To Quebec: Triumph and Tragedy (2)

This is the final post in the series on the Montreal campaign of 1775. The previous post can be found here; an index to all posts can be found here.

Battle of Quebec

Quebec was one of the most readily defended cities in North America. Its “lower town” was built on a narrow terrace between a high cliff and the wide St. Lawrence. Its “upper town” was perched at the top of the cliff and surrounded by 25-foot thick stone walls. A narrow winding road connected the two parts of the city.

An American army camped on the outskirts of the city in early December. Its commanders were Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery and Colonel Benedict Arnold. Somehow these men had to take Quebec if they were to complete the conquest of Canada. They also knew that the attack would have to be made quickly because many of the men’s enlistments would expire at the end of the month. Somehow also, the attack would have to succeed despite the fact that the British defenders outnumbered the attackers by a fair margin (the Americans had about 1,000 men; the British, led by Governor Guy Carleton, had around 1,800).

The Americans tried a variety of stratagems: they tried bluffing the garrison into surrendering, luring the garrison from the city walls, and wearing the garrison down by bombardment and sniper fire. When these efforts failed, they mounted a predawn assault, in a snowstorm, on December 31.

Montgomery wanted to deceive the British as to where the assault would be made. In advance he had hundreds of scaling ladders constructed, so as to convince the British that a frontal assault was planned. On the morning of the attack, John Brown’s provincials and James Livingston’s 1st Canadian regiment feinted against the city wall, so as to hold the attention of the garrison.

Montgomery’s main attack was made against Quebec’s lower town. To maximize the possibility of success, both ends of the lower town were to be assaulted at the same time. Montgomery led a column of New York Continentals from the west, while Arnold led a mixed force from the east (specifically, Continentals from New England, riflemen from Virginia and Pennsylvania, and Lamb’s New York artillery company). Lanterns were set up to light the assembly points, and signal rockets were used to coordinate the attacks.

Despite these careful preparations, the attack was a fiasco.

Circled areas show the approximate area where each American commander made his attack (click to enlarge).

The British were not deceived by the feints against the city walls.

At the western entrance to the lower town, Montgomery’s column encountered a two-storey blockhouse armed with four cannon. Despite a stealthy advance, the vanguard was detected and annihilated. Montgomery was struck in the head and killed instantly; 12 others died around him. The wet weather made it difficult to operate firearms, and the rest of the column, horrified by the death of their commander and facing what appeared to be an insurmountable barrier, decided to retreat.

Arnold’s column was first observed as it passed under the city walls en route to the east end of the lower town. Arnold was hit in the ankle while leading the column, but the men pressed on without him. The barrier they faced was not as formidable as the one confronting Montgomery’s men. Here, two cannon had been placed on an elevated platform. A wall in front blocked the street. Once the cannons fired, the Americans rushed forward with scaling ladders, mounted the platform, and captured the defenders. (In the lead was one Captain Daniel Morgan of Virginia, who would end the war a brigadier-general and an American hero).

By the time the Americans had reorganized on the far side of this barrier, British reinforcements from the upper town had taken up positions at a second street barrier and in the buildings around it. The Americans became pinned down trying to force this point. Worse, some of the British retook the first barrier and cut off their escape. Many of these men were killed and more than 400 captured.

Afterwards, the remnants of the American army maintained a grim blockade of the city. Some reinforcements would arrive that winter and spring, but any real hope of taking Quebec was gone.

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Some passages by participants

Captain Thomas Ainslie (British militia) on the feint attack:

“About 4 o clock in the Morning Capt: Malcom Fraser of the Royal Emigrants being on his rounds, saw many flashes of fire without hearing any reports; the sentries inform 'd him that they had perceived them for some time on the heights of Abraham, the sentinels between Port Louis & Cape Diamond had seen fix'd lights like lamps in a street--these appearances being very uncommon & the night favouring the designs of the enemy, Capt: Fraser order 'd the Guards and Pickets on the ramparts to stand to their arms. The drums beat, the bells rang the alarm, & in a few minutes the whole Garrison was under arms--even old men of seventy were forward to oppose the attackers.

“Two Rockets sent by the enemy from the foot of Cape Diamond were immediately followed by a heavy & hot fire from a body of men posted behind a rising ground within eighty yards of the wall, at Cape Diamond, the flashes from their muskets made their heads visible--their bodies were cover 'd: we briskly returned the fire directed by theirs--at this moment a body of men supposed to be Canadians appear 'd in St Johns suburbs,--& the enemy threw shells into town from St Roc.” [1]

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Caldwell (British militia) on the repulse of Montgomery’s attack:

“In the mean time, Montgomery made his attack at Près-de-Ville… He got past some pickets… but the post was much stronger than, I believe, he imagined, and defended by four cannons there and a 4-pounder; they were served by some seamen under the orders of the master of the transport; his name was Barnsfare. The guard was under the command of a Canadian officer of Militia; the men, Canadians and British, mixed, Barnsfare declared he would not fire till he was sure of doing execution, and with the utmost coolness, waited till the enemy came within his view, at about 30 yards distance, where they received a general discharge from the cannon and musketry. Nothing but groans were heard, and the rebels immediately retired…” [2]

Private Abner Stocking (American Continental) on Arnold’s attack:

“[Arnold] led the forlorn hope in person, and was followed by Captain Lamb with his company of artillery, and a field piece mounted on a sled. Close in the rear of the artillery was the main body, in front of which was Morgan’s company of riflemen… In this order Arnold advanced with the utmost intrepidity… against the battery. The alarm was immediately given, and the fire on his flank commenced [i.e., plunging fire from the walls of the upper town], which, however, did not prove very destructive. As he approached the barrier [to the lower town] he received a musket ball in the leg which shattered the bone, and he was carried off the field to the hospital. Morgan rushed forward to the battery at the head of his company, and received from one of the [cannon] pieces, almost at its mouth, a discharge of grape shot which killed only one man. A few rifles were immediately fired into the embrasures, by which a British soldier was wounded in the head, and the barricade being instantly mounted with the aid of ladders… the battery was deserted without discharging the other gun. The captain of the guard, with the greater number of his men, fell into the hands of the Americans…”

“We had now passed the first barrier; but a second we knew was before us and not far distant. We had no pilot and the night was very dark and dismal. We took shelter from the fury of the storm under the sides of some of the buildings and waited for day light to direct us. At the dawn of day we collected in a body, seized the ladders and were proceeding to the second barrier, when we were hailed by a Captain Anderson [British] who had just issued from the gate with a body of troops to attack us. Captain Morgan who led our little band… answered the British captain by a ball through his head, his soldiers drew him within the barricade and closed the gate; a tremendous fire from the windows of the buildings and port holes of the wall, was directed against our little host.”

“Thirty of our privates being killed and thirty five wounded, and surrounded as we were on all sides without any hope of relief, we were obliged to surrender ourselves prisoners of war.” [3]

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Note:

1. Journal of Thomas Ainslie.

2. Henry Caldwell's account of the battle.

3. Journal of Abner Stocking.

To Quebec: Triumph and Tragedy (1)

To the Gates of Quebec

“We Shall Be Undone”

In the Fall of 1775, the Americans launched an invasion of Canada. The defending British forces were concentrated in the western part of the province, especially at Fort Saint-Jean. In the eastern part of the province, Lieutenant-Colonel Allan Maclean safeguarded Quebec, a strategically valuable city and the seat of government.

Unbeknownst to the British, the American invasion was made in two parts. General Richard Montgomery led the main effort in the west. In the east, Colonel Benedict Arnold led a secretive expedition through the wilderness of Maine and southern Canada in a bid to take the city of surprise. His march was a remarkable achievement, and one of the most celebrated events of the war.

