaided, in the morning.

Doctor John Pine, who had recently joined Washington’s army, found that it was impossible to take care of the sick men from his native Maryland. He wrote that on the 29th:

“I waited on Doctor Morgan, Director-General of the hospitals here, for medicines, etc. He told me he had nothing to say to the Maryland troops, and that it was not his business to supply the regimental surgeons with medicines, and that it must have been a mistake [for Maryland]… to send their surgeons here without them and think they were to be supplied here.”

Dr. Pine then sought out Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion, who was 15 miles away and recuperating from two wounds (one in the arm, one in the hip) he received during the fighting on Chatterton’s Hill. Smallwood wrote a letter for the doctor which gave Pine a little leverage.

When Dr. Pine sought out Dr. Morgan again, he was told that “I might have some few things, if I could go to New-York for them”.

Pine was aghast:

“I told him by the time I went there and got back, that… most of the [sick] Maryland troops would be expired. He told me he could not help it, and that medicines were very hard to be got.”

After the battle of White Plains, Lieutenant-General William Howe deferred attacking the American army again partially because he did not like the strength of the American position and partially because he decided to wait for reinforcements. Once those reinforcements arrived, he planned on attacking Washington’s army. At the same time, he wanted Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen to attack the American forces in upper Manhattan.

According to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Knyphausen’s preparations went smoothly:

“[The Americans had] demolished the bridge at Kings Bridge and those called Dyckman’s bridge and Williams’ bridge. Lieutenant General von Knyphausen had them repaired and sent the Grenadier Battalion Köhler and Wutginau’s and Stern’s [i.e., von Stein’s] regiments across the river to encamp at places where they would be safe from the fire of the rebels’ batteries. The rest of his corps encamped behind Fort Independence”.

The Kingsbridge area, circa 1776 (click to enlarge). On October 30th, Knyphausen occupied Fort Independence and crossed some men into upper Manhattan.

Howe’s reinforcements reached him late in the day. Among these troops was the 46th Regiment of Foot. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham, later wrote:

“On the 30th of October we embarked at Hellgate, and after a passage of about thirty miles by water in flat-bottomed boats, we landed at New Rochelle, and immediately marched to join General Howe’s army at the White Plains.” [see footnote]

After the reinforcements arrived, Howe could see no cause for further delay. He had, it seems, accepted that a full-scale attack on the American works was necessary and inevitable. That night (10pm) he issued orders for the troops to be under arms at 5 am. In the ensuing attack, Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister would command the left division of the army, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right.

In the past, Howe typically consulted with Clinton about any major moves, but the campaign severely strained their relationship. Howe made his plans without Clinton’s input, and Clinton took the omission badly. Clinton later complained that “I received [the] orders late at night”, and protested that he was not ready to attack. In fact, Clinton had convinced himself there would be no further attacks on the American army, because he had previously argued against it. He then reminded Howe of his objections:

“I took the liberty of intimating to the Commander in Chief that it might prove rather hazardous to make any attack from center or right until we saw what would be the effect of one from the left… and that even then they [i.e., the attacks] ought to be pressed with caution, as the enemy had a very strong position in the gorges of the mountains behind them.”

Howe was already aware of these concerns and he ignored Clinton’s protests.

Footnote: Captain William Bamford (40th Foot) recorded in his journal that these reinforcements embarked on the 29th.

Friday, October 28, 2011

October 28, 1776 (Part 4)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the fourth of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the evening of October 28th: The battle of White Plains came to an end; Washington prepared for the next British move; Knyphausen occupied Mile Square.

Previous entry: Afternoon of October 28; next: October 29th.


The battle of White Plains gradually petered out after the British and Hessian infantry broke the American line on Chatterton’s Hill.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled that after his regiment was driven from Chatterton’s Hill, “We fell back a little distance and made a stand” and at the same time “detached parties [were] engaging [the enemy] in almost every direction. We did not come in contact with the enemy again that day, and just at night we fell back to our encampment.”

The “detached parties” probably included some groups of Continentals on the northern end of Chatterton’s Hill. Colonel John Haslet of the Delaware Regiment recalled:

“The left of the regiment took post behind a fence on the top of the hill with most of the officers, and twice repulsed the light troops and [light] horse of the enemy; but seeing ourselves deserted on all hands, and the continued column of the enemy advancing, we also retired.”

Captain William Hull of the Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment stated that his command also held out for awhile:

“Colonel Webb’s regiment maintained the conflict for a time, after the other part of the brigade had abandoned the field, and it had the honour to receive the particular thanks of Washington for its bravery and orderly retreat.”

One observer (Sergeant John Smith of Lippitt’s Regiment) wrote, “this battle lasted from 9 in the morning till night tho the hottest of the battle… was but about 20 or 30 minutes”.

During this prolonged phase of the fighting, Washington sent some reinforcements towards Chatterton’s Hill, including Brigadier-General Rezin Beall’s brigade of Maryland militia (the Maryland “flying camp”) and Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. However, as Jacob Francis of Sargent’s Regiment noted, before these troops could cross the Bronx, “the British got possession of the hill, and we retreated back to the camp.”

Afterwards, the British made no further attacks. According to Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jäger), “Since the soldiers had climbed over nothing but hills, cliffs, and stone walls the whole day, constantly dragging their guns over all obstacles, it was impossible to ask anything more from them.”

The British lost around 230 men during the battle: Most of these losses occurred in the 28th Foot (67 men), 35th Foot (about 60 men), 49th Foot (28 men), and Regiment von Lossberg (about 46 men). The Americans lost more than 200 men [see Footnote 1], but the exact total is not known. Among the regiments that had considerable losses were the Maryland Battalion (44 men), the 3rd New York Regiment (34 men) and the Delaware Regiment (32 men).

