Struggle for Sorel

This is the most recent entry in a series of posts on the American invasion of Canada, for an index of past posts, see here.

Sorel was occupied by British Lieutenant-Colonel Allan Maclean in mid-October, 1775. Maclean’s force consisted of 120 men of the newly-raised Royal Highland Emigrants, 60-some men of the 7th Foot, and a number of Canadian militia. Maclean brought these men from Quebec with the intention of aiding in the relief of Fort Saint-Jean. He advanced up the Richelieu as far as Saint-Denis, where he found that a key bridge had been cut. Some local Canadians were welcomed into his camp, but these men then slipped away at the first opportunity – taking arms and ammunition with them. Maclean returned to Sorel and awaited the advance of Governor Guy Carleton’s force from Montreal.

Carleton’s army was defeated at the battle of Longueuil, which ended hopes of relieving Fort Saint-Jean. Maclean’s militia returned home once the dispiriting news was received. Maclean returned to Quebec soon thereafter, but he left behind an armed vessel (the Fell) and the detachment from the 7th Foot. Their task was to keep communications open between Montreal and Quebec.

Fort Saint-Jean formally surrendered on November 3rd. The victorious American commander, Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery then launched two strikes designed to capture British Governor Guy Carleton and the British garrison defending Montreal. The first strike was led by Montgomery himself, and was aimed directly at the city. The second strike was led by Colonel James Easton, and was aimed at taking Sorel. Montgomery hoped that Easton would cut off Carleton’s escape route to the east.

Montreal Campaign, Early November (click to enlarge).

Easton’s force consisted of his own regiment of New England provincials, and James Livingston’s Canadian Volunteers. These men were in Saint-Ours by November 3rd, and Sorel by the 7th. The British troops there stayed aboard the Fell, nearly 200 yards offshore. To defeat this force, Easton ordered a battery of two 6-pounders to be constructed on shore.

On the morning of November 8th, Easton’s guns opened fire. The Fell quickly cut its cables and moved downstream, but in the meantime, according to American Major John Brown, “we plumped her through in many places” with “at least twelve rounds.” Brown [1] relished hearing civilians on board crying out “O Lord! O Lord!” as the Americans blasted away. Two sailors on the Fell were wounded: William Money "had his thigh broke... by a Cannon Shot" and William Wadlow "had his right Breast shot off by a cannon shot" [2]. The Fell’s return fire missed the battery and landed in the village instead.

It was a small victory, but now Easton could lay a trap for Guy Carleton’s men.

Notes:

1. It is remarkable how active the unheralded Brown was in this campaign. Brown tried to enlist the support of the Canadians for the American cause prior to the start of the Revolutionary War (discussed here). Then Brown participated in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga in May, 1775. Brown later became second in command of Easton’s regiment, but he was active in Montgomery’s operations before Easton arrived in Canada. As described in previous posts, Brown captured supplies bound for Fort Saint-Jean, fought the British at Rivière Saint-Jean, captured the village of La Prairie, conspired with Ethan Allen before the debacle at the battle of Longue-Pointe, and played a leading role in the capture of Fort Chambly.

2. There may have been other casualties – these two men were identified in a return of losses (signed by Hector de Cramahé and dated May 25, 1776) among Royal Navy personnel during the invasion of Canada.

Fruits of Victory

The guns at Fort Saint-Jean fell silent late on November 1, 1775. The next day was spent in negotiations, and the formal surrender took place on the 3rd.

The surrender ceremony was brief. At 10 AM the Americans assembled their regiments and marched to within 50 yards of the fort. There, according to an American artilleryman, “we halted and was all drawn up in a rank and stood there till the regulars got ready and marched out with all their arms and 2 field pieces.” [1]

The British troops are then embarked in a number of bateaux and taken into captivity. For them, it is a bitter defeat. One Juchereau dit Duchesnay, a militia officer, wrote bitterly to a friend, “Notre résistance nous a fait obtenir les honneurs de la guerre et la douce satisfaction d'être traînés à Connecticut: un coup de fusil au travers du corps à Montréal me ferait beaucoup moins de peine et de tort.” (Roughly: ‘Our resistance has obtained us the honors of war and the sweet satisfaction of being dragged to Connecticut; a shot through the body in Montreal would cause much less pain and harm’). [2]

The victorious American commander, Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, soon pressed on to conquer the rest of Canada. By the 7th, most of Montgomery’s men streamed into the village of La Prairie, across from Montreal. On the 11th, a large contingent crossed from La Prairie to L'île St. Paul in the middle of the St. Lawrence. British Governor Guy Carleton realized the futility of trying to hold Montreal any longer, and he embarked the city’s garrison and a large amount of supplies on 11 vessels. Late in the day this flotilla heads down the St. Lawrence towards Quebec.

On the 12th, the city of Montreal entered into surrender negotiations with Montgomery. With Carleton gone, the city walls were defended by local militia. The Montrealers were primarily concerned about property rights and the continued free exercise of religion. The negotiations proceeded smoothly, and the surrender took place the following day.

Winter weather hit the area at this time, which caused much hardship for the Americans, as recorded by journalists:

• Aaron Barlow on November 7th: “The weather being cold makes it very uncomfortable living in tents.”
• Benjamin Trumbull on November 9th: “It begins to rain, the Ways are dirty and Slippery so that it is difficult to Walk without falling. The Whole Country is water and mud & not a dry Spot to be found.”
• John Fassett on November 12: “Went to a Dutchman’s house to get a dram… where were a number of Yorkers of the First Battalion, cursing and swearing and damning themselves and one another. It seemed like a hell upon earth. Fair weather but cold.”

----------------------------------------------------

While working on this project, I've painted a number of 15mm miniatures to represent soldiers from the British garrison and the American army. Some of these appeared in past posts; here are some that I don't believe I've posted before.

The Garrison. Pictured are troops of the 26th Foot, an officer of the 7th Foot with a brass 24-pounder, a Royal Artillery officer, and the officer's wife.

The Besieging Army. Pictured are one of Lamb's cannoneers with a brass 12-pounder, General Montgomery, and some Connecticut Continentals.

----------------------------------------------------

The victory at Fort Saint-Jean was a remarkable achievement for a Continental army that was not yet 5 months old.

The garrison that surrendered included the following:

• 7th Regiment of Foot: 259 men [3]
• 26th Regiment of Foot: 215 men [3]
• Canadian Gentleman Volunteers, Officers, and Militia: 75 men [4]
• Royal Artillery: 38 men [3]
• Royal Highland Emigrants: 19 men [3]
• Other Canadian Volunteers: 12 men [4]
• Native Americans: 2 men [4]

In addition to these land forces, the Americans captured a Royal Navy contingent led by Captain Hunter, and a group of carpenters and artificers, led by Captain Thompson.

The Americans also captured the half-sunk Royal Savage, a row galley, a number of smaller vessels, and a large train of artillery.

Notes:

1. From the “True journal of Barwick’s Company from New York to Quebec, August 4, 1775 to September 25, 1776.” Robert Barwick was a cannonneer in Lamb’s artillery.

2. From Hospice-Anthelme-Jean-Baptiste Verreau's (1873) Invasion du Canada.

3. From a return dated November 1, 1775, at Fort Saint-Jean. Published in A history of the organization, development and services of the military and naval forces of Canada from the Peace of Paris in 1763 to the present time. Vol. 1.

4. From a “Liste des Messieurs les Officiers & Gentilhommes Canadiens qui ont servit en qualite de Volontaires sous les ordres de Mr. Belletre & pris prisonniers dans la Garnison de St. Jean sous le Commandement du Major Preston.” Published in A history of the organization, development and services of the military and naval forces of Canada from the Peace of Paris in 1763 to the present time. Vol. 1.

A large Native American contingent was present at Fort Saint-Jean when the Americans first advanced on the fort. These men participated in a hard-fought September skirmish, but most left the garrison soon thereafter.

Livingston's War

An American army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler crossed into southern Canada on September 4, 1775, and established a base at L’Île-aux-Noix. The next day, Schuyler wrote an address to the people of Canada, informing them of his intentions and requesting their support. He also sent north Colonel Ethan Allen of Vermont and Major John Brown of Massachusetts.

Allen and Brown soon linked up with a body of pro-American Canadians organized by James Livingston. These men kept watch on the British garrisons at Fort Saint-Jean and Fort Chambly, and awaited the advance of Schuyler’s army. On or about September 11, Allen, however, couldn’t resist the temptation to capture five royal artillerymen [1] travelling between the two forts.