Strategic Situation: November-December, 1775 (click to enlarge).

Arnold’s expedition was nearly successful as British attention was focused elsewhere. At the time Arnold reached the St. Lawrence River, the city of Quebec was defended by only a handful of regulars. Maclean, and most of his men had moved west to Sorel. Meanwhile, a number of English merchants in Quebec scarcely hid their hopes that the Americans would take over. However, word of Arnold’s expedition leaked out, and the British removed all small craft from the south shore of the river. This stymied Arnold just long enough. By the time the Americans were across the St. Lawrence, Maclean and his men were back in the garrison. [1]

At this point, the city of Quebec was not in imminent danger, but its fall looked inevitable. Maclean lamented:

“…we have been now ten days invested so that we can get nothing into the Town, and our provisions are by no means Adequate to Maintain the Number of Inhabitants, and if we turn out some thousands, we run a very great risk of having the Canadian Militia Mutiny… But what above all gives me the greatest uneasiness is, that the very best Train of Artillery in Canada fell into the hands of the Rebells at St. John's, there is not a single piece of Brass Ordnance in the Whole Province that they have not got, and if they have got a ship that lay at Montreal with 2000 Barrells of Powder, which I am afraid is the case, we shall be undone…”

Fortunately for the British, the supply of gunpowder had been thrown into the St. Lawrence.

Also, the American army was on the point of dissolution.

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“Patience and Perseverance”

Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery’s men had spent a miserable campaign in the swampy forestland around Fort Saint-Jean, during which time much of the army was debilitated by illness. Now the Canadian winter was at hand, and the men were without adequate clothing. Provisions were chronically in short supply and the army was essentially bankrupt. It didn’t help either that most of the Americans’ terms of enlistment were set to expire on December 31st, and the men longed to be with their families again.

Montgomery issued a proclamation at Montreal on November 15 in which he made “acknowledgment to the troops for their patience and perseverance during the course of a fatiguing campaign.” Rather than force dispirited men to campaign with him any longer, he offered “Passess, together with boats and provisions… for such as choose to return home…” However, he asked “the troops not to lay him under the necessity of abandoning Canada; of undoing in one day what has been the work of months,” and he hoped “that none will leave him at this critical juncture but such whose affairs or health absolutely require their return home…”

Montgomery also asked the men to extend their enlistments until April 15th, by which time new regiments could be raised in the colonies and sent into Canada. By way of enticement, he wrote: “Those who engage in this honorable cause shall be furnished completely with every article of clothing requisite for the rigor of the climate, blanket-coats, coats, waistcoat and breeches, one pair of stockings, two shirts, leggins, sacks, shoes, mittens, and a cap, at the Continental charge, and one dollar bounty.”

The response was disappointing. The Green Mountain Boys chose to return home, so too did Bedel’s Rangers, and most of the troops from Connecticut. At least many in Montgomery’s own New York regiments agreed to stick it out. Major John Brown also remained along with many of his men, and James Livingston retained a corps of Canadian troops (soon to be reorganized as the 1st Canadian Regiment).

Another unit that had planned on departing was Lamb’s artillery company. Cannoneer Robert Barwick recorded in his journal on November 18, “our Capt [John Lamb] Came up to know the minds of our Company about [en]Listing but there was scarce one of them that would consent to it, as they been so long from home and wanted to go Back.” [2]

Lamb’s men, however, seem to have been given the option to leave only after the other unwilling men were dismissed. Lamb’s men then “were told what Difficulty it was in getting down the Lakes in the winter[, and] they began to think it would be best to [en]list again…” Once the other units departed, the Americans suffered from a shortage of bateaux -- the one practical means of returning to New York.

Therefore, Barwick, in spite of his wishes, “went forwards to Quebec although I had but about 4 or 5 weeks to serve of my old inlistment.” Most of the company followed suit.

Montgomery then began to send the troops downriver aboard the vessels captured at Sorel.

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“To Die with a Hero”

Lieutenant John Copp of the 1st New York Regiment left Montreal on December 1st and reached Quebec on the 6th. He wrote the following day, “We met herewith Colonel Arnold and his Detachment from Cambridge, he has about 600 men who have suffered innumerable hardships on their March hither. He is really a brave Man, and will no doubt, if his Life is spared, do honor to the American Arms. Great part of the Army left us when they were most wanted, but I flatter myself we shall be able to do without them. The more Danger, the more Glory. If Quebec is taken all is Ours…” [3]

But Copp admitted that the situation was hardly promising: “the place appears to be almost impregnable… This Evening our Bombardment is to go on, and the Artillery to begin their Attack in different places. Our Chief difficulty is in erecting Batteries, on account of the Frost having hardened the Ground too much for throwing it up.”

The same mix of optimism and fatalism appears in a letter written the same day by an officer stationed at Fort Saint-Jean (now an American depot):

“Heaven seems still to smile upon us… This is the time of the year when in common the rivers about here are froze up, but we have this day calm moderate weather, with a fair wind to carry down the boats with the powder… Gen. Montgomery landed at Point aux Trembles last Friday the 1st inst. on Saturday part of his Army marched for Quebec and he was to follow with the remainder the next day; This we call great news, & if it is true that fortune favours the brave, success must attend our General, for a braver man does not tread on America nor on English leather; to die with such a man is to die with a Hero indeed.” [4]

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Notes:

1. Maclean left Sorel for other reasons and learned of Arnold's arrival on the St. Lawrence while returning to Quebec.

2. Barwick's journal appears in the series, Naval Documents of the Revolutionary War.

3. Source.

4. Source. The last passage is of course remarkably prescient. I got the chills when reading it.

Struggle for Sorel

This is the most recent entry in a series of posts on the American invasion of Canada, for an index of past posts, see here.

Sorel was occupied by British Lieutenant-Colonel Allan Maclean in mid-October, 1775. Maclean’s force consisted of 120 men of the newly-raised Royal Highland Emigrants, 60-some men of the 7th Foot, and a number of Canadian militia. Maclean brought these men from Quebec with the intention of aiding in the relief of Fort Saint-Jean. He advanced up the Richelieu as far as Saint-Denis, where he found that a key bridge had been cut. Some local Canadians were welcomed into his camp, but these men then slipped away at the first opportunity – taking arms and ammunition with them. Maclean returned to Sorel and awaited the advance of Governor Guy Carleton’s force from Montreal.

Carleton’s army was defeated at the battle of Longueuil, which ended hopes of relieving Fort Saint-Jean. Maclean’s militia returned home once the dispiriting news was received. Maclean returned to Quebec soon thereafter, but he left behind an armed vessel (the Fell) and the detachment from the 7th Foot. Their task was to keep communications open between Montreal and Quebec.

Fort Saint-Jean formally surrendered on November 3rd. The victorious American commander, Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery then launched two strikes designed to capture British Governor Guy Carleton and the British garrison defending Montreal. The first strike was led by Montgomery himself, and was aimed directly at the city. The second strike was led by Colonel James Easton, and was aimed at taking Sorel. Montgomery hoped that Easton would cut off Carleton’s escape route to the east.

Montreal Campaign, Early November (click to enlarge).

Easton’s force consisted of his own regiment of New England provincials, and James Livingston’s Canadian Volunteers. These men were in Saint-Ours by November 3rd, and Sorel by the 7th. The British troops there stayed aboard the Fell, nearly 200 yards offshore. To defeat this force, Easton ordered a battery of two 6-pounders to be constructed on shore.

