November 1, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for November 1st: The Americans pulled back from White Plains; the British abandoned the pursuit of Washington’s army.

Previous entry: October 31st.

In the early morning hours, the last of the Americans in the entrenchments pulled back. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion) noted in his journal:

“This morning our guards come off and leave the lines in the centre of the town called White Plains, and to distress the enemy [they] burn all the barns of hay and grain and houses, where the inhabitants had stores of wheat and corn and also stacks and barracks of hay and grain.”

The British officers looked with surprise on the burning buildings and empty defensive works. When they rode forward they could see American forces encamped on a line of hills to the north, but the American army had been so reduced by sickness and other causes, that they thought this force was no more than a rear guard. Major Stephen Kemble wrote of this force, “[we] suppose them to be about 7,000 strong”.

The British concluded that the rest of Washington’s men had fled even deeper into the hills, which meant that their attack plans had gone to naught. However, as the British were not particularly eager to attack the American lines in the first place, there was undoubtedly some sense of relief.

Lieutenant-General William Howe opted not to attack this “rearguard”. He later explained that the Americans’ actions “plainly” indicated a “desire to avoid coming to action,” and added “I did not think the driving their rearguard further back an object of the least consequence.”

Instead, the British advanced and occupied the Americans’ former entrenchments. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) wrote: “At half after 9 o’clock we got under arms, and pushed into the village of the White Plains, which the enemy had just abandoned, and the army advanced at the same time”.

This advance brought the armies within range of each others’ cannons. Major-General William Heath, on the left of the American army, wrote:

“In the morning, the British advanced, with a number of field-pieces, to the north of the road near late headquarters… and commenced a furious cannonade on General Heath’s division, which was nobly returned by Captain-Lieutenant Bryant and Lieutenant Jackson, of the artillery.”

During this cannonade, according to Heath, George Washington rode up to him and expressed concern over one of Heath’s regiments that was separated by a hollow from the rest of the division. “Take care that you do not lose them”, he warned. But the British did not attack this force. Instead, Heath wrote, the British guns withdrew from his front, “made a circuitous movement, and came down toward the American right.” As these guns moved into position, they were fired upon by some American heavy guns. Heath noted that “upon the discharge” from the American guns, the British crews “made off with their field-pieces as fast as their horses could draw them. A shot from the American cannon, at this place, took off the head of a Hessian artilleryman. They also left one of the artillery horses dead on the field.”

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Lee’s division) witnessed the British movement towards the American right. He wrote:

“we saw the enemy advance down the hill towards us in three parties[,] one party coming towards the road the other [two] through a swamp[.] We sent some 25-pound shot to them that stopped some before they could get over the bridge to us and the others passed through the swamp to a hill opposite to us… we sent over some shot… that knocked down a light horse”. [see footnote]

British Major Stephen Kemble summarized the day’s action by writing: “[they] cannonaded us… the greatest part of the day; we lost 9 men [killed] by this business. Six of them Hessians.”

Isolated fatalities were noted by several British officers.

Ensign Henry Stirke wrote:

“We received a few straggling shot, which did no execution. The 15th regiment had one man killed, and another wounded, by the rebel cannon”.

Captain Francis Rawdon observed:

“We had some cannonading with their rear guard, by which my brother John (who is an excellent soldier in every respect) was very near killed. Two men who stood close to him were killed by a twelve-pounder, and a splinter of one of their skulls stuck in his thigh, but did not hurt him much.”

American losses were even fewer. Apparently one man in Levi Paulding’s New York militia regiment was killed, and two other New Yorkers were wounded. Their brigade commander (George Clinton) commented, “I have heard of no other injury done [to] us.”

Brigade-Major Benjamin Tallmadge characterized the American withdrawal from White Plains as something of a victory: He claimed that Howe was “baffled” by this maneuver, and as a result gave up the pursuit of Washington’s army. Thus, Washington’s army, brought perilously close in this campaign to capture or collapse, had survived to fight another day.

William Howe had a rather different perspective. Howe did not wish to place his own army at risk by chasing the Americans into the wild hills on the New York-New England border. He was sure, too, that if Washington did make a firm stand, it would only be on some set of steep and heavily fortified hills. Howe had had enough of this business. He felt he could now turn his back on Washington without losing face and proceed once again to wage war on his own terms. Howe’s preference was to capture Fort Washington and consolidate his hold on the New York City area. His developing plan also came to include sending expeditions into New Jersey, Rhode Island, and, if all went well, the American capitol at Philadelphia.

Heath noted that during the rest of this day, November 1st:

“The two armies lay looking at each other, and within long cannon-shot [range]. In the night time the British lighted up a vast number of fires, the weather growing pretty cold. These fires, some on the level ground, some at the foot of the hills, and at all distances to their brows… seemed to the eye to mix with the stars, and to be of different magnitudes. The American side, doubtless, exhibited to them a similar appearance.”

The bright orange flames licked the cold November sky, and another chapter of the Revolutionary War came to a close.

Footnote: Smith indicated that this event took place on Friday the 31st. Friday was November 1st. A comparison of Smith’s description of other events occurring at the time with the journals of other Americans suggests that he was right about it being Friday and wrong about it being the 31st.

Concluding Comment: The standoff at White Plains did not end on November 1st. For a few days the two armies glowered at each other, and during that time more men were killed in little brushes or perished from illness. The British left White Plains on November 5-6 and soon joined Knyphausen’s division near Manhattan. On November 16th, Howe captured Fort Washington and completed the conquest of Manhattan.

October 29, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 29th: The Americans strengthened their position at White Plains while the armies skirmished; Knyphausen advanced to Kingsbridge, and Howe vacillated.

Previous entry: Evening of October 28; next: October 30th.

