October 29, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 29th: The Americans strengthened their position at White Plains while the armies skirmished; Knyphausen advanced to Kingsbridge, and Howe vacillated.

Previous entry: Evening of October 28; next: October 30th.

During the night, the American army at White Plains began moving their camps to a line of hills to the north. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Spencer’s division) wrote, “at 2 o’clock [AM] the troops in General Spencer’s division had orders to strike their tents and carry them out about one mile and an half by hand and then return to the lines [i.e., the fortifications at White Plains].” The troops then made the roundtrip again, this time carrying their camp kettles and other cooking utensils. It was hard work for the exhausted men. Trumbull wrote that many “had no sleep at all” “though they had been engaged almost all day [yesterday] with the enemy and had been obliged to wade through a river [the Bronx] and were very wet”. “I was afraid I should be sick for I had been in the river almost all over, and could not change [clothes]… [and] was much fatigued with the action… but I am today well and vigorous”. Trumbull praised God for seeing him safely through the battle, and wrote that this protection “lay me under new obligations to live wholly to God and to seek his honor and glory in the little time I have to live in the world”.

Joseph Plumb Martin, who was also in the 5th Connecticut, was not so fortunate. He recalled:

“During the night we remained in our new made trenches, the ground of which was in many parts springy; in that part where I happened to be stationed, the water, before morning, was nearly over [our] shoes, which caused many of us to take violent colds… I was one who felt the effects of it, and was… sent back to the baggage to get well again, if I could, for it was left to my own exertions to do it, and no other assistance was afforded me. I was not alone in my misery; there were a number in the same circumstances. When I arrived at the baggage, which was not more than a mile or two, I had the canopy of heaven for my hospital, and the ground for my hammock. I found a spot where the dry leaves had collected between the knolls; I made up a bed of these, and nestled in it, having no other friend present but the sun to smile upon me. I had nothing to eat or drink, not even water, and was unable to go after any myself, for I was sick indeed. In the evening, one of my messmates found me out, and soon after brought me some boiled hog’s flesh (it was not pork) and turnips, without either bread or salt. I could not eat it, but I felt obliged to him notwithstanding; he did all he could do—he gave me the best he had to give, and had to steal that, poor fellow;--necessity drove him to do it to satisfy the cravings of his own hunger, as well as to assist a fellow sufferer.”

Beginning in the morning and continuing throughout the day, the two armies skirmished.

For Captain Peter Kimball (Stickney’s New Hampshire militia regiment), it was a tense day:

“we lay on our arms. The enemy appeared all round on every hill[,] the riflemen [were] firing on their guards. One of the riflemen [was] killed this day and at night our guard was alarmed. Another fired and killed Captain Buntin.”

Matters were no easier for the British light infantry across the way. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) noted:

“I had a very troublesome picket, at the entrance of the village[;] at daylight my sentries were fired on which continued by popping shots all day. I had one man wounded”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General William Howe had an enormously difficult decision to make. He had at last caught up with Washington’s army, but he loathed sending his troops against the Americans’ entrenchments. Although he was sure he could carry these works, he believed the assault would lead to the death of many of his men and produce little strategic gain.

The obvious alternative was to force the Americans from their trenches by threatening their flank. He later stated that this was his preference:

“I do not hesitate to confess, that if I could by any manoeuvre remove an enemy from a very advantageous position, without hazarding the consequences of an attack, where the point to be carried was not adequate to the loss of men to be expected… I should certainly adopt that cautionary conduct, in the hopes of meeting my adversary upon more equal terms.”

But on this occasion, Howe was unable to find a low-risk way of turning the Americans’ flank. Thus Howe was left with the unpalatable choices of either making a bloody frontal assault, or retreating.

Howe vacillated. His official excuse for not attacking was that the situation at White Plains had changed and that he now needed more men. He later explained:

“The enemy drew back their encampment on the night of the 28th, and observing their lines next morning much strengthened by additional works, the designed attack upon them was deferred, and the 4th brigade, left with Lord Percy, with two battalions of the 6th brigade were ordered to join the army.” [see footnote]

Curiously, when pressed by Parliament several years later to explain his conduct at White Plains, Howe mysteriously claimed that “I have political reasons, and no other, for declining to explain why that assault was not made”.

To the west, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen continued his operation against upper Manhattan. First he detached Major General Martin Conrad Schmidt with regiments von Wissenbach and von Huyne to hold Valentine’s Hill. Then he proceeded with grenadiere battalion Köhler and regiments Wutginau, von Stein, and Buenau to Kingsbridge.