At the time, Livingston was operating with a small party of men on Île Sainte-Thérèse, between Fort Chambly and Fort Saint-Jean. He lamented to Schuyler, “I have begun a war,” because of Allen’s action. Livingston could scarcely provide his volunteers with provisions, arms, or ammunition. No matter. The next day, the British sent out two bateaux from Fort Chambly, one of which allegedly contained 20 armed men, and the other stores for Fort Saint-Jean. As the British neared Île Sainte-Thérèse, Livingston’s men blasted them with musket fire, killing or wounding as many as a dozen men, and sending the dazed survivors fleeing to neighboring Île Sainte-Marie. Both boats were captured.

Not long after, Livingston retired to Pointe-Olivier, downriver from Fort Chambly, and Allen and Brown returned to Schuyler’s camp. Schuyler sent out Allen and Brown a second time in preparation for the Americans final push against Fort Saint-Jean. On September 17, Brown, acting with some Canadian volunteers, intercepted supplies heading for Fort Saint-Jean. The next day, Allen and Livingston captured two British agents at Saint-Denis. Soon after, Allen and Brown occupied key towns on the Saint-Lawrence. Brown took up post at La Prairie, and Allen advanced to Sorel.

Meanwhile, the American army, now led by Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, lay siege to Fort Saint-Jean. While this occurred, Livingston, with a force hovering around 300 men, continued operations on the Richelieu. Livingston’s chief responsibilities were to protect Montgomery’s northern flank and to help stop any breakout attempt from Fort Saint-Jean. The poorly-armed Canadians demanded, and eventually received, two 4-pounder field pieces.

Livingston’s War (click to enlarge). The part of the Richelieu in which Livingston’s Canadians operated during September and October, 1775, is indicated by the blue line (i.e., from Fort Saint-Jean to the parish of Saint-Denis). In mid-September, at least, Livingston’s headquarters was at Pointe-Olivier, near Fort Chambly. The British garrisons at Fort Saint-Jean, Fort Chambly, and Montreal are indicated (cf. Carleton Defends Canada), as is Montgomery’s American army besieging Fort Saint-Jean and Brown’s and Allen’s late September advances to the Saint-Lawrence.

Mostly the Canadians were allowed to act with impunity along the Richelieu. One known exception appears in a letter by Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Mott of Connecticut (Montgomery’s chief engineer). He wrote that:

“On the 3d instant there was a severe engagement between the French Whigs on one side, and the French Tories and Regulars on the other side, at Chambly, about thirteen miles from this place. The Tory party had the advantage, as they fired about fifty cannon-shot on our Whigs, when they had only small arms to defend with. They lost several men on each side. The Whigs maintained their ground.”

In the absence of significant threats, Livingston’s men were able to contribute to the siege of Fort Saint-Jean, and attack Fort Chambly.

First, Livingston’s men erected a breastwork northeast of Fort Saint-Jean on the estate of Moses Hazen. The British attacked this force on October 4 with a heavily armed row galley [2]. The Canadians responded with musket fire and their little 4-pounders. The British eventually withdrew after failing to make any impression on Livingston’s men (according to Mott, they lost “only one man, slightly wounded with a grape-shot”).

Soon thereafter, the Canadians moved their cannon closer to Fort Saint-Jean, and on the 13th they were joined by an American gun section consisting of two 12 pounders. The combined battery sank the British schooner the Royal Savage and inflicted a number of casualties among the garrison.

Canadian artillery.

In mid-October, Livingston was granted permission to attack Fort Chambly. The attack was begun by his men, Major John Brown and around 50 Provincials, a 9-pounder cannon, and Lieutenant Johnston and two privates from Lamb’s Artillery company. The bombardment began on October 17. The next morning, a second 9-pounder joined in the firing. After a day and a half of cannonading (i.e., by midday on the 18th), a small breach was made in the fort’s outer wall. At that point, the 88-man British garrison, consisting chiefly of men from the 7th Foot, agreed to surrender. [3]

Notes:

1. They were Thomas Goone, gunner, and Matthew Bell, John Boetle, Osburn Frederick, and Robert Knox, matrosses, of Captain Jones' s Company, 4th battalion, Royal Artillery

2. According to Major Henry Livingston of the 3rd New York, the galley had one 24-pounder in the bow, and 1 four pounder and some swivel guns on each side.

3. The complete list of men can be found here.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (3)

This is the third and final post devoted to a skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean in southern Canada that took place on September 18, 1775. For the events immediately preceding this skirmish, click here. For transcriptions of journal entries recorded by the participants, click here.

On September 17, 1775, the Americans advanced on Fort Saint-Jean, in southern Canada, for the third time. Unlike the earlier attempts (September 6 and September 10), this time the British offered no outward resistance. The Americans took up positions to the south and northwest of the fort, which placed the garrison in a state of siege. Early on September 18th, the British garrison learned of its predicament. Lieutenant William Duff of the 7th Foot was dispatched with about 30 Canadian volunteers to round up cattle from farms north of the fort and to scout out the American position to the northwest. Also, Guillaume de Lorimier, with a few Indians, was sent to scout out the American position to the south.

When Duff returned to the fort, he reported that the American force to the northwest was small, and the fortification it had erected was crude. Major Preston then dispatched Captain John Stronge with around 100 men of the 7th and 26th regiments, with nearly as many Canadian volunteers, and a field piece to drive away the Americans. The force they attacked was much smaller: about 50 Americans and 34 Canadians under the command of Major John Brown.

Brown’s men fired as the British approached, killing Sieur Beaubien dit Desauniers of the Canadians and wounding Corporal Knowles and Private Kelly of the 7th. The British, for their part, fired and charged. This fire possibly wounded several of Brown’s men, who quickly fled into the woods. [1]

British infantry and Canadian volunteers capture a breastwork near Fort Saint-Jean.

Canadian Antoine Dupré was the first man to climb into the breastwork; there he captured a couple of men, including Moses Hazen, a retired British officer and a prominent local landowner.

Hazen had been Brown's prisoner; he was captured the day before while traveling to his fields. However, the British suspected the worst of him and kept him as their own prisoner. The suspicion was deserved. Hazen had secretly contacted the Americans on September 6. On September 11, the British gave him a captain’s commission and orders to raise a company of militia. He did neither.

The British sortie against Brown’s command surprised the American leadership. Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery had intended Brown’s position to remain secret until he could move 500 men into position to support him. However, Brown was defeated before the American movement began. As soon as the sound of musket fire boomed across the flat woodland, Montgomery raced to get his forces into motion.

On the river, the Schuyler and Hancock rowed towards the fort and opened fire with their 12-pounders. This fire reportedly struck a bateau and the British schooner, the Royal Savage, but apparently did no other harm. The British responded with shell fire, but they, too, were unable to inflict casualties.

On land, Colonel Timothy Bedel led around 500 men from Bedel’s Rangers (his regiment), the 4th Connecticut, and the Green Mountain Boys, on a circuitous march through the wet woodland north and west of Saint-Jean. En route, Bedel received conflicting advice: a Canadian guide wanted to take Bedel directly to the site of the earlier skirmish, while a Huron guide wanted to take Bedel further to the east, so as to cut off the British detachment from the fort. Bedel, not understanding the Indian’s intention, and fearing treachery, took the Canadian’s advice.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). The British attack is shown in red. The advance of the American relief force is shown in blue.

The Americans advanced noisily through the woods, and the British opened fire the moment they came into view. According to Lieutenant John Fassett of Vermont, “They gave us a hot fire. The grape shot and Musket balls flew very thick…”

Bedel's Column Forms for Battle.

Benjamin Trumbull (who at the time was in the main American camp), claimed that the British fire wounded two Americans (including a Captain John Watson of the 4th Connecticut), and that a piece of grape shot accidentally killed one Briton (that would be, based on other evidence, Private Alexander Ross of the 26th). Before the Americans could deploy, the British scrambled for the safety of their fort. Bedel then occupied the breastwork Brown had built.

Once again, Fort Saint-Jean was in a state of siege.

Note:

1. See this letter from Major Israel Morey to the New-Hampshire Committee of Safety.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (1)

The first two American movements against Fort Saint-Jean ended in disappointment (cf. here and here. On the third attempt, however, the Americans were able to cut the roads leading to the fort, placing the garrison in a state of siege. This attempt, like those that preceded it, produced a sharp skirmish between the two opponents.