During the night, the American army at White Plains began moving their camps to a line of hills to the north. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Spencer’s division) wrote, “at 2 o’clock [AM] the troops in General Spencer’s division had orders to strike their tents and carry them out about one mile and an half by hand and then return to the lines [i.e., the fortifications at White Plains].” The troops then made the roundtrip again, this time carrying their camp kettles and other cooking utensils. It was hard work for the exhausted men. Trumbull wrote that many “had no sleep at all” “though they had been engaged almost all day [yesterday] with the enemy and had been obliged to wade through a river [the Bronx] and were very wet”. “I was afraid I should be sick for I had been in the river almost all over, and could not change [clothes]… [and] was much fatigued with the action… but I am today well and vigorous”. Trumbull praised God for seeing him safely through the battle, and wrote that this protection “lay me under new obligations to live wholly to God and to seek his honor and glory in the little time I have to live in the world”.

Joseph Plumb Martin, who was also in the 5th Connecticut, was not so fortunate. He recalled:

“During the night we remained in our new made trenches, the ground of which was in many parts springy; in that part where I happened to be stationed, the water, before morning, was nearly over [our] shoes, which caused many of us to take violent colds… I was one who felt the effects of it, and was… sent back to the baggage to get well again, if I could, for it was left to my own exertions to do it, and no other assistance was afforded me. I was not alone in my misery; there were a number in the same circumstances. When I arrived at the baggage, which was not more than a mile or two, I had the canopy of heaven for my hospital, and the ground for my hammock. I found a spot where the dry leaves had collected between the knolls; I made up a bed of these, and nestled in it, having no other friend present but the sun to smile upon me. I had nothing to eat or drink, not even water, and was unable to go after any myself, for I was sick indeed. In the evening, one of my messmates found me out, and soon after brought me some boiled hog’s flesh (it was not pork) and turnips, without either bread or salt. I could not eat it, but I felt obliged to him notwithstanding; he did all he could do—he gave me the best he had to give, and had to steal that, poor fellow;--necessity drove him to do it to satisfy the cravings of his own hunger, as well as to assist a fellow sufferer.”

Beginning in the morning and continuing throughout the day, the two armies skirmished.

For Captain Peter Kimball (Stickney’s New Hampshire militia regiment), it was a tense day:

“we lay on our arms. The enemy appeared all round on every hill[,] the riflemen [were] firing on their guards. One of the riflemen [was] killed this day and at night our guard was alarmed. Another fired and killed Captain Buntin.”

Matters were no easier for the British light infantry across the way. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) noted:

“I had a very troublesome picket, at the entrance of the village[;] at daylight my sentries were fired on which continued by popping shots all day. I had one man wounded”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General William Howe had an enormously difficult decision to make. He had at last caught up with Washington’s army, but he loathed sending his troops against the Americans’ entrenchments. Although he was sure he could carry these works, he believed the assault would lead to the death of many of his men and produce little strategic gain.

The obvious alternative was to force the Americans from their trenches by threatening their flank. He later stated that this was his preference:

“I do not hesitate to confess, that if I could by any manoeuvre remove an enemy from a very advantageous position, without hazarding the consequences of an attack, where the point to be carried was not adequate to the loss of men to be expected… I should certainly adopt that cautionary conduct, in the hopes of meeting my adversary upon more equal terms.”

But on this occasion, Howe was unable to find a low-risk way of turning the Americans’ flank. Thus Howe was left with the unpalatable choices of either making a bloody frontal assault, or retreating.

Howe vacillated. His official excuse for not attacking was that the situation at White Plains had changed and that he now needed more men. He later explained:

“The enemy drew back their encampment on the night of the 28th, and observing their lines next morning much strengthened by additional works, the designed attack upon them was deferred, and the 4th brigade, left with Lord Percy, with two battalions of the 6th brigade were ordered to join the army.” [see footnote]

Curiously, when pressed by Parliament several years later to explain his conduct at White Plains, Howe mysteriously claimed that “I have political reasons, and no other, for declining to explain why that assault was not made”.

To the west, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen continued his operation against upper Manhattan. First he detached Major General Martin Conrad Schmidt with regiments von Wissenbach and von Huyne to hold Valentine’s Hill. Then he proceeded with grenadiere battalion Köhler and regiments Wutginau, von Stein, and Buenau to Kingsbridge.

Footnote: The 4th brigade consisted of the 17th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot. The two regiments drawn from the 6th brigade were the 44th and 64th regiments of foot. The 6th brigade had been encamped near Mamaroneck since October 25th.

October 27, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 27th: Synopsis for October 27: Hugh Percy made a feint at Fort Washington; Waldeckers were ambushed near Mamaroneck; the British planned a move to White Plains.

Previous entry: October 26th; next: Morning of October 28.

On October 18, Lieutenant-General William Howe cut one of the main supply lines of the American forces in Manhattan (the Boston Post Road). Not long after, George Washington pulled his army away from Manhattan, and took a strong post at the town of White Plains, New York. Howe, meanwhile, established a base for his army at New Rochelle, brought up reinforcements, examined the countryside, and made plans to battle the American army.

Howe’s battle plan came to consist of two main parts. First, his army would attack Washington’s men at White Plains. Second, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knypahusen’s recently arrived Hessian division would advance on upper Manhattan from the north. Although Washington had pulled out of Manhattan, some men were left behind to garrison Fort Washington and the other defensive works in upper Manhattan.

The twin advance was scheduled to begin on the 28th. To draw attention away from Knyphausen’s advance, Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy had orders to make a feint at Fort Washington from the south on the 27th. It was hoped he might also seize some of the Americans’ defensive works in the process.

Percy took with him six British regiments (the 10th, 17th, 37th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot), and two Hessian regiments from Stirn’s brigade. The troops advanced in line of battle with the Hessians on the left, and the British regulars on the right. Percy later wrote:

“I approached… with caution, for I had not force enough to attack them. By the time I had advanced within random musket shot [range], their [defensive] lines (three in number) were all completely manned… As our moving forward did not make them evacuate their works, I tried what a few shots from six-pounders and shells from two howitzers would do”.

The shot and shell had little effect: “they were too well secured by their parapets.”

