Battle of Hanging Rock 12

Part 12: Stalemate

Previous: Rousselet's Gallant Stand

Next: Reinforcement and Retreat

The battle of Hanging Rock began as a major assault on one part of the British camp, but degenerated over time into "skirmishing with detached parties" [1]. These scattered engagements had caused many of the British troops to be driven from the battlefield [2], but the Americans had difficulty completing the victory because "the rout and pursuit of these various [British] corps by a part" of Sumter’s force, "and plunder of the camp by others, had thrown the Americans into great confusion" [3].

South of the British center camp, a mixed force of Provincials, backed up by two cannon, held on in an open area. But although the Americans were disorganized, with "some intoxicated, others plundering in the British camp," still "a respectable number," [4], perhaps 200 in total [5], continued "facing the enemy and pressing them closely" [6]. In this manner, the Provincials "were compelled gradually to give ground 200 yards," [7] or beyond the effective range of the Americans’ rifles.

Sniping Near the Center Camp (two views; click to enlarge). The Americans send long-range rifle fire against the Provincials, who continue to hold the open space south of the center camp.

The British withdrawal was made grudgingly, and they made perhaps two quick bayonet charges against the Americans before falling back to a more secure position [8]. At the time of these charges, the British were under attack "in a peculiarly steep part" of the plateau [9]. The final counterattack was a "vigorous charge with the bayonet," which they claimed left the militia "not merely… repulsed but… broken and dismayed" [10]. In this charge, the British may have briefly succeeded in closing with Sumter’s men. James McConnel of Irvine’s battalion "was wounded in the right arm by a bayonet thrust" [11]. In any event, the Americans "abandoned the whole ridge" [12]. Francis Rawdon claimed this final charge was made by the Legion infantry; a first-hand account places a part of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment on the scene as well [13].

The Final Bayonet Charge (two views; click to enlarge). A fierce bayonet charge drives the Americans off the plateau.

American accounts do not describe such a defeat as the British claimed. Instead, they asserted that Sumter intentionally "had his men withdrawn a small distance." This was done so that the men could be properly "formed" and "stragglers collected." Sumter's intention was "to renew the action." However, as "he rode along the line, personally inquiring of each man his stock of ammunition," he "found that they had not on an average three rounds per man" [14].

There were other serious problems as well. Because "the weather was warm," [15] men were "fainting with heat and drought" [16]. Also, the final British position was "in the centre of the cleared ground" and following William Davie’s charge they "formed a hollow square" [17]. Davie noted that "The distance of the square from the woods, and the fire of the two pieces of field artillery, prevented the militia from making any considerable impression on the British troops" [18].

A final significant factor was the considerable losses that the Americans had sustained. Among the officers, for example, David Reid of North Carolina and John McClure were both mortally wounded in the assault on Bryan’s camp [19]. Richard Winn was shot during the fighting with the Prince of Wales' American Regiment; William Hill was also shot around the same time [20]. William Robison "was wounded by a musket shot through the shoulder," [21] Samuel Otterson was shot "in my left arm which severed" "about midway" "the bone between the elbow and shoulder," [22] and one Captain Petty "had his arm shot off" [23]. James Jamieson "was wounded by a musket shot through the body" [24], left on the field of battle, and subsequently "taken prisoner" [25].

The British Square (click to enlarge). The British form a defensive square in the center of the open area, daring the Americans to attack.

Stalemate. The Provincials launch a desperate bayonet charge against the Americans that have gathered south of the center camp. Neither side is strong enough to completely drive the other from the field.

Notes:

1. The pension application of James Clinton, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. cf. the letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

3. William Davie's account; see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

4. Joseph Graham's account; see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

5. Davie, ibid.

6. Graham, ibid.

7. Graham, ibid.

8. American sources are almost silent on the subject of British charges during this period. Charles Stedman wrote that the Provincials made, "three desperate charges with the bayonet." One of these would have been the earlier charge that retook a cannon. George Hanger was less precise: "Sumpter renewed the attack; he was again and again beat off, charged, and pursued, but with regularity." Banastre Tarleton mentioned two charges and attributed these solely (and probably incorrectly) to the British Legion. His account is unclear as to whether one or more additional charges took place after other Provincials joined the Legion’s resistance.

• For Charles Stedman's account, see Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.
• For George Hanger's account, see An Address to the Army; in Reply to Strictures, by Roderick M'Kenzie, (Late Lieutenant in the 71st Regiment) on Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
• For Banastre Tarleton's account, see Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.

9. Rawdon, ibid. Although there is not a consensus about where the fighting took place, each of the several possibilities I considered previously identified the final part of the battle with the plateau transected by the Camden Road (links to these posts can be found here). The plateau itself does not have "peculiarly steep" slopes. However, there is a place several hundred yards south of the point I’ve identified as the center camp where a kind of gully comes close to the Camden Road (the open area where the Provincials made their stand). Perhaps this terrain feature was used by the Americans to approach and fire on the Provincials in relative safety.

10. Rawdon, ibid.

11. The pension application of James McConnel, transcribed by Will Graves. It is usually difficult to tell when and where participants' injuries occurred. McConnel could plausibly have been stabbed by a bayonet at other points and places. This charge, however, seems to have been the most successful of the battle, and some of Irvine’s men are known to have been present (cf. Joseph Graham, ibid.).

12. Rawdon, ibid.

13. For the account of an anonymous officer of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment, see Todd Braisted (2001). A History of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

14. Graham, ibid. In light of the fact that the Americans were later compelled to abandon the ground, Graham claimed that this shortage "was the true cause of [Sumter's] retreating" Sumter agreed, writing not long after the battle that "the true cause of my not totally defeating [the British] was the want of lead, having been obliged to make use of arms and ammunition taken from the enemy." See the letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

Clearly by this point in the battle, Sumter was on the scene of the fighting south of the center camp. Earlier he oversaw the destruction of a detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. In consequence, Sumter's account of the battle (Sumter, ibid.) provides few details about the fighting near the center camp. He wrote that the British "sustained [the battle for the center camp] with great bravery for near an hour; at length [they] gave way, leaving me in full possession of their camp." They then, "rallied again in Col. Robinson’s encampment," which seems to mean in or near the camp of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment. From this point on, however, "their opposition was but feeble."

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Robinson was an officer in a different Provincial regiment: the South Carolina Royalists. Neither he nor his men were at Hanging Rock.

