On the Origins of the Defense in Depth

At the battle of Guilford Courthouse, the American army deployed in a formation quite unlike those traditionally used by European armies. The American commander, Major-General Nathanael Greene, drew his men up in three successive lines that were designed to attrite the attacking British army. First, the British would be confronted by a line of North Carolina militia, then by a line of Virginia militia, and then finally by a line of Maryland and Virginia Continentals.

Three American Lines at Guilford Courthouse (based on the "Haldane" map).

An obvious inspiration for this deployment was that used by Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan at the battle of Cowpens, 2 months earlier. However, Guilford Courthouse and Cowpens were hardly the first time that such a deployment was used during the war. A less elaborate version of this strategy was employed on numerous occasions, including at the battles of Long Island, White Plains, Brandywine, and Freeman's Farm. On each of these occasions, the Americans dispatched a strong force to wear down the advancing British before the British could attack the Americans’ main defensive line. On Long Island, for example, the advanced force was placed on a rocky, wooded spine well in advance of the American fortifications at Brooklyn. However, the British were able to outflank this force and inflict a major defeat on the Americans. Conversely, at Freeman's Farm the advanced American party brought the British advance to a standstill, and the main line was never seriously threatened.

The battles of Long Island and Freeman's Farm are relatively well known. Below is a description of how the Americans used this strategy at the lesser-known battle of White Plains, New York (October 28, 1776).

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George Washington’s army entrenched at White Plains, New York, after having been driven from Manhattan. The British army advanced on his position in two columns. Washington detached a handful of regiments to harry their advance.

The party confronting the left British column included the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions. At the head of the opposing British column was the 2nd Jäger company, the 3rd battalion of light infantry, and half of the 17th Light Dragoons.

In brief, the Americans used stone walls as impromptu breastworks from which they fired on the head of the advancing British column. The British then halted, brought up some field pieces, and fired on the Americans from outside of musket range. The Americans were finally forced to retreat when their flank was threatened. The advanced party prolonged the fight as long as it could, but unlike Cowpens or Guilford Courthouse, they were unable to inflict serious losses on the British. [1]

Here are several descriptions of this incident:

Colonel William Douglas (commander of the 5th Connecticut State Battalion):

I was ordered out with my regiment [and] with three others to meet and endeavor to retard their [the British] march. We moved on and at about twelve were attacked by their advanced guard. We drove them back but soon after the main body came on and we stood them until they got on our flank and I ordered a retreat. We had a most severe fire to retreat under, ten men to our one, but we came off in good order and very surely fired on our retreat all the way. I lost three dead and five wounded. They cut my regiment off from our main body and got ahead of me but I took advantage of a wood and got clear of them. [2]

Colonel Gold Silliman (commander of the 1st Connecticut State Battalion):

... Yesterday about 10 o'clock in the morning we had news that the enemy were approaching, when I with my regiment & 3 others were ordered out about 1 1/2 miles below our lines to take post on a hill to gall them in their march as they advanced. We accordingly took our post & mine & one other regiment had the advantage of a stone wall right in front at which we had been waiting but little time before the enemy came up within 6 or 8 rods,--when our men rose from behind the wall, poured in a most furious fire.

The enemy retreated & came on several times & were so hotly received every time that finally we drove them off from the hill. We killed some they did not carry off & some they did.

I had not one either killed or wounded. On this the enemy were coming upon us with a number of field pieces & as we had none there to meet them with, we were ordered to retreat over West on to another Hill [Chatterton's] & join another party of men & accordingly did it & formed a line of battle. [2]

Captain Johann Ewald (commander, 2nd Jäger Company):

The army had marched scarcely two hours when the left column encountered an advanced corps of the enemy, which I had to engage supported by the light infantry. The area was intersected by hills, woods, and marshes, and every field was enclosed with a stone wall. This enemy corps had taken a stand behind the stone walls on the steep hills between two plantations. Several guns were set up on the main road at some distance, which were covered by cavalry. General Heister [commander of the left British column] immediately mounted a battery on the main road and cannonaded the enemy, who withdrew to his own lines behind a creek with high banks and deployed upon the steep hills. [3]

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Notes:

1. The actions involving the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions are fairly well described in the sources that I’ve encountered. Douglas’ and Silliman’s account suggest that there were other units on hand, but do not name them. As far as I’ve been able to deduce (my reading and research on this battle is not exhaustive), these two units were accompanied by Sage’s 3rd Connecticut State Battalion and Selden’s 4th Connecticut State Battalion, neither of which distinguished itself in this fight. The right British column was led by the 1st Jäger Company, half of the 16th Light Dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd battalions of light infantry (according to Ewald). At a minimum, some Pennsylvania riflemen were dispatched to resist their advance. There may have been other American units present too, but frankly I’m unsure (it is difficult to identify, for several American regiments reporting casualties, where those losses occurred).

As mentioned by Douglas, the British cut off the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions from the American main line. Therefore, they retreated in a westerly direction (towards their right) and took up position alongside a hodgepodge of other American units on Chatterton’s Hill. The British left column was then sent to attack this position, and the subsequent assault is what is usually described when historians write about the battle of White Plains. (That is, the fight by the advanced parties has received comparatively little attention).

2. The Long Island Historical Society. (1878). The campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn.

3. Joseph P. Tustin (1979). Diary of the American War: A Hessian journal. Captain Johann Ewald.

To Quebec: Triumph and Tragedy (2)

This is the final post in the series on the Montreal campaign of 1775. The previous post can be found here; an index to all posts can be found here.

Battle of Quebec

Quebec was one of the most readily defended cities in North America. Its “lower town” was built on a narrow terrace between a high cliff and the wide St. Lawrence. Its “upper town” was perched at the top of the cliff and surrounded by 25-foot thick stone walls. A narrow winding road connected the two parts of the city.

An American army camped on the outskirts of the city in early December. Its commanders were Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery and Colonel Benedict Arnold. Somehow these men had to take Quebec if they were to complete the conquest of Canada. They also knew that the attack would have to be made quickly because many of the men’s enlistments would expire at the end of the month. Somehow also, the attack would have to succeed despite the fact that the British defenders outnumbered the attackers by a fair margin (the Americans had about 1,000 men; the British, led by Governor Guy Carleton, had around 1,800).

The Americans tried a variety of stratagems: they tried bluffing the garrison into surrendering, luring the garrison from the city walls, and wearing the garrison down by bombardment and sniper fire. When these efforts failed, they mounted a predawn assault, in a snowstorm, on December 31.

Montgomery wanted to deceive the British as to where the assault would be made. In advance he had hundreds of scaling ladders constructed, so as to convince the British that a frontal assault was planned. On the morning of the attack, John Brown’s provincials and James Livingston’s 1st Canadian regiment feinted against the city wall, so as to hold the attention of the garrison.

Montgomery’s main attack was made against Quebec’s lower town. To maximize the possibility of success, both ends of the lower town were to be assaulted at the same time. Montgomery led a column of New York Continentals from the west, while Arnold led a mixed force from the east (specifically, Continentals from New England, riflemen from Virginia and Pennsylvania, and Lamb’s New York artillery company). Lanterns were set up to light the assembly points, and signal rockets were used to coordinate the attacks.

Despite these careful preparations, the attack was a fiasco.

Circled areas show the approximate area where each American commander made his attack (click to enlarge).

The British were not deceived by the feints against the city walls.

At the western entrance to the lower town, Montgomery’s column encountered a two-storey blockhouse armed with four cannon. Despite a stealthy advance, the vanguard was detected and annihilated. Montgomery was struck in the head and killed instantly; 12 others died around him. The wet weather made it difficult to operate firearms, and the rest of the column, horrified by the death of their commander and facing what appeared to be an insurmountable barrier, decided to retreat.