The Americans advanced close to the Fort Saint-Jean on September 17, 1775. That same day, a small force of Canadians and Americans, led by Major John Brown of Massachusetts, skirted Fort Saint-Jean, and cut the roads to the fort. These men first took down the bridge over Rivière Saint-Jean, and then built a crude fortification from the bridge pieces. Brown's men also captured a supply train that was headed to the fort.

On September 18, the British in Fort Saint-Jean learned of Brown’s presence, and drove him from his post. However, a second American force then appeared, led by Colonel Timothy Bedel. This force compelled the British to retreat and reestablished the siege of Saint-Jean. A map of these movements appears below.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). The British attack is shown in red. The advance of the American relief force is shown in blue.

In this post I share how the events of this day were described in the journals of 7 different men that were present at Fort Saint-Jean (5 Americans, 1 Briton, and 1 Canadian). A more detailed description of the skirmish will appear in a future post.

Journal Entries

John André was a lieutenant in the 7th Regiment of Foot. He is thought to have been the author of a journal kept by a British officer during the siege of Fort Saint-Jean. The following extract from that journal describes the events of September 18.

“18th—This morning we were inform’d that the rebels intended to take Post about 2 miles lower than St John’s, at a Rivulet near which we had had a redoubt ‘till within a fortnight, when the Enemy made their first Appearance at the Isle aux Noix. Lieutt Duff with 30 Men was sent for intelligence, with order to bring in the cattle belonging to the neighbouring farms. At his return he reported that there appear’d to him to be about 200 Men on the other Side of the rivulet entrench’d with the logs of a Bridge which they had broken. Captn Strong was then sent with a detachment of 100 Men, an Officer of Artillery with a field piece and the Volunteers. The Rebels on their Appearing fir’d a few Shot and ran off into the wood.

“Our people took two wounded prisoners, and lost one man. (Monsr Beaubien a Volunteer.) We had two or three wounded.

“After this little Skirmish whilst the breastwork was destroying more Ammunition was sent for from the Fort which an Officer and 20 Men brought up. The Bridge was scarce repair’d when some noise was heard an Indian who appear’d at the Edge of the wood was seiz’d by two or three who were with us. A good many Shot were fir’d from behind the Trees and Bushes upon our returning the fire very briskly nothing more was heard of the Enemy. A Soldier of the 26th Regiment was kill’d in this last fray.

“Captn Dundee, on the second firing being heard at the Fort, was order’d out with a reinforcement of 40 Men and met the first detachmt on their return to the Fort.

“During this time, the Enemys Gondola’s had been insulting the redouts with a few Shot which had no Effect.

“The Indian who was taken was buffeted by our Indians and sent back. Mr Hazen and Mr Tucker who were found with the Rebels (tho’ indeed without Arms) were kept prisoners in the Forts. In this Affair, as there have since been throughout the Campaign in Canada There were Englishmen fighting Englishmen, French against French, and Indians of the same Tribe against each other.

“Both the last night and this the Rebels were heard at work entrenchg themselves.—”

Aaron Barlow was a sergeant in the 5th Connecticut Regiment. He was south of the fort (in the American main camp) at the time of the skirmish. The "Shambalee" (or Chambly) party refers to John Brown's men.

“They cut a road toward the Fort in order to draw their cannon. The Shambalee party took this day 12 waggon loads of Provision, Rum, Wine, & Ammunition, from the Regulars and received no damage from them. Towards night the Regulars came out upon the Shambalee party. They wounded 3 of our men and took 2 prisoners. Our men took some provisions and drove them to the Fort.”

John Fassett was a lieutenant in the Green Mountain Boys. The Green Mountain Boys was one of three regiments in Bedel's relief force.

“18 Sept. In the morning our army fired their cannon and they fired from the fort. There was a hot fire from both sides sometime, but in the midst of it Col. Warner’s Regiment was ordered to march about three miles thro’ the wood around St. Johns. We had to travel knee deep in water expecting every minute to meet with the enemy. We at length came very near to Major Brown’s encampment, where the Regulars were. They gave us a hot fire. The grape shot and Musket balls flew very thick, but our pilots, not knowing the ground, we had not an equal chance for they all fled to St. Johns. They wounded Capt. Watson, but killed none of our men. We took the ground and staid there all night and had a very tedious night with our feet wet and cold, no houses nor tents to lie in.”

Foucher was an officer serving with the pro-British Canadian Volunteers. Although the Canadian volunteers participated in this engagement, Foucher, who was ill, did not. The following extract is a translation of the original French.

“Sept. 18th.—The Bostonians arrived at St. Johns in two sloops and barges, numbering about one thousand men. Major Preston, who commanded this fort, sent on the same day about thirty men of the Canadian troops to bring in the cattle which was in the bush near St. Johns. Soon after he was informed by a Canadian that there were two or three hundred Bostonians on the other side of a bridge about half a league from St. Johns, who were raising fortifications and who had taken four cart loads of provisions which were on their way to St. Johns, and also the cattle he had sent for; and that the bridge was already demolished, so that communication between St. Johns and La Prairie de la Magdeleine was cut off by the enemy. Immediately Major Preston ordered out one hundred men under command of Captain Strong, together with one hundred Canadian volunteers and a piece of artillery to feel the enemy. This detachment advanced and the Bostonians fired upon them. The fire was brisk on both sides and lasted about half an hour. The enemy left the battle field and was pursued for some distance. The Srs. Moses Hazen and Toker, and also Hazen's servant, who were within the enemy's line, were made prisoners and brought to the fort. Beaubien Desauniers, a Canadian volunteer, and a soldier of the 26th regiment were shot; another soldier was dangerously wounded. During this action the artillery of the fort and of the gun boat, continued to fire for three hours; the enemy kept up the fire in return; but the above mentioned were the only casualties on our side.”

Rudolphus Ritzema was lieutenant-colonel of the 1st New York Regiment. He was south of the fort (in the American main camp) at the time of the skirmish. The following journal entry spans the events of September 17th and 18th.

“The whole Army amounting to about 1500 Men under General Montgomery [General Schuyler from his ill state of Health being gone to Ticonderoga] embarked again for St Johns—About Noon we landed at the Breast Work nearest the Enemy. The General detached Col Bedel with his Corps to occupy the Road, leading from St Johns to Chamblee, in order to cut off the Enemy’s Communication with the Country, which they effectually accomplished.”

Benjamin Trumbull was a chaplain in the 5th Connecticut Regiment. He was south of the fort (in the American main camp) at the time of the skirmish.

“Monday Morning September, 18th Major Brown who had been previously sent of from the Isle Aux Noix into Canada, and on the 17 had taken 4 Hogsheads of Rum and several Carriages and some clothing from the Enemy was attacked by them above the forts. The Fire was heard in the Camp South of the Forts. On this 500 men under the Command of Colonel Bedel who had orders to Pass the Forts and cut of the Communication between them and the adjacent Country were hastened off immediately to assist major Brown and his Party w[h]o at the Time of the Action did not exceed 50, men of the Provincials, joined with 30 or 40 Canadians. His Party consisted originally of towards 100 men, but one half of them were placed as Guards at Chambly and the adjacent Country. The General marched at the Head of the Detachment of 500 men and passed the Forts. The Regulars who came out with several Field Pieces and 3 or 400 men drove Major Browns Party from their Breast Work and took the Ground on the Appearance of Colonel Beadles Party the Regulars Fire their Field Pieces and discharged a few vollies of small Arms and retreated, almost before our men had marched into open view so as to fire on them with any Advantage.

“No man was lost on the Side of the Provincials. Capt. Watson was badly wounded and afterwards taken up by our men another was wounded and taken. This was all the loss we sustained. The Regulars lost one or two. One was killed with a Cannon ball Shot from their own Canon. Our People took and ever after maintained their Ground.

“The Rest of the Army Advanced to the lower Breast Work and began to clear a Place for an Encampment. Encamped and cast up a Breastwork.”

Bayze Wells was a sergeant in the 4th Connecticut Regiment. The 4th Connecticut was one of three regiments in Bedel's relief force. Wells, (like many of the men in the Connecticut regiments) was sick at the time of the engagement. He did not participate in the action.

“18th three Regiments Col Hinmans With the Rest about 300 of them Ware ordred to march Round St Jo we travild Round St Johns we ware beset by A Party which Give us A warm fire but I was unwell I Did not Get So Near as to See any Enemy I was Abligd to Get my Pack Carried to A house that Day St Johns was Besedged I being So unwell that I Got to mr minneeres with Cpt Watson that was badly wounded...”