American defenses in upper Manhattan (click to enlarge). Upper Manhattan is bounded on the left by Hudson's River and on the right by the Harlem River. Fort Washington appears at the top of the image; below the fort are three defensive lines spanning the width of the island. On October 27th, Percy's men skirmished with American forces defending the first (lowermost) line. The troop movements shown on this map pertain to a later engagement (the assault on Fort Washington on November 16, 1776).

Charles Lefferts illustration of drummers and infantrymen of the 10th Regiment of Foot.

Percy observed that the Americans brought cannon down to their lines, and he “retired with the main body about halfway between their works and ours.” Soon, he added, “The rebels… began to cannonade us”. This fire, however, was not very dangerous: “Their cannon were so ill pointed, that tho' they fired annoyingly at us, they hit nobody.” Nevertheless, he noted, “I retired a little out of reach.” Percy’s men then encamped for the evening.

While these movements took place on land, the frigates Repulse and Pearl advanced up Hudson’s River. Soon the vessels began to be bombarded by the guns from Fort Washington and Fort Lee (the renamed Fort Constitution).

Major-General Nathanael Greene boasted about the battering the Repulse received:

“Colonel [Robert] Magaw got down an eighteen-pounder and fired sixty shot at her, twenty-six of which went into her. She slipped her cable and left her anchor, and was towed off by four boats. I think we must have killed a considerable number of their men, as the confusion and distress exceeded all description.”

Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, acknowledged that “Many shots were thrown into the Repulse, and some into the Pearl”. However, he heard that “no men [were] killed in either, and only one man's leg broke on board the Repulse.”

Percy’s losses were also modest: five were killed or wounded in the 37th Foot; two in the 10th Foot, and three among the Hessians.

Greene stated that one man “was killed by a shell that fell upon his head” and that Major Andrew Colburn (Knowlton’s Rangers) was wounded.

The British made light of the whole affair. Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham of the 46th Foot wrote that “Lord Percy very properly called it ‘the little excursion.’”

Closer to White Plains, the British sent out parties to reconnoiter. Archibald Robertson noted that he accompanied William Erskine on another expedition to the Mile Square area. He was surprised that “We returned [to that area] without firing a shot… as the enemy might have suspected our intention of occupying these heights.” Instead, according to Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Erskine “brought back nine prisoners and the assurance that all the rebels had left this part of the country and gone to White Plains”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton was ordered, as he later wrote, “to take out a part of the army to reconnoiter” the American position at White Plains. Clinton made a cursory effort, turned around, and gave Howe a discouraging report: “I suspected that the enemy’s lines at the White Plains shouldered to the Bronx and to the mountains, whereby their flanks were safe and their retreat practicable when[ever] they pleased.” He concluded, “[I] could not from what I saw recommend a direct attack”.

Howe could not have been pleased either with the incomplete information or the lack of support for his plans.

American scouting parties were also active. Baurmeister noted that one party attacked some men from the Waldeck Regiment:

“Eighteen men of this regiment went marauding in the region around Mamaroneck, where they were surprised and attacked by forty rebels and disarmed. One subaltern and twelve soldiers were captured and hurriedly sent away. Two men remained on the field, wounded.”

October 18, 1776 (Part 2)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for the afternoon of October 18th: The British army attacked Glover’s brigade; afterwards they cut one of Washington’s primary supply lines.

Previous entry: Morning of October 18th; next: October 19th.

On the morning of October 18th, the British landed at Pell’s Point and began streaming inland towards New Rochelle and the Boston Post Road. En route, the light infantry received a check from Colonel John Glover’s brigade of Massachusetts Continentals.

The British then halted and Glover anxiously waited for the attack to be renewed. Glover saw in his front “about four thousand [men], with seven pieces of artillery”. He later recalled:

“Oh! the anxiety of mind I was then in for the fate of the day — the lives of seven hundred and fifty men immediately at hazard, and under God their preservation entirely depended on their being well disposed of; besides this, my country, my honour, my own life, and everything that was dear, appeared at that critical moment to be at stake”.

Lieutenant-General William Howe surveyed the scene. He saw “a considerable body appearing in front behind stone walls and in woods”. He then dispatched “some companies of light infantry and a party of chasseurs [jaegers]… to dislodge them”.

Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) wrote that “The 1st Battalion of Light Infantry pushed the rebels from fence to fence”.

Glover’s Continentals were forced to withdraw, but the withdrawal was conducted slowly and skillfully. Glover was with Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment when the British advance began. He wrote:

“we kept our post under cover of the stone wall… till they came within fifty yards of us, [then we] rose up and gave them the whole charge [i.e., volley] of the battalion; they halted and returned the fire with showers of musketry and cannon balls. We exchanged seven rounds at this post, retreated, and formed in the rear of Colonel Shepard and on his left; they then shouted and pushed on till they came on Shepard, posted behind a fine double stone wall; he rose up and fired by grand divisions, by which he kept up a constant fire, and maintained his part till he exchanged seventeen rounds with them”.

When Shepard’s men were forced back, the British pressed against Colonel Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. Baldwin observed, “Our troops were as calm and steady as though expecting a shot at a flock of pigeons, and not in the least daunted or confused.” When the British came within range, he wrote, “We galled the enemy very much”.

Finally, Baldwin’s Regiment was also made to retreat.

According to Glover:

“we retreated to the bottom of the hill, and had to pass through a run of water, (the bridge I had taken up before) and then marched up a hill [on] the opposite side of the creek, where I [had] left my artillery; the ground being rough and much broken I was afraid to risk [bringing] it over. The enemy halted, and played away their artillery at us, and we at them… without any damage on our side, and but very little on theirs.”

Glover’s own 14th Continental Regiment had been left with the guns. The regiment had erected a crude fortification while the rest of the brigade was in action and this gave Glover another strong position to defend.

The cannonade drew more of the British army into the battle, including some of the British grenadiers and Hessian Regiment von Knyphausen.

Captain George Harris (grenadier company, 5th Foot) noted, “The grenadiers did not suffer, being only exposed to the fire of the American batteries, which were very ill served.”