During the evening, the British discovered that Chatterton’s Hill was of dubious value. Charles Stedman noted: “The possession of that hill… [did] not enable the royalists to annoy their camp, for it rose so gradually from the Bronx that its crest was not within random cannon shot”. In other words, the British could hit the main American defensive works with their cannon, but the range was too great for the fire to be accurate or destructive.

Stedman couldn’t understand why the Americans had detached a part of their army to defend Chatterton’s Hill. He wrote: “The reason of their occupying” the hill “is inexplicable… It seems to have been a blunder of General Washington’s to have placed so considerable a corps entirely out of the capacity of supporting the rest of the army”.

Stedman believed that if the British had attacked the center of the American line instead (as he wanted), the men on Chatterton’s Hill would have had a hard time aiding in the defense. [see Footnote 2]

The Americans kept close watch on the British, not knowing when another attack might come.

Jacob Francis (Sargent’s Regiment) recalled, “I stood sentinel that night in a thicket between the American camp and the hill, so near… that I could hear the Hessians”.

Joseph Plumb Martin observed that:

“The enemy had several pieces of field artillery upon this hill [Chatterton’s], and, as might be expected, entertained us with their music all the evening. We entrenched ourselves where we now lay, expecting another attack. But the British were very civil, and indeed they generally were, after they had received a check from Brother Jonathan, for any of their rude actions”.

Meanwhile, Washington decided that the American army would be in a stronger position if it occupied the hills further north (agreeing with the assessment Major-General Charles Lee made that morning). Therefore, some of the troops were ordered to begin moving their camps to the new position.

Washington expected that the British would either launch a major assault against his defensive works or move to threaten his flank. To shore up his right flank, he sent William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) to occupy high ground between White Plains and the Hudson River.

Alexander’s brigade moved quickly, and without their baggage. It was a hard night for men already exhausted by the day’s fighting. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford of the Delaware Regiment had been shot in the arm on Chatterton’s Hill (it was a flesh wound). He wrote that he and his men spent the night “without a tent or anything but the ground to lay on, and not a blanket to cover us”. Similarly, Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered that “This night we lay in the woods without tents or blankets. It was cold and we made a fire in the woods,--turned our feet to the fire and slept comfortably, although it snowed in the night.”

Situation of the armies on October 28th (click to enlarge). While Howe fought Washington at White Plains (11), Knyphausen advanced on the Mile Square (9) / Valentine's Hill area.

Off to the west, Colonel John Lasher had a detachment of men guarding the landward approaches to Manhattan. After the British raided Mile Square he was ordered to abandon his position and join the American army at White Plains. On this date he burned the American barracks at Kingsbridge and set out on a wide arch that would take his men north and east towards White Plains, and around the British army.

The same day, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, occupied Valentine’s Hill with his division of Hessians. These troops missed cutting off Lasher’s command by a matter of hours. However, by seizing Valentine’s Hill they did cut off the landward retreat of the American forces garrisoning upper Manhattan.

Footnote 1: I’ve estimated a greater American number of casualties than are stated by most authors. If one simply totals up all the numbers available in Peter Force’s American Archives, the total is 53 killed, 96 wounded, and 24 missing (or 175 in total). The relatively high proportion of killed to wounded is at least partially due to the fact that two regiments reported only the former total, not the latter. After estimating, through extrapolation, the number wounded in these regiments, the total American loss becomes about 197.

Doctor John Pine of Maryland wrote after the battle, “the number of killed and wounded, as the report is in the camp, amounts only to about 90, but from the wounded I saw myself in the hospital, and adjacent houses, there must at least be an hundred and twenty or thirty wounded[,] the number of killed I don’t know.”

Documents show that there were several casualties between the Pennsylvania State troops and New Hampshire militia not listed in Force. Brooks’ and Moseley’s Massachusetts militia regiments likely suffered a fair number of casualties on Chatterton’s Hill, but no return exists of their losses. A conservative estimate of losses in these units, added to the losses in the other units, raises the American total to close to the reported British total.

Footnote 2: To the best of my knowledge, Washington did not describe why he chose to defend Chatterton’s Hill. Tallmadge claimed he alerted Washington to the presence of American militia on Chatterton’s Hill and the advance of British troops in their direction. Afterwards, Washington directed several units to the hill, and ordered a trusted officer (John Haslet) to take command of the militia. Perhaps Washington intended simply to support troops (militia) that were well-positioned to impede the British attack. In other words, the defense of Chatterton’s Hill may have been another manifestation of Washington’s general strategy of harassing the British at every opportunity (consider how Washington used his forces on the 21st, the 26th, and the morning of the 28th). The Staten Island raid, the American defense of Pell’s Point and the engagement near East Chester can be understood in these terms as well.

October 28, 1776 (Part 3)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the third of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the afternoon of October 28th: British and Hessian regiments attacked and seized Chatterton’s Hill.

Previous entry: Midday on October 28; next: Evening of October 28.


The first British troops to attack the Americans on Chatterton’s Hill were Regiment von Lossberg and the 28th and 35th Regiments of Foot. They crossed the Bronx River under cover of a cannonade

The Americans had two or three of their own field pieces on the hill. Colonel John Haslet (Delaware Regiment) tried to gall the approaching British infantry with one piece. However:

“[the gun was] so poorly appointed, that myself was forced to assist in dragging it along [in] the rear of the regiment. While so employed, a cannon-ball struck the carriage, and scattered the shot about, a wad of tow blazing in the middle. The artillerymen fled. One alone was prevailed upon to tread out the blaze and collect the shot. The few that returned made not more than two discharges, when they retreated with the field-piece.”