Carleton Defends Canada

At the time that Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold captured Fort Ticonderoga and raided Saint-Jean in the province of Quebec [cf. Allen and Arnold: 30 Days to Glory], the only British regulars in Quebec were the 7th and 26th regiments of Foot and two companies of the Royal Artillery. These forces, like all British forces in North America, fell under the command of Lieutenant-General Thomas Gage. Gage, however, was preoccupied by events in and around Boston and he issued few orders to Canada. The important local commanders were the governor of the province of Quebec, Guy Carleton, and Lieutenant-Colonel (and acting brigadier-general), Richard Prescott [1].

The British were aware that the Americans were amassing thousands of men and that they might try to invade Canada and make it a “fourteenth colony.” The British could have sent additional regiments to Canada to turn back the American invasion in the early summer, but this did not occur due to the crisis in Boston and the false hope that thousands of Canadians and Native Americans would fight alongside the British regulars. By the time the American invasion got underway, and the British fully realized their peril, it was impossible to send reinforcements due to the slowness of communications and the worsening weather on the North Atlantic and in the Gulf of Saint-Lawrence.

Carleton knew little about American intentions, but he reasoned there were four routes by which the Americans plausibly could gain entry into Canada. The most likely route, he determined, was via the Richelieu River, which flowed north from American-controlled Lake Champlain in the province of New York. Also possible, though considerably more difficult, was that the Americans would attempt to invade via the Saint-François or Chaudière river valleys, or even along the upper Saint-Lawrence via the western frontier. Carleton therefore placed the greater part of his regulars in the Richelieu valley, kept watch over the other routes, and maintained garrisons in the key towns of Montréal and Québec.

Strategic Situation (click to enlarge).

Key:

British forces are in red, Americans in blue. Totals include all ranks. The French language is used for places in the province of Québec.

A: Fort Saint-Jean on the Richelieu: 390 men of the 7th and 26th Foot (Major Charles Preston commanding), and 44 men of the Royal Artillery

B: Fort Chambly on the Richelieu: 114 men of the 7th Foot (Major Joseph Stopford commanding), and 5 men of the Royal Artillery

C: Rivière Saint-François: 35 men of the 7th and 26th Foot The placement of this force on the map is quite approximate.

D: Rivière Chaudière: 26 men of the 7th Foot. The placement of this force on the map is quite approximate.

E: Oswegatchie: 28 men of the 8th Foot, and 1 man of the Royal Artillery. This post was on the upper Saint Lawrence, to the west of the area shown on the map. The remainder of the 8th was divided among several posts further west.

F: Lachine: 14 men of the 26th Foot. These men guarded a store of gunpowder and other supplies.

G: Montréal: 110 men of the 26th Foot (plus Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Prescott), and 4 men of the Royal Artillery.

H: Québec (ville): 59 men of the 7th Foot, and 6 men of the Royal Artillery.

In addition to these numbers, 11 of the regulars were on furlough and 69 men of the 26th Foot and 4 men of the Royal Artillery were prisoners of the Americans.

In September, American forces advanced along two of the four possible invasion routes:

A: The American army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery that invaded Canada via the Richelieu.

B: American force commanded by Colonel Benedict Arnold that invaded Canada via the Chaudière (shown here first advancing along the Kennebec River in modern-day Maine).

Note:

1. At the time of the Saint-Jean raid, and before Prescott’s arrival, the senior officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Templer of the 26th; he was no longer with the army at the time of the above dispositions.

Sources:

I'm working from a number of sources, but the above information on troop totals and location comes primarily from the following document:

Is a Hessian Major’s Journal a Key Source on Cowpens?

Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister was in New York when the battle of Cowpens was fought in South Carolina (January 17, 1781). Nevertheless, his journal provides one of the earliest, detailed descriptions of the battle. Baurmeister received his information third-hand; nevertheless his account aligns well in many respects with most first-hand accounts of the battle. For this reason, Baurmeister’s account may help resolve the question of how the British deployed for battle at Cowpens [cf. New Research on Cowpens], and, as described below, how the British force met with defeat.

A traditional view of Cowpens is that the Americans defeated the British by launching a double envelopment: a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the British line. However, as I noted in previous posts, there is considerable evidence that both either British flank was attacked, the British line was first broken in front. Specifically, the American Continentals first overran the center of the British line, and then turned left and right to attack the troops that remained.

How I represented this sequence originally (Spring, 2009):

The American Continentals are attacked in front by three British regiments.

The 71st Foot threatens the right flank of the Continentals; the Continentals make an unintended retreat.

The Continentals then make a surprise counterattack, inflicting devastating casualties on much of the British line.

The ensuing counterattack shatters the British center. The Continentals then divide left and right and attack the remaining regulars (with assistance from American militia and cavalry).

Now let’s take a fresh look at the evidence, beginning with Baurmeister’s treatment of this critical point in the battle:

“The British attack was too furious for the enemy's right wing—nothing withstood the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment. General Morgan withdrew and took another position. Since the Legion did not pursue, Lieutenant Colonel Washington with 240 horse and the Virginia militia under Major Triplett experienced no difficulty in falling between the dispirited Legion and the two British regiments, thus putting the Georgia volunteers in a position to capture the two fieldpieces and charge the rear of the 7th Regiment. Those not killed were captured.”

Some explanation is in order:

• Baurmeister claimed that the British were deployed, from left-to-right, as the 71st Foot (Highlanders), the British Legion infantry, and the 7th Foot.
• Baurmeister’s description of the American units involved in this action is in error, but that is of little consequence to the point under consideration. It was American regulars (chiefly from Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia) that made the counterattack.
• According to Baurmeister, the Americans did not, in fact, overrun the British center before turning left and right: The British Legion failed to attack, leaving the 71st unsupported.
  A comparison of this description with two other sources suggests that Baurmeister’s version may be essentially correct.

A comparison of this description with two other sources suggests that Baurmeister’s version may be essentially correct.

First, here is an excerpt from the journal of Sergeant-Major William Seymour of the 1st Delaware Regiment (who was with the Continentals):

“By this time the enemy advanced and attacked our light infantry [i.e., the Continentals] with both cannon and small arms, where meeting with a very warm reception they then thought to surround our right flank, to prevent which Captain Kirkwood with his company [i.e., the Delaware Continentals] wheeled to the right and attacked their left flank so vigorously that they were soon repulsed, our men advancing on them so very rapidly that they soon gave way. Our left flank advanced at the same time and repulsed their right flank, upon which they retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field, our men pursuing them for the distance of twelve miles, insomuch that all their infantry was killed, wounded, and taken prisoners.”

• Seymour’s account jumps from what is happening in the first image in the sequence above, to what is happening in the fourth and final image. He did not mention the intervening accidental retreat described by a number of others.
• Seymour notably didn’t refer to the Americans attacking and defeating British troops to their immediate front [as is shown in the third image]. Instead, as in Baurmeister’s account, the primary threat is stemming only from the right.
• In Seymour’s account the Continentals were free to divide into two parts and attack either flank of the British line. Seymour explicitly described one part of the Continentals wheeling to their right and attacking the British “left flank” [i.e., the 71st]. In this respect, Seymour’s account matches Baurmeister’s.

Second, here is an excerpt from David Stewart’s (1825) Sketches… of the Highlanders of Scotland.

“…the Highlanders, "who ran in, with characteristic eagerness, desirous to take advantage of the confusion which appeared among the enemy."… [But then the Continentals] threw in a fire upon the 71st when within forty yards of the hostile force. The fire was destructive; nearly one-half of their number fell; and those who remained were so scattered, having run over a space of five hundred yards at full speed, that they could not be united to form a charge with the bayonet, "the mode of attack in which their superiority lay." They were checked; but they did not fall back immediately, probably expecting that the first line and cavalry would push forward to their support. This did not happen; and, after some irregular firing between them and Colonel Howard’s Reserve, the front line of the latter rallied, returned to the field, and pushed forward to the right flank of the Highlanders, who now saw no prospect of support, while their own numbers were diminishing, and the enemy increasing. They began to retire, and at length to run, the first instance of a Highland regiment running from an enemy!!! This retreat struck a panic into those whom they left in the rear, who fled in the greatest confusion: order and command were lost; the rout became general; few of the infantry escaped; and of the cavalry, who put their horses to full speed, not a man was taken.”