Footnote: The 4th brigade consisted of the 17th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot. The two regiments drawn from the 6th brigade were the 44th and 64th regiments of foot. The 6th brigade had been encamped near Mamaroneck since October 25th.

October 27, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 27th: Synopsis for October 27: Hugh Percy made a feint at Fort Washington; Waldeckers were ambushed near Mamaroneck; the British planned a move to White Plains.

Previous entry: October 26th; next: Morning of October 28.

On October 18, Lieutenant-General William Howe cut one of the main supply lines of the American forces in Manhattan (the Boston Post Road). Not long after, George Washington pulled his army away from Manhattan, and took a strong post at the town of White Plains, New York. Howe, meanwhile, established a base for his army at New Rochelle, brought up reinforcements, examined the countryside, and made plans to battle the American army.

Howe’s battle plan came to consist of two main parts. First, his army would attack Washington’s men at White Plains. Second, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knypahusen’s recently arrived Hessian division would advance on upper Manhattan from the north. Although Washington had pulled out of Manhattan, some men were left behind to garrison Fort Washington and the other defensive works in upper Manhattan.

The twin advance was scheduled to begin on the 28th. To draw attention away from Knyphausen’s advance, Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy had orders to make a feint at Fort Washington from the south on the 27th. It was hoped he might also seize some of the Americans’ defensive works in the process.

Percy took with him six British regiments (the 10th, 17th, 37th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot), and two Hessian regiments from Stirn’s brigade. The troops advanced in line of battle with the Hessians on the left, and the British regulars on the right. Percy later wrote:

“I approached… with caution, for I had not force enough to attack them. By the time I had advanced within random musket shot [range], their [defensive] lines (three in number) were all completely manned… As our moving forward did not make them evacuate their works, I tried what a few shots from six-pounders and shells from two howitzers would do”.

The shot and shell had little effect: “they were too well secured by their parapets.”

American defenses in upper Manhattan (click to enlarge). Upper Manhattan is bounded on the left by Hudson's River and on the right by the Harlem River. Fort Washington appears at the top of the image; below the fort are three defensive lines spanning the width of the island. On October 27th, Percy's men skirmished with American forces defending the first (lowermost) line. The troop movements shown on this map pertain to a later engagement (the assault on Fort Washington on November 16, 1776).

Charles Lefferts illustration of drummers and infantrymen of the 10th Regiment of Foot.

Percy observed that the Americans brought cannon down to their lines, and he “retired with the main body about halfway between their works and ours.” Soon, he added, “The rebels… began to cannonade us”. This fire, however, was not very dangerous: “Their cannon were so ill pointed, that tho' they fired annoyingly at us, they hit nobody.” Nevertheless, he noted, “I retired a little out of reach.” Percy’s men then encamped for the evening.

While these movements took place on land, the frigates Repulse and Pearl advanced up Hudson’s River. Soon the vessels began to be bombarded by the guns from Fort Washington and Fort Lee (the renamed Fort Constitution).

Major-General Nathanael Greene boasted about the battering the Repulse received:

“Colonel [Robert] Magaw got down an eighteen-pounder and fired sixty shot at her, twenty-six of which went into her. She slipped her cable and left her anchor, and was towed off by four boats. I think we must have killed a considerable number of their men, as the confusion and distress exceeded all description.”

Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, acknowledged that “Many shots were thrown into the Repulse, and some into the Pearl”. However, he heard that “no men [were] killed in either, and only one man's leg broke on board the Repulse.”

Percy’s losses were also modest: five were killed or wounded in the 37th Foot; two in the 10th Foot, and three among the Hessians.

Greene stated that one man “was killed by a shell that fell upon his head” and that Major Andrew Colburn (Knowlton’s Rangers) was wounded.

The British made light of the whole affair. Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham of the 46th Foot wrote that “Lord Percy very properly called it ‘the little excursion.’”

Closer to White Plains, the British sent out parties to reconnoiter. Archibald Robertson noted that he accompanied William Erskine on another expedition to the Mile Square area. He was surprised that “We returned [to that area] without firing a shot… as the enemy might have suspected our intention of occupying these heights.” Instead, according to Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Erskine “brought back nine prisoners and the assurance that all the rebels had left this part of the country and gone to White Plains”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton was ordered, as he later wrote, “to take out a part of the army to reconnoiter” the American position at White Plains. Clinton made a cursory effort, turned around, and gave Howe a discouraging report: “I suspected that the enemy’s lines at the White Plains shouldered to the Bronx and to the mountains, whereby their flanks were safe and their retreat practicable when[ever] they pleased.” He concluded, “[I] could not from what I saw recommend a direct attack”.