15. Clinton, ibid.

16. Sumter, ibid.

17. Davie, ibid. Graham, ibid., also mentions this feature. Davie has the British adopting this formation as soon as they rallied south of the center camp, a view that is difficult to reconcile with British statements strongly pointing to a more active defense. More believable is that the several British accounts are essentially correct and that the British adopted the square formation only after Davie's dragoons chased a number of Loyalists and Provincials from the woods in their rear.

18. Davie, ibid.

19. Graham, ibid; Davie, ibid; Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Queries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.

20. Davie, ibid; General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.

21. The pension application of William Robison, transcribed by Will Graves.

22. The pension application of Samuel Otterson, transcribed by Will Graves.

23. The pension application of Daniel Carter, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

24. The pension application of James Jamieson, transcribed by Will Graves.

25. The pension application of Henry Rea, transcribed by Will Graves.

Battle of Hanging Rock 11

Part 11: Rousselet's Gallant Stand

Previous: The British Flank Attack

Next: Stalemate

After the American militia charged the center camp, the Loyalists and Provincials on hand retreated to the south and west, taking their cannon with them. What happened next is not entirely clear because few American participants described the subsequent fighting [1] and British sources are mutually contradictory [2]. This much can be said with some certainty: During the retreat of the British, they continued to fire a cannon at the Americans. This gun was somewhat separate from the Provincials, and it was seized by a party of North Carolinians. A group of Provincials that had rallied then charged and retook the cannon. Another group, consisting of both Loyalists and Provincials, also attempted to rally, but they were dispersed by William Davie's dragoons.

The British Rally (two views; click to enlarge). A group of Provincials and Loyalists rallies in the open space south of the center camp, while a second group rallies on the edge of the woods. The British cannon is defended by Henry Rugeley's South Carolina Loyalist militia [3].

Joseph Graham of North Carolina described the seizure of the British cannon as follows:

"On the British retreat from their position after being forced from their camp on the right of their line they kept firing a three pounder. Captain James Knox of Mecklenburg, gave order to his men to load their guns, and when that piece fired the next time they would take it; on the discharge of the gun they started in full run, and before the artillerists could load got within forty steps and began to fire, the British retreated and Knox and party took the gun and turned her on their adversaries" [4].

Knox Has the Cannon (two views; click to enlarge). Knox's North Carolinians turn a cannon on the Provincials.

Knox’s seizure of the gun threatened to drive the British Provincials off the field of battle. At this moment of crisis, however, Captain John Rousselet of the British Legion, was able to rally his regiment. Fortunately for Rousselet and his men, Knox’s men did not know “how to manage or load” the cannon, although it was “in their possession several minutes” [5].

By standing their ground, these “gallant few gave time for a few of the scattered troops to rally and join the legion” [6]. Among the arrivals was the unengaged portion of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment. They had by this time “recover[ed] from the consternation into which they had been thrown by the flight of Colonel Bryan, and they now joined [the Legion infantry] to defend the British encampment” [7].

Elements of the Royal North Carolina Regiment and Prince of Wales' American Regiment were added to the right of the British line [8], and the British then “came on with fixed bayonets and retook the gun" [9]. George Hanger claimed that when the British charged, John Rousselet accompanied them, and that "this officer, possessing happily not only valour, but also good conduct," did not permit the British to pursue the Americans "in a broken and irregular manner," but instead, "convinced of the advantage of the ground he had been attacked upon, he marched back and took possession of it again" [10].

Soon after this episode [11], William Davie managed to get his dragoons "collected and formed on the margin of the woods." However, he did not send his men into the open field to battle Rousselet and the British three-pounders. Instead, he set his sights on “a large body of the enemy, consisting of the legion infantry, Hamilton's regiment, and Tories... rallying, and formed on the opposite side of the British camp, near the wood." William Davie decided to attack this force with his dragoons, “lest they might be induced to take the Americans in flank.” To avoid the deadly open space, he “passed round the [center] camp under cover of the trees, and charged them with his company of dragoons.” As a result, the British “were routed and dispersed by a handful of men” [12].

Davie Charges Around the Camp (click to enlarge). Davie's dragoons charge through the woods, driving before them Loyalist militia and Provincial infantry.

Rousselet's Gallant Stand and Davie's Charge. As one group of Provincials holds off American attacks south of the center camp, a second group is routed by a charge of William Davie's dragoons.

Notes:

1. Joseph Graham provided the clearest description. The accounts by William Davie and Thomas Sumter also provide invaluable insights, however, the latter two appeared to miss at least parts of this action. Of the other participants who wrote postwar narratives (these do not include pension applications), Richard Winn, William Hill, and Joseph Gaston were wounded elsewhere on the battlefield, and Joseph McJunkin was attending to the wounded and/or guarding prisoners.

• For Joseph Graham's account, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.
• For William Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.
• For Thomas Sumter's account, see the letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.
• For Richard Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).
• For William Hill's account, see Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.
• For Joseph Gaston's account, see Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Queries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.
• For Joseph McJunkin's account, see Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

2. Francis Rawdon, Banastre Tarleton, and George Hanger claimed that the British Legion was chiefly responsible for maintaining the resistance against the British during this period, while Charles Stedman, Roderick Mackenzie, and an anonymous officer of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment gave important roles to either the Royal North Carolina Regiment or the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

A tentative resolution to these discrepant versions of events is as follows: The British Legion infantry was the first to rally after the center camp was lost and it was central to maintaining a British presence on the battlefield. After they rallied they were joined by other Provincials, and this combined force fought Sumter's men to a draw. Tarleton and Hanger were officers in the British Legion and their accounts probably reflect a certain degree of pro-British Legion partisanship (cf. Mackenzie). However, Rawdon observed that the British Legion infantry alone remained entirely on the battlefield after the action ended and that morale remained good among the Legion infantry, after it had fallen among the other British units fighting at Hanging Rock. Also, Stedman credited Captain John Rousselet of the Legion infantry with a special leadership role at around this point in the battle (cf. Hanger).

