St. Kitts (10): The Campaign Concludes

This is the tenth and final entry in a series of posts on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9].

Surrender

On the evening of February 12th, the officers of the St. Kitts militia petitioned Governor Shirley to be allowed to surrender. They stated that they were “fully determined, from our zeal to our Sovereign, and a proper regard to the interest of this island, to defend it while prudence justified us, or till we should be relieved by his Majesty’s fleet or army”. However, “the fleet and troops which we looked upon for relief, have been arrived near three weeks, without affording us any assistance, and in all human probability cannot, from the superiority of the enemy by sea and land.” They feared that if they did not open surrender negotiations now they “would lose their estates and properties, and possibly would be sent to a French island or Old France.” [1]

Governor Shirley and Brigadier-General Thomas Fraser conceded that surrender had become the best option, and sent envoys to the French.

A French officer, the Chevalier de Goussencourt, noted the event in his journal: “On the 12th, to the great joy of all, we saw a white flag raised on the breach of the redoubt. We could scarcely believe our eyes”. He added, “the toil and hardship that de Bouillé’s army had to undergo are incredible… There were officers and men who slept only one night under their tents during the whole siege.” [2]

The Marquis de Bouillé granted the garrison generous terms, including the provision that the troops could return to England so long as they did not serve again against France for the duration of the war.

On the 13th, the British regulars and the St. Kitts militia (close to 1,000 men in total) marched out of the garrison with the honors of war and laid down their arms. The British regulars had lost about 250 men between the siege of Brimstone Hill and the January 28th battle on the Mooring Hills. The Marquis de Bouillé claimed to have lost a little more than 300 men between these affairs. [3]

The French were buoyant after the fall of the island. One of their officers was later heard to boast “that it was not necessary to keep their intentions any longer secret, that Barbadoes and Antigua were the next objects, then Jamaica, and lastly New York, and then they will consent to make peace…” [4]

Hood Escapes

Hood learned that the garrison surrendered on the evening of the 13th. He later wrote, “Under this situation of things I had no longer any business in Basseterre Road”. He also thought it was only a matter of time before the French army began to place guns and mortars on the high ground along the shore in order to bombard his ships. [5]

Fortunately for Hood, on February 14th, de Grasse’s ships were anchored near Nevis, taking on badly needed provisions that had arrived from Europe. [6]

Hood decided to sail that night, under cover of darkness. He added: “I judged it necessary… that every ship should be under sail as nearly as possible at the same moment, for the better preserving [of] a compact body”. The ships’ captains were instructed to cut their cables at the same time. Hood also had lights fixed to small boats or buoys that were placed alongside each of his ships. At the same time, the lights were extinguished on his vessels. When the British fleet set sail, the decoy lights remained behind, making it appear as if the British were still at anchor. [7]

The French did not discover Hood’s departure until morning. The Chevalier de Villebresme, recalled that “when M. de Grasse went on deck to see his enemies ...., they were fifteen leagues away. De Grasse, more and more surprised at the inventive genius of his opponent, returned to the anchorage that he had left [i.e., Basseterre Roadstead]”. [8]

French ships at sea.

Rodney Arrives

After St. Kitts fell to the French, Nevis capitulated as well. De Bouillé’s army then embarked on de Grasse’s navy and they set sail on February 20th for the French base at Martinique. De Bouillé placed Colonel Arthur Dillon (the Comte de Dillon) in command of the captured islands and left him a garrison of 850 men and part of the artillery. En route, Comte de Barras was dispatched to seize Montserrat with some ships and soldiers of regiment Auxerrois. The island had no regular army garrison. [9]

Meanwhile, Admiral George Brydges Rodney (at right) had at last reached the West Indies. He wrote:

On the 19th of February, after five weeks passage with the fleet under my command, I arrived in Carlisle Bay, Barbadoes, and instantly proceeded to join the fleet under Sir Samuel Hood, in hopes of bringing the enemy’s fleet to battle, and saving the island of St. Christopher’s [i.e., St. Kitts], which I heard they were then besieging. [10]

Rodney immediately sailed for St. Kitts, via Antigua. Meanwhile, Hood left Antigua and sailed for Barbados in hopes of finding Rodney. The two fleets took different routes and initially missed each other. It wasn’t until February 25th that Hood and Rodney finally united, in the waters west of Antigua. At that point, according to Rodney, “Every endeavour was used to arrive off Martinique before the enemy”. De Grasse, however, narrowly reached Martinique first, and anchored in Port Royal Harbor on February 26th. [11]

So concluded the St. Kitts campaign of 1782, a campaign that marked the high point of French fortunes in the West Indies. In the spring of 1782, de Bouillé and de Grasse embarked on the conquest of Jamaica. De Grasse’s fleet, however, was attacked and defeated at The Saintes by the united fleet of Rodney and Hood. This bloody battle ended France’s island-hopping campaign, for while they remained strong on land, thereafter the British controlled the seas.

Notes:

1. The Remembrancer, Vol. 14.

2. John Gilmary Shea (1864). The operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as described in two contemporary journals.

3. The 1st Foot lost 30 killed, 97 wounded, and 2 missing. The grenadier and light infantry companies of the 15th Foot lost 7 killed, 17 wounded, and 6 missing. The Royal Artillery detachment lost 1 killed, 10 wounded, and 5 missing. Prescott’s loss on January 28th was around 71 men. De Bouille stated his total loss was 13 officers and about 290 men.

4. The statement was allegedly made by Colonel Arthur Dillon; Captain Robert Manners was relaying a statement he received second hand; see Letters and papers of the Duke of Rutland.

5. David Hannay (1895). Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3.

6. Shea, ibid.

7. Shea, ibid; Hannay, ibid; Souvenirs du Cheavlier de Villebresme.

8. Souvenirs du Cheavlier de Villebresme (Translation is my own).

9. Shea, ibid; R. de Kerallain (1928). Bougainville à l’Armée du Cte de Grasse. Journal de la Société des Américanistes de Paris, 20, 1-70; Attaque et prise de Saint-Christophe dit le «Gibraltar» des Antilles (janvier-février 1782), in Revue Historique des Armées, Vol. 1, 1974. This article includes extracts from «Mémoires Secrets» de Bouillé. René Chartrand and Francis Back (1991). The French Army in the American War of Independence.

10. George Basil Mundy (1830). The life and correspondence of the late Admiral Lord Rodney, Volume 2.

11. Shea, ibid; Mundy, ibid.

St. Kitts (6): Battle of Frigate Bay

This is the sixth in a series of post on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, or Part 5].

Hood’s Plans

On January 25th, 1782, British Admiral Samuel Hood outmaneuvered French Admiral François-Joseph-Paul de Grasse and seized an anchorage in near Basseterre town on St. Kitts.

French reactions to this engagement were mixed. The French admired the tactical skill Hood had shown, but downplayed the importance of this engagement. According to one officer:

The most important anchorage for the English admiral, the only one decisive for raising the siege of Brimstone Hill… was that of Sandy Point; there, even under sail, he could have communicated directly with the fortress, he could have landed his troops under his guns, and been protected by them in case of attack; the place would never have been totally invested… and the position of the besiegers would have become very critical; on the other hand the vaunted anchorage [that Hood actually took]… was too far from the besieged place, and the English [infantry] corps was too weak to cut its way through to [the garrison]. [1]

It was true that if Hood had insisted on approaching Sandy Point he could have had a greater impact on the siege of Brimstone Hill. However, Hood’s decision making was influenced by two factors unbeknownst to the French. One was that that Brigadier-General Thomas Fraser of the British garrison had reported that reinforcements were not needed on Brimstone Hill. The other was that Hood was expecting the arrival of a British squadron commanded by George Brydges Rodney. This combined fleet (which Rodney would command) would give the British a decisive advantage over the French. Hood’s secure anchorage near Basseterre allowed him to balance the twin needs of being in supporting distance of the garrison while preserving his ships until Rodney’s arrival.

De Grasse Attacks

De Grasse was disappointed by the result of the action on the 25th, and he had no intention of allowing Hood to peacefully occupy an anchorage at St. Kitts. He chose to strike Hood’s fleet the morning of the 26th.

Hood anticipated an attack, and he specifically feared that the French would direct their ships against the front (eastern end) of his line, where they could use the windward position to their advantage. To protect this end, he rearranged his ships so that the line lay so close to shore that it was virtually unassailable.

The main part of the British line was in an east-west line (from east to west: Bedford, Russell, Montagu, St. Albans, Alcide, America, Intrepid, Torbay, Princessa, Prince George, Ajax, Prince William, Shrewsbury, Invincible, Barfleur). The rear ships lay in a line that curved to the north, towards Basseterre (from southeast to northwest: Monarch, Centaur, Belliqueux, Resolution, Prudent, Canada, Alfred). [2]

The rear ships abutted the 100-fathom depth line which prevented the French ships from anchoring near the British fleet. [3]

On the morning of the 26th, the French formed line of battle in the usual order (i.e., the reverse of that listed here, with Souverain in the lead) and sailed north, towards the British. De Grasse intended to strike the western extremity of the British line. However, the French ships sailed close to shore as they approached the British fleet, and thus the appearance of aiming for the eastern flank. De Grasse, it seems intended to suddenly turn and sail his ships across the length of the British line before closing with the western flank.

Whatever the merits of this plan, it was not carried out as intended. According to an eyewitness on Nevis, “The leading ship of the French [Souverain] stood on with amazing steadiness and resolution, and advanced considerably farther than the rest.” Perhaps Souverain was carried too far forward by wind and waves, or perhaps Souverain’s captain sought to make a name for himself. In any case:

“She [Souverain] kept on advancing till the fire of our line opened upon her, which seemed visibly to stagger her; the fire of the whole line opening in a manner at once, was truly awful; it resembled loud rolling thunder, and was incessant for nearly two hours. The whole French line followed their leader, but none came so near to the English line.” [5]

The Chevalier de Goussencourt concluded that this misaimed attack was a byproduct of infighting between de Grasse and his subordinates. He wrote sarcastically, “in consequence of the good will and affection entertained for the admiral, all efforts were turned to the centre of the [British] fleet” rather than the western flank, or rear. [1]

The French captains responded differently to this changed set of circumstances. According to the observer on Nevis, “the difference among them was very distinguishable… some luffing up and endeavouring to get as close as possible, while others apparently edged out of the heat of our fire.” [5]

----------------------------------------------------

De Grasse’s attack goes awry. The French vessels, with Souverain in the lead, come within range of Hood’s cannon. Ships of the line only are shown; positions are very approximate.

The French Attack. This painting depicts roughly the same events as the map above. The French vessels are sailing from at left. Nevis is in the foreground, and the "Narrows" separating St. Kitts and Nevis is in the middle ground. Brimstone Hill is faintly visible in the far distance at left (a flag appears above the summit and smoke billows from the British fortifications).

----------------------------------------------------

The ships in the British rear began shifting positions once it became apparent that they would come under attack. Captain William Cornwallis, commander of the Canada, was one of those in an exposed position. Seeing “the enemy’s fleet standing in with a press of sail, [we] were obliged to cut the cable…” Canada and the other vessels then began to work eastward, against the wind, to close with the rest of the fleet. [5]

According to de Goussencourt, the French attack did ultimately land hardest against the rear of the British line:

…we were fortunate enough, and our gunners expert enough, to handle the four rear vessels in the English line so severely that they were forced to weigh anchor under our fire, and could hardly have been more cut up than they were. As our ships passed the last English vessels they veered in the same order.

----------------------------------------------------

Battle of the 26th of January, 1782. Hood's fleet is anchored at left. The French ships (with sails unfurled) are shown turning back out to sea after passing the rear-most British vessels.

----------------------------------------------------

The attack killed and wounded many, but nothing of importance was gained. According to de Goussencourt, “This action was simply a brush, which lasted two hours, and amounted to nothing.” A fellow officer pronounced it a “farce” (facétie). [1]

De Grasse Attacks Again

De Grasse soon reformed his fleet; the much-battered Souverain was placed at the rear of the line. The French then made a new attack during the afternoon.

This time, the French attack landed squarely on the rear of the British line as intended. However, according to one of de Grasse’s officers, “only the head of the French line could come into action, and the wind prevented the action from becoming general.” [1] The eyewitness on Nevis recorded that these “six or seven of the French van attacked our rear; two of them seemed to us to luff up very gallantly, almost so as to double round” the British line.

The fighting, while limited in scope, was nevertheless intense. De Goussencourt claimed “we so harassed the English rear that Admiral Hood replaced the four rear vessels by others which had suffered less in the three engagements…”

Captain Robert Manners commanded one of these British ships (the Resolution), and later wrote:

One of their attacks was pretty severe, and fell mostly on our rear; we came off very well in point of men [Resolution’s losses in the three engagements totaled 5 killed, 11 wounded], but are much cut in the masts and rigging, having our bowsprit, all our lower masts, all our top masts, and all our top gallant masts wounded… [5]

The eyewitness on Nevis believed heavy fire from the British rear ships forced the French van to withdraw:

…the fire from our rear was now so terrible and particularly the Barfleur’s, that they soon bore away and stood up to the southward; when they lay-to for the night.

----------------------------------------------------

The final clash on the 26th. Ships of the line only are shown; positions are very approximate.

----------------------------------------------------

Once again, Hood’s fleet remained secure in its anchorage.

An officer with de Grasse commented,

We should have attacked again on the 27th, if the English squadron had not appeared out of reach of insult; the vessels cut up the day before were removed and eight or nine of the largest had taken their places. They were anchored, the bowsprit of one over the stern of the other; thus unattackable, the fleet contented itself with keeping them there. [1]

The British and French tallied up their losses from the several clashes. The British counted 316 killed and wounded, the French 314. [6]

Notes:

De Grasse’s clashes with Hood on the 25th and 26th have been termed the “battle of Frigate Bay,” but this appears to be a misnomer. Frigate Bay was mentioned in Hood’s report on the St. Kitts campaign, but in connection only with the events of January 28th-29th (to be described in the next two posts), not his battle with de Grasse. Maps of St. Kitts shows Frigate Bay to be only a concave section of coastline, east of Basseterre Town, and some miles distant from where de Grasse and Hood are thought to have clashed. Several histories of the campaign claim that Hood anchored his fleet off Green Point, and this is what I have shown on the maps I’ve prepared (it’s the western “bump” in the coastline near Hood’s vessels). I have not seen Green Point specifically mentioned in primary sources, but several illustrations of the St. Kitts campaign (e.g., the Lescalet painting) show the British fleet anchored near a point of land that appears to correspond with Green Point.

1. The journals of Chevalier de Goussencourt, and another, anonymous French officer, can be found in John Gilmary Shea (1864). The operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as described in two contemporary journals.

2. cf. William Laird Clowes et al. (1898). The royal navy: a history from the earliest times to the present, Volume 3. Isaac Schomberg (1802). Naval chronology...

3. cf. Clowes et al., ibid.

4. Journal of the capture and recovery of Nevis in Charles Ekins (1824). Naval battles, from 1744 to the peace in 1814.

5. The accounts by Captains Cornwallis and Manners can be found in David Hannay (1895) Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3

6. The commanders' reports can be found in the British Remembrancer, and the French Journal Politique for 1782.

St. Kitts (5): The Fleets Clash

This is the fifth in a series of post on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, or Part 4].

Hood’s Mission

Rear Admiral Samuel Hood learned on January 14th that the French were attacking St. Kitts. He and his fleet promptly left Barbados and sailed north for Antigua. En route he was joined by the Russell, which increased his fleet to 21 ships of the line. Hood noted that he had “nothing but flattering winds” on this voyage, but his ships faced “an ugly sea at times” and two ships lost a maintopsail yard and another additionally lost a main topmast and mizzen topmast. [1]

----------------------------------------------------

Hood’s Mission: January 14-24, 1782 (click to enlarge). This map shows Hood’s route from Barbados to Nevis January 14-24 (red line). Also shown is the path taken by the French fleet under de Grasse from Martinique to St. Kitts (January 5-11; blue line). Both paths are approximate.

----------------------------------------------------

On the 21st, Hood reached Antigua, where he was joined by the Prudent and a couple of lesser vessels. The British fleet then began to take on board provisions and part of the island’s garrison. The troops from the garrison included Brigadier-General Robert Prescott, the 28th Regiment of Foot, and the flank companies of the 13th Regiment of Foot. [2]

By the evening of the 23rd, preparations were complete, and the British fleet sailed out of St. John’s Harbour on Antigua, and anchored at sea. The French and British fleets were now about 60 miles apart.

Hood had probably learned that the French fleet at St. Kitts was, as one eye-witness put it, “formed [in] no regular line,” but rather were “in great confusion in Basseterre road, three or four deep.”

Hood’s intention, it seems, was to cross from Antigua to St. Kitts during the night, and to strike the French in Basseterre roadstead at daybreak. There, with the wind at his back, he would strike the eastern end of the French fleet. The rest of the French fleet would have difficulty coming to their assistance (they would be working against the wind). In this manner, he hoped to win a major victory before the French were ready for battle.

----------------------------------------------------

Rear Admiral Samuel Hood

----------------------------------------------------

The British sailed that night with 22 ships of the line in the following order of battle: [3]

Advance Guard (Francis Drake)

Alfred (74 guns), Alcide (74), Intrepid (64), Torbay (74), Princessa (74), Prince George (98), Ajax (74)

Center (Samuel Hood)

Prince William (64), Shrewsbury (74), Invincible (74), Barfleur (98), Monarch (74), Belliqueux (64), Centaur (74), St. Albans (64)

Rear Guard (Edmund Affleck)

Russell (74), Resolution (74), Bedford (74), Canada (74), Prudent (64), Montagu (74), America (64)

De Grasse’s Defense

The French had been expecting the British fleet for some days. The French commander, François-Joseph-Paul de Grasse, concentrated his fleet in Basseterre roadstead and used frigates and other, smaller vessels, as lookouts. The lookouts quickly spotted Hood’s departure from Antigua on the evening of the 23rd.

De Grasse then had to decide how he would face the British fleet. One option was to form a line of battle in Basseterre roadstead. As he had numerical superiority and occupied an excellent harbor, he should have been able to ward off any attempt to oust him. However, he thought this might not be the best position if Hood was determined to aid the British garrison on Brimstone Hill. Instead, it might be better to take to the open sea southwest of Basseterre. There, he would be windward of Hood’s ships and poised to maul the British while they lay close to shore. A third consideration was that he was expecting the arrival of supply ships and other reinforcements. If he remained at Basseterre he would be placing these vessels at grave risk of capture.

On balance, de Grasse decided it would be best to take to the open sea and await the British fleet. He planned to set sail the following day.

Hood Reaches St. Kitts

Hood’s daring plan to strike the French fleet in Basseterre roadstead was foiled before it could put into effect. The early morning hours of January 24th were “squally with rain” and by daylight the British fleet was near the south end of Nevis, but still far short of its destination. Also, one of Hood’s leading ship of the line (Alfred) had collided with one of his frigates (Nymphe) with the result that Alfred’s “fore topmast [was] down, and jib boom and sprit-sailyard gone,” and it appeared “much damaged about the bows…” Alfred was in no shape for immediate action, but, it was determined, the necessary repairs could be made in less than 24 hours. Having lost the advantage of surprise, Hood advanced cautiously towards St. Kitts.

The two advance-most British frigates (Lizard and Convert) in Hood’s fleet reached the western shore of Nevis far ahead of the ships of the line. A large French cutter (l’Espion), then just arriving from Martinique, mistook the British frigates for French ones and was promptly captured. The cutter was bringing to St. Kitts mortar shells and other ordinance, which the French could ill afford to lose.

That afternoon, the French fleet began to get underway, and headed south. At 10:00pm, Hood could see from the deck of his command ship (Barfleur) “20 strange vessels in the N.W., which proved to be the French fleet.” Neither commander sought battle at this late hour. Instead, the British sailed south, to a point near Isle Redondo, while the French drew closer to St. Kitts.

The Fleets Clash

The two fleets maneuvered during the night of January 24th-25th. Cannon discharges and rockets were used (at least among the French) to transmit signals in the darkness. Hood, by this time, had formed a new plan -- to take anchorage in Frigate Bay, a short distance southeast of Basseterre. Hood later called this “the only chance I had of saving the island, if it was to be saved.”

Specifically, Hood intended to gain a defensive position that would neutralize the French advantage in numbers. Ships at anchor could be carefully arranged into a defensive line that would be difficult to attack. Also, ships at anchor were relatively still and could fire with greater accuracy than those rolling on the open water.

Although Hood occupied the windward position (meaning that the winds favored his movements), a lunge towards Basseterre carried with it considerable risk. He would be placing his vessels between the French fleet and the rocky shores of St. Kitts and Nevis. Hood acted carefully before committing himself to this course of action. He later noted, “At daylight we plainly discerned thirty-three sail of the enemy’s ships… I made every appearance of an attack, which drew the Count de Grasse a little from the shore.” Close to midday, the situation appeared favorable to Hood – the main part of the French fleet was some 4 or 5 miles to the west and it appeared that the planned dash would be successful. Hood therefore ordered his fleet to sail north, hugging the coastline of the islands.

De Grasse had decided to concentrate on keeping his line of communications open and protecting the siege of Brimstone Hill. Not unaware that the Basseterre anchorage had been left vulnerable, he ordered François-Aymar, Baron de Monteil, “to hug the point of Isle Nevis” with the French “light squadron” (Caton, Hector, Sagittaire, and Experiment). As the British neared Nevis, de Grasse ordered the “light squadron and van… to bear down on the enemy’s [van].” The rest of the fleet followed “in a bow and quarter line.”

The French main body sailed in approximately the following order (note that the French were doubling back towards Nevis and consequently were in reverse order). [4]

Rear Guard (Louis-Antoine, Comte de Bougainville)

Pluton (74 guns), Bourgogne (74), Auguste (80), Neptune (74), Ardent (64), Scipion (74), Citoyen (74), Réfléchi (64), Glorieux (74)

Center (François-Joseph-Paul, Comte de Grasse)

Diadème (74), Northumberland (74), César (74), Ville de Paris (104), Sceptre (74), Saint-Esprit (80), Eveillé (64), Zélé (74)

Advance Guard (Jacques-Melchior, Comte de Barras)

Magnanime (74), Palmier (74), Jason (64), Marseillais (74), Duc de Bourgogne (80), Languedoc (80), Hercule (74), Souverain (74)

Contrary to de Grasse’s wishes, the light squadron did not contest the British advance. According to an officer with the French fleet,

…the French light squadron instead of continuing to bear down on the enemy, bore away. The admiral [de Grasse] surprised at this manoeuvre, thought that Nevis intercepted their wind [i.e., he thought that the mountainous island might have created a windless calm off its western shore]; to assure himself of it, [de Grasse] signaled [de Monteil] to lie to, which the squadron did; assured by this that it was by no fault of wind that they bore away, the admiral repeated his first signal to the squadron and the van; but it was too late... [5]

----------------------------------------------------

Hood’s Dash to St. Kitts (click to enlarge). Hood’s fleet passes the western end of Nevis en route to an anchorage off St. Kitts. De Grasse attempts to intercept Hood, while the light squadron, under de Monteil, bears away. Positioning of the British and French vessels is approximate. Ships carrying fewer than 50 guns are not shown.

----------------------------------------------------

The French then aimed at overtaking the center and rear of the British line (the British van was by now beyond their reach). However, the British vessels were moving too quickly and only the British rear found itself in real danger.

An eyewitness on Nevis described the engagement that followed:

About half-past two the Ville de Paris [de Grasse’s flagship]… fired about three single shots, probably to try the range of his guns; which were taken no notice of.