Lieutenant Andreas Wiederholdt (Regiment von Knyphausen) wrote, “The enemy had dug in on the high ground facing us and greeted us with a number of cannon shots, but these had no effect because they flew wide. I skirmished with the enemy and they wounded one of my men, for which I sent one of them into the next world with my rifle.”

Artist Charles Lefferts painted these representations of British soldiers. At left is a light infantryman in the 10th Regiment of Foot (Stirke’s company); at right is a grenadier in the 5th Regiment of Foot (Harris’ company).

Glover’s men blocked the route westward, which led towards the Bronx River and the rear of the American army. However, Howe did not attempt to force Glover from his post. Instead, he kept some men facing the Americans while others were sent to occupy high ground to the east. That night, according to Howe, the men “laid… upon their arms with the left upon a creek opposite to East Chester [i.e., opposite Glover’s position] and the right near to [New] Rochelle.”

Glover had done everything in his power to harass and delay the British army. Now it was time to pull back to a safer position:

“At dark we came off, and marched about three miles… after fighting all day without victuals or drink, laying as a picket all night, the heavens over us and the earth under us, which was all we had, having left our baggage at the old encampment we left in the morning. The next morning [we] marched over to Mile Square. I had eight men killed and thirteen wounded, among which was Colonel Shepard, a brave officer.”

British losses were heavier, but not as heavy as the volume of American fire would suggest. Ensign Stirke claimed there were 34 killed and wounded in the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry. Accounts by others suggest that the total British loss was not much higher.

Situation of the armies on October 18th (click to enlarge). Howe’s army crossed from Throg’s Neck (7) to Pell’s Point, and fought Glover’s brigade on his march inland. By the end of the day, the leading elements of his army were near New Rochelle (8). Meanwhile, Charles Lee prepared to defend Mile Square (9) lest the British attempt to cross the Bronx River and surround the American army.

October 18, 1776 (Part 1)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for the morning of October 18th: The British army crossed to Pell’s Point, but were met by Glover’s brigade; Washington’s divisions scrambled to turn back the British advance.

Previous entry: October 17th; next: Afternoon of October 18th.

For a second straight day, the British vanguard marched at 1AM. This time the weather cooperated, and the troops boarded flatboats and crossed from Throg’s Neck to Pell’s Point. As the British ships approached shore, they were fired on by some American sentries [see footnote]. Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton, who commanded the vanguard, recalled, “They… began to fire a few shot. But, as I was certain they could not be in any great force, I ordered the debarkation to proceed”.

The sentries quickly withdrew, and the British began to assemble on the shore. According to Clinton, “The moment the whole avant garde was ashore I… detached Lord Cornwallis with the grenadiers, light infantry, and [jaegers]… to our right”.

Meanwhile, Colonel John Glover was hurrying forward with his brigade of Massachusetts Continentals to contest the British advance. Glover wrote that:

“[The British had] stole a march [of] one and a half miles on us. I marched down to oppose their landing with about seven hundred and fifty men, and three field-pieces, but had not gone more than half the distance before I met their advanced guard, about thirty men; upon which I detached a captain's guard of forty men to meet them, while I could dispose of the main body to advantage.”

Glover’s advanced troops were able to surprise the head of the British column.

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) recalled:

“I was ordered to join the light infantry and grenadiers under Lieutenant General Clinton… I was ordered by the General to the top of a rising ground in front with the advance guard of the light infantry to reconnoitre, but we were immediately fired upon from behind trees and heaps of stones where the rebels lay concealed”.

Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company of the 10th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion) was also with the leading troops. He recorded, “we received a very heavy fire, as we marched up a hill, from behind stone walls, pickets etc. by which I had 1 sergeant killed, another, with a private man wounded.”

Glover wrote that the advanced troops “kept the ground till we exchanged five rounds” with the British. Soon, however, they were forced to withdraw. The advanced troops had lost “two men killed and several wounded,” and the British aggressively pressed ahead:

“Their body being much larger than mine… [and] the enemy pushing forward not more than thirty yards distant, I ordered a retreat, which was masterly well done by the captain that commanded the party. The enemy gave a shout and advanced”.

However, as the British light infantry advanced, they ran into Colonel Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment. These men, Glover wrote, were “laying under cover of a stone wall undiscovered till they [the British] came within thirty yards, then rose up and gave them the whole charge [i.e., a volley]; the enemy broke, and retreated for the main body to come up.”

According to Archibald Robertson, “we halted until General Howe came up. The Rebels appeared drawn up in our front behind all the fences and high stone walls.”

One of the clearest indicators of the site of the battle of Pell’s Point is a map prepared by Charles Blaskowitz documenting the movements of the British army in Westchester County. Below is an excerpt of his map (click to enlarge) that shows the British landing on Pell’s Poin.

Note the road network on Pell’s Point: there is a road that goes inland, goes through a marsh, and on the far side of the marsh forms a “V” with one branch going north, and the other brance going east. Blaskowitz indicated that the battle was fought on the road leading to the north.

A comparison with later maps helps make it possible to determine the site of the main phase of the fighting (see especially Part 2). The first row in the image below (click to enlarge) shows a series of maps that illustrate how the road system at Pell’s Point changed over time.

The first map dates to the Revolutionary War. On this map the “V” pattern is quite distinct; the road connecting the V with the shore is also visible, but it is quite short in length. The second map dates to the early 19th Century and the third map dates to the late 19th Century. Both of these maps show the V present in the Blaskowitz map, with a road leading to the shore. These maps show additional roads as well, indicating that the area was becoming more developed. The fourth map is from the 20th-Century, and on this map the V is no longer visible. Instead, the northern branch, on which the battle was fought, was removed to accommodate a golf course. The eastern branch, however, remains. The fifth map is from a modern satellite image. It shows the same road network present in the fourth map. Larger versions of these maps are available are available through the Library of Congress, the David Rumsey Map Collection, Acme Mapper, and Google Maps.