Arnold’s column was first observed as it passed under the city walls en route to the east end of the lower town. Arnold was hit in the ankle while leading the column, but the men pressed on without him. The barrier they faced was not as formidable as the one confronting Montgomery’s men. Here, two cannon had been placed on an elevated platform. A wall in front blocked the street. Once the cannons fired, the Americans rushed forward with scaling ladders, mounted the platform, and captured the defenders. (In the lead was one Captain Daniel Morgan of Virginia, who would end the war a brigadier-general and an American hero).

By the time the Americans had reorganized on the far side of this barrier, British reinforcements from the upper town had taken up positions at a second street barrier and in the buildings around it. The Americans became pinned down trying to force this point. Worse, some of the British retook the first barrier and cut off their escape. Many of these men were killed and more than 400 captured.

Afterwards, the remnants of the American army maintained a grim blockade of the city. Some reinforcements would arrive that winter and spring, but any real hope of taking Quebec was gone.

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Some passages by participants

Captain Thomas Ainslie (British militia) on the feint attack:

“About 4 o clock in the Morning Capt: Malcom Fraser of the Royal Emigrants being on his rounds, saw many flashes of fire without hearing any reports; the sentries inform 'd him that they had perceived them for some time on the heights of Abraham, the sentinels between Port Louis & Cape Diamond had seen fix'd lights like lamps in a street--these appearances being very uncommon & the night favouring the designs of the enemy, Capt: Fraser order 'd the Guards and Pickets on the ramparts to stand to their arms. The drums beat, the bells rang the alarm, & in a few minutes the whole Garrison was under arms--even old men of seventy were forward to oppose the attackers.

“Two Rockets sent by the enemy from the foot of Cape Diamond were immediately followed by a heavy & hot fire from a body of men posted behind a rising ground within eighty yards of the wall, at Cape Diamond, the flashes from their muskets made their heads visible--their bodies were cover 'd: we briskly returned the fire directed by theirs--at this moment a body of men supposed to be Canadians appear 'd in St Johns suburbs,--& the enemy threw shells into town from St Roc.” [1]

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Caldwell (British militia) on the repulse of Montgomery’s attack:

“In the mean time, Montgomery made his attack at Près-de-Ville… He got past some pickets… but the post was much stronger than, I believe, he imagined, and defended by four cannons there and a 4-pounder; they were served by some seamen under the orders of the master of the transport; his name was Barnsfare. The guard was under the command of a Canadian officer of Militia; the men, Canadians and British, mixed, Barnsfare declared he would not fire till he was sure of doing execution, and with the utmost coolness, waited till the enemy came within his view, at about 30 yards distance, where they received a general discharge from the cannon and musketry. Nothing but groans were heard, and the rebels immediately retired…” [2]

Private Abner Stocking (American Continental) on Arnold’s attack:

“[Arnold] led the forlorn hope in person, and was followed by Captain Lamb with his company of artillery, and a field piece mounted on a sled. Close in the rear of the artillery was the main body, in front of which was Morgan’s company of riflemen… In this order Arnold advanced with the utmost intrepidity… against the battery. The alarm was immediately given, and the fire on his flank commenced [i.e., plunging fire from the walls of the upper town], which, however, did not prove very destructive. As he approached the barrier [to the lower town] he received a musket ball in the leg which shattered the bone, and he was carried off the field to the hospital. Morgan rushed forward to the battery at the head of his company, and received from one of the [cannon] pieces, almost at its mouth, a discharge of grape shot which killed only one man. A few rifles were immediately fired into the embrasures, by which a British soldier was wounded in the head, and the barricade being instantly mounted with the aid of ladders… the battery was deserted without discharging the other gun. The captain of the guard, with the greater number of his men, fell into the hands of the Americans…”

“We had now passed the first barrier; but a second we knew was before us and not far distant. We had no pilot and the night was very dark and dismal. We took shelter from the fury of the storm under the sides of some of the buildings and waited for day light to direct us. At the dawn of day we collected in a body, seized the ladders and were proceeding to the second barrier, when we were hailed by a Captain Anderson [British] who had just issued from the gate with a body of troops to attack us. Captain Morgan who led our little band… answered the British captain by a ball through his head, his soldiers drew him within the barricade and closed the gate; a tremendous fire from the windows of the buildings and port holes of the wall, was directed against our little host.”

“Thirty of our privates being killed and thirty five wounded, and surrounded as we were on all sides without any hope of relief, we were obliged to surrender ourselves prisoners of war.” [3]

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Note:

1. Journal of Thomas Ainslie.

2. Henry Caldwell's account of the battle.

3. Journal of Abner Stocking.

New Research on Cowpens

Recently, I’ve come across new evidence about how the British force was deployed at the onset of the fateful battle of Cowpens. This evidence has convinced me that the deployment that I described last year (and which is the same as appears in histories of the battle) is likely in error.

To the best of my knowledge, every published description of the British deployment at Cowpens has followed Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s account. None have suggested there is reason to doubt the accuracy of his description. Consider the weight of evidence described below and ask yourself a) whether the question of how the British deployed should be regarded as settled, and b) whether Tarleton’s description is most likely the correct one.

Below is a listing of the earliest descriptions of the British deployment at Cowpens, followed by two different representations of the deployment in miniature.

Lieutenant Harry Calvert, on or shortly after January 17, 1781:

Comments: Calvert was not present at the battle but he evidently spoke with men that had been present, and he summarized their discussion in his journal. Mark Urban summarized Calvert's take on Cowpens in Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution. According to Urban:

"As one fugitive after another wandered into the British camp, Calvert pierced together the story of what had gone wrong. Tarleton, as was his custom, had hurled his troops into action before they were all up, and the 71st had advanced towards their enemy, taking significant losses from enemy sharpshooters as they went" (p 226).

Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, January 18, 1781:

Comments: Cornwallis was not present at the battle but he spoke with Tarleton shortly afterward. Cornwallis briefly summarized the British deployment in a letter to his superior, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton. He did not describe the relative positioning of the various units aside from identifying them with a front line or with a reserve.

“The attack was begun by the first Line of Infantry, consisting of the 7th Regiment, the Infantry of the Legion & Corps of Light Infantry annexed to it; & Troop of Cavalry was placed on each Flank: the 1st Battalion of the 71st, and the Remainder of the Cavalry, formed the reserve.”

Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, January 19, 1781:

Comments: Morgan was an eyewitness writing about the event shortly afterwards. He reportedly rode up to the front line before the battle began where (presumably) he could clearly observe how the British were deploying. Because a number of British officers were later made prisoners, he also had the opportunity to question them at length about their numbers, battle plan, etc. The following passage is from his official report of the battle.

“The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front moved two pieces of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line.”

Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, February 21, 1781:

Comments: Baurmeister was not present at Cowpens, but he recorded a description of the battle in his journal. Apparently, one or more paroled British officers that had returned to Charleston, South Carolina, described the battle to James Wemyss, a major in the 63rd Foot. Wemyss, who was recuperating from a wound, soon after departed for New York where he described his second-hand information to officers there. In this way, Baurmeister learned of the battle. Baurmeister’s description of the British deployment is strikingly similar to that in Morgan’s report. However, Wemyss’ description, rather than Morgan’s report, seems to have been the source of Baurmeister’s description. Baurmeister’s account shows a poor understanding of the American side of the battle. For example, Baurmeister wrote that it was the "the Georgia volunteers" that broke the British line and captured the cannon; he made no mention of the Maryland and Delaware Continentals. This is the kind of error that might be expected if Baurmeister got his information from Wemyss, who in turn got it from an officer in the battle -- not the kind of error that would occur if Baurmeister was restating Morgan’s published report. Baurmeister's description of the British deployment also differs from Morgan's in several minor respects.