On the morning of November 8th, Easton’s guns opened fire. The Fell quickly cut its cables and moved downstream, but in the meantime, according to American Major John Brown, “we plumped her through in many places” with “at least twelve rounds.” Brown [1] relished hearing civilians on board crying out “O Lord! O Lord!” as the Americans blasted away. Two sailors on the Fell were wounded: William Money "had his thigh broke... by a Cannon Shot" and William Wadlow "had his right Breast shot off by a cannon shot" [2]. The Fell’s return fire missed the battery and landed in the village instead.

It was a small victory, but now Easton could lay a trap for Guy Carleton’s men.

Notes:

1. It is remarkable how active the unheralded Brown was in this campaign. Brown tried to enlist the support of the Canadians for the American cause prior to the start of the Revolutionary War (discussed here). Then Brown participated in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga in May, 1775. Brown later became second in command of Easton’s regiment, but he was active in Montgomery’s operations before Easton arrived in Canada. As described in previous posts, Brown captured supplies bound for Fort Saint-Jean, fought the British at Rivière Saint-Jean, captured the village of La Prairie, conspired with Ethan Allen before the debacle at the battle of Longue-Pointe, and played a leading role in the capture of Fort Chambly.

2. There may have been other casualties – these two men were identified in a return of losses (signed by Hector de Cramahé and dated May 25, 1776) among Royal Navy personnel during the invasion of Canada.

Final Bombardment of Fort Saint-Jean

The siege of Fort Saint-Jean dragged on for weeks. Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, who led the American forces, was impatient to finish the siege, so that he could capture Montreal before winter set on. In the meantime it was hoped that a second American army, led by Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold, would capture the town of Quebec, thereby completing the conquest of Canada.

Early in the siege Montgomery identified a hill to the northwest as the key spot from which to threaten the fort. In early October, he “had a road cut to the intended ground and some fascines made.” [1]

However, his army disapproved of this plan and Montgomery “was informed by Major Brown that a general dissatisfaction prevailed; that unless something was undertaken, in a few days there would be a mutiny.” The army preferred to bombard the fort from afar -- especially the east bank of the Richelieu. Montgomery confessed in a letter to Major-General Philip Schuyler, that when he laid his plans, “I did not consider I was at the head of troops who carry the spirit of freedom into the field, and [who] think for themselves.”

The British took little action to thwart the Americans beyond the exchange of long-range artillery fire. Occasional sorties were made by armed boats, but these efforts ended once a battery was established east of the fort (October 11). On land, a party of Canadians, led by Captains David Monin and Samuel McKay, ambushed some Americans in the woods (October 9), but no sorties were directed against the American camps or gun emplacements.

By the end of October, Montgomery was ready to bring the siege of the fort to a close. He had been reinforced by mortars and ammunition captured at Fort Chambly, and some additional infantry companies from the colonies (specifically, the bulk of the 1st Connecticut and 4th New York regiments). On October 27-28, he abandoned the fortifications south of Fort Saint-Jean and brought his whole force to Grosse Pointe northwest of the fort. There, construction of a new battery overlooking the fort was begun on the evening of October 29.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema of the 1st New York Regiment oversaw the construction:

“In the Evening I was ordered with 200 Men to erect a Battery [the Ground for which having been previously laid out by the Engineers] within 250 Yards of the Fort—In the Morning the Breast Work & Ambresurs completed”

The British soon learned what the Americans were planning:

“Captn Monin and Captn McKay went out this morning in hopes of getting a prisoner, and if possible to survey the Enemys position. An Officer & 25 Men were order’d to be in readiness to support them. They had been out a very little while, when they fell in with a Man who we afterward found was a straggler from a party of 200 Men, who were very near the same Spot [i.e., they captured one of Ritzema’s men]. The Man inform’d us there were 2,000 Men at the rapids (i.e., the lower Camp) and 50 Indians… He shew’d us the place of the Battery…” [2]

Because of the prisoner’s confession, the new battery quickly became a harrowing place for those that guarded it.

According to Aaron Barlow of the 5th Connecticut Regiment:

“The Regulars discovered our Battery. We guarded it with 100 men, I being one of the Guard. They flung upwards of 100 Bomb shells, some cannon and grape shot at us. Wounded one man, broke two guns. One bomb shell broke within 4 feet of me which made me almost deaf. I believe there were 20 shells broke within 2 rods of me. This night [October 29-30] we dragged four cannon and five mortars to this Breast work in order to play on the Fort.” [3]

The battery opened on November 1, and was joined by the guns east of the fort. Together, they devastated the fort.

A British officer recorded:

“Large pieces of the Wall were knock’d in. The Chimneys of the House in the South Redoubt were thrown down and the few Corners where some little Shelter from the Weather was to be had were now no longer tenable. A great many shot pass’d thro’ the parapets and some wounded Men behind them. 3 Men were kill’d and 4 or 5 wounded. A good deal of provision was destroy’d.—”

British counterfire was also deadly.

According to Benjamin Trumbull of the 5th Connecticut Regiment:

“On our Side one man was killed right out on the Platform, another had his Leg[,] foot and Thigh torn all to Pieces with a shell, had his Leg cut of[f] about nine o’clock as near the trunk of his body as possible, he bore the Operation with great magnanimity but did not Survive the Night. Three more were wounded but two of them very Slightily.”

Late in the day, Montgomery attempted to open surrender negotiations with the British. An officer in Lamb's artillery recalled:

“I received a message from General Montgomery, ordering me to cease firing till further orders; these orders were extremely disagreeable to me, when I saw some of my men bleeding before my eyes, and dying with the wounds which they had received. On our ceasing to fire, the General ordered a parley to be beat...”

The messenger Montgomery sent was one Lacoste, a Canadian militiaman captured at Longueuil. From him, the British learned that Governor Guy Carleton had been defeated and that there was no hope of relief. The garrison was left with enough rations for 8 days at 2/3 the usual allotment, not including those rations destroyed in the bombardment. The British agreed to a cease fire and pondered their few remaining options.

Notes:

1. A copy of the letter is available here.

The journal attributed to British Lieutenant John André seemingly confirms the wisdom of Montgomery’s assessment. He noted at the end of the siege:

“We may thank our Enemy in some sort for leaving us in such slight field Works the credit of having been only reduc’d by Famine… Their Batterys might with their numbers [of infantry] by means of Approaches have been brought much closer to our Redouts have overlook’d us, destroyed our breastworks, and by a slaughter from which there cou’d have been no Shelter, have render’d our holding out, a meer sacrifice of Men who might have been reserv’d for better Services.”

2. From a journal attributed to British Lieutenant John André.

3. Sources disagree on the composition of this battery. For example, Montgomery referred to "our battery of four twelve-pounders" (see here). Colonel Timothy Bedel wrote, "I have a battery of four twelve-pounders, one mortar, and three royals, fixing at my post" (see here). Ritzema claimed it consisted of four 12-pounders and six Royal Mortars. An officer with Lamb's Artillery company (likely Captain John Lamb himself) stated that it consisted of "three twelve and one nine-pounders, three mortars, and as many cohorns" (see here). For additional comparison, see this description of the American ordinance used during the siege.

Battle of Longueuil (1)

The American Invasion of Canada has been a recurring theme of this blog. Last month I wrote about two events that took place during this campaign. On September 25, 1775, the Americans began to bombard Fort Saint-Jean. Most of the British regulars defending Canada were trapped in this fort. On the same day, the British defeated Ethan Allen’s men in the battle of Longue-Pointe. Afterwards, hundreds of Canadian militia rallied to the support of the British governor Guy Carleton.

By the beginning of October, Carleton had amassed a small army at Montreal which he hoped to use to raise the siege of Fort Saint-Jean. This army consisted of 900 or so militia, 100 Native Americans (Algonquians and Mohawk), and more than 100 British regulars [1].