Howe could not have been pleased either with the incomplete information or the lack of support for his plans.

American scouting parties were also active. Baurmeister noted that one party attacked some men from the Waldeck Regiment:

“Eighteen men of this regiment went marauding in the region around Mamaroneck, where they were surprised and attacked by forty rebels and disarmed. One subaltern and twelve soldiers were captured and hurriedly sent away. Two men remained on the field, wounded.”

October 10, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 10th: Gunning Bedford described life in the American army; the Americans feared the British would seize key points on the Hudson; William Howe prepared for the move to Throg’s Point.

Previous entry: October 9th; next: October 11th.

The passage of the British ships up the Hudson on the 9th alarmed the American army. Once it became clear that no major movement was afoot, the officers and men returned to their usual routine. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford (the Delaware Regiment) described the situation of the army on this date:

“We are strengthening our [defensive] lines,--the enemy are also busy with theirs. Our duty continues hard, having the lines to man every morning before day, and they are a mile and a half from here, and [we have] a great deal of other duty… many of our men have deserted to the enemy, though none from our regiment... [British] deserters say the enemy are apprehensive of an attack from us. They all, likewise, say they are healthy, and their army strong,--above thirty thousand… Our army is very sickly yet. We have one hundred and forty of our regiment unfit for duty. We have neither hospitals nor medicines for them, which makes them suffer much… Our army seems in good spirits, and we think our lines are secure, if they should be attempted.”

Although the British vessels on the Hudson posed no immediate threat to the American army, their presence was suggestive of Britain’s longer-term plans. Writing from the town of Fishkill, the New York Committee of Safety described to George Washington their fears that British vessels, acting in conjunction with local Loyalists, would take control of key points on the river:

“Nothing can be more alarming than the present situation of our state; we are daily getting the most authentic intelligence of bodies of men [i.e., Loyalists] enlisted and armed in order to assist the enemy[.] We much fear that they[,] cooperating with the enemy may seize such passes as will cut off all communication, between the army and us and prevent your supplies.”

This map (click to enlarge) shows the lower Hudson River, which was a primary route for the flow of men and materials to and from Washington’s army. On October 9th, a handful of British vessels successfully passed Fort Washington (4) and Fort Constitution (5) and took post in a wide stretch of the Hudson’s River near Dobb’s Ferry (7) and Tarrytown (8). The Americans had previously begun construction on Fort Montgomery (10) to defend one vital chokepoint on the river, but other points seemed vulnerable, such as Stony Point (9) and West Point (11).

The painting is Dominic Serres’ depiction of the frigates Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar passing, on October 9th, between the American batteries in and around Fort Constitution (left) and Fort Washington (right).

The Americans were well aware that their supply lines extending north and east of Manhattan were also vulnerable. Although they had no forts to control the shoreline (like they did on the Hudson), the Americans were at least aided by geography: British vessels moving troops into Long Island Sound would have to pass through a treacherous passageway known as Hell Gate.

Colonel George Weedon (3rd Virginia Regiment) wrote with amazement that the British kept a vessel anchored in this passage: “at this time a 28 gun frigate lays in Hellgate, a place not much wider than the streets of Williamsburg, [Virginia]”

Lieutenant-General William Howe had in fact decided to move his entire army through this passage and land on Throg’s Point (cf. October 8, 1776). At this time he was attending to the details of this operation. In brief, the British occupied several posts in the New York City area: the lower half of Manhattan, western Long Island, Staten Island, Paulus Hook on the New Jersey shore, and a couple of islands in New York’s East River. Howe decided to largely strip these posts of troops, although on Manhattan Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy would be left with three brigades of British troops and one of Hessians.

Howe’s force would consist, at first, of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th brigades of British regulars, the British Reserve (three battalions of British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the brigade of Guards, one brigade of Hessian grenadiers, one brigade of Hessian musketeers and fusiliers, three battalions of light infantry, two battalions of the 71st Foot, some light dragoons, the Hessian jaegers, and a couple of recently formed Loyalist corps.

Howe expected to receive substantial reinforcements while the campaign was underway, including an entire division of Hessian troops that was then crossing the Atlantic. In addition, Percy would be able to release some of his men to Howe if and when Washington pulled back from Manhattan.

The exact timing of these decisions was unrecorded, but by this time the British were nearly ready for the offensive to begin. On this date the army was issued 6 days’ worth of provisions (a sure sign that a move was imminent) and they were ordered to “dress” these provisions on the 11th.