“Believing that he had forced General Morgan to retreat and that his force was superior to the rebels', he [Tarleton] went in search of General Morgan on the 17th of January. He found him in battle formation at the Cowpens, close to the Pacolet River. Colonel Tarleton had to defend himself as well as he could in a space of four hundred yards. He posted the 7th Regiment on his right, the 1st Battalion of the 71st on his left, and the dismounted Legion in the center. His dragoons covered the flanks… in front of the left wing of the 7th Regiment he had two light fieldpieces.

“The British attack was too furious for the enemy's right wing—nothing withstood the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment….”

Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, 1787:

Comments: Tarleton issued the orders for the British deployment and observed their execution. He wrote about the event approximately 6 years later in his history of the southern campaign of the American Revolution.

“Tarleton desired the British infantry to disencumber themselves of every thing, except their arms and ammunition: The light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line: The legion infantry were added to their left; and, under the fire of a three-pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to advance within three hundred yards of the enemy. This situation. being acquired, the 7th regiment was commanded to form upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th: A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps, who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and threaten the flanks of the enemy: The 1st battalion of the 71st was desired to extend a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near two hundred cavalry, composed the reserve.”

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Two different conceptions of the British deployment at Cowpens appear below. (For information on the deployment of American forces in the background, see The Militia Line at Cowpens, The Main Line at Cowpens: Organization, The Americans Deploy). Each miniature represents approximately 20 combatants. The two British guns are represented by a single piece. Per Tarleton's account (and what was likely standard practice), the infantry are in open order [cf. Modeling Notes]. The flags are carried by the 7th Foot; the British Legion infantry is clothed in green [cf. British Legion Redux]. Not all of the British Legion dragoons can be seen in these images.

Banastre Tarleton's Description of the British Deployment at Cowpens. The front line consists of (from left to right), a troop of dragoons, the 7th Foot, a contingent of Royal Artillery, the British Legion infantry, a contingent of light infantry, and a troop of dragoons. The 71st Foot and the greater part of the British Legion dragoons are in reserve.

Alternative Conception of the British Deployment at Cowpens. The British line is anchored on either end by a troops of dragoons (Baurmeister, Tarleton). The 71st Foot is on the left of the British line where it is close enough to the front to participate in the attack on the American militia (Calvert, Morgan, Baurmeister), but far enough from the front where it can be called accurately a reserve (Cornwallis, Tarleton). With the 71st is part of the light infantry (Morgan). The center of the line consists of the British Legion infantry (Morgan, Baurmeister), and the right consists of the 7th Foot (Morgan, Baurmeister), supported by the remainder of the light infantry (Morgan). A contingent of Royal Artillery is in advance of the infantry (Morgan, Baurmeister). The greater part of the British Legion dragoons are in reserve (Cornwallis, Morgan, Baurmeister, Tarleton).

Cowpens Historiography

Last year when I wrote about the battle of Cowpens, the approach I took was to track down and read (virtually) every primary source on the battle, identify how the accounts appear best to fit together, and then write a revisionitic account of the battle based on that analysis of the source material. Repeatedly, during this process, I was struck by the disconnect I found between participants' reminiscences and what is stated in published histories. Indeed, I developed the nagging feeling that Cowpens must be one of the most misdescribed battles in American history.

Recently I took a comparative look at what authors have had to say about Cowpens over the past 200 years. One might expect that within that time, accounts of Cowpens, while problematic in some respects, would at least have improved. Errors appearing in early accounts would be detected and omitted from later histories.

To examine this question, I compared 20 relatively detailed accounts of the battle of Cowpens on certain fine points of the battle. (The 20 accounts are far fewer than the total number that has been published, but the selection, listed at the bottom of this post, is representative). Below I summarize my findings in respect to one aspect of the battle: the deployment of the American militia line and skirmishers.

The most trustworthy description of the battle is the detailed report of the American commander, Daniel Morgan, written just 2 days after the event. In regards to the American deployement, he wrote:

“An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton [the British commander] had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them... The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of the brave and valuable Col. Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the line [i.e., the Continentals], one hundred and fifty yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front, Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolinans, were posted on the right of Maj. McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Maj. Cunningham. Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta [Virginia] riflemen, to support the right of the line.

“The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps… [a detailed description of the British deployment then follows].

“The [British] disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy…” [for the full account, see here].

Note the following assertions in this excerpt:

1. The militia was deployed so as “to guard the flanks” of the Continentals posted behind them.

2. The left flank was guarded by Cunningham, Hay, and McCall. The right flank was guarded by McDowell, Brannon, and Thomas.

3. “Small parties of riflemen,” or skirmishers, were detached from the militia line after the British had deployed (or at least after they had begun to deploy).

There is little reason to doubt these assertions. Surely Morgan, a man whose military genius has been widely praised, was able to accurately describe how the battle had been fought 2 days afterwards. Moreover, comparison with descriptions of the battle by other participants shows a high degree of agreement with Morgan's account (see The Militia Line at Cowpens, "Bring on the Battle", Fighting on the Skirmish Line).

Below I describe how well these three facts are represented in the 20 accounts.

1. The militia was deployed so as “to guard the flanks” of the Continentals posted behind them.

• States this: Bearss (see references below).
• Doesn’t state this: Everyone else.
• Trend: Published histories of the battle have almost always neglected this important point. Babits is the one author in this review to give a reason for contradicting Morgan. He claimed that Morgan was describing a temporarily formation adopted at 8pm on the evening before the battle. However, Morgan's report very plainly states that this formation was adopted on the morning of the battle and offers no suggestion that a change in formation occurred before the first shot was fired.

2. The left flank was guarded by Cunningham, Hay, and McCall. The right flank was guarded by McDowell, Brannon, and Thomas.

• States this: Bearss. Graham, Scharf, Davis, and Babits had these units on the sides of the battlefield indicated by Morgan, although they didn't state that the units were being used to provide flank protection.
• States something different: Johnson reversed the relative position of Cunningham and McDowell. McCrady evidently copied Johnson's mistake.
• Trend: Johnson's error seemingly was caught and corrected. Most accounts do not name these units or identify their relative position.

3. “Small parties of riflemen,” or skirmishers, were detached from the militia line after the British had deployed (or at least begun to deploy).

• States this: Davis.
• Doesn’t state this: Everyone else.
• Trend: Published histories of the battle have almost always failed to describe this facet of the battle. Early accounts were at least somewhat ambiguous as to when the skirmishers were deployed. Recent accounts tend to baldly state that Morgan deployed his militia in two distinct lines in front of his Continentals and that they were in this position before the British arrived.

Summary: Most accounts of the battle either get the same details right or they get the same details wrong. The errors that appeared in earlier accounts are eventually corrected (I'm thinking in particular of the histories by Bearss and Davis), but fascinatingly, later authors either do not notice or choose to ignore these corrections.

Based on this finding, it would appear that authors writing about Cowpens rely more on secondary accounts than primary sources. In some individual cases, this is quite obvious:

Christopher Ward (1952): "About one hundred and fifty yards in front, 300 North and South Carolina militia under Pickens were posted in open order in a thin line three hundred yards long. In front of them, at a similar interval, 150 picked riflemen, Georgians and North Carolinians under Major John Cunningham of Georgia and Major Charles McDowell of North Carolina were thrown out in line as sharpshooters."

Lee Patrick Anderson (2002): "About one hundred and fifty yards in front of the main line, 300 North and South Carolina militia under Pickens were posted in open order in a thin line three hundred yards long. In front of them, at a similar interval, 150 hand picked riflemen; Georgians and North Carolinians under Major John Cunningham of Georgia and Major Charles McDowell of North Carolina were literally thrown out in a line as sharpshooters."

Christopher Ward (1952): "After two volleys they were to retire slowly, firing at will, and fall into the spaces in the second line of militia."