However, Carleton took no immediate action.

• He lacked reliable information on American numbers and deployment.
• He doubted that his militia would overpower Montgomery’s Continentals.
• He was hopeful of obtaining additional militia from the rural parishes.
• He wanted Lieutenant-Colonel Allan Maclean to come to his assistance with British troops garrisoning the city of Quebec.

During mid-to-late October, the Americans built up a small force to defend the southern shore of the St. Lawrence river. This force consisted of the Green Mountain Boys, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Seth Warner, the 2nd New York regiment, and two companies of the 3rd New York regiment (those of Captains John Nicholson and Lewis Dubois).

British and American Positions in Mid-October (click to enlarge). Warner occupied Longueuil on October 15. Brown and Livingston attacked Fort Chambly on October 17. Around this time, Maclean arrived at Sorel.

While the Americans grew stronger, Carleton’s army grew weaker. Carleton’s efforts to force additional militia to join his army were unsuccessful. In addition, as the weeks went by without action, Carleton’s militia began to grow restless and started returning to their homes [2].

In mid-October, the British began sending armed boats along the southern shore of the St. Lawrence in what seem to have been efforts to probe the American defenses. Exchanges of fire took place on October 15, between Boucherville and Longueuil, and October 18 and October 26 at Longueuil.

Carleton finally launched a major attack at Longueuil on October 30. Details concerning this battle will be described in two upcoming posts.

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Example of a probing attack (that of October 18), as described by Lieutenant John Fassett of the Green Mountain Boys:

“Seven Boats came down the river and made as if they were going to land on a point of an island or come across the river to us. A number of our officers went out towards the boats, and the Regulars from the boats fired their field pieces at us. The Balls and Grape Shot flew over our heads, but did us no harm. They shot two or three cannon balls thro' the roofs of some of the houses. Our men fired several small arms at them. Their Balls scooted along by their boats, some of them” [3].

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Notes:

1. Estimates of Carleton’s force varied widely. Carleton claimed 900; Simon Sanguinet, resident of Montreal, stated there twice as many men. Others, less credibly, claimed that Carleton had almost no assistance from the Canadian militia.

2. Carleton complained in a letter dated October 25 that the militia “disappear thirty or forty of a night.” However, it seems that he still had at least 500 Canadians available for the October 30 attack on Longueuil (see journals of John Fassett and Henry Livingston, and these letters by Henry Livingston and Timothy Bedel).

3. Fassett’s journal provides essential reading on the American invasion of Canada. A .pdf copy can be found here.

The Siege of Fort Saint-Jean

Fort Saint-Jean in southern Quebec was the place at which the British hoped to turn back the American invasion of Canada. The Americans were not strong enough to take the fort by assault, and so intended to capture the fort by siege. However, the Americans’ initial attempts to approach the fort were easily turned back.

Some events described in previous posts:

• September 4: The invasion begins
• September 6: First attempt to approach Fort Saint-Jean
• September 10: Second attempt to approach Fort Saint-Jean
• ~September 11: Canadian volunteers prevent supplies from reaching Fort Saint-Jean by water.
• September 17: Major John Brown cuts the land route to Fort Saint-Jean. The fort is now in a state of siege.
• September 18: Colonel Timothy Bedel turns back a British sortie northwest of the fort.

Over the next week, the Americans expanded their main camp, and constructed a road leading towards Fort Saint-Jean. At the edge of the woods south of the fort, the Americans constructed two gun emplacements. These guns opened fire at 3pm on September 25th, 1775 (the same day that Ethan Allen met with defeat near Montreal).

On November 1st, the British garrison, worn down by the bombardment, low on rations, and without hope of relief, decided to enter into surrender negotiations. The garrison formally surrendered on November 3rd.

I don’t plan on providing an exhaustive review of the month-and-a-half long siege. Instead, this post is intended to provide a broad overview of the siege. An upcoming post will describe, in detail, the dramatic, final bombardment of the fort on November 1st.

The Americans had four camps in the vicinity of Fort Saint-Jean during the siege. Their approximate location is identified by the following letters on the map below:

A. Main camp, commanded by Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery. In use from September 17 to October 28, 1775. On the 28th, Montgomery relocated all of the forces in the main camp to the lower camp.

B. Lower camp, commanded by Colonel Timothy Bedel (superseded by Brigadier-General David Wooster on October 27, and Montgomery on October 28). In use from September 18 to November 3, 1775.

C. Camp near Hazen’s house, commanded by James Livingston. First occupied by September 22 and probably in use for the remainder of the siege. In mid-October, Livingston and most of his men departed to attack Fort Chambly.

D. East camp, commanded by Colonel James Clinton. In use from around October 11 to November 3, 1775.

The Americans also established four gun emplacements during the siege. For the most part, these pieces were manned by Lamb’s artillery company with support from various infantry detachments. The location of the emplacements is identified by the following numbers on the map below:

1. 2-gun battery of 12-pounders. Intended to fire on the British shipyard and the British vessels. Operational September 25-October 27.

2. Mortar battery, including a 13-in. mortar nicknamed the “old sow”. Intended to shell the fort. Operational September 25-October 27.

3. East battery, consisting of 2 4-pounders (the Canadian artillery) and 2 12-pounders. Intended to fire on the British vessels and the fort. Operational October 11-November 1 (the 4-pounders first opened fire on the 11th, the 12-pounders on the 14th).

4. Northwest battery, consisting of four 12-pounders and 6 mortars. Intended to fire on the fort. Operational November 1.

The Siege of Fort Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). For details on construction, see here. The site of the gun emplacements indicated on the map is fairly exact; however, the map should not be used for guidance as to the shape and size of the emplacements. A number of the roads shown on this map were constructed after the siege began. While the existence of these roads is clearly indicated in primary sources, their exact course is not, and the manner in which I’ve represented these roads is based on interpretation. The British fort consisted of two redoubts connected by a trench and picket fence. The trench and fence were constructed after the siege began and do not appear on earlier maps I've made of the area. Bedel constructed at least one breastwork to defend his camp at Grosse Pointe. His men also felled trees (not shown) at several places across the road leading north from the fort, and they controlled the shore opposite Hazen's estate.

Comments on Research

I do not document here the various sources used to support each of the above statements. However, interested readers are welcome to contact me with specific questions regarding sources and interpretations.

One subject that I've wrestled with in composing this post concerns the location of the Canadians' guns.

Foucher, a Canadian officer serving with the British garrison, recorded in his journal "On the fourth [of October] several Bostonians [actually, they were primarily Livingston's men] were noticed on the south side of the river near Moses Hazen's house. Several cannon shots were fired at them, to which the enemy replied in the same way."

From this statement, I concluded that the Canadians' had built, or were building, a gun emplacement for their 4 pounders by Hazen's house, and I indicated as much in an earlier post.

This view seemed confirmed by an October 6 letter from General Montgomery to Major-General Philip Schuyler, in which Montgomery noted, "Mr. Livingston, some days ago, took post at Mr. Hazen' s house, with near two hundred of the Canadians; they are erecting a battery there, which seems to make the garrison very uneasy." [Emphasis in original]

However, only Foucher's account suggests the Canadians fired their cannon on this occasion; other accounts indicate only that the Canadians responded to British fire with their muskets.

A British officer's journal (thought to have been written by Lieutenant John André), noted in the entry for October 5th that "Some imagin'd they saw men at work opposite the north redoubt on the east side of the River." His account makes it clear that this is a new enemy position: on October 7th, a British row galley is sent out both "towards Hazens House and along the side of the River opposite the N. Redoubt." No account mentions the Canadians' guns in action on this occasion, strongly suggesting that such a battery had not yet been erected. The British officer's journal indicates that a battery across from the north redoubt was completed on October 11th and opened fire on the fort the same day.