• For Francis Rawdon's account, see the letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801
• For Banastre Tarleton's account, see Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
• For George Hanger's account, see An Address to the Army; in Reply to Strictures, by Roderick M'Kenzie, (Late Lieutenant in the 71st Regiment) on Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
• For Charles Stedman's account, see Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.
• For Roderick Mackenzie's account, see Strictures On Lieutenant. Col. Tarleton's History of the Campaigns Of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America.
• For the account of an anonymous officer of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment, see Todd Braisted (2001). A History of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

3. Braisted, ibid.

4. Graham, ibid.

5. Graham, ibid.

6. Hanger, ibid.

7. Tarleton, ibid.

8. Braisted, ibid.

9. Graham, ibid. It was perhaps at this time that, according to Mackenzie, ibid., that "Lieutenant [or Adjutant] Browne, of the North Carolinians... fell in a desperate charge, which the crisis of the action rendered inevitable."

10. Hanger, ibid.

11. Suggested by a comparison of Davie's and Graham's accounts. Davie seemingly missed the taking of the cannon and the subsequent British charge. His account states vaguely that “The remainder of a British line who had also made a movement, retreated hastily towards their former position.” This passage follows his description of the destruction of a detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment, suggesting that his charge came subsequent to the charges by Knox and Rousselet.

12. Davie, ibid. As noted here and here, Davie's dragoons had scattered earlier in the battle.

Battle of Hanging Rock 10

Part 10: The British Flank Attack

Previous: Battle for the Center Camp

Next: Rousselet's Gallant Stand

Around the time the battle opened, a detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment (PoWAR) was dispatched northward towards the sound of battle. This contingent seemingly reached the center camp while the fighting was still raging at Bryan's encampment. At the time, the British commander at Hanging Rock, Major John Carden, would not have known that Bryan's men had been completely routed or that McCulloch’s company was in the process of being destroyed. He therefore sent this detachment to Bryan's support, while keeping the remainder of the Provincials in a defensive posture [1].

At about the time the men of the PoWAR advanced towards Bryan's camp and "passed into a wood between the Tory and centre encampments" [2], the Americans began their assault on the center camp. Hearing the resulting gunfire, the PoWAR "drew up unperceived" into a line of battle, "and poured in a heavy fire on the militia." The Americans had quickly succeeded in taking the center camp, and at this moment "were forming from the disorder of the pursuit" [3]. Receiving this attack was a band of 30 militiamen [4]. By this "bold and skillful [British] manoeuvre," [5] these soldiers were "separated from the main [American] body" still near Bryan's camp [6]. One Samuel Saxon, a company commander, recalled that they turned about and "rushed upon the [British] line and broke our way [through,] losing in killed and missing 15 men" [7].

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment's Flank Attack (click to enlarge). Saxon's company and others attempt to retreat through the attacking PoWAR. Hanging Rock Creek is at far left. The green patch in the middle distance designates the ravine separating Bryan's camp from the British center camp.

The PoWAR detachment pursued these men towards Bryan's camp, and "nearly changed the fate of the day" [8]. At that moment, however, numbers of Americans led by Thomas Sumter and Robert Irwin were heading towards the center camp, and the attacking British. The Americans were in what appeared to be "an old field," [9] when Sumter saw that the British had "found means to turn my right flank" [10]. "The British advanced in good order" [11] through what appeared to be "a swamp," [12], or "a marsh" [13], while the Americans "halted and awaited their approach." Saxon stopped fleeing once he reached this group and "turned about, and took part in the battle which ensued" [14].

According to one participant:

"The contest was severe and of doubtful issue for some considerable time at length the American troops retreated and occupied a more favorable situation, where undergrowth and brush protected them much from the musketry of the enemy" [15].

Richard Winn, who was at the center camp, recalled that "On hearing a severe firing to my right I ordered my men to repair to the place." They joined the action "as quick as possible," and came upon "the back of the British" who were "in action" with "a party of our men." Winn gave the order to "commence firing as usual," which caught "the British between two fires." Their line soon "gave way," [16] and the Redcoats "took instinctively to the trees and bush heaps," to defend themselves [17].

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment Under Attack (click to enlarge).

Soon "there was not a British officer standing, and many of the regiment had fallen," but still they "returned the fire with deadly effect." [18] Robert Irwin "had his clothes perforated with four separate balls," but "escaped unhurt" [19]. Richard Winn was not so lucky; he received "a most dangerous wound" [20].

At last, 22 men, all the rank and file that were left unhurt, "threw down their arms" "on being offered quarters" [21]. Robert Irwin, who had particularly distinguished himself during the fighting [22] approached an obstinate sergeant major and "wrenched the bayonet" from his hands. Then he too surrendered. [23]

Capitulation (click to enlarge).

The British Flank Attack. A detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment is beset by American militia near Bryan's camp. Meanwhile, the British Legion infantry rally near the center camp.

Notes:

1. That it was a detachment of the regiment that was sent north, and not the whole regiment, was discussed previously, see Note 1 in this post. The timing of these events is not discussed in participant accounts, but this is the most parsimonious explanation. Several American participants, including Thomas Sumter, asserted that this detachment was sent to Bryan's relief. For Sumter's account, see the letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

2. William Davie's account; see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

3. Davie, ibid.

4. The pension application of Samuel Saxon, transcribed by Will Graves.

5. Davie, ibid.

6. Saxon, ibid.

7. Saxon, ibid.

8. Davie, ibid.

9. The pension application of John L. Davies, transcribed by Will Graves. Sumter, ibid., places this event near Bryan's camp.

10. Sumter, ibid.

11. Davies, ibid.

12. Sumter, ibid.

13. Saxon, ibid.

14. Saxon, ibid.

15. Davies, ibid.

16. Richard Winn; see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).

17. Davie, ibid.

18. Davie, ibid.

19. Joseph Graham; see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

20. Winn, ibid.

21. Davie, ibid. for the quote; Sumter, ibid., and George Cunningham are the source of the number of surrendered men. For Cunnigham's account, see the pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves.

22. According to Joseph McJunkin, before this battle, he was "called Granny Irwin," but "afterwards [he] was spoken very highly of on account of his good conduct that day." See Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

23. Davies, ibid.

Battle of Hanging Rock 4

Part 4: British Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Previous: Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina

Next: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Statements about the British forces at Hanging Rock were made by British and American participants and their contemporaries. Most reliable is Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon's statement that Hanging Rock was defended by "400 provincials and 800 militia" [1].

Provincials:

The Provincials included men from three different regiments: The British Legion infantry, The Prince of Wales’ American Regiment, and the Royal North Carolina Regiment [2]. Total losses for the Provincials were 38 men killed, 69 wounded, 71 missing [3]. The strength and losses of each unit are as follows:

Prince of Wales’ American Regiment: Lost 93 of 181 men (51%) [4]

Royal North Carolina Regiment: Lost 50 of approximately 100 men (~50%) [5]

British Legion Infantry: Lost 35 of 161 men (22%) [6]

In regards to the number of missing, 43 men were captured by the Americans [7]. Half of these men were privates and noncommissioned officers of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment that surrendered to the Americans during the fighting [8]. The other half had been both wounded and captured (most, if not all of these, were also of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment).

Loyalist Militia:

Two forces of Loyalist militia were at Hanging Rock: Colonel Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers (called in some sources the North Carolina Refugees, because they had been forced to flee their native state), and Colonel Henry Rugeley’s South Carolina regiment [9]. Bryan organized between 600-700 men in North Carolina, however, he brought only 250 men with him to Camden after Hanging Rock [10]. Bryan surely had a fair number of his men killed, wounded, or missing as a result of the battle, but there is no reason to believe that his losses ran into the hundreds. Rather, his original force had likely been greatly reduced by August 6 by desertion, sickness, and combat [11].

Rugeley’s regiment, like other South Carolina Loyalist militia regiments, likely numbered around several dozen men [12].

Some sources claimed Bryan lost many men [13], while others thought his losses were negligible [14]. One clue to Bryan's actual loss is Thomas Sumter's account of the battle, which implies that around 30 of the Loyalists were captured [15]. As these men were likely wounded before being captured, and as a common ratio of killed to wounded during the war was 1:3, Bryan's losses were likely in the neighborhood of 40 men.

It is not possible to make any estimate of losses in Rugeley's regiment.

Based on this rather imperfect information, I estimate the total force of Loyalist militia at the battle of Hanging Rock as near 400 men. The numbers listed above suggest a lower total (250 for Bryan's survivors + ~40 for Bryan's losses + several dozen for Rugeley = ~325), but this does not include men that would have remained missing, or would have left Bryan's command altogether, after his defeat at Hanging Rock.

Division of Forces:

The British were divided into three camps. The center camp included the British Legion infantry and the Royal North Carolina Regiment [16]. The right camp included Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers [17]. The left camp included the Prince of Wales' American Regiment [18]. It is not possible to place Rugeley's regiment at any one of these camps with confidence, but the center camp seems most probable [19].

Notes:

1. Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

2. Todd Braisted (2001). A History of the Prince Of Wales' American Regiment; The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

Some secondary accounts claim that the King’s Rangers, commanded by Colonel Thomas Brown, were at the battle. This stems from a misreading of Tarleton’s description of the battle, which refers to Brown’s regiment, but means Colonel Montfort Browne, commander of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment. Browne was not present on this occasion, and command of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment was left to Major John Carden. Because of absences in the field officers for the other regiments, Carden also commanded the entire post.

3. Enclosure in a letter dated August 20, 1780 from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain. In K. G. Davies (Ed.), Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series), Vol. XVI. Irish University Press.

4. Braisted, ibid., Donald E. Graves. Guide to Canadian Sources Related to Southern Revolutionary War National Parks. (Retrieved February 6, 2010).

5. See this return of losses; Braisted, ibid. The Royal North Carolina Regiment appears to have been a detachment only; its strength was estimated from subtracting the strength of the Legion infantry and the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment from Rawdon’s stated 400.

6. Braisted, ibid. The strength of the regiment is estimated by adding these losses to their strength on August 15, 1780. Approximately forty of the Legion infantry were in the companies of Patrick Stewart and Charles McDonald, according to Banastre Tarleton’s A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. These companies arrived at the close of the battle, and William Davie claimed they lost 1 man. Of the Legion infantry who were present at the beginning of the battle, 34 men were lost of approximately 121 (or 28%).

7. Pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves. Sumter claimed that the number was 40 or so; see Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

8. National Archives of Canada: List of the Killed Wounded & Prisoners of ye P.W.A.Regt [posted on a geocities website that is no longer available].

9. Braisted, ibid.

10. Judicary report on Samuel Bryant, John Hampton and Nicholas White, April 5, 1782.

11. Desertion, as noted previously, was a natural occurrence when militia units were not regularly employed. Sickness was likely a factor given that Bryan's men were encamped briefly at Cheraws, South Carolina, where the 71st Foot became debilitated. Losses in combat occurred primarily at Colson's Ferry, North Carolina, on July 21 (see letter from Thomas Blount to Abner Nash, July 23, 1780), and at Hanging Rock on July 30 (see Davie, ibid.).

12. By way of comparison, Mathew Floyd's Loyalist militia regiment, which fought at Hill's Ironworks, Williamson's Plantation, and (probably) Rocky Mount had only 30 men in mid June. See Michael C. Scoggins, More on the Battle of Hill's Ironworks, Volume 2, Number 7 of Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution. This unsourced website gives Rugeley's regiment 40 men at the battle.

13. For example, Davie, ibid., claimed that during the battle, Bryan's men were "routed with great slaughter."

14. Tarleton, ibid., stated that "Colonel Bryan's North-Carolina refugees were greatly dispersed, but did not suffer considerably by the fire of the enemy."

15. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

16. Davie, ibid.

17. The rationale behind this placement was described in this post.

18. The site of their encampment was determined by process of elimination in the absence of clear statements among the available sources.

19. Davie said Bryan's camp included "Bryan's Regiment, and other Loyalists." This can be interpreted to include Rugeley's regiment, but it is not a necessary conclusion. Given how small American and Loyalist militia regiments typically were in this campaign, Davie may simply be indicating that a Loyalist force consisting of hundreds of men must have included more than a single regiment. Sumter said that Bryan's was "the most considerable of the Tory encampments," clearly implying that some of the Loyalist militia were encamped elsewhere. Oddly, he indicated that the left British camp belonged to Joseph Robinson, an officer in the South Carolina Royalists, who was stationed at the British post at Ninety-Six, South Carolina. Sumter's statement could be read, though not very convincingly, to mean that the South Carolina militia were encamped there. Braisted, ibid., has Rugeley's militia defending one of the British guns after the Legion infantry was driven from the center camp. As the British forces were in considerable disarray at the time, it is more believable that both the Legion infantry and Rugeley's militia had been in the center camp than that Rugeley's militia came to their assistance from some other quarter. The Legion infantry and Rugeley's militia also appear to be the units stationed longest at this post. It's plausible that when they were first stationed at Hanging Rock, they chose to encamp near each other on the site of the center camp.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield in Miniature

Recently, I described how I was working on a version of the Hanging Rock battlefield, at a 1:20 scale for 15mm miniatures. That battlefield is now more-or-less complete and is shown below.

I first had to identify the area in which the fighting was likely to have taken place (see here, here, and here). Early on I realized that I couldn't make an exact representation of the area as it likely appeared in 1780. Therefore, I settled on a certain amount of abstraction. I didn't create miniature hills, ravines, and watercourses per se, but rather represented these things using variations in the "vegetation." Also, the trees are spaced somewhat far apart; this is necessary so that I can move the miniatures about on the battlefield. As a consequence of these decisions, the miniature battlefield may not closely resemble the Hanging Rock Creek area in 1780, but it at least captures something of the flavor of the time and place.

Two Maps of the Hanging Rock Battlefield (click to enlarge). The map on the left is from Google Maps. The map on the right is from ACME Mapper. In both cases, today's Flat Rock Road (which follows roughly the same path as the 18th-Century Camden Road) runs from north (at top) to south. Hanging Rock Creek runs from the top of the map to the right. I believe Bryan's North Carolinians were encamped on the hill near the upper right. The lakes in the area were not present in the 18th Century. Several small streams in the area are not represented on the map on the left.

Hanging Rock Battlefield in Miniature (click to enlarge). As per above, the Camden road runs from north to south. The farmland at center left is the site of the center camp (note the brush hut near the cabin). The encampment of Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers is in the woods at the upper right. The encampment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment is in "Cole's Old Fields" near the lower right.

Images of the Hanging Rock Battlefield

Previously, I made the case that the battle of Hanging Rock was fought on a height south of where present-day Flat Rock Road crosses Hanging Rock Creek, and on a neighboring hill. A map that I presented in that post appears below. The red circles show the locations of the three British camps. The circle nearest the upper right represents the encampment of Samuel Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers, the circle below and to the left of this point represents the encampment of the British Legion infantry and the Royal North Carolina Regiment (this is also known as the center camp), and the circle nearest the bottom represents the encampment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment (PoWAR). These British forces guarded the Camden Road (the brown line; this followed approximately the same path as today's Flat Rock Road).

Topographic maps provide an imperfect sense of place; it helps that one can take a virtual tour of Revolutionary War battlefields using Google Earth. Below are several screen shots I made of the approximate site of the center camp and the PoWAR camp, as seen from Flat Rock Road.

The Flat Rock Road, near the site of the center camp. The view is northwest; the crest of the elevation is to the right. Near the trees in the middle ground, the road slopes steeply downwards and turns towards the north. The British post at Hanging Rock was designed to prevent the Americans from coming down this road (i.e., towards the viewer).

The same location, but looking in the opposite direction (i.e., southeast). The area near Hanging Rock is hilly and cut by numerous ravines. This relatively flat plateau was attractive to early settlers.

The same location, looking northeast. The crest of the height is at the right edge of the image, a short distance behind the trees. The profile of the slope can be made out in the distance. William Davie claimed that "the regular troops [actually, Provincials] could not be approached without an entire exposure of the assailants." The slope is gentle enough that this land may well have been cleared by settlers prior to the battle. A nearby stream would have helped make this site attractive. If this interpretation is correct, one can understand Davie's apprehension: The direct approach to Hanging Rock would have led the American troops to advance up this slope from the left towards the British infantry and two 3-pounder guns on the right. To circumvent this danger, the Americans chose to attack the center camp on its flank.

Much of the area around Hanging Rock is woodland today, just as it was in 1780. Today the area is covered by second-growth forest, but the mix of deciduous and coniferous trees one finds in the area today is probably not unlike the original forest.

This image (looking east) was taken near the site of the PoWAR's camp (the lower red circle). The Flat Rock Road is in the foreground; the road heading into the background passes near the Hanging Rock. The distant trees are on the Hanging Rock Battlefield Property. The historical marker at right is for the James Ingram house. To read the marker, click here; the site of the John Ingram house can be seen on Mills' 1825 map of Kershaw District; note the proximity to the marked site of the battle of Hanging Rock.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 4

An Alternative Proposal

In the previous two posts, I considered two different points of view about the location of British forces at the battle of Hanging Rock in South Carolina (see here and here). To evaluate these accounts, I developed an "objective" rating system that compared how well the landscape identified by these accounts matches that appearing in descriptions of the battlefield. Noteworthy, is that neither account rated better than a 75% under this system, suggesting that there is room for improvement. I therefore set about examining the terrain features in this area carefully, in order to determine whether there is some constellation of terrain features that would match participants at a higher rate.

A scheme that is a good match for participant accounts is shown in the map below. A description follows.

The center camp is located on top of a hill overlooking Hanging Rock Creek, at the approximate spot identified as the Hanging Rock battlefield on Mills' 1825 map of Kershaw District, South Carolina. (#3 on the map).

The right camp is located on top of a nearby high that is bounded by Hanging Rock Creek on two sides, a short distance upstream from the eponymous rock formation (the rock formation is #1 on the map).

The left camp is located on the Camden Road, at the approximate site of Cole's Old Fields. (#4 on the map).

Objective Assessment

1) The three camps were on elevations. 2 points.

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. 2 points.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek. 2 points.

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." 2 points.

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. 2 points. Remarkably, the hill has exactly this feature, as shown in the topographic map below. To highlight the hill shape, I've marked two of the contour lines in bold. Also important that this bend in the hill is pointed towards a defile (on which a blue arrow is placed) through which I believe the Americans advanced (see section below concerning William Davie's account of the American advance).

The red circles on this map are the three camps. The green box is described below.

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. 1 point. There is a flat patch of ground in the appropriate area in which several streams converge, but there is no "swamp" icon on this spot. This area is marked by the green box in the map above. The absence of a swamp icon may only be because the area is not large in extent.

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. 2 points. The distance is about .37 miles.

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." 2 points.

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road. 2 points. This is the brown line on the map above.

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. 2 points.

Total Score: 19 points (95%).

Subjective Assessment

Aside from agreement with the 10-item list, there are several good reasons to adopt this interpretation of the placement of the British camps at Hanging Rock. These include 1) agreement with William Davie's description of the American route of attack, 2) agreement with participant descriptions of a British flank attack during the battle, and 3) the relative military soundness of this alignment.

1) William Davie on the American Advance. William Davie described the difficulties the Americans faced in attacking the British post as follows:

"the situation of the regular troops could not be approached without an entire exposure of the assailants, and a deep ravine and creek covered the whole point of the Tory camp."

In the account that I've described, this makes perfect sense. The center camp included two 3-pounders and a force of infantry. The cannon probably could not stop movement over the creek (both because of the distance and because of tall trees obscuring the view of the creek). However, south of the creek, an American force advancing along the Camden Road, would come to a high hill that was cleared of trees (participant accounts indicate that the center camp was on farmland). At that point, the cannon would have been a very significant obstacle to advancing infantry.

Both according to Davie's account and the maps above, an American force that crossed the creek further downstream would have had to cross a ravine and creek directly in front of the Loyalist militia. Note that in Davie's account, and that of other American participants, the Loyalists are called "Tories," and the Provincials are called "regulars."

Davie's description does not fit well with the Battlefield Property site. The creek covers the front of both camps, and attacking one hilltop camp would not seem to have entailed more exposure than attacking the other.

Davie also described the route the Americans took to the battlefield: "They [Sumter's force] turned to the left of the road to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol, with an intention to return to it under cover of a defile near the camp, but the guides, either from ignorance or timidity, led them so far to the left that the right, centre, and left divisions, all fell on the Tory encampment."

As shown on the maps above, advancing parallel to the road, but on its east side (i.e., left, when one is heading south), would lead the Americans in the direction of the "Tory" camp. The defile that Davie referred to is readily identifiable in the account I've proposed: it runs parallel to the Camden Road, beginning in modern-day Heath Springs, and then joins the ravine through which Hanging Rock Creek runs. In the map below, the grey arrow shows the extent of the defile; the hilltop on which I've proposed that Bryan's Loyalist militia were encamped is at the bottom.

As will be seen when I describe the battle, the guides did not know that the Loyalist militia were on a hilltop across from this juncture, and thus this path lead Davie's men into Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers.

Davie's description of the route taken by the Americans, however, is not a good fit for the Battlefield Property site. They didn't leave the road "to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol," but evidently swung far off to the east with the purpose of reaching the well-known Hanging Rock. Once at this point, they were directly across the creek from the Loyalist militia and Provincials. There would not have been a defile to follow from this position to reach the British encampments -- the only avenue of attack was to cross the creek.

2) The British Flank Attack. Thomas Sumter, writing 3 days after the battle, noted that "They [i.e., the Provincials] had Detached a Colum[n] to support Bryant [i.e., Samuel Bryan, commander of the Loyalist militia], who, through a swamp, found means to turn my Right flank." This "column" consisted of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

Richard Winn's force at that time was assaulting the center camp, but upon "hearing a Severe firing to my Right," from this column, he moved his men towards the regiment "as quick as possible." They then arrived "on the back [i.e., rear] of the British," who were engaged with another party of Americans. Once Winn's men opened up, the British detachment was caught "between two fires [and] gave way." Davie claimed that this attack occurred "between the Tory and centre encampments."

A comparison with the terrain I've identified as the battle site shows that there is a flat patch of ground fed by several streams between the center and right camps. A British force advancing into this area from the direction of the Camden Road would have run into the Americans that had seized the Loyalists' camp. A force of Americans attacking the center camp (i.e., Winn's men)could have turned around and fallen on the rear of this force. In short, the pieces appear to fit. (Some additional explanation is required concerning the movements of all of the units involved; that will appear in the description of the battle).

A comparison of these statements by Sumter, Winn, and Davie with the Hanging Rock Battleground Property is not a good fit. Yes, there is a swampy patch of ground on the right flank of the Americans' initial position east of Hanging Rock Creek, but not on their right flank once they seized Bryan's camp and turned south. The only way for a British force to get between the two camps would be to enter a wooded ravine dividing the hills on which the Loyalist militia and Provincials were allegedly camped. Such an attack would not have been a turning maneuver.

3) Strength of the Position. The British post was in place to defend the Camden Road at the point it crossed Hanging Rock Creek. The camps, one might expect, would be laid out in a way to provide for a strong defense of the crossing. The scheme I've described seems to have this feature. The British are deployed in three camps so as to prevent a coup de main, yet the three camps are within close supporting distance of each other, forming a kind of defensive "triangle." Each camp is also in a strong location. One camp (the center camp) is on high hill south of the creek, on the Camden Road. A second camp covers the right flank of this position, on a high hill next to the creek. The third camp is also on the Camden Road, in position to either cover the left flank of the position or to act as a reserve. Befitting the fighting style of the different forces on hand, the Provincials were on cleared land along the road, while the Loyalist militia were encamped in a wooded area.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 2

Was the Battle of Hanging Rock Fought on the Hanging Rock Battlefield Property?

Although I recently raised the question of where the battle of Hanging Rock was fought, the site is presumably known. Today, the Hanging Rock battleground is public property, and visitors to the site can visit the eponymous rock formation and walk over the (alleged) battlefield.

Site of the Hanging Rock Battleground Property, as shown in Google Maps. (Click to enlarge).

A nomination form filed by the State of South Carolina for the National Register of Historic Places filed on December 31, 1974, described the battlefield and the events that took place there. The nomination form reads in part:

“The property nominated for Hanging Rock Historic Site includes the high ground around Hanging Rock, a portion of Hanging Rock Creek, and the plateau to the west of the creek that centers around county road 58. Hanging Rock itself, near which General Sumter’s men left their horses before going into battle, is east of the creek on a high bluff. The whole area on the east side of the creek is strewn with huge, rounded boulders and is heavily wooded with steep banks. To the west of the creek, the ground rises sharply and reaches a plateau, where the British and Tories camped. Bryan’s Tories were camped to the north, the British Legion troops immediately to the south, and Major Bryan’s [sic] troops south of the Legion. This plateau was partly wooded and partly open fields, some of which are still visible along road 58. On the extreme south end of the nominated property, along road 58, are several houses and the Mt. Zion Church and cemetery."

“North of Hanging Rock, on Hanging Rock Creek immediately above the county road bridge, is an old Indian ford. Large flat boulders in the creek bed connect the two banks at this point."

“The British garrison was held by 1,400 men under the command of Major Carden of the Prince of Wales Regiment. They were encamped on the west side of the creek, on high ground protected by a deep ravine formed by the creek. The British units lay in three divisions, from north to south along the ridge: about 900 Tories under Colonel Samuel Bryan on a hill south of Hanging Rock Creek, (separated from the center by a ravine and a band of woods; about 160 of Colonel Tarleton’s Legion and Hamilton’s Regiment in some houses at the center; and the British regulars under Colonel Brown in open ground to the south."

Bryan's "Tories" are North Carolina Loyalist militia, "Tarleton's Legion" are the British Legion infantry, "Hamilton's Regiment" is the Royal North Carolina Regiment, and "the British regulars under Colonel Brown" is the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. The map below illustrates the location attributed to these units. Bryan's North Carolina volunteers are represented by the uppermost red square, the Legion infantry and the Royal North Carolina Regiment are represented by the middle square, and the PoWAR is represented by the lower square.

British Dispositions at Hanging Rock, according to the State of South Carolina (click to enlarge).

Sumter's men were encamped in the lands of the Catawba Nation, miles to the northwest of the British encampment. A force moving to attack Hanging Rock would most likely advance from the north along the Flat Rock (then Camden) Road, running north to south through the middle of the map.

The disposition of British troops described here seems peculiar on several counts: 1) The least-experience troops, Samuel Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers, were placed in the position closest to the enemy, 2) none of the camps were well positioned to dispute a crossing of Hanging Rock Creek along the Camden Road, 3) the principle strength of the position lay on its eastern side, where a steep slope ran down to the creek, not facing the Americans to the north.

The nomination form describes the beginning of the battle as follows:

“Sumter’s surprise attack began at six o’clock, the men advancing across the creek against Bryan’s Tory militia. Sumter meant to attack the entire British line, but misjudged; the American units met instead the northern end of the British line. Within half an hour the Americans had taken the Tory camp, sending the Tories fleeing through the woods into the center of the British line."

Although Sumter's men presumably would have approached from the north along the Camden Road, this version of events indicates that they swung away from the road so as to approach the British post from the east (and towards its main strength).

The account places Sumter's brigade in the immediate vicinity of Hanging Rock at the start of the battle. On the other side of Hanging Rock Creek were two hills. On the northern hill was Samuel Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers. On the southern hill was the infantry of the British Legion and the Royal North Carolina Regiment. (The Prince of Wales' American Regiment was encamped further to the south). Sumter intended to attack the two camps closest to him simultaneously. Although the two camps were a short distance away, an error was allegedly made in crossing the creek, causing all of the troops to become engaged with Bryan's camp.

So far I have given a number of reasons why this description of the site of the fighting is improbable. However, I recognize that there could be good reasons (just not obvious ones), as to why events unfolded in this manner. A better way of assessing the validity of this account is to compare it against the 10 statements about the Hanging Rock battlefield I listed previously.

In this post, and in two upcoming posts, I will measure the validity of an account of the Hanging Rock battlefield using these 10 statements. In making this assessment, I will determine for each statement whether it is consistent with the alleged battle site. If the site and statement are consistent, I will award 2 points to the account. Each time the site and statement may be consistent, but there is some ambiguity, I will award 1 point to the account. Each time the site and statement are inconsistent, I will award 0 points to the account. In this manner, the claimed site of the fighting can earn between 0 and 20 points.

Here is the scoring for the site of the battlefield as described in this nomination form:

1) The three camps were on elevations. 2 points.

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. 0 points. This account has the British facing eastward, with Bryan on the left of the line.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek. 2 points.

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." 2 points.

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. 1 point. The hill does not obviously have this property; but who can tell what the terrain looked like at ground level in 1780?

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. 2 points. Swamp symbols appear to the left of Bryan along the banks of Hanging Rock Creek.

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. 2 points. The distance is about .28 miles.

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." 1 point. This field was likely nearer the road than the hill along the creek.

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road. 1 point. The center camp is not placed on the road, but on a hill bordering the creek. The account does have the Prince of Wales' American Regiment on the road, albeit to the south near modern-day Mount Zion Church.

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. 2 points. In this case, the "left" camp is that of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment. They are located more than 1/4 mile from the center camp. The nomination form claims that during the battle "The British retreated further south to Colonel Robinson’s camp [i.e., the third camp], but Sumter moved in and took two-thirds of that camp also." This statement is broadly inconsistent with participant accounts.

Total Score: 15 points (75%).

Prince of Wales' American Regiment

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment was raised by Monfort Browne in the winter of 1776-1777 at New York. For most of its early history, the regiment was used for garrison duty in New York and Providence, Rhode Island. During this time, the regiment participated in the Danbury Raid (1777), and formed part of the reserve at the battle of Quaker Hill (1778). Later, the regiment was transferred to the Southern theatre, where they played a minor role in the siege of Charleston, South Carolina (1780). Subsequently, the regiment was detailed to occupy the South Carolina Backcountry. The PoWAR was part of the British garrison that was attacked at Hanging Rock (1780) where half of the men in the battalion companies were killed, wounded, or captured. The light infantry company was destroyed at Cowpens (1781), while the grenadier company was captured at Fort Granby (1781). The remnants of the regiment performed garrison duty at Charleston and New York during the final years of the war.

The PoWAR is thought to have worn green coats with white facings early in the war while at New York, and red coats with blue facings while in the South. Katcher claimed that the late war uniforms were red coats faced blue and/or green

Below is a group of miniatures (click to enlarge) that will be used to represent the PoWAR and some other British infantry serving in the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution. All but one comes from a pack of Continental infantry with round hats (the other is from a pack of Continental infantry with floppy hats). Although intended to be Americans, the hats, sparse gear and coats with cut-down tails are appropriate to many regiments of British regulars and Provincial infantry.


Sources:

René Chartrand (2008). American Loyalist Troops 1775-84. Osprey.

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

The On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies. A History of the Prince Of Wales' American Regiment. (Retrieved December 11, 2009).

Cowpens in Miniature 2

Part 2: British Order of Battle
Previous: About the Recreation

Next: American Order of Battle

The American commander Brigadier-General Morgan indicated that the British force at Cowpens was comprised of 1,150 men (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?). I assume that this number included both the men (of all ranks) that fought at the battle and the detachment that was left behind to guard the British baggage train.

Rank and file totals for most British units can be found in a British report dated January 15, 1781. This includes the detachment of the 16th Foot (44 men), the 7th Foot (167 men), the 1st Battalion of the 71st Foot (249 men), the light infantry companies of the 71st Foot (69 men), and the British Legion (451 men).

I also reviewed the rolls for the Prince of Wales American Regiment (PoWAR) light infantry company, and determined that there were as many as 1 officer and 28 rank and file of this company present at Cowpens.

Finally, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie recorded the number of officers present in most of the units at Cowpens, including the 7th Foot (7), the 71st Foot (16 between the battalion and light companies), the PoWAR light infantry company (1), and the detachment of the 17th Light Dragoons (2).

Some assumptions had to be made fill in the gaps in the records.

Rank and File Estimates

The two 3-pounders that the British had at the battle had a crew in the neighborhood of 22 men and no officers (an estimate based primarily on John Moncure's estimate in The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour and Lawrence Babits' estimate in A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens).

Tarleton's account implies that the 17th Light Dragoons had around 50 men, but he was speaking very loosely. The other numbers he gave are demonstrably wrong, such as his statement that his total force was 1000 men, and that the 7th Foot, and 1st battalion of the 71st Foot both had 200 men. A U.S. intelligence report of Jan 6, 1781 gives 35 men for the 17th (see excerpt, below). This is also not entirely trustworthy. However a number between 35 and 50 men is probably accurate. For this reason, the 17th Light Dragoons are assumed to have had around 40 men.

The British report does not indicate how many of the rank and file in the British Legion were infantry and how many were dragoons. Tarleton's account implies that there were 250 dragoons, which would leave about 200 infantrymen. The US intelligence report, mentioned above, indicates that the infantry and cavalry components were of equal size (this is not shown in the excerpt above). An annotation on the Pigee Map (Babits, page 71) lists 280 men for Tarleton's cavalry. This number also appeared in a New Jersey newspaper account of the battle. My assumption is that the cavalry had around 240 men (280 rank and file total - 40 rank and file for the 17th light dragoons); this leaves about 210 rank and file for the infantry.

Officer Estimates

Using the number of officers listed by Mackenzie, and the rank and file numbers indicated above, it is possible to determine for some units the ratio of officers to rank and file. There were 9 officers for 167 rank and file in the 7th Foot (1:19), 16 officers for 318 rank and file in the 71st Foot (1:20) 2 officers for 40 rank and file in the 17th Light Dragoons (1:20), and 1 officer for 28 rank and file in the PoWAR light infantry (1:28). The average ratio is 1:20. By extension the number of officers in other units can be estimated.

Musician Estimates

British companies at the Cowpens were badly understrength. I'm assuming that there was not more than 1 musician per company. Following Babits, I'm further assuming that the detachment of the 16th Foot was organized as a single company, and that the 7th Foot was organized into four companies. The number of infantry and dragoon companies in the British Legion are based on records found on Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website.

Esimated Totals

British Regulars

16th Foot: ~44 men (41 rank and file, 2 officers, and 1 musician).

7th Foot: ~180 men (167 rank and file, 9 officers, and 4 musicians).

71st Foot (1st battalion): ~269 men (249 rank and file, 12 officers, and 8 musicians)

71st Foot (light infantry companies): ~75 men (69 rank and file, 4 officers and 2 musicians).

17th Light Dragoons: ~43 men (40 rank and file, 2 officers, and 1 musician).

Royal Artillery detachment: ~ 22 men (all rank and file).

Loyalists

British Legion Infantry: ~226 men (about 210 rank and file plus about 10 officers and 6 musicians).

British Legion Dragoons: ~258 men (about 241 rank and file, 12 officers and 5 musicians)

Prince of Wales American Regiment light infantry: ~29 men (28 rank and file, 1 officer, and 0 musicians).

Grand Totals

Total: 1,146 men of all ranks (1,067 rank and file, 52 officers, 27 musicians)

This total almost exactly matches the total of 1,150 men Morgan named.

Morgan said that the British claimed to have "fought" 1,037 during the battle. I'm assuming that this number was the total number of rank and file with Tarleton, minus the baggage detachment. The size of this detachment is unknown, however Mackenzie said that it was under the command of Ensign Fraser of the 71st. If the detachment was comprised of Ensign Fraser and 30 men then the total number of British present during the battle would be as follows:

Revised Total: 1,115 men of all ranks (1,037 rank and file, 51 officers, 27 musicians).

Tarleton and Mackenzie said the British force had 1,000 men. They were probably counting only rank and file that were on the battlefield.

American Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard wrote that at the climax of the battle, his 350 men were confronted by 800 Bitish. I show he was facing 814 men (1146 for the British overall - 31 men for the baggage detachment - 258 men for the British Legion dragoons - 43 men for the 17th Light Dragoons = 814) minus whatever losses the British sustained earlier in the battle).

American Major-General Nathanael Greene estimated that there were 50 Loyalist militiamen accompanying Tarleton's baggage train and presumably serving as drivers and/or guards. Tarleton probably also had a number of African Americans serving as drivers. Morgan recorded, in his after action report, the capture of "ten negroes." Tarleton mentioned having the service of Loyalist guides, but they were probably very few in number. Of these, South Carolina militaman Thomas Young encountered the Loyalists "Littlefield and Kelly" after the battle. Loyalist Captain Alexander Chesney scouted for Tarleton and participated at least during the late stages of the fighting.

The British Force in Miniature

(click to enlarge)

7th Foot (left) and 71st Foot (right)


British Legion infantry (left) and British Legion dragoons (right)


17th Light Dragoons (left) and light infantry companies (right)


Royal Artillery detachment (left) and baggage guard (right)

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of statements by Morgan, Mackenzie, Tarleton, Howard, and Greene.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has transcriptions of Tarleton's account, Mackenzie's Strictures, and other records pertaining to the British Legion.

François-Jean de Chastellux's (1787) Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782 is one place to find a copy of the British rank and file returns.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has Morgan's account of the battle as it appeared in a New Jersey newspaper.

Related: Cowpens in Miniature 1, Tarleton's Narrative, Cornwallis' Report