Lee Patrick Anderson (2002): "After three volleys they were to retire, slowly, firing at will as they retreated, and fall into spaces in the second line of militia."

(How pathetic).

However, it would be misleading to suggest that most new authors are simply borrowing the ideas of others because there is a host of contradictory statements to be found across secondary accounts. These histories differ, for example, as to how many volleys the militia was to fire before retreating, whether the militia was primarily made up of good soldiers or bad, whether the skirmishers were given detailed instructions or none at all, and whether the skirmishers fought alongside the main body of militia or whether they kept apart. Leaving aside the question of which statements are accurate, the lack of agreement in these cases further shows that inaccuracies are commonplace (only one side can be accurate).

All-in-all, this strikes me as a very bad state of affairs.

So here is a thought question, and if you've made it this far through a very long post, I encourage you to leave a response in comments. Which of the following positions seems to you to be more true?

History writing is getting worse:

• History is of broad interest but most of the consumers of historical writing are, in some respects, poor judges of the quality of a written work (they lack the expertise to detect errors in fact or reasoning). This is problematic because history writing is increasingly done not by scholars but by pop-historians. The contingencies that govern this type of writing are unfavorable to spending a significant amount of time in research. Authors make the most money when they churn out books relatively quickly. This combination of factors leads authors to borrow heavily from other authors rather than consult the source material at every turn. Over time, historical works grow further and further removed from the source material, and the public is given an increasingly distorted view of the past.

History writing is getter better:

• One does not have to look very hard to find errors in history books written for a mass audience, but this is irrelevant so long as the essential facts are correct. People read these books primarily for entertainment purposes, and if they are sufficiently entertained, they may be encouraged to delve into the field more deeply to learn about "what really happened." Meanwhile, a community of people exists that makes a serious study of history and that is working towards a more accurate understanding of the past. Progress may not be smooth or linear, but in time it does occur.

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The 20 accounts I compared are:

William Gordon. (1801). The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the Independence of...

David Ramsay. (1811). The History of the American Revolution. Vol 2.

Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department...

William Johnson. (1822). Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene...

William Gilmore Simms. (1840). The History of South Carolina…

James Graham. (1856). The Life of General Daniel Morgan…

Henry B. Dawson. (1858). Battles of the United States… Vol. 1.

Henry Beebee Carrington. (1876). Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781.

John Thomas Scharf. (1879). History of Maryland...

Edward McCrady. (1902). The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783.

Christopher Ward. (1952). The War of the Revolution. Vol. 2.

Burke Davis. (1962). The Cowpens-Guilford Courthouse Campaign.

Edwin Bearss. (1967). Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Craig L. Symonds. (1986). A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution.

Lawrence Babits. (1998). A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens.

Ian Barnes & Charles Royster. (2000). The Historical Atlas of the American Revolution.

David Lee Russell. (2000). The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies.

Lee Patrick Anderson. (2002). Forgotten Patriot: The Life & Times of Major-General Nathanael Greene.

John W. Gordon. (2003). South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History.

Terry Golway. (2005). Washington’s General: Nathanael Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution.

Cowpens: Battlefield Maps

Cowpens is one of the more frequently written about battles of the American Revolution; it's a staple, at least, of general military histories of the war. Having perused a number of such histories over the year, my feeling is that the textual summaries of the battle found in these histories are more-or-less adequate. However, the battlefield map that accompanies these histories (at least when one is present) is usually quite inaccurate. Why is this?

The oldest extant maps of the battlefield are the so-called "Pigee map" and "Clove map" first published in Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping. These were evidently drawn not long after the battle, although by whom is unclear. My view is that these were not the work of a participant at the battle, but rather that they were produced by someone that had read (and wished to illustrate) the disposition of the British and American forces indicated by Morgan's after action report. Morgan's report mentions in one place that "The light infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, and the Virginia militia under the command of Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground, and extended a line in front." In another place it states that "Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta riflemen, [were] to support the right of the line." Consistent with this description, the author(s) of the maps drew a battle line consisting of Howard's and Triplett's troops with another two companies forming a wing to the right rear consisting of Tate's and Buchanan's companies. This is exactly what someone relying solely on the report would have drawn; a participant would have known that Tate and Buchanan were part of Triplett's command, not a separate entity.

In any case, these maps have only recently come to light. The first battlefield map to be widely circulated was the map that William Johnson included in his 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene. I previously noted that the depiction is inaccurate, but it does have some strong points worth noting.

The Johnson Map (click to enlarge).

First of all, William Johnson clearly visited the battlefield. The three major elevations which I've previously described in connection with the battlefield are both present and correctly placed on his map.

Three Elevations on the Cowpens Battlefield.

Second, Johnson correctly placed the main American line between the first and second elevations on the battlefield. Although counterintuitive, this is indicated in various participant memoirs and pension applications (for a previous discussion, see: The Main Line: Location). For example, in one application, the son of North Carolina militiaman Thomas Lackey learned from his father "That at the Battle of the Cowpens the regulars were situated rather behind a hill."

Third, Johnson shows both troops of British dragoons attached to their front line charging the American militia, a point which most writers overlook, but which does seem indicated, on balance by participant accounts (see: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, Cowpens in Miniature 16, Cowpens in Miniature 18).

Fourth, Johnson shows that at the end of the battle, the British line had broken into two parts, which separately surrendered. This does not appear in Morgan's or Tarleton's description of the battle, but it is indicated in participant accounts (see: Cowpens in Miniature 21, Cowpens in Miniature 23). This further suggests that Johnson made an investment into learning what really happened at Cowpens rather than just rely on authority. This is clearly to his credit, even if he did err in some respects.

The chief problem, however, isn't the problems with Johnson's map, but it's rather with what was done with it. Henry Beebee Carrington printed a modified version of this map in his 1881 Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.

For reasons not easily guessed at, Carrington turned Johnson's three elevations into two and he placed the Broad River on the edge of the battlefield, when in actuality it is miles away. Carrington's other deviations from Johnson were likewise unhelpful: he placed the main line on the crest of the foremost ridge and he reduced the number of charging troops of dragoons from two to one. Strangest of all, Carrington mistook the small rectangles representing the retreating American militia (lower right panel in Johnson's map) for British infantry units, and so has the British infantry drifting off to the right rather than directly advancing on the Continentals.

The Carrington Map (click to enlarge).

Although the Carrington map does not adhere well to the physical geography of the battlefield or participant accounts of the fighting, most of the subsequently-published battlefield maps adhere closely to the Carrington map. Notable exceptions can be found in the histories published by Edwin Bearss, Lawrence Babits, and John Moncure. All three of these distinguished writers prepared detailed maps based on multiple participant accounts and a careful consideration of battlefield topography. Two of these three works can be read in their entirety online, and Bearss' history is more than 40 years old. What does it say about the quality of contemporary treatments of the battle of Cowpens when Carrington should remain the gold standard and Bearss, Babits, and Moncure should have little discernable impact?

One of Edwin Bearss' excellent maps (click to enlarge).

Sources:

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Lackey (.pdf file).

Henry Beebee Carrington's 1881 Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps. (Also valuable is Edwin Bearss' 1974 Historic Grounds and Resource Study).

John Moncure published The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour.

Related: The Cowpens Battlefield, Morgan's Report, Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature

Cowpens: Addendum

I've read numerous participant accounts pertaining to the battle of Cowpens, but I expect that there are some accounts out there that I haven't read yet and which may alter to some degree my views about the battle. Recently I read a couple of British accounts that I hadn't cited previously, and I feel compelled to briefly comment on each.

One source is the widely-read history of the American Revolution authored by Charles Stedman, commissay during the war to Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis. Stedman was not present at the battle of Cowpens; his account of it is therefore largely based on Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton's history and Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie's commentary on that history. Earlier I argued that Mackenzie contradicted (and likely corrected) Tarleton's description of the first British cavalry charge. I also blamed William Johnson for creating confusion about this charge by adopting a nonsensical position halfway between Tarleton and Mackenize. Stedman, however, adopted this position before Johnson did. Stedman wrote:

"The first line of the Americans being composed of militia, did not long withstand the charge of the British regulars: It gave way in all quarters, and was pursued to the continentals. The latter, undismayed by the retreat of the militia, maintained their ground with great bravery; and the conflict between them and the British was obstinate and bloody. Captain Ogilvie, with his troop of dragoons on the right of the British line, was directed to charge the left flank of the enemy. He cut his way through their line, but being exposed to a heavy fire, and, at the same time, charged by the whole of Washington's cavalry, was compelled to retreat in confusion. The British reserve now received orders to move forward; and as soon as they felt the advance of the Seventy-first regiment, the whole again moved on. The continentals, no longer able to withstand the shock, were forced to give way."

I also observed with interest, that while Tarleton claimed the British were outnumbered by the Americans and Mackenzie hedged on this point, Stedman unequivocally stated that the "The British were superior in numbers." I have no idea whether Stedman, by virtue of his having served with the British army in the South had special insight into the true strength of the two armies. At the very least, this statement indicates that the American view about the relative strength of the two armies eventually came to prevail on both sides of the Atlantic. (In regards to the strength of the two armies, see: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Cowpens in Miniature 2, and Cowpens in Miniature 3).

The other source is Mark Urban's recently published, Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution, which focuses on the experience of the 23rd Foot. In it, I was surprised to find an unpublished officer's account of Cowpens. The officer, Lieutenant Harry Calvert, was with Cornwallis' army at the time, and he described in his journal what was being said about the battle. One passage stands out. Urban, summarizing the journal, wrote:

"As one fugitive after another wandered into the British camp, Calvert pierced together the story of what had gone wrong. Tarleton, as was his custom, had hurled his troops into action before they were all up, and the 71st had advanced towards their enemy, taking significant losses from enemy sharpshooters as they went" (p 226).

Assuming that the description is faithful to the source, Calvert echoed Mackenzie's complaint that the British attack against the first line (militia and skirmishers) occurred before all of the British troops were in position (see Cowpens in Miniature 13). However, Mackenzie complained that the 71st Foot was out of position when the attack was launched, while Calvert seemingly indicated the opposite. I make this observation not because I feel compelled to reverse course but because it helps illustrate how difficult it can be to reconcile the various participant accounts. To summarize on this issue, participants indicated that the 71st directly participated in the attack on the first line (Morgan, Calvert), that it was a short distance in reserve and joined the fighting soon after the Continentals were attacked (Tarleton and, sycophantically, Hanger), and that it joined the fighting after the British had begun to retreat (Cornwallis). Regardless of the view adopted (I deferred to Tarleton), it is necessary to stand in contradiction with key sources.

Sources:

Charles Stedman's 1794 The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton's and Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

Mark Urban 's 2007 Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution is available through amazon.com.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan's report of the battle.

A transcription of Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' report of the battle can be found here.

Related: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Cowpens in Miniature 16, Cowpens in Miniature 17

Looking Back

So, I have written what basically amounts to a book-length treatment of the battle of Cowpens. Clearly I have enjoyed this endeavor, from reading the various participant accounts, to painting the military miniatures, to arranging them on the miniature battlefield and writing the whole thing up. But I’ve asked myself, is this good history?

My answer is… maybe.

The usual history of the battle of Cowpens seems to be one that is based on a few well-known participant accounts (Morgan’s and Tarleton’s, in particular) and that is deferential towards earlier histories. While this sounds reasonable, the result is often wanting. I’ve noticed that dubious details present in earlier histories tend to be echoed uncritically in later ones. For example, William Johnson's 1822 history of the battle included one of the first maps of the battle of Cowpens. Although his history was flawed (I criticized him in particular on his description of the retreat of the American militia; see Flight of the Militia - Part 1) and the accompanying map crude, this nevertheless became the model on which later maps were based.

The Johnson Map. Initial positions are shown on the left, the retreat of the front-line militia is shown at the lower right, and the American counterattack is shown at the upper right. This map does not reflect the actual geography of the Cowpens battlefield (see The Cowpens Battlefield).

Henry Carrington's 1881 compendium of battlefield maps of the American Revolution included a refined version of the Johnson map. This map repeated the errors present in the Johnson map, and added additional ones as well. Most notably, the Broad River is shown closely skirting the edges of the battlefield. Remarkably, most recently-published histories of the battle present a battlefield map that closely follows Carrington.

The Carrington Map.

Not every history of the battle has uncritically followed earlier histories. Henry Cabot Lodge's 1903 history, for example, wisely did not adopt Johnson's map of the battle or his description of the militia's retreat. In general, Lodge's approach seems to have been one of reporting details that seemed relatively certain and omitting ones that were not. He entirely avoided the topic of British cavalry charges during the battle, perhaps because of the varying and confusing claims made in this regard by Tarleton and Mackenzie (see British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1). Regardless of the causes of these omissions, the result is something less than a complete description of the battle.

Lawrence Babits' recent history, which I have frequently cited, improved in important respects on earlier histories. Babits eschewed the usual practice of relying solely on a few well-known participant accounts and earlier histories, but rather built off of a huge amount of source material offer a completely new interpretation of what took place.

Delving into a battle in such great detail can lead to numerous new insights into how the American Revolution was won (or lost, depending on the point of view). Drawing upon new sources of information can also shed new light on the contradictions present in the well-known accounts. The downside is that the greater detail and wider array of sources necessitate an increase in how frequently interpretation must substitute for fact. This in turn means that errors in the account are likely, perhaps even inevitable.

Despite these hazards, I have more-or-less emulated Babits. I decided that it would be possible to describe the battle in detail based solely on participant accounts and for the most part ignore postwar histories (which I consider to be largely unreliable). I did make an exception for a few secondary accounts. The postwar histories by Henry Lee and William Moultrie were cited with some frequency, for example, because of the authors’ familiarity with the Revolutionary War, because of their acquaintanceship with key participants at Cowpens, and because their histories usually agree with participant accounts. The inclusion of David Stewart’s history was based principally on the unique perspective it provides; I noted more than once that its description of the battle is not wholly reliable.

Having decided to use these sources, I next sought to show how they could be strung together to create a fairly reasonable and coherent narrative of the battle. There are numerous ways to connect the dots among these accounts. My guiding principle was that the narrative should be true to a natural reading of the accounts, have the actors making rational decisions, and avoid unnecessary complexity.

In this regard, I believe I have had considerable success.

Consider again Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan’s official report of the battle, which is arguably one of the most important and trustworthy participant accounts. In considering this report I took it for granted that Morgan did not describe every facet of the fighting, but instead emphasized how the Americans won rather than how they almost lost (for this reason he said very little about the British cavalry charges). Likewise, I presumed that the report named all of the major officers, but not all of the minor commands. Given those caveats (which I think are reasonable), a side-by-side reading of Morgan’s report and my account shows that they are well matched, although there are some discrepancies.

Morgan wrote:

"An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them. The light infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, and the Virginia militia under the command of Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground, and extended a line in front. The third regiment of dragoons, under Lieut. Col. Washington, were posted at such a distance in their rear, as not to be subjected to the line of fire directed at them, and to be so near as to be able to charge them should they be broken. The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of the brave and valuable Col, Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the line, one hundred and fifty yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front, Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolinans, were posted on the right of Maj. McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Maj. Cunningham. Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta riflemen, to support the right of the line [Cowpens in Miniature 8].

"The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front moved two pieces of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line [Cowpens in Miniature 11, 12].

"The disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy [Cowpens in Miniature 12], upon which their whole line moved on with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. McDowall and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for their support [13]. The whole of Col. Pickens' command then kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeably to their orders [14]. When the enemy advanced on our line, they received a well-directed and incessant fire [15]. But their numbers being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position [17]. We retired in good order about fifty paces, formed, and advanced on the enemy, and gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder [19]. Lieut. Col. Howard observing this, gave orders for the line to charge bayonets [20], which was done with such address that they fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces in our possession [21]. We pushed our advantage so effectually, that they never had an opportunity of rallying, had their intentions been ever so good [22].

"Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that Tarleton was cutting down our riflemen on the left [Cowpens in Miniature 18, 19], pushed forward, and charged them with such firmness [20, 21], that instead of attempting to recover the fate of the day, which one would have expected from an officer of his splendid character, broke and fled [22].

"The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight [Cowpens in Miniature 22] -the list of their killed, wounded, and prisoners, will inform you with what effect [23, 25]. Tarleton, with the small remains of his cavalry, and a few scattered infantry he had mounted on his wagonhorses, made their escape. He was pursued twenty-four miles, but owing to our having taken a wrong trail at first, we could never overtake him [25].

By my count, there are three notable discrepancies between Morgan’s account and mine.

First, I did not place Hayes’ regiment in the position Morgan indicated, because I deferred to Robert Long’s description of his position. Instead, I indicated that Andrew Pickens’ regiment of South Carolina militia (not mentioned by Morgan) was in this area [see Cowpens in Miniature 8, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, The Statements of Private Robert Long].

Second, I did not place Tate’s company on the right of the Continentals. Instead, I deferred to Howard’s description of Tate’s whereabouts and placed Tate on the Continentals’ left (see Cowpens in Miniature 8, The Main Line: Composition). (Babits sidestepped this disagreement between Morgan and Howard by claiming that there were two captains Tate present: one James and one Edward).

Third, I adopted a very different British deployment, because I deferred (with some reluctance) to Tarleton’s account (see Cowpens in Miniature 11, Note 5).

Although not without problems, I think my account provides a fairer treatment of Morgan’s report than is found in Babits’ history of the battle. Babits’ history contains 11 notable discrepancies by my count. 1) He did not show the American militia under Pickens to be situated to guard the flanks. 2) He did not have McDowell and Cunningham 150 yards in front of the Continentals, but rather 150 yards in front of Pickens and the South Carolina militia. 3) He did not have the commands of Brandon, Thomas, McDowell, Hayes, McCall (Hammond), and Cunningham positioned relative to each other in the manner Morgan indicated. 4) He deferred (as did I) to Tarleton’s description of the British deployment. 5) He had the skirmishers deployed before the British deployment, not after. 6) He had the skirmishers to be a fairly numerous, consisting of several small battalions (McDowell, Cunningham, and Hammond), not "small parties." 7) He did not have McDowell, Cunningham, and Hammond partaking in the "fire by regiments," although they were under Pickens’ control. 8) He did not show the attacking British infantry to be more numerous than the American main line; their numbers would have been roughly comparable following British losses on the militia line (possibly, the British would have been outnumbered). 9) He had the British gaining the American right flank of the main line chiefly because of a regiment-sized gap between the 7th Foot and 71st Foot. He did not have the British right extending beyond the American left. 10) He had Washington’s cavalry charge to the left occurring well before Howard’s counterattack. Also, he did not directly connect this charge with the charge that carried Washington into the rear of the British line. 11) He had Washington’s climatic charge launched from the American right.

Also noteworthy is that my method of interpreting the source material led me to some relatively unorthodox conclusions about how the battle was fought. Nevertheless, the present account holds together fairly well. The unusual manner in which I’ve shown the American main line to be deployed [see Cowpens in Miniature 8, The Main Line: Organization], for example, wasn’t based on a whimsical desire to elevate Samuel Hammond’s description of the main line deployment. Rather, Hammond's description, in combination with other participant accounts, led to a reasonable and parsimonious explanation for how Morgan intended to protect his retreating front-line militia [see Cowpens in Miniature 9], why Tarleton directed Ogilvie to charge [see Cowpens in Miniature 16], why Howard felt compelled to refuse his right flank [see Cowpens in Miniature 17], why the Continentals retreated up to 100 yards during the main line fighting [see Cowpens in Miniature 19, Note 5], and why Triplett’s Virginians held their ground [see Cowpens in Miniature 17, Note 2].

Just because things fit well together, however, does not mean that there isn’t a great deal of room for improvement. Two major concerns spring to mind:

First, I relied frequently on interpretation, and I’m sure that I have erred along the way. The fact that I have worked on this project in isolation is particularly problematic. Persons taking a fresh look at this account may discover errors in my reasoning to which I’ve been blind. In particular, there are key passages in the accounts of Alexander Chesney, James Collins, and Thomas Young describing the fighting on the extreme left and right that caused me difficulty. I'm not wholly satisfied with how I finessed those accounts, and I suspect a better interpretation is possible.

Second, I certainly have not exhausted every possible source of information. I did not examine all of the extant relevant documents, such as muster rolls, or perform a detailed examination of the terrain. If I had, I would have likely refined my estimate of the number of British and American participants and losses, and the exact positioning of units on the battlfield. I avoided estimating with any precision the duration of specific events on the battlefield and the speed with which specific units moved. I'm sure that a series of detailed time-motion studies would lead to numerous refinements.

Sources:

Henry Beebee Carrington's 1881 Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.

Henry Cabot Lodge's 1903 The Story of the Revolution.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Cowpens in Miniature 25

Part 25: The Battle Ends

Previous: The Last Gambit

At the time that Tarleton and the remnants of the British cavalry fled the battlefield, it was still morning. For many of the Americans, the remainder of the day would be spent in pursuit of the British. The Continentals would not return to the battlefield until the evening.

The main body of British Legion dragoons were in the foremost of the retreat. When they reached the British baggage train, according to Lieutenant Mackenzie, the British guards soon mounted the wagon horses and retreated after them. After their departure, some Americans began arriving on the scene and began raiding the baggage train. Tarleton noted that his group, the last of the British to flee the battlefield, came up behind and attacked "a party of the Americans, who had seized upon the baggage of the British troops on the road." In the official British report, Tarleton "retook the Baggage of the Corps, & cut to pieces the detachment of the Enemy who had taken possession of it."

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie disputed Tarleton’s characterization of it describe this event. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard believed that "Baron Glaubeck… with some five or six militia men… had taken the baggage," but when Tarleton’s band arrived, "he was obliged to leave." Howard did not refer to British losses; however, one of the raiders, militiaman Thomas Young, described running into Tarleton’s group while returning to camp and being severely injured by them [see Note 1].

Meanwhile, on the battlefield, according to Major Joseph McJunkin, "You might have seen some five or six hundred tall, brawny, well clad soldiers, the flower of the British Army, guarded by a set of militia clad in hunting shirts ‘blacked, smoked and greasy.’"

McJunkin also recalled that "The plain was strewn with the dead and dying." But at least "The number of the slain on the side of the Americans was inconsiderable compared with that of the Enemy." Private James Collins remembered that "After the fight was over, the sight was truly melancholy." Remembrance of the scene was also persevered in local lore. Obadiah Haggis, a mid-19th Century visitor to the battlefield, learned of "A woman who lived 2 miles away… [that] When the firin’ stopped and she knowed which side had whipt, she ventured to the place, with the rest of the neighborhood, and found the place all covered with dead people."

Those men that had pursued the British slept on the battlefield that night, and in Lieutenant Thomas Anderson’s words, "lay amongst the Dead & Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work."

Losses:

One of the more difficult questions to address in connection with the battle of Cowpens concerns how many British and American soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured. Quite a few participants commented on losses, but their claims are not particularly trustworthy for the reason that they are typically reporting on what they heard others claim rather than on what they personally witnessed.

The numbers of Americans killed or wounded are stated in most histories to be quite few, about 72 in number, and they refer to a seemingly unimpeachable source: Morgan’s official report of the battle. Lawrence Babits, writing in A Devil of a Whipping, claimed to have a list of 128 Americans known to have been killed or wounded based on a number of different sources, including pension applications [see Note 2].

I’m inclined to believe that the number was higher, but for a different reason. Consider carefully Morgan’s language (see Morgan's Report). He said first, "Our loss is inconsiderable, which the enclosed return will evince. I have not been able to ascertain Col. Pickens loss, but know it to be very small" [see Note 3].

Then in a postscript he added, "Our loss was very inconsiderable, not having more than twelve killed and about sixty wounded." Notice, however, that he previously defined "our loss" as something different than Pickens’ loss. Therefore, the 72 casualties is arguably limited to the force he took with him from North Carolina: Howard’s battalion of Continentals, Washington’s regiment of dragoons, and Triplett’s battalion of Virginia militia.

If 72 is an "inconsiderable" number, then Pickens’ "very small" loss would likely be something a bit less, say around 50. This produces a total loss in the neighborhood of 120, or near Babits’ number.

Sergeant Major William Seymour recorded in his journal that "Our loss in the action were one Lieutenant wounded, and one Sergeant, and thirty-five killed and wounded, of which fourteen were of Captain Kirkwood's Company of the Delaware Regiment." In this case, "our loss" would seem to mean something different than it did in Morgan’s report. It’s possible that he is describing only the losses sustained by Howard’s Continentals (which included Kirkwood’s company). When Morgan’s and Seymour’s statements are combined, American losses would have included 37 men in Howard’s Continentals (about 13% of the battalion), of which 14 men were lost in Kirkwood’s company (23% of the company; see Note 4). This leaves about 35 men lost between Washington’s dragoons and Triplett’s Virginians (about 14% of those commands). These numbers are not unreasonable, and they are reflected in the four miniature casualties on the battlefield (again, the representation is 1:20).

I also placed on the battlefield three miniature casualties representing around 50 killed and wounded between the various detachments of Georgia and Carolina militia attached to Morgan’s army (about 12% of those forces, not including the baggage guard and other detachments). One casualty was placed on the militia line, another with the militia charged by Ogilvie, and the last with the militia charged by Nettles.

For the American army, exclusive of detachments, losses are estimated to have been in the neighborhood of 13% (~120 out of ~950 participants).

Quite a few sources provide an estimate of British casualties. All agree that British losses were considerable. The exact number given, however, differs widely from one source to another. An exact count of the British killed and wounded was not performed, and most sources report their impression of British losses or what had been related to them by others.

The Americans did not linger long on the battlefield. Morgan was concerned that the British army under Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis would soon advance on him in an effort to free the British prisoners. Morgan, did, however, have an officer ride over the battlefield and do a rough count of British losses. Subsequently, Morgan stated in his report of the battle that the British had 10 officers and 100 or so rank and file killed, and 200 or so wounded. A total in the low 300s is also suggested by subtracting from total British strength the number of unwounded prisoners captured by the time Morgan filed his report, a number of infantry and cavalry that were captured after the report was filed, a small contingent of infantry that escaped capture, and the British Legion dragoons and 17th Light Dragoons that escaped wounding or capture. Therefore, I have placed 16 miniature British casualties on the battlefield. A number of American sources pegged British losses higher than Morgan, but those claims are generally less trustworthy.

For the British army, exclusive of the baggage train detachment, losses are estimated to have been around 29% (~320 out of ~1,115 participants).

In addition to the killed and wounded, the British lost large numbers of prisoners to the Americans. Morgan indicated that 531 were captured soon after the battle (some others were captured after Morgan wrote his report). For reasons that I will not wholly recount, it appears that a certain portion of Tarleton’s infantry escaped capture during the battle, but some of these men were captured later. It also appears that while almost all of Tarleton’s cavalry escaped capture during the battle, some of these men were also captured afterwards (notably, the British Legion lost 277 rank and file around the time of the battle; far too many to be accounted for by infantry losses alone). Samuel Otterson recalled how some of the Legion dragoons were captured by the American militia. Others were likely taken by William Washington’s dragoons during the pursuit. Some of the Americans must have been mounted on faster horses than some of the British, especially as the latter had made an all-night march to reach the battlefield.

Notes:

1. Howard’s acknowledgement that the Americans were forced to withdraw is the only acknowledgement on the American side that such an encounter took place. However, American participants were more likely to recall triumphs rather than setbacks, and it’s possible that there were some American casualties (aside from Young). That’s not to suggest, however, that Tarleton’s description is without exaggeration. Young’s vivid description of his wounding and capture is worth reading, but it is not recounted here.

2. Babits also suggested that the actual number may have been even higher, because these records did not cover all participants and because of an ambiguous document in the archives of the state of North Carolina [a transcription of which can be found here].

Conversely, counting the losses mentioned in pension applications may overstate the number of American killed or wounded as the information in the pension applications may in some cases be inaccurate. It’s possible, even likely that some of the claims about having been present at the battle and even wounded there were in error.

3. I have not seen a transcription of this return, but I suspect it is extant. Babits alluded to it in recounting American losses.

4. There are quite a few reasons for why Kirkwood’s losses exceeded those of the other companies. I show in the maps (although not in the miniature representation) one of the two three-pounders lined up with Kirkwood’s company during the British advance against the American main line. One or more salvos of grapeshot could have led to significantly higher casualties. William Seymour’s journal gives Kirkwood’s company a leading role in the American counterattack. It’s possible they sustained greater losses in the subsequent melee than did other companies. Henry Wells’ account suggests that Kirkwood’s company was also attacked during the final British cavalry charge; perhaps other companies were not.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Mackenzie's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, McJunkin, Collins, Anderson among others.

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South has Young's account of the battle.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes a review by Will Graves of McJunkin's statements.

Edwin Bearss' 1974 Historic Grounds and Resource Study (.pdf file) has a transcription of Obadiah Haggis' description of an 1857 visit to the Cowpens battlefield, in which Haggis related some local lore about the battle.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782 has a comparison of British rank and file returns before and after the battle of Cowpens.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson (.pdf).

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

Related: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Morgan and Seymour, The British Legion

Cowpens in Miniature 23

Part 23: Surrender

Previous: Flight

Next: The Last Gambit

The flight of the British Legion dragoon reserve meant that the American counterattack would not be checked. François-Jean de Chastellux noted that the British Legion "fled full gallop, without ever thinking of the infantry, or taking the least precaution to cover their retreat."

The infantry struggled to fend for themselves as all order broke down. Daniel Morgan reported that "The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight." Sergeant-Major William Seymour happily observed that the British "retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field." From writing from a British perspective, David Stewart gloomily concurred, "the rout Was general; few of the infantry escaped; and of the cavalry, who put their horses to full speed, not a man was taken."

Not all of the British troops attempted to flee, however. The remnant of the 17th Light Dragoons stayed on the field, although they had been, in Cornet James Simons words, "deserted by Colo. Tarleton's Legeonary Cavalry." Tarleton also remained behind. When the Legion dragoons could not be rallied, he remained with the 17th Light Dragoons and a handful of others on horseback, near the Green River Road. George Hanger claimed that "He stood almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy, with hopes either of rallying his own men, or not surviving their disgrace." This small force offered at least some protection for his retreating infantry, which had, in American Thomas Young’s words, thrown "down their guns and cartouch boxes, made for the wagon road, and did the prettiest sort of running!"

The presence of the American cavalry in the rear of the British infantry severely limited their options to escape.

Cornet James Simons stated in a letter to William Washington long after the battle that "In pursuit of their Cavalry [i.e., the 17th Light Dragoons] you overtook their Artillery, whom you immediately made prisoners." Howard convincingly claimed that the guns were taken by his own infantry [see Note 1], but it’s possible that the cavalry encountered at least the horse-drawn limbers. Simon went on to relate that "the Drivers of the Horses who were Galloping off with 2-3 pounders, you could not make Surrender until after Repeated Commands from you, you were obliged to order to be Shot; after securing these fieldpieces."

Letting the 17th go, the American then turned on the British infantry. According to Simons "your third Charge was made on the right wing of their Army… who, under the Operation of a Universal panic, (having been successfully charged on the left of their Army by our friend Col. Howard) instantly surrendered" [see Note 2]. Major Joseph McJunkin remembered also the key role played by the American cavalry, "Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms [see Note 3].

The British infantry was certainly not going to outrun the American cavalry; frequently they could not outrun the American infantry.

Mackenzie wrote that "the infantry were easily overtaken, as the cause which had retarded the pursuit [i.e., exhaustion], had now an equal effect in impeding the retreat: dispirited on many accounts, they surrendered at discretion." De Chastellux agreed, "Fatigued by a very long march, they were soon overtaken."

Even the militia that had survived Nettles’ attack was able to contribute to this final assault on the British right. According to Private James Collins, "We… advanced briskly, and gained the right flank of the enemy, and they being hard pressed in front, by Howard, and falling very fast, could not stand it long.

Surrender (click to enlarge). Closely pressed by American Continentals and militia, and their retreat cut off by the American cavalry, most of the British infantry throw down their arms (not shown). Meanwhile, Tarleton stands "almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy."

American Cavalryman Thomas Young, seeing the British line collapse so utterly noted that at this time, "Major Jolly and seven or eight of us, resolved upon an excursion to capture some of the baggage" [see Note 4]. Tarleton may have seen these men, but he evidently did not interfere with them. He retained his toehold on the battlefield.

Around the same time, that the Americans were mopping up the right side of the British line, the British left was also in complete collapse. Lieutenant-Colonel Howard recalled that "In the pursuit, I was led towards the [American] right, in among the 71st, who were broken into squads. They no longer offered serious resistance. William Moultrie claimed that "So great was the consternation in which the British infantry were, at seeing their cavalry gallop off, that, either from pique or panic, numbers of them never fired a gun."

Howard recalled that "I called to them [the 71st Foot] to surrender, they laid down their arms, and the officers delivered up their swords." Major McJunkin was also immediately present and remembered that "some begin to call for quarters," when "the voice of Howard is heard amid the rush of men and clangor of steel: ‘Throw down your arms and you shall have good quarters.’ When they were finally "convinced that quarters would be given, they as it were rent the very air with thanks that their lives would be spared. These were called the Scots regiment" [see Note 5].

All-in-all, according to William Moultrie, "upwards of five hundred laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners. The first battalion of the seventy-first, and two companies of light infantry, laid down their arms." The 71st surrendered on the British left; the two companies of light infantry (perhaps Moultrie meant the light infantry of the 16th and 71st regiments) were perhaps the last organized resistance on the British right.

Several anecdotes concerning the surrender of the 71st Foot have been preserved in participant accounts. McJunkin stated that "In the conclusion of this foray you might have seen Major [James] Jackson of Georgia rush among the broken ranks of the 71st Regiment and attempting to seize their standard, while they are vainly trying to form by it; you might have seen Col. Howard interposing for the relief of his friend when entangled among his foes" [see Note 6].

Howard related that one "Captain Duncanson, of the 71st grenadiers [see Note 7], gave me his sword, and stood by me. Upon getting on my horse, I found him pulling at my saddle, and he nearly unhorsed me. I expressed my displeasure, and asked him what he was about. The explanation was, that they had orders to give no'quarter, and they did not expect any; and as my men were coming up, he was afraid they would use him ill. I admitted his excuse, and put him into the care of a sergeant. I had messages from him for some years afterwards, expressing his obligation for my having saved his life."

Major Arthur McArthur, who commanded the first battalion of the 71st attempted to escape on horseback, but he was overridden by one or more mounted Americans. Who captured him is unclear. Colonel Andrew Pickens claimed that, "Major McCarthur surrendered to me, some distance from the battlefield & delivered his sword to me," while Major Jackson wrote that McArthur was "a prisoner on that occasion taken by myself" [emphasis in original].

Notes:

1. Morgan also implicitly credited Howard with capturing the guns in his official report of the battle. Howard, Morgan reported, "gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address that they [the British] fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces in our possession."

2. The excised text includes that "the right wing of their Army Composed of their Legeonary Infantry, intermixed with the Battallion of the Brave 71st (under the Command of Major McArthur,)" The 71st Foot was neither a part of the right wing of their army nor next to the British Legion infantry. Perhaps he was thinking of the light infantry companies of the 71st Foot, who were on hand.

3. The full text reads "One battalion throws down their arms and the men fall to the earth. Another commences flight, but Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms." McJunkin recognized that the British line had broken into two parts. The battalion that "throws down their arms" is the 71st, the other "battalion" is the British right. McJunkin was personally involved at this time in the fight against the 71st; he did not seem to realize or remember that the British right included several commands.

4. Howard mentions Morgan’s aide, Baron de Glaubeck leading "five or six militia men well mounted," on this excursion. McJunkin related that "After the surrender of the British infantry a company of fourteen dashed off to take possession of the British baggage wagons ten miles distant. Major Benjamin Jolly and a Frenchman called De Barron headed this party. It happened to pass Col. Tarleton while he was collecting his men after the retreat. Unconscious of this fact, they pressed on in comparative security."

Other individuals may have also made a mounted pursuit. Militiaman Hugh McNary claimed that he joined in the pursuit "when the Enemy first gave way." Whether the rest of his company was mounted or on foot, he "got far enough ahead of his company to stop a British officer, the officer surrendered, deponent [i.e., McNary] dismounted and took from the officer his Holsters and pistols, and after getting them, he discovered, that his company had stopped pursuit and were retreating back, he mounted his horse and returned leaving the British officer, but took the Holsters and pistols which he afterwards sold."

5. Several American sources seemed impressed by the restraint they showed on this occasion (implicitly in contrast with what happened on other battlefields). Morgan reported that "It, perhaps, would be well to remark, for the honor of the American arms, that although the progress of this [Tarleton’s] corps was marked with burning and devastation, and although they waged the most cruel warfare, not a man was killed, wounded, or even insulted, after he surrendered."

6. Major James Jackson confirmed this episode: "[I ran] the utmost risk of my life, in an attempt to seize the colors of the 71st regiment in the midst of it, on their attempt to form after they were broken, being saved by an exertion of Col. Howard’s." The 71st Foot did not carry its colors into the battle. The 7th Foot did have its colors, one of which was captured by an American militiaman (see 7th Regiment of Foot). This account may describe that capture.

7. The two battalions of the 71st Foot had, between them, two companies of light infantry, and two companies of grenadiers. The former were at the battle of Cowpens, the latter were not. The 71st's grenadiers were captured at the battle of Stony Point in 1779. That Captain Duncanson would have been at Cowpens indicates that he was 1) absent during the battle of Stony Point, 2) at that battle, but subsequently exchanged, or 3) captured at Stony Point, but released on parole. If Duncanson had violated his parole, he was liable to be hanged.

Sources:

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report, and a copy of Jackson's letters.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Hanger's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Young, McJunkin, Collins, Howard, and Pickens, among others.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes a review by Will Graves of McJunkin's statements. McJunkin's description of the raid on the baggage train can be found here.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh McNary (.pdf file).

Related: 71st Foot, The American Cavalry - Part 1, The American Cavalry - Part 2