On considering these and other sources again, I've concluded that Foucher was probably mistaken in his characterization of the October 4th incident, and that Montgomery's description probably applies to the battery that began to be constructed on October 5th and that the garrison discovered on the 11th.

All of this is a very minor point, of course, but it is illustrative of the difficulty that arises when one attempts to reconcile participant accounts.

The Battle of Longue-Pointe

After dark, on September 24, 1775, Ethan Allen, with 80 Canadians and 30 American provincials, crossed the St. Lawrence River in order to attack Montreal. [1] The Americans “…expected all in the Suburbs, some in the Town, & many from the neighbouring Parishes wou'd have joyned them, & that they were to march in [to Montreal] without opposition…” [2] However, Allen’s plans were not widely known and he was too far removed to receive much help from friendly Canadians. Allen claimed that Major John Brown had promised to cross the river, too, but in any event his force failed to appear. [3] Instead, at about 9am on September 25, a local farmer rushed into Montreal and alerted the garrison of the impending threat. [4]

According to the Quebec Gazette, the drums beat the alarm, and “The faithful Citizens of Montreal, both English and French, wanted little persuation; in a moment the whole Town appear’d under arms…” [5] In Carleton’s words, those that turned out were primarily “all the old Gentlemen & better sort of Citizens English & Canadian” but also “some of the lower Classes followed their Example.” Carleton spoke to the assembled mass about the rebel threat, and ordered the citizens to join the British troops at the city barracks. [6]

Carleton did not know how many men he was facing and feared the worse. While ammunition was distributed to the citizens, the British leadership prepared to evacuate the city. The force that was entrusted to do battle with the Americans would be commanded by Major John Campbell, superintendent of Indian affairs in Quebec, and Major John Carden, a half-pay officer who had served with the 60th Foot. Governor Carleton and Brigadier-General Richard Prescott would remain behind with most of the city’s garrison. These stood ready to march to the city’s docks in case Campbell was defeated. Meanwhile, some other prominent officials (including Guy Johnson and Daniel Claus of the Indian Department) and the wives and children of the officers and soldiers embarked on boats in the city harbor. [7]

In the early afternoon, the British force filed out the eastern end of the city. A detachment of the 26th Foot led the advance, and the citizenry followed. Carleton noted sardonically that as the men marched forth, some of the English citizens (many of whom had ties to New England) “turned off the contrary way” while the rest “followed the Troops very gallantly, & hurried them forward without further command & without much Order.” [8]

The British force consisted of:

• 34 British regulars of the 26th Regiment, commanded by Captain John Crawford. [9]
• Between 20 and 32 officers and men attached to the Indian Department. [10]
• 6 or 8 Native Americans. [11]
• Between 30 and 80 English citizens of Montreal. [12]
• Between 120 and 300 Canadians citizens of Montreal. [13]

Allen’s men were deployed behind houses and trees near the St. Lawrence. Watching the British column advance, he dispatched one Richard Young with 9 men to protect his left flank and to annoy the right flank of the enemy. These men took post behind a creek embankment between the road and the St. Lawrence. Allen’s men were so well hidden that the British discovered them only when the British regulars came under fire. [14]

According to an account in the Quebec Gazette, Major Carden “was one of the first in the field” “tho’ extremely corpulent” “and unfortunately received a wound of which he expired in 8 hours after.” While Carden lay bleeding, the citizens began to come up. Alexander Paterson, a prominent merchant, had a ball pass through his body “as he boldly advanced towards the rebels.” “Then the general fire began on both sides and continued about fifteen minute.” The regulars delivered “a constant and steady platoon fire” “who were within sixty yards of [the rebels], covered by the gable end of a house.” Allen recalled that the British and Canadians “began to attack from wood-piles, ditches, buildings, and such like places, at a considerable distance, and I returned the fire from a situation more than equally advantageous.” Allen’s men blasted away, but they “were not the best of marksmen,” and he would later lament that “it is rare, that so much ammunition was expended, and so little execution done by it.” Fortunately, the opposing fire was little more effective as they could not see more than 2 or 3 of Allen’s men at a time. [15]

While this firefight erupted in front of Allen’s position, a flank attack was made by Indian department officers, Indians, and Canadian volunteers. Allen ordered Jeremiah Dugan to take 50 of the Canadians and take post in a ditch on his right. However, Dugan’s men quickly fled in the face of overwhelming numbers. At about the same time, Young’s party on Allen’s left flank gave way for the same reason.

The Longue-Pointe Battlefield. For information on the possible site of the battlefield (and the construction of this map), click here.

According to Allen:

“At this time I had but about forty five men with me; some of whom were wounded; the enemy kept closing round me, nor was it in my power to prevent it; by which means, my situation, which was advantageous in the first part of the attack, ceased to be so in the last; and being almost entirely surrounded with such vast, unequal numbers, I ordered a retreat, but found that those of the enemy, who were of the country, and their Indians, could run as fast as my men, though the regulars could not. Thus I retreated near a mile, and some of the enemy, with the savages, kept flanking me, and others crowded hard in the rear. In fine, I expected, in a very short time, to try the world of spirits; for I was apprehensive that no quarter would be given to me, and therefore had determined to sell my life as dear as I could. One of the enemy's officers [one Johnson, an officer in the Indian Department], boldly pressing in the rear, discharged his fusee at me; the ball whistled near me, as did many others that day. I returned the salute, and missed him, as running had put us both out of breath; for I conclude we were not frightened: I then saluted him with my tongue in a harsh manner, and told him that, inasmuch as his numbers were so far superior to mine, I would surrender provided I could be treated with honor, and be assured of good quarter for myself and the men who were with me; and he answered I should; another officer [possibly Walter Butler], coming up directly after, confirmed the treaty; upon which I agreed to surrender with my party… I ordered them to ground their arms, which they did.” [16]

Allen recalled that one of his wounded, William Stewart, was struck by an Indian with a tomahawk after he had surrendered.

An Indian tried to kill Allen as well. Allen grabbed onto Johnson and, he claimed, “I twitched the officer, to whom I gave my sword, between me and the savage; but he flew round with great fury, trying to single me out to shoot me without killing the officer; but by this time I was nearly as nimble as he, keeping the officer in such a position that his danger was my defence; but, in less than half a minute, I was attacked by just such another imp of hell: Then I made the officer fly around with incredible velocity, for a few seconds of time, when I perceived a Canadian, who had lost one eye, as appeared afterwards, taking my part against the savages; and in an instant an Irishman came to my assistance with a fixed bayonet, and drove away the fiends, swearing by Jasus he would kill them.”

Allen was then brought before the British officers, who said they were happy to see him. “I answered them, that I should rather choose to have seen them at General Montgomery's camp.” [17]

The British captured Ethan Allen, 17 other Americans, and 16 Canadians. Ten of the prisoners were wounded (2 mortally, 8 slightly). Allen also lost 5 men killed. The rest escaped. [18]
On the British side, three were mortally wounded (Major Carden, Alexander Patterson, and a soldier in the 26th). One Sieur Beaubassin “had his eyebrow carried away by a glancing shot,” and it was said that one volunteer was shot in the thigh and another lost an eye. [19]

Allen was escorted back to town by a British officer, and Sieur Beaubassin, who was “very merry and facetious” despite his brush with death. The British officers were considerably less amused and Brigadier-General Richard Prescott threatened to bayonet Allen and the other prisoners. Instead, Allen was put in irons on a British vessel, and his men were placed in prison. Carleton ordered Allen to be brought to England for trial as a traitor. [20]

The Battle of Longue-Pointe. This is a crude, and not-to-scale, representation of the battlefield. Allen's men are in the building or behind trees on the left; the British force is on the right. The British force, consisting of regulars, Indian Department officers, Native Americans, and English and Canadian civilians (shown here at a 1:20 figure:combatant ratio), also had the protection of some buildings (not shown).