In the second row is a series of close-up views of the area where the road leading north once was. Based on clues in 18th and 19th Century maps, I sketched in the old road network in red. Based on clues in the Blaskowitz map and participant accounts of the battle, I marked the approximate site of the battle with a blue square. Note that Glover’s men were deployed just shy of the crest of a hill. As described above, the battle began when the British were ascending this hill and came under fire from the men in Glover’s advance party. The British were able to seize the high ground, and Glover’s men were deployed somewhat shy of the crest. Glover noted, “The enemy had the advantage of us, being posted on an eminence which commanded the ground we had to march over.” He also referred, in his account of the battle, to “the ground being much in their favour”.

Glover deployed three of his regiments in a staggered manner to meet the British: the lead regiment was on the left of the road, the other two were on the right. Their relative placement (but not absolute position) is indicated in the map below: Blue 1 = Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment, Blue 2 = William Shepard’s 3rd Continental Regiment, Blue 3 = Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. Red 1 = the route taken by the British light infantry, Red 2 = the route taken by the British grenadiers. The Hessian jaegers (position not marked) likely occupied the woods to the right of the light infantry.

When the British army moved to Pell’s Point, they left behind, at Throg’s Neck, the 2nd and 6th British brigades. These troops made a feint to distract the Americans, by making it appear as if the British army was going to advance overland from Throg’s Neck.

Major-General William Heath scrambled to respond. First he was informed “that the British were opening an embrasure in their work at the end of the causeway [i.e., by Westchester Creek bridge]… [which made it appear that] they intended, under [cover of] a cannonade… to attempt to pass.” Heath instantly ordered a brigade stationed near Valentine’s Hill to hurry towards the bridge. Then, “When the troops had advanced to about half the way… another express met him, informing him that the whole British army were in motion, and seemed to be moving towards the pass at the head of the creek.” Heath ordered the troops to change direction “and march briskly to reinforce the Americans at the pass at the head of the creek.”

General Washington was not deceived by these movements, and he called off Heath’s response. Washington, however, saw a large number of British vessels heading up the East River (a change in wind direction now favored the movement of British ships), and he expressed concern over the possibility that the British might land troops west of Throg’s Neck. Therefore, according to Heath, Washington “ordered him to return immediately, and have his division formed ready for action”.

The other divisions on the New York mainland similarly prepared for a fight. At Mile Square, Major-General Charles Lee positioned his forces (minus Glover’s brigade) to defend the crossings of the Bronx River.

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment; Nixon’s brigade) listened to the sound of British cannon fire at Pell’s Point, while his troops moved into position:

“we heard a heard a heavy firing of cannon after breakfast[.] We were ordered to parade ourselves under arms and marched over to General Lee’s quarters who ordered our regiment to take post on a hill… to prevent the enemy’s crossing the land from east to west”.

To further protect these key crossings, George Washington sent Major-General Joseph Spencer’s division to nearby Valentine’s Hill.

This map shows the distribution of Washington’s army units in Westchester County on October 18, 1776 (click to enlarge). The placement of the units on this map is inexact. North is up at the upper-right corner of the map. A part of the Hudson is at the top of the map, and a part of Long Island Sound is at the bottom.

While Howe’s army landed at Pell’s Point, the 2nd and 6th British brigades conducted a feint on Throg’s Neck. (The 2nd brigade is shown near the head of Westchester Creek; the 6th brigade was in an off-map location near the bridge at extreme lower left). The divisions of William Heath and John Sullivan watched over the British on Throg’s Neck and defended the shoreline between Throg’s Neck and Manhattan (off map, at left). The crossings of the Bronx River are marked by the numbers 1-4. One part of Charles Lee’s division guarded these crossings, while another (John Glover’s brigade) contested the British advance from Pell’s Point. During the day, Joseph Spencer’s division marched from Kingsbridge (upper left) to Valentine’s Hill (upper right).

Footnote: The sentries were probably a detachment of militia. Militia units from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire were placed in various locations along the shore of Long Island Sound and Hudson’s River to watch the movements of the British navy, safeguard caches of supplies, and keep key points out of the hands of the Loyalists. The detachments were not expected to stop a major drive by the British army. New York militiaman Benjamin Bogardus later wrote, “The orders came from [Major] General [Charles] Lee, for all the guard along the shore to draw back and let them [the British] land”.

October 17, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 17th: Bad weather delayed the British move to Pell’s Point; William Smallwood commented on the sufferings of the American soldier.

Previous entry: October 16th; next: Morning of October 18th.

The British vanguard marched at 1 AM for the move to Pell’s Point. The move, however, was soon cancelled because of a storm. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company of the 10th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion) recorded in his journal that “very heavy rain, and high wind” “obliged us to return to our quarters at ½ after 3 o’clock [A.M.].”

Lieutenant-General William Howe decided to make the move on the 18th instead.

Lieutenant Tench Tilghman (one of Washington’s aides) was puzzled by the British inactivity:

“The enemy has made no move from Frog's Point. We may say the 17th October is come and nearly past without the predicted blow. The winds have not been favourable to pass Hell-Gate, where several of their transports are now laying; perhaps that may be the reason…. If we can but foil General Howe again, I think we knock him up for the campaign.”

Tilghman expected the British advance to be made overland from Throg’s Neck, not by water to the east; therefore, he was puzzled by the British inactivity. He was right, however, about the winds causing delays for the British.

Captain Frederick Mackenzie (23rd Regiment of Foot) commented on the slow movement of men and supplies from New York City to Throg’s Neck:

“The recruits lately arrived for those regiments which are with the army under General Howe, went though Hellgate this morning in flatboats. The ships with the Hessians [see footnote] cannot go through for want of a proper wind. Several ships with horses and wagons are detained for the same reason. The Senegal sloop of war got through this morning with much difficulty; she touched the shore several times but at last effected the passage with much labor and danger.”

This map illustrates the distribution of Washington’s army units in Westchester County on October 17, 1776 (click to enlarge). North is at the upper-right corner of the map. A part of the Hudson is at the top of the map, and a part of Long Island Sound is at the bottom. By the end of the day, four of Washington’s divisions were on the New York mainland (those of William Heath, John Sullivan, Charles Lee, and Joseph Spencer) as was Benjamin Lincoln's brigade of Massachusetts militia. The placement of the units on this map is inexact.