The two British foot regiments crossed at a ford, and made it across the river quickly. Then, according to Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige, they “turned to their left and came up to storm the entrenchment” occupied by the Massachusetts militia regiments of John Moseley and Eleazer Brooks.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall sent the Maryland battalion to the support of the militia. According to a Maryland officer, “Colonel [William] Smallwood… was ordered to march down the hill and attack the enemy... and a smart contest ensued, in which the enemy gave way”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton attributed this setback to the officer leading this advance. He observed that when the British “suddenly found themselves exposed to a very heavy fire… The officer who led them… marched forward about twenty paces… halted, fired his fuzee, and began to reload (his column remaining during the time under the enemy’s fire)”. Watching this, he predicted “that they would break. It happened as I said [it would]”.

To the south, Regiment von Lossberg also experienced difficulty. According to Johann Caspar Ries, “[we] found a little river [the Bronx] before us, though which we had to wade, the water going into the cartouche pouches of most of the men. Scarcely were we through the water, than a rain of shot fell upon us, by which many were wounded.”

Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister claimed that the regiment was exposed because “On the far side [of the river there] is a steep slope, where the right wing had to halt while the left maneuvered to the front”. Ries added that “the left wing had to march through a wood that had been set alight, so that many men burnt the shoes on their feet.”

The Hessians advanced towards the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions, which were jointly led by Colonel William Douglas. The Connecticutians claimed that they drove back the Hessians just as the Massachusetts militia and Marylanders had with the British regulars.

One of the Connecticutians wrote that:

“[the Hessians] came up in the front of Colonel Douglas' s regiment, and we fired a general volley upon them, at about twenty rods distance, and scattered them like leaves in a whirlwind; and they ran off so far, that some… ran out to the ground where they were… and brought off their arms and accoutrements, and rum, that the men who fell had with them, which we had time to drink round… before they came on again.” [see Footnote 1]

More succinctly, Colonel Gold Silliman of the 1st Connecticut wrote, “We gave them a heavy fire which made them retreat but they soon returned”.

The British, it seems, intensified their cannonade after this initial check; possibly some field pieces were wheeled closer to the hill. Haslet described this as a “cannonade from twelve or fifteen pieces, well served, [which] kept up a continual peal of reiterated thunder.” A Connecticutian recalled, “the air and hills smoked and echoed terribly with the bursting of shells: the fences and walls were knocked down, and torn to pieces, and men' s legs, arms, and bodies, mingled with cannon and grape-shot all round us.” [see Footnote 1]

The British formed a line of battle on the lower part of Chatterton’s Hill. The troops crowded together, as there was little room for them to form. According to Thomas Sullivan (49th Regiment of Foot):

“Lieutenant Colonel [Robert] Carr, who commanded the 35th Regiment, behaved with great courage, being obliged to force the left of his battalion through the right wing of the 28th… The 49th Battalion formed as well as the ground would admit, [and] every company engaged as they came up… The hill was so narrow that the right-hand company of our battalion had scarcely room to form”.

The 49th Foot found itself opposite the Delaware Regiment. According to Thomas Sullivan:

“Captain[-Lieutenant William] Gore, who commanded the right wing of our battalion, seeing the rebels which we engaged on the right wing were dressed in blue, took them to be Colonel Rall’s brigade of Hessians, and immediately ordered us to cease firing; for, says he, ‘you are firing at your own men.’ We ceased for about two minutes. The rebels, hearing him, made answer that they were no Hessians, and that we should soon know the difference”.

Other British units moved to threaten the flanks of the American position.

Regiment von Rall advanced against the American right flank, with Regiment von Knyphausen and the Lieb Regiment in support.

According to Major John Brooks of Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment, the American left flank was threatened by “a body of light infantry and jaegers”.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall spotted the threat to the left, and he ordered Webb’s Regiment, (and perhaps also the 3rd New York Regiment), partially down the hill to meet them.

This movement greatly exposed the men to British cannon fire. According to Second Lieutenant Elisha Bostwick of Webb’s Regiment:

“a cannon ball cut down Lieutenant Young’s platoon which was next to that of mine[;] the ball first took the head of [Nathaniel] Smith, a stout heavy man and dashed it open, then it took off Chilson’s arm… it then took [Joel] Taylor across the bowels, it then struck Sergeant [Amasa] Garret of our company on the hip [and] took off the point of the hip bone[.] Smith and Taylor were left on the spot. Sergeant Garret was carried [away] but died the same day[.] Now to think, oh! What a sight that was to see within a distance of six rods those men with their legs and arms and guns and packs all in a heap[.] There was not a better sergeant in the army than Sergeant Garret when the soldiers were murmuring, weary, without shelter cold and hungry[;] he would stir about among them build fires and get them all in good humour and cheerful.”

For this cost, Webb’s Regiment succeeded in turning back the threat to the left. According to Captain William Hull, “After a sharp conflict, the object was completely attained.”

Meanwhile, the British began a major push against the right and center of the American position. Their line now included, from left to right, Regiment von Lossberg, the 28th, 35th, and 49th regiments of Foot. Behind these troops crowded up two battalions of Hessians grenadiers (von Linsing and Block) and the 5th Regiment of Foot.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled:

“There was in our front, about ten rods distant, an orchard of apple trees. The ground on which the orchard stood was lower than the ground that we occupied, but was level from our post to the verge of the orchard, when it fell off so abruptly that we could see the lower parts of the trees. A party of Hessian troops [Regiment von Lossberg], and some English [the 28th Regiment of Foot], soon took possession of this ground: they would advance so far as just to show themselves above the rising ground, fire, and fall back and reload their muskets. Our chance upon them was, as soon as they showed themselves above the level ground, or when they fired, to aim at the flashes of their guns—their position was as advantageous to them as a breastwork.”

Lieutenant Enoch Anderson (Delaware Regiment) remembered:

“Now began our firing with small arms on the hill and a hot fire was kept up for some time. Many lives were lost on both sides and many were wounded.”

He remembered in particular seeing a mortally wounded soldier of his regiment who “fell to the ground” and “in falling, his gun fell from him.” Then “He picked it up,--turned on his face,--took aim at the British, who were advancing,--fired,--the gun fell from him,--he turned over on his back and expired.”