Notes:

1. These numbers are from Allen’s memoir. British sources tended to credit him with somewhat more men; American sources with somewhat fewer men.

2. Carleton to Legge. Carleton’s description of the battle, as well as that of some others, can be found in this previous post.

3. Allen’s meeting with Brown was described in an earlier post. It is unclear of what to make of Allen’s statement: Did Brown encounter some unexpected difficulty in crossing the St. Lawrence? Was there a miscommunication between the two men? Did Allen willfully misconstrue events? One thing that is clear is that Allen was not alone in contemplating an attack on Montreal. Consider the following intriguing snippet appearing in a letter from Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery to Colonel Timothy Bedel, written on the day of the battle (but before news of Allen’s attack and defeat were received):

“I have just received yours by Mr. [James] Livingston. I approve exceedingly of your plan, if it can be done without risk of weakening your present post [he was encamped northwest of Fort Saint-Jean; see here], which might facilitate the escape of the garrison. If you go to Montreal, pay the utmost attention to good order.”

4. See Allen’s memoir. Sanguinet gave his name as Deshotel.

5. October 5, 1775, issue.

6. Carleton to Legge.

7. Sanguinet is the sole source on these details, but in light of the telling omissions in the British side of the story, his description of events seems correct. Carleton and Johnson both wrote about the battle afterwards, but neither they, nor other British sources, indicated why a number of senior officers did not participate in the battle. Sanguinet claimed that 80 British regulars remained in the city, while only 30 fought in the battle. His claim is supported by evidence that the British garrison consisted of about 110 rank and file (see here and here). Carleton’s intention was to abandon Montreal if necessary (as evidenced by his actions in November, 1775) and preserve the town of Quebec at all costs. It was believed that if the town of Quebec fell to the Americans, all of upper Canada (including Montreal) would inevitably fall, too.

8. Carleton to Legge

9. Carleton to Legge; “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter of September 28, 1775; Sanguinet

10. “Nauticus”; Johnson to Legge

11. “Nauticus”; Johnson to Legge; Carleton to Legge

12. Sanguinet provided the low estimate; the high estimate was reported by “Nauticus” and the author of the anonymous letter dated September 28, 1775

13. “Nauticus” and the anonymous letter of September 28, 1775 provided the low estimate, Sanguinet the high estimate.

14. Allen’s memoir; “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter of September 28, 1775; Sanguinet

15. Allen’s memoir; “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter of September 28, 1775

16. Allen’s memoir; that a Johnson was the first officer is indicated by Johnson to Legge and “Nauticus”. That Walter Butler was the second officer is suggested by “Nauticus” and this biography of Walter Butler.

17. Allen’s memoir

18. “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter dated September 28, 1775; Livingston to Montgomery; Carleton to Legge; Sanguinet

Allen’s memoir and the account by “Nauticus” imply that the Americans surrendered as one group, and the Canadians were captured either singly, or in one or more groups, elsewhere in the area.

19. “Nauticus”; Anonymous letter dated September 28, 1775; Carleton to Legge; Allen’s memoir

20. See Allen’s memoir for a vivid description of his capture, near killing, and imprisonment.

Guy Carleton vs. Ethan Allen

This is another installment in my ongoing series on the American invasion of Canada in 1775.

Governor Guy Carleton made Montréal his headquarters after the Americans began to invade Canada. The colony’s chief defense was Fort Saint-Jean on the Richelieu, where the bulk of the 7th and 26th regiments was garrisoned. Once that fort was besieged, Carleton placed his hopes in raising a large body of Canadian militia to relieve the fort, or to at least prevent the Americans from making any further inroads into Canada. However, the rebellion of Canadian forces in the Richelieu valley and forays made by Colonel Ethan Allen and Major John Brown dashed Carleton’s hopes. On September 21, 1775, he bemoaned [1] that “A few days ago I had hopes of assembling a corps on the Sorell [i.e., the Richelieu river] and another at La Prairie, either of which might have saved the province for this year, but the friends of rebellion dissipated both by their intrigues and lies” (Allen helped capture Carleton’s agents on the Richelieu, and Brown captured La Prairie; cf. here). He determined, however, to “spin out matters as long as I can in hopes that a good wind may bring us relief” (i.e., until reinforcements should arrive from Boston or Britain).

Guy Carleton

In practice, this meant that Carleton remained holed up in Montréal while awaiting events. Carleton had with him a detachment of the 26th Regiment, some Indian Department officers and [Guy] “Johnson’s rangers,” and a small number of Indians. Montréal was a walled city, but Carleton took little comfort in this as the walls were “extensive and defenceless.” The town’s primary defense was its Canadian and English militia. The upper class of Canadians seemed dependable; already a number of these men were serving with the garrison at Fort Saint-Jean. The lower class, however, were at best ambivalent in their sentiments, and quite a few of the English citizens of Montréal had strong ties to the Thirteen Colonies and preferred the American cause.

Meanwhile, Colonel Ethan Allen was heading his way.

Allen distinguished him by co-leading the successful attack on Fort Ticonderoga. However, he afterwards led a meaningless expedition into Canada that almost got him and his command killed or captured [see events of May 17 and May 18, 1775]. (This misadventure in Canada was a primary reason why Allen was bypassed for the leadership of the Green Mountain Boys, when they organized as a regiment in the Continental Army).

A correspondent for the New York Gazette observed that “Allen is a high flying genius, pursues every scheme on its first impression, without consideration, and much less judgment. It was with the utmost difficulty, and through the greatest entreaty, that [Major] General [Philip] Schuyler permitted him to go with the army, knowing his natural disposition…” [2]

Allen's Route to Longue-Pointe: September 18-24, 1775 (click to enlarge).

On September 18, Allen was at Saint-Denis, and contemplated capturing some British vessels anchored at Sorel. On the 20th he was at Saint-Ours, with, he claimed, 250 newly-raised volunteers. He boasted in a letter to Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery that he would raise hundreds, if not thousands, of men, and join Montgomery's army then besieging Fort Saint-Jean. [3] Soon thereafter, Allen marched to Sorel, but made no attempt to capture the British vessels. Instead, his force turned towards La Prairie. Allen could not pay, or feed, or arm his men, and only about 80 left the Richelieu valley with him. Those that did allegedly “plundered the Houses and Farms of the Gentlemen and Habitants, that had joined the King's Forces” “in every Parish on their Road.” [4]

On September 24, Allen’s party left Longueuil for La Prairie, marching along the stretch of St. Lawrence opposite Montréal. En route, he encountered Major Brown. According to Allen, “Col. Brown proposed that, "provided I would return to Longueuil, and procure some canoes, so as to cross the river St. Lawrence a little north of Montreal, he would cross it a little to the south of the town, with near two hundred men, as he had boats sufficient; and that we could make ourselves masters of Montreal."” [5] Allen quickly agreed, picked up 30 Americans that had been with Brown, and returned to Longueuil. His party crossed the river that night and landed in an area known generally as Longue-Pointe. [6]

Notes:

1. Letter to William Legge, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated September 21, 1775.

2. In Frank Moore (1859). Diary of the American Revolution: From newspapers and original documents.

3. The full contents of Allen's letter can be found here.

4. Here I am quoting a letter by Hector de Cramahé, lieutenant governor of the province of Quebec.

5. From Allen's narrative.

6. As shown in the map, Allen landed in a rural area considerably above the "village" of Longue-Pointe. The landing site was almost certainly within the modern-day Hochelaga-Maisonneuve district of Montréal.