Washington’s army units were deployed with three objectives in mind:

• First, units were deployed to defend the crossings of the Bronx River (marked by the numbers 1-4). Glover’s brigade of Lee’s division was positioned in advance of these crossings near the town of East Chester. As long as the British were kept from crossing the Bronx, Washington had a secure connection with upstate New York and New England.
• Second, units were deployed to contain the British army on Throg’s Neck (partially visible at extreme lower left).
• Third, units were deployed to guard the shoreline between Throg’s Neck and Manhattan (off the map, at left).

The divisions of Israel Putnam and Nathanael Greene (not shown) defended upper Manhattan, and nearby Fort Constitution in New Jersey. Around this time, Fort Constitution was renamed Fort Lee, after the American general.

Spencer’s division was in a reserve position at Kingsbridge, where it could quickly move to reinforce American forces in either Westchester County or upper Manhattan.

Howe had wanted to land his forces at Pell's Point on this date (bottom of the map), but the move was delayed by bad weather.

On this quiet day, Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion (McDougall’s brigade; Lee’s division), wrote about his misgivings with the army. He asserted that “Our Commander-in-Chief is an excellent man,” but he found much fault with the officers below Washington:

“Were our officers good, and our men well trained, it would be impossible [for the British] to effect their purpose…” but “there seems to be a total ignorance of and inattention to” the kind of military discipline “necessary to render an army formidable.” He argued that many of the officers essentially “train” their men “to run away” from the enemy, “and to make them believe they never can be safe unless under cover of an entrenchment… Discipline here is totally neglected, and yet after all it is the only bulwark in war. Had our troops been trained better, and worried less with the pick-axe and spade, by this time our army would have been in a condition to have sought for their enemies in turn.”

Smallwood also complained that the men were poorly fed, and that many were sick from “being often moved, and… exposed to lie on the cold ground… often lying without their tents for several nights”. He added, “We want medicine much; none can be had here. Our sick have [been] and are now suffering extremely.” “I foresee the evils arising from the shameful neglect… One good-seasoned and well-trained soldier, recovered to health, is worth a dozen new recruits, and [it] is often easier [to] get [a well-trained soldier] recovered than [it is] to get a recruit…”

But, Smallwood also saw glimmers of hope. He believed the British “are as much afraid and cautious of us, as we can be… of them”. He remarked also that all ranks in the army understood what was on the line: they must either “fight or starve and surrender at [British] discretion”.

Footnote: The Hessian reinforcement consisted of the Lieb Regiment, Regiment von Dittfurth, and Regiment Prinz Carl, which together formed a brigade under the command of Friedrich Wilhelm von Lossberg. These troops departed Staten Island on October 12th, but were still awaiting the opportunity to join Howe’s army.

On Lexington Green (5)

In several previous posts, I’ve walked through much of the source material on the start of the Revolutionary War at Lexington Green, and concluded that there are at least four different plausible scenarios by which a gunshot (or perhaps several) started the outbreak of violence.

What happened after this initial shot (or shots) is in little dispute: British light infantrymen opened fire on the retreating Lexington militia.

The senior British officer on hand, Major John Pitcairn, blandly recorded that “without any order or regularity, the Light Infantry began a scattered fire, and continued in that situation for some little time, contrary to the repeated orders both of me and other officers that were present.”

British Lieutenant John Barker described the scene more vividly:

“…our Men without any orders rushed in upon them, fired and put ‘em to flight; several of them were killed, we cou’d not tell how many, because they were got behind Walls and into the Woods [i.e., the militia had fled]; We had a Man of the 10th light Infantry wounded, nobody else hurt. We then formed on the Common, but with some difficulty, the Men were so wild they cou’d hear no orders; we waited a considerable time there, and at length proceeded on our way to Concord…”

For the Lexington militia, and the dozens of spectators loitering around the green, emotions quickly swung from apprehension to horror:

Timothy Smith: “I saw a large body of Regular Troops marching up towards the Lexington Company, then dispersing, and likewise saw the Regular Troops fire on the Lexington Company, before the latter fired a gun. I immediately ran, and a volley was discharged at me, which put me in imminent danger of losing my life.”

Thomas Fessenden: “[The Lexington] Company of Militia dispersed every way as fast as they could, and while they were dispersing the Regulars kept firing at them incessantly”

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The exchange of fire on Lexington Green presents a couple of interesting challenges to those that would visually represent it. First, it is unclear how the firing began. Second, it’s clear enough that the subsequent exchange of fire was extremely one-sided. Eight Massachusetts provincials were killed, another 9 were wounded, and others were spared only by the inaccuracy of British musketry [1] and the rapidity of their flight. Few of the Lexington militia got off a shot.

Doolittle’s depiction was made early in the Revolutionary War and its purpose seems to have been not only to document events, but also to editorialize. He makes it clear that the British were the aggressors. The Lexington militia is shown running from the coldly deliberative British infantry, leaving behind the bleeding bodies of their friends and neighbors [2]. The blunt, ugly message is dulled only by the crudity with which it was executed.

Later paintings borrowed Doolittle’s vantage point, but not his message. In these cases, the purpose appears to have been to memorialize those who fought the British. The artists left ambiguous how the firing started, but instead focused on (and arguably took some historical liberties with) the resistance by the Lexington militia. Doolittle depicted murder. Later artists memorialized brave men defending their liberties.

Amos Doolittle

Howard Pyle

William Barnes Wollen

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Notes:

1. Elijah Sanderson: “All was smoke when the [British] foot fired. I heard no particular orders after what the commander [Pitcairn] first said. I looked, and, seeing nobody fall, thought to be sure they couldn’t be firing balls, and I didn’t move off. After our militia had dispersed, I saw them firing at one man, (Solomon Brown,) who was stationed behind a wall. I saw the wall smoke with the bullets hitting it. I then knew they were firing balls.” In Elias Phinney (1825). History of the Battle of Lexington on the morning of 19th April, 1775.