• As described by Baurmeister and implied by Seymour, the critical British attack was made solely by the 71st. According to Stewart, it was precisely because this regiment was not supported by the others that the British met with defeat.

A Reinterpretation:

Baurmeister’s account, taken in combination with that of others, suggests that the sequence by which the British met with defeat was different than how I originally described it. A more likely sequence was that when the Americans made their unintended retreat, only the 71st Foot made a serious pursuit. The British Legion infantry advanced either not at all, or only in the most halting manner. Therefore, when the Continentals made their counterattack, the field of action would have looked something like this:

The 71st Foot would have taken the full brunt of the Continentals’ close-range volley, and the Americans would have been free to pivot both to their right (taking the 71st in the flank) and to their left (taking the British artillery and 7th Foot in the flank). According to Stewart, once the 71st fell back, the Legion retreated also. This would have ceded the center of the battlefield to the Americans. (Note that in this image, unlike those above, I don’t show casualties or smoke bursts, and there are changes to the British figurines).

Fort Saint-Jean

War came to Canada soon after the beginning of the American Revolution. On May 17, 1775 (less than 1 month after the inaugural battle at Lexington and Concord), Colonel Benedict Arnold led a raid against British Fort Saint-Jean in southern Quebec, capturing the personnel, boats, and stores located there. Despite this setback, British governor Guy Carleton did not abandon the post. Instead, Fort Saint-Jean was transformed over the summer of 1775 into the most important point of defense for the province of Quebec.

Fort Saint-Jean was situated at a strategic point in the Richelieu-Champlain-Hudson corridor, a traditional invasion route between the American colonies and Canada. Boats launched from Saint-Jean could sail as far south as Skenesborough, deep within the province of New York (cf. New York: May, 1775). However, no large boat could sail north from Saint-Jean because of nearby rapids in the Richelieu River.

The Richelieu River Valley. Fort Saint-Jean is rendered in English on the map as Fort St. John. The upper part of the Richelieu is labelled River Chambly -- a distinction no longer in use. Note that there were two supply routes connecting Fort Saint-Jean to the rest of Canada. Supplies could be sent by water along the Richelieu, or they could be sent overland from La Prairie (near Montréal).

Fort Saint-Jean was originally constructed by the French of earth and wood, but little remained of those fortifications by 1775. Therefore, the British began from scratch, constructing two earthen redoubts along the river, with a wharf between them. This fort was garrisoned by most of the British regulars in Quebec, including the greater part of the 7th and 26th regiments of foot, and a detachment of Royal Artillery. Others serving at the fort included (French) Canadian volunteers and militia, Scottish emigrants, and Native Americans (the Kahnawake Mohawk were nearest).

The new fort and its garrison were first put to the test in early September, 1775, when an American army, led by Major-General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, invaded southern Quebec. These commanders found the fort difficult to approach, for aside from its guns and mortars, much of the surrounding countryside was a vast, flat, swampy woods.

Fort Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). The Americans approached from the south (bottom of the map) via the Richelieu. This map was created by overlaying two early maps of the area on a modern map. The location of the roads and the course of the stream near Hazen's estate are quite approximate. Most difficult to determine was the areas of cleared land (shown on the map in yellow). The approximate dimensions of the cleared area around the redoubts is inferred from several sources. Much less is known about the cleared areas north of the fort; their representation here is speculative. There was likely also some cleared land near Petite-Rivière-du-Nord (at least there was a small house there), but this is not shown for lack of substantive information.

--------------

One of the better descriptions of Fort Saint-Jean appears in the journal of American Major Henry Livingston of the 3rd New York Regiment. He wrote the following (edited to bring the text in line with modern standards for capitalization and punctuation) in an entry dated November 21, 1775:

"The fortress of St. Johns lies near 130 miles north from Ticonderoga on the brink of Lake Champlain and about a quarter of a mile from the first rapid. [Note: Livingston evidently believed that the fort was on an arm of Lake Champlain]. It consists of 2 forts or redoubts near 100 yards asunder. The southern one rather the largest. In this is a brick house containing 2 clever rooms and Lintels back of them-- and a small potash house near it.

"In the north redoubt is a very large white stone house 2 stories high but unfinished within... The forts are about 100 feet wide each way in the inside; and mounted between them, upwards of 30 iron cannon besides brass field pieces (6 pounders) and several mortars.

"The wall is composed altogether of earth, and neatly sodded without, looking as green as the field around it.

"The whole surrounded with a ditch of 7 feet deep and 8 or 9 feet wide--picketed on the interiour side with timbers projecting from under the wall and over the ditch, and a little elevated, with their points made very sharp.

"Between the 2 forts there was a line of pickets placed (or posts) 10 feet high and close together...

"A ditch was also dug deep enough for men to pass unseen thro from one fort to the other, and between the pickets and the lake. Both the pickets and ditch were constructed after we built our eastern battery [i.e., in October, 1775].

"In each redoubt the enemy kept a union [i.e., a flag] displayed.

"It's 2 or 300 yards from the forts to the nearest woods or bushes. In general it's 5 or 600 to the woods--a low plain wet, and covered with excellent grass surrounds the fortress. If there is any elevation of the earth at all, it is where the forts stand.

"The wilderness west of St. Johns is an impassable quagmire--low, wet and covered with timber and brush--and for 7 or 8 miles north [sic, northwest] of the fort we meet with but one sorry log tenement which stood in our grand camp.

"Opposite the forts on the east of the lake the soil is also very wet and low; a perfect howling swamp. There are a considerable number of large hemloc trees [that] grow on this side and plenty of the balm-of-Gilead firs. North east of St. Johns at the distance of about a mile stands a large elegant house belonging to one Captain Hasen [i.e., Moses Hazen] with a considerable quantity of cleared ground around it. The captain has a saw mill standing on the rapids which are just by his house. These rapids are not so great but what rafts of boards and timber can at any time go down them and so into the River St. Lawrence. Our people frequently sent battoes down with cannon in them--and empty ones can be drawn up against the current.

"The fall is perhaps 100 yards in length. The breadth of the lake here as at St. Johns [is] between 3 and 400 yards.

"On the west side of the lake, from St. Johns northward there are settlements all the way to Chamblee [Chambly]; a house or two being in sight of the fort."

New Research on Cowpens

Recently, I’ve come across new evidence about how the British force was deployed at the onset of the fateful battle of Cowpens. This evidence has convinced me that the deployment that I described last year (and which is the same as appears in histories of the battle) is likely in error.

To the best of my knowledge, every published description of the British deployment at Cowpens has followed Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s account. None have suggested there is reason to doubt the accuracy of his description. Consider the weight of evidence described below and ask yourself a) whether the question of how the British deployed should be regarded as settled, and b) whether Tarleton’s description is most likely the correct one.

Below is a listing of the earliest descriptions of the British deployment at Cowpens, followed by two different representations of the deployment in miniature.

Lieutenant Harry Calvert, on or shortly after January 17, 1781:

Comments: Calvert was not present at the battle but he evidently spoke with men that had been present, and he summarized their discussion in his journal. Mark Urban summarized Calvert's take on Cowpens in Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution. According to Urban:

"As one fugitive after another wandered into the British camp, Calvert pierced together the story of what had gone wrong. Tarleton, as was his custom, had hurled his troops into action before they were all up, and the 71st had advanced towards their enemy, taking significant losses from enemy sharpshooters as they went" (p 226).

Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, January 18, 1781:

Comments: Cornwallis was not present at the battle but he spoke with Tarleton shortly afterward. Cornwallis briefly summarized the British deployment in a letter to his superior, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton. He did not describe the relative positioning of the various units aside from identifying them with a front line or with a reserve.

“The attack was begun by the first Line of Infantry, consisting of the 7th Regiment, the Infantry of the Legion & Corps of Light Infantry annexed to it; & Troop of Cavalry was placed on each Flank: the 1st Battalion of the 71st, and the Remainder of the Cavalry, formed the reserve.”

Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, January 19, 1781:

Comments: Morgan was an eyewitness writing about the event shortly afterwards. He reportedly rode up to the front line before the battle began where (presumably) he could clearly observe how the British were deploying. Because a number of British officers were later made prisoners, he also had the opportunity to question them at length about their numbers, battle plan, etc. The following passage is from his official report of the battle.

“The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front moved two pieces of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line.”

Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, February 21, 1781:

Comments: Baurmeister was not present at Cowpens, but he recorded a description of the battle in his journal. Apparently, one or more paroled British officers that had returned to Charleston, South Carolina, described the battle to James Wemyss, a major in the 63rd Foot. Wemyss, who was recuperating from a wound, soon after departed for New York where he described his second-hand information to officers there. In this way, Baurmeister learned of the battle. Baurmeister’s description of the British deployment is strikingly similar to that in Morgan’s report. However, Wemyss’ description, rather than Morgan’s report, seems to have been the source of Baurmeister’s description. Baurmeister’s account shows a poor understanding of the American side of the battle. For example, Baurmeister wrote that it was the "the Georgia volunteers" that broke the British line and captured the cannon; he made no mention of the Maryland and Delaware Continentals. This is the kind of error that might be expected if Baurmeister got his information from Wemyss, who in turn got it from an officer in the battle -- not the kind of error that would occur if Baurmeister was restating Morgan’s published report. Baurmeister's description of the British deployment also differs from Morgan's in several minor respects.

“Believing that he had forced General Morgan to retreat and that his force was superior to the rebels', he [Tarleton] went in search of General Morgan on the 17th of January. He found him in battle formation at the Cowpens, close to the Pacolet River. Colonel Tarleton had to defend himself as well as he could in a space of four hundred yards. He posted the 7th Regiment on his right, the 1st Battalion of the 71st on his left, and the dismounted Legion in the center. His dragoons covered the flanks… in front of the left wing of the 7th Regiment he had two light fieldpieces.

“The British attack was too furious for the enemy's right wing—nothing withstood the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment….”

Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, 1787:

Comments: Tarleton issued the orders for the British deployment and observed their execution. He wrote about the event approximately 6 years later in his history of the southern campaign of the American Revolution.

“Tarleton desired the British infantry to disencumber themselves of every thing, except their arms and ammunition: The light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line: The legion infantry were added to their left; and, under the fire of a three-pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to advance within three hundred yards of the enemy. This situation. being acquired, the 7th regiment was commanded to form upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th: A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps, who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and threaten the flanks of the enemy: The 1st battalion of the 71st was desired to extend a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near two hundred cavalry, composed the reserve.”

--------------

Two different conceptions of the British deployment at Cowpens appear below. (For information on the deployment of American forces in the background, see The Militia Line at Cowpens, The Main Line at Cowpens: Organization, The Americans Deploy). Each miniature represents approximately 20 combatants. The two British guns are represented by a single piece. Per Tarleton's account (and what was likely standard practice), the infantry are in open order [cf. Modeling Notes]. The flags are carried by the 7th Foot; the British Legion infantry is clothed in green [cf. British Legion Redux]. Not all of the British Legion dragoons can be seen in these images.

Banastre Tarleton's Description of the British Deployment at Cowpens. The front line consists of (from left to right), a troop of dragoons, the 7th Foot, a contingent of Royal Artillery, the British Legion infantry, a contingent of light infantry, and a troop of dragoons. The 71st Foot and the greater part of the British Legion dragoons are in reserve.

Alternative Conception of the British Deployment at Cowpens. The British line is anchored on either end by a troops of dragoons (Baurmeister, Tarleton). The 71st Foot is on the left of the British line where it is close enough to the front to participate in the attack on the American militia (Calvert, Morgan, Baurmeister), but far enough from the front where it can be called accurately a reserve (Cornwallis, Tarleton). With the 71st is part of the light infantry (Morgan). The center of the line consists of the British Legion infantry (Morgan, Baurmeister), and the right consists of the 7th Foot (Morgan, Baurmeister), supported by the remainder of the light infantry (Morgan). A contingent of Royal Artillery is in advance of the infantry (Morgan, Baurmeister). The greater part of the British Legion dragoons are in reserve (Cornwallis, Morgan, Baurmeister, Tarleton).

Allen and Arnold 10

30 Days to Glory: May 18-19
Previous: May 15 - May 17

Thursday, May 18:

Major Charles Preston of the 26th Foot has his men up at an early hour and on the road to Saint-Jean. Ethan Allen had set up an ambush along this road with his Green Mountain Boys, but the British do not walk into a trap. The Green Mountain Boys are mostly asleep. The British open fire upon seeing men in the woods, and amid the rattle of musketry and grape shot, Allen’s men flee to their boats and head upstream. In their haste, however, three men are left behind. As all the British boats have been taken or destroyed, there is no pursuit.

John Brown is in Philadelphia where he meets with the delegates to the Continental Congress and tells them about the capture of Fort Ticonderoga. He is rewarded for bringing this valuable information. George Washington, a delegate from Virginia, contributes 1 guinea.

Brown alarms the delegates by alleging that the Governor of the Province of Quebec, Guy Carleton, is preparing for war. He warns that the British government “means to form an army in Canada, composed of British Regulars, French, and Indians, to attack the colonies...” Afterwards, the Continental Congress passes a resolution that portrays the Green Mountain Boys as would-be victims of British aggression:

“Whereas, there is indubitable evidence that a design is formed by the British Ministry of making a cruel invasion from the Province of Quebec upon these colonies, for the purpose of destroying our lives and liberties, and some steps have actually been taken to carry the said design into execution: and whereas several inhabitants of the northern colonies, residing in the vicinity of Ticonderoga, immediately exposed to incursions, impelled by a just regard for the defense and preservation of themselves and their countrymen from such imminent danger and calamities, have taken possession of that post in which was lodged a quantity of cannon and military stores that would certainly have been used in the intended invasion of these colonies...”

There is some question as to who should take responsibility for the captured lake forts. Neither Connecticut nor Massachusetts wishes to have on this role [cf. May 16 and 17], and New York has been little more than a well wisher to the efforts of its sister colonies [cf. May 2, May 5, and May 12]. The Continental Congress nudges New York along the path toward war by requesting that it take the lead in removing the cannon from Ticonderoga and in establishing “a strong post” to defend them. Like other military measures taken by the colonies to date, these steps are justified by “the overruling law of self-preservation.”

Sunday, May 19:

It is one month since the battle of Lexington and Concord. In Quebec, Governor Guy Carleton receives a letter from Lieutenant-General Thomas Gage describing that battle and requesting him to send the 7th Foot and some companies of Canadians and Indians to Crown Point. Tomorrow Carleton will be shocked when he learns from Moses Hazen of the loss of Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point and Benedict Arnold’s successful raid on Saint-Jean.

Arnold's flotilla on Lake Champlain ensures that the British cannot quickly recapture the lake forts. However, Arnold is concerned that in time the British will transport bateaus to Saint-Jean and challenge him for mastery of the lake. Captain Eleazer Oswald records that “It is Colonel Arnold's present design that the sloop Enterprise, as she is called, and the schooner Liberty, shall cruise on the lake, and defend our frontiers.”

Arnold ships return to Fort Ticonderoga, where more men of his still-forming regiment await him. Feeling triumphant, he dispatches word to Connecticut and Massachusetts of his success and his intention to begin sending cannon to New England. Arnold does not know yet that his efforts have received little notice nor that the decision has already been made to replace him [cf. May 17]. In the weeks ahead, Arnold will struggle hard, but without success, to retain his command. By his count, 86 guns were taken at Ticonderoga, and 111 at Crown Point. A large proportion are deemed “useless,” but the serviceable guns include big 24-pounder cannon and 13-inch howitzers. Because of command difficulties and various setbacks, it will not be until March of 1776 that the guns from the lake forts will have a decisive impact around Boston.

In the short-term, the capture of the lake forts is seen as another example of British weakness and growing American strength. Such incidents have made the public increasingly bellicose. Only a short time ago, the Ticonderoga expedition was seen as potentially undermining the Americans' claim to moral superiority, and its organizers distanced themselves from the potential fallout [cf. April 27 and April 28]. Now the capture is embraced by the Continental Congress. The changing mood is well expressed in a letter Congressional delegate Benjamin Franklin will write on the 23rd: “…as Britain has begun to use force, it seems absolutely necessary that we should be prepared to repel force by force, which I think, united, we are well able to do. It is a true old saying, that make yourselves sheep and the wolves will eat you; to which I may add another, God helps them that help themselves.”

A Bit of Perspective

Here is a look at a drummer of the 7th Regiment of Foot (Essex miniatures). To provide some sense of scale, I've posed him next to my index finger.

Cowpens in Miniature 21

Part 21: Collapse

Previous: Washington and Howard Charge

Next: Flight

After Howard charged, several specific things happened at this time so close together that it is difficult to sort out the exact timing of each.