Livingston's War

An American army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler crossed into southern Canada on September 4, 1775, and established a base at L’Île-aux-Noix. The next day, Schuyler wrote an address to the people of Canada, informing them of his intentions and requesting their support. He also sent north Colonel Ethan Allen of Vermont and Major John Brown of Massachusetts.

Allen and Brown soon linked up with a body of pro-American Canadians organized by James Livingston. These men kept watch on the British garrisons at Fort Saint-Jean and Fort Chambly, and awaited the advance of Schuyler’s army. On or about September 11, Allen, however, couldn’t resist the temptation to capture five royal artillerymen [1] travelling between the two forts.

At the time, Livingston was operating with a small party of men on Île Sainte-Thérèse, between Fort Chambly and Fort Saint-Jean. He lamented to Schuyler, “I have begun a war,” because of Allen’s action. Livingston could scarcely provide his volunteers with provisions, arms, or ammunition. No matter. The next day, the British sent out two bateaux from Fort Chambly, one of which allegedly contained 20 armed men, and the other stores for Fort Saint-Jean. As the British neared Île Sainte-Thérèse, Livingston’s men blasted them with musket fire, killing or wounding as many as a dozen men, and sending the dazed survivors fleeing to neighboring Île Sainte-Marie. Both boats were captured.

Not long after, Livingston retired to Pointe-Olivier, downriver from Fort Chambly, and Allen and Brown returned to Schuyler’s camp. Schuyler sent out Allen and Brown a second time in preparation for the Americans final push against Fort Saint-Jean. On September 17, Brown, acting with some Canadian volunteers, intercepted supplies heading for Fort Saint-Jean. The next day, Allen and Livingston captured two British agents at Saint-Denis. Soon after, Allen and Brown occupied key towns on the Saint-Lawrence. Brown took up post at La Prairie, and Allen advanced to Sorel.

Meanwhile, the American army, now led by Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, lay siege to Fort Saint-Jean. While this occurred, Livingston, with a force hovering around 300 men, continued operations on the Richelieu. Livingston’s chief responsibilities were to protect Montgomery’s northern flank and to help stop any breakout attempt from Fort Saint-Jean. The poorly-armed Canadians demanded, and eventually received, two 4-pounder field pieces.

Livingston’s War (click to enlarge). The part of the Richelieu in which Livingston’s Canadians operated during September and October, 1775, is indicated by the blue line (i.e., from Fort Saint-Jean to the parish of Saint-Denis). In mid-September, at least, Livingston’s headquarters was at Pointe-Olivier, near Fort Chambly. The British garrisons at Fort Saint-Jean, Fort Chambly, and Montreal are indicated (cf. Carleton Defends Canada), as is Montgomery’s American army besieging Fort Saint-Jean and Brown’s and Allen’s late September advances to the Saint-Lawrence.

Mostly the Canadians were allowed to act with impunity along the Richelieu. One known exception appears in a letter by Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Mott of Connecticut (Montgomery’s chief engineer). He wrote that:

“On the 3d instant there was a severe engagement between the French Whigs on one side, and the French Tories and Regulars on the other side, at Chambly, about thirteen miles from this place. The Tory party had the advantage, as they fired about fifty cannon-shot on our Whigs, when they had only small arms to defend with. They lost several men on each side. The Whigs maintained their ground.”

In the absence of significant threats, Livingston’s men were able to contribute to the siege of Fort Saint-Jean, and attack Fort Chambly.

First, Livingston’s men erected a breastwork northeast of Fort Saint-Jean on the estate of Moses Hazen. The British attacked this force on October 4 with a heavily armed row galley [2]. The Canadians responded with musket fire and their little 4-pounders. The British eventually withdrew after failing to make any impression on Livingston’s men (according to Mott, they lost “only one man, slightly wounded with a grape-shot”).

Soon thereafter, the Canadians moved their cannon closer to Fort Saint-Jean, and on the 13th they were joined by an American gun section consisting of two 12 pounders. The combined battery sank the British schooner the Royal Savage and inflicted a number of casualties among the garrison.

Canadian artillery.

In mid-October, Livingston was granted permission to attack Fort Chambly. The attack was begun by his men, Major John Brown and around 50 Provincials, a 9-pounder cannon, and Lieutenant Johnston and two privates from Lamb’s Artillery company. The bombardment began on October 17. The next morning, a second 9-pounder joined in the firing. After a day and a half of cannonading (i.e., by midday on the 18th), a small breach was made in the fort’s outer wall. At that point, the 88-man British garrison, consisting chiefly of men from the 7th Foot, agreed to surrender. [3]

Notes:

1. They were Thomas Goone, gunner, and Matthew Bell, John Boetle, Osburn Frederick, and Robert Knox, matrosses, of Captain Jones' s Company, 4th battalion, Royal Artillery

2. According to Major Henry Livingston of the 3rd New York, the galley had one 24-pounder in the bow, and 1 four pounder and some swivel guns on each side.

3. The complete list of men can be found here.

On Maps

One thing that never ceases to amaze me is how much progress one can make researching Revolutionary War battles with a computer and an Internet connection. (No doubt the same can be said of many other historical topics). This is especially true when it comes to finding, and, when necessary, creating, maps of historic places.

At the public's disposal are collections of both modern and historic maps.

For modern maps, I rely chiefly on Google Maps and ACME Mapper. For historic maps, I cannot speak too highly of the David Rumsey map collection. The Library of Congress' digital map collection is also recommended.

Of course, there are also available more specialized collections. While researching the American invasion of Canada, for example, I've relied heavily on the online collections maintained by the Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec and the McCord Museum of Canadian History.

To make a map, I rely on both modern and historic maps. In the case of the map I made of Fort Saint-Jean and vicinity, I was able to resize and "paste" a historic map (which shows lost terrain features) onto a modern map of the area.

Making maps (click to enlarge). At left, an early of Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu has been superimposed on a modern map of the area. The early map shows a hill and stream that were important during the siege of Fort Saint-Jean, but that are not visible on modern maps of the area.

The roads and place names shown in the final map were derived from 18th Century maps of the area, such as the one partially shown below.

An early map of Fort Saint-Jean and vicinity. North is at upper left. The fort is at the southern terminus of the road (labeled C). The Richelieu is labeled Rivière Chambly. The roads that diverge north of Rivière Saint-Jean are shown going to La Prairie and Chambly. These roads remained in use at the time of the Revolution.

Once I've been able to compare old and new maps to work out where some specific event occurred, like the skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean, I can use Google Maps' street view function to "visit" the site of these historic events. The image shows the site of this skirmish, which of course is much changed from 1775. The road heading into the background follows the route by which the British supplied Fort Saint-Jean in 1775. On September 18, 1775, the Americans under Major John Brown defended a breastwork that was built across this road (likely near the houses in the background).

Rivière Saint-Jean has been obliterated by urban development. The road that angles to the left sits on or near the site of this stream. The Richelieu (into which it flowed) can be glimpsed at right. The British deployed for battle near the spot from which this image was made.

The methods of research described above are of course better suited to some battles than others. I'm planning to write in the not-too-distant future about the battle of Longue-Pointe, which was fought near the city of Montreal. The Google street view image below was taken somewhere near the place where the British deployed for that battle and looks in the direction of Montreal (from whence the British marched). However, the landscape has been so utterly transformed by development that it's quite impossible to visual the scene of the desperate fight that once took place there.