2. As described in previous posts, American accounts are inconsistent in their description of how the firing started. They implicitly acknowledge that once the British infantry fired, some Americans began to return fire. Doolittle presented a particularly inflammatory version of the event, in which the Lexington militia is all but a hapless victim of purposeful British aggression.

On Lexington Green (4)

In a recent post, I described, from the British point of view, some of the events immediately preceding the opening of the Revolutionary War on Lexington Green. Five British officers who were on the green when the shooting started recorded their observations -- Major John Pitcairn, Lieutenant William Sutherland, Ensign Jeremy Lister, Lieutenant John Barker, and Lieutenant Edward Thoroton Gould. Of these, Pitcairn, Sutherland, and Lister clearly asserted how the firing began. Barker and Gould belonged to the 4th Regiment of the Foot; the light infantry company of this regiment may have been just entering Lexington Green at the time and they may not have participated in the initial exchange of fire. [1]

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The Battle of Lexington; propagandistic engraving by Amos Doolittle (click to enlarge). The British entered Lexington Green between the two tall buildings on either side of the tree at center. To the left is Buckman’s Tavern, to the right is the Meeting House. Major John Pitcairn (the mounted officer) indicated that the Meeting House was to his left (not behind him) when the firing started.

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Major Pitcairn, who commanded the British vanguard, recorded that:

When I arrived at the end of the Village, I observed drawn up upon the green near two hundred of the rebels. When I came within about one hundred yards of them, they began to file off towards some stone walls on our right flank - - The Light Infantry observing this, ran after them - - I instantly called to the soldiers not to fire, but surround and disarm them and after several repetitions of these positive orders to the men, not to fire, etc.

Tensions were extraordinarily high at this point, and the sound of gunfire from some quarter caused the light infantry company of the 10th Regiment to open fire.

As described in a previous post, American spectators were confident that the first shots were fired by the British, but their accounts are so inconsistent that it is unclear which, if any, is accurate.

The British accounts are similarly inconsistent.

According to Pitcairn, the first shots occurred while the militia was retreating, and the shots came simultaneously from behind a wall and from the meeting house:

some of the rebels who had jumped over the wall, fired four or five shots at the soldiers, which wounded a man of the Tenth, and my horse was wounded in two places, from some quarter or other and at the same time several shots were fired from a Meeting House on our left

According to Lister, the first shots came from some men in the open:

they gave us a fire then ran off to get behind a wall.

According to Sutherland, the first shots came from Buckman’s Tavern, then some moments later from some men on the other side of a hedge:

We still went on further when three shots were fired at us, which we did not return, & this is sacred truth as I hope for mercy these 3 shots were fired from the corner of a large house to the right of the Church when we came up to the main body which appeared to me to exceed 400 in & about the Village who were drawn up in a plane opposite to the Church, several officers called out to throw down your arms & you shall come to no harm, or words to that effect which they refused to do. Instantaneously the gentlemen who were on horseback rode amongst them of which I was one, at which instant I heard Major Pitcairn's voice call out 'soldiers don't fire, keep your ranks, form & surround them, instantly some of the villains who got over a hedge fired at us

So what is one to make of the British and American accounts? Below I list some tentative conclusions:

First, although observers may have twisted the truth to some degree, there is no evidence of a conspiracy to lie about the events at Lexington within either the pool of American sources or the pool of British sources. Each set of statements appears to be about as reliable (or rather, as unreliable) as the other.

Second, there is a measure of agreement that either one shot, or a few shots occurring in close succession, immediately preceded a volley by the British regulars.

• Benjamin Tidd and Joseph Abbot: “the regulars fired, first, a few guns, which we took to be pistols from some of the Regulars who were mounted on Horses”.
• Major Pitcairn: “some of the rebels who had jumped over the wall, fired four or five shots”
• Levi Harrington and Levi Mead: “some of the Regulars, on Horses, whom we took to be officers, Fired a Pistol or two on the Lexington Company, which were then dispersing: These were the First Guns that were Fired…”
• Lieutenant Barker: “one of the rebels fired a shot”
• Thomas Fessenden: A British officer “fired a Pistol, pointed at said Militia”

Third, there is good reason to believe that observers’ perceptions of the event were strongly colored by their expectations.

For example, spectator William Draper believed Major Pitcairn was shouting “fire! fire! damn you, fire!” to his Regulars, but the Lexington militia (among others) did not. More believable is that Draper heard Pitcairn shouting, but he didn’t quite make out everything Pitcairn said. Pitcairn has himself saying the word “fire” more than once, but in the context of telling the troops not to fire. If Draper heard only part of what was said and saw the light infantry fire a moment later, he could have well become convinced that Pitcairn had ordered the troops to fire.

Another example: Major Pitcairn thought he heard simultaneous gunfire from his right (a wall) and left (the meeting house), but no other British officer, and no American source, claimed that shots were fired from the meeting house. Pitcairn had reason to believe that the Americans were assembling and their intentions were hostile before riding into Lexington. He also may have seen some men running from the meeting house after the firing began. Perhaps gun shots to his right echoed off the building to his left, creating the perception of simultaneous gunfire.

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So, who fired this first shot or shots on Lexington Green? Because the source statements are so inconsistent, any interpretation of the event must overlook some of the evidence. However, some scenarios are more believable than others, and I list four of the more plausible scenarios below. What scenario do you think best explains what happened?

Scenario #1: The Lexington militia started the firing. As Pitcairn and Sutherland claimed, some Americans jumped behind a wall (or “hedge”) and fired several shots at the British. These men were acting without orders and their actions were seen by few, if any, of the Americans on or around the Green.

Scenario #2: One of the mounted British officers fired a pistol or two. This officer would have been behind Pitcairn, Sutherland, and the others, and none of the British were looking in his direction. Perhaps the officer fired a pistol in the air so as to goad the militia into dispersing, but in so doing he inadvertently triggered a volley by the regulars.