This map (click to enlarge) illustrates the position of British (red numbers) and American units (blue circles) during the British assault on Chatterton’s Hill.

I relied on Thomas Sullivan's account for the placement of the British foot regiments on Chatterton's Hill. Other details about the construction of this map can be found in the post for Midday on October 28.

Although the Connecticut battalions and Delaware Regiment offered stiff resistance, the units in between soon began to collapse. First, according to Haslet, “The [Massachusetts] militia regiment behind the fence fled in confusion, without more than a random, scattering fire” [see Footnote 2].

The Maryland battalion gave way next. According to Lieutenant William Harrison:

“We were badly disposed to receive the attack of the enemy’s small arms, and unfortunately much exposed to their artillery, which flanked us so heavily as to render the post tenable but a short time. The matter was ended by a confused and precipitate retreat on our part”.

The remaining American units were soon hard pressed. Haslet wrote that “the first three Delaware companies [those closest to the retreating troops] also retreated in disorder, but not till after several were wounded and killed.”

The Connecticut state troops found themselves almost surrounded. The collapse of the center of the American line allowed British and Hessian troops to threaten the left flank of the Connecticut men, while at the same time Regiment von Rall drove against their right flank.

One of the Connecticut men wrote:

“they advanced in solid columns upon us, and were gathering all round us ten to our one. Colonel Douglas's and Silliman's regiments fired four or five times on them as they were advancing, and then retreated; but not till the enemy began to fire on their flanks. Colonels Silliman, Douglas and Arnold behaved nobly, and the men [afterwards] gained much applause.” [see Footnote 1]

Most of the Connecticutians who were killed or wounded were struck down when they fled. According to Colonel Silliman, “we were obliged to retreat which we did through a most furious fire from the enemy for half a mile for so far there was nothing to cover us from it…”

Joseph Plumb Martin recalled:

“finding ourselves flanked and in danger of being surrounded, we were compelled to make a hasty retreat from the stone wall. We lost comparatively speaking, very few at the fence: but when forced to retreat, we lost, in killed and wounded, a considerable number. One man who belonged to our company… said, “Now I am going out to the field to be killed;”… and he was—he was shot dead on the field.”

Footnote 1: This passage is from an anonymous letter published in newspapers after the battle. Ezra Stiles believed the author was Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull of the 5th Connecticut State Battalion.

Footnote 2: Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige of Moseley’s Regiment offered this curious recollection:

“While they [the British] were rallying [after the first unsuccessful attack], the Highlanders came down, stacked their arms, drew their broadswords, and formed in rear of the [British] infantry. Then they all came up. Our men opened fire as before, and soon the enemy’s infantry opened, and the Highlanders marched into our entrenchments, and the Americans retreated down the hill westwardly.”

None of the British or Hessian accounts make mention of a Highlander regiment participating in this attack (though there were two with the army – the 42nd and 71st regiments). This description would make considerably more sense if Hessian grenadiers were substituted for highlanders. The Hessian grenadiers were placed in the second line, and although they were not armed with broadswords, they did carry short swords called hangers.

Thursday, September 29, 2011

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (13)

This is Part 13 in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12.

At the battle of Guilford Courthouse, British units reached the Americans’ third and final defensive line at different times and attacked in a piecemeal fashion. First Lieutenant-Colonel James Webster led an attack against the American right that was bloodily repulsed (Part 9). Then, the 2nd Battalion of Guards attacked the American left and defeated the troops opposed to them (Part 10). The Guards’ success, however, was short-lived; they were soon mauled made by counterattacking American infantry and cavalry (the 1st Maryland Regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s dragoons; Part 12).

Although these attacks were unsuccessful, the threat they posed was sufficiently great that the American commander, Major-General Nathanael Greene, ordered his army to retreat (Part 11).

The setbacks also did not deter the British from continuing their attacks. The 71st Regiment reached the Guilford Courthouse building more or less opposed, where they threatened the flank and rear of the 1st Maryland Regiment. Webster’s group advanced again and attacked the 2nd Virginia Regiment. Finally, the 23rd Regiment of Foot and the remnants of the Guards began to advance once more.

The American forces still on the field could not hope to repel all of these threats.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard was with the 1st Maryland Regiment, and recalled:

I found myself in the cleared ground, and saw the seventy-first regiment near the courthouse, and other columns of the enemy appearing in different directions. Washington's horse having gone off, I found it necessary to retire, which I did leisurely; but many of the guards who were lying on the ground, and who we supposed were wounded, got up and fired at us as we retired. [1]

Then, Webster’s men advanced again and attacked the 2nd Virginia Regiment.

Lewis Griffin of the 2nd Virginia saw his brigade commander get wounded in this clash:

General [Isaac] Huger was wounded in the right hand in my view. I saw him with his Sword in his hand raised above his head encouraging his men when a shot penetrated his hand and his Sword fell in his lap, which he caught up with his left, drew from his pocket a handkerchief, tied up his hand, and moved on, not long after this occurrence we were ordered to retreat. [2]

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At top, the 33rd Regiment of Foot advances against the 2nd Virginia Regiment (click to enlarge). At lower left, the 1st Maryland Regiment holds the open ground; at lower right, the 71st Foot has reached the courthouse building (not shown).

Another view of the above. At bottom and lower left: The 23rd Foot and remnants of the Guards assemble on the edge of the open ground near three-pounders of the Royal Artillery. The 2nd Virginia Regiment is represented by the troops around the red and white flag; the 1st Maryland by the troops around the blue flag.

Another view of the above. In the foreground, the last of the North Carolina militia retreat along the Reedy Fork Road. In the background, the 23rd Foot prepares to advance.

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Finally, the 23rd Regiment of Foot and the remnants of the Guards advanced once more.

According to Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, “the two 6-pounders [of Singleton’s battery] once more fell into our hands; two ammunition-wagons and two other 6-pounders [Finley’s battery], being all the artillery they had in the field, were likewise taken… The 23rd and 71st regiments, with part of the cavalry, were ordered to pursue”. [3]

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At right, the 1st Maryland Regiment retreats along the Reedy Fork Road, while the British Guards, the 23rd, 33rd, and 71st Regiments seize the American artillery.

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The exhausted 23rd and 71st regiments did not advance very far, but the British cavalry thundered down the road after the retreating Continentals. They soon received a check from some troops of the 1st Virginia Regiment, who were acting as rearguard. According to Henry Ingle:

on our retreat we went about 3 quarters of a mile… got into a thicket we had not been there but a little while until we spied the British Light Horse coming through the lane full speed when they got within about 40 yards we stepped out in an open place and fired upon them and there was a dreadful slaughter again of Light horse men &c. [4]

Greene wrote, in concluding his report:

General Huger was the last that was engaged, and gave the enemy a check. We retreated in good order to the Reedy Fork river; and crossed at the ford, about three miles from the field of action, and then halted, and drew up the troops, until we collected most of the stragglers. We lost our artillery, and two ammunition wagons, the greater part of the horses being killed before the retreat began, and it being impossible to move the pieces but along the great road. After collecting our stragglers, we retired… ten miles distant from Guilford. [3]

But the battle was not quite over yet. South of the American third line, a separate battle continued between American riflemen and light infantry and Hessian infantry and British guardsmen.

Notes:

1. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

2. Pension application of Lewis Griffin, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. Cornwallis' and Greene's accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

4. Pension application of Henry Ingle, transcribed by Will Graves.

Monday, September 19, 2011

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (12)

This is Part 12 in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11.

The 2nd Battalion of Guards was one of the first British units to reach the American third line. They attacked and quickly defeated the 2nd Maryland Regiment. In their pursuit of this regiment, the Guards then captured a battery of guns and gained the American flank and rear (Part 10). This success on their part was short-lived. Moments later they were suddenly counterattacked by the 1st Maryland Regiment and charged by Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s light dragoons.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard of the 1st Maryland Regiment recalled:

Our men gave them some well directed fires, and we then advanced and continued firing. At this time [Colonel John] Gunby's horse was shot… his horse fell upon him, and it was with difficulty he extricated himself. Major [Archibald] Anderson was killed about this time. As we advanced I observed Washington's horse, and as their movements were quicker than ours, they first charged and broke the enemy. My men followed very quickly, and we passed through the guards, many of whom had been knocked down by the horse without being much hurt. We took some prisoners, and the whole were in our power. [1]

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee, in his history of the southern campaign, wrote that “Gunby… wheeled to his left upon [the Guards]… Here the action was well fought; each corps manfully struggling for victory; when lieutenant colonel Washington… pressed forward with his cavalry… This combined operation was irresistible… the two field pieces were recovered” and the Guards were “driven back with slaughter”.

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From the third line, looking west (here and below, click to enlarge). In the foreground, the 2nd Battalion of Guards melees with the 1st Maryland and William Washington's light dragoons. In the middle ground, British infantry, artillery, and cavalry approach the third line. In the extreme distance lie casualties from the fighting on the first and second lines.

A view of the third line fighting looking south. The 2nd Guards are being mauled at upper left, while other British units approach from the right. At center, the 2nd Virginia Regiment occupies a hillside opposite the 33rd Regiment of Foot.

The 1st Maryland Regiment drives the 2nd Battalion of Guards into the open field.

Washington's light dragoons pursue the remnants of the 2nd Guards.

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Most of the Guards were left prostrate on the field of battle, but a number reached the western edge of the field. Lee believed these men were “saved by the British artillery". He wrote that these guns:

“to stop the ardent pursuit of Washington and Howard, opened upon friends as well as foes; for [Lieutenant-General Charles] Cornwallis, seeing the vigorous advance of these two officers, determined to arrest their progress, though every ball, leveled at them, must pass through the flying guards.” [2]

Neither Howard nor Cornwallis mentioned the British firing on their own men. However, Cornwallis did report that “The enemy's cavalry was soon repulsed by a well-directed fire from two 3-pounders”. [2]

Hundreds of American militia were in the vicinity of this bloody clash, and it seems some were willing to continue the contest. John Wadkins stated that “some of the militia who had stopped at the Court House followed in the rear of the Horse” when they charged the Guards [3]. James Martin claimed that he helped rally “about 500 [men] & was marching them to the Battle Ground” [3].

However, Greene had previously issued orders for the army to retreat (see Part 11), and soon these militia began to move off. Martin noted that when he was approaching the fighting “I met General Stephens [i.e., Brigadier-General Edward Stevens] of [the] Virginia [militia] Corps retreating[.] I asked if the Retreat was by General Greene's Orders[;] he told me it was[.] I then retreated with him” [4].

At the same time that Howard and Washington lost their potential support, the Guards were aided by British troops coming through the woods.