Google street view near site of 1775 battle of Longue-Pointe, looking towards Montreal.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (3)

This is the third and final post devoted to a skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean in southern Canada that took place on September 18, 1775. For the events immediately preceding this skirmish, click here. For transcriptions of journal entries recorded by the participants, click here.

On September 17, 1775, the Americans advanced on Fort Saint-Jean, in southern Canada, for the third time. Unlike the earlier attempts (September 6 and September 10), this time the British offered no outward resistance. The Americans took up positions to the south and northwest of the fort, which placed the garrison in a state of siege. Early on September 18th, the British garrison learned of its predicament. Lieutenant William Duff of the 7th Foot was dispatched with about 30 Canadian volunteers to round up cattle from farms north of the fort and to scout out the American position to the northwest. Also, Guillaume de Lorimier, with a few Indians, was sent to scout out the American position to the south.

When Duff returned to the fort, he reported that the American force to the northwest was small, and the fortification it had erected was crude. Major Preston then dispatched Captain John Stronge with around 100 men of the 7th and 26th regiments, with nearly as many Canadian volunteers, and a field piece to drive away the Americans. The force they attacked was much smaller: about 50 Americans and 34 Canadians under the command of Major John Brown.

Brown’s men fired as the British approached, killing Sieur Beaubien dit Desauniers of the Canadians and wounding Corporal Knowles and Private Kelly of the 7th. The British, for their part, fired and charged. This fire possibly wounded several of Brown’s men, who quickly fled into the woods. [1]

British infantry and Canadian volunteers capture a breastwork near Fort Saint-Jean.

Canadian Antoine Dupré was the first man to climb into the breastwork; there he captured a couple of men, including Moses Hazen, a retired British officer and a prominent local landowner.

Hazen had been Brown's prisoner; he was captured the day before while traveling to his fields. However, the British suspected the worst of him and kept him as their own prisoner. The suspicion was deserved. Hazen had secretly contacted the Americans on September 6. On September 11, the British gave him a captain’s commission and orders to raise a company of militia. He did neither.

The British sortie against Brown’s command surprised the American leadership. Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery had intended Brown’s position to remain secret until he could move 500 men into position to support him. However, Brown was defeated before the American movement began. As soon as the sound of musket fire boomed across the flat woodland, Montgomery raced to get his forces into motion.

On the river, the Schuyler and Hancock rowed towards the fort and opened fire with their 12-pounders. This fire reportedly struck a bateau and the British schooner, the Royal Savage, but apparently did no other harm. The British responded with shell fire, but they, too, were unable to inflict casualties.

On land, Colonel Timothy Bedel led around 500 men from Bedel’s Rangers (his regiment), the 4th Connecticut, and the Green Mountain Boys, on a circuitous march through the wet woodland north and west of Saint-Jean. En route, Bedel received conflicting advice: a Canadian guide wanted to take Bedel directly to the site of the earlier skirmish, while a Huron guide wanted to take Bedel further to the east, so as to cut off the British detachment from the fort. Bedel, not understanding the Indian’s intention, and fearing treachery, took the Canadian’s advice.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). The British attack is shown in red. The advance of the American relief force is shown in blue.

The Americans advanced noisily through the woods, and the British opened fire the moment they came into view. According to Lieutenant John Fassett of Vermont, “They gave us a hot fire. The grape shot and Musket balls flew very thick…”

Bedel's Column Forms for Battle.

Benjamin Trumbull (who at the time was in the main American camp), claimed that the British fire wounded two Americans (including a Captain John Watson of the 4th Connecticut), and that a piece of grape shot accidentally killed one Briton (that would be, based on other evidence, Private Alexander Ross of the 26th). Before the Americans could deploy, the British scrambled for the safety of their fort. Bedel then occupied the breastwork Brown had built.

Once again, Fort Saint-Jean was in a state of siege.

Note:

1. See this letter from Major Israel Morey to the New-Hampshire Committee of Safety.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (2)

In early September, 1775, Major-General Philip Schuyler led an American army into southern Canada. It was the first American offensive of the war and the first major test of the new Continental army. The first advances against British-held Fort Saint-Jean met with disappointment (see here and here). On September 17-18, however, the Americans were successful in laying siege to the fort. I describe these events in this post and in another that will follow. For an earlier treatment of this subject, see here.

On September 11, 1775, the Americans were encamped south of Fort Saint-Jean. Their supply line consisted of a flotilla of small vessels operating on the Richelieu River. When a British schooner, the Royal Savage, threatened to disrupt this supply line, the Americans retreated to a more secure base on L'Île-aux-Noix.

On September 14, Schuyler learned that a force of Canadian Volunteers had taken the field under the command of James Livingston. Schuyler dispatched Major John Brown of Massachusetts to support Livingston with about 100 Americans and 34 Canadians. These men circled around Fort Saint-Jean and established a base between the American army and the friendly Canadians.

Meanwhile, hundreds of men had fallen ill in the American camp and were either discharged or sent south to recuperate. Fortunately, reinforcements started arriving at L’Île-aux-Noix, which partially offset the loss in strength. The new troops included a company of the 4th New York Regiment, 100 of Bedel’s Rangers, and 170 Green Mountain Boys.

Schuyler was also ill, and he soon turned over command of the army to Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery. Before he left, the two generals made plans for a new attack on Fort Saint-Jean.

The American plan was to divide into three parts: a) 500 men would circle around the fort, and cut the British supply lines, b) 200 men would establish a base south of the fort, and c) 350 men would defend the Americans’ own supply lines against the Royal Savage.

None of the American vessels was strong enough to confront the Royal Savage directly. Instead, the Schuyler and Montgomery planned on using the row galleys Hancock and Schuyler to fire on the vessel, while “picked men” aboard Liberty, Enterprise, and 10 bateaux would board it. [1]

American Invasion of Canada: September 16, 1775 (click to enlarge). The blue circles in the Richelieu River Valley show the positions of the main American army under Mongtomery at L'Île-aux-Noix, Brown's detachment near Fort Saint-Jean, and Livingston's Canadian forces near Chambly.

Schuyler left the army on September 16, and Montgomery led the attack against Saint-Jean on the following day. The operation faced minimal opposition. [2]

To the northwest, John Brown’s men captured eight wagons bringing supplies to the fort. Brown then threw down the bridge over Rivière Saint-Jean and erected a crude fortification from the wooden beams. Fort Saint-Jean was now in a state of siege, although the garrison did not know it.

Interception. Brown's Americans and Canadians seize a British waggon train and hide the supplies in the nearby woods.

To the south, the American flotilla advanced downstream and found that the Royal Savage was stationed near the fort and out of effective fire range. Hancock and Schuyler advanced a short ways further and fired on the fort and on British bateaux in the river. The British in Fort Saint-Jean replied with howitzer shells, but made no other movement.

Montgomery’s land forces disembarked without incident and reoccupied the abandoned breastworks south of the fort. In the words of Lieutenant John Fassett of the Green Mountain Boys, “We arrived at the breast work before night and found no Molestation, tho’ we expected a battle as much as we expected to get there. The whole army soon came up where we all staid that night and had nothing to cover us but the heavens and it was very cold and they flung Bom[b]s among us [i.e., howitzer shells] and we had a very tedious night of it indeed.”

Notes:

1. Hancock and Schuyler each carried a double-fortified 12-pounder and 12 swivel guns. Enterprise was armed with two 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, and 11 swivel guns. Liberty was armed with two 2-pounders and 10 swivel guns.

2. The British commander, Major Charles Preston, had been abandoned by most of his Indian allies over the past week. Without these men, it was difficult to track (much less stop) American movements in the wilderness surrounding the fort. The Indians left for several reasons, including earlier diplomatic efforts by the Americans and the fact that their Canadian neighbors generally favored the American cause.