Scenario #3: An accidental discharge started the firing. British officers were galloping about on horses, members of the Lexington militia were scrambling over a wall to safety -- accidental discharges were not rare events and perhaps this is what caused the nervous regulars to begin shooting.

Scenario #4: The first shot was not fired away on Lexington Green. British officers recorded that shots were repeatedly heard in the countryside on their march towards Lexington. They took these shots to be a signal for the militia to assemble. Perhaps the sound of one of these shots echoing around the green made it sound like several shots had been fired, and each party assumed it came from the other side. If this shot (or shots) was fired at a distance, the sound would have been somewhat muffled, and that might explain why Pitcairn and Sutherland thought the shots came from buildings or walls and why a handful of Americans thought it came from an officer’s pistol.

Note:

1. By comparison, the Doolittle engraving appears to depict two British companies deployed in line of battle (presumably those of the 4th and 10th), one of which is firing on the Lexington militia.

Also:

Some readers may note that in this series of posts I have not invoked certain sources. My impression is that those that have been discussed include the most trustworthy accounts of the battle and that the omitted statements do not greatly affect the perception of events.

On Lexington Green (3)

Last Fall, I commented on depositions made by witnesses to the opening of the American Revolutionary War at Lexington Green (see here and here). These depositions were collected in the days immediately following, and they were soon widely distributed. These depositions have also served as fodder for historians and have greatly shaped views of what took place on that fateful April morning.

Although less widely cited and discussed, journals, letters, and reports authored by British officers also provide a wealth of information about what happened at Lexington. In this post, I relate some of the events described by British sources as leading up to the fight at Lexington.

1. A British expeditionary force departs from Boston. This force consists of two battalions: one made up of light infantry companies, the other of grenadier companies.

Lieutenant-General Thomas Gage to William Legge, Secretary of State for the Colonies:

I having intelligence of a large quantity of Military Stores, being collected at Concord, for the avowed purpose, of Supplying a Body of Troops, to act in Opposition to his Majesty’s Government; I gott the Grenadiers, and Light Infantry out of Town, under the Command of Lieut. Colonel Smith of the 10th Regiment, and Major Pitcairn of the Marines, with as much Secrecy as possible, on the 18th at night; and with Orders to destroy the said Military Stores

Boston Area: April-May, 1775 (Click to enlarge).

2. The British land near Cambridge.

Lieutenant John Barker, 4th Regiment of Foot:

[The troops] were landed upon the opposite shore [from Boston] on Cambridge Marsh; few but the Commandg. Officers knew what expedition we were going upon. After getting over the Marsh, where we were wet up to the knees, we were halted in a dirty road and stood there ‘till two o’clock in the morning, waiting for provisions to be brought from the boats and divided, and which most of the Men threw away, having carried some with ‘em. At 2 o’clock we began our March by wading through a very long ford up to our Middles…

3. Six light infantry companies lead the advance.

Major John Pitcairn, His Majesty's Marines:

Six companies of Light Infantry were detached by Lt. Col. Smith to take possession of two bridges on the other side of Concord

4. The British are unable to keep their march a secret.

Lieutenant William Sutherland, 38th Regiment of Foot:

…we marched with Major Pitcairn commanding in front of the Light Infantry… continued for 3 miles without meeting any person. When I heard Lieut. Adair of the Marines who was a little before me in front call out, here are two fellows galloping express to Alarm the Country, on which I immediately ran up to them, seized one of them and our guide the other, dismounted them and by Major Pitcairn's direction gave them in charge to the men. A little after we were joined by Lieut. Grant of the Royal Artillery who told us the Country he was afraid was alarm'd of which we had little reason to doubt as we heard several shots being then between 3 & 4 in the morning, a very unusual time for firing. When we were joined by Major Mitchell, Capt. Cochrane, Capt. Limm & several other gentlemen who told us the whole country was alarm'd & galloped for their lives, or words to that purpose, that they had taken Paul Revierre, but was obliged to lett him go after having cutt his girths and stirrups…

5. British officers on the road learn that a large body of militia has assembled at Lexington, a village on their route to Concord. The leading light infantry companies halt.

Lieutenant Barker:

after going a few miles we took 3 or 4 People who were going off to give intelligence; about 5 miles on this side of a Town called Lexington, which lay in our road, we heard there were some hundreds of People collected together intending to oppose us and stop our going on

6. The light infantry load their muskets

Ensign Jeremy Lister, 10th Regiment of Foot:

To the best of my recollection about 4 oClock in the morning being the 19th of April the 5 front Compys. was ordered to Load which we did.

7. An American soldier “fires” at a British officer.

Lieutenant Sutherland:

I went on with the front party which consisted of a Sergeant and 6 or 8 men. I shall observe here that the road before you go into Lexington is level for about 1000 yards. Here we saw shots fired to the right and left of us, but as we heard no whistling of balls, I concluded they were to alarm the body that was there of our approach. On coming within gun shot of the Village of Lexington a fellow from the corner of the road on the right hand cock'd his piece at me, burnt priming [i.e., there was a flash in the pan]. I immediately called to Mr. Adair & party to observe this circumstance which they did. I acquainted Major Pitcairn of it immediately.

8. The British light infantry march into Lexington.

Major Pitcairn:

when I arrived at the head of the advance Company, two Officers [i.e., Sutherland and Adair] came and informed me that a man of the rebels advanced from those assembled, had presented his musket and attempted to shoot them, but the piece flashed in the pan - - On this I gave directions to the troops to move forward, but on no account to fire, or even attempt it without orders: When I arrived at the end of the Village, I observed drawn up upon the green near two hundred of the rebels.

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The incident described by Sutherland (#7) and referred to by Pitcairn (#8) is curious. Why did a lone American militiaman apparently try to shoot Lieutenant Sutherland when he was accompanied by a party of armed men? Did a misfire save Sutherland’s life? Or was the militiaman attempting only to frighten the British officer – not kill him? In either case it was a remarkably reckless action. Also remarkable is that the British (who must have been most astonished) did not attempt to apprehend the man.