On the British left, the 71st Foot was disorganized, but still dangerous. David Stewart wrote that "They were checked; but they did not fall back immediately, probably expecting that the first line and cavalry would push forward to their support" [see Note 1].

It is likely that the 71st Foot still extended beyond the right flank of the Continentals. There was, on at least one part of the line, enough separation with the Continentals to permit, in Stewart’s words, "some irregular firing between them [the 71st Foot] and Colonel Howard's reserve [the Continentals]" [see Note 2].

This portion of the 71st may also have continued to advance, even as other parts of the British line were falling back. Sergeant Major William Seymour recorded in journal that the British "thought to surround our right flank," but they were foiled in this effort because "Captain Kirkwood with his company wheeled to the right and attacked their left flank [i.e., the 71st Foot] so vigorously that they were soon repulsed, our men advancing on them so very rapidly that they soon gave way" [see Note 3].

In the British center, the Americans pitched into the ranks of the British infantry with their bayonets, making prisoners of some, striking down others, and driving back the rest. This created a clean break in the British line with the British infantry there either scattering or falling back towards the flanks and rear [see Note 4]. Just as a part of the Continentals had wheeled to the right to attack the 71st Foot, others wheeled to the left and fell upon the other end of the broken British line. According to Sergeant-Major William Seymour, "Our left flank [i.e., the left side of the Continentals] advanced… and repulsed their right flank [i.e., the right half of the British line]."

In this moment of crisis, Tarleton ordered his last reserve, the British Legion dragoons, to advance. He "sent directions to his cavalry to form about four hundred yards to the right of the enemy, in order to check them." With the British infantry beginning to retreat, Tarleton perhaps thought that by placing this massive cavalry force on the flank of the American line he could compel them to fall back and adopt a defensive posture. However, "The cavalry did not comply with the order" [see Note 5]. Meanwhile, Tarleton personally attempt to turn around the British infantry, but he was stymied: "Exertions to make them advance were useless" [see Note 6].

As the 7th Foot and British Legion infantry fell back, they left exposed the two cannon belonging to the Royal Artillery.

Howard recalled that "As the [Continental] line approached [the British], I observed their artillery a short distance in front, and called to Captain Ewing, who was near me, to take it. Captain Anderson… hearing the order, also pushed for the same object, and both being emulous for the prize, kept pace until near the first piece, when Anderson, by placing the end of his espontoon forward into the ground, made a long leap which brought him upon the gun, and gave him the honour of the prize" [see Note 7].

Tarleton was on hand and "endeavoured to rally the infantry to protect the guns… [but] the effort to collect the infantry was ineffectual: Neither promises nor threats could gain their attention; they surrendered or dispersed, and abandoned the guns to the artillery men, who defended them for some time with exemplary resolution" [see Note 8].

On the British right, Washington burst onto the scene as he pursued the fleeing 17th Light Dragoons. Howard wrote that "as soon as we got among the enemy & were making prisoners I observed the enemy's cavalry retreating the way they had advanced, by our left flank, and Washington in pursuit of them and he followed them some distance."

Howard recalled that "My attention was now drawn to an altercation of some of the men with an artillery man, who appeared to make it a point of honour not to surrender his match. The men, provoked by his obstinacy, would have bayonetted him on the spot, had I not interfered, and desired them to spare the life of so brave a man. He then surrendered his match" [see Note 9].

The British Line Collapses. 1 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (reforming), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

The British Line Collapses (two views; click to enlarge). The British infantry began to retreat in the face of a bayonet charge by the Continental infantry in front. Meanwhile, the American cavalry and militia begin to threaten the British flanks.

Notes:

1. The first line was not behind them at this point, as he alleged, but off to the right. It was in a similar situation at this moment and in no condition to offer assistance.

2. One of the distinctive features of Lawrence Babits’ account of the battle (A Devil of a Whipping) is that he maintained that Major Joseph McDowell’s battalion of North Carolinians did not retreat behind the main line when the militia line broke, but rather maintained contact with the British infantry and were driven back only by a charge of Ogilvie’s dragoons and a detachment of the 71st Foot. In support of this account, Babits cited the pension application of William Meade, who claimed that "He had a rib broken by the point of a Bayonet, had his skull badly fractured by a Sword, and had a leg badly wounded by the stroke of a Cutlass of a British Light horseman."

Meade's statement indicates that some of the American militia on the right were assailed by both infantry and cavalry. In my account, Ogilvie charged the American militia on the right, but without the participation of British infantry. However, I do show that the 71st Foot later crossed into the area through which Ogilvie had charged in attempting to turn the right flank of the Continentals. My explanation for Meade’s injuries is as follows: in the wake of Ogilvie’s charge, a number of militiamen (including, but not limited to, the men of McDowell’s battalion) were left wounded on the ground, and as the 71st Foot swept over the area, some of these hapless Americans were bayoneted by the Highlanders).

3. Captain Robert Kirkwood commanded the company of Delaware Continentals. Seymour’s description is ambiguous as to whether he was referring to the larger British effort to turn the Americans’ right flank or a specific proximal event that triggered this movement by Kirkwood’s company.

4. Several American accounts distinguish between a British left and right for this and later points in the battle. Robert Long, for example, recalled that late in the battle the British "on the right and left surrendered or retreated." Seymour’s account provides the strongest indication that the Continentals’ counterattack forced this severance.

5. This failure of the British Legion cavalry to advance has been interpreted as a primary cause of the British defeat. The cavalry, it has been argued by others, were lacking in fighting spirit. I don’t find this argument to be particularly compelling. Captain David Ogilvie’s company charged the Americans and appears to have fought bravely, and I know of no reason why this company should be viewed as exceptional within the regiment.

Worth considering is an alternative possibility: that the Legion dragoons didn’t execute the order because it didn’t make sense.

The order would have carried the dragoons into a creek bottom and wood swarming with militiamen. That’s not to say that Tarleton should have realized that the order was nonsensical. Tarleton was, after all, in the center trying to rally the British regulars, and things were so chaotic at this moment that there was no opportunity for him to converse with the officers commanding his dragoons.

But why would Tarleton have thought this order to be appropriate?

Tarleton had already ordered the Legion dragoons to occupy a position on the American right (see Cowpens in Miniature 17), but they failed to fully execute this order. I suggested one of three possible reasons for that failure (see Cowpens in Miniature 18, Note 1): that they may have misunderstood Tarleton’s intentions, that they may have found the ground in front of them to be unsuitable, or that they may have found the timing of the movement to be spoiled. Tarleton can be excused on this count unless the problem was with the terrain and he had been informed of that problem.

Also curious is that at this moment the Americans were a short distance to the front. Why then would Tarleton then order the dragoons to a position on the flank? Perhaps Tarleton saw that the dragoons could not make a direct charge (in any order at least) through the swarm of Continentals and British regulars, and he ordered the dragoons to the flank where they would have a relatively clear shot at the Americans.

6. There are some noteworthy differences between the Tarleton-inspired British official report of the battle and Tarleton’s later memoir. The report notes that "The 1st Battalion of the 71st & the cavalry were successively ordered up; but neither the exertions, entreaties, or Example of Lieut. Colonel Tarleton could prevent the panic from becoming general." In the memoir, it is clear that the 71st had already been committed and was in no condition to rescue anyone. David Stewart, in fact, claimed that the rest of the British line failed to come up in support of the 71st. Such gross differences suggest that neither half of the broken British line knew where the other half was or what it was doing.

7. Captain James Ewing commanded the left-hand company in Howard’s battalion (see pension application of Sergeant Benjamin Martin). The placement of Anderson’s company is unknown, but he may have been next to Ewing.

8. The language in Cornwallis’ report of the battle is even stronger, "the two three pounders were taken… In justice to the Detachment of the Royal Artillery, I must here observe that no terrors could induce them to abandon their Guns, & they were all either killed or wounded in defense of them."

9. Elsewhere he gave another version of this event: "When I came up to the two pieces of artillery which we took, I saw some of my men going to bayonet the man who had the match. He refused to surrender it, and I believe he would have suffered himself to have been bayoneted, if I had not rescued him rather than give up his match."

Sources:

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's account of the battle.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Meade (.pdf file).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf).

Related: 7th Regiment of Foot, 71st Foot, The British Legion

Cowpens in Miniature 17

Part 17: The Second Crisis

Previous: The First Crisis

Next: The Third Crisis

In the center of the battlefield, the British front line bore down on the American Continentals.