Cornwallis wrote:

the 71st regiment, which, having been impeded by some deep ravine, were now coming out of the wood on the right of the Guards, opposite to the Court-house. By the spirited exertions of Brigadier-General [Charles] O'Hara, though wounded, the second battalion of Guards was soon rallied, and, supported by the grenadiers [of the Guards], returned to the charge with the greatest alacrity. The 23rd regiment arriving at that instant from our left, and Lieut.-Colonel [Banastre] Tarleton having advanced with a part of the cavalry, the enemy were soon put to flight. [2]

Notes:

A challenging aspect of depicting the battle in miniature has involved issues of timing. The sequence of events involving each unit is generally clear, but it’s rather difficult to determine how the events involving one unit corresponded in time with the events involving other units on the battlefield. A source of particular consternation for me has been the retreat of Stevens’ brigade to the third line. In recent posts, Stevens’ men were depicted as reaching the third line only after major combat had begun on the third line (in the second picture, above, they are the block of retreating militia at the top of the image). There are a couple of reasons for this. One is that the 71st Foot is known to have been delayed by rough terrain on its march to the third line (see Cornwallis' quote, above); Stevens’ brigade had to traverse the same ground, and it’s reasonable to think they would have been delayed as well. The other is Martin's pension application (also quoted above), which implies that Stevens’ brigade was still moving towards the courthouse when the Guards were defeated. However, the depiction has ended up looking a bit peculiar – this huge brigade of Virginia militia is shown essentially behind the Guards during the third line fighting. Of course, the alternative would also look a bit odd – having Stevens' brigade reach the third line quickly only to stand idly about while the Guards attacked and routed the 2nd Maryland. (As is, there are already quite a few militia figures shown hovering near the third line, based on Martin’s comment above, and comments by St. George Tucker concerning Lawson’s Virginia brigade [5]). There is, to say the least, room for varying interpretations.

1. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

4. Lee's and Cornwallis' accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium

3. Pension application of John Wadkins.

4. Pension application of James Martin.

5. Letters of St. George Tucker to his wife (from the Magazine of American History).

Wednesday, September 14, 2011

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (11)

This is Part 11 in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10.

At the battle of Guilford Courthouse, Major-General Nathanael Greene used an elaborate defense-in-depth to wear down the advancing British infantry. He hoped they would be primed for defeat by the time they reached the Continentals posted on the the third and final line. However, a number of things had not gone as planned. The North Carolina militia retreated without orders on the first line (Part 4). So too did part of the Virginia militia on the second line (Part 6). Also, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s flank corps had become separated from rest of the army (Part 8). Finally, on the third line, the 2nd Maryland regiment gave cursory resistance to the British 2nd Battalion of Guards, then broke and fled (Part 10). Greene later wrote:

[the Guards had] turned our left flank, got into the rear of the Virginia brigade, and appearing to be gaining on our right, which would have encircled the whole of the continental troops, I thought it was most advisable to order a retreat. [1]

There is some unwitting exaggeration in this description. The Guards had gained the rear of the American line, but probably they had not yet advanced as far as the Virginia regiments. The Guards were also much too few in number to encircle “the whole of the continental troops”. Nevertheless, the sudden collapse of his left flank may have appeared to presage the total defeat of his army. Greene's orders to retreat no doubt seemed prudent.

However, the Continental units nearest the 2nd Guards had already chosen to take matters into their own hands.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard of the 1st Maryland recalled:

[M]y station being on the left of the first regiment, and next the cleared ground, Captain Gibson, deputy adjutant-general, rode to me, and informed me that a party of the enemy, inferior in number to us, were pushing through the cleared ground and into our rear, and that if we would face about and charge them, we might take them. We had been for some time engaged with a part of Webster's brigade, though not hard pressed, and at that moment their fire had slackened. I rode to [Colonel John] Gunby and gave him the information. He did not hesitate to order the regiment to face about, and we were immediately engaged with the guards. [2]

Also nearby was Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s cavalry, which consisted of the 1st and 3rd Light Dragoons, and additional troops raised recently in North Carolina and Virginia.

Lieutenant Philemon Holcombe, who served under Washington, recalled:

Colo[nel] Washington’s command was in view of the conflicting armies and were spectators of the bloody scene for several hours. The Carolina Militia had given way, and the second and third lines of the american army were hard pressed, and the British columns were passing to the rear of the american line, flushed with victory, marching rapidly and in some confusion. [3]

Coolly appraising the situation, Washington did not hesitate to act. In Holcombe’s words, “the brave and gallant William Washington ordered a charge upon their columns”.

The 2nd Battalion of Guards (at center) is simultaneously attacked by the 1st Maryland Regiment (shown here with a blue regimental flag), and Washington's cavalry (the mounted men at left). (Click to enlarge).

Another view of the above; North Carolina militiamen look on as Washington's cavalry charges.

Notes:

1. Greene's account of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

2. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

3. Pension application of Philemon Holcombe.

Saturday, September 10, 2011

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (10)

This is the tenth in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9.

The second battalion of British Guards was placed in reserve at the start of the battle, but before long the battalion entered the action and on the second line it helped defeat both Lawson’s (Part 6) and Stevens’ (Part 7) brigades of Virginia militia. The Guards then pressed on towards the American third line. The units to their left and right were delayed in the woods, and when the Guards reached the third line, they were without support.

The second battalion of Guards found opposite them, in an open field, the 2nd Maryland Regiment. Although the 2nd Maryland was considerably larger, the Guards did not hesitate to attack.

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The Guards Approach the Third Line (click to enlarge). The 2nd Battalion of Guards has entered the field at left and is attacking the 2nd Maryland Regiment. In the foreground, Virginia and North Carolina militia rally. In the distance, Stevens' Virginia militia and several British units approach the edge of the woods, and American light infantry clash with the British left (see Part 9).

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The Marylanders’ regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Ford, reacted aggressively. According to an American staff officer (Colonel William Davie), Ford “ordered a charge, that proceeded some distance,” but the brigade commander, Colonel Otho Holland Williams, ordered them to halt and reform their line. The British meanwhile “continued to advance (at the run)”. Soon they brought the disordered Marylanders “under a heavy fire”. [1]

When the 2nd Maryland was ordered to attack again, they gave way and headed for the rear.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard blamed this collapse on “the want of officers, and having so many new recruits” in this regiment. Howard’s own regiment, the 1st Maryland, was nearby but provided no immediate assistance. He noted, “This transaction [between the Guards and 2nd Maryland] was in a great measure concealed from the first regiment by the wood, and unevenness of the ground.” [2]

The Guards’ followed the 2nd Maryland into the rear of the American position, and in this pursuit they captured Captain Singleton’s battery of two 6-pounders.

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The Guards pursue the 2nd Maryland and gain the Americans' left flank.

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Notes:

1. Blackwell P. Robinson (1976). The Revolutionary War sketches of William R. Davie, as cited by Lawrence E. Babits (1998). The "Fifth" Maryland at Guilford Courthouse: An exercise in historical accuracy.

2. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

Friday, September 2, 2011

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (9)

This is the eighth in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8.

At the beginning of the battle, Lieutenant-Colonel James Webster commanded the left half of the British line (the 23rd and 33rd regiments, aided by part of the British Guards and a company of jaegers). With these men, he overcome part of the North Carolinians defending the rail fence (Part 4), and got into a nasty fight with William Washington’s flank corps in the woods (Part 5). During these actions, Webster gravitated to wherever the action was hottest. He boldly led the 23rd Foot through the open fields in front of the North Carolinians on the first line, and then joined the 33rd Foot after its flank was threatened by Washington. [1]

Webster’s men fought with skill and courage, and eventually they pushed through the woods to the Americans’ third and final line. Probably their advance was facilitated by the early and almost total collapse of the second line troops nearest them (i.e., Randolph’s and Holcombe’s regiments of Lawson’s brigade, see Part 6).

In any case, Webster reached the third line before the rest of the British army. Many of the Continentals on the third line were placed on a wooded hillside and hidden from view; Webster, however, could see that part of the line which abutted an old field to his front. He ordered an attack.

According to Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee:

Webster… sought with zeal the continental line; and presently approached its right wing. Here was posted the first regiment of Maryland… The enemy rushed into close fire; but so firmly was he received by this body of veterans, supported by Hawe's regiment of Virginia [i.e., the 2nd Virginia] and Kirkwood's company of Delawares… that with equal rapidity he was compelled to recoil from the shock. [2]

A soldier with the 2nd Virginia vividly recalled that the Continentals were positioned “along behind a fence near a creek”, and that “when the British marched up towards us we fired upon them and there was a dreadful slaughter indeed… he could have walked for one hundred yards upon dead men and not have touched the ground.” [3]

According to Lee, Webster fell back across “a ravine in his rear,” “occupied an advantageous height,” and waited “for the approach of the rest of the line.”

Then, the men in Washington’s flank corps tried to exploit this reverse. Sergeant-Major William Seymour of the Delaware regiment wrote, “Washington’s Light Infantry… pursued them up a very steep hill, almost inaccessible”. The British “lay concealed in ambush,” and when the Americans approached they “[rose] up, and [poured] in a very heavy fire” by which the Americans “suffered very much” and “were obliged to retreat”. [4]

Webster's men (at center) approach the 3rd line (here and below, click to enlarge). The blue-coated Continentals are, from left-to-right, the 1st Maryland Regiment, the 2nd Virginia Regiment, and the 1st Virginia Regiment (cf. the third line at Guilford Courthouse). Some of the Virginia militia can be seen retreating from the second third line or rallying behind the Continentals.

The 33rd Foot is staggered by a volley.

“Washington’s light infantry” pursue Webster's men.

Notes:

William Seymour served in Captain Robert Kirkwood’s company of the 1st Delaware Regiment and kept a journal during the southern campaign of the Revolutionary War. At Cowpens, Kirkwood’s company participated in a sudden American counterattack that broke apart the British and turned the battle into a major American victory. Something similar appears to have been attempted on this occasion. The British had fought their way through the militia, only to be bloodily repulsed by the Continentals. The Americans then made a bold counterattack. However, the counterattack at Cowpens is famous, while this counterattack at Guilford Courthouse has been almost wholly forgotten (presumably because the former succeeded while the latter did not). At Cowpens, the American counterattack was made by all of the Continentals and across a short expanse of fairly level ground. At Guilford Courthouse, only “Washington’s Light Infantry” are credited with the counterattack, and the movement was made across a wider and more difficult expanse of ground.

Washington’s Continental light infantry included Kirkwood's Delaware light infantry company, and Captain Phillip Huffman's Virginia light infantry company [cf. Babits & Howard (2009) Long, obstinate, and bloody: The battle of Guilford Courthouse]. Possibly some or all of Colonel Charles Lynch’s Virginia riflemen, who also served in Washington’s flank corps, participated in this counterattack.

1. See the accounts by Charles Cornwallis, Charles Stedman, and Roger Lamb in this compendium of sources.

2. Henry Lee (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

3. Pension application of Henry Ingle.

4. William Seymour (1896). A journal of the southern expedition: 1780-1783. Papers of the Historical Society of Delaware, 15, 3-42.

Friday, May 20, 2011

The 71st at Guilford Courthouse

The 71st Regiment of Foot (Fraser's Highlanders) was one of the most active British units serving in the southern theater of the American Revolutionary War. The regiment played an important role a string of British victories in the south from 1778-1780. However, 1781 proved to be a very difficult year for the regiment. The 1st battalion of the 71st was captured at the battle of Cowpens, while the 2nd battalion was first mauled at Guilford Courthouse and then captured at Yorktown.

In this post I summarize the experiences of the 71st Foot at Guilford Courthouse, giving special attention to the role the 71st may have played in breaking the American “third line” at the battle.

The map below shows the approximate movements of the 71st during the battle. The red and blue lines show positions early in the battle for British and American units, respectively. The long red arrow marks the approximate path taken by the 71st. The numbers on the map refer to important events involving the 71st during the battle. These are:

  1. The 71st attacks North Carolina militiamen behind a rail fence on the first line.
  2. The 71st battles Virginia militiamen on the wooded second line.
  3. The 71st struggles to cross a ravine.
  4. The 71st reaches the high ground near Guilford Courthouse and threatens the Americans’ left flank.

Movements of the 71st Foot at Guilford Courthouse.

1. Attack on the First Line.

Early in the battle, the 71st was ordered to cross a muddy field and assail the American first line (specifically, part of John Butler's brigade of North Carolina militia). David Stewart, a historian who chronicled the experiences of the highland regiments during the Revolutionary War, wrote that:

The Americans, covered by the fence in their front, maintained their position with confidence, and reserved their fire till the British were within thirty or forty paces. At this short distance, their fire was destructive to [the British in front], nearly one-third being killed or wounded. The [British] returned the fire, and rushed forward on the enemy, who abandoned their fence, and retreated on the second line. [1]

Some of the most vivid accounts of this attack were given by the North Carolinians who faced the 71st. John Wadkins recalled:

The North Carolina Militia was stationed in the front line in the rear of a fence – [I] was in the left wing – orders were given us not to fire until the Enemy passed two dead Trees standing in the field through which he was to approach us, about 100 yards from the fence. The morning was cloudy – cannonading commenced on both sides which lasted a short time only – after it ceased, the enemy began to advance and fire – and as soon as they reached the trees the N. C. militia fired – and that part of the line in which [I] was exchanged three or four fires – when [we] became alarmed by report that the enemy was surrounding [us] – and fled [2]

Nathan Slade also appears to have faced the 71st. He recalled:

At the battle of Guilford I was one of the North Carolina militia. We were in that battle stationed by Genl. Greene behind a fence that being a position which he thought most advantageous for raw troops who were unaccustomed to stand the shock of battle... The enemy approached us and were according to the best of my belief within eighty to an hundred yards of us when they made their first fire—my recollection is that most of us stood firm until after the second fire. On the third fire there were but few if any of us left to receive it—all or nearly all had broke and retreated in great disorder. [3]

2. Attack on the Second Line.

The 71st then moved on to attack the second line (specifically, part of Edward Stevens' brigade of Virginia militia). Here the fighting was more prolonged, but the 71st suffered fewer losses. According to Stewart, “The ground was level, but the wood was so thick and difficult, that, though the fire rolled in torrents, few were killed on either side.” [1]

3. Delay.

The attacking British regiments reached the American third line at different times. The 33rd Regiment attacked Continentals first and was repulsed. Then the 2nd battalion of Guards arrived and defeated the Americans' 2nd Maryland Regiment. The American army commander, Major-General Nathanael Greene, was alarmed by the defeat of the 2nd Maryland, and he ordered a general retreat. Before this order was received, the Guards were defeated by the 1st Maryland Regiment and William Washington’s dragoons. The Marylanders and dragoons then chased the Guards to the western edge of the cleared ground on the third line. The 71st arrived just as the Washington's dragoons received a check.

According to British army commander, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis:

The enemy's cavalry was soon repulsed by a well-directed fire from two 3-pounders just brought up tip by Lieutenant Macleod, and by the appearance of the grenadiers of the Guards, and of the 71st regiment, which, having been impeded by some deep ravine, were now coming out of the wood on the right of the Guards, opposite to the Court-house. [4]

4. The 71st Reaches the Courthouse.

Following the defeat of the Guards, the 71st boldly advanced around the American left flank. According to Stewart, this was maneuver prompted the retreat of the remaining American forces. He wrote:

…the Highlanders, who had rapidly pushed round the flank, appeared on a rising ground in rear of the left of the enemy, and, rushing forward with shouts, made such an impression on the Americans, that they immediately fled, abandoning their guns and ammunition, without attempting farther resistance. [1]

This account is partly confirmed by Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard of the 1st Maryland Regiment, who recalled:

After passing through the guards [i.e., defeating the British 2nd battalion of Guards]… I found myself in the cleared ground, and saw the seventy-first regiment near the courthouse, and other columns of the enemy appearing in different directions. Washington's horse having gone off, I found it necessary to retire, which I did leisurely [5]

Howard said that the Washington's dragoons had “gone off” without elaborating. It is possible that they charged the 71st.

Philemon Holcombe, who was with Washington’s cavalry this day, recalled that after defeating the Guards,

…Colo. Washington moved against a large body of Tories, two hundred in numbers, who were formed near the Court house. They were well armed. On the approach of the Cavalry, they fired their guns, and took shelter in the Court house, and under it, for it was not underpined. [6]

A large body of American militia rallied near the courthouse after the British broke the first and second lines. Curiously, none mentioned the advance of the 71st. For example, James Martin recalled that

General Greene… wished me to go with Major Hunter to the Court House in case of a Defeat to rally the Men which we did and collected about 500 & was marching them to the Battle Ground when I met General Stephens [Edward Stevens] of Virginia Corps retreating I asked if the Retreat was by General Greene's Orders he told me it was I then retreated with him [7]

John Wadkins' account suggests that some of the militia may even have attempted to pursue the defeated British Guards. He remembered that “…some of the militia who had stopped at the Court House followed in the rear of the Horse to the Battle Ground” [2]

If all of these accounts are accurate, then it would seem that the American militia left the courthouse area shortly before the 71st arrived. As mentioned above, General Greene ordered the army to retreat after the 2nd Maryland was routed.

In any case, the last of the American units began to withdraw.

Cornwallis wrote that “The 23rd and 71st regiments, with part of the [British] cavalry, were ordered to pursue.” [4] The pursuit, however, does not appear to have been especially energetic. Thomas Cook, a North Carolina militiaman, recalled, “The British did not follow us as we guessed, just took our cannon and fired it upon us.” [8] Possibly this was men of the 71st regiment firing two 6-pounders the Americans had abandoned near the courthouse.

By the conclusion of the battle, the 71st had lost 13 killed and 50 wounded out of 244 men (or 26%).

Notes:

1. David Stewart (1825). Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

2. Pension application of John Wadkins.

3. Pension application of Nathan Slade

4. Cornwallis' account of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

5. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

6. Pension application of Philemon Holcombe

7. Pension application of James Martin

8. Pension application of Thomas Cook