At about three o’clock the French Admiral began in earnest, seeming to direct his fire at the sixth ship from our rear [i.e., the Resolution]. He was immediately followed by about thirteen or fourteen of his ships nearest to him a-head and a-stern. This being returned by the six or seven or our rear, a most dreadful cannonade ensued, which spread by degrees to about the twelfth ship from our rear [i.e., Hood’s flagship, the Barfleur]. But the heaviest of the French fire fell on our last ships; for whose fate we trembled, as they had the fire of twelve or fourteen of the enemy on them at once; yet they never moved an inch out of line, but kept their stations and distances as steadily as if they had been at anchor; at the same time we could distinctly perceive they shot a-head of the enemy. [6]

At one point, de Grasse, aboard his flagship Ville de Paris, came close to cutting off the last three vessels in the British line (Prudent, Montagu, and America). According to Hood, “The Prudent had the misfortune to have her wheel shot to pieces [by] the first broadside”. Soon a gap began to develop between the Prudent and the vessel ahead (Canada), which the Ville de Paris attempted to exploit. However, Canada, followed by the vessels still further ahead (Resolution and Bedford) astutely slowed down and closed the gap.

The British Anchor

As the British vessels neared St. Kitts, they turned and anchored in line of battle in Frigate Bay. From this anchorage, some of the British vessels opened fire again as the French ships passed.

----------------------------------------------------

Hood Anchors (click to enlarge). Hood’s lead vessel (St. Albans) turns towards shore and anchors off of Green Point, on the southwest corner of St. Kitts. The following vessels anchor behind St. Albans, forming a line of battle. Meanwhile, the rear of the British fleet is engaged with the Ville de Paris and other French vessels. Some of the French ships, perhaps de Barras’ vessels, did not participate in this portion of the engagement. Positioning of the British and French vessels is approximate. Only ships of the line are shown.

----------------------------------------------------

A French officer, Chevalier de Goussencourt, glumly noted, “In spite of our fire, the English admiral managed his fleet so well that it anchored in our place with a spring on the cable, under our fire, without Mr. de Grasse preventing them” [5]. The French fleet turned and headed south for open waters. The last shots were fired around 5:30pm.

Only one British vessel was lost in this action, the frigate Solebay, which ran aground off Nevis at the beginning of the engagement. The observer on Nevis recorded that

Several French ships kept firing on her in this distress, and the Captain returned it; but, finding she must inevitably fall into the enemy’s hands, Captain Everett set fire to her and quitted her. She burnt for an hour or more, and blew up about eight o’clock with a most tremendous report; having 160 barrels of powder on board. [6]

The captain and his crew took shelter on Nevis.

----------------------------------------------------

Notes:

1. For primary accounts of Hood's actions during this period, see David Hannay (1895) Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3 and Charles Middleton (1907) Letters and papers of Charles, Lord Barham.

2. The 28th Foot saw significant action in the Thirteen Colonies earlier in the war, distinguishing itself in the storming of Chatterton’s Hill at the battle of White Plains (October 28th, 1776). The regiment was sent to the West Indies in the fall of 1778. There, the 28th had significant losses, chiefly from disease. The regiment’s strength was kept up my drafting into it the rank and file from other weak regiments (which were then sent home to recruit). The flank companies of the 13th Foot saw little or no combat prior to the St. Kitts campaign. Seven of the regiment’s battalion companies were captured in November, 1781, when the Marquis de Bouillé stormed St. Eustatius.

3. cf. William Laird Clowes et al. (1898). The royal navy: a history from the earliest times to the present, Volume 3. Isaac Schomberg (1802). Naval chronology...

4. cf. Odet-Julien Leboucher (1788). Histoire de la derniere guerre...

5. John Gilmary Shea (1864). The operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as described in two contemporary journals.

6. cf. Journal of the capture and recovery of Nevis in Charles Ekins (1824). Naval battles, from 1744 to the peace in 1814.

Shooting Cannonballs at Waterspouts

The French fleet commanded by François-Joseph-Paul de Grasse repeatedly came into mortal danger. Perhaps the most unusual danger was a waterspout encountered while the fleet was traveling from Virginia to Martinique. The "Chevalier de Goussencourt" described in his journal the novel manner in which they attempted to protect themselves:

"On the 15th [of November, 1781] we saw a water-spout, a very considerable mass of air and water in the form of a truncated cone, which pumps up the sea till the volume of water outweighs that of air, when it bursts. The volume of a spout, as I was assured by several intelligent seamen, is enough to swamp the largest vessels. We fired two cannon balls at it to break it, but did not succeed, as we were too far off."

Source:

John Gilmary Shea (1864). The Operations of the French Fleet Under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as Described in Two Contemporary Journals.