Major-General Chastellux commented that when the British were on the offensive, their "attack is not hot, but consists in general of a brisk fire, rather than in closing with the enemy." This seems to have been the tactic used on this occasion. The British front line advanced steadily on the Continentals, stopping repeatedly to fire. At the same time, the Continentals repeatedly volleyed at the British. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals recorded that the British "advanced On boldly under a Very heavy fire until they got Within a few yards of us" [see Note 1].

Tarleton saw that the American Continentals would not easily be driven off. He saw too that the right wing of the main line had fled. Now was the moment to launch the final attack that would end the battle in a decisive British victory.

"As the contest between the British infantry in the front line and the continentals seemed equally balanced, neither retreating, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton thought the advance of the 71st into line, and a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy's right flank, would put a victorious period into the action. No time was lost in performing this manoeuvre. The 71st were desired to pass the 7th before they gave their fire, and were directed not to entangale their right flank with the left of the other battalion."

In making this maneuver, the two regiments did become entangled. Major George Hanger learned that the 71st "moved up; and when moving up to form in line with the rest of the troops, whether from their not taking ground enough, or from some other circumstance, their right flank brushed the left flank of the 7th regiment, and intermixed one with the other."

Meanwhile, according to Tarleton, "The cavalry were ordered to incline to the left, and to form a line, which would embrace the whole of the enemy's right flank."

The entanglement between the 71st and the 7th was not allowed to slow the attack. In Tarleton’s words, "Upon the advance of the 71st, all the infantry again moved on."

The 71st Foot Enters the Fight. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken by Ogilvie's charge), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming / retreating), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Main Line Fighting (two views; click to enlarge). The events shown in this image overlap with some of those shown in the last post. Ogilvie’s charge is visible in both images. The British front line advances on the Continentals. Meanwhile, the 71st Foot has advanced alongside the 7th Foot and the British Legion dragoon reserve advances towards the American right.

As the British made their final push, the Continentals began to retreat. François-Jean de Chastellux learned that "the whole line… [wheeled] to the right," and wondered at its cause. Other writers noted the retreat but gave no explanation for it. Tarleton, for example, recalled only that "The continentals and back woodsmen gave ground" [see Note 2].

This retreat would become one of the most commented upon features of the battle.

Historian David Stewart assumed that the retreat of the Continentals was related to the retreat of the front line. "the second [line], which had as yet taken no share in the action, observing confusion and retrograding in their front, suddenly faced to the right, and inclined backwards; a manoeuvre by which a space was left for the front line to retreat, without interfering with the ranks of those who were now to oppose the advance of the Highlanders, "who ran in, with characteristic eagerness, desirous to take advantage of the confusion which appeared among the enemy." This description, however, does not mesh well with participant accounts.

More credibly, others claimed that the retreat occurred because the Continentals had been outflanked. Thomas Anderson wrote in his journal that "their line Was So much longer than ours the turn'd our Flanks Which Caused us to fall back Some Disstance." This is also the reason that Daniel Morgan gave in his official report of the battle: "their numbers being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position."

However, there was another reason for the retreat. Morgan admitted "very candidly" to François-Jean de Chastellux, "that the retrograde movement he had made, was not premeditated." The retreat, in other words, was an accident.

Henry Lee, who knew Morgan and Howard, elaborated on this theme in his history of the battle. He noted that the British, "outstretching our front, endangered Howard's right." The threat stemmed from the dissolution of the right wing of the main line and the advance of the 71st Foot. Therefore, Howard "instantly took measures to defend his flank, by directing his right company to change its front; but, mistaking this order, the company fell back; upon which the line began to retire, and General Morgan directed it to retreat to the cavalry. This manoeuvre being performed with precision, our flank became relieved, and the new position was assumed with promptitude."

After historian William Johnson inaccurately described the causes of this retreat (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1), Howard felt compelled to comment on this incident at length. This retreat, he said:

"was not occasioned by the fire of the enemy… I soon observed, as I had but about 350 men and the british about 800 [see Note 3], that their line extended much further than mine particularly on my right, where they were pressing forward to gain my flank.--To protect that flank, I ordered the company on my right to change its front so as to oppose the enemy on that flank [see Note 4]. Whether my orders were not well understood or whether it proceeded from any other cause, in attempting this movement some disorder ensued in this company which rather fell back than faced as I wished them." As a consequence, "first a part, and then the whole of the company commenced a retreat."

Regarding the cause of the confusion, Howard (fairly or not) placed the blame firmly on the company commander:

"This company on my right were Virginians, commanded by Capt. Wallace who some time previous had formed a connexion with a vile woman of the camp, and the infatuation was so great that on guard or any other duty he had this woman with him and seemed miserable when she was absent. He seemed to have lost all sense of the character of an officer. He was in this state of mind at the time of the action. As well as I can recollect Morgan afterwards reprimanded him severely & forced him to break off the connexion."

In any case, the effect of this error was not limited to Wallace’s company. "The rest of the line expecting that a retreat was ordered, faced about and retreated but in perfect order."

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson recorded what happened next: "The Enemy thinking that We Were broke set up a great Shout Charged us With their bayonets but in no Order."

The British had paid a steep price in blood, but now at least victory seemed imminent. The Continentals, the last significant form of resistance on the battlefield, were retreating. They would not be allowed to retreat peacefully. The British infantry stormed after them.

According to Howard, "Morgan, who had mostly been with the militia, quickly rode up to me and expressed apprehensions of the event; but I soon removed his fears by pointing to the line, and observing that the men were not beaten who retreated in that order. He then ordered me to keep with the men, until we came to the rising ground near Washington's horse; and he rode forward to fix on the most proper place for us to halt and face about.

Howard clearly indicated that he was ordered to take a position near Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s dragoon reserve, or at least that portion not engaged with Ogilvie. "At this moment Genl. Morgan rode to me and ordered me to retreat to Washington's horse about 100 yards, and there form."

Other sources, however, indicate that not only were the Continental infantry retreating to the rear, but that Washington’s dragoons approached the Continental infantry as they were retreating.

William Moultrie stated in his postwar history that "Colonel Washington perceiving this [retreat], immediately rode up close to the rear of the second line [i.e., the Continentals] with his cavalry… Colonel Washington, riding up so close to the rear of our second line stopped the British for a moment, which gave time to Colonel Howard to rally his men."

On the British side, Lieutenant Mackenzie also believed this is what occurred. Morgan "ordered Colonel Washington, with his dragoons, to cover his [Howard’s] retreat, and to check the pursuit."

The Continentals in Retreat. The Continentals are retreating to the rear and wheeling to the right. A portion of the American cavalry marks the spot where they will halt. Meanwhile, the British infantry pursue.

Notes:

1. That the Continentals fired repeatedly on the advancing British is also indicated in the statement by John Thomas, who lost track of the number of volleys. He noted that when the British began their attack, "The musquetry [i.e., Continentals]… had orders to fire but doesn't know how many times they fired before they retreated."

2. Tarleton knew that the right wing of the main line had retreated. Unclear from this or other statements is whether the left wing of the main line retreated at the same time as the Continentals. It seems unlikely that they did. Virginian rifleman John Thomas notably used "they" rather than "we" to describe the retreat of the Continentals. Lawrence Babits also quotes a Virginian riflemen by the name of Jeremiah Preston who claimed to have "fired 17 rounds," which also suggests that Triplett’s Virginians remained in place (and continued to fire on the British as the Continentals retreated). Triplett’s Virginians probably would have remained behind the Continentals, after the latter completed their retreat, which makes it plausible that Triplett would have remained in place.

3. According to my order of battle, he has somewhat overstated British strength and understated American strength. See Cowpens in Miniature 2, Cowpens in Miniature 3.

4. In my order of battle, I noted that Wallace’s Virginians numbered only 20 men. This number would seem to be far too few to have effectively checked the more than 250 men of the 71st Foot. It’s possible that Wallace’s small company was augmented with some of the miscellaneous troops assigned to Howard’s battalion (specifically, the North Carolina continentals and Virginia State Troops; see the American order of battle for details). However, even in that case this company would still have been outnumbered 5-1. A retreat, it would seem, was unavoidable.

Sources:

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Anderson, Howard, and Thomas, among others.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, Hanger's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Main Line: The Right Wing Collapses, The American Cavalry - Part 1, Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature