October 30, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 30th: The American medical service cannot cope with the sick; William Howe prepared to attack upper Manhattan and White Plains; Henry Clinton balked at Howe’s plans.

Previous entry: October 29th; next: October 31st.

The American army at White Plains grimly held on to their redoubts and trenches. The men continued to suffer from a lack of food, medicine, proper clothing, and all other materials necessary for an army’s survival.

The Americans had established a general hospital in a church in the town of North Castle, 9 miles to the northeast, but it was poorly staffed due to a shortage of physicians.

The head of the American medical service (Doctor John Morgan) later wrote:

“I cannot but feel for the hospital surgeons [at North Castle], who… were suddenly overwhelmed with numbers of sick sent to them, as well as the wounded … at a time when an engagement was considered as inevitable, there were few at hand to give aid… the wounded, who were conveyed to the hospitals, naturally demanded the attention of the whole body of surgeons, to administer aid to them.”

The sick, it seems, were largely left to the informal care of their comrades.

Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote, “Today it being rainy[,] Luke was taking not well[, and] I still being not well… we both set out for North Castle hospital… and we got within 4 miles of the hospital and put up for this night.” They slept in the woods and then completed the arduous journey, unaided, in the morning.

Doctor John Pine, who had recently joined Washington’s army, found that it was impossible to take care of the sick men from his native Maryland. He wrote that on the 29th:

“I waited on Doctor Morgan, Director-General of the hospitals here, for medicines, etc. He told me he had nothing to say to the Maryland troops, and that it was not his business to supply the regimental surgeons with medicines, and that it must have been a mistake [for Maryland]… to send their surgeons here without them and think they were to be supplied here.”

Dr. Pine then sought out Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion, who was 15 miles away and recuperating from two wounds (one in the arm, one in the hip) he received during the fighting on Chatterton’s Hill. Smallwood wrote a letter for the doctor which gave Pine a little leverage.

When Dr. Pine sought out Dr. Morgan again, he was told that “I might have some few things, if I could go to New-York for them”.

Pine was aghast:

“I told him by the time I went there and got back, that… most of the [sick] Maryland troops would be expired. He told me he could not help it, and that medicines were very hard to be got.”

After the battle of White Plains, Lieutenant-General William Howe deferred attacking the American army again partially because he did not like the strength of the American position and partially because he decided to wait for reinforcements. Once those reinforcements arrived, he planned on attacking Washington’s army. At the same time, he wanted Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen to attack the American forces in upper Manhattan.

According to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Knyphausen’s preparations went smoothly:

“[The Americans had] demolished the bridge at Kings Bridge and those called Dyckman’s bridge and Williams’ bridge. Lieutenant General von Knyphausen had them repaired and sent the Grenadier Battalion Köhler and Wutginau’s and Stern’s [i.e., von Stein’s] regiments across the river to encamp at places where they would be safe from the fire of the rebels’ batteries. The rest of his corps encamped behind Fort Independence”.

The Kingsbridge area, circa 1776 (click to enlarge). On October 30th, Knyphausen occupied Fort Independence and crossed some men into upper Manhattan.

Howe’s reinforcements reached him late in the day. Among these troops was the 46th Regiment of Foot. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham, later wrote:

“On the 30th of October we embarked at Hellgate, and after a passage of about thirty miles by water in flat-bottomed boats, we landed at New Rochelle, and immediately marched to join General Howe’s army at the White Plains.” [see footnote]

After the reinforcements arrived, Howe could see no cause for further delay. He had, it seems, accepted that a full-scale attack on the American works was necessary and inevitable. That night (10pm) he issued orders for the troops to be under arms at 5 am. In the ensuing attack, Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister would command the left division of the army, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right.

In the past, Howe typically consulted with Clinton about any major moves, but the campaign severely strained their relationship. Howe made his plans without Clinton’s input, and Clinton took the omission badly. Clinton later complained that “I received [the] orders late at night”, and protested that he was not ready to attack. In fact, Clinton had convinced himself there would be no further attacks on the American army, because he had previously argued against it. He then reminded Howe of his objections:

“I took the liberty of intimating to the Commander in Chief that it might prove rather hazardous to make any attack from center or right until we saw what would be the effect of one from the left… and that even then they [i.e., the attacks] ought to be pressed with caution, as the enemy had a very strong position in the gorges of the mountains behind them.”

Howe was already aware of these concerns and he ignored Clinton’s protests.

Footnote: Captain William Bamford (40th Foot) recorded in his journal that these reinforcements embarked on the 29th.

October 17, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 17th: Bad weather delayed the British move to Pell’s Point; William Smallwood commented on the sufferings of the American soldier.

Previous entry: October 16th; next: Morning of October 18th.

The British vanguard marched at 1 AM for the move to Pell’s Point. The move, however, was soon cancelled because of a storm. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company of the 10th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion) recorded in his journal that “very heavy rain, and high wind” “obliged us to return to our quarters at ½ after 3 o’clock [A.M.].”

Lieutenant-General William Howe decided to make the move on the 18th instead.

Lieutenant Tench Tilghman (one of Washington’s aides) was puzzled by the British inactivity:

“The enemy has made no move from Frog's Point. We may say the 17th October is come and nearly past without the predicted blow. The winds have not been favourable to pass Hell-Gate, where several of their transports are now laying; perhaps that may be the reason…. If we can but foil General Howe again, I think we knock him up for the campaign.”

Tilghman expected the British advance to be made overland from Throg’s Neck, not by water to the east; therefore, he was puzzled by the British inactivity. He was right, however, about the winds causing delays for the British.

Captain Frederick Mackenzie (23rd Regiment of Foot) commented on the slow movement of men and supplies from New York City to Throg’s Neck:

“The recruits lately arrived for those regiments which are with the army under General Howe, went though Hellgate this morning in flatboats. The ships with the Hessians [see footnote] cannot go through for want of a proper wind. Several ships with horses and wagons are detained for the same reason. The Senegal sloop of war got through this morning with much difficulty; she touched the shore several times but at last effected the passage with much labor and danger.”

This map illustrates the distribution of Washington’s army units in Westchester County on October 17, 1776 (click to enlarge). North is at the upper-right corner of the map. A part of the Hudson is at the top of the map, and a part of Long Island Sound is at the bottom. By the end of the day, four of Washington’s divisions were on the New York mainland (those of William Heath, John Sullivan, Charles Lee, and Joseph Spencer) as was Benjamin Lincoln's brigade of Massachusetts militia. The placement of the units on this map is inexact.

Washington’s army units were deployed with three objectives in mind:

• First, units were deployed to defend the crossings of the Bronx River (marked by the numbers 1-4). Glover’s brigade of Lee’s division was positioned in advance of these crossings near the town of East Chester. As long as the British were kept from crossing the Bronx, Washington had a secure connection with upstate New York and New England.
• Second, units were deployed to contain the British army on Throg’s Neck (partially visible at extreme lower left).
• Third, units were deployed to guard the shoreline between Throg’s Neck and Manhattan (off the map, at left).

The divisions of Israel Putnam and Nathanael Greene (not shown) defended upper Manhattan, and nearby Fort Constitution in New Jersey. Around this time, Fort Constitution was renamed Fort Lee, after the American general.

Spencer’s division was in a reserve position at Kingsbridge, where it could quickly move to reinforce American forces in either Westchester County or upper Manhattan.

Howe had wanted to land his forces at Pell's Point on this date (bottom of the map), but the move was delayed by bad weather.

On this quiet day, Colonel William Smallwood of the Maryland Battalion (McDougall’s brigade; Lee’s division), wrote about his misgivings with the army. He asserted that “Our Commander-in-Chief is an excellent man,” but he found much fault with the officers below Washington:

“Were our officers good, and our men well trained, it would be impossible [for the British] to effect their purpose…” but “there seems to be a total ignorance of and inattention to” the kind of military discipline “necessary to render an army formidable.” He argued that many of the officers essentially “train” their men “to run away” from the enemy, “and to make them believe they never can be safe unless under cover of an entrenchment… Discipline here is totally neglected, and yet after all it is the only bulwark in war. Had our troops been trained better, and worried less with the pick-axe and spade, by this time our army would have been in a condition to have sought for their enemies in turn.”

Smallwood also complained that the men were poorly fed, and that many were sick from “being often moved, and… exposed to lie on the cold ground… often lying without their tents for several nights”. He added, “We want medicine much; none can be had here. Our sick have [been] and are now suffering extremely.” “I foresee the evils arising from the shameful neglect… One good-seasoned and well-trained soldier, recovered to health, is worth a dozen new recruits, and [it] is often easier [to] get [a well-trained soldier] recovered than [it is] to get a recruit…”

But, Smallwood also saw glimmers of hope. He believed the British “are as much afraid and cautious of us, as we can be… of them”. He remarked also that all ranks in the army understood what was on the line: they must either “fight or starve and surrender at [British] discretion”.

Footnote: The Hessian reinforcement consisted of the Lieb Regiment, Regiment von Dittfurth, and Regiment Prinz Carl, which together formed a brigade under the command of Friedrich Wilhelm von Lossberg. These troops departed Staten Island on October 12th, but were still awaiting the opportunity to join Howe’s army.